G.R. No.

189255, June 17, 2015

REYES V. GLAUCOMA
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated April 20, 2009 and
August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104261. The assailed CA Decision
annulled the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
NCR Case No. 05-0441-05 and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in the
same case, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by petitioner
against respondents with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City. Petitioner
alleged that: on August 1, 2003, he was hired by respondent corporation as
administrator of the latter's Eye Referral Center (ERC); he performed his duties as
administrator and continuously received his monthly salary of P20,000.00 until the
end of January 2005; beginning February 2005, respondent withheld petitioner's
salary without notice but he still continued to report for work; on April 11, 2005,
petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Manuel Agulto (Agulto), who is the Executive
Director of respondent corporation, informing the latter that he has not been receiving
his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month pay for 2004; petitioner
did not receive any response from Agulto; on April 21, 2005, petitioner was informed
by the Assistant to the Executive Director as well as the Assistant Administrative
Officer, that he is no longer the Administrator of the ERC; subsequently, petitioner's
office was padlocked and closed without notice; he still continued to report for work
but on April 29, 2005 he was no longer allowed by the security guard on duty to enter
the premises of the ERC.
On their part, respondents contended that: upon petitioner's representation that he is
an expert in corporate organizational structure and management affairs, they engaged
his services as a consultant or adviser in the formulation of an updated organizational
set-up and employees' manual which is compatible with their present condition; based
on his claim that there is a need for an administrator for the ERC, he later designated
himself as such on a trial basis; there is no employer-employee relationship between
them because respondents had no control over petitioner in terms of working hours as
he reports for work at anytime of the day and leaves as he pleases; respondents also
had no control as to the manner in which he performs his alleged duties as
consultant; he became overbearing and his relationship with the employees and
officers of the company soured leading to the filing of three complaints against him;
petitioner was not dismissed as he was the one who voluntarily severed his relations
with respondents.
On January 20, 2006, the LA assigned to the case rendered a Decision3 dismissing
petitioner's complaint. The LA held, among others, that petitioner failed to establish
that the elements of an employer-employee relationship existed between him and
respondents because he was unable to show that he was, in fact, appointed as
administrator of the ERC and received salaries as such; he also failed to deny that
during his stint with respondents, he was, at the same time, a consultant of various
government agencies such as the Manila International Airport Authority, Manila
Intercontinental Port Authority, Anti-Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air
Transportation Sector; his actions were neither supervised nor controlled by the
management of the ERC; petitioner, likewise, did not observe working hours by
reporting for work and leaving therefrom as he pleased; and, he was receiving
allowances, not salaries, as a consultant.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the LA. The NLRC
declared petitioner as respondents' employee, that he was illegally dismissed and
ordered respondents to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and privileges with full backwages. The NLRC held that the basis upon which
the conclusion of the LA was drawn lacked support; that it was incumbent for
respondents to discharge the burden of proving that petitioner's dismissal was for
cause and effected after due process was observed; and, that respondents failed to
discharge this burden.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the NLRC in its
Resolution dated May 30, 2008.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari6 with the CA.
In its assailed Decision, the CA annulled and set aside the judgment of the NLRC and
reinstated the Decision of the LA. The CA held that the LA was correct in ruling that,
under the control test and the economic reality test, no employer-employee
relationship existed between respondents and petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated August 25, 2009.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND
THAT RESPONDENTS SUBMITTED A VERIFICATION THAT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH
THE 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT NO EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS AND PETITIONER.
As to the first ground, petitioner contends that respondents' petition for certiorari filed
with the CA should have been dismissed on the ground that it was improperly verified
because the jurat portion of the verification states only the community tax certificate
number of the affiant as evidence of her identity. Petitioner argues that under the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by a Resolution of this Court, dated
February 19, 2008, a community tax certificate is not among those considered as
competent evidence of identity.
The Court does not agree.
This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of identity is not required in
cases where the affiant is personally known to the notary public.
Thus, in Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr., this Court held that:
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show
their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat"
under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an
act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary
public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c)
signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath
or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
Also, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides as follows:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions -
(a) x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
Moreover, Rule II, Section 6 of the same Rules states that:
SEC 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.
In legal hermeneutics, "or" is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a
choice of one among two or more things. The word signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another thing in an enumeration.
Thus, as earlier stated, if the affiant is personally known to the notary public, the
latter need not require the former to show evidence of identity as required under the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended.
Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the attorney-in-fact
of respondents who executed the verification and certificate against forum shopping,
which was attached to respondents' petition filed with the CA, is personally known to
the notary public before whom the documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-
fact and the notary public hold office at respondents' place of business and the latter
is also the legal counsel of respondents.
In any event, this Court's disquisition in the fairly recent case of Heirs of Amada
Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda regarding the import of procedural rules vis-a-vis the
substantive rights of the parties, is instructive, to wit:
[G]ranting, arguendo, that there was non-compliance with the verification
requirement, the rule is that courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
which do not really impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the higher
objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the substantive rights of the parties are
protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities.
In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz, where the verification was marred only by a glitch
in the evidence of the identity of the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that,
in the interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and should not defeat the
petition.
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable, but if it would be attained
by precipitate, if not preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not be
served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court's
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on
appeal rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to
the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on technicalities. The rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this juncture,
the Court reminds all members of the bench and bar of the admonition in the often-
cited case of Alonso v. Villamor:
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in
technicalities.
Anent the second ground, petitioner insists that, based on evidence on record, an
employer-employee relationship exists between him and respondents.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.16 If
he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence,
relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent. The test for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the
result of an inquiry as to which party would be successful if no evidence of such
matters were given. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the
employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. However,
before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee relationship
must first be established. Thus, in filing a complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal,
based on the premise that he was an employee of respondents, it is incumbent upon
petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence.
In regard to the above discussion, the issue of whether or not an employer-employee
relationship existed between petitioner and respondents is essentially a question of
fact. The factors that determine the issue include who has the power to select the
employee, who pays the employee's wages, who has the power to dismiss the
employee, and who exercises control of the methods and results by which the work of
the employee is accomplished. Although no particular form of evidence is required to
prove the existence of the relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to
prove the relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must
nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Generally, the Court does not review factual questions, primarily because the Court is
not a trier of facts. However, where, like here, there is a conflict between the factual
findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and those of the NLRC, on the other, it
becomes proper for the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review and
re-evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of the case and re-examine
the questioned findings.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection
and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the
presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control
of the putative employee's conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-
called "control test."
Indeed, the power of the employer to control the work of the employee is considered
the most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. This test is premised on whether the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the manner and
means used to achieve that end.
In the present case, petitioner contends that, as evidence of respondents' supposed
control over him, the organizational plans he has drawn were subject to the approval
of respondent corporation's Board of Trustees. However, the Court agrees with the
disquisition of the CA on this matter, to wit:
[Respondents'] power to approve or reject the organizational plans drawn by
[petitioner] cannot be the control contemplated in the "control test." It is but logical
that one who commissions another to do a piece of work should have the right to
accept or reject the product. The important factor to consider in the "control test" is
still the element of control over how the work itself is done, not just the end result
thereof.
Well settled is the rule that where a person who works for another performs his job
more or less at his own pleasure, in the manner he sees fit, not subject to definite
hours or conditions of work, and is compensated according to the result of his efforts
and not the amount thereof, no employer-employee relationship
exists.30cralawlawlibrary
What was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact that petitioner was never
subject to definite working hours. He never denied that he goes to work and leaves
therefrom as he pleases. In fact, on December 1-31, 2004, he went on leave without
seeking approval from the officers of respondent company. On the contrary, his letter
simply informed respondents that he will be away for a month and even advised them
that they have the option of appointing his replacement during his absence. This
Court has held that there is no employer-employee relationship where the supposed
employee is not subject to a set of rules and regulations governing the performance of
his duties under the agreement with the company and is not required to report for
work at any time, nor to devote his time exclusively to working for the company.
In this regard, this Court also agrees with the ruling of the CA that:
Aside from the control test, the Supreme Court has also used the economic reality test
in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties.
Under this test, the economic realities prevailing within the activity or between the
parties are examined, taking into consideration the totality of circumstances
surrounding the true nature of the relationship between the parties. This is especially
appropriate when, as in this case, there is no written agreement or contract on which
to base the relationship. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economic reality in
analyzing possible employment relationships for purposes of applying the Labor Code
ought to be the economic dependence of the worker on his employer.
In the instant case, as shown by the resume of [petitioner], he concurrently held
consultancy positions with the Manila International Airport Authority (from 04 March
2001 to September 2003 and from 01 November 2004 up to the present) and the Anti-
Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air Transportation Sector (from 16 April 2004 to
30 June 2004) during his stint with the Eye Referral Center (from 01 August 2003 to
29 April 2005). Accordingly, it cannot be said that the [petitioner] was wholly
dependent on [respondent] company.
In bolstering his contention that there was an employer-employee relationship,
petitioner draws attention to the pay slips he supposedly received from respondent
corporation. However, he does not dispute the findings of the CA that there are no
deductions for SSS and withholding tax from his compensation, which are the usual
deductions from employees' salaries. Thus, the alleged pay slips may not be treated as
competent evidence of petitioner's claim that he is respondents' employee.
In addition, the designation of the payments to petitioner as salaries, is not
determinative of the existence of an employer-employee relationship.Salary is a general
term defined as a remuneration for services given. Evidence of this fact, in the instant
case, was the cash voucher issued in favor of petitioner where it was stated therein
that the amount of P20,000.00 was given as petitioner's allowance for the month of
December 2004, although it appears from the pay slip that the said amount was his
salary for the same period.
Additional evidence of the fact that petitioner was hired as a consultant and not as an
employee of respondent corporation are affidavits to this effect which were executed by
Roy Oliveres and Aurea Luz Esteva, who are Medical Records Custodian and
Administrative Officer, respectively, of respondent corporation. Petitioner insists in its
objection of the use of these affidavits on the ground that they are, essentially,
hearsay. However, this Court has ruled that although the affiants had not been
presented to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their
affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were
hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, this Court ruled that it was not necessary for
the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse
party.To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the
summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory
the application of the technical rules of evidence.
These affidavits are corroborated by evidence, as discussed above, showing that
petitioner has no definite working hours and is not subject to the control of
respondents.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioner's insistence that his being hired as
respondent corporation's administrator and his designation as such in intra-company
correspondence proves that he is an employee of the corporation. The fact alone that
petitioner was designated as an administrator does not necessarily mean that he is an
employee of respondents. Mere title or designation in a corporation will not, by itself,
determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In this regard, even the
identification card which was issued to petitioner is not an adequate proof of
petitioner's claim that he is respondents' employee. In addition, petitioner's
designation as an administrator neither disproves respondents' contention that he was
engaged only as a consultant.
As a final point, it bears to reiterate that while the Constitution is committed to the
policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for the less privileged in life, the Court
has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his
conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the
rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 20, 2009 and August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R.
SPNo. 104261, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.