66 - Tubb V Griess - Digest PDF
66 - Tubb V Griess - Digest PDF
66 - Tubb V Griess - Digest PDF
GEORGE L. TUBB and WESLEY TEDROW, petitioners, vs. THOMAS E. GRIESS, respondent.
FACTS:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by George L. Tubb and Wesley Tedrow citizens of the United States but
residents of the Philippines, under written contract of employment with the Army of the United States. It appeals that
sometime between January 4 and January 13, 1947, as appearing in the "charge sheet" submitted by Thoma Griess,
Tubb and Tedrow were apprehended by the authorities of the United States Army and have since been held in custody.
On January 28, 1947, they were formally charged by said authorities with violations of Articles of War regarding
misappropriation of United States Government property destined for military use, said acts having been committed
within premises occupied by the United States Army under lease contracts. They now come before this Court alleging
that they are being unlawfully deprived of their liberty and that Philippine courts have exclusive jurisdiction over their
arrest, confinement and imprisonment because (1) they are not persons subject to military laws, and (2) martial law is
no longer enforced.
ISSUE:
WON the foreign army has jurisdiction over their person and the offenses charged against the petitioners
RULING:
YES. In the contract of employment entered into by Tubb and Griess with the United States Army, it is shown that they
voluntarily submitted themselves to United States military law while serving said contract, thereby submitting
themselves to the full extent of the authority of the United States Army in this area. This, coupled with the fact that both
are American citizens, makes their position during the subsistence of said contract no different from that of enlisted
men, enlistment after all being nothing more than a contract of voluntary service in the armed forces of one's country.
Petitioners then, in relation to the United States Army in the Philippines and during the subsistence of their employment
contract, can be deemed to possess the status of military personnel.
It is a settled principle of International Law that a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the
place. In applying this rule in the case of Raquiza vs. Bradford (75 Phil., 50), this Court held that "if a foreign army
permitted to be stationed in a friendly country, 'by permission of its government or sovereign,' is exempt from the civil
and criminal jurisdiction of the place, with much more reason should the Army of the United States which is not only
permitted by the Commonwealth Government to be stationed here has come to the islands and stayed in them for the
express purpose of liberating them, and further prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion, be exempt from the civil
criminal jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time covered by said agreement of the two Governments. By analogy,
an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period expires, would be
considered as a violation of this country's faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold. By exercising
it, paraphrasing the foregoing quotation, the purpose for which the stationing of the army in the islands was requested
or agreed upon may be hampered or prejudiced, and a portion of said military force would be withdrawn from the
control of the sovereign to whom they belong. And, again, by analogy, the agreement for the stationing of the United
States Army or a part of its forces in the Philippines implies a waiver of jurisdiction over their troops during the time
covered by such agreement, and permits the allied general or commander-in-chief to retain that exclusive control and
discipline which the government of his army may require."