Hamm (1982) Critique of Self-Education PDF

Critique of Self-Education
Author(s): Cornel Hamm

Source: Canadian Journal of Education / Revue canadienne de l'éducation, Vol. 7, No. 4 (1982), pp
. 87-106
Published by: Canadian Society for the Study of Education
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1494775
Accessed: 10-12-2015 00:58 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Canadian Society for the Study of Education is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Canadian
Journal of Education / Revue canadienne de l'éducation.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.237.29.138 on Thu, 10 Dec 2015 00:58:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Critique of Self-Education
Cornel Hamm
simon fraser university
An apparently new educational vogue under the name "self-education"(or sometimes

"challenge education")is gaining momentum in parts of Canada and the United States; it
purports to solve such major and perennial problems as student apathy, motivation to
learn, and "educationalrelevance."A critical look at the movement reveals that many of the
underlying ideas are re-emerging notions from so-called "progressive" and "radical"
education. Some new practices and techniques, however, are advocated. The move-
ment's scope allows for discussion under three broad interpretations of self-education.
When viewed as education of the self, self-education is a conceptual truth about all
education from which few, if any, conclusions for practice can be drawn. Viewed as
education about the self, self-education is a positive stride forward in helping students
adjust to adult society and the world of work, though as such it is not centrally concerned
with education. Viewed as education by the self, self-education advances techniques such
as self-teaching, self-direction, "walkabout,"and contract learning, all of which are inappro-
priate practices for purposes of general education. They are inappropriate because the
notions themselves are conceptually confused, because the practices are recommended
on the basis of false empirical assumptions and an inadequate conception of education,
and because the radical impact these practices may have on school and society has not
been, and likely cannot be, justified.
Une nouvelle tendance en education appelee "auto-education" (self education) (et

parfois "challenge education") gagne en popularite dans certaines regions du Canada et
des Etats-Unis. L'auto-education pretend resoudre des problemes a la fois serieux et
perpetuels tels que l'apathie chez les etudiants, le manque de motivation a apprendre et
la pertinence des matieres etudiees. Si l'on examine cette tendance de fagon critique, on
constate que les concepts qui la sous-tendent sont des notions empruntees '
lenseigne-
ment "progressif" et "radical" qui sont remises en evidence. Cependant, on preconise
egalement des techniques et des concepts nouveaux. Cette nouvelle approche considere
trois definitions de l'auto-education. Lorsqu'elle est consideree comme l'education de la
personne, l'auto-education est definie comme une verite inh6rente a tous les systemes
d'education et qu'on ne peut tirer de conclusions (ou tr6s peu) qui soient en faveur de
leur utilisation. Lorsqu'elle est consideree comme l'education concernant - ayant trait a -
la personne, elle est vue comme un pas en avant sur le plan de l'aide que l'on apporte aux
etudiants afin de leur permettre de s'adapter a la societe adulte, au marche du travail,
bien que ces domaines ne soient pas directement relies a l'education par la personne, elle
preconise des techniques telles que l'auto-formation, l'initiative personnelle, l'explora-
tion et le contrat d'apprentissage qui ne sont generalement pas indiques dans l'enseigne-
ment traditionnel. Car des techniques ne sont pas clairement definies, qu'elles sont
recommandees a partir de fausses hypotheses purement empiriques et a partir d'une
conception erronCe de l'education et enfin parce que l'impact que ces techniques
pourraient avoir sur l'ecole et la societe n'est pas encore, et ne peut probablement pas etre
justifie.
There is much to be admired in a "self-made" or "self-taught" man.

We admire him for his devotion, endurance, dedication, and intense
labour. He has, after all, achieved success as an artist, inventor,
business man, or whatever, without the help of criticism, advice,
direction, and stimulus of a teacher or master tradesman. But that is
87 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 7:4 (1982)
88 CORNEL HAMM
also why our admiration might well be tinged with a sense of pity.
We pity him for having so little help and having had to overcome such
great odds, "... for having been the devoted pupil only of that solitary and
untrained teacher, himself" (Ryle, 1967, p. 105). It is therefore puzzling
that suggestions of self-teaching, self-learning, self-direction, and other
activities characteristically engaged in by the self-made man, usually (but
not exclusively) under the rubric of"self-education," should be hailed as a
novel and remedial measure to correct the ills of the modern school.
Yet self-education is being advanced as an important recent educa-
tional development. Research into self-education is being conducted;
courses on the subject are being offered; a growing literature on the topic
is appearing. At Simon Fraser University, faculty time and effort as well as
Faculty of Education space have been devoted to the study of self-
education. Out of such studies there has emerged a private enterprise for
the continued study and dissemination of self-education ideas, known as
"Challenge Education Associates."' The Faculty of Education at Simon
Fraser University is also offering for credit experimental courses is
self-education. Apparently there has been an enthusiastic reception of the
notion by practitioners. This may be because of the extraordinary
promise it is said to have. Gibbons and Phillips, for example, claim that
"with a single, bold stroke" teachers and administrators will be able to
solve the many problems facing secondary schools, problems ranging
from fatalism and apathy to vandalism and drug abuse (Gibbons and
Phillips, 1980, p. 1-4). What is more, this movement in self-education
(challenge education) is reported to be uniquely distinguished as a
trend-reverser by being a major Canadian educational idea having an
impact on educational thought and practice in the United States. The
driving force behind the movement is Maurice Gibbons of Simon Fraser
University. He and his associates are also major contributors to the more
recent literature on self-education and related notions (Gibbons, et al.,
1970 to 1980).
Many of the themes discussed under the topic of self-education are not
unfamiliar to students of education. Indeed, most of them can be found in
one form or another in the so-called "progressive" and even "radical"
educational movements dating back to Rousseau. The emphases on
natural growth, freedom from constraint, individualization, practical and
palpable utility, self-direction and self-teaching, minimization of instruc-
tion and institutional authority, self-actualization, and self-discovery are
themes familiar to those who have read Rousseau, Dewey, Neill, Good-
man, Reimer, and Illich. Self-education proponents lean heavily also on
the works of psychologists such as Rogers, Maslow, and Perls in their
theory and practice for helping students gain self-control, confidence,
decisiveness (Gibbons, "Toward a Theory of Self-Directed Learning,"
1978). What is new in the recent literature is an attempt to tie together
these many themes into a coherent theory. This includes a series of
A CRITIQUE OF SELF-EDUCATION 89
techniques such as individualized instruction, the "walkabout," and

contract learning for implementing self-education. Interesting claims are
made about motivation to learn, ego development, and educational
worth. But it is not readily apparent what is meant by many of the claims,
what support they have in fact, and what justification there is for the
values on which they are predicated. This paper is, therefore, an attempt
to clarify what is (or could be) meant by the term "self-education," to
ascertain the status of the claims related to it in the hope of showing what
kind of support and evidence they require, and to determine what is new
and valuable about them.
What will be argued is, first, that self-education, when viewed as
education of the self, is a conceptual truth about all education and that
therefore the new movement is neither novel nor interesting nor the
radical new pedagogy warranted on that account. Second, when "self-
education" is viewed as education aboutthe self, the movement does make
good sense and has merit, but is not centrally concerned with education.
The initial plausibility of it rests on a false assumption about human
nature, growth, and development. Third, when self-education is viewed
as education by the self, the new movement draws false conclusions for
practice from conceptual confusions in the language of self-education,
reveals a lack of clear vision of the nature of education, and makes
unwarranted empirical and value assumptions. This analysis raises more
questions than it answers, but the attempt may serve to invite others tojoin
the debate before another vogue in education is established and publicly
embraced only to be discarded again with the swing of the pendulum
because it was poorly conceived and prematurely put into practice.
Since there is no generally accepted usage for the term "self-
education," the meaning attached to it must be derived from commonly
understood meanings associated with "self' and "education" and from
themes prominent in the emerging literature. Various and diverse
interpretations can be expected.
SELF-EDUCATION AS EDUCATION OF THE SELF
At least one interpretation of self-education is that education is by its very

nature a process of developing a "self," a "person." Though the average
layman would probably not have any such idea in mind when reference is
made to "self-education," it nevertheless could occur (and has occurred)
to reflective educational specialists that one sense of the term is centrally
concerned with the development of a person's awareness. The key to
understanding such an interpretation of self-education is understanding
what constitutes a person. A person, on this view, is someone who has
developed, or is developing, a mind; the hallmark of mind is conscious-
ness or awareness. That which distinguishes things with minds (such as
90 CORNEL HAMM
persons) from things without minds (such as machines, plants, and stones)
is the fact that the former are aware (have consciousness) while the latter
are not aware. Now the peculiar observation about consciousness is that to
be conscious is to be conscious of, or about, something. One cannot be
conscious of or about nothing. Even to be self-conscious is only to be aware
about what one is conscious of. Things about which one can be conscious
have to have an identity, a limitation, a parameter, distinguishing them
from the pre-cognitive web of experience. What, then, enables us to select
objects of consciousness? Concepts and propositions made up of con-
cepts. The very possibility of consciously experiencing anything is our
conceptualization of something. This conceptualization is not a private
affair. It is the central feature of acquiring a public language which is the
central notion of education. "The ideas and expectations of an individual
centre of consciousness ... do not develop as deposits out of an atomic
individual experience ... On the contrary, they are the product of
initiation of an individual into public traditions enshrined in the
language, concepts, beliefs, and rules of a society" (Peters, 1966, p. 48).
The process whereby a child is guided to an understanding of a public
language which marks out objects of consciousness in a public world is the
process of education. The process of education is thus tantamount to the
development of mind which is tantamount to the development of
persons. This conception of self-education thus turns out to be a
tautology. Education, by virtue of its meaning, could not be other than
education of the self.
From this logical truth proponents of self-education draw at least two
false conclusions. One is that mastery of curriculum content, based on
public forms of knowledge and experience, must be relinquished as an
educational goal. In the new pedagogy "teaching implies the assumption
that content, sequence of learning, structure of knowledge and learning
style are, or should be, individual and personal, and therefore cannot be
presented" (Gibbons, 1970, p. 36). The pursuit of personal goals is
encouraged and mastery of educational content discouraged. "Self-
education can only truly occur when people are not compelled to learn
and others are not obliged to teach them - especially not to teach them a
particular subject-matter curriculum" (Gibbons and Phillips, 1980, p. 4).
Why this recommendation? Because of two assumptions they make: (1)
that personal and private knowledge is possible; arid (2) that the
acquisition of public knowledge militates against the development of
selves. Both of these assumptions are false. As has already been alluded to
above, private language and hence private personal knowledge are for
logical reasons impossible, as Wittgenstein showed in PhilosophicalInvesti-
gations. Hamlyn similarly argues that, "the objectivity of a concept is
bound up with the idea that it must be inter-subjective, inter-personal,just
as knowledge is ... It is impossible to think of education and learning at all
except from a social point of view" (Hamlyn, 1967, pp. 39, 40). And for
the same reason the second assumption is false. Not only does public
knowledge not militate against development of the self; it is the only way
for a rational conscious person to develop. Peters notes that "all the
different options open to individuals are inescapably social in character ...
The plea for the development of selves is always to be understood within a
framework of shared valuations" (Peters, 1969, p. 7, 8).
The other false conclusion proponents of self-education draw because
of the conceptual link between education and the development of the
self is that teaching becomes largely unnecessary and undesirable. This
follows from their assumption about the nature of knowledge. But if that
assumption is false, then it is at least an open empirical question whether
or not teaching should be abandoned. It certainly does not follow from
the fact that all education is self-education (in the above sense) that
children should be self-directed, self-taught, and learn without the
benefit of teaching. To think so is falsely to conclude that an empirical
generalization follows from a conceptual truth. As interpreted above,
self-education is perfectly compatible with teachers teaching and children
learning, even in a very conventional manner.
Tautologies, however, need not necessarily be trivial. Frequently they
serve as important reminders about the genuine nature of a thing and
cause us to reflect on it. If the expression "self-education" serves to
remind teachers that their business is centrally that of developing
awareness in children through conceptual growth and understanding,
then the term serves a useful function. It points to the deleterious effects
of conditioning, manipulation, indoctrination, meaningless memoriza-
tion, and other forms of miseducation. It may be this emphasis that
underlies recommendations by Gattegno (1976) and others for teachers
to proceed the "silent way" or to "subject teaching to learning," suggesting
that there is little educational significance in teaching activities which do
not engage the conscious mind of the child. The term has another
valuable function - to remind us that the long-term goal of all formal
education is to encourage children and young people to acquire sufficient
mastery of educationally valuable subject matter and to acquire interest
and pleasure in its pursuit in order to continue that pursuit unassisted
once they leave the formal school setting. One of the most important
characteristics of the educated person is that he pursues worthwhile
activities by himself without being required by others to do so. We can say
then that the making of the "self-educating" person is the goal of all
formal education. But, of course, it does not follow that with this goal for
formal schooling children should become directors of their own educa-
tion. There is, strictly speaking, nothing startling or novel in "self-
education" when viewed as development of the self. Rather more,
however, is at stake on our second interpretation.
92 CORNEL HAMM
SELF-EDUCATION AS EDUCATION ABOUT THE SELF
On this interpretation (again a rather unusual one for the average

layman) the object of learning is the "self." The emphasis is on
self-knowledge. Such investigation into the self has a two-fold purpose.
The first is to discover something about the natural self for guidance in
self-education, ensuring that self-directed choices will be in accord with
one's true nature. The second purpose is to learn about the developed self
to enhance wisdom in career and life-style choices.
Now it should be readily apparent that if one accepts the view that
education is essentially the development of a person (Interpretation I),
then learning about the self (Interpretation II) is logically impossible to
achieve before I, because II presupposes I. One cannot learn about the
self if there is as yet no self to learn about. But following upon I, II does
have significance. To this we shall return shortly.
If one, however, does not accept I then self-education on the II
interpretation is either implicitly or explicitly based on some theory of
human nature, perhaps even a theory of a unique nature for each human
being. That there is such appeal to human nature theories is apparent in
the literature. Gibbons, for example, claims that the "model of self-
education ... draws on the natural forces of human development"
(Gibbons, 1978, p. 7). Elsewhere he refers to "activitywhich grow[s] out of
their [children's] lives," "clarification of our own inner directives,"
"inner-directed act[s] of will," "the will [which] must mature," and "the
process of self-education grow[ing] directly out of their [self-educated
people's] lives" (Gibbons, 1978). These phrases in themselves do not
articulate a clear view of human nature, but they do point to an
unexpressed reliance on the unique qualities of individuals to account for
their unique development. It is as though there is a force in each child
which guides its development along predetermined (almost genetic)
bents, inclinations, directions, fulfillments, and realizations. But the point
is not so much that self-education theories do in fact rely on an
unambiguous human nature theory as evident in the literature, but that
they must rely on it if they do not accept the theory of education as the
development of the self under interpretation I (or at minimum a
combination of I and II). If education is not the development of self
through the development of mind, then one must posit the self in advance
of the process of education, in which case the process of education is the
process of bringing to fruition what is already predetermined by nature.
The latter is, of course, the familiar growth model of education, so
fraught with difficulty precisely because it relies on unwarranted assump-
tions about human nature.
The problems with relying on human nature doctrines in education are
manifold and manifest. What we know about human nature is next to
nothing, unless it is that human nature is a potential only, a potential to
learn to choose to develop in infinitely various ways. Perhaps the only

useful thing we can learn from the study of human nature is something
about the extent and limitations of that potential, indicating the ranges
within which we can choose to become what we want to become. There is,
of course, some point in knowing what that range of potential is, since
what we want to become and ought to become we should be capable of
becoming. As Kant once noted, "The 'ought' implies the 'can'." But the
suggestion that there are specific characteristic qualities, states, condi-
tions, and achievements, toward which a human being (external social
influences aside) will naturally develop, and that an individual has a
unique set of such settled potentialities waiting to flower into a unique
natural personality, character, even career, is highly suspicious, if not
false. Indeed, it appears that what is human about human beings is not
"natural" at all, but rather something that is superimposed on our natural
state. Michael Oakeshott notes that, "A human life is composed of
performances, and each performance is a disclosure of a man's beliefs
about himself and the world and an exploit in self-enactment. He is what
he becomes; he has a history but no 'nature'" (Oakeshott, 1971, p. 44).
Clearly then education is not a matter of simply realizing our potential,
but it is the realization of a particular potential approximating the best of
human achievements. It is the understanding of our history, through
social experience and learning (usually by being taught by those who
know the history), that enables us to evaluate and choose what sort of
human beings we ought to become and what type of nature to strive
toward. The crucial decisions concern the direction of growth and the
normative ends of development (Scheffler, 1960, passim). All of us have
the potential to become a St Francis or a Hitler, but never both
simultaneously since they are mutually exclusive. All of this points to the
ineluctably normative nature of education. Human nature doctrines can
be relied on only in a very minimal sense as grounds for educational
judgment.
But as already noted, proponents of self-education need not be caught
in this problem. They might very well accept that education is initially and
fundamentally the development ofself, according to interpretation I, and
then argue that study about the self has merit after I has been achieved.
They could argue cogently that learning about the unique features of
oneself (unique because every individual has a unique combination of
social experiences and a unique history) through self-analysis or by
inference from systematic observation of one's own persisting interest,
bents, and proclivities is a practice which could contribute to self-
knowledge and the planning of a satisfactory life-style within the bounds
of social acceptability. This might even include psychiatric investigation
and forms of therapy and practices such as self-renewal.2 The question is
whether these practices are central to education as the development of
mind (which shall henceforth be called "general education," and the
94 CORNEL HAMM
pursuit of which it is assumed is the public school's main function) or

whether they are worthwhile adjuncts to public schooling. This is a
question of school and social policy. With respect to the latter (practices of
psychotherapy), this would depend on its established need and on the
ability and expertise of school teachers to engage in it, both balanced
against the still urgent task of providing general education. With respect
to the former (assisting young people in choosing careers and life-styles),
this would depend on age-level, previous success in achieving general
education, and again on professional expertise. This might indeed be an
area where the youngster is the sole or main authority. The only question
here is whether we need schools for this at all. It is not unreasonable to
try to assist young people in this regard under the auspices of the school.
With increased general knowledge of history, literature, and the social
sciences, increased flexibility in family and social arrangements, and
increased technology and occupational possibilities, there is a concomitant
increase in the potential for life goal options. Young people have, as a
result of this "future shock," an enormously difficult problem in deciding
what sort of life goals they should adopt, and the schools might profitably
assist them in acquiring information about themselves and their suitability
for certain life-styles and careers (Hamm & Daniels, 1979). But this is
expression of preference in social policy and school policy, not an
argument about what constitutes education. It could be viewed as an
additional charge to the public school, provided that schools are not
already overloaded and that their main function of providing general
education is not thwarted. Certainly one would hesitate to regard this as
sufficient reason to compel young people by law to attend school. But
given that we already have compulsory school attendance, justified in
terms of the overriding importance of general education, it could be a
reasonable extra burden to place on the schools. Perhaps, as Gibbons and
Phillips suggest, an educational institution has the responsibility to assist
young people in the transition from the protected environment of the
school to the world outside it; it might be a good idea "for students to take
responsibility for their last term or semester" (Gibbons and Phillips, 1978,
p. 300). It would seem to be a good idea under such conditions: (1) if the
requirements of minimum general education have been achieved; (2) if
certain students have reached the level of their ability even if the desired
minimum has not been achieved; (3) if for various reasons (including
inept teaching, lack of insight into the importance of general education,
administrators' confusion about the goals of public schools), the school is
not functioning as an educational institution;3 and (4) if conditions obtain
where a large majority of students need therapy of some sort. But such,
(one is tempted to say, peripheral) objectives and such techniques for
social adjustment and career preparation should not be confused with
education. A remedy to ease the pain of parturition does not constitute
the mainstay of educational nourishment.
But to construe self-education as this form of "education" aboutthe self

is possibly still to miss the main concern of its proponents. Indeed, the key
terms in the literature shift away from self-education to self-direction,
self-learning, and self-choosing in the educational program generally. The
emphasis is on the student choosing the matter and the manner of
education for himself. Accordingly, we will now take a closer look at
self-education conceived of as education by the self.
SELF-EDUCATION AS EDUCATION BY THE SELF
With this interpretation we confront the core recommendations of the

"self-educator." It is also an interpretation that most accurately reflects
ordinary usage. The emphasis is on the freedom of the student to choose
his own educational program. Superficially it appears that self-education
proponents have addressed and resolved some of the fundamental and
perennial problems in education concerning motivation to learn, the
relationship of teaching and learning, the paradox of freedom and
authority, and the balancing of individual and social demands. However,
a closer look at some of the main themes in the self-education literature
reveals that it is not at all clear what some of the terminology means, or if
clear, what consequences for education certain practices have, or what
reasons and evidence underlie the prescriptions. If self-education con-
ceived of as education bythe self is to become a coherent and viable public
educational policy it will need to untangle some serious conceptual
difficulties, to answer some basic questions about the nature of education,
and to justify its prescriptions insofar as they affect social concerns. A
clearer understanding of what self-education means and what it implies
for educational policy can be obtained from a closer examination of some
logical, educational, and social and moral considerations.
Some logical considerations

A number of the key terms in the language of self-education literally do
not make sense. Their analysis reveals that they are used to make some
rather simple, but also highly questionable, claims.
Self-teaching
Proponents of self-education make much of the notion of self-teaching.
But is this logically possible? One cannot teach if one is not able in some
way to display the subject matter to be learnt. If one does not know that
subject matter, then one is unable to teach oneself. If one does know the
subject matter, then it is not only pointless to teach oneself, but it becomes
impossible to do so because one cannot learn what one already knows. If
one does not know the subject matter, it is still possible to learn it, say from
experience or trial and error, but that is not teaching unless one
mistakenly equates teaching with learning. But why then would propo-
96 CORNEL HAMM
nents of self-education recommend self-teaching if it is logically impossi-

ble? One can only assume that they believe it to be desirable that children
should not have subject matter displayed to them. And why should this be
so? Several answers consistent with self-education theory suggests them-
selves. One is that teaching requires choice of subject matter to be taught.
That is, teachers must perforce make a judgment about what is to be
taught. And this means that teachers must make value judgments about
what is good for children to learn. Proponents of self-education want to
escape making this value judgment. But, as we shall see below, it is
impossible to escape making this most difficult of all education judg-
ments. Another possible answer is that children will more effectively and
reliably learn subject matter when the subject matter is not displayed to
them. One is reminded here of the "learning to learn" and "learning by
discovery" slogans. The alleged effectiveness and reliability of such
methods still need to be demonstrated on empirical grounds. It is highly
doubtful that the claims can be supported (Dearden, 1976, pp. 69-83). So
what the self-teaching notion boils down to is the simple unsupported
recommendation that children should not be taught.
Self-direction
Another key term favoured by proponents of self-education is "self-
direction." The problems with this notion are similar to self-teaching. For
self-direction to be logically possible it is necessary for the individual to
have knowledge of the direction (goal or objective) together with the
wisdom to select the appropriate direction. If an individual has this
knowledge and wisdom he does not need to be (cannot benefit from)
direction. If such knowledge and wisdom are absent, then it is impossible
to give good guidance and direction. So what then is being recommended
by proponents of self-direction? Simply that children should not be
directed. Why not? Perhaps, as before, there is unwillingness or inability
to make rationaljudgments about what are suitable directions for children
and young people. This might make a fair amount of sense with respect to
directing young people in pursuit of leisure activities or career goals. But
is that to be extended to judgments about educational goals? Are
proponents of self-direction really that bankrupt with respect to educa-
tional vision? It seems fair to say that that is precisely so, as will be argued
below. Or perhaps the claim that children should not be directed is meant
to solve the motivational question in education such that if children
choose a direction to follow they will be motivated to follow it through. If
so, then a caution is warranted. The solution to the motivation problem in
education is not allowing children to choose what they want to do. Being
motivated to do what one wants is either a tautology or not a problem.
Instilling in children the desire to pursue what is in their interest to
pursue when they lack that interest initially is the motivational problem in
education.
Self-learning
Another emphasis in self-education is self-learning, or learning on one's
own4. This notion is, as we shall see, very similar to the recommendation
that children should not be taught, discussed under "self-teaching." Two
obvious questions must be asked in this connection. Can one learn on
one's own? If one can, should one? The answer to the first question is
puzzling since, on the one hand, it seems obvious that one must learn on
one's own. This follows from the truism that I learn what I learn; no one
can ever learn for anyone else. Learning is always done by the agent
involved. In this sense the phrase "on my own" is strictly speaking
redundant. On the other hand, it seems obvious that I could never learn
on my own without external stimuli of some sort. It is doubtful that any
learning could take place without assistance from something or someone
in the environment.5 So it seems inevitable that one learn on one's own as
well as with external assistance. It would appear that proponents of
self-education see a contradiction in this, as though there is a contradic-
tion in the learner learning on his own, on the one hand, and the learner
being taught by a teacher on the other. Caught in this dilemma they opt
for the learner learning on his own. There is, however, no contradiction.
The puzzle results from a confused notion of teaching and learning.
Learning is, at least, absorbing things into the mind; it is more than merely
parroting words and formulae. Real learning no teacher can ever do for
students. Students must do it on their own. It is both surprising and
dismaying to observe many otherwise well-informed teachers and teach-
ers of teachers drawing false conclusions from this simple truth. They
err in assuming that if it is the student who learns (acquires the belief, the
skill, the critical attitude, etc.) then the teacher can do little, if anything, to
bring that learning about. Or if the teacher is successful in teaching, then
it somehow follows that students could not actually have learned with
understanding. It is almost as if they cannot or will not accept that
teaching can result in learning that contributes to the student's under-
standing. Yet a teacher can say things or manipulate the environment to
make it highly likely that the student will learn what the teacher intends.
Learning on one's own is perfectly compatible (Ryle, 1967, p. 105-119)
with teaching of various kinds. So if there is no paradox, why then is
learning on one's own recommended? The phrase seems a plea for
genuine and thorough learning, and no one would wish to quarrel with
that. This, however, is neither new nor fraught with any implication that
children choose the content to be learned and learn it without the help of a
teacher.
This takes us to the consideration of the second question, if one can
learn on one's own, should one? We have seen that one can, that one must,
and that this is compatible with good teaching. In light of the above, the
question does not concern the presence of assistance in learning, but its
quantity; it does not concern the existence of a learning environment, but
98 CORNEL HAMM
the kind of environment - a planned and manipulated one or an

unplanned and random one? Planned by whom? For what purpose? With
what justification? Is it suggested that only that content chosen by the
child is worthwhile for him to learn? How does one justify that? We have
seen that there can be no influence-free learning or child rearing. Human
beings just are not hermetically sealed off from their environment. Is it
assumed that random exposure to the environment based on children's
whims and short-term interests as influenced by peers, parents, business,
or television is superior to the planned exposure by thoughtful concerned
teachers? If indeed this informal environment is richer in experiences
and sources of learning motivation than the formal school, then one
might well be advised to let the child plan his own curriculum or at least let
noneducationists take charge. But if that is so, it may amount to the
strongest indictment yet of our school teachers and curriculum planners.
Self-choosing
Another logical consideration pertains to the notion of choosing. The
specific question is this: if children are to choose both the manner and
matter, means and ends of education, can they do this? Is education not
presupposed by choice? If choosing is to be taken as something more than
opting, as in the case of throwing dice or pulling a card, then the
information describing the alternatives and the criteria for intelligent
selection are presupposed (Hamm, 1971). Simply put, the dilemma is this:
how does a student choose to learn X rather than Y unless he has
knowledge of X and Y and some reason to select one over the other. If
one has knowledge of X and Y and the reason to select one over the other,
then one does not need to (cannot) learn about X or Y since one already
knows them. But if one does not have the knowledge, then the decision is
not of genuine choice, but mere option. The recommendation that
children choose independently, then, almost amounts to the suggestion
that children opt rather than rationally choose. Almost, but not quite.
Children, depending on their age and experience, will be able to make
better or worse choices according to their partial knowledge and insight.
And it seems reasonable that they should not be prohibited from making
free choices in many aspects of their lives, even if they choose unwisely.
There is much to be said for children learning about their own power of
choice and their own effectiveness in making an imprint on the world,
even if it means learning from their mistakes. This is particularly true in
helping them to take responsibility (in the moral sense of that term) for
their actions. But that is a very risky stance to take with respect to children
choosing their own curriculum. It might be argued that even though a
child does not fully know the X and Y about what he should learn he still
has some vague idea and curiosity concerning them. But is a vague
impression sufficient grounds to make important judgments about
educational value? One must again ask why curiosity aroused by television
advertisement,business and peer pressure, or random social experience

is to be preferred over curiosityaroused by parentsand teacherswith the
long-range interest of the child in mind.
Responsibilityfor action
Proponentsof self-education also recommend that students take respon-
sibilityfor their education. And indeed, why not? But acceptanceof this
principle does not imply policies of self-direction and learning without
teaching. Such policy recommendations trade on the ambiguity of the
term "responsible."It can mean causalresponsibilityin Aristotle'ssense of
"efficient cause" as when one initiates action and takes courage to
perform. Or it can mean upright and morallywise, with connotationsof
bringing to bear knowledge, thoughtfulness, and intelligence. Respon-
sible choice in the former sense does not imply responsiblechoice in the
latter. Even though a person might take full responsibilityin the former
sense for the courageous action of quitting school at age thirteen, it does
not follow that the choice is responsible in the second sense. Thus a
student who does his homework dutifully until he has mastered the
minimum requirementsof general education, accordingto parentaland
teacher advice, could be deemed more responsible (in both senses) than
the quitter.
Nevertheless, we do, apparently meaningfully, use such terms as
"self-taught,""self-directed,""learningon one's own,""beingresponsible
for one's learning." Why? Precisely to indicate that we are not being
instructed,guided, directed, or compelled by a professionalteacher. We
are, in a peripheral and metaphorical sense, being "taught by the
environment,"by others with whom we communicate,by booksand films,
etc., all of which are of our own choosing. But intelligenceand wisdomin
our choosing presupposes knowledge, wisdom, and experience. The
question is: how much knowledge and experience? This is the classical
problem of freedom versus authorityin education. Given that educators
by and large accept the moral principle that one should not interfere
unwarrantedly with another human being doing what he wants, the
problem in education is determining what is warranted given that
children and young people (depending on age and sophistication)lack
the knowledge and experience necessary for civilized social life. Clearly
the two extremes of absolute freedom and absolute imposition are
unwarranted.No one in his right mind would suggest leavingan infant in
a crib to fend for itself on the grounds that interference is morally
prohibited. Nor could one rationallysupport the view that adults ought
permanently to remain under the tutelage and authority of any other
adult. This issue is one of degree. Self-education proponents clearlyare
opting for a reduction in the level of sophisticationrequiredbefore young
people are given the freedom to determine their futures. But why? Is it
because they have, correctly, observed that schools are not doing an
100 CORNEL HAMM
adequatejob of education? Because children are bored? Because adminis-

trators are confused? Because good teachers are hard to come by? And if
that is so, is the solution not to do a betterjob of education? Or is it because
they do not know what "better" means? That they lack a clear understand-
ing of the nature and value of education. Probably so. That is why it is
important to remind ourselves of what education is all about.
Some educationalconsiderations
In the present context it is not possible to do more than sketch a brief
outline of the major criteria for education in order to show what
education is not. Despite the fact that unreflective people still fail to
distinguish between education and going to school, between education
and general child rearing, between education and socialization, between
education and career training, it is becoming apparent to those whose
business it is to reflect on the nature of education that something more
specific and more important is represented by the term "education." It
represents, first, the initiation of new-born members of a society into
those elements of the society's culture that are deemed most valuable.
Education, then, is a normative concept. If that is so, it will by no means be
possible for self-education advocates to escape the task of making value
judgments for children. Given that children are born ignorant and
dependent, nature has left us no alternative to some form of paternalism.
Even to allow children in schools - wisely or unwisely - to pursue their
whims and interests is to make a valuejudgment, thejudgment that those
whims and interests are of equal worth to whatever a teacher has to offer.
But, as might be expected, "self-educators" do not (because they cannot)
follow through with their theory. Thus they define the self-educated
person as one who has "become expert in any socially acceptedfield of
human activity" (Gibbons, et al., 1980, p. 5). If they had explored further
why some activities are not only "socially accepted" but "socially accept-
able," then identified whatever principles would guide students to make
rational choices, they would have revealed some understanding of
education's implications. But with no criteria for success in education,
they have no way of distinguishing between those who are successfully
educated and those who are merely successful in some walk of life though
not necessarily educated. The models of the successfully "self-educated"
chosen by "self-educators" for study include H. L. Mencken and Eric
Hoffer as well as Will Rogers and Muhammed Ali (Gibbons, et al., 1980).
But if the proponents of self-education carried through with their
insistence to not make value judgments, they would have no reason to
exclude as models of self-education such achievers as Hitler, Charles
Manson, and Jim Jones of Jonestown.
But genuine education represents more than the value judgment to
transmit what is the most worthwhile in our culture. It represents, also, an
understanding of the principles of rational thought. There is an internal
logical connection between education and rationality and between both of

these and knowledge. This is not the occasion to explore this in detail; it
will have to suffice for now to note that education necessarily requires
mastery of a great deal of knowledge - not merely isolated bits of
free-floating inert knowledge, but knowledge in a breadth and depth,
with understanding and corresponding attitudes and sensitivities to-
gether with a sense of their distinctiveness and inter-relatedness. As such
it represents a mastery of extant conceptual schemes around which
experience and knowledge are structured as well as mastery of various
ways of testing for knowledge and of organizing facts. These modes of
knowledge and experience - logic and mathematics, physical sciences,
history and the social sciences, aesthetics, morality, and possibly others -
are the fundamentals of man's cultural achievement. They are embedded
in our language, our traditions, our institutions; they are public in
character, and represent the ingredients for the development of mind
(Peters, 1966). This is also not the occasion for presenting an argument
for the value of such rational pursuits. But it should be observed that
education thus conceived is consistent with and necessary for rational
autonomous agency, an ideal that few would disavow and probably none
could rationally argue against. It is also important to note that from such a
conception of the ultimate aims of education very little is implied for
detailed curriculum planning and teaching methodology. That is why it
does not easily fit into the untenable "liberal versus conservative" or
"progressive versus traditional" dichotomies. Hirst and Peters observe
that "... if we examine carefully the character of the central objectives
sought by progressives, we find that they, as much as those sought by
traditionalists, are necessarily related to the acquisition of certain funda-
mental forms of what we have loosely called public modes of experience,
understanding, and knowledge" (Hirst and Peters, 1970, p. 60).
Now the question to be faced regarding the issue of freedom in
education is this: how much of this tradition shall children be initiated
into, with compulsion if necesary, before we allow or encourage them to
choose for themselves? How much is necessary if they are to choose
wisely? Clearly if our intention is merely for them to cope as useful
members of society and stay out of trouble we would ask for much less
than if we wished for their full participation in the richest aspects of our
cultural achievement - not only to participate with style, humour,
sensitivity, and imagination, but also to criticize and correct its weaknesses
and build upon its strengths. Perhaps the better way to pose the question
is: how much of this cultural inheritance can children rightfully demand
in virtue of their human potential for fully developed minds?
The key issue is how much of and which elements of the cultural
heritage should children acquire before striking out on their own. "What
shall we teach our children?" is the single most important question in
education. Yet on this important question proponents of self-education
102 CORNEL HAMM
are peculiarly noncommital. They emphasize "process" instead of "con-

tent" and advocate letting children themselves decide the issue. It seems
that a significant increase in children's freedom is the most important
recommendation of self-education proponents, freedom not only how to
learn but what to learn. But they are strangely silent concerning the
grounds for this recommendation. Is the recommendation based on the
assumed empirical truth that learning increases and social behaviour
improves as a result of acquiring a sense of determining one's destiny by
being allowed to choose for oneself? If the claim is true, it could be an
important finding in enhancement of school performance. But it also
raises some moral problems. Children can easily be led to believe they
have made free choices when in fact they have been manipulated by skil-
ful teachers or clever advertisers or persuasive peers. Is such deception
justified? And is there not a deception in the suggestion that teachers "set
expectations," "help students to explore alternative activities," "provide a
general program structure," "setting realistic goals and deadlines"
(Gibbons & Phillips, 1978, p. 298) and so on, while letting students think
they are making the important decisions? Is this more than merely an
aura of freedom? If one is not by those techniques attempting to convey
the sense of freedom without actually granting the freedom, there is little
difference between it and conventional teaching. If it is genuine granting
of freedom of choice to children then the question of justification looms
large again. The suggestion that self-education teachers should teach
children to be self-directed and to choose wisely, it would appear, cannot
function as a justification either. Of course it is not being argued that we
should not teach children to choose wisely. What is being argued is that to
teach children to choose wisely is precisely to initiate students into the
public concepts, knowledge, rules, traditions, in terms of which alterna-
tives are recognized and wisdom is articulated. And is this not precisely
what teacher-directed education attempts to do? Even if it doesn't,
shouldn't it? It may very well be that the route to freedom, independence,
and autonomy is constraint, dependence, and heteronomy. This appar-
ent contradiction, this paradox of all education, is not simply resolved by
assuming without warrant that the route to autonomy is free choice.
Indeed it might be said that self-education errs by mistaking the means
for the end as neo-progressivists so often do - making "no distinction
between the characteristics of an ideal end-product and the characteristics
of the process that is supposed to lead to such a product" (Egan, 1980, p.
200).
Social and moral considerations

It must not be thought that self-education is simply an improved, new
technique for achieving familiar and recognized educational objectives
for the public school. Instruction in educationally valuable subject matter
has historically been entrusted to the school as its primary function.
Self-education represents a major shift in such objectives. With its
emphasis on adjustment to the community, preparation for occupational

skills, limiting instruction, removal of compulsory curriculum, it envis-
ages the school as a multi-functioning institution embracing a host of
social problems. In it the student - together with the parent as guide, the
teacher as facilitator, and the community as resource - would be
encouraged to select randomly from within our culture whatever interests
him and is suitable for career and social success. Self-education, in fact,
takes huge strides toward the deschooling, or at least the deeducation, of
society. But even if self-education proposals for quasi-real encounters
with the real world may solve some of the current discontents, such as
lowering crime rate, drug abuse, apathy, and wasted time, none of this
does what the formalized study in subject matter is supposed to do
(Broudy, 1978, p. 22). Broudy argues that such formalized study has
many advantages, including providing contexts in which situations and
problems in life are made intelligible, encouraging acquisition of trans-
ferable and generalizable knowledge, enhancing opportunity to tran-
scend local bias and class culture, and advancing democratic egalitarian-
ism (Broudy, 1978, passim). To give up these and other benefits of form-
alized study through the process of self-education is to modify radically
the function of the public school. "Such shifts and gross modification of
function are not to be taken lightly and are often opposed because they
threaten the social order" (Broudy, 1978, p. 19). Obviously the school as a
social institution in a democracy can change its function as times and
needs change. But it would seem morally inappropriate for teachers and
teachers of teachers, either deliberately or in ignorance, to embark upon
such a major shift in objectives for the public school and to implement
radical practices resulting in major social change without first engaging in
full public discussion of the issues involved and without first gaining
public concurrence and assent.
There is, too, the possibility that self-education can become a form of
self-deception. As such the practice of self-education is crudely outlined
in the following scenario: (1) In the interest of freedom, self-education is
desirable. (2) Teacher-directed activities, such as planning a curriculum
and instructing, are abandoned in favour of student-directed activities.
(3) Because teachers do not teach, the student is bored, restless, suffers
from malaise, is socially apathetic or destructive, remains ignorant, feels
unduly compelled, lacks a sense of achievement. (4) It is better for such a
student to leave school to repair cars (or something else) than to waste
time in school. (5) The student's choice to repair cars (or whatever else he
directs himself to do) relieves the boredom and the frustration (resulting
from pointless compulsion), improves his self-image, and gives him a
sense of worth; he becomes socially useful and adjusted; there is
transference from this experience in self-help to other areas of social life.
(6) This is proof that self-education works. In this scenario the disease is
invented so the favorite remedy can be applied. More often perhaps the
malady is the result of teaching ineptitude and curriculum planners' lack
104 CORNEL HAMM
of good judgment. In any case, one does not need the remedy when the
pathology does not exist; with careful reflection on the nature and
purpose of education, with sound practical judgment, and with imagina-
tive teaching the pathology need not occur. Self-education most surely
addresses a serious contemporary problem in that it helps young people
with social and personal adjustment and with career preparation. But
these concerns are not centrally educationalconcerns.
CONCLUSION
In the search for the meaning and significance of "self-education," it has

been suggested that issues surrounding it can usefully be explored by
viewing self-education under three broad interpretations. When self-
education is viewed as education of the self, the term is a tautology, since
education is conceived of as the development of the self. Self-education so
conceived has no direct implications for teaching methodology. Indeed,
as suggested, it is quite compatible with conventional teaching.
When self-education is conceived of as education about the self,
reference is made to an individual learning about himself, about his
talents, interests, and career potential. Based on the emerging literature
on self-education, one must conclude that part of the program involves a
recommendation that schools engage in this practice to cure the ills of
educationally deprived young people. Reference is usually made to the
teenager who has failed in school, suffers from malaise and boredom, is
socially troublesome, lacks a wholesome self-image, and is a candidate for
unemployment. To acquire a sense of worth and achievement in some
socially useful career skill, they are encouraged to follow independent
pursuits with the guidance and approval of an adult. This is obviously a
worthwhile endeavour. Yet, as has been suggested, it does not amount to
an education, though it can become an important adjunct to public
schooling. In fact, the problem can be solved by better teaching and less
confused administration. That part of the problem which is not attribut-
able to failure in education is the matter of helping young people,
including those who achieve success in general education, to adjust from
the school world to one of work. This is another worthwhile endeavour
self-educators emphasize, yet this is not in fact education per se that is
central, but an aspect of schooling usually considered counselling.
When self-education is viewed as education by the self, we refer to the
student himself making the important decisions concerning the content
and manner of his education. So viewed it is not merely a new technique
for achieving recognized educational objectives, but rather a disguised
prescription for general school practice with an altered perspective on
educational and social values. Yet it fails to live up to a full-fledged theory
of education. It lacks foundational underpinnings. As a theory to
determine the objectives of the school as a social institution, it lacks social
and moral justification; as a theory about the worthwhile objectives in

general education, it lacks a set of criteria for judging what is education-
ally worthwhile. As a theory of learning, it fails to spell out just what is to
be learned, when, and how; as a theory of motivation, it fails to specify the
object of interest. As a theory of ego-development through successful
achievement, it fails to spell out the criteria of success. But perhaps this
failure to specify clear criteria is antithetical to the whole notion of
self-education, since such specification would require teacher-direction
and thus undermine its central tenet of student-direction. One could note
too, the contradictory nature of some recommended practices of self-
education. Should one be compelled by law to withdraw from home and
society to attend an institution specifically for learning (presumably),
only to be required by that same institution to return to community and
society to choose for oneself what and how to learn? Compulsory
education without compulsory curriculum surely does not make much
sense. Unless these theoretical and practical difficulties are somehow
resolved, self-education could quickly end as an outmoded fad and
discarded jargon.
Yet there is, on the face of it, a healthy sentiment in the language of
self-education, even if its theory and practice are questionable. The
impetus to great deeds, successful careers, exploited talent, personal
fulfillment springs from the spirits of people who control their own
destiny. To seek to unleash such power for achievement in their students
has long been the dream and ideal of all true educators. But they differ
from self-educators in that their methods seek to minimize the chance
involved in such achievement. In gaining the ability to control one's own
destiny one must submit to the slow and painstaking process of acquiring
knowledge through discipline. To achieve this discipline by chance, as
proponents of self-education seem to propose, is also to leave to chance
the achievement of the ideal, except perhaps for the few with extraordi-
nary luck and talent.
NOTES
The name "challenge education" is sometimes used interchangeably with "self-

education", sometimes it refers to a sub-theme within it.
2
Note how these practices pre-suppose education. A psychiatrist, who "educates" an
individual about himself, relies on his client's perception of himself and of the world;
"self-renewal" preys upon the vision of a formerly satisfactorily developed "self." There is,
too, the additional legal and moral problem of obtaining consent to be psychoanalyzed.
3 A better solution would be to remove those
inadequacies.
4 The same could be said in connection with "thinking on my own," "acting on my own,"
"choosing on my own," etc.
5
Philosophers making logical connections in an armchair or a Buddhist contemplating self
might be exceptions, although even these inner activities are based on prior external
stimuli.
106 CORNEL HAMM
REFERENCES
Broudy, H. S. Smoothing the way from school to society. In R. W. Tyler (Ed.), Fromyouthto
the constructive adult life: The role of the public school. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan
Publishing Corp., 1978.
Dearden, R. F. Problemsin primaryeducation.London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.
Egan, K. Education and psychology:Plato, Piaget, and scientific psychology.Burnaby: Simon
Fraser University, Faculty of Education, 1980. (Unpublished book)
Gattegno, C. Commonsense of teachingforeign languages. New York: Educational Solutions
Incorporated, 1976.
Gibbons, M. What is individualized instruction? Interchange, 1970, 1(2), 28-45.
Gibbons, M. Walkabout: Searching for the right passage from childhood and school. Phi
Delta Kappan, 1974, 55(9), 596-602.
Gibbons, M. The new secondaryeducation: A Phi Delta Kappa taskforce report.Bloomington,
Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, 1976.
Gibbons, M. The process of self-education: A model of inner-directed learning. North
Vancouver: Challenge Associates, 1978.
Gibbons, M., Bailey, A., Comeau, P., Schmuck, J., Seymour, S., & Wallace, D. Toward a
theory of self-directed learning: A study of experts without formal training. Journal of
HumanisticPsychology,1980, 20(2), 41-46.
Gibbons, M., Norman, P., & Phillips, G. The self-directing professional. North Vancouver:
Challenge Education Associates, 1980.
Gibbons, M., & Phillips, G. Helping students through the self-education crisis. Phi Delta
Kappan, 1978, 60(4), 296-300.
Gibbons, M., & Phillips, G. Unlimited Potential: The case for negotiated learning contracts.
NASSP Bulletin, 1979, 63(431), 55-6.
Gibbons, M., & Phillips, G. Teaching for self-education: Promising new professional role.
TheJournal of TeacherEducation, 1979, 30(5), 26-28.
Gibbons, M., & Phillips, G. Self-education: The process of life-long learning. North
Vancouver: Challenge Education Associates, 1980.
Hamlyn, D. The logical and psychological aspects of learning. In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The
conceptof education.London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
Hamm, C. The logic of choice and implications for moral education. TheJournalof Education
(University of British Columbia), 1971, 17 (April), 71-91.
Hamm, C., & Daniels, L. B. Moral education in relation to values education. In D. Cochrane,
C. Hamm, & A. C. Kazepides (Eds.), The domain of moral education.New York: Paulist
Press and The Ontario Institute for the Study of Education, 1979.
Hirst, P. H., & Peters, R. S. The logic of education.London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
Oakeshott, M. Education: The engagement and its frustration. Proceedingsof thePhilosophyof
Education Societyof GreatBritain, 1971, 5(1), 43-76.
Peters, R. S. Ethics and education.London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.
Peters, R. S. (Ed.) Perspectiveson Plowden. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.
Ryle, G. Teaching and training. In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The concept of education. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
Scheffler, I. The language of education. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher,
1960.
Cornel Hamm is an Associated Professor in the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser

University, Burnaby, British Columbia V5A is6.

Hamm (1982) Critique of Self-Education PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hamm (1982) Critique of Self-Education PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Hamm (1982) Critique of Self-Education PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Critique of Self-Education

Author(s): Cornel Hamm

An apparently new educational vogue under the name "self-education"(or sometimes

Une nouvelle tendance en education appelee "auto-education" (self education) (et

There is much to be admired in a "self-made" or "self-taught" man.

87 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 7:4 (1982)

techniques such as individualized instruction, the "walkabout," and

SELF-EDUCATION AS EDUCATION OF THE SELF

At least one interpretation of self-education is that education is by its very

SELF-EDUCATION AS EDUCATION ABOUT THE SELF

On this interpretation (again a rather unusual one for the average

learn to choose to develop in infinitely various ways. Perhaps the only

pursuit of which it is assumed is the public school's main function) or

But to construe self-education as this form of "education" aboutthe self

SELF-EDUCATION AS EDUCATION BY THE SELF

With this interpretation we confront the core recommendations of the

Some logical considerations

nents of self-education recommend self-teaching if it is logically impossi-

the kind of environment - a planned and manipulated one or an

advertisement,business and peer pressure, or random social experience

adequatejob of education? Because children are bored? Because adminis-

logical connection between education and rationality and between both of

are peculiarly noncommital. They emphasize "process" instead of "con-

Social and moral considerations

emphasis on adjustment to the community, preparation for occupational

In the search for the meaning and significance of "self-education," it has

and moral justification; as a theory about the worthwhile objectives in

The name "challenge education" is sometimes used interchangeably with "self-

Cornel Hamm is an Associated Professor in the Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser

You might also like