SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005.]

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA , petitioners, vs . HON. MONINA

A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

After an information has been led and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded
guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the information be
amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was
allegedly altered/tampered with?
In an Information led by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero
dated 03 July 1996, 1 accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug, in violation of said law.

The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and ra ed to
Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N.
Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16 July
1996 in this wise: 2
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the
assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano entered a plea of GUILTY
to the crime charged against them in the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby nd[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and
FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425 and they are
hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and
the period during which said accused are under detention is hereby deducted
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.

The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana
fruiting tops is hereby ordered con scated in favor of the government. The
Property Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposition.

On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree No.
968, as amended. 3

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 On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City
Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions, first, to admit amended
Information, 4 and second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the
decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996. 5 In plaintiff's motion to admit amended
information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged
of (sic) Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams
of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for
transportation and delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45)
pieces of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La
Trinidad to Metro Manila.

2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make

it conformable to the evidence on hand.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that

the herewith attached Amended Information against both accused be admitted
and subsequently set for arraignment and trial. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996, 7 held:.
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court
has already decided this case on the basis that the accused was arrested in
possession of 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to amend
the information.

Another Order 8 of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the second
motion in the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the
Decision dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor is hereby GRANTED, it
appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 18,
1995, in G.R. No. 119131 Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon.
FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by this court on August
20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case at bar should
be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. 7659
which took effect on December 31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of
prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision [correccional] to reclusion temporal
which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has
jurisdiction over a criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached
by the statute to the crime. AHDaET

The amended Information reads:

That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
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 helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully unlawfully
sell or offer for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug, in violation of said law. 9

This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City
presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa, 1 0 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572.
Both accused led a Motion to Quash 1 1 which was opposed 1 2 by the People in its
Comment/Opposition led before the trial court. Subsequently, while the motion to quash
before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused led before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari 1 3 which they later moved to withdraw "to pave the way for Branch
76 of the RTC of Quezon City to act judiciously on their motion to quash." 1 4 The Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 1996 1 5 noted the motion and considered
the petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997, 1 6 the trial court denied
accused's motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. Accused's Motion for Reconsideration, 1 7 duly opposed by the
prosecution, 1 8 was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997. 1 9 Hence, the
instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order 2 0
based on the following grounds: 2 1
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE,
THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and

B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING

TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE, DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-96-66799. 2 2

In this Court's resolution dated 23 July 1997, 2 3 respondents were required to

comment on the Petition. They submitted their Comment on 18 November 1998. 2 4
Accused led their Reply 2 5 on 02 March 2000. In compliance with the Court's resolution
dated 29 March 2000, 2 6 accused and respondents submitted their memoranda,
respectively, on 26 May 2000 2 7 and 26 July 2000. 2 8
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 2 9
The issues boil down to whether or not the rst information is valid and whether or
not the RTC, Branch 103, where the rst information was led and under which Criminal
Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to try the case. SIEHcA

On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents submitted

opposing views — accused insisting on its validity, whereas respondents asserted that the
accused were arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there being an alteration
on the rst information, hence it failed to re ect the true quantity of drugs caught in
possession of the accused, the prosecution insisted that the rst information under which
accused were arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the accused's
motion to quash, stating: 3 0
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 . . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information led
against the accused appeared to be sufficient in form. It was discovered, however,
that an alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which
was placed at only 42.410 grams when the correct amount should have been in
kilos. This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of the
proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not
bar a subsequent prosecution for the correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy,
the prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any
fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would also
make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured
by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in
jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same
offense.

Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or

by collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting himself from
further prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, either on the ground that the conviction
is void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense
a party to it and therefore not bound by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp.
244-245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful
maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight of the marijuana fruiting
tops as alleged in the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for
which they were charged before the information was tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade
when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased
weight in the now altered information which merited a much lighter penalty was
irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the
proceedings in court which was tainted with fraud.

The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle

with the courts by participating in a grand deception of pleading guilty to a lesser
offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then
tell the court that they would be placed in jeopardy for the second time.

We do not agree with the trial court.

FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings
dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by
Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were apprehended "for conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with each other in facilitating and effecting the
transportation and delivery . . . of forty- ve pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in
bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos." 3 1
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 In the joint a davit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and
arresting o cer SPO1 Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were caught with
approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops. 3 2 For some unknown reasons,
however, the Information led against the accused re ected a much lesser quantity, i.e.,
42.410 grams. HDcaAI

The question is whether this is su cient to consider the rst Information under
which the accused were arraigned invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:
Section 4. Information de ned . — An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the scal and led with
the court.

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 3 3 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed: 3 4

It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 de nes an information as
nothing more than "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense
subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court."

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the

offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. 3 5
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not
necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be
sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law. 3 6
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the rst information is
valid inasmuch as it su ciently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed.
Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the rst information, applying Rule 110, 3 7 Section 6, shows on its face
that it is valid.
Section 6. Su ciency of complaint or information . — A complaint or
information is su cient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

SECOND, and with respect speci cally to the trial court's point of view that the
accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they
"participated/acquiesced to the tampering," we hold that while this may not be far-fetched,
there is actually no hard evidence thereof. 3 8 Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that
accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the rst information.
Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does
not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
I n Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People, 39 the Court a rming the nality of a
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 decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modi ed or
set aside before it becomes nal or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes nal after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satis ed or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to
appeal, or has applied for probation.
aSAHCE

Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information
amended de es procedural rules, the decision having attained nality after the accused
applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the ling of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.

I n Sanvicente v. People, 4 0 this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an
accused's right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham. Respondent People of the Philippines
argues, citing the case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 4 1 that the trial was a sham. We do not
agree with the respondent as the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock trial
owing to the act of a then authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure a predetermined nal outcome of acquittal and total absolution of
the respondents-accused therein of all the charges. 4 2
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears
repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in
the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the
prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again accused
for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of
the prosecution and at the time when the accused had already been convicted is contrary
to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v. Escano,
Jr., 43 upon which both trial courts justi ed their claim of jurisdiction, was actually based
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 on this Court's resolution dated 18 October 1995 where this Court held:
The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as
amended by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the ne
(Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the imposable
penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range of prision
correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the charges against petitioners.

If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the
Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case under the rst Information.
Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103 was
rendered without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not invoke the right against double
jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later resolution
superseding the resolution cited by the trial courts, speci cally Administrative Order No.
51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q-96-
67572. The resolution provides:

RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS

DRUGS, CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO.
7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy
and efficient administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set
forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to
exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN
BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES de ned and penalized under Rep. Act
No. 7659, committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions:
xxx xxx xxx

11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N.
SALAZAR, JR. DHcEAa

Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clari cation on the
applicability of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in
Administrative Order No. 5-96, to read:
Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest
of speedy administration of justice and subject to the guidelines
hereinafter set forth, the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby
designated to exclusively try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED
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 AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, regardless of the
quantity of the drugs involved.

This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco: 4 4
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the
penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted in People vs.
Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor
modified this Section.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders
dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed.
Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from detention 4 5
unless there may be valid reasons for their further detention.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Records, p. 41.
2. Records, p. 45.

3. Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefore And For Other

Purposes.
4. Rollo, p. 48.
5. Rollo, pp. 53-54.
6. Records, pp. 48-49.
7. Records, p. 52.
8. Records, p. 55.

9. Records, p. 50.
10. Now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
11. Rollo, pp. 26-39.
12. Records, pp. 98-107.
13. CA-G.R. SP No. 41932 raffled to Justice Hector L. Hofilena.

14. Records, pp. 117-119.

15. Rollo, p. 129.
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 16. Records, pp. 137-142.
17. Records, pp. 152-158.
18. Records, p. 159.

19. Records, p. 163.

20. Rollo, pp. 4-18.
21. Rollo, p. 10.
22. Rollo, p. 10.
23. Rollo, p. 61.
24. Rollo, pp. 87-102.
25. Rollo, pp. 131-146.
26. Rollo, pp. 148-149.
27. Rollo, pp. 163-189.
28. Rollo, pp. 197-212.
29. Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended; Reynaldo
Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, 28 May 2004, citing People v. Tac-an,
G.R. No. 148000, 27 February 2003, 398 SCRA 373, 380; Navallo v. Sandiganbayan G.R.
No. 97214, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 175, cited in Potot v. People, G.R. No. 143547, 26
June 2002, 383 SCRA 449.
30. RTC Order, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
31. Records, pp. 5-6.
32. Records, pp. 7-8.
33. G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.

34. G.R. No. .L-23654, 28 March 1969, 27 SCRA 808.

35. People v. Alba, G.R. Nos. 131858-59, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 811.
36. Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, 12 August 2004.
37. Rules of Court.

38. In Director,PNP Narcotics Command v. Judge Salazar (A.M. No. 96-9-332-RTC, 15

August 2001, 363 SCRA 8), a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and gross
inefficiency was filed against Judge Salazar relative to the tampering/alteration of the
information in Crim. Case No. 96-66788. However, while the court found that there was
indeed a tampering/alteration, the accused were not at all implicated or faulted for the
act.
39. G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456, 467.

40. G.R. No. 132081, 26 November 2002, 392 SCRA 610.

41. G.R. No. L-72670, 12 September 1986, 144 SCRA 43.
42. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 118251, 29 June 2001,
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 360 SCRA 359.
43. G.R. No. L-119135, 18 October 1995.
44. G.R. No. 110592, 23 January 1996, 252 SCRA 135, 149.
45. Records, p. 260.

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