Crimpro - Digest (2) 8 - Panaguiton - V - Doj - Precription - 1P
Crimpro - Digest (2) 8 - Panaguiton - V - Doj - Precription - 1P
Crimpro - Digest (2) 8 - Panaguiton - V - Doj - Precription - 1P
RULING:
The offense has not yet prescribed. There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the
law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions
read:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to
run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
When Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. The
first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends
the prescription of the offense. The prescriptive period should be interrupted, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured
party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. As in this case, petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals
and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to
suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.