G.R. No. 155227 Case Digest
G.R. No. 155227 Case Digest
G.R. No. 155227 Case Digest
FACTS: The petitioners are lessees of three distinct and separate parcels of land owned by the respondents.
Based on the parties’ oral lease agreements, the petitioners agreed to pay monthly rents, pegged as of October
9, 1995 at the following rates, namely: for Carmen Reyes, P570.00; for Amelia Mar, P840.00; and for
Emiliana Peña,P480.00. On August 15, 1995, the respondents wrote a demand letter to each of the petitioners,
informing that they were terminating the respective month-to-month lease contracts effective September 15,
1995 and demanding that the petitioners vacate and remove their houses from their respective premises, with
warning that should they not heed the demand, the respondents would charge them P3,000.00/month each as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises from October 1, 1995 until they would
actually vacate. After the petitioners refused to vacate within the period allowed, the respondents filed on
October 9, 1995 three distinct complaints for ejectment against the petitioners in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila. The MeTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) modified the
MeTC’s decision. Both parties appealed by petition for review. The CA rendered judgment setting aside the
decision of the RTC with modification.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contracts of lease were for an indefinite period.
HELD: The petitioners contend that their lease contracts were covered by P.D. No. 20, which suspended
paragraph 1 of Article 1673, Civil Code that as a result, the expiration of the period of their leases was no
longer a valid ground to eject them and that their leases should be deemed to be for an indefinite period. In
refutation, the respondents argue that P.D. 20 suspended only Article 1673, not Article 1687, Civil Code that
under Article 1687, a lease on a month-to-month basis was a lease with a definite period and that the
petitioners could be ejected from the leased premises upon the expiration of the definite period, particularly as
a demand to that effect was made. The petitioners’ contention is erroneous. It is clear, therefore, that B.P. Blg.
877 was the controlling rental law when the complaints against the petitioners were filed on October 9, 1995.
We note that on January 1, 2002, R.A. No. 9161 took effect. It’s Section 7(e) provided that the expiration of
the period of the lease contract was still one of the grounds for judicial ejectment. Also, its Section 10 provided
for the suspension of paragraph 1 of Article 1673 of the Civil Code. In several rulings, the Court held that
Section 6 of B.P. Blg. 877 did not suspend the effects of Article 1687 of the Civil Code and that the only effect
of the suspension of paragraph 1, Article 1673 of the Civil Code was that, independently of the grounds for
ejectment enumerated in B.P. Blg. 877, the owner/lessor could not eject the tenant by reason of the expiration
of the period of lease as fixed or determined under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the
determination of the period of the lease could still be made in accordance with Article 1687.