THE GOD OF

JESUS CHRIST

Walter Kasper

Translated
by
Matthew J. O'Connell

Crossroad· New York

1988
The Crossroad Publishing Company
370 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017
Originally published under the title Dcr Golt Jesll C" ~;Stl
is> 1982 Manhias·Gninewald.verlag, Mainz
English .ransla.ion copyrigh. © 1984
by .he Crossroad Publishing Company
This p:tperback reprint incorporates fony· five
corrections of the orginal hardcover edition.
All righ" reserved. No parr of .his book may be
reproduced, stored in <l retrieval system, or transmitted.
in :my (orm or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the
written permission of The Crossroad Publishing
Camp3ny.
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Dar..
Kasper, Walter.
The God of Jesus Christ.
Transladon of: Der got[ Jesu Christi.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
1. God 2. Trinity 1. Title.
BTI02.K33813 1984 231 84·16991
ISBN 0·8245 ·0629·4
 CONTENTS

Preface IX

PART ONE
The God-Question Today

God as a Problem 3
1. The traditional formulation of the problem 3
2. The formulation of the problem today 7
3. The theological formulation of the problem 12

II The Denial of God in Modern Atheism 16

1. The autonomy of the modern age as the basis for
contemporary atheism 16
2. Atheism in the name of the autonomy of nature 20
3. Atheism in the name of human autonomy 26
(0) Ludwig Feuerbach 28
(b) Karl Marx 32
(c) Friedrich Nietzsche 39

III The Predicament of Theology in the Face of Atheism 47

1. The traditional apologetic position 47
2. The new attitude of dialogue 50
3. Dialectical relationship between Christianity and atheism 58

IV Experience of God and Knowledge of God 65

1. The problem and concern of natural theology 65
(0) Natural theology in the Greek philosophers 72
(b) The Christian form of natural theology 73
(c) Natural theology in the Enlightenment 74
(d) Contemporary problematic 76
2. Experience of God 79
VI Contents
3. God in human language 87
4. Knowledge of God 99
(a) The cosmological argument 101
(b) The anthropological argument 104
(c) The argument from the philosophy of history 106
(d) The ontological argument 109

V Knowledge of God in Faith 116

1. The revelation of God 116
2. The hiddenness of God 123

PART TWO
The Message about the God of Jesus Christ

God, the Father Almighty 133

1. The problem of an almighty Father-God 133
2. The Christian message of God the Father 137
(a) God as Father in the history of religions 137
(b) God as Father in the Old Testament 138
(c) God as Father in the New Testament 140
(d) God as Father in the history of theology and dogma 144
3. Theological definition of the essence of God 147
(a) The definition of God's essence in the horizon of
Western metaphysics 147
(b) The definition of God's essence in the horizon of
the modern philosophy of freedom 152

Il Jesus Christ, Son of God 158

1. The question of salvation as point of departure for
the God-question 158
2. The salvific proclamation of Jesus the Christ 163
(a) The messianic promise of salvation in the Old Testament 163
(b) Ministry and preaching of Jesus of Nazareth 166
(c) The Son-christology of the New Testament 173
(d) The explanation of the divine sonship of Jesus Christ
in the history of dogma and theology 178
3. Theological interpretation of the divine Sonship of Jesus Christ 184
(a) Logos-christology 184
(b) Kenosis-christology 189
 COlltellts VII

III The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 198

1. Problem and urgency of a theology of the Holy Spirit today 198
2. The Christian message of God's life-giving Holy Spirit 200
(a) The Spirit of God in creation 200
(b) The Holy Spirit in the history of salvation 202
(c) The Holy Spirit as a person 210

3. Theology olthe Holy Spirit 214

(a) Different theologies in East and West 214
(b) Suggestions for a theology of the Holy Spirit 223

PART THREE
The Trinitarian Mystery of God

Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 233

1. Preparation in religious history and in philosophy 233
2. Foundations in revealed theology 238
(a) The unity of God 238
(b) The living God (Old Testament preparation) 241
(c) The basic trinitarian structure of the revelation of God
(establishment of the doctrine in the New Testament) 243
(d )The trinitarian confession as rule of faith 249
3. History of theological and dogmatic development 251

II Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 264

1. The point of departure 264
(a) The Trinity as mystery of faith 264
(b) Images and likenesses for the trinitarian mystery 272
(c) The unity of immanent Trinity and economic Trinity 273
2. Basic concepts of the doctrine of the Trinity 277
(a) The classical basic concepts 277
(b) The language of 'three persons' 285
3. Systematic understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity 290
(a) Unity in trinity 290
(b) Trinity in unity 299
(c) Conclusion: The trinitarian confession as the answer to
modern atheism 315
Vlll Contents
Abbreviations 317
Notes 320
Index of Subjects 383
Index of Proper Names 395
 PREFACE

The God-question is the fundamental theological question. The present

book is intended as a strong plea to give it that status once again. True
enough, there is no lack of publications on the God-question; for the most
part, however, these limit themselves to a discussion of modern atheism.
The Christian understanding of God, the God of Jesus Christ, and thus the
confession of the triune God are usually brought in only as a kind
of appendix and without any doser study of the problems involved.
Contemporary Protestant theology shows the opposite tendency. On the
basis of a solus Christus (Christ alone) and a sola fide (faith alone) that
are interpreted with greater radicalness than they had in the Reformers,
an effort is being made to find a standpoint beyond atheism and the theism
to which the previous approach leads. In my view, however, both of these
standpoints are equally untenable. The only answer to the modern God-
question and to the situation of modern atheism is the God of Jesus Christ
and the trinitarian confession, which must be brought out of its present
existential obscurity and turned into a grammar for theology as a whole.
To this end I have gone back and studied once again the church fathers
and the other great doctors of the church. What I have learned from them
is not a spiritless traditionalism but a courage - hardly imaginable
nowadays - in thinking things out for myself. A renewal of both tradition
and speculation is needed, precisely in the present much-deplored stag-
nation of theology. For a theology which is pastoral, that is, which tackles
the question of contemporary man, and which knows what it is about,
demands not less but more scientific thoroughness. This triad of ecdesial-
minded ness, scientific thoroughness and openness to the times - and not
the other things occasionally daimed - are the true Tiibingen tradition out
of which this book has emerged.
The present book is therefore addressed primarily tostudentsoftheology,
x Preface
but it is also meant for all who have a deeper interest in the theological
questions connected with the faith : priests and lay-persons in the service
of the church; Christians for whom participation in theological discussion
has become part of their faith; and the growing number of people, even
outside the churches, whom the present crisis of meaning h.s led to a new
interest in the God-question.
Unfortunately there has been. longer delay th.n planned between my
book on christology, which appeared in 1974, and this volume on the
doctrine of God and the Trinity. Numerous obligations inside and outside
the university and, in no small part, turbulent developments within our
university that took their toll on time, energy and nerves, h.veconsider.bly
retarded the work. Above all, however, the difficulty of the subject-rna ncr
itself c.lled repeatedly for deeper investigation and reOection.
That the book should finally have appeared at all is due to the selOess
efforts of my fellow-workers: my assistants, Giancarlo Collet and Hans
Kreidler, who relieved me of a great deal of labour; Miss Martina Lanau
and Messrs. Wolfgang Thonissen, Erich Posch I and Brad Malkovsky, who
tirelessly did the detailed technical work and compiled the indexes; my
secretaries, Mrs Elli Wolf and Mrs Renata Fischer, who carefully prepared
the manuscript; and, finally, the collaborators at the Matthias-Griinewald-
Verlag in Mainz.
The book I now offer to the public is far from finished. But, then, who
is ever done with the God-question? Even though the book spends so much
time winnowing and summarizing the discussion, it is itself intended only
as a contribution to the discussion which others will carryon in a critical
fashion. If anywhere, then certainly in dealing with the theme of this book,
the words of the great Augustine - from whom I have learned so much,
even though I have often dared to dis.gree with him - ore .pplic.ble:
Therefore let my reader travel on with me when he sh.res fully in my
convictions; let him search with me when he shares my doubts; let him
return to me when he recognizes that he is in error; let him call me back to
the right path when he sees th.t I am the one in error. In this. way let us
advance along the road of ch.rity toward him of whom it is written :"Seek
his f.ce unceasingly" (Ps.104.4), (De Tr;l!;tate 1,3).
I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of my mother who first
taught me to talk of God.

Tiib;l!gel!,
Feast of Mal/hel<! the Apostle. 1982
 PART ONE

The God-Question Today

 I
God as a Problem

1. The traditional formulation of the problem

The confession of faith which all the great churches of the East and the
West have had in common from the early Christian centuries down to our
own day begins with the statement: Credo ill lillI/ill Del/III, 'I believe in
one God." This opening sentence is also the foundational statement of the
entire creed; it contains in an implicit way the whole of the Christian faith.
For anyone who believes that God exists and that he will give life to those
who seck him is saved (Heb 11.6). In other words, anyone who believes
that God is the one God who has revealed himself in the Old and New
Testaments as the God who helps and liberates, who is life and gives life-
that person is saved. As far as their content is concerned, the other
statements of the faith speak of many other things besides God: the
beginning and the end of the world; the origin, sin, redemption and
fulfillment of the human person; the church, its preaching, sacraments and
offices. But these many and varied statements arc statements of the faith
only to the extent that they arc related to God, that is, to the extent that
they speak of God's saving action or the mediations of this action.' God is
therefore the sole and unifying theme of theology.' God - who is the
salvation of the world and the human race - is as it 'were the one
word spoken in the many words of theology. To this extent theology is
accountable speech (logos ) about God (t"eos ), or the science of God, as
the ancients called it.'
But what docs it really mean to say 'God'? This question of Kurt
Tucholsky is quite understandable; in fact, it is even necessary. For, as M.
Buber says in an often quoted passage, God,
is the most heavy-laden of all human words. None has become so soiled,
so mutilated ... Generations of men have laid the burden of their
4 The God-Question Today
anxious lives upon this word and weighed it to the ground; it lies in the
dust and bears their whole burden. The races of men with their religious
factions have torn the word to pieces; they have killed for it and died for
it, and it bears their fingermarks and their blood ... They draw
caricatures and write 'God' underneath; they murder one another to say
'in God's name' ... We must esteem those who interdict it because they
rebel against the injustice and wrong which are so readily referred to
'God' for authorization) -

Therefore before we ask 'Does God exist?' and before we answer 'God
exists' or claim 'God does not exist" we must know what is at issue when
we use the ambiguous word 'God'. Unless we have a clear concept of God
or at least some preunderstanding we cannot answer the questions just
asked, and any answers given are bound to be empty formulas.
The question, then, is this: how can we arrive at such a preliminary
concept of God? How are we to set about theologizing? We certainly
cannot begin with a proof of God that supposedly has no presuppositions.
Anyone who undertakes a proof of God must already have some idea of
what he wants to prove; any meaningful question supposes some pre-
understanding of what the questioning is meant to ascertain; so too a
proof of God presupposes a provisional concept of God. The principle
may be formulated universally: there is no such thing as presupposi-
tionless thinking. All human knowing occurs through the medium of
language, which always provides us with pre-existent symbols and
schemata for interpreting reality. For this reason, the only way to begin
theology is by inquiring what the religions and the theological tradition
have understood by 'God'. We must investigate the history of talk about
God and thus make clear to ourselves the problem that resides in the word
'God'.
We may begin with one of the great mosters of theology, Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274). At the start of his theological SlImma he immediately gives
a number of descriptions of what 'all' mean when they speak of God: God
is the ultimate, ungrounded Ground of all reality that sustains and moves
everything; God is the supreme Good in which all finite goods participate
and which is the ground of all these goods; God is the ultimate End that
directs and orders all things.' For these reasons Anselm of Canterbury
(1033-1109), the father of medieval Scholasticism, defined God as id quo
maillS cogitari Iteqllit, 'that than which nothing greater can be thought",
and indeed that which is greater than anything that can be thought.- This
definition is not simply a superlative; it is not saying that God is 'the
greatest thing that can be thought'. If this were the case, God would simply
 God as a Problem 5
be the highest possible realization of the human person. God is, rather, a
comparative that can never be matched: he who is always greater and
fuller; hewho amid all likeness is always more unlike, always other, always
more mysterious.
The definition which Luther gives in his Grosser Katechislllus is quite
different in character. It is utterly unphilosophical and expresses, rather,
the existential importance of the understanding of God: 'What does it
mean to have a God, or: What is God? A God is that from which we should
expect every good and to whom we should have recourse in every distress.'
'That ... to which you attach your heart and on which you rely is in fact
your God." The necessary (notwendige) being of the scholastic definition
has become for Luther the one who 'turns afflictions around' (der Not-
welldende), who supports and sustains human beings in the distresses of
life, the one who is absolutely trustworthy and on whom human beings
can base their lives. There is no doubt that Luther has effectively brought
into play basic motifs of biblical faith in God.
Various modern definitions a!tempt to combine the abstract philosoph-
ical and the concrete existential dimensions. According to P. Tillich, God
is 'what concerns us ultimately'.ID According to R. Bultmann, he is 'the
reality determining all else' .11 G. Ebeling calls God 'the mystery of reality', 12
and K. Rahner speaks of him as 'the holy mystery' which is the term and
origin of man and which 'is present in loving freedom' as 'that which is
nameless and which is not at our disposal, and at whose complete disposal
we exist'.1l
Despite differences in their details all these definitions make one point
clear: the word 'God' is not intended to answer one question among many
others. For the tradition, God is not a reality alongside or above the rest
of reality. He is not an object of questioning and understanding in the way
that other objects are. God is not a given in the way that human beings
and things are given. He is rather the answer to the question that is
contained in all questions; he is the answer to the question that is contained
in the very existence of the human person and the world." God is an
answer that includes and transcends all other answers.
The all-inclusive and all-transcending answer given in the word 'God'
corresponds exactly to the basic situation of the human person. Man is
unlike any other living thing in that he is the one being that is not adapted
by sure instinct and therefore unquestioningly to a particular environment.
On the contrary, he is the being who is open to the world, as the
anthropologists like to say." He does not live in an unforced harmony
with himself and his environment; he himself must shape both himself and
his environment. He is pregiven to himself but also given to himself as a
6 The God-Questioll Today
task to be carried out. He therefore has the power to ask questions, and
he is constantly asking them. This ability to ask questions is the source of
man's greatness; it is the ground of his transcendence, that is, his being
insofar as it reaches above and beyond everything else, and it is the ground
of his freedom as well. But his ability to ask questions is also the source of
his wretchedness. He is the only being who can be bored, the only one who
can be discontented and unhappy. Man, thus open to the world in its
entirety, finds fulfillment only if he finds an answer to the meaning of his
own existence and to the existence of reality as such.
The religious tradition is convinced that the reality expressed in the word
God provides this answer. According to this tradition, therefore, God is not
just one reality alongside all the others; he is the reality that comprehends,
grounds and determines all other realities, the unconditional in all that is
conditioned, man's all in all. To put it differently: the God-question is not
a categorical but a transcendental question, in the twofold sense of a
question that includes all that is (transcendental, therefore, in the sense the
term has in the Scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals) and a question
that has to do with the condition for the possibility of all other questions
and answers (transcendental, therefore, in the sense this term has in modern
transcendental philosophy).
Because God is the question in all questions, he himself can be placed in
question. Even classical theology did not develop in a sterile atmosphere
in which there were no contradictions or in an idyllic world falsely assumed
to be sound and good.,n In his theological Summa Thomas Aquinas
introduces his article on the question 'Does God exist?' by stating the two
objections which arc still fundamental even today. He cites evil in the world
as an argument against the affirmation of a God who is infinitely good,
and the possibility of explaining the world in a purely immanent way 'if it
be supposed that God docs not exist'." Thomas thus anticipates the
modern explanation of reality 'even if there were no God'.
But in Thomas' discussions with the pagans (the gentiles), and especially
with Islam, it was not only the existence of God but also the identity of
God (who is God?) that was disputed. Otherwise he would not have had
to write an entire Summa call Ira gemiles. Even for a medieval thinker like
Thomas, then, God is not something self·evident, and talk about God is
anything but a peaceful exercise of poetic contemplation. Given the
characterof reality as we have it, faith in God has always been a questioning
and a seeking faith. Human beings have always had to say: 'I believe: help
my unbelief!' (Mark 9.24). For this reason, in the classical tradition faith
was always a fides quaerells illtellectltm, a faith in search of understanding.
In this formula we have the classical definition oftheology or accountable
 God as a Problem 7
speech about God. Following Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury defines
theology as fides qllaerells illtel/ectllm," faith in search of understanding.
According to this definition neither the asking nor the understanding is
extrinsic to faith. Faith itself is understood as a faith that questions and
understands. Faith is an act of the human person (even though from
another standpoint it is also an act of sheer grace in which God enlightens
man); faith exists only in the medium of human hearing, understanding,
assenting and also questioning. Theology therefore prolongs and develops
a movement that arises within faith and from faith. In the proper sense of
the phrase, theology is a science of faith. The special character of theology
as a science consists in the fact that it prolongs, in a methodical and
systematic way, the quest for understanding that is inherent in faith, focuses
this quest on the problems that arise in each situation, and seeks to satisfy
it with the tools made available by the thinking of a given age."

2. The formulation of the problem today

Although God was never something that could be regarded as self-evident,
the situation in which and for which there was to be speech about God has
changed radically since the beginning of modern times. For the religious
person of the past, God or the divine was the only true reality, and the
world was in danger of being regarded as a mere appearance and illusion.'"
But in the consciousness of the average person at the end of the twentieth
century the situation is just the reverse. The thing that he takes for granted
is the reality which the senses apprehend; God, on the other hand, is
suspected of being simply a renection of the world, a purely ideological
construct. F. Nietzsche's statement about the death of God is widely
regarded as a diagnostic key to modern culture. In like manner, M.
He;degger, following Holderlin, speaks of the absence of the god," and
M. Buber of the eclipse of God in our time. l l Amid the interior and exterior
tribulation of their imprisonment by the Gestapo, the Protestant theologian
D. Bonhoeffer" and the Jesuit Catholic priest A. DelpH saw the approach
of a religion less, godless age in which the old religious values would be
powerless and unintelligible. So universal has this situation become in the
years since then that the real issue has long since been, not the atheism of
others, but the atheism in our own hearts. According to the Second Vatican
Council atheism has become 'one of the most serious problems of our
time';H it is one of the 'signs of the times'.
The background for this atheism of the masses - which is.a novelty in
the history of the human race - is usually summed up in the term
'secularization'. By this is meant the process that had led to an understan-
8 The God-Questiolt Today
ding of the world and its spheres of activity (politics, culture, the economy,
sciences, and so on), and to a handling of them that at least prescinds from
their transcendent ground and thinks of them and deals with them in a
purely immanent way.26

Contradictory evaluations have been made of this development. In reaction to

the liberal programmatic affirmation of secularization, traditional theology
could see in modern secularization nothing but an unparal1eJed great apostasy
from God and Christianity and could only think that it is bound to end in
catastrophe. It was therefore thought [hat the program of secularization should
be met by an opposite Christi:m program of restoration. In opposition to this
rraditionalistview with its emphasis on restoration, a new and more progressive
current of thought, the secularization theology, as it was called, of the 1950s
and 1960s took a different view: following the lead of Hegel, M. Weber, E.
Troeltsch and K. L6wirh, it maimained that modern secularization is a
consequence of Christianity and even, in a sense, the fulfillment of Christianity
within this world (F. Goganen; J. B. Metz). For it was the biblical distinction
between God and the world that opened the way for a wordly conception of
the world. According to this view, modern atheism, which has forgotten its
Christian origin and is in protest against it, is a possible interpretation of the
modern process of secularization but not the only possible one, and is certainly
not inevitable. For this reason, these writers sought to distinguish berween a
legitimate secularization and an illegitimate secularism.
This 'progressive' theory has the advantage over the 'restoration' theory
that it makes possible a Christian affirmation of the various modern processes
of liberation. On the other hand, it remains at a rather abstract level when
compared with the actual course of modern history. For the actual history of
the modern age has unfolded largely in opposition to Christianity and against
the protests of the churches. The resulting secularized world is not a Christian
world but a world that is indifferent to Christianity. This fact cannor be
rendered innocuous by attributing it to misunderstanding on both sides.
For this reason H. Blumenberg has criticized the secularization thesis and
offered a third explanatory model: the modern age originated as an act of
human self-assertion against an overwhelming transcendence that enslaves
human beings, as well as against ecclesiastical structures that had become
rigid, reactionary and repressive. In this view, the modern age is interpreted as
a critical reaction to Christianity and an attempt of the human person to
achieve autonomy and find his ground within himself. This theory is certainly
more in accord with the actual development of modern history than is the
quite abstract secularization thesis. It is unable, however, to do full justice to
the valid poims of view set forth in the secularization thesis, and to this extent
it too does nor offer a fully satisfactory theory to explain the modern age.
An adequate judgment on the situation requires us to take into account that
the modern age, and especially the atheism of the late modern period, is a
 God as a Problem 9
many-layered phenomenon that cannot be treated monocausally and derived
from a single source)' As far as the hismry of ideas is concerned, we may, like
H. Blumenberg, take as our starting point the conflict between autonomy and
a crushing theonomy, but we must immediately add various other points of
view. For the emancipation from Christianity was itself based on Christian
presuppositions. The idea of the freedom and dignity of the individual person
is one that entered the world with Christianity)1I Modern emancipation
presupposes this Christian liberation of the person as well as the misunderstan-
ding of Christian freedom in late medieval nominalism and in the rigidified
ecclesiastical structure of the confessional era. Thus the human self·assertion
against Christianity was itself made possible by Christianity. The return to the
humanism of antiquity and the renaissance of the ancient world provided aids
for the establishment of a new humanism." The often misunderstood ideas of
the Reformation on the freedom of the Christian, the two kingdoms, and the
secular callinglO also played a part.
But in addition to these motifs from the history of ideas account must be
taken of the objective historical factors which were closely connected with
those motifs: the division of the churches in the sixteenth century and the rise
of the modern bourgeoisie." After the Reformation had led to the destruction
of the unity of faith and thus of the basis for the unity of society up to that
time, the· whole social order inevitably fell into disarray. The result was the
wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which brought
society to the brink of destruction. This development made it clear that religion
had lost its integrative function. The survival of society demanded that religion
be set aside and a new basis be found that would tie everything together and
be binding on all. For the sake of peace, religion had to be declared a private
matter, and people had to accept as a new basis for social life the reason which
all men have in common Of, as the case might be, the order of nature which
was recognized 3S rational :lOd which, it was thought, would be unch<tnged
'even if there were no God' (H. Grotius)."
This development was ~ided and abetted by the rise of the modern bour-
geoisie. The bourgeoisie - whose development had started in the twelfth
century and was powerfully aided by the Reformation - c~me into existence
as a result of em<tncipation from traditional political, social and intellectual
forces and had as its basis the principle of the autonomy of the individu~1 who
makes his way by knowledge, work, achievements and diligence. When life
and its meaning are thus given a coherent, autonomous basis in personal insight
and personal activity, religion, which sees reality as established and ordered
by God, becomes, if not super()uous and meaningless, at least a matter of
private morality; it is turned into an answer to the question 'What ought we
to do?' and as such is 3ccepted because of its social usefulness among the
people. Religion could then easily be distorted into an ideology promoted by
the prevailing system wherever ceremonious, though not constitutive use was
still made of it.
10 The God-Question Today
Finally, we must not forget the development of the modern sciences which
made possible a new vision of a world that is independent of any and
every transcendent ground and is even contradictory to the vision of things
presupposed in the Bible and ecclesiastical tradition.·1l
The emancipation of the public realm from the theological contexts that
had previously provided it with its foundations led to a loss of the universality
proper to the idea of God. Religion became a purely internal affair and thus
lost its connection with reality. Pietism and the various revivalist movements
made religion completely a matter of subjective devotion, a religion of the
heart. Hegel's description of (he situation has never been bettered: 'Religion
builds its temples and altars in the heart of the individual. In sighs and prayers
he seeks for the God whom he denies to himself in intuition, because of the
risk that the intellect will cognize what is intuited as a mere thing, reducing
the sacred grove to mere timber.'J4 Hegel realizes that the objectification of
reality and the withdrawal of religion into subjectivity leads both to a nattening
of reality and an emptying of religion. The world becomes godless; God
becomes world less and - in the proper sense of the term - objectless. Hegel
therefore sees in the sentence from a hymn in the Lutheran hymnal 4God
Himself is dead', an expression of modern culture and of the feeling 'upon
which the religion of more recent times rests' . .15

The conclusion we may draw from this brief survey is that modern
secularization has various roots. Having been made possible by Christ-
ianity, it sprang into existence as a reaction, in the name of freedom, against
an absolutist image of God. It is inseparable from modern subjectivity,
which grounds its autonomy not theonomously but in terms of immanence
and even by way of a critique of religion, and therefore also makes its own
the humanism of antiquity. Thus many and partially contradictory motifs
explain the rise of modern autonomous culture, which is dearly distingui-
shed by its immanentiS! orientation from the medieval world-picture that
had been formed by Augustine and was transcendent in its orientation. In
this secularized world God become increasingly supernuous as a hypothesis
for explaining phenomena within the world; he loses his function in regard
to the world. We must live in the world 'as though there were no God'.
Thus faith in God becomes increasingly emptied of its perceptual and
experiential elements and increasingly unreal; God himself becomes increa-
singly unreal. When all is said and done, the statement 'God is dead' could
serve as a plausible interpretation of the modern sense of life and reality.
It is not possible, of course, to expunge the reality of God and expect
that everything else will go on as before. In the history of the human race
the word 'God' stands for the ultimate ground and ultimate goal of man
and his world. When God drops out of the picture, the world becomes
 GDd as a PrDblem 11
without ground and without goal and everything threatens to become
meaningless. For a thing has meaning only when it stands in a larger
context that is inherently meaningful. Then, once the meaning of the whole
has been lost and once the reality of God as that which ordains, governs
and supports the whole has been removed, every individual reality also
becomes ultimately meaningless. Everything descends into an abyss of
nothingness. In other words, as J. Paul, Jacobi, l-lovalis, Fichte, Schelling
and Hegel already saw, nihilism stands at the term of this development.
Nietzsche was one of the few who had the courage to face up to the nihilistic
consequences of atheism. In The Gay Scie//Ce he follows his message of the
death of God with some questions:

What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither
is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Are we not plunging
continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there
still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?
Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is
not night continually closing in on us?'·

Nietzsche's thinking has become dismayingly to the point today. It is more

relevant than the various plans for an atheistic humanism, more relevant
even than Marxist atheism, which until recently was regarded by many as
the challenge to Christianity. For with the disappearance of the mystery of
God the mystery of man likewise disappears. People look upon the human
person as simply a being with biological needs or as a sum-total of social
relations. When that which is greater than man and his world is no longer
present, it is replaced by an ideology of total adaptation to the sphere of
needs and desires and to social relationships; freedom dies, the human
person retrogresses and becomes a clever animal, and all hunger and thirst
for an unconditional justice disappears as well. The death of God leads to
the death of man. Consequently people today feel a dreadful emptiness, a
loss of meaning and direction, that is the deepest source of the existential
anxieties which many experience. Even more than atheism, the nihilism
that flows from atheism is the real mark of the age.
According to L. Kolakowski,
along with the self-confidence of faith, the self-confidence of unbelief is
also sharrered. In contrast to the comfortable world of Enlightenment
atheism, in which a benevolent, friendly Nature extended irs protection,
the godless world of today is perceived as an oppressive, everlasting
chaos. It is stripped of any meaning, any aim, any directional signal, any
structure . .. For 3 hundred years now, ever since Nietzsche announced
12 The God-Question Today
the death of God, few cheerful atheists have been visible ... The absence
of God became a continuously open wound in the European spirit, even
if people managed to narcotize themselves into forgetfulness of it ...
The collapse of Christianiry, which the Enlightenment awaited with glee,
proved (insofar as it occurred) to be almost contemporaneous with
the collapse of the Enlightenment itself. The radiant new order of
anthropocentrism that was to be built where the overthrown God had
stood never arrived.)7
In this situation, talk of God as the ground and goal of all realiry becomes
an urgent task of the theologian for the sake of the human person, in fact
it becomes the most urgent of all his tasks. I began this secrion wirh the
statement of M. Buber, the Jewish philosopher of religion, that the word
'God' is 'the most heavy-laden of all human words'; let me end it with this
further statement of his: 'We cannot cleanse the word "God" and we
cannot make it whole; but, defiled and mutilated as it is, we can raise it
from the ground and set it over an hour of great care.'''

3. The theological formulation of the problem

The question before us is: given this situation, how are we to speak
intelligibly about God? Certainly we cannot start directly from a faith in
God that is taken more or less as a matter of course and then, in a purely
positivistic manner, begin with the God of biblical revelation. Such a start
directly 'from above' is barred to us today. The reason is that no answer
is intelligible unless people first grasp the question to which it is the answer.
Neither, therefore, can we adopt an (apparently or really) presupposition-
less point of view and try step by step to demonstrate God's existence. This
way 'from below' is also barred to us, because every question already
presupposes a preunderstanding of the realiry with which the question is
concerned. If we had never even heard of 'God' we would never get the
idea of talking about him or even of proving his existence. In addition,
proofs of God are usually convincing only to those who already believe in
him. In our talk about God we are therefore forced to turn back to tradition
and to refer to it."
Traditional speech about God is a possible starting point, because this
speech is not simply something traditional. Religious tradition could and
still can remain an abiding force because it is an answer to an abiding
question: the question which is identical with man himself. The human
person can never forget the question of God because it accompanies the
person himself. An atheistic cultural policy and atheistic schooling that are
 God as a Problem 13
carried on for a generation or two can of course have far reaching eHects.
Yet even the propaganda of the godless helps in its own way to keep the
problem of God alive. Complete silence about God would require the
silencing of those questions which the tradition of the human race has
answered by referring to God. For this reason it is probably not simply
chance that even totalitarian systems have thus far not succeeded in
eHecting this complete silence. On the contrary, the question of God is at
present being revived in a remarkable way throughout the world.
1shall therefore take as my starting point the problem which is recorded
in the word 'God' which history has handed down to us. A problem is a
preliminary sketch (a pro-blema, 'something thrown forward'), an answer
that at the same time contains a question, a pointer showing the direction
to be taken in order to reach the goal.
Aristotle already maintains the thesis that the sciences, even and
especially metaphysics, must start with problems that have emerged from
previous study.'· With due qualifications this is also of theological science.
Theology takes as its starting point the talk about God (theos) that has
been transmitted in the church's confession of faith, and endeavours to
justify this talk at the bar of reason (logos) in view of the questions of
human beings and to understand it more fully. The intention of theology,
therefore, is to give an account (apologia) of the hope that finds expression
in the confession of God, and it does this in response to the challenge of
the world's unbelief (I Peter 3.15). To that extent, theology is fides ql/aerens
intel/eetl/m, faith in God that seeks understanding. In the process, the
believer is inAuenced by the situation of unbelief and of the eclipse of God.
The decisive thing is not the atheism of other people but the atheism that
makes its home in one's own heart. Thus faith itself becomes a question.
The whole purpose of theology is to grasp in a scientifically reAective way
the understanding, the seeking (quaerere), and the questioning which are
part of faith itself. When theology transforms the question inherent in faith
into a scientific problem, it is not constructing something diHerent (alilld)
from faith but is simply articulating one and the same faith differently
(aliter) and giving it the form of methodically scientific .. Aection.
To articulate one and the same faith differently does not mean turning
faith into a gnosis. Since the question represented by God is nor a particular
categorical question but the basic transcendental question, it must be said
a priori that the goal of theology cannot be a rationalistic comprehension
of God. Any such comprehension supposes an all-inclusive standpoint and
viewpoint. But since God is the reality that includes all else, he is also id
quo maillS cogitari neqllit, that which cannot be conceived in terms of
some more inclusive horizon. A theology that has managed to conceive
14 The God-Question Today
God has in fact misconceived him; it has stripped him of his divinity and
reduced him to the level of a finite idol. A theology that sells out to a
rationalism which aims to grasp everything, even God, in its concepts, has
no power to dislodge the superstition in claims to be attacking; it is itself
the most ignorant kind of superstition.
All this means that for the theological mind God is not a problem
comparable to the many other problems which a person can, at least in
principle, solve one after the other. God is an abiding problem; he is the
problem par excellence which we describe as 'mystery'.·' The goal of
theology, therefore, is not primarily the resolution (soll/tio) of problems
nor an advance (progressio) from problem to problem, but the reduction
of all knowing and questioning to the mystery of God (redl/ctio ill
mysteril/m). It cannot be the goal of theology to move beyond faith in God
by means of thought, but only to grasp the mystery of God as mystery.
In accordance with all that I have been saying, the only way to carry out
this task is by understanding the mystery of God as a response to the
mystery of man. Concretely: it can be carried out only amid a conflict
regarding the mystery of realiry and man and in a debate with the
interpretations which present-day forms of atheism offer as projects of
meaning and hope. By its whole nature this conflict is not a purely
theoretical problem; nor does it touch only the private and personal sphere.
The conflict about God, being also a conflict about man, is an eminently
practical problem, which also has a political dimension since it concerns
man in all his dimensions.

A person who believes in God as the realiry that determines all else cannot
acquiesce in the bourgeois separation between a secular public sphere nnd a
private sphere in which alone religion is given a place. We can only agree
eagerly with the new political theology insofar as it calls attenrion to this
baneful separation and bids us relate God to public life as the trurh abour man
and human social life. On the other hand, insofar as this rheology turns the
political dimension into a programmatic foundation and the all-inclusive
framework and horizon of its arguments, it is to be no less decisively rejected.
Even in inner·worldly terms! the political is not the quintessence of reality nOf,
consequently, the framework within which the freedom of the person is to be
discussed. The person is indeed social by narure and dependent for its concrete
fulfillment on a social order marked by freedom, bur it also has inherent rights
over against society and is even in its turn the ground or origin, the supporting
base, and the goal of all social institutions." The point of departure for our
argument is therefore not society as such bur the human being who as person
has a social dimension, but also transcends this in the direction of a real Whole
which hear she always possess only in a pre·apprehension (Vorgriff) bur never
 God as a Problem 15
in a concept (Begriff) and to which he or she is always on the way as one who
seeks, asks, hopes and dares.

Talk of God as the reality that includes and determines everything, as the
ground and goal of everything, and as id qltO IIwilts cogitari lIeqllit, is to
be understood as the answer to the question, inseparable from the human
being as a person, regarding the whole of reality; moreover, it is only in
relation to the most comprehensive of all questions that talk about God
can become articulate. Metaphysics is the name given to the science which
enquires not about individual beings or realms of being but about being
as such and as a whole.4' Talk about God presupposes the metaphysical
question about being and at the same time keeps this question alive. In our
present situation, therefore, theology as talk about God also acts as
protector and defender of philosophy as the question about being as such.
'The Christian is the person who by virtue of his faith is compelled to
philosophize.'44 This does not imply a choice of one particular philosophy,
as, for example, Aristotelian philosophy and metaphysics; it does, however,
imply an option for a philosophy that in opposition to every narrowing
and obscuring' of the human horizon keeps open the question about the
meaning of the whole and precisely in this way serves the humanness of
humanity. For it is the removal of these limits as well as human openness,
transcending reality as given, that sets us free from all reality as given and
endows us with freedom and dignity within the existing and any future
social order.
H talk about God transcends any and every inner-wordly sphere,
including the political, then to preserve the transcendence of God is also
to preserve the transcendence of the human person and therefore the
freedom and inalienable rights of humanity.4' For the sake, then, of both
God and man 'the return to the sacred' is our essential task today.4'ln view
of the many reductionist theological programs now in existence it is
unfortunately not a redundancy to say that, especially today, a theological
theology is the need of the hour and the only appropriate answer to modern
atheism.
 II

The Denial of God in Modern Atheism

1. The autonomy of the modern age as the basis for contemporary

atheism

Atheism in the strict sense of the word came into existence only in the
modern age. Even the word atheism seems to have entered common use
only around the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth
centuries.' The content of the concept may not be derived simply from an
analysis of the two components of the word itself (theism .nd alph.
privative or the negating particle). It would be both a narrowing and an
unwarranted extension of the idea if we were to understand by 'atheism'
simply a denial of (monotheistic) theism and therefore to regard even
pantheism as a form of atheism. Only that view should be regarded as
atheistic which denies any and every divine or absolute that is not simply
identical with man and with the world of our empirical experience and
with its immanent principles. Atheism, therefore, rejects any and every
claim that God or the divine exists. This means that there can be and are
not only various forms of the idea of God but also various forms of atheism.
Given this concept of atheism, it can be said that no primitive people is
unqualifiedly atheistic, since among all primitive peoples there is some kind
of an idea or a worship of a divine realiry. Even the high religions of Asia
that do not .cknowledge a personal absolute (Buddhism, Taoism) are not
atheistic, as is often mistakenly claimed. By reason of its conception of the
world as numinous, classical antiquity likewise did not have any atheists
in the sense described above. From the second century be on we do indeed
find lists of names of atheoi, but the term refers to people who disregarded
the gods of the state and their public veneration, not to people who simply
denied everything divine. 2 1t was in this limited sense that even Christians
were subsequently execrated and persecuted as atheoi. Justin comments:
 The Denial of God ill Modern Atheism 17
'We admit that as far as all such false gods are concerned we are atheists.
but we are not atheists when it comes to the true God." It is therefore a
kind of fraudulent labelling to make the 'accusation of atheism' against
the early Christians the basis for a contemporary Christian atheism.
Atheism in the proper sense. which denies everything divine. became
possible only in the modern age. It presupposes Christianity and to that
extent is a post-Christian phenomenon. 4 The biblical faith in creation had
broken with the numinous conception of the world that was current in
antiquity and had effected a denuminization of reality by distinguishing
clearly and unambiguously between God the creator and the world as his
creation. In so doing. the Bible thought of the world in wordly terms and
God in divine terms and of the two as qualitatively distinct in infinite
degree. Only when God had been conceived as radically God was it possible
also to deny him in a radical way. Only when the transcendence of
God had been taken seriously did it become possible to experience the
immanence of the world, and only after the world had been 3Cknowledged
simply as world could it become the object of objectifying scientific study
and technical transformation. The way was being prepared for this kind
of autonomous understanding of the world as early as the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas were the most
outstanding representatives of this movement. But the autonomy of the
world. based as it was on the idea of creation. remained part of a total
context that was theonomous; in fact. the autonomy itself was given a
theonomous justification.' On the other hand, the very emancipation of
autonomy from its theonomous context and reference and thus the
presupposition for the rise of modern atheism had theological causes.
These were provided by late medieval nominalism. Nominalism carried
the idea of God's omnipotence and freedom to an extreme. turning him
into an absolutist deity who acts in an arbitrary manner. The rebellion
against this God who does not liberate human freedom but oppresses it.
this God who might well command even what is untrue and unjust. was
an act of human self-assertion.
The reaction is especially clear in Descartes (1596-1650). He is
tormented by the thought of a genius maligmls, an evil spirit. 'very powerful
and very tricky" who 'bends all his efforts' to deceive him. Atlast Descartes
discovers an unshakable foundation on which to base knowledge of the
truth. In triumphant tones he declares: 'Let him deceive me as much as he
will. he can never make me be nothing as long as 1 think that I am
something,'· Descartes expresses his new insight in the formula: Cogito
ergo SIIIIl ('I think, hence 1 am').' The 'hence' does not point to the
conclusion of a syllogism, but is simply a way of expressing an insight
18 The God-Questio/l Today
given in the very act of thinking: 'I am a thinking being." In thus starting
with the ego cogital/5, with the subject who grasps himself as subject.
Descartes provided an Archimedean fulcrum for the entire modern age
that followed; subjectivity was to become the modern mode of thought
and intellectual attitude. Kant described this as a Copernican revolution.'
But subjectivity should not be confused with subjectivism, although this is
a mistake constantly made. Subjectivism, which abolutizes the subject's
limited position and private interests, is a particularist point of view;
modern subjectivity, on the other hand, is a universalist mode of thought,
a new approach to the whole of reality.
In a special way, modern subjectivity has consequences for the God-
question. Descartes and all the great thinkers of the modern age down to
the nineteenth century were anything but atheists. In fact, in his third and
fifth meditations Descartes falls back on traditional arguments for the
existence of God (the proof that concludes from effect to cause, and the
proof that starts with the concept of God). But for Descartes knowledge
of God occurs in the medium of human subjectivity. In contrast to the
nominalist exaggeration of theonomy autonomy here becomes the norm
of judgment. The idea of God is admitted as the ground and means of
human autonomy. In this approach, God ultimately becomes a factor in
the self-fulfillment of man, although Descartes himself does not yet draw
this conclusion. III

This new baSIC ani tude which was cscablishcd by Descartes was henceforth
given the name 'autonomy'," Antiquity and the Middle Ages knew this idea
only as a political catesory; amonomy meant the freedom to lave according to
onc's own laws, that is, political sclf·dctermination. The concept acquired a
bro:.tdcr meaning in the context of the confessional or religious wars of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Unity, freedom and peace could no longer
be defended on theonomous grounds; recourse had to be had to natural law,
which binds everyone and alone is evident to all, and in terms of which
autonomy can be granted to the religious dissenter. Thus the modern doctrine
of natural law was formulated by J. Bodin and H. Grotius, under the influence
of Stoic idea!!!. This teaching identifics lex uaturae with lex dlVina, but
grounds it no longer thconomously but autonomously with the help of human
understanding 'cven if there were no God'. 1l The autonomy of Jaw Icads to the
autonomy of morality. WhIle in antiquity and the Middle Ages law, custom
and morality formed in large measure an inextricably interwoven complex,
morality was forced to become conscious of itself now that the state and law
had achieved emancipa~ion. The result was an autonomous morality based on
interior conviction. 1.1 It was owing to Kant that this morality was given its
philosophical justification. His starting point is the dignity of the human person
 The Denial of God in Modem Atheism 19
who can never be made a means to an end but 4exisrs as an end in himself' ,14
This autonomy has its basis in freedom, which 'can be efficient, independently
of foreign causes determining ir',lS Freedom can therefore only be its own law.
But the autonomy enjoyed by freedom is not to be identified with caprice; it
had its norm in the freedom of the individual himself as well as in the freedom
of everyone else. For this rcason Kant's categorical imperative runs as follows:
41 am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law.''' This principle is only seemingly a formal
onc, for in fact it bases morality on the dignity of the human person; it grounds
an interpersonal (not an individualistic) ethics in a perspective which embraces
the entire human race.
The emancipation of law and morality from the theological contexts that
had given them their foundations meant a new situation for religion. If religion
is no longer the necessary presupposition of order, law and morals in society,
then it inevitably becomes a private affair. Once the various secular spheres
had been freed of their theonomous connections, religion became increasingly
a matter of the interior life. It became a matter of subjective piety, a religion
of the heart, with the way being paved by pietism and the various revivalist
movements.!Hegei recognized that this withdrawal of religion into the subjecti-
vity leads, on the one hand, to a flattening of reality and, on the other, to an
emptying of religion itself. The world becomes godless, God worldless and -
in the strict sense of the word - objectless. The consequences are atheism and It
nihilism. 17

Modern thought has laid the foundations for various forms of atheism.
The word 'atheism' is applied to very diverse phenomena that are classified
in quite different ways in philosophical and theological literature.'" Funda-
mentally, however, atheistic systems may be reduced to two basic types,
corresponding to the two possible understandings of autonomy in the
modern age. There is, first, the autonomy of nature and the secular
spheres (culture, science, art, the economy, politics, and so on), for the
understanding and functioning of which there is increasingly less need
of the God-hypothesis (naturalistic, materialistic, scientistic, methodical
atheism or agnosticism). There is, second, the autonomy of the subject,
whose dignity and freedom militate against the acceptance of an omnipo-
tent God (the humanistic atheism of freedom and the political atheism of
liberation). To be distinguished from these are the forms of atheism that
spring from protest against the wickedness and evil in the world. From an
existential point of view wickedness and evil are far more decisive for many
people than are theoretical and ideological denials of God. I shall discuss
this third kind of atheism in c'lnnection with the question of theodicy
rather than here. "
It would, of course, be absurd to focus attention here solely on the
20 The God-Qllestion Today
systematic philosophical approaches to atheism andon the major ideologies
of the modern age. 2• These, after all, suppose that basic atheistic attitudes
are already seen as plausible. To describe this state of affairs K. Rahner
has coined the phrase 'troubled atheism'; by this he means the experience
of being crushed by a secularized world, the feeling of no longer being able
to make the divine real to oneself, the experience of the silence of God, and
the fear of the emptiness and meaninglessness of the world. 2I Atheism thus
becomes a plausible interpretation of modern secularization. At the same
time, troubled atheists, who are frightened by the absence of God and
whose hearts are restless, are a pastoral windfall.
In addition, there is an atheism characterized by indifference: a complete
unconcern with religious questions, an atheism that, either seemingly or
really, is all too much at peace and takes itself for granted, an atheism that
represses, no longer raises, or even disparages the great questions asked by
the religions. Nietzsche has drawn a sarcastic picture of this 'last man'.
The last man only blinks when the great questions are raised (Zarathustra
is speaking in this passage):
'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?'
thus asks the last man, and he blinks.
The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes
everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the Aea-beetle; the last
man lives longest.
'We have invented happiness,' say the last men, and they blink .. .
One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful
lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes rich or
poor: both require tOO much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who
obey? Both require too much exertion.
No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is
the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse. 22
What Nietzsche has done here is, 01 course, to anticipate the consequences
of modern atheism. Despite all the humanistic impulses at work in modern
atheism, the death of God leads ultimately to the death of man."

2. Atheism in the name of the autonomy of nature

The first great conflict that made a decisive contribution to the rise of
modern atheism was the conAict between theology and the new natural
sciences of the modern cra .24

The trial of Galileo, which ended in 1633 with a condemnation 01 his teaching,
 The DCllial of God ill Modem Atheism 21
was, more than any other incident, of prororypical and epochal significancc"!-~
As everyone knows, in developing the discoveries made by Copernicus and
Kepler, Galileo was led to reject the ancient geocentric picture of the world
that is presupposed in the Bible. He advocated the thesis that the sun docs not
circle the earth but rather the earth circles the sun. The Roman Inquisition on
the other hand defended an outdated picture of the world and an unhistorical
interpretation of the Bible (in this respect, by the way, it was in agreement with
the Reformers). It must be said, however, that there have been few historical
events in which the historical reality has been so unrelated to (he historical
influence it exerted as in the Galileo case, which quickly became a myth. For
the issue at the time was nor only a claim to the autonomy of the natural
sciences, a claim which was quite legitimate from the standpoint of modern
theology. The issue was also Galileo's claim that it is for the natural sciences
to interpret what the Bible says about creation or, in other words, the claim,
in the name of natural science, to determine the scope of theological statements.
Both sides went beyond their competency, even allowing for the fact that the
Inquisition would have been satisfied if Galileo had presented his thesis as a
hypothesis - which is precisely what it is by modern standards. The conflict
that marked the Galileo case was unfortunately not an isolated phenomenon.
Similar conflicts arose, especially in the nineteenth century, in connection with
the disputes over Charles Darwin's theory of evolution; these conflicts have
lasted well into our own century, as the debate over Teilhard de Chardin
shows. The result was one of the greatest catastrophes in the history of the
church: the schism between natural science and theology and even between
the church and modern culture..!" For the modern natural sciences are the hard
core of modernity.:!7The modern economy and technology which these sciences
made possible provided the foundations for the bourgeois culture in which the
modern philosophy of subjectivity could develop and in which the modern
immanentist outlook of which I have already spoken could spread abroad.
Conversely, the natural sciences have their roots in the modern identification
of the human person as subject, for only then could nature become the object
of scientific observation and technical mastery. Consequently, if any new talk
about God is to be serious and to be taken seriously, it must prove itself by the
hard standard of the scientific understanding of reality.
In the Middle Ages nature was an image and symbol of God. In Nikolaus
Copernicus and especially in Johannes Kepler such a symbolic view of the
cosmos is still present in the background. In his Mysterimn cosmographicum
and his Harmonices mlludi (World Harmony), Kepler's aim is to capture the
creative thought of God himself. As for Copernicus, although his rejection of
the old geocentric world-picture expels man from his position at the centre of
the cosmos, he keeps man as the spiritual centre and reference point of the
universe; man is no longer by his physical nature the centre of the world, but
he becomes this centre actively and spiritually by his own efforts." The age
had now dawned in which the dominam vision was of a world which man
22 The God-Questioll Today
creOles for himself scientifically, artistically and philosophically. Central
position had given way to central function. For this reason Kant was justified
in seeing himself as the one who had completed the Copernican revolution.
In Galileo and Newton this revolutionary new mode of though! bears fruit
in il method proper to the natural scicnces.!oJ The laws of nature are nor simply
rcad off. in a purely objectivist way, from nature itself, bur emerge rather from
the interaction of hypothesis and experience. The natural scientist compels
nature, as it were, to give answers to questions which he puts to it. Bur as early
as Newton the danger arises of confusing this way by which knowledge of
nature IS gamed with the way of nature itself; of turning the laws enunciated
by the natural sciences into iron laws of n:afure itself; and of converting the
method of the natural sciences into a new metaphysics. The danger becomes
,cute in the mechanistic approach to the world which Newton developed. In
this approach n;J{urc is treated like a gigantic clockwork that operates in
accordance with minutely determined patterns.

Initially there was a widespread conviction th>t faith and knowledge were
reconcilable. The work of G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), one of the last
univer,,1 scholars, w" representative of the attempt to find a new
synthesis of faith and knowledge. But the more the scientists discovered the
regul,!ities of nature, the more they were forced to eliminate God from
the world. They needed him now only at the periphery and to fill up lacun"
in hum,n knowledge (for example, in the c"e of Newton, to correct the
deflections in the orbits of the planets). In the course of such withdmwal
skirmishes God was increasingly pushed off (0 the periphery of the world
and into the hereafter. On the other hand, scientists were more and more
convinced that the world is infinite. Did this mean th>t in the final analysis
divine predications must be made of the world itself? that God and world
were in fact one? As a result of these developments two possible but
contrary ways emerged of defining a new relationship between God and
the world: pantheism and deism. Atheism is, by comparison, only a
relatively late product of this development.
Pantheism") means that in his being and nature God is one with the
whole (pall) of reality. The concept occurs only in modern times. Factors
inclining to pantheism are to be found, however, in all religious cultures,
especially in the Asiatic high religions but also in the ancient Stoa, in
Neoplatonism and even in the Middle Ages (Amalric of Bena, David of
Dinant). But the formation of a pantheistic system is a modern
phenomenon.

G. Bruno" (1548-1600) is the first in the line of pantheistic thinkers of the

modern age. He was scimulated by prototypes in antiquity, bue the decisive
 The Dellial of Gad ill Modem Atheism 23
mfluence came from the new outlook on the world and life that developed in
the Renaissance; he was 3 man captivated by the beauty of the world. As a
result of Copernicus' discoveries he became convinced that the new science
and the traditional world picture were in conAict. He dared, therefore, to be
the firS( to think of the world as infinite and consequently of God and world
as identical. For him the world is the necessary unfolding of God. For these
ideas he was burned at the stake in the Campo dei Fiori at Rome in 1600.
B. Spinoza (1632-1677) developed the most consistent of all pantheistic
systems. He drew upon Ncoplaronic andJcwish mystical sources, but especially
on the ideas of the Renaissance. For Spinoza God is the one, absolutely infinite
substance which by a process of immanent causality engenders its own infinite
attributes and finite modalities. The basic principle of this pantheism can be
formulated as 'DellS sive lIatura'(God or narurc).J2 But the formula docs not
assert a downright or undifferentiated identitYj God and nature remain, being
distinguished as natura naturans (nature actively creating itself) and natura
naturata (the system of what is created).11 This doctrine exercised an immense
influence. Through the offices of Lessing it became the basis for the religious
attitude to the world which characterized the age of Goethe; it decisively
influenced the young Holderlin, Schelling and Hegel, as well as F. Schleier-
macher in his speeches on religion. 14 The fascination which Spinoza's concept
of God can have precisely for natural scientists, even today, can be secn not
I.:ast in the cosmic religiosity of A. Einstein, who saw God in the harmonious
regularity of being but did not believe in a God who involves himself in the
destinies and activities of human beings. God docs not interfere - he does not
play dice!"

Early on, Jacobi objected to this pantheistic identification of God and the
world as being atheistic, since it dissolves God in nature and nature in
God.'· The debate over whether or not Spinozism is a concealed, though
refined, form of atheism lasted into the nineteenth century.,17 It is no less
possible, of course, to agree with Hegel that Spinozism is a form of
acosmism, since according to Spinoza the world is simply a disposition
and mode of the one divine substance and not something substantial in
itself.,1H Pantheism is thus a profoundly ambiguous system.
The characteristic religious philosophy of the Enlightenment was not,
however, pantheism but deism." It started in seventeenth-eighteenth
century England (Lord Herbert of Cherbury, T. Hobbes, J. Toland, J.
Locke, M. Tindal, A. Collins, and others), became the religious philosophy
to which the French Enlightenment gave its allegiance (P. Bayle, Voltaire,
D. Diderot, and others), and finally gained entrance into Germany (H. S.
Reimarus, and others).

Deism was 'natural religion I, or the embodiment of normal religious truth to

24 The God-QtlestiOlI Today
which everyone has access without any dependence on the supernatural. The
authority of supernatural religion had been relativized by the discovery of
other religions; in any case, in the confessional conflicts at the beginning of the
modern age it could no longer serve as a common bond of union; furthermore,
its absolutist claims were challenged by the new knowledge that had been
gained by the natural sciences. Thus the natural religion of Deism was in a
position to become the modern religious view which all could share and
understand. In this view, nature, understood after the manner of the Stoics,
became the critical court of appeal and the norm of religion.

Deism's concept of God showed variations ranging from the absolute

transcendence of inactive God (Detls otiostls) who has formed the world
after the manner of a master builder and clockmaker and now allows it to
operate in accordance with its own natural laws, to more immanentist and
pantheistic notions. Initally, therefore, deism, pantheism and theism were
not unambiguously distinguishable either in concept or in content. The
clear distinction between deism, pantheism and theism was in fact the work
of later dogmatic theology as it developed its classifications. According to
this later explanation, deism reduces God to a state of transcendence, in
that it fails to recognize his immanence in the world. Commentators
frequently, and justifiably, saw this deism as in danger of turning into a
subtle atheism. 40 For a God who no longer plays an active role in the world
is in the final analysis a dead God. Yet deistic motifs often exert an influence
even today, for example, in the discussion of the possibility of miracles,
the meaning of petitionary prayer, and faith in divine providence.
Pantheism and deism could not have the last word, for both contained
a latent tendency to atheism. The decisive influence in the development of
an explicit atheism came from the empirical, sensate and materialistic
concept of nature in the natural sciences of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. 41 As faith in God found itself compelled more and more to fight
rearguard actions in the face of the victorious spread of the Enlightenment,
God was increasingly deprived of a place and function. Thus when
Napoleon asked Laplace where God fitted into his Systeme dl/ mOllde (The
System of the World), he replied: 'Sire, I no longer have need of that
hypothesis.'4! Lalande, Laplace's contemporary and fellow philosopher,
asserted that God's existence cannot be proved, 'because everything can
be explained without him'.4' As a purely immanent explanation of realiry
became more and more widespread, the way was paved for the return of
the materialistic ideas of antiquity (Democritus, Epicurus).44 We already
find these in P. Gassendi, T. Hobbes and R. Descartes. In the French
Enlightenment they gained currency especially through the Encyclopedie
published by D. Diderot in 1751-1780. J. A. de LaMettrie was the firstlo
 The Denial of God in Modern Atheism 25
apply them to the human person in his book L 'homme machine (Man a
Machine). P. H. D. von Holbach and C. A. Helvetius became their
propagandists. These views reached their high point or, better, their low
point, in the 'popular materialism' of the mid-nineteenth century as seen
in the writings of]. Moleschott, L. Biichner and especially E. Haeckel,
whose Die Weltratsel (The Riddle of the Universe) ran to about 400,000
copies and was translated into twenty five languages. Haeckel could not
see God as anything more than a higher mammal, gaseous in nature; he
mocked him as 'Doctor of Engineering, first degree'.4s All this was at about
the same level as N. Khrushchev's trick question to the first astronauts:
Had they seen God while they were out there in space?
Mechanistic materialism and the scientistic atheism to which it gave rise
are regarded today as outmoded. 46 This shift is the result not least of the
development of the natural science itself. The theory of relativity (A.
Einstein) and quantum physics (N. Bohr and W. Heisenberg) turned upside
down the mechanistic picture of the world that had often been deduced
from classical natural science. That picture of the world had been rendered
possible only by a methodologically irresponsible crossing of the bound-
aries of the natural sciences. The doctrinaire atheism of the past is replaced
today by a 'methodical atheism' (the phrase is from]. Lacroix), which says
that the natural scientist as such can and must methodically prescind from
the question of the existence of God. The natural scientist's own method
allows him only to make statements pertaining to the sciences; as a
scientist, therefore, he can neither refute nor positively justify faith in God.
Conversely, the theologian'S method does not permit him either to dispute
or to confirm what is said in the natural sciences. God is by definition not
an inner-wordly entity alongside other such entities; neither, therefore, is
he a hypothesis that can be reliably tested by empirical methods. Anyone
who dismissed as meaningless such assertions as are not empirically
verifiable or falsifiable, himself steps outside the realm of empirically
verifiable or at least falsifiable assertions. He contradicts himself, since his
thesis about meaninglessness cannot itself be empirically tested. 4' He
absolutizes and ideologizes a form of knowledge that is legitimate in its
own sphere and is inherently conscious of its own limitations, turning it
instead into a faith in science (scientism), which can only be a superstition.
Natural science and theology are thus on different levels; this does not
mean, however, that they can be indifferent to one another and that they
have nothing to do with one another. Modern science that is conscious of
its limitations is today running into the question of God in two ways: when
in inquires into its own ultimate presuppositions, which themselves are no
longer of a scientific kind, and when it inquires into the ethical responsibility
~
26 The God-Questioll Today
of the scientist when faced with the consequences of his research, especially
in the nuclear and genetic areas. The basic defect of scientistic atheism, on
the one hand, and, on the other, of the ecclesiastical apologetics that was
launched against it and sought to harmonize faith and science, was that
they tried to put God and the world as it were, on the same level. God and
the world became competitors, and it was assumed that anything attributed
to God had to be denied to the world, and vice versa. But the notion of
competition mistakes both the absoluteness of God and the freedom of
man. For God, as the reality that encompasses everything, cannot be an
entity alongside or above the world, since, if he were, he would be limited
by the world and would himself be a limited finite being. It is precisely
when God is taken seriously as God that he liberates the world to be the
world. The converse is also true: when the world and its laws are made
absolutes, the result is a deterministic system in which not only God but
man as well is dead, because there is no room left for human freedom. The
deplorable thing about mechanistic materialism and the atheism to which
it gives rise is that it surrenders the great insight of the modern era, namely,
that humanity is the point of reference for the world, and turns human
beings into a function of the world and of matter. It is only logical, then,
that a further discussion of the God-question should be narrowed down
to the question of the relation between theonomy and autonomy, divine
absoluteness and human freedom.

3. Atheism in the name of human autonomy

The point of departure for modern thinking is not nature and substance,
but subject and freedom. The decision in the God-question is therefore
made not in dealing with the problems raised by nature but in the debate
over human freedom. Here again, atheism comes on the scene only at the
end of the modern development. The great thinkers from Descartes to
Hegel held resolutely to the idea of God. On the other hand, the new point
of departure altered the concept of God in a decisive way and thus created
the presuppositions for the humanistic atheism of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.

As I indicated earlier, Descartes already introduces the idea of God in order to

protect the human ego. In the process the idea of God becomes ambiguous.
God is in danger of becoming the means of human self-fulfillment and thus of
being reduced to a function. This danger becomes clearer as early as Kant.
According to Kant, the idea of God cannot be reached by speculative reason;
Kant introduces it, however, as a postulate of practiCa( reason." For man's

~.J-
.I"-l~
 The De/lia/ of God in Modern Atheism 27
desire for happiness can be fulfilled only if the desire is in harmony with
external nature; but this harmony between spirit or freedom and nature can
in turn only be ensured by absolute Spirit and absolute Freedom, that is, by
God. Only if God is presupposed, then, can human freedom 'turn out well'.
Kant needs God for the sake of man's happiness. God is no longer important
'in himself' but only in his significance 'for us'.
In thinkers after Kant, in Fichte and Schelling, for example, the idea of
human autonomy is again the focus of intense interest. The young Schelling,
in his Philosophische Briefe iiber Dogmatismus lind Krit;zismus (Philosophical
Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism) already comes quite close toa postulatory
atheism. He seems to regard human freedom as incompatible with the idea of
an objective God." The conflicts are already evident here which will become
acute in the atheism controversy started by Fichte in 1798. In an article entitled
'Concerning the Foundation of Our Belief in the Divine Government of the
World','o Fichte identified God with the moral order of the world; God is thus
the means and mediation of freedom, but he himself is not free. Fichte denied
that God is personal, because he was afraid that this would introduce limitation
and finiteness into God. sl What he was trying to say in this misleading manner
was that God should not bethoughtof as exisringafterthe mannerof substance,
for the concept of substance is derivable from the sensible world and (in Kant,
for example) is in the service of human happiness. In Fichte's eyes, such a God
would be an idol and not the true God. For him, the true God belongs to the
moral sphere, that is, to the dimension of freedom. From this point of view
Fichte is close to the late philosophy of Schelling, who repeatedly tries to think
of God not as a means of freedom but as absolute freedom in himself."
Hegel in particular grasped the situation and emphasized atheism as the
current flowing in the depths of modern thought. He made his point by referring
on several occasions to the hymn in the Lutheran hymnal, 'God Himself is
dead'." The way was prepared for him here by Pascal and by Jean Paul's
address of the dead Christ from out of the universe. Hegel called the sentence
'God himself is dead' an expression of the culture of his age, as 'the feeling
upon which the religion of more recent times rests'. With the help of his idea
of the 'speculative Good Friday', that is, of the reconciliation of God and death
with the help of the idea of absolute freedom that recovers itself in its contrary,
he sought to overcome this situation. God must be thought of as a living God,
as kenotic freedom, as love that empties itself out in its opposite, namely death,
and is thus able to abrogate death.
Despite the sublimiry of the ideas involved, Hegel's effort to eliminate
atheism dialectically was marked by ambiguity. This is why immediately after
Hegel's death (1831) his disciples split up into a right wing and a left wing.
While the Right Hegelians, especially P. Marheineke, sought to interpret Hegel
in terms of orr hod ox theism, the Left Hegclians soon charged him with atheism.
Typical here was B. Bauer's book Die Posa/Ille des Jiil1gstel1 Gerichts iiber
Hegel dell Atheisten WId Alllichristell (1841; The Trumpet of the Last
28 The God-Question Today
Judgment sounded over Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist). According to Bauer,
Hegel acknowledges only the universal World-Spirit that becomes conscious
of itself in man. Naive disciples like Strauss (says Bauer) have regarded this
simply as pantheism; but in fact it is the most deliberate atheism, that puts
self-consciousness in the place of God." A. Ruge called Hegel a 'messiah of
atheism' and a 4Robespierre of theology'.55 We may leave aside here the
question of the true interpretation of Hegel. The only important point in this
context is the fact that as far as its historical influence was concerned, Hegel's
philosophy turned into the atheism that has shaped our situation down to the
present time. 56

Two thinkers in particular must be mentioned as prophets of the ~ew

humanistic atheism: L. Feuerbach and K. Marx. The third thinker with
whom I shall deal, F. Nietzsche, already saw the nihilistic consequences
both of this atheism and of theism.

(a) Ludwig Feuerbach

L. Feuerbach (1804-1872) was the most influential and successful ofthose
disciples of Hegel who reduced theology to anthropology.57 Feuerbach
himself was converted from theologian to anti-theological philosopher,
from Hegelian to the anthropologist of a materialistically understood
sensuousness that today is often explained as emancipatory sensuousness. 5 1!
I am interested here only in his criticism of religion. K. Marx was of the
opinion that Feuerbach had largely completed the criticism of religion. 59
'And there is no other way for you to tTllth and freedom except that leading
through the stream of fire [the Feuer-bachl. Feuerbach is the purgatory of
the present time. '60
Feuerbach gained this influence through his book Das Wesen des
Christenll/ms (1841; The Essence of Christianity). In this book Feuerbach
reverses Hegel's dialectically understood identification of God and man.
His starting point was: 'Religion ... is consciousness of the infinite.''' The
consciousness is a necessary element in the consciousness that distinguishes
man from the beasts. Forthis reason Feuerbach can say 'In the consciousness
of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object the infinity of his
own nature.'6Z 4The absolute to man [i.e. a man's God) is his own nature. '6]
'God is the manifested inward nature, the expressed self of a man- religion
the solemn unveiling of a man's hidden treasures, the revelation of his
intimate thoughts, the open confession of his love-secr~ts.'64 'God is the
mirror of man.''' The mystery of theology is therefore anthropology. In
religion, man projects and objectifies his own being. 66
Feuerbach explains the origin of religion with the aid of his theory of
 The DelJial of God ill Modem Atheism 29
projection. Because man does not find fulfillment in himself, he projects
his desire for infinity on to God. 'Man makes a god of what he is not but
would like to be.'·7 But in so doing man alienates himself. 'To enrich God,
man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing.' 'Man
denies to himself only what he attributes to God.'·' Religion is therefore,
'the disuniting of man from himself ... God is not what man is - man is
not what God is.' This disunity is nothing else than 'a distancing of man
with his own nature' .6'J
The religious projection thus leads to alienation and estrangement, to
the negation of man. In this perspective atheism is the negation of negation
and thus the new higher position. A No to God is a Yes to man. Once the
mystery of theology has been shown to be the mystery of anthropology,
faith in God becomes the faith in man in himself. 'The beginning, middle
and end of religion is MAN.'7. Anthropology, therefore, is theology that
has become conscious of itself. 'Holllo homilli Deus est; - this is the great
practical principle; - this is the axis on which revolves the history of the
world.'7' Feuerbach's atheism ultimately leads to an apotheosis of the
world. 'The profoundest secrets lie in common every-day things.' Water,
bread, wine are by their very nature sacraments. Feuerbach concludes;
'Therefore let bread be sacred for us, let wine be sacred, and also let water
be sacred. Amen!'72 The change to a new kind of religion shows even more
clearly in this passage; 'Thus do things change. What yesterday was still
religion is no longer such to.day, and what to-day is atheism, tomorrow
will be religion.'7'
Later on, Feuerbach further expanded this philosophy. His 'new philos-
ophy' anticipates an I-Thou philosophy7. and even political theology;
'Man with man - the ullity of "[" alld "You" - that is God.''' 'The t",e
dialectic is 1I0t a monologue of the solitllry thinker with himself; it is a
dialogue betwem "I" and "You""· Religion is therefore not replaced by
a cult of the individual; religion and the church are replaced by politics,
prayer by work.77 'The new religion, the religion of the future, is politics.'''
'Whatever else it may imply, this anti-theology of Feuerbach represents
a question; a question put by him to the theology of his time, and perhaps
not only of his time.''' But questions in reply are also necessary. With
regard to the theory of projection it must be said first, and as a general
principle, that projection is part of all human experience and knowledge;
there can therefore be no question of denying it as part of religious
experience and knowledge. But the fact of projection proves only that there
is an inevitable subjective element in our knowledge; it proves nothing
about the reality of the object we experience and know. It is indeed possible
with the help ofthe theory of projection to explain to some extent subjective
30 The God-Question Today
conceptions of God, but the theory as such tells us nothing about the reality
of God himself. With regard to Feuerbach's theory of projection in
particular it must be said that while human consciousness is indeed infinite
in its intention, it is precisely within the horizon of this intentional infinity
that its own finitude becomes clear. By reason of his material finitude man
can never materially fulfill his formal infinity. For this reason, man cannot
in the final analysis endure by his own resources; he is not to be made
unconditionally happy by becoming closed in within himself. For this same
reason, man can never be man's God. The reduction of theology to
anthropology does not solve the problem to which theology seeks an
answer. It is true that the intentional infinity of man does not prove that
some real transcendence exists to answer the sclf· transcending of man; but
neither does it prove the non-existence of God or the validity of reducing
the idea of God to the idea of man. Feuerbach's criticism fails of its purpose.
At the very least it leaves the God·question still open.

Fcucrbach's anthropological reductions of religion has nonetheless remained

a basic parr of (he criticism of religion down [Q our own day. This is true not
only of Marxism, but also of thinkers who arc more bourgeois in their
orientation. It lives on in the 'postulatory atheism' of the twentieth century,
which denies God for the sake of man and his freedom (N. Hartmann, j.- P.
Sarree, Merleau-Ponry, and ochers). Kant's pastula tory proof of God's exist-
ence is here turned into its opposite: not the existence but the non-existence
of God is postulated by human freedom. Even if God existed, the fact could
play no role in man's life. IIO Human autonomy contradicts every kind of
theonomy!
Feuerbach's continued relevance could not be more dearly shown than by
mentioning the name of Sigmund Freud" (1856-1939), whose psycho-analysis
of the experience and consciousness (in the broadest sense) of the self has
opened up a new dimension and had far-reaching practical consequences,
especially for sexual behaviour. Meanwhile psycho-analysis is far more than
a medical and therapeutic procedure; it represents a further stage of the
Enlightenment and exercises an influence today in the sciences of literature,
culture and art as well as in pedagogical theory, ethics, the science of religion
and philosophy. It is a new key for the interpretation of reality, including nO!
least the reality of religion. The outcome of Freud's psychoanalytic explanation
of religion is very much the same as that of Feuerbach 's projection theory, thus
making it all the more necessary to come to grips with this latter.
Freud's criticism of religion is part of his entire anthropology and psycho-
analytical theory, but it is not possible here to deal with these broad areas. Nor
shall I discuss Freud's later derivation of religion in terms of the history of
religion and culturej from the historical standpoint this derivation, worked
out in Totem and Taboo and Moses and Monotheism, is questionable, to say
 The Dell;al of God ;11 Modem Athe;sm 31
the leaS!. I shall restrict myself here to Freud's chief work of religious criticism:
The Flltllre of all 1/1115;011 (1927), which he then carried further in his
Civt/izatioll alld Its Discolltellls (1930).
Freud defines man primarily 3S a creature of instinct that is nonetheless
called upon by external reality and by civilization to renounce his instincts;
erroneous or unsuccessful efforts to overcome the conflict lead to neuroses, to
a flight from hard reality to surrogate solutions. Freud's decisive step is
to recognize an analogy between such neuroses and religious behaviour.
According to Freud, religion originates in the effort to find consolation in the
face of lifc's difficulties and the renunciations imposed by civilization, and in
this way to make human helplessness tolerable. Religious ideas spring from
'the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior power of
nature' and 'the urge to reerify the shortcomings of civilization which make
themselves painfully felt'." Religious ideas are therefore 'not precipitates of
experience or end-results of thinking: they arc illusions, fulfillments of the
oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind'.lIl Thcy arc infantile
wishful illusions, a 'universal obsL"Ssional neurosis', 'a system of wishful
illusions together with a disavowal of reality'.M" To this infantilism Freud
opposes an 'educatioll to reality\ which includes the acceptance of the
necessities imposed by fate, for ag::J.inst these no science is of any help. But this
resignation includes an element of very muted hope: 'By withdrawing their
expectations from the other world and concentrating all their liberated energies
into their life on earth, they will probably succeed in achieving a state of things
in which life will become tolerable for everyone and civilization no longer
oppressive to anyone. '"5
Freud's criticism of religion was meant not only to strengthen the unbelief
of unbelievers but also to explain the faith of believers. It is therefore of the
greatest importance, both theologically and pastorally. On the other hand, its
limitations must also be pointed out. Is it really possible to start in such an
unquestioning way with an analogy between religious and psychopathic
phenomena (obsessional neurosis, infantile wishful illusions)? The least that
must be said is that no identity of nature may be deduced from such analogies.
Rather, the religious phenomenon must first be analysed on its terms; it may
not bea prior; reduced to other phenomena. Otherwise the critic opens himself
to the suspicion that atheism rather than religion is a wishful illusion. On the
basis of a morc detailed analysis of the phenomenon of religion as such, other
depth psychologists reach a much marc positive view of religion than Freud
did (c. G. Jung, E. Fromm, V. Frankl and others). In any case, psychology can
explain only the psychological re.lity, the psychic content and the psychic
consequences of religion; its methods do not permit it to say anything about
the objective reality and truth-content of what is being conveyed by religious
representations. This fact brings us once again to the limits of the projection
theory and its effectiveness.
32 The God-QllestiOlI Today
(b) Karl Marx
Karl Marx"' (1818-1883) was born into a Jewish family that was later
converted to Protestantism. As a young man he was already familiar with
the French Enlightenment; later on, as a member of the Doctors' Club in
Berlin (A. Ruge, M. Stirner, M. Hess and others) he adopted the atheism
of the Left Hegelians and made Feuerbach's criticism of religion his own.
He came to socialism and communism only subsequently, during his years
in Paris, where he became acquainted with the ideas of the early socialists
(Proudhon, Saint-Simon, Owen, etc.) and became a friend of H. Heine and
F. Engels. In 1948 he and Engels composed the Communist Manifesto
which thenceforth became the basis of the Communist movement. It was
likewise Engels who stimulated Marx to study political economy (A. Smith,
D. Ricardo, J. S. Mill). While the early 'Paris Manuscripts' (1844) still
move in the direction primarily of a philosophical humanism, Marx was
becoming increasingly interested in a more realistic humanism. In his
principal work, Capital (1867), economic analyses occupy the entire
foreground. On the other hand, the later dialectical materialism (Diamat)
came into existence only as the result of the Allti-Diihring (1878) of F.
Engels, who turned the doctrine of the historical dialect followed by society
into a general view of the world by adopting Darwin's theory of evolution
and integrating the historical dialectic into a more encompassing dialectic
of nature. Lenin made Diamat the official world-view of the Communist
Party. The relation between the early and the late Marx, between Marx
and Marxism, is debated. Nowadays, amid all the differences in emphasis,
scholars tend to stress more the connections and the continuity,

It was the publication of the Paris Manuscripts in 1932 that led to a discussion
of the original Marxism of Marx himself as distinct from the orthodox
doctrinaire and totalitarian Marxism found in the ideology of the Communist
party and state. The debate led to various anthropological and humanistic
interpretations of Marx (Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci, Schaff, Kolakowski,
Machovec, Bloch, Same, Garaudy, Lefebvre, Merleau-Ponty and others),
which were rejected as revisionist by orthodox Marxism. These new interpreta-
tions introduced the idea of a democratic Marxism as well as new possibilities
of dialogue with Christianity. The 'Frankfurt School' (M. Horkheimer, T. W.
Adorno and others) sought to present Marxism as a continuation of modern
enlightenment and to revitalize it as a philosophy of history that has a practical
purpose U. Habermas). The structuralist interpretation of Marx offered by L.
Althusser, on the other hand, insists on the very opposite: that is not the
individual human being but the totality of relations that is the subject of
history. More recent interpretations are once again contending that totalitarian
traits are to be found not only in Marxism but in the thinking of K. Marx
 The Dellial of God ill ModeTII Atheism 33
himself, so that rhe internal development of Marxism is ro be considered not
a degeneration but a more or less consistent evolution (A. Glucksmann; C.
Jambet; G. Lardreau; B. H. Levy). From rhe theological standpoint, rhe most
important question in the interpretation of Mux is whether atheism and (he
criticism of religion are essential to Marxism or simply historically conditioned
and, as such, accidental.

Looked ar simply in historical rerms, Marx's criticism of religion rook as

irs incontroverrible basis rhe humanistic atheism of L. Feuerbach. 'The
basis of irreligious criricism is rhis: man makes religion; religion does nor
make man.''' As for Feuerbach, so for Marx religion is a projection. And
as for Feuerbach, so for Marx atheism is not simply a negation, but a
negation of a negation and, to this extent, a positive assertion: the assertion
of humanism. Communism presupposes this atheism, but atheism is nor
yet communism. For Marxist thought the criticism of religion is rather a
presupposition for a criticism of the world. 'Thus the criticism of heaven
is rransformed into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religioll into the
criticism oflalli, and the criticism oftbeology into the criticism ofpolitics.· ..
This is the point at which Marx takes a decisive step beyond Feuerbach.
Unlike Feuerbach, Marx is bent on understanding man in and through his
economic and social conditioning. But 'the essence of man is no abstraction
inhering in each single individual. In irs actuality it is the ensemble of social
relationships.''' 'Man is tbe bllman 1II0rld, the stato, society. This stare,
this society, produce religion.'·o

This concrete economic and political view of man has consequences for the
new humanism which Marx is seeking, Whereas Fcuerbach was bent on
unmasking Hegel's pantheism as a form of atheism, Marx wants 'the world's
becoming philosophical' in Hegel to be replaced by 'philosophy's becoming
wordly'.91 Hegel reconciled philosophy and the world only in thoughr, nO! in
reality; philosophy made perfecr now stands in contrast ro a world rhar is
perverse. Marx wanrs ro fulfill and rhus cancel our philosophy; he wanrs ro
rurn rheory into pracrice. 'The philosophers have only il!te~preted rhe world
in various ways; the point is, to change it,''12 According to Marx, therefore,
rhe chief defecr of marerialism up ro now, including rhe marerialism of
Feuerbach, is rhar it has grasped realiry only as an objecr of perception and
not subjectively as human activity and practice. '1.\ Marx thus moves beyond the
previous mechanistic materialism and replaces it with a historical materialism.
The larrer makes irs own rhe modern idea of subjecrivity and is rhus able ro see
irself as rhe rrue heir of rhe Enlighrenment and idealism. Marx's marerialism
is thus at the same time a humanism, according to which man is the supreme
being for man. '14 But since there is also the question of the concrete person,
this humanism is also a naturalism, that is, the realization of a human world.
34 The God-Questioll Today
This realization in turn presupposes rhatrhc products of work, being mediations
between man and the world, belong tD all in common. For this reason the
elimination of private property, or communism, is true humanism.'1s In the
final analysis Marx's aim is a radical and universal emancipation, that is, the
complete restoration of man, 'a restoration of the human world and of human
relationships to malt himself. 96 The need, therefore, is 'to overthrow all those
conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible
being','J7

This practico-political understandingof man necessarily had to modify the

criticism of religion that had been taken over from Feuerbach, by expanding
it in terms of politics, economics and practice. The classical passage here
is in the 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'
(1843/44). Religion is not inverted self-consciousness but inverted world-
consciousness: inverted because it is the expression of an inverted world.
Religion is even 'the general theory of this world', 'its moral sanction', 'its
general basis of consolation and justification'. 'Religion is the sigh of the
oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of
soulless conditions. It is the opilllll of the people. ,,.
Several interesting points arc made in these passages. First, religion is
understood as a projection. But the starting point for the projection is not
humanity as such; religion is rather understood (to use a later phraseology)
as a superstructure built upon relations. This idea finds expression in what
is from the standpoint of the criticism of religion the most important
chapter in Capital, a chapter that has the significant title: 'The Fetishism
of Commodities and the Secret Thereof'. A commodity is, in Marx's eyes,
'a very queer thing', 'abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological
niccties',99 The mystical character it possesses and the secret surrounding
it arc due to the fact that it comes before man as an object and thus reflects
back to him his own nature as this produces itself in work. It is thus
analogous to 'the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world'. "MI This is
why the removal of religious alienation is only a presupposition of
true humanism. The philanthropy which is fostered by atheism is only
philosophical and abstract; it becomes rcal only in communism, which
eliminates real alienations. wl
The religious illusion is, secondly, not simply the work of a ruling caste
of priests who keep the people in a state of stultification. Marx is far
removed from any such primitive explanation. He does not say, as Lenin
will later, that religion is an opiumforthe people, a consolation deliberately
administered to the people. Marx says rather that it is an opium of the
people, a consolation which the people administer to themselves because
 The Dellial of God ill Modern Atheism 35
of the wretched conditions in which they Iive. W2 The religious ideology is
not viewed by Marx as something arbitrary but as a kind of necessary
natural process. 'Consciousness can never be anything but conscious
existence. "OJ 'The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of
the dominant material relationships.''''' If these relationships are changed,
religion will by itself die out and cease to exist. 'The religious reflex of the
real world can, in any case, only finally vanish when the practical relations
of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable
relations with regard to his fellow·men and to Nature.'w, Then there will
no longer be any need of religion.
The third point to be made is that Marx's judgment on religion is not
purely negative. He sees in it not only a function that sanctions and
legitimizes existing relations but also a protest and a sigh of the oppressed
creature. But religion deals in promises of an illusory happiness, in
'imaginary flowers from the chain'.w. This illusion must be eliminated, so
that man may take control of his own history, 'so that he will think, act
and fashion his reality'. Criticism of religion is therefore a presupposition
of an earthly, political criticism. 'It is the task of history, therefore, once
the other·world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this
llJorld. '107
Is atheism, therefore, an essential presupposition in Marx's judgment,
or would he find acceptable a belief in God and a Christianity that do not
serve to justify oppression but are in the service of a prophetic criticism
against unjust conditions and of the liberation of man?

Opinion is divided in the answer to this question, 1011 In the Marxist-Leninist

ideology that is officially professed today in the Soviet Union and in other
communist countries atheism is undoubtedly regarded as an essential point of
doctrine and even as the basis for some of its fundamental theses. But according
to theologians like T. Steinblichel, M. Reding and H. Gollwitzer, the connection
IS not an unconditionally necessary one. Early on, the representatives of
religious socialism (c. F. B1umhardt, H. Kutter, L. Ragaz, the early K. Barth,
P. Tillich) maintained that the impulses of Marxism in the direction of justice
and peace were compatible with the Christian gospel, and were even in
conformity with it. After 1945 came the 'Christian Peace Conference' (J. L.
Hromadka, H. Iwand and others); numerous efforts were made to establish
communication, especially in Italy and France (G. Girardi; G. Fessard and
others); in Germany there were the conferences sponsored by the Paulus·
Gesellschaft and, until 1975, the Intemationale Dialog·Zeitschri(t edited by
H. Vorgrimler; in Austria, the Neltes Forum, edited by G. Neuning; and,
finally, the Christians for Socialism movement which was begun in Santiago
de Chile in 1972. The new political theology, the theology of revolution and
36 The God-Question Today
liberation .heology likewise derived important s.imuli from Marxis. and Neo-
Marxist thinkers, at least as far as the analysis of social relations is concerned.
Official Ca.holic .eaching is likewise no. as monoli.hic as i. may seem if one
.akes in.o account only .he decrees of Pius XII and John XXIII .ha. forbid
Catholics to belong to the Communist Parry under pain of excommunication.
The social encyclical Quadragesimo anno of Pius XI (1931) already has
important points in common with the Marxist analysis and criticism of
capitalism. This criticism of capitalism has persisted down to the very recent
social encyclical Laborem exercens of John Paul II (1981). In addi.ion, .he
encyclical Pacem in lerris of John XXIII (1963), .he Pas.oral Cons.itution
Gaudium el spes and .he encyclical Popu/orum progressio of Paul VI (1967)
began '0 make dis.inc.ions. This process shows mos. clearly in .he Apos.olic
Letter OClogesima adveniens of Paul VI (1971), where various levels of
Marxism are distinguished: Marxism as the active practice of the class struggle;
as the exercise of all forms of political and economic power; as an ideology
based on his.orical ma.erialism and .he denial of any.hing beyond .he present
life; as a scien.ific me.hod and '001 for .he inves.iga.ion of social and poli.ical
relations. But the Letter is realistic enough to acknowledge the internal links
between these various levels,I09

As a mat.er of fac., Marx himself always regarded .he a.heistic criticism

of religion as not only a historical but also an essential presupposition of
communism; moreover, he was of the opinion that the humanistic impulses
present in a.heism find .heir true fulfillment only in communism. For .his
reason Marx did no. attack only an unsocial and socially backward
Christianity; he also conduc.ed a vehement onslaught upon a socially
committed Christiani.y that was gelling involved in the problem of the
workers, as in the case of Bishop Ketteler.' '0 Marx's disciples, K. Kautzky
and E. Bloch, were the first to discover .he social, emancipatory and even
revolu.ionary potential of Christianity. But Bloch reclaims .his po.ential
for socialism and atheism, since 'without atheism there is no place for
messianism' .111 In his eyes, therefore, only an atheist can be a good
Chris.ian.'ll Bu. even .hough hope in an absolute future does not exclude
a rightly understood commi.ment to an intra-historical future, but
unshackles, motivates and inspires such a commitment,l13 it remains a fact
that .he .his-wordly messianism of Marxism and .he eschatological hope
of the Chris.ian are evidently incompa.ible.' 14
The reason for .his is to be found in the Marxis. picture of man, according
to which man or humanity is its own creator and owes its existence only
to itself. IIS According to Marx, man is his own redeemer. Every notion of
a mediator is excluded from the outset. 1I6 'For man, the root is man
himself.' Such radical autonomy excludes every form of theonomy. The
 The Dellial o( God i,/ Modem Atheism 37
criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that 'mall is the supreme beillg
(or lIIall. '117 V. Gardavski comments: 'Marxism is essentially atheistic. Or
to put it another way: it is atheism which provides the radical aspect of the
Marxist philosophy of life. Withoutit, both Marx's plan for a "lOtal man"
and his concept of Communism are equally inconceivable.'1IK We must
therefore put our cards on the table and admit that not only for orthodox
Diamat, but also for Marxism in its original form, atheism is an essential
element. The question of whether it is possible 10 separate this atheism
from the socio-political and economic thrust of Marxism is one that can
only be put- at best - to a radically revised Marxism that surrenders its
(necessarily) totalitarian messianism. But would this then be the original
Marxism?
Every theological criticism of Marx must begin with self-criticism. With
the exception of a few men like Bishop Keneler, A. Kolping, F. Hitze
and others, nineteenth-century Christianity came much too late 10 an
appreciation of the social question. The General Synod of the Sees
of Germany (1971-1975) speaks, not without reason, of a continuing
scandal''' that has its basis in an erroneous mentality, especially in a
primarily caritative and insufficiently structural view of the problem. In
addition, there has long been a failure 10 distinguish adequately between
the various levels of Marxism and in particular between the Marxist
analysis of the social problem and the ideological interpretation then given
by Marxism. Even if we formulate fundamental theological objections to
the ideological interpretation offered by Marxism, we need not deny that
Marxism has developed important and by now indispensable tools for
analysing social, economic and political problems. These methods become
ideological only if they are turned into universal absolutes, that is, if
religious phenomena are a priori discussed only in a socio-economic
perspective and no longer in themselves.
In addition to this methodical advance, Marxism makes a contribution
of a substantive kind: its demonstration of the fundamental importance of
work. The encyclical Laborelll exercells (1981) has adopted this viewpoint,
but in a Christian perspective; it sees work as a fundamental form of human
self-fulfillment and thereby shows the primacy of man the worker over
things, even over capital. The defects of the Marxist interpretation of
religion are due, among other things, to the fact that M3rX nowhere
expressly analyses the phenomenon of religion in itself but a priori reduces
itto economic and political functions. Since Marx does not himself justify
his criticism of religion, but more or less takes this from Feuerbach, the
objections against Feuerbach's theory of projection hold against Marx as
well. This means that from the fact that ideas of God are influenced by the
38 The God-Questioll Today
socio-economic relations of a given time, it docs not follow that God is
simply a reflection of these rclations. If Marx had really investigated the
role played by religion in the social process, he would have had to ask
himself whether in addition to the influence of socio·economic relations
on religious ideas, there is also an influence (shown by M . Weber) of
religion on social ideas and social practice.'" At least by allusions he
makes, Marx shows his realization that not only do relations determine
ideas, but ideas, in the form of utopias, detl!rminc and can revolutionize
relations. This means in turn that spirit enjoys at least a relative independ·
ence in regard ro maner. The end result is thar religion is not a function of
bad economic and social conditions and that it docs nor simply die our
when rhese condirions change in a revolurionary degree. This is why
religion has still nor died out in the communiS! counrries; despire harsh
persecution and suppression it not only survives but is even rev1£alized.
This siruation is connecred wirh a second poinr: communism is still
unable to give an answer to the individual person's questions regarding
meaning. Thesequesrionsare asked also and especially in socialistsocieries,
because rhe laner bring new rypes of alien arion of rhe individual from
sociery. The question of personal happiness, of a personal destiny, of
individual guilt, suffering and death docs not accepr as adequate rhe
explanation that these arc part of the progress toward a classless society.
Here is rhe decisive point. Christianity sees man not simply as an ensemble
of social relations but as a person who, no mailer how thoroughly inte-
grated he is into society, possesses an inherent value and dignity!!1 and is
in turn the source, subject andobjcctof all social institutions. 1:!!Christianity
therefore sees evil as taking the form primarily not of structures and
institutions but of sin, which has its origin in the heart of man. The dignity
of the person is ultimately based on the transcendence of the person.1!.l
Human autonomy and theonomy are therefore not related to each other
as competitors; they increase in direct, not in inverse proportion. I!"
From the Christian view of man and his constitutive relatedness it
follows that every form of intra-historical messianism is excluded for
Christians. Because of his constitutive relatedness to God, man can never
be completely his own master. Neither, therefore, can he completely liberate
himself from his history and begin fully anew. Even the revolutionary
is caught in the enranglemenrs of history; even he needs forgiveness,
redemption and the grace of a new beginning. Finally: revolution can - at
best - offer a hope to coming generations. But what about the suffering,
the oppressed, the losers of the past and the presenr? Are they simply a
means to the happiness of others? If hope and justice are to be possible for
all, even the dead, this can only be if God is lord of life and death and if he
 The Dellial of God ill Modem Atheism 39
is a God who raises the dead. '" There are doubtless mistaken ways of
looking for consolation in the next world, but when every form of
consolation in the next world is rejected as an empty promise, then this
world, too, is stripped of all consolation.

(c) Friedrich Nietzsche

Even as a student, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)126 was alienated by
the sentimental and moralistic Christianity he came to know in the close
atmosphere of a Protestant parsonage. His argument against Christianity
is drawn less from reason than from life. Consequently, Nietzsche is more
than a philosopher; he is rather a prophet ofthe death of God and a witness
to the question which modern man addresses to Christians and to the
ascetical ideal of Christianity. But Nietzsche is also already aware of
the result to which atheism leads, namely, nihilism; he anticipates the
twentieth-century crisis of meaning and attempts to overcome it by a new
view of the world and of life.

Nict?-schc's thought has merwirh many interpretations and misinterpretations.

He was first claimed as an aesthetic thinker by the Stefan George group: then
his statements about the morality of masters and about the blond beast were
misused for political and nationalistic ends by National Socialism. His influence
was at first a more literary kind; in this context we may mention Thomas
Mann, Stefan Zweig, Nikos Kazantzakis, Andre Gide and Andre Malraux.
Because of his aphoristic style and the way his thinking in terms of opposites
involves him in numerous contradictions, he was initally refused the rank of a
philosopher who is to be taken seriously (W. Windelband; J. Hirschberger); it
was not until K. Jaspers and M. Heidegger that he began [Q exercise a serious
influence on philosophy. But Jaspers and Heidegger interpret him rather in
terms of what is left unsaid in his thoughts and thus in terms of the direction
of their own philosophizing. Nietzsche's importance is probably to be found
in the fact that he seeks to overcome the appreciation of history which
Christianity introduced, together with its secularized consequences in the
modern faith in progress, and to foster a revitalization of the cyclical thinking
of antiquity (K. Lowith; E. Fink) and a Heraditcan philosophy of opposites
(Muller-Lauter). On the other hand, Nietzsche's keyword is not cosmos but
life. It is in this perspective that he formulates his passionate criticism of
Christianity, which he interprets as a ressentiment against life. For this reason,
Christians generally and theologians in particular initially responded to
Nietzsche in a hypersensitive way. Soloviev saw him as precursor of the
Antichrist. G. Marcel, H. de Lubac, K. Barth and others see him as prophet of
a human race without God and at the same time as a witness to the crisis which
this godlessness brings upon the West. More recently, B. Welte, E. Biser and
40 The God-Qllestion Today
others, despite all the unbridgeable differences of principle between themselves
a.nd Nietzsche, have entered into an open dia.logue with him.

Nietzsche interprets his own writings as a 'school of suspicion'. '" All

previous values, ideas and ideals are examined in terms of their historical
and psychological origin; all truths are identified as approximations,
perspectives, prejudices advantageous for life, expressions of the will to
power.'" 'Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life
could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive."29 'There is only a
perspective seeing, only a perspective knowing'."o and this perspectivism
is the basic condition of all life.'" What remains in life, which demands
illusion and lives by iliusion,1l2 and is identical with the will to power.'JJ
Nietzsche also speaks of this as the 'Dionysian', meaning all that is ecstatic,
irrational and even anarchic in contrast to Apollonian clarity.'" Here
Nietzsche parts company with the modern belief in reason, morality and
ideals. In the final analysis his intention is to renounce the whole of
metaphysics since Plato, and to renounce Christianity as well, since
'Christianity is Platonism for "the people"'.'" Even science is based on a
metaphysical faith. II. Nietzsche isengaged in a struggle against any ulterior
world of truth, goodness, being, or the Ding all sich, which would cause
life in this world to be depreciated as something unreal.
According to Nietzsche, the illusion of an absolute truth reaches its high
point and ultimate concentration in the idea of God. God is our 'most
enduring lie',1J7 it is 'invention, poetic pretension'138; it is the 'counter-
concept of life'''' and an expression of ressentiment against life.'" Nietz-
sche was therefore compelled to make the death of God the central content
of his thinking. The death of God was, for him, the highest expression of
the death of metaphysics.'" But the reader would be dangerously deceiving
himself ifhe were to think that Nietzsche is concerned only about the death
of the god of metaphysics and not the death of the Christian God. Quite
the contrary is the case, for Nietzsche considers the Christian conception
of God to be 'one of the most corrupt conceptions of God arrived at on
earth'. In it God 'degenerated to the contradiction of life, instead of being
irs transfiguration and eternal Yes!'''' 'The god on the cross is a curse on
life.'''' Therefore: 'Dionysus versus the Crucified.""
Nietzsche's message about the death of God finds its classical exptession
in The Gay Science (1886). Here he offers the parable of the madman who
on a bright morning lights a lantern, runs to the market place and cries
incessantly: 'I seek God! I seek God!' He jumps in among the laughing
crowd, pierces them with his glance, and cries: 'Whither is God? I will tell
you. We have killed him - you and I. All of us are his murderers."" These
 The Dellial of God ill ModeTII Atheism 41
words of Nietzsche about the death of God go back to Pascal, Jean Paul
and Hegel. But in Nietzsche the message had a new and much more
comprehensive meaning, The death of God is 'the greatest recent event';
'the event itself is far too great, too distant, too remote from the multitude's
capacity for comprehension even for the tidings of it to be thought of as
having arrived as yet, Much less may one suppose that many people know
as yet what this event really means.'''' God's shadow is a long one, and
we must first conquer this shadow,'"
The immediate consequences of this event are 'a new and scarcely
describable kind of light, happiness, relief, exhilaration, encouragment,
dawn'; 'at last the horizon appears free to us again','" But Nietzsche is far
removed from this kind of optimistic atheism, He sees the 'long plenitude
and sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm that is now
impending','" Therefore he has his madman say:
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither
is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are
we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all
directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as though
through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space?
Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on US?ISO
Ultimately, of course, it is not the death of God, that is, unbelief, but
faith in God itself that is for Nietzsche the cause of nihilism, This is because
God is a No to life, 'In God nothingness [is] deified, the will to nothingness
sanctified !"51 Here we reach the theme that preoccupied Nietzsche,
especially in the late phase of his thinking: theism is ultimately a form of
nihilism; nihilism exists 'because the values we have had hitherto thus draw
their final consequences'; 1S2 it 'represents the ultimate logical conclusion of
our great values and ideals',1S·1 Christianity itself is a nihilistic religion,
'Nihilist and Christian [Nihilist Imd Christ]: they rhyme, and do not merely
rhyme. '154
'What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves,
The aim is lacking; "why?" finds no answer."55 Nihilism is the belief that
'there is no truth at all';'56 it includes 'disbelief in any metaphysical
world',IS1 But Nietzsche distinguishes between 'the weary nihilism that no
longer attacks', and the active nihilism that perceives previous goals to be
inadequate and is strong enough 'to posit for oneself, productively, a goal,
a why, a faith' . ISH An aim? a new aim? - that is what humanity needs.' 159
I

Nietzsche clothes his own answer to the question of aim in various metaphors.
The most important of these is his talk of the Superman in Thus Spoke
42 The God-Question Today
Zarat/JUstra. The figure of the Superman makes its appearance when the death
of God has become a reality. 'Dead are all gods: now we want the Superman
to Iive.'J60 But what is this Superman? For Nietzsche he is 'the meaning of the
earth'lnl and the meaning of man. 16Z For 'man is something that shall be
overcome'; 'What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end: what
Ciln be loved in man is that he is an overture and a going under.'163 Superman
is the man who has overcome all the former alienations. He is therefore not
an other-worldly man, but rather remains '(aith(ull to the earth' and does not
believe in other-worldly hopes.'" He also breaks in pieces the 'tables of
values';lnS he is not one of 'the despisers of the body';Hi6 he rejects the old
virtues and lives 'beyond good and evil', He is the man who is at one with
himself, who has overcome all tension and division between being and meaning;
he is the man who has himself become God and replaced the vanished and
slain God. Only in order to become God could man kill God.'" 'J(there were
gods, how could I endure not to be a god!'If>H
Nietzsche explains the way to Superman by means of another image: the
metaphor of the three metamorphoses, or 'how the spirit becomes a camel;
and the camel, a lion; and the lion, finally, a child'. The camel humbles itself;
it submits co higher values. The lion seeks freedom; he is an image of the man
who wants to win happiness and fulfillment for himself in and by hi, own
freedom. But as for the child: 'The child is innocence and forgetting, a new
beginning, a game, a !telf-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes". 'If>,)
Yes-saying brings redemption from transitory time. The creative will says:
'But thus I will ir.' ''. 'Was that life? .. Well then! Once more!' '' '
In the third part of Thus Spoke Zarat/lIIstra Nietzsche logically extends rhe
idea of Superman to an 'abysmal thought': the idea of eternal recurrence. I- "!
He means by this the presence of eternity in every instant: 'In every Now, being
begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The center is everywhere.
Bent is the path of eternity.'l 71 Nietzsche gives expression co this insight in the
image of the great Noon.' " 'The world is deep, I Deeper than day had been
aware. I Deep is its woe; I Joy - deeper yet than agony: / Woe implores: God!
I But ioy wants all eternity -/ Wants deep, wants deep eternity.'l 1.i Instead of
accepting the negation oftife, Nietzsche wants co break through 'to a Dionysian
affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection'. I16
He wants to understand the previously denied aspects of existence as not only
necessary but desirable and to accept the eternal recurrence of all things. His
formula for this is 'alllor (ati lIove of fate],.' '''
This doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is undoubtedly meant to
contradict the historical and eschatological world view of Christianity, and
this dissolution of all contrarieties and oppositions. represents a rejection of
the very foundations of Western metaphysics. It is possible to see in it a critical
revival of mythical religiosity, which would show that even Nietzsche was not
really finished with the God-question and that instead it returns in a new form
in his writings. Nietzsche is not alone in thus having recourse (0 myth. Before
 The Denial of God in Modern Atheism 43
him Gorres, Schelling and Holderlin had already called for a new mythology.
In his poem Die Gotter Griechenlands [The Gods of Greece] Schiller grieves
over a world that has lost its soul, and summons back the ancient world in
which 'everything was a footprint of God'. '" Even more filled with a sense of
urgency, if this be possible, are Holderlin 's elegies, his grief at the disappearance
of the gods, and his call for and even expectations of their return. 'Close is the
God and difficult to grasp. But where danger threatens, redemption is also at
hand.'''' Later on, Stephan George and Rilke (in the form of the angel in the
Dllino Elegies) point in a similar direction. In Thomas Mann and, though
differently, in Giinther Grass we again come upon the fascination with myth.
No onc, of course, has dared to gaze so deeply as Martin Heidegger into (he
abyss of nothingness that is the present world with its technological image of
reality, while at the same time joining H61derlin and Nietzsche in looking for
a new revelation of being. 1110
Nietzsche himself asks: 'Is not just this godlike that there are gods but no
GOcl?,11I1 Even in his late notes we find the question: 4How many new gods are
still possible?' He answers: 'I should not doubt that there are many kinds of
gods."" Therefore: 'We believe in Olympus - and no/ in the "Crucified",''']
This longing finds its clearest expression in the well-known 'Dionysus Dithy-
ramb': 'Oh, come back, I My unknown god! My pain! My last-happiness!'''4
However these verses are to be interpreted, Nietzsche was preoccupied with
the God-question until the very end, and he supplies the reason: '. fear we are
not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar.'''' We are caught
in the snares of grammar, which is 'the metaphysics of the people';IK6 due
to it, nothing hitherto has as direct a power of persuasion as the error
regarding being: 'Every word, every sentence we utter speaks in irs favour.'Ul 1
Is ir even possible, rhen, ro express Nierzsche's conceprion? Is ir possible [0
think it?

Nietzsche does not simply confront us with the question of theism or

atheism. Certainly he does not criticize only sentimental and moralistic
caricatures of Christianity; it is therefore not possible to meet his criticisms
by touching up our image of God a bit. He confronts us rather with the
question of being or not being; his focus is on the foundations of our entire
Western culture, both Greek and Christian. Heunveils its nihilistic tendency
and sees nihilism coming as a result. Due to his diagnosis of the present
age, Nietzsche is an uncannily contemporary thinker, much more so than
Marx, who still lived by the principles of meaning embodied in humanity
and history. In Nietzsche faith in reason and thus in modernity is shattered.
He reveals the lack of meaning and direction, the boredom of modern
civilization. He knows the consequences of de-divinization, including the
emptying out of the world which Platonism and Christianity together had
built and which achieved its full practical results in modern science and
44 The God-Question Today
technology. The statement that God is dead is as it were an abbreviated
expression of this far-ranging process.
But, challenging though Nietzsche's diagnosis is, his answer may not be
convincing. Is life - healthy, vital, robust life - and the will to life really
the ultimate thing? May not life itself be only a perspective, an expression
of the will to power, a despairing effort to survive the nihilism that
threatens? Nietzsche's attempt to locate eternity in the present life and not
in a world beyond, and thus to eternalize our present life, can only lead (as
no one saw more clearly than Nietzsche himself) to an eternalizing of what
is meaningless, to deadly boredom and a disgust with life. Another point:
if man is to remain human, can he do away with the distinction between
good and evil? Can he say Yes to evil, to lying, murder, violence? For the
sake of a human kind of life must he not make distinctions here? And
finally: Is recourse to myth enough? The distinction between Yes and No,
true and false is at bottom identical with the discovery of thought, which
it is impossible to reject without falling into absurdities. When the
contradictions in the thinking of Nietzsche seem to be reconciled, they end
up reappearing. For the principle of contradiction, according to which
something cannot simultaneously be and not be in the same respect, is the
basis of all thinking; even the attempt to deny the principle presupposes it.
As a consequence, the passage from mythos to logos cannot be revoked.
Of course, there is also the counter·question: if this is so, then are not also
the consequences unavoidable that lead to a de·divinized, un souled and
objectified world in which as a final logical step God must be dead? Or is
it possible to think theos and logos - theo-Iogy - in a new and non-
nihilistic way? What positive role would mythological language have in
this enterprise?
In his Anti-Christ, of all places, Nietzsche points to such a way out. For,
despite his very cutting criticism of Christianity and the church, he retains
a certain respect for Jesus, whose good news the church turned into bad
news. Nietzsche sees Jesus not as a genius or a hero, but as Dostoievsk)
did (to whom Nietzsche IS so close in many ways and yet from whom he
is so totally alien): as an idiot who lives 'love as the sole, as the last
possibility oflife'.'H8 In this 'life lived in love, in love without deduction or
exclusion, without distance' there is no question of a new faith but rather
of a different way of acting; and 'evangelic practice alone leads to God, it
is God'.'" For the kingdom of God is within us; it is not something one
waits for: 'it is everywhere, it is nowhere'. 190 Thus in the life and life-
project of Jesus Nietzsche thinks he finds what he proclaims: a life at one
with itself, a claiming back for man of the attributes squandered on God.
A life lived in love as the essence of the gift-giving virtue which Nietzsche
 The Dellial of God in Modern Atheism 45
praises: \9, would this be the new unalienated existential project, which
though not entirely Christian is at least that of Jesus? Is it an atheistic
following of Jesus, in which the biblical statement that God is love is
affirmed only in its converse, namely, that love is God?

Recent theology has often sought to follow this path as a way out of the crisis.
Undoubtedly the Nietzsche to whom appeal is made in this context is a carefully
selected Nietzsche.'" In addition, the questions of principle which Nietzsche
raises are by no means answered in such short-cur adaptions. Nicczsche's
remarks do, however, supply a stimulus which it will be worth accepting in a
critical way. But if absolute love is to be the answer on which there is agreement
in principle, then man can never be this absolute love; he can only allow it to
be bestowed on him.

This brings us back once again to the basic question involved in the modern
idea of autonomy: can the concept of a radical human autonomy in the
sense of a pure self-mediation ever succeed? Or must not a successful
human identity rather be only a freedom that is given to man from another?
Being from man's own resources - or being that is received? Can autonomy
find an other than theonomous foundation? And how can theonomy be so
conceived that it does not signify heteronomy, but rather both grounds
autonomy and brings it to fulfillment? The word 'love' already points to
the answer given by theology. For love means a union which does not
absorb the other but sets him free to be himself and thus brings him to
fulfillment. The response which theology gives to a modern atheism that
appeals to human autonomy is, then, the following: greater union with
God means greater and more fulfilled freedom for humanity.
In order that it may give its answer to modern atheism in a reasoned
way, theology is challenged to a basic self-definition and self-criticism. In
dosing this chapter, therefore, let me once again call to mind the funda-
mental question raised by modern atheism. The fundamental question is
not the one that arises when the confession of faith 'God exists', is met by
the conttaty assertion:. 'God does not exist,' so that theology is forced to
ask: 'Does God exist?' The confession of faith has never asserted the
existence of God in an abstract way; it has always spoken instead of the
one God shows himself as creator of heaven and earth and as Father of
our Lord Jesus Christ. Neither has modern atheism in its reflective forms
ever simply asserted the non-existence of God; it has, rather, denied a very
particular God who acts as opptessor toward humanity, and life, and this
in order that it might then ascribe the divine attributes to humanity.
The fundamental question that lies behind this historical process was
already brought out into the open by Fichte during the atheism controversy
46 The God-Qllestioll Today
(the Atheism"sstreit). The question is whether and to what extent we can
speak of God at all in terms of being and existence, or whether we can only
assign predicates based on action.'" Classical theology concluded from
God's action to his being and said, for example, that because God shows
himself good to me, God is good. It thus understood God as a substance
to which certain predicates could be applied. Modern philosophy criticized
this approach. Fichte'" and later Feuerbach'9S were of the opinion that
when such statements about being in the sense of substance are used of
God, he is being thought of as a being who exists in space and time and
is thus objectified and rendered finite. The answers given by modern
philosophy itself are admilledly ambiguous, to say the least. The Fichte of
the atheism controversy gives the impression that he applies the divine
predicates to the moral order, somewhat as Spinoza applies them to nature
and as myth does to the cosmos. Feuerbach for his part applies them to
humanity, and Marx to society. The later Fichte and the later Schelling
wanted to avoid these atheistic consequences by speaking of God not as a
substance but as a subject (in the modern sense of the term); that is, by
thinking of God within the horizon of freedom. They thought therefore
that they could overcome modern atheism on the very ground where it had
arisen: on the ground of the modern philosophy of subjectivity when this
is thought through to the end.
The fundamental question raised by modern atheism is thus the question
of the meaning or meaninglessness of sentences such 35 'God exists' or
'God does not exist'. It is the question of the condition for the possibility
of existential (existe/ttia/) statements as made about God. This clarification
is necessary because the word 'is' is profoundly ambiguous. At first glance
it seems to assert an identity. If this is the case, then it is possible to convert
the New Testament statement that God is love, exchange subject and
predicate, and say: Love is God; that is, where love occurs, there God is
and there something divine occurs. Now this statement may be quite
legitimate from a Christian point of view, but it can also be interpreted
atheistically unless an explanation is given of who the subject of this love
is, or how human and divine subjects are related to one another in the
loving. Thus, in the mailer of the God-question modern philosophy
ultimately confronts us with the problem of whether and how the question
of being, or the question of the meaning of being, can be asked anew within
the modern philosophy of subjectivity. It is the merit of Nietzsche and of
Martin Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche to have posed the problem
in this radical manner.
 III
The Predicament of Theology in the Face of Atheism

1. The traditional apologetic position

Modern atheism has put theology in a difficult position. Of particular
importance here is mass atheism, a phenomenon unparalleled in past
history; it regards the practical, if not theoretical denial of God or at least
indifference to belief in God as being by far the most plausible attitude to
take. As a result, theology has been stripped of its power to speak to people
and to communicate with them. There are now no generally accepted
images, symbols, concepts and categories with which it can make itself
understood. This crisis in the presuppositions for understanding talk about
God is the real crisis of present-day theology. To put the matter in more
Scholastic terms; the crisis of contemporary theology arises from the loss
of the praeambllia fidei, that is, of the presuppositions which faith needs
if it is to be possible as faith and if it is to be able to make itself intelligible
as faith. The quandary becomes clear when we consider the various ways
in which theology comes to grips with modern atheism.
In dealing with modern atheism, the theology of the second half of the
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth understandably had
recourse to the forms in which the scripture, the Fathers, and the Scholastic
theology of the Middle Ages and the modern era dealt with the forms of
atheism of their day or with what was then designated as atheism. This
type of treatment can be described as apologetic in two senses of this term.
On the negative and critical side, the attempt was made to refute the
arguments of the adversaries as being non-probative; on the positive side
and in response to criticism, the attempt was made to show that faith in
God is reasonable, and in this way to offer a defense (apologia) of the
faith.'
This kind of approach is already germinally present in scripture.' Only
fools say: 'There is no God' (Pss.14.1; 10.4; 36.2). In the view of the
psalmist this kind of folly is wicked, since God's rule over creation and
48 The God-Qllestioll Today
history is only too obvious. From this experience the wisdom literature of
the Old Testament already derives an intellectual argument. According to
this literature, all who lack knowledge of God are foolish, 'for from the
greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception
of their Creator' (Wisdom 13.5). The New Testament adopts this argument
(Rom. 1.18- 20; Acts 14.14-16; 17.26-29). Like the Old Testament, the
New Testament can see in godlessness only a wicked heart that refuses to
acknowledge the God it knows (Rom 1.20) and that therefore worships
earthly things as idols (Rom. 1.23; Gal. 4.8) and may move on from this
to the worst kind of moral corruption (Rom. 1.24ff.; I Thess. 4.5). The
Letter to the Ephesians speaks explicity of the atheoi who have no hope
(Eph. 2.12); the reference is evidently not to atheists in our present-day
sense of the word but to pagans who worship idols. Their thinking is futile,
their understanding darkened; their ignorance cuts them off from true life,
and the reason for it all is their hardness of heart. As a result, they give
themselves up to licentiousness; they arc full of greed, and practise every
kind of uncleanness (Eph. 4.17-19). Moral wickedness is thus both the
source and consequence of godlessness; moral depravity is a sign of
godlessness. The New Testament thus shows its awareness of the practical
atheism of those who 'profess to know God, but ... deny him by their
deeds' (Titus 1.16; d. II Tim. 3.5).
According to the Old and New Testaments, atheism in the sense of
godlessness includes every attitude that fails to acknowledge the true God,
and therefore every form of idolatry; idolatry, meaning the absolutization
of finite realities, is in fact a possibility and a reality not only in times past
but in the present as well. Such an absolutization of honour (prestige),
power, possessions, sex, nation, race and so on docs in fact by its nature
lead to morally reprehensible actions and to the alienation not only to
human beings from God but of human beings from one another and of the
individual from himself. Only one who acknowledges the true God has
true life. In other words: only one who believes is saved. This connection
between faith in God and human salvation is expressly stated in Heb. 11.6:
'Without faith it is impossible to please him [God]. For whoever would
draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those
who seek him.' The reference here is clearly nOt to a purely natural
knowledge of God that is achieved by reason but to faith in the true God
who has revealed himself as the God of history and as redeemer and judge.
Atheism, which springs from wickedness and leads to wickedness, is thus
an expression of man's loss of salvation.
The fathers of the church' further develop these suggestions given in
scripture. They often define atheism in a very broad way that includes not
 The Predicament of Theology in the Face of Atheism 49
only pagan polytheism but frequently Jewish and Islamic monotheism as
well. Atheism conceived in such a comprehensive way by comparison with
our modern usage presents the fathers with not only a theoretical but also,
and even more, a moral problem. Since God is naturally knowable, they
regard atheism as a refutable and even absurd position. Consequently a
complete ignorance of God that is also inculpable seems to them an
impossibility. They tend to regard atheism rather from a practical view-
point, as a consequence and expression of moral failure and, in the final
analysis, as a demonic attack on God.

Scholasticism provided some further explana tions that are important especially
for present-day discussion. In particular, in his Proslogion Anselm of Canter-
bury, the father of medieval Scholasticism, develops the thought of Augustine
and explains that God cannot rationally be thought of as non-existent.' Anselm
thus prepares the way for the Thomist theory according to which God is
implicitly known in every act of knowing. s This means that there can be no
such thing as absolute atheism and that the athiest who (for example) makes
matter ultimate and therefore absolute does know of God in a manner which
under some conditions may be hidden from him, although he gives an erroneous
interpretation of this knowledge. Nonetheless, with Heb. 11.6 Thomas main-
tains as necessary for salvation a faith that is not simply implicit but explicit/·
He gives two reasons for this view. On the one hand, even what we are able
to know of God by our natural powers cannot be known easily and without
admixture of error by all. On the other hand, human beings can by their natural
powers know the existence of God, but knowledge of God as man's salvation
is beyond the natural powers of man to obtain. Consequently an explicit faith
in response to revelation is necessary if man is to be saved. Here Thomas
presupposes, of course, that the message of God as man's salvation is known
to all human beings. If then (says Thomas) there is a human being who lives
in the primeval forest or among wild beasts and has not heard this message,
God will certainly convey to him by an interior enlightenment the revelation
of what is necessary for salvation, or else he will send the person an evangelist. 7
It is possible that at a later stage, in his theological Summa, Thomas moved
beyond this emergency solution, which really requires a miracle. He says that
every adult human being who is capable of the full use of reason must renect
on himself and on the meaning and goal of his life and, with tho help of grace,
has the power to turn to God as meaning and fulfillment or, in other words,
as man's salvation. II It would follow from this that anyone is saved who in his
conscience directs himself toward ulrimace values, insofar as he is capable of
recognizing these in his concrete situation.

It is against this theological background that we must interpret the

statements of the magisterittm on atheism. It was only at a very late point
50 The God-Questioll Today
in history that atheism became the subject of doctrinal statements. The
Syllabus of Pius IX (1864) only summarizes the older condemnations of
pantheism, deism and indifferentism; atheism is not mentioned.' The first
mention of it comes in Vatican I. In its preface to the Constitution Dei
Filills 'on the Catholic faith' the Council harks back to the Council of
Trent and sees the modern errors of rationalism, naturalism, pantheism,
materialism and atheism as consequences of the Protestant principle that
every Christian may exercise private judgment in matters of Christian
doctrine. It regards atheism as a contradiction of reason and as cles(Cucrive
of the foundations of human society.1O In keeping with this view, the
Council defines the possibility of a natural knowledge of God" and
condemns atheism, materialism and pantheism as opposed to Christian
faith." The line is thus set down which will be followed in future papal
statements of doctrine: those of Leo Xlll," Pius XI (especially in his
Encyclical Divilli Rcdemptoris against atheistic communism)," and Pius
XIIl." But all these statements give only summary indications. An extended
commentary comes for the first time in John XXlll's Encyclical Mater et
Magistra (1961), although in other respects this remains within the
traditional framework: ,. Atheism contradicts reason and unsettles the
foundations of every human and social order. There is no careful analysis
of the phenomenon itself or of its often humanistic, even if misguided
impulses to the establishment of a more just and human world. The
Encyclical Ecclesiam SlIam of Paul VI (1964) is the first to introduce new
standards in that despite its rejection of atheism in principle it establishes
a new attitude of dialogue."

2. The new attitude of dialogue

The Second Vatican Council opens a new chapter in the church's rclation
to atheism. It counts atheism as 'one of the most serious problems of our
times', but adds immediately that it 'deserves more thorough treatment'."
This change, especially in rclation to Marxist atheism, has been summed
up in the formula: 'From anathema to dialogue.''' The formula correctly
captures the new pastoral emphasis of the Council, but it is also exag-
gerated, inasmuch as while the Council does set new emphases, these do
not replace the old statements. On the contrary, for the Council says: 'The
Church, as given over to the service of both God and man, cannot cease
from reproving, with sorrow yet with the utmost firmness, as she has done
in the past, those harmful teachings and ways of acting which arc in conflict
with reason and with common human experience, and which cast man
down from the noble state to which he is born.'''' On the other hand, there
 The Predicamellt of Theology ill the Face of Atheism 51
is something new here in that the Council is not simply issuing an abstract
judgment but is accepting a concrete historical approach and shifting the
discussion from the purely essentialist level to the existential.
This new approach to the problem manifests itself in three ways. First,
there is the effort to offer a description that differentiates various forms of
the phenomenon of atheism, as well as an attempt to do justice to its
positive motives and impulses: the freedom of man, justice in society, and
a protest against evil in the world. Second, the Council turns these
arguments and impulses into a question directed at its own position.
For atheism, taken as a whole, is not present in the mind of man from
the start. It springs from various causes, among which must be included
a critical reaction against religion 3nd, in some places, against the
Christian religion in particular. Believers can thus have more than a little
to do with the rise of atheism.
By a misleading presentation of Christian teaching and through deficiencies
in their private and social life they may 'conceal rather than ... reveal the
true nature of God and of religion'.lI Effective remedies against atheism
include therefore not only its refutation but also an improved presentation
of one's own doctrine and a creditable living of this teaching."
Third, there arc also new emphases in the arguments against atheism.
To begin with, the knowledge of God gained by reason is supplemented
by knowledge gained from human experience. 2l But the real argument is
based on the dignity of man, who without God remains in his own eyes an
unanswered question. The acknowledgment of God is therefore not
opposed to human dignity but rather provides its foundation and fulfill-
ment." This anthropological argument is then further developed in christo-
logical terms, since only through the mystery of Jesus Christ is true clarity
brought to the mystery of man himself; only thus is light thrown on the
riddle of suffering and deathJ' No longer, then, does the Council base its
arguments on the natural knowledge of God; rather, it takes as its point
of departure the heart of the Christian faith itself. This anthropological
and christological approach runs through almost all the utterances of Pope
John Paul II."
Admittedly, the conciliar text is cause for some dissatisfaction, inasmuch
as the intellectual questions raised by atheism are not to be answered solely
by a concrete, historical and existential approach. The historical aspect
should therefore have been more clearly connected with the traditional
teaching on the possibility of a natural knowledge of God. In the process,
the fundamental objections raised by K. Barth and many Protestant
theologians would also have to have been met. In addition, the Council
 52 The God-Ql/eSliDlI Today
passed over the doctrine of the theo/agia negativa, the doctrine of the
hiddenness of God. This might have been of help in bringing out even more
clearly the positive, purificatory function atheism has in relation to faith
in God. Finally, we miss any reference to the moral presuppositions of
faith in God; among these are not only ratio pl/ra (unprejudiced reason)
but also the cor PI/rulll et purifieatl/III (the pure and purified heart). This
aspect of the matter has deep roots in scripture and in the Augustinian
traditionP But despite these criticisms it must be said that chapters \9-22
of the Pastoral Constitution 'may be counted among the most important
pronouncements of Vatican II' ,28 and even that they lare a milestone in the
church history of our century'.29
Vatican II would obviously not have been possible without intensive
theological preparation. So, too, after the Council Catholic theology has
taken up and developed further the suggestions given there. A complete
survey of the extensive discussion of the God·question is, not of course,
possible here,."' and I shall limit myself to some of the kinds of discussion
of atheism that are to be found in post-conciliar Catholic theology.
K. Rahner's efforts to do theology as anthropology or to make anthro-
pology the context for theology is of special importance in view of
the humanistic thrust that characterizes modern atheism and of the
corresponding anthropological arguments it uses. FollowingJ. Marcchal,
Rahner makes his own the transcendental srarring point adopted in the
modern era, but he endeavours to ovcrcome Kant's agnosticism and to
move beyond him to a new basis for metaphysics. The ascent from beings
to Being and ultimately to an absolute mystery is for Rahner the condition

Ii
for the possibility of finite knowledge. According to Rahner- and entirely
in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas - in this pre-apprehension (Vorgrif{) of
being as the condition for the possibility of knowledge of beings the reality
,
of God is always already affirmed ..!1 The unthematic experience of God
thus occurs with transcendental necessity in every spiritual act, even in the
act of denying God. This thesis is of radical importance in coming to grips
with atheism. There arc four possibilities:.12
(a) The person interprets his transcendental relatedness categorically as
theism and accepts this by a free decision.
(b) The person interprets his transcendental relatedness categorically as
theism, but denies God by a free decision . This represents the conventional
idea of culpable practical and theoretical atheism.
(e) The person accepts his transcendental relatedness but interprets this
with the aid of an erroneous concept of God, which he rejects, or else
reaches no concept of God at all. This is inculpable atheism, which at
bottom is an anonymous theism.
 The Predicamelll of Theology ill the Face of Atheism 53
(d) The person violates his conscience and denies even the transcendental
relatedness, and then goes on to reject both correct and erroneous concepts
of God, or else he reaches no concept of God at all. This is culpable atheism;
as long as the person remains in this attitude, he has no possibility of being
saved.
Rahner's theory, which on the whole is entirely in the line of Scholastic
tradition, represents a tremendous advance because it makes it possible
for the first time to reflect on the inherent possibilities in the phenomenon
of atheism and to do so in theological terms, instead of immediately
rejecting it as alien and even absurd. This theory makes a dialogue possible
for the first time, since dialogue by its nature presupposes a common basis.
Nonetheless questions remain that have to do with Rahner's central idea
of a necessary affirmation of God. If this idea is presupposed, is any real
atheism still possible, that is, an atheism which is not a veiled anonymous
theism? For, according 10 the theory, every individual, whether or not he
realizes it, whether or not he wills ir, must with transcendental necessity
direct his life to an absolute. The only questions remaining are whether
this absolute is God or an idol and, should the case arise, whether or not
the decision against God and for an idol is culpable. In a sense, then, it can
be said that Rahner's theory of atheism is the antitype of the atheistic
theory of religion. H The laner theory interprets theism atheistically as a
projection of man, while Rahner interprets atheism theistically as a false
interpretation of man and his transcendence.
Rahner thus remains within the framework provided by classical meta·
physics as well as within that provided by the modern point of departure.
His merit is to have shown that there is no opposition between classical
thinking in the line of Thomas Aquinas and modern transcendental
thought. On the other hand, as the entire modern development has made
clear, it is highly ambiguous to claim God as the interpretation of human
transcendence, for there is the danger either of no longer being able 10
preserve fully the transcendence of God or - as is rather the danger in
Rahner - of turning this transcendence into an ineffable mystery in which
man exists but which he must rather be silent about than speak of. Today,
at the end of modern times (R. Guardini), at the end of modernity (A.
Gehlen) and at the end of modern consciousness (R. Spaemann), when we
have become clear on the limits of these starting points, this position is no
longer adequate as an answer to modern atheism.

M. Heidegger in particular has attempted to move beyond both traditional

metaphysics and the modern philosophy of subjectivity. B. Welte and H. Vrs
von Balthasar have followed him in a critical and creative way, while reaching
~
-
-.--
.
• - ... ~ '!-....L. _-_

54 The God-Qllestioll Today

different conclusions. HCldcgger's basic objections to both traditional meta-
physics and the modern ph.lsophy of subjectivity is their forgetfulness of
heing.]" They think of being only in relation to what is and have forgotten the
question of the meaning of being itself. This functional type of thinking has
nO( only produced rhe modern ~cicntific and technical picture of the world,
with all its consequences that arc today becoming increasingly c1car;H it has
also led [0 thinking of God solely as the ground of what is and thus [0 stripping
him of hi~ di"imty. 'tvlan can neither pray nor sacrifice to this God. Before the
causa slti, man C~1n neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music lnd
dance before this God. The god-Ies; thinking which must abandon the god of
philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine GOd.'36
Nietzsche's saying that 'God IS dead' is the summary result of metaphysical
thinking as ~UCh.·'~ In response, Heidegger wants to take seriously the ontolog-
ical difference between being and what is. At the beginning of his thinking
stands not admiration of the beamy of what is but astonishment that anything
exists at all, rather than nmhingness. IH
After the collap;e of metaphysics God can no longer be thought of as
necessary ground. As a result, the hidden ness of God comes into view once
more. According to B. Welte, the being to which all knowmg points as the
condition for its possibility is profoundly equivocal.J'I1t can also be interpreted
as nothingness. The question then b whether this nothingness is empty
nothingness or whether on the conrrary the nothingness is the hidden presence
of the Absolute. The answer to thl5 question cannm be reached by sheer logic;
it calls for a decision which is ultimately a decision about the meaning or
unmeaningofhfe. \Velte thus realizes that nihilism ha~sha((ered the intellectual
premises which the classical humanistic atheism of the modern age still took
for granred.-l O On the other hand, unlike Nietzsche and in direct disagreemenr
with him, Welte regards as itself absurd and impermissible the option for
absurdity and therefore nothmgness. For the distinction between good and
evil may not be ~urrendered; love is meaningful, no less than the struggle for
freedom and Justice. Given the non-necessity of God, Welte finds it possible to
preserve the hiddenness of the divine God as well as the freedom and ethic.1
dimension of faith in God. In this regard his post-mcraphysical thinking is
substantially closer [0 biblical thinking than was traditional metaphysics. He
is able to comprehend the inherent possibility of atheism and at the same time
is better able than Rahner to let atheism be atheism and not turn it inro an
anonymous theism. But precisely at this point the limitation of thiS pOSition
also becomes clear. Atheism has almost become a possibility and danger of
faith in God as such, and one of its virtualities. The post-metaphysical
understanding of God comes very close to the mysticism of Eckhart: God is in
danger of being s\\'allowed up in 'modclessness', of vanishing into nothingness;
the (rightly) non-objective understanding of God is in danger of losing its
object.-l l The difference between atheism and theism becomes extremely thin.
Texts expressive of atheism can therefure provide almost as much of a basis
 The Predicamellt of Theology ill the Face of Atheism 55
for a ncw God-talk a ... texts (,.'xprcssivc of theism cJn."~Such a 01) stical
undcrstJIH.Jing of God IS In its own way 01h:C ;lgam vcry far removcd from rhL'
personal God of the Old ~mJ New Tcstamcnrs who spc.lks ami a(t~ in hi!tlOry.41
Like HciJcggcr, H. Un, von B;llth'ls;lr st.tns from heing :IS calise of rOldieal
astonishment ..... Huwever he ~l'CS the question of Ill'jug as ntcJiatc:u. (rom the
outset, through other persons. 'The I is awakened by its experience of the
Thou: oy the ~milc of thl' mother, frolll which the..' d111J cxpcricllccs thar It IS
aCl.x'prcJ. affirmed ,1IlU lo\'ed wuhin an cm'ironml'J\t (hm is incomprehensibly
self-sacrificing, already real, protectivc and flourishing. '.H The light of being
arisL's in the experience of the lo\'e shO\\'ll or the Thou. Being and Icwc arc co·
eXH.'l1sivc. By its vcry non·nc..'cc..'ssity. love.: hecol1ll'''l the radically ~ls{ol1io,hil1g
d'nll'nsion of hl'lng, the ml'aning of hl.'ing. It i!t thc ano,wer to the question of
why there is a world in:o.tt.'.ld of no·world ..'" Thc ha,;s of thiS approach is already
to he- found in Plato, for whom the Idea of of thl' Good that is be-yond Being
I~ at the same time- the- light wlnd1 illumine>; ;111 hell1g!oo. The GoOtI .;;111 only he
grasped '!tuddl'nly' (e.' ,li/,lmes ) in i1 kind of eC.,t;l!OOy." ~ But this philo!tophical
mysticism is by its nature incarahle of heing hrought to fulfillment. For the
dlvinc Absolutc prove!'! co ha\'e no content and to he incxprl'ssihle. ;\nd it turns
II1tn <lthe-i"lm lIllle-ss it j, thought of as Thou and persnnallm'e - hur it alone
Gln dcmonstrate or rl'\ eal itself to he such. The ontological differelH.:c that i-;
experienccd in thc phenomenon oflo\'canJ )m'e'>; non · nccc!oosit~· must therdorl'
he supplemcntcd hy ,1 theological difkrencc 111 whllh all that is mu,o,t hc
grounded in .1I1ungroundcd .1m.l frl'dr hestO\\'ed lo\'l.'. This ahsolute lo\'c is at
one :lnd thc samc rimc ncccss'1f), for 111;10 and yct givcn to him not ncccssarily
but frcdy anu as all <1(( of gr;l\.:c. It is more than ne(essary .... 11 Thereforl' it can
be concei\'ed as rcasonablc, but at thc samc time it is seen to be beyond reason
and thereforc to bc receivcd olll\' hv a frce act. Thc Christian answcr to modcrn
atheism is to pro\'c not that Gc;d i~ Tlc(cssary bur th~1f hc is rllt: e\·cr·greater.~"
\Vlc do not Ile-ed him in order to explain the profane world; he is beyond all
worldly reality, he yond cvcrything that SCf\'CS a functional purposc in and for
thc world; he is l.o\'c and can only bc grasped in Im'e and thcrcforl' in frecdom.
E\'crr "rgUlnl'nt offered in this ;1feJ prcsurposl'd an option. Or, in the languagc
of Thomas Aquinas: knowing and willing Jrc profoundly interdcpcndcnt. In
thus moving from philosophy to tilL'o)ogy Balthasar has prcscrrcd the: positivc
possibilities for dialugue that \'(It.'he has upcne:d up in rL'i;lIion tel athcism,
hur at thc samc timc he has unequi\'()c;}lIy eliminated the- amhiguities that
ne:ccssarily persist in the realm of philosophy. He is ahlc on the h;lSis of hints
to be fOllnd in Thomas Aquinas himsdf to hrcak our of sclf~cndoscd dassieal
metaphysics into ;1 metaphrsics that is open: th.ll ft.'mains in(ornplere in itself
and only in theology is hmh prcsL'f\'ed and trJnscl'ndcd.

All ,he thcologil..'al approaches to :ttllL'isl11 that I h;\ve thus far disclIssed arc
challenged by politic;}1 rhcology'iO and hy the qucstions it raises in thl' form
of thl' thl'olngy of libl'ratioll.;1 Thesl' two theologiL's promote a new kind
56 The God-Qllestioll Today
of theology which is conceived of not primarily as a renection on faith but
as a reflection on the practice of faith. They regard even modern atheism
as primarily a practical and political problem that can be resolved only
through a new practice. Their concern is thus with a new acceptance and
new definition of the theory-practice relationship, which past theology has
neglected. This theology has undoubtedly performed a service by reacting
against the tendencies to privatization that arc found in transcendental
and in dialogical theology and by calling attention to the practical and
political dimension of theology in general and of modern atheism in
particular. Political theology and the theology of liberation have thus
intensified our awareness of certain problems. The insight that the modern
privatization of religion has produced modern atheism leads these theol-
ogies to the programmatic statement of a post-bourgeois religion and
theology that will not uncritically accept into theology the modern subject
which is the result of the modern age and its process of privatization. I! Put
concretely, the antithesis is: theology of the people. 53 The people, or the
base of the pyramid as the case may be, is here not only the goal and
addressee of theology but its subject and the place where ir is carried on.
The struggle about God becomes a struggle for the right of all to be free
subjects before God."The new God-talk is thus possible only in the context
of a liberating practice.
Political theology in fact calls our attention to aspects which are short-
changed in the theologies of the modern age which take as their point of
departure the subject or the I-Thou relationship. The only question is
whether it in turn does not fall victim to possibly even more deleterious
simplifications. I have already pointed out that society and therefore the
political dimension is not the only dimension, and certainly not the most
inclusive one, or the one in which alone the God-question can appropriately
be raised. 55 And in fact, with the passage of time, political theology has
substantially broadened its approach, by maintaining that religion must
be at once political and mysticaL'· But atheism calls in question the
very condition for the possibility of mysticism, insofar as mysticism is
understood in the traditional theistic sense. This question can be tackled
under the rubric of 'practice' only if practice is understood strictly in the
sense given it by modern philosophy: the practice of freedom; in other
words, only if one accepts the despised modern philosophy of freedom and
then, within the horizon of freedom, raises anew the metaphysical question
of the meaning of freedom within reality as a whole.

Since catch-word simplifications arc repeatedly to be found in connection with

political theology and in its wake, there ore a few points that need furthcr brief
 The Predicamellt of Theology ill the Face of Atheism 57
discussion, First, a preliminary question. If the catch ~phrase 'post-bourgeois
religion and theology' is not to conceal a reversion [Q a pre-bourgeois theology,
then we must take with us into this post-bourgeois religion all the positive
achievements of bourgeois modern subjectivity, and specifically the advance
in knowledge and the winning of individual freedom. But this is possible -
especially in view of the long rejection of modernity by Catholic theology-
only if we look at the modern problematic in a concrete way instead of turning
it into an all-inclusive abstraction and then spurning it. The real question then
is whether this task can be appropriately tackled solely under the catch-word
·practicc'.17 Practice is a word with many meanings; it can mean both
productive work (subject-object relation) and the activity of free communi-
cation (subject-subject rclation). If the concept of practice is used as a slogan
and magical incantation against a supposedly purely abstract theorizing, and
understood as a call to concrete realiry, then it becomes a form of abstract
opposition to theory; it becomes i:m abstraction without conceptual content.
In the fact of such a development we need to be reminded of the truism rhar
the relation of theory and practice is itself first and foremost a theoretical
problem. Especially worth noting in this context arc T. W. Adorno's warnings
against a conceptless practice which accepts no criterion but itself and therefore
becomes irrational and totalitarian. 'The face of practice wears an expression
of deadly seriousness ... Theory represents all that is not narrow-minded.
Despite all its lack of freedom it becomes the representative of freedom in the
midst of unfreedom.'-'" Theory, properly understood, is itself a practice, just
as responsible practice is rational .md thus the result of theoretical reflection.
Finally: a confession of faith in God is neither a theory nor a practice in the
modern sense of the term; rather, it is a unique linguistic expression in which
theoretical and practical clements intermingle. For this reason it cannot be
adequately understood within the pre·established framework of a theory-
practice dialcctic which is intcrprctcd in ultimately nco-Marxist terms.
However great a use faith in God may make of human ways of understanding,
in the 6nal analysis it can only be understood on its own terms)'] Any other
approach leads to rhe reductions of faith that are typical of modern atheism.

The attempt to ground faith in God purely in itself and to. take a radical
position of faith as the starting point for a debate with modern atheism
brings us to a final model of theological encounter with atheism; it is a
model that may be described as dialectical. The dialogical model looks to
the natural-theology tradition for a common basis of understanding that
allows faith in God and atheism to comprehend and discuss each other
and thus enter into a dialogue. The dialectical model, on the other hand,
challenges the existence of this common basis. It acknowledges no positive
connection between the two, but only a connection in the form of a
58 The God-Questioll Today
contradiction. This is the direction in which a large part of contemporary
Protestant theology has moved in its exchanges with modern atheism.

3. Dialectical relationship between Christianity and atheism

In the sixteenth century the question of natural theology was not a subject
of controversy between the Catholic churches and the churches of the
Reformation. The natural, that is, rational knowableness of of God was
taught in Protestant orthodoxy of the seventeenth century just as it was in
the Catholic theology ofthe time. Only in the nineteenth century, especially
in liberal theology, did the radical break come, while in our own century
the dialectical theology of Karl Barth'o turned the question of natural
theology into a new, hitherto unrecognized subject of controversy and in
fact even turned it into the subject of controversy par excellence.'l
The early Barth of The Epistle to the Romalls (first German publication
in 1918; second ed. in 1922) took as its starting point the contrast between
God and the world. God is the wholly other, who judges and annulls the
world. The saving message of God is 'not a religious message to inform
mankind of their divinity or to tell them how they may become divine. The
Gospel proclaims a God utterly distinct from men. Salvation comes to
them from Him, because they are, as men, incapable of knowing Him, and
because they have no right to claim anything from Him.''' Correspond-
ingly, the allalogia elltis is for Barth (according to the well-known passage
in the Foreword to the first volume of his Church Dogmatics) 'the invention
of Antichrist' and the only serious reason for not becoming a Catholic.· ;
The basis for this extremely harsh statement is clear: Barth sees the analogy
of being and the natural theology based on it as cut from the same cloth
as the modern theology of the Enlightenment and of liberalism, against
which his own battle is being waged. In natural theology nature, reason,
history and man's natural religiosity become the context for and criterion
of faith, while Christianity becomes a particular instance of a phenomenon
that is neutral in itself and found universally in human beings. 64 ft is against
this background that we must understand the famous chapter on 'The
Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion' in Volume 112 of the
Clmrc!) Dogmatics. His central thesis here is: 'Religion is unbelief. It is a
concern, indeed, we must say chat it is the one great concern, of godless
man. '(is It is a self-willed human manufacture, an arrogant attempt by man
to take control of God and in the process to form God after man's image
and likeness. It is idolatry and self-righteousness." Mysticism therefore
turns into atheism; both arc forms of religion. Feuerbach is right: 'Atheism
is the blabbing out of the true secret of religion."7 Revelation does not link
 The Predicamellt of Theology ill the Face of Atheism 59
up with a human religion that is already present and practised. It contradicts
it, just as religion previously contradicted revelation. It displaces it, just as
religion previously displaced revelation.'-' The contradiction is admittedly
of a dialectical kind; it displaces or abolishes religion in the two senses of
negating and exalting it. Therefore: The Christian religion is the true
religion. 'n'}
Materially, if not in formal statement, Barth subsequently modified in
large measures his harsh judgment of natural theology as underslOod by
Catholic theology as distinct from the theology of the Enlightenment, and
he made more positive statements about the religions. 7() His earlier position,
however, exercised an almost incalculable influence on the Protestant
theology of our century; these effects can only be hinted at here. They have
in common an attempt to establish a position beyond theism and atheism
and thus, by rejecting theism, to make its own the legitimate aspirations
of atheism. In this way, the statement that God is dead, which, as I pointed
out earlier, goes back 10 an old Lutheran hymn, was to be taken back into
theology and, to that extent theologically ollfgehobell (Le., negated,
retained and lifted 10 a higher level).

This attempt is to be secn in its most authentic form in the notes which D.
Bonhocffer jotted down during his imprisonment by the Nazis." We find in
them an outline of a rcligionl<ss Christianity. Even though Bonhoeffer's
concept of religion is not (hat of Barth, the two are nonetheless in agreement
that at least today and in the time to come the religious presupposition is
lacking in our society which has become irrcligious.7.2 But the Christian need
not bemoan this turn of events, since It brings us to '." true recognition of our
situation before God'. The God of Jesus Christ allows himself to be expelled
from the world through the cross ; he is helpless and weak in the world, and
only under these conditions does he abide with us and hdp us. Therefore
'before God and with God we live without God'. The atheistic situation makes
it possible to sec the God of the Bible 'who WinS power and space in the world
by his weakness' .' " 'The world that has come of age is more godless, and
perhaps for that very reason ncarer to God than the world before its coming
of agc.'~"Bonhocfrcr thus takes:1 renewed theology of the cross as rhe starting
point for his answer to modern atheism.
It was not until the 1960s, when the situation had completely changed since
his time, that Bonhocffer began [0 exert an extensive, although unfortunately
often quite superficial, influence. In German theology his influence showed
itself first in the radical wing of the Bultmann school, where H. Braun extended
Bultmann's program of demythologization 10 the understanding of God that
is presupposed in the New Tc>tamenr, and interpreted God in existential terms
"' 'the ground of my drifting', 'the ground of the security I find in my fellow
man and of the obligation Ihavcto him', '3 certain kind of human fcllowship',1.5
60 The God-Questioll Today
In like manner, D. SolIe looks for a way of believing atheistically in God."
'God happens in what happens between human beings';77 faith is '3 certain
kind of living' ,711 '3 certain way of being there',1'1 an 'existential movement'.IIO
By means of this Christian atheism SolIe attempts to reach a position beyond
theism and atheism, although in the process she oversimplifies both by taking
them to be objectivizing positions. 1I1 In the final analysis, her position, like that
of Braun, leads to exactly what Feuerbach wanted, and is indistinguishable
from a pure humanism,1Il
In non-German theology there was a direct connection between K. Barth,
D. Bonhoeffer and, to some extent, Hegel, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the 'death of God' theology" that caused so much shaking of heads within and
especially outside theological circles. 'Death of God' actually had a variety of
meanings: from the death of God in modern secularized culture (G. Vahanian),
in language (P. van Buren), in the silence of God (W. Hamilton), all the way
to the extreme kenosis-theologies according to which God in Jesus Christ died
on the scene of world history (T. J. J. Altizer). These ideas were popularized
in the book HOliest to God by the Anglican bishop J. A. T. Robinson; this
book, though it was an undigested mixture full of over-simplifications,
nonetheless gave expression to what many people were vaguely feeling. 1I4 It
soon became clear, of course, that this theological fad was self·contradictory.
For if God is dead then so is theology - a fate that has since befallen at least
the Death-of-God theology. This current of thought has not really grappled
with modern atheism, but has simply capitulated to it and thus surrendered
any chance of arguing on mhcr than an atheistic basis. All that was left was a
theological verbal facade with nothing theological behind it.
The first new serious attempt has come inJ. Moltmann's The Crucified God.
Following closely in the footsteps of Barth and Bonhoeffer, Moltmann take,
as his starting point 'the cross of Christ as the foundation and criticism of
Christian theology'." This approach thus excludes natural theology which,
in Moltmann's view, ignores the cross and attempts to argue back from
experienced reality to its absolute ground in God, reaching in the process the
theistic notion of a God who is incapable of suffering.1I1> The rejection of this
theistic God justifies our speaking of a 'Christian atheism'.II':' Moltmann's
epistemological starting point is not analogy but dialectic."" That is, God is
known here in terms of his opposite, and godlessness is in a sense the
presupposition for knowing God. In other words, if we start with the death of
God on the cross and really take this seriously, then atheism is integrated into
the reality of God and, at the same time, is therein negated, preserved and
transcended. On the cross God has anticipated atheism, made it his own, and
blunted it. Atheism and theism alike have been negated and transcended by
the cross. 'With a trinitarian theology of the cross faith escapes the dispute
between and the alternative of theism and atheism.'"':! The conclusion, to be
sure, that Moltmann draws from all this is that God is, in an almost Hegelian
manner, entangled in the history of human sin, so that God's existence in and
 The Predicament of Theology iI/ the Face of Atheism 61
for himself (the immanent Trinity) can no longer be distinguished from the
history of God's suffering in the world. At this point, a radical approach 'from
above' in terms of the theology of revelation and of the cross is dialectically
converted by Moltmann into a conception of God that no longer adequately
distinguishes God from the world and is almost mythological and tragic in
character. The dialectic with which Mailman" starred turns into an identity.
The extremes touch.

The question that has to be asked'· of the dialectic theology which K. Barth
inaugurated is whether the transcendence of God and his word can be
preserved otherwise than by 1I0t making man and his positive or negative
answer a phase in the word and action of God; for if man and his answer
are given such a role, the next easy step is to make God a phase of man. It
is necessary, in other words, to understand the human person as a partner
who has been brought on the scene by God and established as free, that is,
as a relatively independent partner whom God, in revealing himself,
presupposes as one capable of hearing and understanding his word
(poeelltia obocdielltialis, obediential potency) . The correspondence at the
level of faith (allalogia fidei, analogy of faith) thus presupposes, on its own
behalf, a correspondence at the level of creaturehood (allalogia elltis,
analogy of being). This second correspondence does not function as a
pregiven, independent framework for revelation, restricting the scope of
the latter and turning it into a special application of a pre-given general
principle; it is, rather a presupposition for revelation, and a presupposition
which revelation itself requires if it is to be possible. It exists for the sake
of revelation and formulates the pure potentialiry of the creature for God,
utterly beyond any active power of its own."

Contemporary Protestant theology has by no means lost sight of the authentic

concern of natural theology. In the context of the God-question this concern
is very much alive in theologians who approach the question from the
vantage point of Paul Tillich's correlation theology; for example, in the
phenomenological analyses of L. Gilkey" and in the recent natural philosophy
of the process theologians."·l This concern emerges most emphatically in W.
Pannenberg." Pannenberg raises the objection to K. Barth and his radical
stance of faith, that Barth does not get beyond an empty assertion of God and
thus, is himself an extreme example of modern subjectivity. 'Amongst the
examples of an excessive adaption of theology to the intellectual fashions of
the age was the belief of dialectical theology that it is possible to accept atheistic
arguments and trump them by a radical belief in revelation .. . In terms of the
intellectual effort a theologian has to extend, this represents the cheapest form
of modernity'." In the final analysis dialectical theology paradoxically makes
atheism the natural presupposition for faith and thus (urns it into a natural
62 The God-Questioll Today
theology." But iffaith no longer finds any foothold in the questionablene;; of
human existence, it becomes irrational and authoritarian.':!"Today, however,
theology and the church must drop their authoritarian approach and come to
grips with modern atheism at the level of argument.

Barth's position is not the only onc that serves contemporary Protestant
theology as a basis for coming to grips with atheism. The Lutheran position
is also brought to bear on the discussion, especially in the writings of G.
Ebeling" and E. Jungel." Luther agrees with Barth that true knowledge
of God is to be had only through faith. 'For the two go together: faith and
God! Anyone who tries to find God apart from faith finds only the devil.
But it is faith that gives shape to both: God and idols. "" When faith and
God arc connected in such a close way. Fcuerbach's suspicion of a
projection seems to make itself felt with special intensity. Luther's position
is by its innermost nature exposed to the temptation of atheism. 10 1
Objectively, of course, it is worlds removed from atheism. For while Luther
says: 'That to which you attach and surrender your heart is really your
God,''''' Feuerbach's principle is: 'His heart is his god.' ''''

The question, of course, is how this fundamental difference can be not only
asserted hut also made clear to the unbeliever or, in words, how what is
believed can be made universally intelligible and thus its rationality be proved.
At this point rhe Lutheran position differs from the Barthian in that the former
claims a correlation not only between God and faith, but also between faith
or word and situation.l o4 In the word 'God' and in the word of God it is not
only God who makes himsclfknown; light is also shed on the situation of man.
In fact, the word 'God' and the word of God look to the basic situation of man
as a word situation; they lay hold of man in his Iinguisticality.1U5 The word
'God' shows us 'that man in his linguisticality is not master of himself. He lives
from the power of a word that is not his own, and at the same time he thirsts
after the power of a word that likewise cannot be his own.' lUll God is thus the
mystery of reality .IO~ But because of his linguisticality man gains knowledge
of this mystery only in and through the word; only in the word does the truth
about God and man come to light. Only the word of God makes it known that
man is always one who is already being approached by God. For this reason,
before the word comes to him man cannot know God as the mystery of reality;
on the other hand, the word 'God' and the word of God arc verified in the
being of man and the world - 'verified' in the sense of verum facere, 'make
true' and bring to the truth. 1011

The contest with atheism is thus a contest for the world and man. But the
contest is not waged - as it is in natural theology and to some extent also
and especially when the relation between faith in God and modern atheism
 The Predicamellt of Theology ill the Face of Atheism 63
is conceived as dialogical- on the ground of a shared neutral base, namely
a natural power of knowing God that precedes both faith and unbelief.
Faith is not a particular case under an overarching universal category (on
this poine Luther's criticism is in agreement with Banh's},IU,* The starting
point is the reality of faith, which encounters the reality of unbelief as
man's factual simarian ilnd seeks to convince man in this situation of
his losmess and lack of truth. The starting point is God's promise, the
prollllssio of the word of revelation, to which faith responds but which
unbelief opposes. Luther's thinking moves not in the framework of natural
and supernatural knowledge of God but in the framework of law and
gospel. ""

The thesis that true knowledge of God is to be had only through faith in the
word of God has for a consequence thar we c:m never speak of God \\,hile
prescinding from man, but only of God for me and for us, or of God in his
rdation to man. 111 If we abstract from thiS relation and speak abstractly of
God's being in itself, we are in d:lngcr of turning God into an object and thus
:,rripping him of his divinity, One acts as an atheist by 3S~crtlOg the existence
of God no·k'Ss than by denying it.'" The old ontology of substance must
therefore be replac<d by relational thinking. The following principle is valid:
'The idea of God without rhe world is a pure hm it nQtlon which gives expression
to the truth that when God and world arc taken together the absolute primacy
of God emerges. 'I L1 For the rcst, it remains true that DeliS supra liDS, nibil ad
liDS, God is beyond us and no business of our5. 114 \Virh this, the classical
distinction between the being of God thought of as at rest and the same being
thought of as active is eliminated. From the inSIght that we may not speak of
God's being while prescinding from his activity I[ follows that 'God's being is
in becoming'.'"
At thIS pomt we arc dangerously close to Hegel's h'ghly ambiguous position
that God cannot exist without the wor1d. ll t> The dialectical definition of the
relation between £3ith and unbelief is thus in danger, even in Lurher's version
of it, of turning IOto an identific:1tIon of the two, so that it is no longer possible
to distinguish between the (wo in :1 rationally argued way, hut instead the
distinction must be arbitrarily asscncd. Neither In the old ontology ofsubslancc
nor in the rciational theology developed out of Luther does the danger of
atheism seem to be eliminated in principle.
It is interesting, to be surc, tha.t Luther a.nd Thoma.s a.rc not only threatened
by the sa.me danger but a.lso a.stonishingly close in their positive a.ssertions. As
everyone knows, according to Thoma.s we ca." know better wha.t God is not
than what he is. Less well known is the fact that for Thomas the same holds
trUC of fa.ith. Even through rcvcla.tion we do not know what God iSj wc arc
united to him quasi ignoto, a.s ro one unknown to us. Through revebrion we
gain knowledge only of more and greater works of his.ll~ There is no denying
64 The Cod-Ql/estiO// Today
that this thesis of Thomas is at odds with the many passages in which he makes
statements about the being of God. Nonetheless, the passage to which I have
referred shows that there is no mutual opposition between the metaphysically
based theology of Thomas and a relational theology of lutheran extraction.
We are dealing father with two complementary schemes and approaches which
intend to say materially the same thing but which also have limits and dangers,
so that each needs to be criticized and supplemented by the other. On this
fundamental question, which is a matter of life or death for both, they can
fulfill their common task only in conjunction with each other and not in
opposition [Q each other.

As we look back and try to summarize, we can identify a profound aporia

that is common to all the theological positions discussed as they face up to
modern atheism. The aporia affects the apologetic and dialogical positions,
both of which make use of natural theology, and the dialectical positions,
which reject natural theology and precisely for that reason are in danger
of themselves turning into a purely natural theology. We would probably
not be mistaken if we were to claim that the aporia affects all the
contemporary theology. We lack the language and the adequately devel-
oped categories that would enable us to speak unambiguously about God.
Ever since philosophy has become atheistic, whether professedly or tacitly
or even only methodically, all philosophical concepts - the concept of
substance no less than the concept of rclation - are open to misunderstan-
ding along atheist lines. Faced with atheism, faith and theology as well
have no choice but to raise anew and at a fundamental level the question
oftheirown presuppositions andofthe conditions fortheirown possibility.
But this basic theological question has become further specified as
compared with the question asked at the end of the previous chapter. That
chapter ended with our saying that the basic metaphysical question, the
question of being, could alone provide the adequate horizon within which
to raise the question of God. Now, however, we must define this question
more closely. This further definition is necessary both by reason of the
intra-philosophical criticism directed at traditional ontotheology and by
reason of the critical questions asked by dialectical theology. The question
now is how the question of God and the question of being are specifically
related to each other; that is, whether we must ask the question of God
within the horizon of the question of being, or the question of being within
the horizon of the question of God. This means that the question of the
relation between faith and thought, theology and philosophy, natural
theology and theology based on revelation is raised anew. This brings me
to the foundations of my own answer to the challenge of modern atheism.
 IV
Experience of God and Knowledge of God

1. The problem and concern of natural theology

For many people today the Christian message about God has become a
foreign language they are unable to understand or grasp. In fact, in the
context of modern experience the questions asked in this message and the
answers given seem to have become meaningless. This loss of the basic
presuppositions needed for understanding affects in our day not only
peripheral and borderline truths but even the terms that are central to the
Christian proclamation (God, sin, redemption, grace). The real issue today
is no longer primarily this or that truth but the very abiliry to believe. We
have to a large extent lost the dimension of faith, which is the dimension
of mystery. Theologically, therefore, we are forced back to the rudiments
of understanding; our capacity for experience has become in good measure
limited to what can be grasped by the senses, to what can be counted and
produced. As a result, in our secularized sociery dogmatic theology is
compelled, more than in the past, to reflect on the presuppositions o(
understanding that are proper to it. This reflection on the presuppositions
(or the understanding of faith is known as natural theology. '
The present situation of nawraltheology is admittedly a quite paradox-
ical one. For in the measure that the call has been increasingly sounded in
present-day theology for a discussion of the presuppositions of understan-
ding, natural theology has failed into disrepute. Natural theology has
become as it were the neuralgic point in contemporary theology (E. Jiingel).
The Bible does not as yet contain any reflection on the presuppositions
for the understanding of faith. To that extent there is no natural theology
in the Bible. On the other hand, the Bible practises natural theology to a
surprising degree. For the life mirrored in the Bible goes on in a world that
is religious to the core; the Bible can therefore, in a still utterly unreflective
66 The God-Questioll Today
way, have recourse not only to religious ideas and experience but also to
universal human, every-day experiences and from these derive images for
use in religious statements. We see this process at work on the opening
pages of the Bible, in the two accounts of creation. These take very ancient
religious ideas of the human race (ideas which we today describe as
mythical) and interpret them in a new and critical way in the light of the
experience of faith. The creation psalms in particular show how the devout
ofthe Old Testament derive from wordly reality a knowledge of the power
and glory of God (d. Pss. 8; 19; 29; 104; 148). Only the fool says in his
heart: There is no God (Ps. 14.1). In the late period of the Old Testament
this 'natural' knowledge of God is already being expressed in didactic
form: 'All men who were ignorant of God were foolish by nature ... For
from the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding
perception of their Creator' (Wisdom 13.1-5).
In the New Testament, Jesus' practice of speaking in parables is highly
significant. In the parables of Jesus the world as it presents itself to human
beings in their everyday experience becomes an image of the reign of God.
All the processes in nature and history are capable of serving in this context
as images of eschatological salvation. Jesus takes the everyday experiences
of human beings as his starting point and uses them as a mirror in which
to make his message intelligible. Conversely, however, these same everyday
experiences often have a new and unexpected light thrown on them by the
parables of Jesus (contrast parables). Through the parables of God's reign
the world at last acquires its definitive meaning. When Jesus speaks in
parables he turns the world into a parable of the reign of God.
The New Testament shows parabolic language being used in varying
measures. The link with wordly experience shows up with greatest immed-
iacy in Luke's Acts of the Apostles. According to Acts Paul appeals in his
missionary discourses not only to the Old Testament but also to the
religious experiences of the pagans: to the testimony God has given to
himself in nature and history (Acts 14.16f.; 17.22-28).
In the letters of Paul the reference to 'natural' experience and knowledge
does not take this direct and positive form but rather a critical and
dialectical form. Paul does indeed speak of God being known from created
reality (Rom 1.19f.), and especially from conscience (Rom. 2.14f.). But he
also says that while the pagans knew God they did not acknowledge him
as God, but refused to honour him and transferred to creatures the homage
due to him alone. In so doing, their hearts were hardened and their minds
darkened. They have no excuse for their godlessness and corruption (Rom.
1.20). When Paul thus makes the pagans responsible for their unbelief, he
indirectly recognizes the possibility and actuality of the pagans' knowledge
 Experiellce of God alld Kllowledge of God 67
of God. It is possible here to speak of contact amid contradiction. In other
words: it is not legitimate to make Paul's theology of the cross simply a
contradiction of the concern at work in natural theology. For although
Paul emphasizes the foolishness of the cross (I Cor. 1-2), he would also
rather speak five words with his mind than stammer ten thousand words
in an ecstatic tongue (I Cor 14.19); in fact, he wants to take all thinking
captive for Christ (II Cor 10.5).
The situation is again different to Johannine theology. John accepts the
questions of human beings with regard to bread Uohn 6), light Uohn 8),
and way, truth and life Uohn 14), in order then to proclaim Jesus Christ
as the definitive answer to these questions. He starts therefore with the
assumption that the lives of human beings are inspired by the quest for
salvation and that in this way men and women have a preunderstanding
of salvation. On the other hand, it is only through Jesus Christ that
definitive clarity comes on what light, life and truth are. Just as an answer
is intelligible only in the light of the question being asked, so conversely
the answer throws a definitive light on the meaning of the question. John's
proclamation of Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word proved to be especially
momentous Uohn 1.1-14), for it meant the acceptance of a concept which
Philo, a Jewish philosopher of religion, had already used as a way of
mediating between Old Testament faith and Hellenistic thought. Behind
John's application of Logos to Jesus stands the conviction that the Logos
at work in creation is no other than the Logos who in the fullness of time
became a human being in Jesus Christ. In similar fashion, the theology of
later ages drew Stoic, Platonic and finally also Aristotelian concepts into
the service of the faith. The purpose in so doing was to give expression to
the fact that the Logos who holds sway in a seminal and traceable manner
in all reality (logos spermatikos) has manifested himself fully in Jesus
Christ.'
In summary we may say that while the Bible does not expressly reflect
on the natural presuppositions of faith, it does in fact appeal to these
presuppositions to a quite notable extent and in manifold ways. In the
background of this unreflective yet extensively practised natural theology
there is a convinction that is basic to both the Old and the New Testament:
the conviction that the order of creation and the order of salvation fit
together. The Bible understands the revelation given in the course of
salvation history as being a prophetic interpretation of reality. Conse-
quently, faith, as understood in the Bible, is not a blind venture, not an
irrational feeling, not an uncalculated option and certainly not a sacri{icillm
illtellecllls (sacrifice of the understanding). Rather, faith can and must give
a rational account of itself. According to the New Testament, believers are
68 The God-Qllestion Today
called upon to explain to all men the reasons for the hope which they have
(I Peter 3.15).

Early tradition provides a copious development of the testimony found in

scripture. The fathers speak of the possibility of a twofold natural knowledge
of God: according to them, God can be known both from visible things and
from the human soul.lrenaeus already speaks of the cosmological way to God:
'For creation points to the one creator, the work requires a masrer·buiJder,
and the order in the world reveals the one who ordered it. 'J The psychological
way of knowing God finds expression above all in the doctrine of the ide. of
God as innate in man.' Tertullian says that the knowledge of God is a dowry
of the soul (animae dos).'
A radical reflection on the relation between faith and natural knowledge
was forced upon the fathers especially by the conflict with the gnostic
movements of the ancient world. The origin of the gnostic idea has not yet
been fully explained. Gnosis is characterized by an absolute dualism between
God and world, spirit and matter. Redemption is conceivable only as a
redemption from the world, not as a redemption of the world. The conflict
with this dualistic world·view turned into a life-or-death struggle for early
Christianity; it was in the course of this struggle that the foundations of the
Christian idea were first clarified. In response to the gnostic separation of the
order of creation from the order of redempcion the church drew up its canon
of scripture, deliberately adopting the Old Testament, which contains the slOry
of creation, and the New Testament as a single: canon or norm of ecclesial
faith. The formation of the canon thus gives expression to what is probably
the most important of all hermeneutical principles for the interpretation of
scripture: the Old and New Testaments, the revelations regarding creation
and salvadon, are to be interpreted according co [heir inherent unity and their
reciprocal correspondences (analogy ). In our present context this means [hat
biblical revelation is to be interpreted in the light of reality and in view of it;
biblical revelation must demonstrate its internal intelligibility by continuing
to be a prophetic interpreeation of reality.
The Scholastic traduion expresses this unity ot creation and redemption
chiefly by means of the classical axiom: 'Grace presupposes nature' (gratia
SIIpponit naturam) or 'Faith presupposes reason' ((ides slIpponit rationem)'1
cannot here review the complicated history of [his axiom and the quesdons of
interpretation [hat this history raises. In its original form [he axiom does not
mean that faith presupposes a mind cultivated to the highest possible degree.
Natural prerequisites of that kind would mcan that grace and faith were no
longer free gIfts and would contradict the experience already attested in the
New Testament that faith 'is accepted' by the little ones and the simple folk.
The meaning of the axiom is rather that God's reveladon presupposes a subject
capable of hearing, understanding, and making a free decision. For this
reason God can issue his call to faith only to human beings endowed with
 Experiellce of God alld Kllowledge of God 69
undemanding and free will and not, for example, to dead objects or to living
things that do not possess a spiritual soul. The human person as such, and not
the human person as possessing a particular cultural development, is what
faith presupposes.

Not until the modern age do we find statements of the magisteri,m,

regarding these natural presuppositions of faith. This late appearance is
not accidental. For it was not until the modern age that the presuppositions
of faith were initially seen as doubtful and then even denied in principle.
This new situation came about in two ways : through an over-estimation
of reason (rationalism) which led to an unqualifiedly autonomistic view of
man and the world, and then, in reaction against this over-estimation,
through a devaluation of reason, which led to the claim that God is
accessible only in faith (fideism) and by way of religious tradition
(traditionalism).
The First Vatican Council (1869-1870) condemned both views. It
harked back to relevant earlier papal decrees and explained that faith is an
act of obedience consistent with re.3son (obsequium ratio", C011sen·
tane"m).' On this basis the Council maintained, in opposition to fideism
and traditionalism, that by the natural light of reason man can know God
with certainty from created reality.' We will correctly understand this
definition olthe possibility of a narural knowledge of God only if we realize
that it is deliberately couched in general terms. It speaks of 'knowledge' in
the broadest sense of the term and not of purely argumentative and
deductive thinking. It is not defined, therefore, that one can prove God by
the natural light of reason.' In addition, the definition speaks only of the
possibility of knowing God (certo cogllosci posse) and deliberately says
nothing about whether such a natural knowledge of God actually exists.
The issue, therefore, is simply the openness, in principle, of reason to God,
and not whether in fact specific human beings have ever reached knowledge
of God solely by their natural powers of knowing. The dogma of the First
Vatican Council is thus making a theological statement of a transcendental
kind; that is, it is concerned with the condition for the possibility of faith
which faith itself presupposes. This transcendental theological statement
is meant to bring out the accountability of man for his belief or unbelief,
and thus the reasonableness and intellectual probity of faith .
The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) accepted and repeated the
fundamental assertions of the First Vatican Council. l • At the same time,
however, it integrated the abstract, transcendental theological approach
of Vatican I into a concretely historical and salvation-historical perspective.
On the one hand, the Council describes in detail the difficulties which
70 The God-Qllestion Today
contemporary man has with the natural knowledge of God, and the
resultant forms of modern atheism. On the other hand, it brings out the
fact that the answer to the question which man is for himself is given, in
the final analysis, not through the natural knowledge of God but only
through Jesus Christ. ' 1 The connection between the transcendental starting
point and the historical or salvation-historical aspect is admittedly left
more or less undetermined by the Council; the two aspects stand side by
side in relative isolation in the conciliar texts. The integration of the two
viewpoints is therefore an important task for a dogmatic foundational
reflection.
This question has a practical as well as theoretical side to it. In its
Declaratioll all Religiolls Liberty the Second Vatican Council takes up its
own various earlier magisterial statements and says that it is the church'5
duty to proclaim and teach with authority the truth which is Christ and
'at the same time, to declare and confirm by her authority the principles of
the moral order which spring from human nature itself'." This doctrine
of the church's task as teacher of the natural moral law is the ba;is for the
church's instructions on individual and social ethics; above all, it is the
basis of the church's social teaching and its more recent acceptance of
universal human rights. The problems which this teaching raises are
obvious. Nonetheless, anyone who docs not wish to deny that the order
of creation and the order of redemption fit together and who docs not wish
to turn Christianity into a purely theoretical maner, cannot reject this
teaching in principle, quite independently of the fact that it has a basis in
the Bible (d. Rom. 2.15). The problem raised by this teaching must
therefore be defined more precisely. The problem is comparable to that
raised by the natural knowledge of God; it finds expression in the oft-
repeated criticism that the moral directives of the church arc based on a
non·historical concept of nature. Here again, therefore, in the area of the
church'5 moral directives, there is a need to connect the transcendental
presuppositions of faith with the historical or salvation-historical situation
of the human person.
The statements of scripture, tradition and the ecclesiastical magisterium
can be validated by a more systematic reflection on the realities involved.
In fact, an initial consideration of the matter already yields a first approach
to the subject of natural theology. That is, a relatively simple kind of
reflection shows that we never possess the Christian faith 'in itself', in as
it were a 'chemically pure' state. We 'possess' the Christian faith only as a
faith that is humanly heard, humanly understood, humanly affirmed and
humanly appropriated. Faith is 'given' as it were only in the medium of
human hearing and understanding. Whatever else, therefore, must be said
 Experiellce of God alld Kllowledge of God 71
about Christian faith as a free gift, it is a fully and wholly human act (acll/s
hI/mali/Is) and, as such, is subject 10 a human and therefore rational
accountability. A faith for which no human and rational account can be
given would be unworthy not only of man but of God.
We achieve a comparable result if we engage in a second reflection that
starts not with the subject of the testimony of faith but with its addressees.
The Christian faith daims 10 be the universal truth about salvation for all
human beings. Consequently it cannot be the intention of the testimony of
faith to express only private religious experiences. The Christian faith
stands and falls by its universal communicabiliry. Christians must therefore
not only answer for their faith before the bar of their own consciences;
they must render an account 10 all men of the hope that is theirs (I Peter
3.15). In the nature of things,then, it is impossible that the Christian faith
should not refer to what all human beings have in common and what links
them as human beings amid all their cultural differences: their reason or
understanding. Especially in a situation like ours today, when everything
depends on the Christian faith making the transition to new cultural
horizons and a new epoch, there can be no question of the Christian
retreating into the realm of private experience. Today, as hardly ever before
in the history of Christianity, it is essential that the Christian faith emphasize
its reasonableness which is accessible to all human beings.
The highlighting of the reasonableness of the Christian faith, as I mean
it here, has nothing to do with a rationalistic reduction of faith. There is
no question of comprehending faith from outside, as it were, with the aid
of a supposedly neutral mind. As will be made dear, faith can be
substantiated only by itself or, more accuratcly, by its proper object, which
IS the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Natural theology cannot substitute
for this substantiation or even attempt simply to supplement it. The task
of natural theology is rather to show the internal reasonabless of a faith
which has its substantiation in and from itself. This demonstration of the
reasonableness of the Christian faith likewise has nothing to do with an
mtellectualistic abridgement of faith . It is utterly beyond denial that faith
is not simply an act of the mind but a personal act of the whole human
being. In the language of the Bible: faith springs from the heart. In this
sense faith is simple and also guileless. But this undividedness of faith does
not exdude but indudes the understanding. For this reason a 'childlike',
that is, blind faith, which shuns the bright light of reason and, in a kind of
pre-Pentecostal way, simply continues to believe behind dosed doors, is
not an especially intense faith but rather a very deficient form of faith, that
expects not too much but 100 little of faith . Those who are really convinced
of the truth of the faith also trust that their faith will enable them 10 come
72 The God-Questioll Today
to grips with the intellectual challenges to it. The kind and extent of this
intellectual grappling will depend, of course, on the kind and degree of the
Christian's education in other areas, on his faith and on his mission and
position in the church and the world. In principle, however, those who
proclaim the Christian faith carry out their tasks in the proper way only
when they do not communicate the faith through clever psychological
manipulation or force it upon people in a dictatorial way but rather when
the proclamation liberates people and renders them capable of a responsible
decision to believe. Natural theology is meant to be of service in the
execution of this task.

A deeper understanding of the business of natural theology requires a survey

of the different forms it has taken in history. Three classical types of natural
theology may be distinguished.

(aJ Natural theology ill the Greek philosophers

From the standpoint of cultural history it was the great achievement of the
Greek mind that it was not satisfied with the imagery of myth but inquired
into the logos that was hidden within it. The natural philosophers of the
seventh to fifth centuries BC were already taking this approach. The Sophists
fifth to fourth centuries BC showed at this early stage a critical and distrustful
attitude toward the mythical tradition. This led them to distinguish between
physis, that is, what gods and men are by their nature, and thesis, or what they
are by reason of arbitrary human determination. The critical meaning of the
concept of 'nature' is also evident in Plato. In Plato we find for the first time
the concept of 'theology'. He is aware of the pernicious character of many of
the mythical stories and wants types of theology to be distinguished, that is,
critical norms for discourse about the gods. 13 In Aristotle theology, becomes
identical with first philosophy, which discourses in a rational way about first
principles or the first Principle" and is later distinguished as natural theology
from mythical theology and from political theology, that is, the theology
publicly acknowledged and celebrated in the polis. The Stoic Varro in the first
century Be expressly reports this threefold division of theology into natural,
mythical and political. lS Augustine criticizes this threefold division on the
grounds that it is really twofold because the mythical theology is in fact the
theology of the polis and the theology of the polis is in fact the mythical one.
But both ascribe to the gods a good deal that is absurd and unworthy. In any
case, even the best natural theology, that of Plato, is in Augustine'S view far
inferior to the Christian truth. 16 Nonetheless early Christianity took over this
natural theology to such an extent that Tertullian could speak of an anima
naturaliter christiana. 17 ln this tension-filled reception there found expression
a new and specifically Christian understanding of natural theology which
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 73
incorporated and carried even further the critical side of the natural theology
of antiquity.

(b) The Christian fonn of natural theology

The Bible is nor concerned with the nature of things, that is, with what things
are by reason of the origin peculiar to each of them (natura from nasci, 'to be
born') but only with what man and the world are by reason of their origin in
God. The Bible thus looks upon reality not as nature (physis) but as creature
(ktisis). Reality as created is, on the one hand, wholly dependent on God and,
on the other, infinitely different from him; moreover, insofar as it is entirely
distinct from him even while being dependent on him, it enjoys a relative
independence over against him. Because of this relative independence the Bible
has no hesitation about speaking of a nature that has been given to man by
God himself and that inspires him (el. Rom. 1.26; 21.4; I Cor. 11.14). This
relative independence also makes it possible for human beings to [Urn against
God and in this way to corrupt their own natures (el. Rom. I. ISH.). Now they
are by nature children of wrath (el. Eph. 2.3), but because they owe their entire
being to God, they remain, even as sinners, wholly related to God. Precisely as
sinners, they arc, in their corrupt state, a question to themselves, a question
which they themselves cannot answer. The Bible thus expounds the being of
world and man in the form of an extremely tension·filled history of relations
between God and human beings. But despite all the vicissitudes that mark this
history, there is something that abides and retains its identity and that, even
though profoundly distorted by sin, cannot be radically negated or cancelled
out. At the same rime, however, this abiding nature is henceforth drawn into
the dynamic movement of the historical dealings between God and man, a
history of which Greek philosophy could have had no knowledge. In the Bible,
therefore, nature is not the basis for an order of being which is independent of
grace; it is rather the term which expresses a relatively independent meaningful
structure within the ordpr of grace.
This integration of natural theology into the history of salvation is to be
found in all the great theologians of the classical tradition: Augustine, Anselm
of Canterbury, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas. The dynami~ movement of
salvation history into which the concept of nature has been incorporated finds
expression especially in the axiom mentioned earlier: 'Grace presupposes
nature and completes it.' The axiom makes it clear that nature exists entirely
for the sake of grace; it is the extrinsic presupposition of grace, just as,
conversely, grace is the intrinsic presupposition of nature, that for the sake of
which nature exists. Nature is therefore not an independent, self·enclosed and
self·completing or fulfilling realm. It is dynamically ordered beyond itself to a
fulfillment which it cannot bestow upon itself but rather achieves through
grace alone. Only through grace does nature attain to its own full de(ermina·
74 The God-Question Today
tion. When it closes itself to grace through sin it becomes contradictory to
itself and is deeply perverted.
A twofold order, one of nature and one of grace, is at most suggested as a
possibiliry in the classical tradition; the idea has been developed only in the
modern age. This momentous development was set in motion by the heresy of
Baius, a theologian at Louvain in the sixteenth century. Baius taught that
nature is not only ordered co grace bur even has a right to grace. As a way of
maintaining the gratuitousness of grace the theologians of the Baroque and
NeD-scholastic periods constructed the idea of a pure nature (natllra pllra).n
This was originally intended simply as an auxiliary construct, a conceptual
hyporhesis, enabling theologians to grasp (he gratuitousness of gracc. Bur it
led in turn to the development of a twofold order of natural and supernatural
theology. This elaboration of something initially proposed simply as a concep-
tual possibility is intelligible only in the light of the indirect inOuence exercised
by a new understanding of natural theology that developed in the modern
Enlightenment.

(e) Natural theology ill the Elllightenmellt

For many reasons the modern age liberated itself from many of the historical
presuppositions of Chrisrianiry. After the division of the church in the sixteenth
century and after the religious wars that resulted from this division, Christianity
could no longer be the force holding society together. Modern society had to
find a new and religiously neutral basis, and for this purpose it turned to nature
and reason as common to all human beings. The result was a new form of
natural theology: a knowledge of God and a doctrine of God that were derived
from the contemplation of the nature of man and the world as seen solely by
the natural light of human understanding. This new and independent natural
theology became the equal partner of theology based on revelation. In fact,
the old relationship was soon reversed. Natural theology had previously been
a presupposition for theology based on revelation; now it became the norm
for this theology." Revelational theology had to submit to being judged by
whether it served the advancement of reason and happiness. Revelational
theology became a historical presupposition and a vehicle for natural theology.
However much it criticized this rationalism, Catholic theology preserved a
tone of moderation in its reaction. It objected not only to rationalism but also
to the opposite extreme of fideism and traditionalism, both of which denied
reason any capacity or competence in the area of faith. Catholic theology thus
sought to travel a middle way between rationalism and fidcism.ln opposition to
rationalism it made a distinction in principle between faith and understanding;
against fideism it maintained the conformity between faith and reason. This
led to the theory of a twofold order of knowledge, one natural, the other
supernatural, no contradiction between the two being possible. But however
justified the underlying concern for mediating between faith and reason, the
 Experiellce of God Q/ld Kllowledge of God 75
intellectual form in which the concern found expression calls for criticism in
the light of the older tradition. For this '!Wo-storey model' of natural and
supernatural theology ends up simply in a relatively loose juxtaposition of the
two or a superposition of the one on the other; it effects no real mediation. In
fact, the model is even dependent on the spirit of the Enlightenment to the
extent that it develops natural theology in an abstract and u"historical manner
and fails [Q grasp its proper integration inro the history of salvation.
In its reaction to the modern age, the theology of the Reformation followed
a different path than Catholic theology, and this difference developed in our
own century into almost a new kind of disagreement dividing the church, a
disagreement of which the sixteenth century knew nothing as yet in this form. 20
Luther's statements on the question of the natura) knowledge of God are
ambivalent. He knows that God has given all human beings a general
knowledge of God; apart from revelation, however, human beings do not
know who God is for them. As a result they turn God into an idol, a figure
created by human desires. According to Luther, the word of God alone makes
it possible to have a right knowledge not only of God but even of man. The
objectof theology is cogllilio Dei el homillis (the knowledge of God and man);
but the 'man' thus known is homo rells el perdillls (man guilty and lost), and
God is DeliS illslificalls elsa/valor (God who justifies and saves)." For Luther,
then, there is no universal natural knowledge of God and man within which
the knowledge gained through revelation occurs as a special case. The generally
conceived being of God and man can be specified only by the very concrete
knowledge given through revelation and justification.
These tension-filled foundations served as the basis later on for various
approaches to a solution. In early Protestant theology, or what is called the
'Protestant orthodoxy' of the seventeenth century, the subject of natural
theology was known and accepted in a way that was fully in accordance with
Catholic presentations of the same subject. Only in the NeD-Protestantism of
the nineteenth century did natural theology become a subject for criticism. But
the way in which this occurred seems to confirm rather than refute the proper
concern of natural theology. In F. Schleiermacher the criticism of natural
theology serves as a means of turning away from the Enlightenment. In contrast
to the indeterminate and vague meaning of 'natural' as understood in the
modern philosophy of subjectivity, Schleiermacher wants to give due attention
to the reality of freedom and history. Accordingly his dogmatics begin with
lemmata taken over from ethics. This means that Schleiermacher is simply
criticizing a particular natural theology and replacing it with another. Some·
thing comparable is the case with A. Ritschl, the leader of the liberal theology
school. His position against natural theology is for him part of his criticism of
metaphysics. In his view, religion and revelation are concerned not with nature
but with the spiritual. His rejection of natural theology is thus in keeping with
the bourgeois consciousness of his age; philosophical parallels to his view are
76 The God-Questioll Today
Neo-Kantianism and the effort of the human sciences to escape from the grip
of the natural sciences.
The strongest criticism of natural theology comes from the representatives
of dialectical theology, and especially from K. Barth, who on this account
parted company with his former comrade-in-arms, E. Brunner.ll In Barth's
eyes natural theology is evidence of the bourgeoisification of Christianity; in
criticizing it he hopes to vanquish the liberal theology of culural Protestantism
(Kultlirprotestant;St1llls).lJ But in this criticism of bourgeois cultural Prot-
estantism he is in harmony, in a new way, with the changed consciousness of
the age. For in the meantime, the criticism of religion that had been developed
by Feuerbach, Marx and Nietzsche had destroyed the optimistic expectations
of Enlightenment rationalism that man could know God by his own powers,
and had endeavoured to unmask knowl<dge of God as a projection by man.
In a manner that is structurally comparable Barth explains natural theology
as 3 manufacture of idols; he sees in it man's mongrel effort to take control
of God. Consequently, the theological criticism of religion represents for
dialectical theology the possibility of getting in contact with the general
consciousness of the age; paradoxically, atheism has here become a form of
natural theology."
It thus becomes clear that the old natural theology contains questions and
themes that did not cease to be valid when the historical form they once took
was dropped, but rather have come ro the fore repeatedly in changed form,
even in those who criticize it most severely. The criticism of natural theology
sees to it, as it werc, that the business most proper to natural theology is carried
on: reflection on the intellectual prcsuppositlons of the Christian faith. It is
therefore not at all surprising that the concerns of natural theology are
reappearing in comcmpor:uy Protestant theology. To a certain extent this was
already true of the later K. Barth and is being continued roday, although in
different ways, by W. Pannenberg, G. Ebeling and E. Junge!.

(d) Contemporary problematic

The historical survey has shown that the concept of narural theology is very
ambiguous. The ambiguity of the concept ·natural theology' is connected with
the ambiguity of the concept of ·nature'.l5 For the concept of nature changes
its meaning depending on the rdational framework in which it is used. The
philosophical concept of nature relates (that is, opposes) nature to culture and
history. Culture and history are what emerges from the free creative activity
of man; nature, on the other hand, is what we men presuppose at each point
in our activity, namely the reality of the world, of other human beings, and of
ourselves as a natural prcgivcn reality. Nature is what we do not make and are
incapable of making but rather must presuppose in all our making and doing.
In this sense we speak of raw or untouched and unshaped nature.
The theological concept of nature must be distinguished from the philosoph-
 Experiellce of God alld Know/edge of God 77
ical concept just described. The theological concept relates nature not to
freedom and history but to gracc. Nature is now what grace presupposes: man
as a being endowed with intellectual knowledge and with freedom, a being
who as such is capablc of encountering and receiving grace. The theological
concept is thus broader and more comprehensive than the philosophical; it
includes what the philosophical concept of nature excludes, and in fact it
includes this especially, because it is precisely spirit and freedom that are the
transcendental presuppositions for faith and for the grace that is given through
faith.
In the light of this explanation of concepts we may arrive at this summary
statement: natural theology originates in a transcendental reflection of faith
on the conditions for its own possibility. Faith, however, presupposes a subject
endowed with freedom. Natural theology is therefore connected not with what
philosophers mean by nature, but with what, from a philosophical standpoint,
is contrasted with nature, namely, freedom. The theological concept of nature
has [0 do, then, with freedom and therefore history. This in rum means that
natural theology may not be satisfied with an abstract transcendental reflection
and must instead involve itself with the concrete hiswrical condhions and
presuppositions of faith. Natural theology must establish itself by coming to
grips with concrete hiswrical reality.
Such a concrecization of absuact uanscendental theological refleccion
emerges from the constellacion of problems dealt with in contemporary
philosophy as well as from the more sharply focused constellation of problems
in recent Catholic and Protestant theology. Modern philosophy achieved a
clarification of Enlightenment views with regard to itself; more particularly, it
achieved a c1arificacion of Enlightenment views about its own hiswrical
presuppositions. In the process, the abstract, unhistorical understanding of
nature and reason found in the Enlightenment was transcended. It was
recognized that human reason and what it accepts as natural and reasonable
are subject to cultural and historical changes. Quite independently of whether
these changes in the horizon of understanding, in the modes of thought, in the
understanding of being, and so on, are interpreted idealistically in terms of a
history of ideas or materialistically as an epiphenomenon of economic changes,
the intrinsic historicity has, ever since Hegel and Schelling, Marx and Nietzsche
and not least Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas and others, become a generally
accepted insight which moves the transcendental approach beyond the point
to which Kant took it. Unlike Kant, thinkers today know that the a priori
conditions of human understanding can vary in the course of history ..!6 This
means that new presuppositions of understanding have been established for
the understanding of the integration of nature and reason into the history of
salvation, and that a natural theology which abstracts from the historical
presuppositions of faith has become definitively impossible. Paradoxically,
this thesis derives its strongest confirmation from the significant fact that
projected natural theologies which prescind at least methodically from the
78 The God-Questioll Today
revelation of God in Jesus Christ and seck to establish a purely natural
presupposition for faith in God, arc indeed of some help to Christians who
have become unsure of themselves, but usually seem to carry liulc conviction
to non-Christians. The critical evaluation which W. Weischedel hao; given of
these attempts is very instructive and worth hccding,r The proof of the
reasonableness of faith thus presupposes faith and its horizon of understanding
and cannot by itself make these available.
The same result is yielded by the constellation of problems in contemporary
theology. From this point of vicw, the original meaning of natural theology in
High Scholasticism and the new approaches of the Reformation to It arc not
so far apart as they might seem to be at first sight. In both approaches there 15
no question of a neutral pre-structure and sub-structure for revelatlonal
theology or for a general framework in which the special revelation In sahation
history could be subsequently inserted. In the theology of the HIgh Scholastic
period thc point is rather that thcre is a relatively independent reality which
revc1ational faith presupposes and which achieves its own fulfillmcnt only
through faith. Natural theology docs not substantiate the faith; rather the faith
grounds natural theology, although only as a relatively independent entity.
Natural theology is therefore concerned with the reasonableness and universal-
ity of faith. This proof of the reasonableness of faith has for ItS starting pOInt
the fact that in Jesus Christ the definitivc truth about God, man and the world
has made its appcarance. This primordial confession of the Chnstlan faith can
be shown to be reasonable by showing how in the light of Jesus Christ the light
which shines in the world shines in a new, more complctc and eyen definitive
way.

The reasonableness of faith can be shown concretely in two ways. On

the one hand, and in a more negative way, it can be shown by the fact that
faith, being convinced of the fact that in principle created reality and the
realities of salvation arc not contradictory, builds on this to show that the
arguments brought against it arc not coherent and sound even from the
standpoint of pure reason.!·!! On the other hand, and in a more positive
way, it can be shown by the fact that faith proves its value as a prophetic
interpretation of reality, that is, that faith gives access to a meaningful
experience of reality, a meaningful understanding of reality, a liberating
practice, and so on. The conflict between faith and unbelief is thus not a
conflict regarding some sort of higher or ulterior world but a conflict
regarding our present reality. Faith claims knowledge of the ultimate
ground and the ultimate meaning and goal of all reality and asserts that
for this reason only its own light makes it possible for the light proper to
creation to shine out fully. It seeks to prove itself by the fact that unlike
the ideologies which always absolutize a single aspect or single area of
reality, it docs not do violence to phenomena but can 'save' them as ancient
 Experiel1ce of God and Knowledge of God 79
philosophy claimed to do." Above all, faith does justice both to the
greatness and to the wretchedness of man. Faith can therefore ask other
interpretations of reality whether they are able to say anything greater and
more comprehensive about the world and man or whether on the contrary
it is true to say that he who believes sees more.

2. Experience of God
As far as the God-question is concerned, we arc being forced back today
to the rudiments of understanding. Consequently, when we speak of a
natural knowledge of God, there can be no question simply of abstract
proofs of God. Such proofs are meaningful and intelligible only if they
have a basis in experience and represent an affort to penetrate more deeply
into this experience and defend it against intellectual challenges. Like all
knowledge, the knowledge of God requires a basis in experience. But what
is experience? To what extent is it possible to speak at all of an experience
of God?"'o
The them~ of faith and experience is an extremely difficult and perplexing
one. This is due not least to the fact that both the concept of experience
and the concept of faith arc many-levelled and ambiguous. Experience
may mean: personal experience of life, and the methodically disciplined
experience of the modern experimental sciences; everyday experience in
the secularized world of our day, and devotional experience and the
experience of faith all the way up to mystical experience; practical
experience, especially that gained in political practice, and experience
taken over and imported from the experimental sciences. It is clear that
these distinct concepts of experience, to which others might be added,
point in very different and to some extent contradictory directions. When
someone appeals to experience, he has not yet said anything clear and
unequivocal; he has called attention to a problem, but he has not answered
any questions.
The concept of faith likewise has a number of meanings. In theological
parlance faith may mean the act of faith (fides qua credilllr, the [act of]
faith by which one believes) but also the content of faith (fides quae
creditur, the faith-contents which arc believed). In the first case, to ask
about the relation between faith and experience is to ask how the act of
trust, self-surrender and obedience toward the impenetrable mystery which
in religious language we call God can be reconciled with our sober,
enlightened, rational experience of the world. In the second case, the
relation between faith and experience has to do with the problem of how
certain contents of faith can be reconciled with our modern world-picture
80 The God-Qllestioll Today
and especially with the results of the modern experimental sciences. The
two problems cannot be wholly separated, but they must nonetheless be
carefully distinguished.
It is not only the concepts of experience and faith but also the relation
between faith and experience that can be defined in very different ways.
At the present time two opposed positions call for particular discussion.
The first and traditional formulation of the relation says: faith comes from
hearing (Rom. 10.17) and has for its criterion not our present experience
of reality but the authoritatively proclaimed gospel message which is
transmitted through the church. The second and basically modernistic
definition of the relation says: faith is an expression of religious experience,
and the traditional confessions of faith must be measured by their ability
to express our changed modern experience or at least 10 make this
experience possible. Both positions have something true 10 say, but both
are also one-sided.
True though it is that the Christian faith has for its norm the faith
delivered once and for all Uude 3), it is also true 10 say that we encounter
this faith in a quite limited hislOrical experiential tradition and that this
tradition is no longer directly ours but must be appropriated via our own
experience. This fact points 10 the truth in the second position. The latter,
however, overlooks the fact that experience never begins at point zero but
is historically mediated. Above all, it overlooks the fact that not the word
of God as such but the hislOrical form in which it is transmitted 10 us (and
it comes 10 us only in a historical form) needs 10 be criticized, tested
and sounded more fully. Our always limited and historically changing
experience cannot and may not be the criterion for what is 10 be accepted
as the word of God; rather, the word of God is meant to, and must, make
known 10 us whattrueexperience is as compared with illusory appearances.
The word of God proves itself 10 be true by opening up new experience 10
us, experience which proves its worth by other experiences.
Finally, the point must be made that faith is not only related 10 an
experiential reality which antecedes it, but also has experience which is
proper 10 it. This aspect finds expression particularly in the biblical
understanding of knowledge (Yadli) which is never acquired with the mind
alone but is mediated through the whole of existence and through the
existential centre, the heart of man. This experience which is proper 10
faith has been known especially by the mystics, for 10 them mysticism is
cognito Dei experimentalis (an experiential knowledge of God)."
It follows from all this that the relation between faith and experience
can only be described as a relation of critical correlation. The resultant
hermeneutical circle between the transmission of faith and the experience
 Experiellce of God alld Kllow/edge of God 81
of faith cannot be eliminated. The decisive point, of course, is that within
this circle primacy belongs to the message; this means that we may never
absolutize our present experience and that our experience is rather always
a historically open experience that is and must be open to new experience.
The question, then, is this. Where is faith to find its correlative in present-
day experience of reality?
Our present situation is characterized by a far-reaching loss of religious
experience. If, then, we are to make such experience at all accessible again,
we must take as our point of departure a general understanding of
experience and then show how the dimension of religious experience opens
up 'in, with and under' everyday human experience. This very attempt is
still difficult enough, since, as I already said, the concept of experience is
extremely complex and multi-leveled; it is one of the most difficult and
obscure concepts in all philosophy.
In our everyday linguistic usage we speak of an experienced person,
meaning that he is one who knows people and things not simply by hearsay
or from books but repeated direct dealings with them; one, therefore, who
combines knowledge and ability. The German word for 'to experience',
er{ahrell, is derived from {ahre>t, which means ' to journey'. An experienced
man is thus a 'travelled' man, who does not know the world only by
hearsay but has rather been out in the midst of it and has shared the life,
sufferings and activities of other human beings. The Romance languages
take a different approach to the idea. They speak of cxpericlltia (the Latin
word behind the Romance words). The expert is the periflls, the man who
through experimentation, trial and error, and confirmation has as it were
piled up insights within his own person.
This everyday linguistic usage shows that experience may not be reduced
to an objectivist understanding of experience, such as is often attributed
to the so-called experimental sciences. Experience is not only what we can
establish and test by experiment and then reduce to the simplest kind
of factual descriptions. Such a narrowly empiricist understanding of
experience has in fact now been rejected even by the experimental sciences.
Down to the present, no science, not even the natural sciences, has
succeeded in convincingly reducing all knowledge to purely empirical data.
The very development of modern physics, especially quantum physics, has
shown that we never know reality in itself but always and only through
human images, models and concepts. We never experience reality in itself;
we always experience it as something that has a specific meaning for
US; objective experience and interpretation of experience can never be
completely separated. In any case, an absolutization of what is experiment-
ally ascertainable would be a contradictory claim, since the thesis that
82 The God-Qllestion Today
the empirically ascertainable is alone real is itself not an empirically
ascertainable assertion. Anti-metaphysical positivism is, paradoxically, a
metaphysics of the positive. Consequently it is not a valid objection against
belief in God to observe that God is not empirically observable; for there
is no conceivable empirical method that could show that God is. The God
who is is not a given. But there is also no conceivoble empirical method
that could ever prove the non-existence of God.
The critique of a one-sidedly objectivist concept of experience should
not, of course, lead to a reduction of religious experience to the opposite,
that is, to subjective experience (£rfebnis ) or even to subjective moods.
Every expenence doubtless takes place in the medium of human subjecti-
vity, calling forth therein an echoanda reflex response. Religiousexperience
affects the human person to the depths and in all the fibres of the being; it
sets humming all the chords of existence. One cannot encounter God and
remain a distant spectator, for God lays total claim to the person. In the
language of the Bible: the experience of God takes place in the heart, that
is, in the core or centre of the human person. But the primary clement in
the person's being subjectively touched is that he or she comes in contact
with and is even overwhelmed by a reality not himselfor herself. TIllS holds
even for religIOUS experience. Significantly, it is precisely the great mystics
who arc mOSt critical and reserved toward inward personal experiences.
The hunger for religious experiences can be very unreligious and self-
centred. If, then, the person wants to encounter God and not simply himself
or herself he or she must not seck such experiences for their own sake.
Were we to reduce the experience of God to pcrsonallife·expcriencc, we
would confine ourselves to the realm of the subjective, of non-commitmentj
the suspicion of projection would then immediately arise.
The twofold limitation on the concept of experience brings us to a
positive definition of the essence of experience. Experience is not (0 be
reduced to something purely objective or to something purely subjective. It
includes both clements: objective contact and subjective feeling. Experience
arises from the interplay of objective reality and subjective intercourse with
the milieu and our times. Experience is inseparably a being affected by
reality and an interpretation of this contact through words, images,
symbols and concepts. It thus has a dialectical structure; that is, it is
historical, for 'history' means the reciprocal interaction of the person and
the world.
The historicity of experience has, in turn, several aspects. It means, to
begin with, that experience never takes place at an isolated point of
time through the here-and-now digestion of momentary perceptions.
Experiential knowledge emerges, rather, from repeated and increasingly
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 83
proficient intercourse with reality. It comes into existence by the fact that
certain impressions and the interpretation made of them are repeatedly
confirmed. Experience thus requires a familiarity and practice in dealing
with things and persons, a mastering of patterns of action. This is why
Aristotle connects experience with memory.·ll But the memory of which
he speaks is not simply the individual memory of each person; it is also
the collective memory that is recorded especially in the language of
a community. Language is the precipitate of the experience of many
generations. This means that experiences are always likewise the we-
experience of a community, a people, a race or class. These various
human communities arc characterized by a common remembrance of basic
experiences that are constantly revived through the retelling of myths,
sagas, legends, anecdotes and other stories. In other words, experiences
are communicated through narrative.
This last statement points to a second aspect of the historicity of our
experience. Through the mediation of language not only do former
experiences come alive again today; language and the experience 'stored
up' in it also help to interpret our prescnt experience and pass it on to a
future generation. Experience thus exists, at any given time, in a tcnsion
between remembrance of past experience, the experience of the moment,
and the transmission of this experience in the hope that the future will
preserve and confirm it. In other words: experience is a constantly renewed
and never finished learning process. It is 'experience of life' in the proper
sense of the phrase. The experienced person is not one who has a definitive
answer for everything but the person who realizes that experience can
never be complete, is opcn to new experience on the basis of past experience,
knows how to experience, and understands how to undergo new experi-
ences and correlate them in a productive way with past experience.
This historical tension between past, present and future experience has
a twofold critical significance. First, the remembrance of past experience
has a critical significance. For there are not only memories that shed light
on the past but also dangerous memories in which unfulfilled hopes or
experience of profound suffering are revived and present their claims. As
a result, the delusive coherence of a personal universe now taken for
granted can be suddenly destroyed and a new world opened up. Conse-
quently, nothing would be more foolish and uncritical than to absolutize
present and possibly very impoverished experiences and make them the
sale criterion for judging past experiences by applying the simplistic
saying: That no longer says anything to us today.' On the contrary, the
remembrance of great past experiences can provide an impulse toward the
future and render us capable today of new and more profound experiences.
84 The God-Questioll Today
On the other hand, there can evidently be no question of simply
integrating new experiences into old experiential patterns. We undergo
truly fundamental experiences only when we experience the stubborn
resistance of reality to the model of thought and action which we have
cultivated up to now; when we experience something surprisingly new
which alters our previous views, thwarts our plans, opens up new perspec-
tives to us and forces us to advance in new directions. The capacity for
experience is always linked to a readiness to change our minds and
be converted. The experiences that arc fruitful are not our everyday
experiences but rather those contrasting experiences that challenge us to
il decision. In other words: experiences 3rc dis-illusioning, in the positive
sense of the term; they dissolve previous illusions and delusive coherences
and thus reveal the truth about our previous experience.
The understanding of experience as historical, as I have thus farpresented
it, leads to a final point. It is this: the historical dialectic between past,
present and future experiences shows that we not only have immediate
and direct experiences but also experiences of our cxpcrienccs 11 or indirect
experiences. These indirect experiences represent the beginning of reflec-
tion. The reflection is not yet of a conceptual kind but consists rather in
the fact that 'in, with and under' our immediate experience a deeper
experience takes place.
This experience of our experience is in the final analysis an experience
of the finiteness and incompleteness of our experience; it is thus an
experience of suffering. From Aeschylus onward Greek literature repeated
the play on the words patbos and lIIatbos: experiential learning (Illatbos )
through suffering (patbos). Nietzsche prOVides a clear formulation of this
idea: 'As deeply as a man sees into life, he also sees into suffering.''' 'It
almost determines the order of rank bolU profoundly human beings can
suffer.''' From this it follows that the widespread expulsion of suffering
from public life by hiding it behind a mask of youthfulness, vitality and
health leads to an alarming shallowness and impoverishment of our
experience and a declining sensitivity to 'the sigh of the oppressed creature'
(Karl Marx). No one has experienced humanity to the full unless he or she
has experienced its finiteness and suffering. But then experience becomes
a way leading into an open immensity, into a mystery that is ever greater
and never (0 be completely plumbed.
I may sum up by saying that our experience of our experience is in the
final analysis an experience of the finiteness and mysteriousness of our
experience. At this point we have reached the religious dimension of
experience. Religious experience is an indirect, not a direct type of
expcriencc; it is an experience which we have 4in, with and under' our
 Experimce of God and Know/edge of God 85
other experiences. It is therefore not just one experience alongside other
experiences, but rather the basic experience present in our other experi-
ences; it is an experience that presides over and gives a pervasive tone to
all other experience. For this reason, K. Rahner and J. B. Lotz speak of
transcendental experience." At first hearing, this description sounds
like a contradiction. For the term 'transcendental' applies to a type of
consideration that is concerned with the conditions that precede and make
possible any and all experience. It is impossible, or so it seems, for an
experience to be its own condition; experiential knowledge cannot grasp
the conditions that precede any and all experience. But the paradoxical
character of the concept simply reflects the paradoxical character of the
reality. For on the one hand it is transcendentality that makes experience
possible to begin with; on the other hand, this transcendentality is itself
historically contingent as far as its concrete form is concerned, and to this
extent it can be the content of a special experience at the level of horizontal
disclosure. In religious experience there is revealed to us, via other
experiences, the ultimate, all-inclusive, sheltering horizon of human experi-
ence, namely, the dimension of that mystery out of which all experience
emerges and to which all experience points.
Having pointed out the dimension of religious experience, 1 must now
turn to the reality of religious experience itself. Religious experience would
be simply a general, vague mood, were there no individual experiences
to which the religious dimension became 'manifest'. In Anglo-Saxon
philosophy, 'disclosure situation' has become the accepted term for such
experiences." What is meant are individual experiences in which more
than just this individual experience is revealed to us: 'suddenly' the whole
of our experience is clarified; the overall coherence of our experience, and
the mystery that holds sway in it, become the subject of experience 'in,
with and under' 3 concrete experience.
Such disclosure situations can take many forms: a situation of joy, for
example, in which we feel a blissful delight and in which the world, and
our own life, seems infinitely rich, beautiful and lovable; or a situation of
sorrow, in which the world no longer makes sense to us and the question
of 'Why?' forces itself ineluctably upon us; or a situation of anxiety, in
which firm ground suddenly vanishes from beneath our feet, the world
reels, and the utter unfathomableness of it all is made clear to us; or a
situation of consolation, in which we feci supported, embraced and
protected; or a situation of love and fidelity coming to us from our fellows,
when we are unconditionally accepted and affirmed, and are ourselves so
taken by the lovableness and beauty of another that everything about us
seems transformed and even under a spell; or a situation of appalling
--
1=--=-=--= ===- ~ _ ~
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= MP
-.. _

86 The God-Questioll Today

boredom in which everything becomes slack and indifferent and reality
proves to be empty, a hollow facade; a situation of encounter with death,
when a human being falls for ever silent and everything is taken from him
and put beyond his control, and when we ourselves are for ever deprived
of a familiar, intimate and beloved friend. In the face of death the dcfinirive
rruth abour the human person is made pitilessly clear: that in the final
analysis a human being belongs neither to himself nor to others; that an
unfathomable mystery envelops the human person; that he himself is a
mystery which he can never master.
Such religious experiences arc profoundly ambivalent. In his well-known
book, The Idea of tlIC Holy, R. Otto spoke of a 'harmony of contrast'. 1M
He described ;1 holy mystery as m),sterillHl fremeudum et (aSciltOSlfnt, a
mystery that is distant and rejects us but is also, at the same time, close to
us and attracts us. Insofar as this experienced mystery is an in3cccssiblc
horizon of all our experience it encounters us as the Wholly Other, a
frightening abyss, a wilderness of nothingness. Insofar as it is close to us
in everything, it appears [0 us as a protecting Ground, as grace and
fulfillment. The encounter with this mystery can be terrifying or blissful;
it can repel and attract, fill us with anxiety and fear or with gratitude, joy
and consolation. Augustine knew long ago of this ambivalence. 'I tremble
and I catch fire. I rremble because I am so unlike him; I catch fire, because
I am so like him.'"
Because of this ambivalence and ambiguity it has been possible for this
mystery to be given many names in the history of human culture and to be
susceptible of many interpretations. It would therefore be very premature
to present the experience of this mystery as unqualifiedly an experience of
God. The experience can be imcrprc(cd in theistic termSj bur it can also be
interpreted in pantheistic, atheistic or nihilistic terms. Or finally - as is
often the case in our contemporary civilization - it can also be left
anonymous and unnamed. When this happens, of course, it nonetheless
succeeds in finding distorted expression, whether in the form of modern
ideologies or in the form of psychic disorders. In the long run it is not pos-
sible to dismiss this dimension of experience completely. For the mystery
is the foundation of .11 experience. It is therefore something different in
nature from the riddles or problems which can, at least in principle, be
solved one after another. In our experience we will always experience
ourselves as finite beings who are surrounded by an unfathomable mystery.
The experience of the mystery that holds sway over our lives and all of
reality is accompanied by a question that is no less unavoidable and
insoluble: the question of the universal meaning of all reality. Since on the
one hand we constantly experience both meaning and meaninglessness
 Experie"ce of God a"d K"owledge of God 87
within history and since, on the other, the mystery that makes itself known
to us in all experience is profoundly ambivalent, we will never be able to
answer this question in a definitive way on the basis of experience. As in
the case of all other experience, so in the case of religious experience the
real meaning is disclosed only in a religious language and the tradition
behind it. We must therefore go further and ask: What is this mystery?
What name can we give it? Can we name it at all, or does it nOl continually
evade our grasp and withdraw into a nameless beyond? May we even call
it God? Is such religious language meaningful to begin with?

3. God in human language

The path of experience leads us to the threshold of an ultimate mystery

which we can experience not directly but only indirectly, 'in, with and
under' our everyday experience. Moreover, as soon as we attempt to
describe this mystery, our language proves useless. What reveals itself to
us in our experience issomething that ultimately lies beyond the boundaries
of language. This difficulty has always been felt in the mystical tradition,
but in our day modern linguistic philosophy has given the problem a new
degree of acuteness.'O Modern linguistic philosophy asks: Is it possible to
speak at all of the religious dimension? Is God a meaningful word in our
language? Or must we not in the final analysis be dumb and silent before
the mystical dimension of our experience? The answer to these questions
is a matter of life and death for the church's proclamation and confession
of its faith; on the answer also depends the very possibility of theology as
linguistically communicated rational discourse on the Christian faith.

The answers given by modern linguistic philosophy have undergone a dramatic

development in the course of our century; I can only prescnt them in a very
schematic way here. At the beginning of the century came logical posirivism
or logical empiricism, usuillly known as neo·positivism. The authoritative
figures were B. Russell and L. Wittgenstein, and the Vienna Circle around H.
Schlick and R. Carnap, who had been influenced by Russell and Wittgenstein.
Logical positivism took 3S its point of departure the ideal of an exact unified
science, the propositions of which can be expressed in a symbolic language
that reflects the world and follows • logical syntax. For this reason, only those
propositions are to be regarded as scienrific and meaningful which arc
demonstrable and repe.table and to this extent are susceptible of inter-
subjective proof. In addidon to the criterion of logic there was also an empirical
criterion of meaning, according to which all propositions must be capable of
empirical verification. Metaphysical and religious propositions cannot meet
88 The God-QlIestion Today
either of these criteria. Metaphysical and religious questions are therefore
unanswcra hIe; they represent pscudo·problcms and me::mlingless propositions.
The classical expression of this position is to be found in L. Wittgenstcin's
Tractatlls Logico-Phi/osophiclls. In the very Preface of the book the author
sets down the statement: 'What can be said at all can be said cleady. and what
we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. '41 Anything that falls 1I~t5ide
these limits of language IS meaningless. 'Mo~t of the propositions and question~
to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently
we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish
that they arc nonsensical ... And it is not surprising that the deepest problems
are in fact not problems at all.· .. .2 At the end of the Tractatlls Wittgenstein
admittedly comes to the realization: 'We feci that even when all possible
scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely
uncouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the
answer. '.. .I Nonetheless he observes: 'There are, indeed, things that cannot be
put into words. They make themselves mallifest. They are what is mystical:....
On the other hand, he concludes that 'what we cannot speak about we must
pass over in silence· ... l
Where this position was adopted, theology was reduced to speechlessness.
Once neo-positivist presuppositions were allowed dominance, 'God' seemed
to be no longer a meaningful word. (A. J. Ayer, A. Flew). We may speak In
this context of a semantic atheism or the death of God. But such descriptions
are, if anything, too innocuous, since they are meaningless.
But logical positivism, which wa. wholly inspired by the paradigm of the
modern natural sciences, 500n proved to be untenable from the standpoint of
natural science itself. Its presupposition was that our language is an image of
reality, but this presupposition was rejected as a result of modern quantum
physics and its interpretation by N. Bohrand W. Heiscnbergofthe Copenhagen
school. According to the latter view we cannot describe microphysical natural
processes in an exact way but only with the help of complementary images
and concepts from our macrophysical world." 6 In addition, difficulties were
met with in reflection on the theory of scientific knowledge. These had to do,
on the one hand, with the impossibility of strict verification and, on the other,
with the unavoidability of conventional language both in the establishment of
a universally valid formal language and in the statement of the basic proposi-
tions of a theory. The result was to undermine the presuppositions of logical
positivism, along with its ideal of scientific statement.
The first consequences of these new insights were drawn especially by K.
Popper in his The Lallguage of Scielltific Discovery" and, following him, by
H. Albert."1! According to these men the basic principles of a science are drawn
from convention; they are stipulations accepted by the scientific community.
They cannot be verified, although they can certainly be falsified. In this view,
science is an open-ended process that proceeds by way of hypotheses and must
obey the method of trial and error. Truth is thus a regulative idea: we can
 Experimce of God Qltd Kltowledge of God 89
strive for the truth in :1 process that is always open~ended, but we can never
reach it. What finds expression here is a radical scepticism with regard to
unconditional truth-claims and an opposition to every philosophy of being
(metaphysics). This position was developed in critical fashion by T. S. Kuhn in
his studies of scientific revolutions. 4\1 According to Kuhn, scientific development
proceeds not in an evolutionary manner (the view still maintained by Popper)
but in a revolutionary way through changes of paradigm. A paradigm is an
accepted typical case or model for the solving of a problem. In the normal
practice of science the cases that arise arc forced into the framework of this
paradigm until the paradigm proves incapable of resolving further problems
and, as the result of a revolution, is replaced by a new paradigm. Examples of
such scientific revolutions may be seen with special clarity in Copernicus,
Newton and Einstein.
In this context I need not emer into the details of the several theories I have
been presenting. I introduce them here only to show that the logical positivism
which prevailed at the beginning of the century has for practical purposes been
generally rejected today. But this change does not at all mean that theology
has already been saved. For the thinking neither of K. Popper nor T. S. Kuhn
allows the possibility of speaking of something that is unconditioned and
possesses a definitive ultimacy. The question still remains, therefore: how is it
possible to speak meaningfully of God?
In a second phase of the discussion the question of the possibility of
religious speech was approached in a completely different way. L. Wittgenstcin
subsequently subjected his earlier starting point to a radical criticism. This
turnabout in Wittgenstein's thinking finds expression in his Philosophical
Investigations. The meaning of a word or proposition is now seen as residing
not in its representation of an object but in its use. 'The meaning of a word is
its use in the language.'JiI Uses are many, depending in each case on the vital
situation, the context, the language game (which at the same time represents
a way of living). A word or sentence can function as blame, challenge,
explanation, instruction or communication. The meaning of a proposition can
therefore be explained only in terms of the language game being used. Instead
of artificial scientific language, ordinary everyday language became the focus
of attention (ordinary language philo,ophy).
In the framework of linguistic usage as a starting point two theories were
developed to explain religious statements: the non-cognitive theOfY and the
cognitive theory. According to the non-cognitive theory (R. Braithwaite, R.
M. Hare, P. M. van Buren and others) the word 'God' has no cognitive content
but serves rather to express an ethical attitude, to explain a commitment, a
life-style or a conviction, or to express a certain way of viewing reality. Thus
the sentence 'God is love' is not meant as a statement of fact, but is rather a
declaration of the person's intention of Ii ving a life governed by agape; it means
that love is God, i.e. is the highest, ultimate and mostdeflnitive reality. Allowing
for all the progress which this theory represents, we must nonetheless ask
90 The God-QuestiOl/ Today
whether it does justice to the religious use of language. For beyond any doubt
a believer (when he prays, for example) is not simply explicitating his moral
approach and his view of the world; he is invoking and addressing God. The
various non·cognitivc theories are thus removed from the religious use of
language; thcy reduce religious faith to ethics.
The foundations of the cognitive theory were laid by j. Wisdom, and the
theory's chief representatives have been I. T. Ramsey51 and, following him, W.
A. de Pater." Ramsey's theory of religious language is closely connected with
his theory of disclosure situations. The situations meam are those in which
suddenly a person 'secs the light', in which suddenly 'the penny drops', or, in
other words, a broader and deeper coherence is revealed. In such situations
there is both a reality to be observed and something that transcends observation.
The insights gained in such situations arc not themselves verifiable, but neither
are they irrelevant; rather, they fit in with experiences and organize the latter
into a meaningful whole (empirical fit). But the understanding of these insights
depends on an interior involvement; it demands an interior commitment. In
religious disclosure situations what is at issue is the total coherence of reality,
our experience in their totality; in these situations the universe acquires depth
and comes alive. Religious language is not descriptive but evocative; it aims at
opening up a particular view of the world, a view which, for the person who
accepts it, is authenticated by reality itself. Once again, though Ramsey's
theories contain much that is useful, they are in the final analysis vague. In the
final analysis, the exact nature of the connection between religious language
and reality and of the reality intended in such language remains unclear.
Ramsey has nonetheless managed to show that there is a specifically religious
use of language which is not reducible either to an empirical content or to
ethics.
A further step is taken in j. L. Austin's How To Do Thil/gs with Words;"
his views have been further developed by j. R. Searle.'" Austin's theory
distinguished between a constative and a performative use of language. In the
performative use of language, reality is not only observed, but is accomplished
by the speech-act. In this sense we can say, for example, that someone is passed
over in silence or something is verbally torn to pieces or someone puts
something in its place or someone lays a problem on the table, and so on. These
examples make it clear that language can have the character of a happening.
Especially clear examples of such effective speaking arc statements that assert
a claim or establish a status: 'I christen this ship the Elizabeth'; 'I take you for
my wedded wife'; 'The session is opened'. Such speech-acts do not simply
record an objective reality and information communicated regarding it; rather,
the speech effects what it says. This theory of speech-acts is very important for
religious speech. For religious speech does not convey neutral information, but
rather has the nature of a testimony; that is, in dealing with it it is impossible
in the final analysis to separate word and reality, the person of the speaker and
the object spoken of. In the word 'God', God is 'uttered' in a literal sense; he
 Experience of God and Know/edge of God 91
becomes present and active in the world and in human life. On the other hand,
when we pass God over in silence, he becomes dead as far as we are concerned;
that is, no life goes forth from him.
We may say in a general way that the recognition of the historicity of
language and human knowledge was the result of the second phase of the
debates carried on in linguistic philosophy. Our language is not a neutral,
objective reflection of reality; it is a subjective 'achievement' of human beings
who through language are introduced into a historical inter-subjective speech-
community and its historical way of life. One of the functions of the pre-
understanding that is communicated through language is to disclose reality.
But this pre-understanding is very diverse and historically changeable when
considered at the level of individuals, so that in each instance reality 'happens'
historically in language. Language thus undetstood does not express reality as
such, but the meaning which reality has for us in each case. Such a historical
understanding of reality brings with it new points of departure for a positive
understanding of religious language. In fact, theology had long since perceived
the tasks and possibilities set before it, independently of the more recent
discussion in linguistic philosophy. For the form-critical srudy of the various
literary genres and the sociological context (Silz im Leben) proper to each had
to a large extent objectively anticipated the new approaches opened up by
linguistic philosophy.
We must, however, also recognize the limits of this linguistic-philosophical
approach. Religious language and the manner of life that crJrresponds to it are
here seen as one language-game alongside others. The question remains. How
do I enter into this language-game? Simply by blindly trusting myself to it and
pracrising the corresponding way of life? In this context commentators have
often spoken critically of the fideism of Wingenstein's language-game theory.
If religious language is not to be a specialized idiom bur universally communi-
cable, then it has to be understood in terms of a general theory of language.
Only under these conditions can there be a universal response to talk about
God.
A third stage in the discussion arose from the convergence of the two
orientations thus far discussed. For all the positions converge in an under·
standing of language as a practice of communication. The dependence of
scientific language on a consensus among researchers already pointed in this
direction; the theory of language games and speech-acts likewise highlighted
the inter-subjective conditions for the validity of language. This understanding
of language as a practice of communication is represented in Germany by the
Erlangen School (Lorenzen, Kambartel, Minelstrass); it has been developed
especially by j. Habermas and K. o. Apel in ways that are relevantto theology.
K. o. Apel has developed the theory of the a priori that is tepresented by the
communication-community .55 According to him, the language of a communi·
cation-community is the transcendental presupposition of all knowledge. On
a similar foundation, J. Habermas developed the consensus theory of truthY·
92 The God-Qllestioll Today
He contrasts this theory with the cl3ssical correspondence theory: the corres-
pondence theory is concerned with the agreement between language and
reality, while the consensus theory is concerned with the agreement among
those who participate in the communication process. In our present circum-
stances of disrupted communication every act of communication is also a pre-
apprehension of an ideal communication community, an anticipation of a life
unmarked by alienation. But the ontological status of this pre-apprehension
remains ultimately unexplained in Habermas' wrirings.
The understanding of language as a practice of communication is of direct
importance to religious language. For the testimony of faith is given through
word and deed. Religious speech is not primarily a theological and systematic
teaching of the faith; it is 3 testimony to the truth and as such is in the nature
of an action and has its place within the community gathered for worship and
liturgy, within the practice of proclamation, liturgy and diakonia (service). Its
primary purpose is not to instruct bur to urge a conversion of life. H. Peukert
therefore justifiably looks to the understanding of language as communicative
practice for a new approach to talk about God." He introduces an idea taken
from W. Benjamin and argues as follows. If the hope and longing implied in
every act of linguistic communication is not to end in nothingness, and if
communication is to be, above all else, truly universal and to include solidarity
with the dead, this is possible only if God exists and if he is the God who gives
life to the dead. Every act of linguistic communication is therefore at the same
time a question and a pre·apprehension of the living and life· giving God.
Every speech-act draws its vitality from the hope of a beatifying universal
communication and is therefore an act of hope that anticipates the coming
reign of God. Religious language is therefore not a specialized idiom alongside
other kinds of language; rather, it makes explicit the condition for the
possibility of all other language.
The question that arises at this point is whether we can be satisfied with this
undoubtedly impressive result. A first question to be put may be derived from
linguistic philosophy itself. According to C. W. Morris we must distinguish
three meanings in language: the syntactic or grammatical (intra-linguistic), the
semantic (relative to realilY), and the pragmatic (related to action)." The
theories previously considered have essentially concentrated co explaining the
syntactic and pragmatic dimensions but have left the semantic dimension
untouched. We musttherefore ask more specifically what the reality is of which
the word 'God' speaks. The same question is also raised by a philosophical
consideration. J, Simon has made the acute observation that an opposition
between correspondence theory and consensus theory is untenable since the
consensus theory is itself a covert correspondence theory,H
For the consensus consists in people having the same view of the 'same
thing', As a practice of communication, language is at the same time an
interpretation of reality, But what is the reality that is meant by the word
'God'? If this ontological question is no longer raised, then the proposition
 Experie'Jce of God and Knowledge of God 93
that God is becomes a statement of what the word 'God' means to us. This
kind of transformation of ontological statements into statements of meaning
and function empty the word 'God~ of its cognitive content. It becomes either
the embodiment of universal communication or oil code· word and impulse for
a certain attitude of solidarity or some other ethical attitude, or a perspective
on (he meaning of reality. Under such circumstances, the word 'God' is used
in a merely allegorical way, that is, it always stands for something else and
therefore can in principle be exchanged and replaced. In short: the question of
the truth of religious language and therefore the question of the reality of God
is unavoidable.
In a fourth stage of our reflections the ontological significance of language
may be best brought out with the aid of the later philosophy of M. Heidegger. 60
In Heidegger's eyes the human person is dos Da-sein (literally: 'the "being-
there"'); he does not exist solely by interacting with reality that is simply 'at
hand', but is rather concerned always with the meaning of being as a whole.
Being is concretely present in language, through which reality is at each
moment disclosed to us in a historical way. Language is therefore 'the house
of being'. Language (for example, the language of science and technology that
aims at communicating information) eim indeed obstruct the question of beingj
but language can also disclose being in new ways, especially the language of
myth and creative literature. Language is a story in which the mystery of being
either conceals itself or addresses us.
The difficult views and approaches of Heidegger have been fruitfully applied
to theology in various ways, especially by H. Gadame .. ' and P. Ricoeur." In
order to explain the semantic function and ontological significance of religious
language we may most profitably start with metaphorical language or the
language of symbols and similes (or parables), as this has been explored by P.
Ricoeur and E. Junge!."
As everyone knows, the language of simile is also the language used by Jesus.
Metaphors and similes do not have for their function simply to depict a set of
familiar facts; rather, they offer a new and creative description of reality. In
so doing they employ a dialectic of the familiar and the strange. When, for
example, it is said that' Achilles is a lion', a familiar concept is being employed
in an unusual and unfamiliar way in order to turn something familiar into
something strange and thus to shed an entirely new light on it and illumine it.
Metaphors are meant to open up a new vision of reality. Like scientific models
and paradigms they are a heuristic tool and a speech strategy that serves to
demolish a previous inadequate interpretation and pave the way for a new and
more adequate one. Metaphor thus gives expression to a plus of reality, or, we
may say, it makes reality speak to us in such a way that at the same time
something more than the reality we encounter reaches expression. This is
especially the case with the word 'God'. In the word 'God', reality expresses
itself in such a way that at the same time the world becomes a place in which
'something' more than the world is seen. Talk about God makes the world a
94 The God-Qllestioll Today
simile or parable of God; this rakes place in such a way that the world shows
itself capable of serving as a parable of God. The word 'God' is thus a simile
which gives expression to the world as itself a simile. Consequently, metaphor,
and especially talk about God, is always an effective word. It is nO! concerned
with what the world has always been, with its abiding nature, but with its
open-ended future. The word 'God' is thus an invitation to look upon the
world as a simile and to enter into it as such, that is, ro undergo a change of
thinking and a conversion, to believe and hope. The semantic meaning of the
word 'God' thus discloses at the same time the pragmatic meaning of the word.
If the word 'God' is understood as a simile which discloses the simile-nature
of the world, then it is not a projective extrapohuion of reality (3 projection)
but an anticipation of a reality which invites us to a new pracdce that in turn
proves itself to be authentic through experience and the doing of the truth.
The word 'God' is a word that opens up a place of freedom and a future.

By way of summary I may say that both from the syntactico·grammatical

standpoint and from the pragmatic and semantic standpoints language
contains a movement to transcendence. Not only can it, but it intends
always to say more than what the factual case is. Language draws its life
from a pre-apprehension olthe total meaning of reality and gives expression
to this meaning in metaphors and similes. Thus language is at the same
time a remembering of an unfulfilled hope of the human race and an
anticipation of this hope. Even before language becomes explicitly religious
language, it always already implies a religious dimension. Only in religious
language does language reach its full stature. The fact is that the word
'God' is not a meaningless word; rather, where God is passed over in
silence, speech itself is endangered. When God is no longer spoken of, there
is danger of a Babel-like confusion of tongues.
If we try to adopt the results of the developments in linguistic philosophy
and take seriously the creative power of language, which does not simply
reflect the pre-given reality of our everyday or scientific experience but at
every point embodies a preapprehension of a total meaning for reality and
thus of the religious dimension, and which is consequently capable of a
creative new description of reality in metaphor and of giving voice to
something truly new, then we come face to face with the doctrine of analogy
which is to be seen as the linguistic doctrine of faith."
The dialectic of familiarity and strangeness which is characteristic of
metaphorical speech is taken over in a new way in the doctrine of analogy.
Analogous predications occupy a position between univocal and equivocal
predictions." A term is univocal when it is applied with one and the same
meaning to various objects. For example, in the statements 'Peter is man'
and 'Paul is man', the concept 'man' has the same meaning in both cases
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 95
and is therefore predicated univocally. A term is equivocal when it has a
different meaning as applied 10 different objects. Thus the word 'foot' is
used with different meanings and therefore equivocally when it is applied
10 the appendage at the end of a human or animal leg, to a unit of measure,
10 a unit of verse meter, and 10 the lower edge of a sail. Analogous terms
fall in between univocal and equivocal terms; they convey the idea of a
similarity and comparability that includes both sameness and difference.
More precisely, analogy means a similarity of relations. The idea was
originally developed in mathematics (A:B = CoD), but is found in practically
all the sciences; in biology, for example, it describes the similarities between
various organisms, where the similarities are not the result of kinship (for
example, the 'wings' of insects and birds, or even the parallel between the
wings of birds, the fins of fish and the legs of higher vertebrates). Last but
by no means least, metaphors can be translated into analogies. When, for
example, we speak metaphorically of the evening of life, the meaning is
that evening is related 10 day as old age is 10 life.
At first glan~e, analogous predication may seem 10 be a derivative and
non-literal manner of speaking as compared with unambiguous, univocal
predications. In reality, analogy is primary and not secondary in relation
to unambiguous, univocal statements. 66 Unambiguous statements are
possible only through differentiation from and correlation with other
statements. Unambiguousness or univocity thus presupposes compar-
ability, which includes both sameness and difference. Analogy is thus the
presupposition and ground of possibility of univocal statements. Not
without reason, then, do all the sciences, even the so-called exact sciences,
depend on analogies.

Ancient philosophy prepared the way for the theological use of analogy as a
linguistic form. On foundations laid by Parmenides and Heraclitus" Plato first
introduced the concept of analogy into philosophy. He regards analogy as the
most beautiful of all bonds/·II as what binds reality together, mediates between
all things, and creates unity and coherence. This cenere assigns the extremes
their place and links them together. Analogy here is thus a structural principle
of the universe. For Aristotle, [00, the ana/agon (the proportional) is a meso",
an intermediate;6\! this is especially important to him philosophically when he
comes 10 describe the unity (which embraces the various genera) of all reality
insofar as it is being. 70 This unity cannot be strictly defined, because every
definition presupposes a genus and a specific difference, whereas when there
is question of being, there is no conceivable specific difference that is not itself
somehow being. Being can therefore only be ascribed proportionately, that is,
analogously, to ,he various spheres of being. 7I It is possible to speak of being
96 The God-Question Today
only in relation to the one and in terms of the one.7.! Analogy, like metaphor,
proves to be an indirect discourse that points beyond itself.

Wisdom 13.5 already makes it clear how fundamental a role analogy plays
in speech about God, for we are told there that we can gain knowledge of
God from the world by analogy (ana/ogos) because the order and beauty
of the world point beyond the world. Of course, the ancient philosophers
were already aware that the statements which we can make about God or
the divine in this process are of a more negative character. 7.1 Properly
speaking, we can say of God or the divine only what it is not: incorporeal,
invisible, infinite, and so on. But these negative statements have a positive
meaning. They point not to a nothing but to that which is beyond being
and unity and cannot be grasped in concepts" and before which the mind
that secks conceptual knowledge can only stand silent and still." The
fathers of the church took over this the%gia negativa and applied it even
more radically. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite (so called because he was
wrongly identified with the disciple who attached himself to Paul on the
Areopagus) already gives classical expression to the idea: 'In dealing with
the divine, negations (apophaseis) are true, affirmations (kataphaseis)
inadequate.'7. The ultimate possibility for thought in this area is thus a
realization that we do not know, a docta ignorantia (learned ignorance).77
These insights ultimately found their way into the confession of faith of
the Fourth Lateran Council (1215): 'For no similarity can be asserted
between creature and creature unless an even greater dissimilarity is
included.''' Here the self-enclosed philosophical doctrine of analogy,
which sought to bring all oppositions into unity through a mean, was
forced open in the direction of God, dynamically oriented beyond itself,
and directed towards an Ever-Greater. The theological doctrine of analogy
when thus understood does not serve as the basis for a closed cosmological
or ontological continuity, but on the contrary is a principle of ever greater
openness. It directs us toward the ever greater mystery and as such does
not supply the basis for a natural theology in the sense of a doctrine of
God with a purely rational content, but is rather the grammar of faith."
If we look more closely at the theological doctrine of analogy, we find
that it contains three phases or three interconnected steps.'· The via
affirmationis (way of affirmation) takes as its starting point the positive
connection between the finite and the infinite, as this emerges from crearion;
it knows God from his effects in the world. The via negationis (way of
negation) denies the finite mode inherent in our statements and in the
embodiment of all perfections in the finite realm. The via em;,/elltiae (way
of eminence), finally, says that these finite perfections belong to God in a
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 97
higher degree, in a more sublime manner, and, in fact, in a simply all-
surpassing way (eminenter). By following these steps we come to know
more what God is not than what he is; we come to know that we cannot
know him. Nonetheless we do know that we do not know. Ours is not an
unqualified ignorantia but a docta ignorantia, an informed ignorance or
conscious not-knowing. This does not mean, as Hegel thought, that our
statements tail off into indeterminancy. Rather, we may say with Hegel
that the via negation is presupposes the via affirmation is; the negation is
not total but limited, denying only the finite mode of the posit;ve perfection
and not the perfection itself; the via eminentiae in turn negates the negation
and to that extent posits something higher. It expresses the positive meaning
of the negation. We are dealing therefore with a coherent process of
mediation that in the end does not close in on itself but is entirely open."

A more detailed examination reveals that in Scholastic theology there were

various interpretations of the doctrine of analogy. Even the teaching oEThomas
Aquinas, which is regarded as the classical statement of analogy, is not
monolithic but shows some not unimportant changes at various stages of his
literary production, and is therefore susceptible of divergent interpretations. lIl
One important point is that Thomas speaks of an analogia 1I011l;'lIIm (analogy
of names or terms) and thus an analogy of the names of God,'" and not yet of
an analogia entis (analogy of being), a concept which Cajetan introduces only
in the sixteenth century and which acquired its status as a principle only in our
own century through the work of E. Przywara. The Franciscan theologians,
especially Bonaventure, show even greater reserve than Thomas does; in their
view knowledge of God is possible only on the basis of revelation and of the
analogy of faith which revelation establishes." But, as G. S6hngen" and H.
Urs von Balthasar" have shown, the analogy of faith presupposes an analogy
of being, although as a pure possibility, that is, in the form of the human
person's capacity for being addressed by God. Duns SCOIUS goes farthest in
this direction. According to him, reason can attain only to a 'confused concept'
of God as supreme being. K7 Reason cannot, however, know the nature of God.
What God is can be known and expressed only in faith, in which God freely
makes himself known.
In view of these intra-scholastic and thus intra-catholic differences the
abrupt antitheses between analogia entis and allalogia (idei, as formulated by
K. Barth and, following him, a large number of Protestant theologians in their
opposition to the doctrine of ana/agia entis, are very much relativized. Barth
thought that the doctrine of analogia entislumped God and the world together
within an overarching omological continuity and thus made God cease to be
God. For this reason he regarded the analogy of being as an invention of
Antichrist. IIK Later on, however, he developed his own ana/agia relationis and
operationis (analogy of relation and operation) that is established by revelation
98 The God-Qllestion Today
but is also reflected in creation, which the covenant presupposes as an extrinsic
basis." This view of Barth's is structurally not very different from the
Franciscan conception of analogy. There is, however, this difference, that
the ana/agia relationis grounds only an external correspondence (ana/agia
proportionalitatis extrir.secae - an analogy of extrinsic proportionality) and
not an ontological correspondence (ana/agio proportionalitatis intr;nsecae -
an analogy of intrinsic proportionality) Of, in other words, there is an analogy
based on God's historical action and speaking (alia/agio nom;mmt!) but not
an analogy embodied in being itself.'" This raises the deeper problem of the
reladon between being and history or a (salvation·)historical understanding
of being. The question, then, is this: how can we transform the classical
doctrine of analogy into a (salvation-lhistorical mode of thought?

A (salvation'rJhistorical transformation of the doctrine of analogy is

possible provided that we do nor adopt the Greek metaphysics of the
cosmos but follow modern philosophy in taking freedom as our point of
departure." For it can be shown that analogy represents an interpretation
of the exercise of freedom. Freedom has its existence in the tension between
infinite and finite, absolute and relative. It is possible for us in a free act to
distance ourselves from the finite and conditioned experience of the
moment and to conceive this as finite and conditioned, only because we
reach beyond it to what is infinite and unconditioned. Only within the
horizon of the infinite can we grasp the finite as finite; only in the light
of the unconditioned and absolute can we grasp the conditioned as
conditioned. Every finite concept presupposes a pre-apprehension of the
infinite. Because of this structure of pre-apprehension that is proper to
human freedom and understanding, there is always present in human
freedom and understanding an implicit and latent knowledge of the
unconditioned and infinite. We may even say: there is an analogical
knowledge. For we cannot speak of the infinite and absolute in the same
univocal way that we do of the finite and conditioned; otherwise we would
render it finite and conditioned. But neither may we speak of the two as
simply equivocal, for then the infinite could not serve as a horizon for the
finite and shine out of the finite. Therefore, despite all the qualitative as
well as quantitative distinctness there must be a correspondence between
the two poles of our freedom, and to this relation of correspondence we
give the name analogy.
Once analogy is no longer understood primarily as an interpretation of
the cosmos but is conceived in light of the basic exercise of freedom, it
takes on a historocal shape; it then participates in the structure of freedom
and even represents the very heart of freedom. It expresses the 'more' and
the 'new' of freedom as compared with the pure facticity of the world. It
 Experiellce of God Q/ld Kllowledge of God 99
leads us to see the world anew within the horizon of freedom and to
understand the world as the place where freedom is exercised, or, in other
words, to conceive the world as a historical world. The doctrine of analogy,
when thus transformed, can therefore disclose to us the possibilities present
in reality; this means, it can disclose reality's dimension of futurity. The
pre-apprehension characteristic of freedom is thus an anticipation of a
future that is more than an extrapolated past and present. A doctrine of
analogy that is renewed in this way can be regarded as a speculative
interpretation of the form of speech we call metaphor and of the gospel
parables.
If we a!tempt to think of God within the horizon of freedom as perfect
and absolute freedom to which our finite freedom reaches forward," and
if we then conceive of the world as the place for the exercise of freedom,
there is no possibility of showing God to be a necessity posited by thought.
As perfect freedom, God is more than necessary; because he is free, he can
be recognized only in freedom, if and when he freely discloses himself to
human beings. For this reason, when we a!tempt to think of God within
the horizon of freedom, we are nptindulging in abstract speculation about
God but listening in concrete ways to the world, to determine whether and
where [races of God's free revelation are to be found, and then, in the light
of these traces, conceiving reality in a new way as the space of freedom
and as history. The doctrine of analogy constrains us, then, to turn to the
testimony of the Bible and to allow reality, in the light of that testimony,
to disclose itself to us anew. At the same time, analogy equips us with a
language that presupposes the self-disclosure of God and makes it possible
for us in turn to give expression to this self-disclosure. In this sense the
analogia fidei presupposes the allalogia en tis or libertatis and brings the
latter to its fulfillment.

4. Knowledge of God
In our present-day world of science and technology the basic question of
natural theology, which is the problem of responsible talk about God, will
be answered, in the final analysis, not in terms of religious experience and
religious language but in the light of reason. Without 'the exertion of the
concept' experience and language become empty (Hegel). The question,
then, is this: is faith in God intellectually honest and responsible or is faith
in God possible only through the mind's abandonment of itself (sacrificillm
intellectlls)? What is the relation between faith in God and human
knowledge? Can we know or even prove God in a purely natural way?"
Let me get into the subject by asking first of all: what docs it mean to
100 The God-Questioll Today
know? Knowledge evidently includes far more than proof. Knowledge is
a many-leveled vital process of the entire person; it is not a matter simply
of conceptual abstraction but has a personal dimension and, above all,
always presupposes experience. But knowledge differs from experience in
that it is not only in contact with reality but also knows that it is in
contact." While direct experience involves only an absorption in its object
.nd subjective interiorization of this object, knowledge is entirely present
to the other but in that very act .Iso entirely present to itself. It is reflective,
that is, it turns back from the object to itself .nd becomes conscious of
itself. Knowledge thus presupposes a relative independence from wh.t is
known; it is immediately linked to freedom. In knowledge we ore one with
things .nd human beings, but in such. way th.t at the same time we
dist.nce ourselves from them .nd distinguish them.s objects from ourselves
as subjects.
In agreement with Aristotle I may describe the difference between
experience and knowledge in this \V.y. Knowledge .sks not only wh.t is
but also why it is; it also inquires into the grounds of this knowledge-
including knowledge of and talk .bout God." To that extent knowing
.Iso includes supplying orguments and proving. We must realize,ofcourse,
th.t proof is an analogous concept which derives its specific meaning from
the object of the proof in each instance." Common to all forms of proof
is the fact that there is a process of subst.ntiarion that can be repeated
by people generally. But proofs take different forms: the proof of a
m.thematician, the proof of • n.tural scientist who proceeds by exper-
iment, the proof of a lawyer, a historian, a literary researcher, Or the proof
of a doctor when he di.gnoses .n illness. It is not surprising, therefore,
th.t. proof of God's existence must be of. different kind from. proof in
mathem.tics or the n.!Ur.1 sciences. The 'proofs of God's existence' reach
beyond the dimension of the physic. I .nd of the purely ration. I into the
metaphysic. I world .nd the realm of the infinite, which by its very noture
c.n no longer be conceived and comprehended in finite definitions. If we
were to attempt to prove God as though he were just like any other being,
.nd to reach him through calculation and est.blish his f.ctu.lity after the
manner of the scientist who objectifies .nd keeps his own dist.nce, then,
for from knowing him, we would profoundly foil to know him. Therefore
we should not expect more from the proofs of God's existence than.
well-founded invit.tion to faith. If freedom and knowledge are .Iw.ys
interconnected, then it can be said of the knowledge of God that it is in a
special w.y possible only in freedom. The proofs of God's existence 're
therefore. re.son.ble appeal to human freedom .nd an account rendered
of the intellectu.1 honesty of f.ith in God.
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 101
(aJ The cosmological argllmellt
The cosmological argument is probably the oldest of the proofs for God's
existence. Its point of departure is the reality of the cosmos with its order
and beauty, but also its mobility, frailty and contingency. Starting with
experience of these aspects of the world, the argument inquires into the
ultimate ground of the world; to this ground if finally gives the name 'God',
which is derived from the language of religion.
The cosmological argument has been in use since practically the begin-
ning of Western thought. The early Greek natural philosophers already
argue back from the cosmos and its order to the ground of these. The
fathers of the church take over this approach at a very early point in church
history.·7 The argument is given its classical form in the East in the three
ways of John Damascene" and in the West in the five ways of Thomas
Aquinas." Thomas takes as his starting point various aspects of the world
of our experience (movement, causality, contingency, degrees of being,
purposefulness). He then inquires into the cause of these phenomena. In
this search for a cause it is not possible to engage in an infinite regress in
its entirety as a series, no less than in its individual members since the series
of causes is itself contingent and therefore requires an explanatory ground.
There must therefore be a first cause that is not to be understood simply
as the first member in a series of causes, but that grounds this series in its
entirety and cannot itself have its ground in a higher cause. It must therefore
be understood as self-subsistent, complete being, as that fullness of being
which we call God. Even Kant, who subjected this proof to a searching
critique, is of the opinion that it has an abiding importance. In Kant's view
the arguments are not indeed compelling, but they do impose on the mind,
so that even in the future attention will have to be paid to this proof. In
particular, the so called teleological argument from purposefulness will
always have to be mentioned with respect. It is 'the oldest, the clearest, and
that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity'.IO.
As a matter of fact, even among present-day natural scientists arguments
are to be found that resemble the cosmological argument, especially as this
talies the form of the teleological proof. The natural scientist sees a
marvellous order everywhere in nature. Admittedly, we know today that
natural laws are laws formulated by man and that they have only a very
high degree of probabiliry; on the other hand, we also know that we can
rely on these laws, for without such reliance technology, for example,
would be impossible. There must therefore be something in the realiry of
nature itself that corresponds to the designs worked out by the human
mind in the natural sciences; nature must be controlled by a rational order
102 The God-Questioll Today
that cannot originate in man but only from a mind that embraces reality
in its entirety. This consideration leads prominent natural scientists (0 a
kind of new Platonism. They see in reality the embodiment of intellectual
ideas which we cre:ltively reconstruct in our natural laws. Thus nature,
precisely as known by the natural sciences, makes it possible to accept the
existence of God. This acceptance can, of course, take many forms. The
argument just explained still leaves the way open for pantheism or
panentheism (A. Einstein), for the acceptance of a personal God (W.
Heisenberg) or for a Neoplatonic th.o/ogia /tega/iva (c. F. v. Weizsiicker).
But whatever the more specific interpretation of the relation between God
and world, these various positions are in agreement that God alone can
ground the scientific intelligibility of reality.
Nowadays it is philosophy rather than the natural sciences that chal-
lenges the proofs of God's existence. It was Kant that dealt them a first
blow from which they have still not entirely recovered. Yet the more serious
challenge to them comes today from nihilism rather than from Kant. For
this reason, for us the starring point for the proofs of God's existence can
no longer be simply an inquiry into the ground of the order in the world.
For it is not only the "what' but the "that" of reality that calls for an
explanation. The basic philosophical question is: why is there anything at
all instead of nothing?'O' With this dimension of the question Thomas
deals rather in his third way, the proof from contingency.'" For the
contingency of reality means its radical problematicalness. Everything that
is was not at one time and will at some point cease (0 bej even morc,
everything that is could also not be. Everything that is is therefore suspended
over the abyss of non· being; it is inclined tow3rd nothingness and controlled
through and through by nothingness. This nothing is not a minimally
structured, perhaps ever so weak and shadowy reality; nothing is nothing.
It is a pure concept of the understanding which we use in order to bring
out the problematical characterofbeing.lt is with this radical problematical
character that we must begin.
If we do start here, we notice something remarkable; it is precisely when
we take the possibility of not-being as our horizon that we realize the
positive character of being. Despite its vanity, being does not fall prey to
nothingness; rather, the wonder of being reveals itself to us precisely in the
face of nothingness. Precisely when confronted with the non·evidentiality
of reality we experience its reliability, solidity and beauty. Thus being
reveals a power within it that resists nothingness. This may be stated
formally in the classical principle of contradiction: insofar as it is, what is
cannot not be. Thomas says the same thing in a more substantive way:
nothing is so contingent that it does not contain within itself some element
 Experience of God and Know/edge of God 103
of necessity. This element of the unconditioned in the conditioned is not
first brought home to us by a complicated proof; it is grasped unrhematically
in every knowledge of the conditioned, since it is only in the light of the
necessary that we know the conditioned as conditioned. When thus
understood, the cosmological argument is in the final analysis simply
reflecting this primordial knowledge; it is an explanation of the astonish-
ment felt at the wonder of being. IOJ
In its radical form, the proof from contingency, the cosmological
argument, thus brings us into the presence of the marvellous fact that being
is, even though (to use a paradox) non-being could exist. We are therefore
confronted with a pure 'that', the 'what' of which we are unable to grasp.IO'
We are dealing here with a limit-concept of the mind, for we grasp
something of which we can say only that we do not grasp it. We know
what it is not but not what it is. In this idea the mind that seeks to conceive
and explain reaches beyond itself. We are confronted with a groundless
ground that lies beyond our explanatory thinking. Precisely when we deal
with the ultimate ground we must put aside our explanatory thinking and
trust ourselves to the absolutely Groundless. And that which is an abyss
for our thinking is also an abyss for our conduct and our striving for
security. Man faced with groundlessness, with the abyss, is overcome by
anxiety. There is nothing to which he can hold tight in the abyss of Dasein.
He can only trust himself to the groundless Ground. When finite values
that have been absolutized collapse, when the idols fall, only God, the
Absolute, can give life stability and meaning. A conversion of mind and
conduct is needed, and only through such a conversion is knowledge of
God possible. Such a conversion does not disclose to liS God's being in
itself, but it does allow us to grasp reality in a new way as an image and
likeness of the mystery of God and thus to understand it as meaningful.
Even in its incomprehensibility, the knowledge of God is authenticated by
the fact that it makes the world and its order intelligible and thus proves
its authenticity by means of the phenomena of reality. This is due not least
to the fact that the acknowledgment of God means a demythologization
and de-ideologization of all the finite realities that have been turned into
absolutes. Man thus becomes free over against the world; he need not
become the slave of anything or anyone. The acknowledgment that God
alone is God makes it possible to be human in a human way. At this point
the cosmological argument leads into the anthropological argument.
104 The God.Questioll Today

(b) The anthropological argument

The anthropological argument takes as its point of departure not the
external reality of the cosmos but the inner reality of the human spirit.
Depending on whether one prefers11ere to start with mtelIectual knowledge
or with moral willing (or freedom), one will speak of the noetic (ideological)
proof or the moral proof.

The writers of antiquity already saw that in the spiritual nature of man there
is a presentiment and tacit presupposition that something divine exists. These
~iters ~ointed especially to (he ph,5nomenon of conscience as a testimo~
God. T e fathers of the churcti look up this nOlion and spoke of an idea of
God that is innate in the human person. lOS Terwllian even speaks of the witness
given by the a"ima 1Iaturaliter christiana (the soul that is by its nature
Christian).I06 Above all others, however, it was Augustine who T'inted:!:1
way inward and taught men (0 look for God in the heart that [Jr1 e ss u til
It n s 1m. IS own spirit man n strut regarding which he can, in
prinCiple, have no doubt. For, long before Descartes. Augustine says: 'Si eni",
(aI/or slim' (If I am deceived then I exist).'·' He finds it impossible 10 interpret
this truth as being anything but an enlightenment from God. 'Therefore we
cannot know God except by going beyond ourselves within ourselves. 'uw The
same arguments are to be found in Thomas Aquinas. According to him, in
every act of knowledge of a finite entity we apprehend infinite being, for it is
only in the light of the infinite that we can know the finite as finite. Thus in
every act of knowledge we implicitly know God. '''' In like manner our willing
strives beyond all that is finite.
In this process there cannot be an infinite regress; there must therefore be a
final goal. We are free in the face of finite goods only because we strive toward
the absolute good. All of our striving is implicitly a striving toward God; he is
loved along with everything else we love. In Scholasticism these arguments
admittedly take second place to the cosmological argument; only in the modern
age do they move into the foreground. In his third Meditation Descartes takes
3S his point of departure the idea of God that is given in human consciousness;
he cannot find the ground for this in the finite human mind itself but only in
the reality of God.'" The idea of God is of fundamental importance to
Descartes especially because he can ensure the certainty of our knowledge of
the external world only through the idea of God who embraces both man and
world. As Descartes needs God as guarantee of knowledge, so Kant needs him
as a postulate of freedom. For freedom can find the blessedness It seeks only it-
there IS a pfe-establishs d harmony bet'. cea ftccdoJii aad hJmre. Bu( (hiS In
tum-irpOsslble only If both IIJCUie and freedom are embraced by (he all-
inclusive freedom of God.'"
It was owing to the Belgian Jesuit J. Marechal that the modern approach
through subjectivity was accepted into Catholic theology. ' " Marochal
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 105
influenced K. Rahner, J. B. Lon, M. Muller, B. Welte, J. Moller, E. Coreth,
W. Kern and others. J. H. Newman had already independently pointed out the
presence in the human conscience of a real apprehension of God. II " In the
following remarks I shall adopt the approach of the Marechal school, but with
H. Frings I shall take freedom as my starting point rather than consciousness." 1

, It is constitutive of human free®m.that.it is in tension between the finite

I
and the tntimte. Only because it is open to the infinite can .t lie free in
relation to the finite. For this reason there is no intra-wordly encounter
that can bring human freedom its proper fulfillment. The person can reach
fulfillment only through encounter with a freedom that is unconditioned
not only in its formal claims but also in its material possession of the good.
Only in encounter with absolute freedom can the person reach inner peace
and inner fulfillment. In every other exercise of freedom there is a hopeful
but always unsatisfied pre-apprehension of the complete realization of i
freedom. This pre-apprehension of complete fulfillment makes possible,
and supplies the light and strength for, every free act. The idea of an utterly
fulfilted-.@d all-fulfilling..@solute freed.omls th,!!s a n~dea;-it-is-a
transcen,ie.m al conditton for the possibility of freedom .
1
But is there a realicy that corresponds to this idea? As in the case of the
cosmological argument, so here we arc confronted with a limit·definition.
For the encounter with absolute freedom is outside the conditions of our
present mode of existence. If possible at all, it is possible only in death . It
would therefore be possible to speak of God only in a pre-apprehension
of 'eternal life' and the 'vision of God'. In our present life we must be
s;!.t· with fragmentary antici atio lsi! not, therd5re, enough for us
to settle for grasptng t e absolute in ever-new symbols that constantly
elude us? According to a view that is widespread today it is better to be
modest and renounce any absolute determination of meaning. But is human
freedom adequately grounded by means of an indeterminately infinite
horizon, or must it derive its ultimate grounding from a determinately
infinite goal? Only this much can be said by way of answer: if there is to
b an absolute fulfillment of . an this re uires absolute
reedom as tlon. The question then is: is there then to be an absolute
fulfi ment of meaning? (t was Christianity thatlirought into1he world
-Such an absol utefiilfillmentof meantng. In the final analysis this fulfillment
stanas or fallsmaependence on a decIsIon in which freedom decides about
itself and its own meaning. Only in fteedom can the meaning of freedom
be decided. This means, hmvever, that God as ~erfect freedom Whid!.f
brings our freedom to fulfillment cannot he d"morutrated to ar1fQne-.fFOm~
outside unless that person Intenorly opens himself to thjsuuth. The person
106 The God-Qllestion Today
must be ready to anticipate death and to surrender himself in order to gain
himself. The anthropological argument can only explicitate the alrernatives
on which a decision must be made. It can, in addition, show that the choice
of God is meaningful and even the more meaningful of the alternatives.
When all is said and done the anthropological argument boils down to
Pascal's 'wager': 'If you win you win everything, if you lose you lose
nothing. '116
The anthropological argument h.s. decisive advantage over the cosmo-
logical argument: it points not to a necessary aLsolute being, a supreme
Good, and so on, but to perfect freedom. Freedom is something the human
person can recognize only if it discloses and reveals itself in history. For
this reason, what we encounter in the anthropological argument is not an
abstr.ct God but the living God of history. Thus the anthropological
argument leads us to the proof of God's existence from the philosophy of
history.

(c) The argllment frolll the philosophy of history

Down to the present time, relatively little attention has been paid in
Catholic theology to the argument from the philosophy of history; this is
still the case today. The lack is all the harder to understand since the
argument from divine providence in connection with scripture already
plays a role in the fathers of the church. 111
It was Augustine who in his The City of God wrote the most brilliant of
all theologies of history and one that was influential for many centuries.
The thesis that history is a work and, at the same time, a sign of divine
providence exerted an influence into the modern age, in Vieo and Bossuet
and finally Hegel.'" Hegel looks upon his entire philosophy of history as
a proof that providence rules the world; for this reason he interprets his
philosophy of history as a theodicy that is being worked out in history and
that he wishes to see replacing the metaphysical theodicy of I.eibni •. '"

More than any other, it was J. S. Drey, the father of the C.tholic Tiibingen
school, who, in critical and creative di:llogue with German idealism, developed
the idea of God in the perspective of universal history. I!!) In contemporary
Protestant theology W. Pannenberg has expounded a theology in the light of
universal history; in his work he h3rks back to Hegel but also depends on
Dilthcy, Heidcgger and Gadamer,lZI In its Marxist or Nco-marxist form,
Hegel's philosophy of history has exerted a wide influence on political theology
and liberation theology.1Z.! For Hegel's idealist interpretation of history,
according to which it is spirit that determines history, became problematical
to the post-idealist thinkers (the laterSchelJing, Feuerbach, Marx. Kicrkcgaard,
 Experiellce of God alld Kllowledge of God 107
etc.). They acknowledged the facticity of teality as both incapable of being
detived from spirit and as nonetheless a given that cannot be ignored. K. Marx
believed that idealism should be turned upside down and that history should
be derived from changing socia-economic conditions. According co Marx,
mediation between humanity and world is through practice and more spec-
ifically through work, in which humanity shapes the world but at the same
time is determined by the world, 12J until finally humanity is entirely reconciled
to the world in the communist kingdom of freedom. '"
The Scholastic tradition, to which I attach myself here, intends to move
beyond the one sidedness of both idealism and materialism and sees itself as a
realism Of, in many cases, more specifically 3n ideal-realism.I!S It acknowledges
subject and object, spirit and mattcr, intellectual knowledge and sense experi-
ence as each having a relative independence, and thus does not simply derive
anyone of them from the others. However 1 realism, being an ideal-realism,
does see spirit as the more comprehensive reality. For in the act of intellectual
knowledge and in free practice human beings appropriate reality for them-
selves. On the one hand, this appropriation is of such a kind that in this very
act of becoming one with the world spirit sees itself as a relatively independent
entity, while at the same time acknowledging the rdative independence of
material reality. On the other hand, this relative unity and relative penetration
of matter by spirit presupposes that matter is not unqualifiedly spirit-less bur
rather has a structure that makes it analogous to spirit. w , If matter did not
'somehow' have a spiritual character and if it were not ordered to spirit, we
would be unable to discern laws of nature which are more than human
projections. The very knowledge of nature, and especially the sciences of
narure, presuppose that spirit embraces both subject and object, establishing
each of them in relative independence. This interconnection is revealed and
realized in the historical intercourse of man and world. Consequently, a
historical vision of the world signifies that reality is not simply something
objectively pregiven, but rather that the subject plays a parr in the constitution
of the world, just as the subject in its turn is mediated through the world. Thus
reality is constituted in a dialectical interplay of world and humanity.ll'

This historical understanding of reality entails consequences for the God-

question. For, given this basic approach, it follows that the basic human
situation in the world is at first sight a paradoxical one. '" On the one
hand, the human intellect stands superior over all reality, for in principle
it can make all reality its own by knowing it. In its freedom with respect
to pregiven reality it can inquire into everything and overwhelm it with
questions. As Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas used to say, the intellect is
'quodammodo OI1lIl;a' - it is 'in a manner, all things'.'l9 But this very
'quodammodo' (in a manner) points to a limitation that must not be
overlooked and that signifies a boundary which may not be crossed (unlike
108 The God-Question Today
what we find in rationalism and idealism). On the other hand, then, this
'in a manner' indicates that reality is also greater than man and his mind.
Man can never completely know, still less completely control, reality as a
whole; reality always proves larger, broader and deeper than man's reach,
until in death man finally succumbs to reality. But even the details of reality
man can likewise never completely penetrate; he can never completely
comprehend them. In the final analysis, matter eludes man's grasp.
Is man's situation therefore meaningless and absurd? The suspicion of
meaninglessness that was fostered by nihilism at the collapse of idealism is
countered by our experience that partial fragmentary meaning is available; I
refer to successfully acquired knowledge of reality, such as may be seen,
for example, in technology, and above all to the experienceofthe happiness
of love between human beings. In every successful knowing and every
successful practice meaning is revealed that checks the acceptance of total
meaninglessness and that keeps alive the question of the meaning of reality
as a whole and even leads to a well-founded hope that the experience
of partial meaning presupposes the meaningfulness and therefore the
rationality of the whole.1.l0 Every experience of partial meaning proves to
be a hope-inspired pre-apprehension of the unconditioned meaning of the
whole. But, given the finiteness of human knowledge and action, it is not
possible to establish and prove this unconditioned meaning of the whole,
either theoretically or practically. All that is possible here is a founded
hope, a docta spes. Above all, the meaningfulness of the whole cannot
come from finite man but only from a meaning and a spirit that embraces
both man and the world, from a spirit which is at the same time the all-
determining reality and thus from what in the language of religion we call
God.
This argument can be made a bit more concrete. The historical hope of
man is ultimately a hope of justice, that is, a hope of being acknowledged
as man. Hope thus understood is not a position taken or a plank in a party
platform; it is a transcendental condition for the possibility of a common
being-human. As human beings we simply cannot stop hoping that in the
end the murderer will not triumph over his innocent victim. III If we were
to abandon this hope, we would abandon ourselves. On the other hand,
unjustified violence can be eliminated only by violence. Consequently we
are caught up in a satanic cycle of guilt and revenge from which we can be
redeemed only by a wholly new beginning that cannot be derived from the
conditions of history. The pre-apprehension of the future thus implies a
pre-apprehension of the new justice of God and his reign. But this justice
must also be applied to the dead. Any hope of the future would be cynical
that was built on the toil, suffering and renunciation of previous generations
 Experiellce of God and Knowledge of God 109
and that offered these as victims on the altar of the future. Consequently,
unless we are willing to cut hope in half, as it were, and limit it to a future
generation and to those who are in the vanguard of progress, our hope
must imply the God of hope who gives life to the dead. III The future cannot
therefore be simply a prolongation and intensification of the present (future
as fUll/mm); it must rather be the future of a self-sufficient power of the
future (future as adventus).
The God of hope to which the historico-philosophical argument brings
us is not the God who stands at the end: the God who makes his appearance
at the term of an intellectual regression to the ground of reality and who
as the unmoved Mover can only be an end and never a beginning. Rather,
this God of hope is the living God who can be a beginning; he is the power
of the future, the one who is coming. The God of hope cannot be thought
of as other than absolute freedom. Therefore this proof of God's existence
can only be a kind of hypothesis that only the advance of history can verify.
It represents a justifiable decision in behalf of a particular way of viewing
reality, a paradigm which has proved its validity according to the testimony
of the biblical writers and of all true Christians down to our own day and
which we in turn must verify in our own experience. The arguments from
the philosophy of history make especially clear a point that has already
emerged in connection with the other arguments: in the final analysis it is
impossible to prove God's existence from some authority external to him;
he must show himself. The idea of God can be established as a true one
only if we take into account its specific implications. This is the way
followed by the so-called ontological argument, to which all the other
arguments boil down.

(d) The ontological argument

All the proofs of God's existence that have thus far been discussed have a
common underlying structure: they start with cosmological, anthropo-
logical or historical experiences and ask what the ground and meaningful
goal of these experiences must be. A third step in the argument then
identifies absolute being with God: 'and this is what everyone calls "God".'
Because of this identification of being or the ultimate ground of being with
God it is possible to speak of the onto-theological constitution of classical
metaphysics. m The classical tradition admittedly paid little attention to
this identification; there was a tactic consensus that the ultimate, supreme
and all-embracing reality is God. Modern atheism and especially nihilism
has desrroyed this consensus. Debate with these positions had made it clear
that no obvious statements about this ultimate reality are possible. Only
110 The God-Qllestioll Today
God can make God plain. But this means that God cannot be proved in
the strict sense of the word 'prove'; he must make himsclfknown. Therefore
our thinking must not move solely from the world to God; it must also
move from God to the world, and the idea of God must be tested by the
reality of man, world and history. This is the way followed in the proof of
God's existence that was set forth by Anselm of Canterbury and that has
since Kant been called the ontological argument. Il•
Anselm develops the ontological argument in his Pros/ogiol/, in which
he seeks to concentrate into a single argument the many arguments offered
in his previous work, the Mon%gion. He tells us that he had in despair
decided to drop this plan, but finally the idea forced itself upon him and
ended by filling him with joy.Il' The ontological argument thus represents
an intellectual experience, an intellectual breakthrough, or, more accu -
rately, the experience of truth breaking through into thought, a being
overpowered by truth. Correspondingly, this argument, unlike the others,
moves from above downward; it starts from above, from a grasp of, or a
being grasped by, the idea of God, in order to demonstrate the reality of
God. For this reason Anselm begins with a prayer: 'Teach me to seek You,
and reveal Yourself to me as I seek; for unless You instruct me I cannot
seek You, and unless You reveal Yourself I cannot find You.' Where and
how does God reveal himself? By creating 'in me Your image so that I may
remember, contemplate, and love YoU'.1J6 Anselm's ontological argument
is thus connected with his doctrine of the image of God in man. This
connec:ion is usually overlooked. If it is taken into consideration, his
argument ceases to seem purely aprioristic and deductive and proves to be
close to the teaching of the church fathers on the image of God or the idea
of God innate in man.
Anselm now attempts to bring God's image in man into consciousness.
Thought grasps God as that 'than which nothing greater can be thought'
(,aliqllid qllo lIIaill' nihil cogitari potes!,).I" Thought experiences the
reality of God not in an ordinarv concept but in a limit-concept, which
expresses the dynamic movement of thought beyond itself. Conse-
quently, Anselm defines God not simply as that 'than which nothing
greater can be thought', but as 'something greater than can be thought'. III
Consequently, it must be said of the mind that it 'rationally comprehends
that (God] is incomprehensible'.'" In the idea of God, then, which is innate
in the human spirit as image of God, thinking is radically directed beyond
itself. The ontological argument is simply a logical 'ex-plication' or
unfolding of the ontological constitution of reason, (ratio). Anselm states
the argument as follows: 'Surely that than which a greater cannot be
thought cannot be only in the understanding. For if it were only in the
 Experiellce of God Qlld Kllowledge of God 111
understanding. it could be thought to exist also in reality - which is greater
[than existing only in the understanding). Therefore if that than which a
greater cannot be thought existed only in the understanding. then that than
which a greater Call1lot be thought would be that than which a greater call
be thought! Butsur.ly this conclusion is impossible. Hence. without doubt.
something than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in the
understanding and in reality.'''" In short. the idea of God cannot without
contradiction be thought of as merely an idea.'"

Anselm's thinking is caricatured when objection is raised to him that in the

ontological argument he is deducing existence from the concept of existence
or arguing from the idea of God to the existence of God. This objection to the
ontological argument was already being voiced during the lifetime of Anselm.
In a work entitled Liber pro illsipiellle IBook On Behalf of the Fool) the monk
Gaunilo objected that Anselm was making a leap from the ideal order to the
real; but from the idea of a perfect island its real existence does not follow.l~l
Kant raised a similar objection later on. though he started with different
presuppositions: a hundred dollars in the mind are not a hundred real dollars;
you cannot derive existence from the concept of existence,l-H In the language
of the schools the objection runs thus: the ontological argument is a sophism
because it contains four terms. True enough, from the concept of God it follows
that God exists, but the concept of existence is ambiguous, for it can mean
either existence in (he mind or real existence. From the idea that existence is
necessary follows only a conceptual existence, not a real existence. These
criticisms fail to grasp the structure of the ontological argument. The argument
is concerned with the existence not of just any idea but of the supreme idea
which is requ ired for thinking and in which thinking transcends itself.
Anselm is entirely a Platonic thinker for whom thinking is inconceivable
except as a participation in being and as'ln interpretation of being. Augustine
had already characterized God as that 'than which there is nothing greater'
('quo lIi"il superius' ).'" We can. to be sure, know God only in the light of the
truth which is God himself and which is present to the soul.'" Knowledge of
God therefore presupposes illumination by the truth which is God. In the
Proslogion Anselm relates this idea to the image of God in the interior of man
where the reality of God directly manifests itself. The ontological .rgumenr is
meant to give expression to this ontological connection. It is therefore typical
that th inkers in the Augusdnian readition (Alexander of Hales , Bonaventure,
Duns Scotus and others) should, in connection with the doctrine of illumination,
give their adherence ro Anselm. The idealist thinkers of the modern age -
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel and others - likewise accept his arguments,
although they reinterpret it in their own manner. Especially for Hegel. the self-
interpretation of the Absolute takes place in thinking; the proofs of God's
existence are an exegesis of this necessary connection. I"6
These idealist presuppositions provide the basis for a second objection that
112 The Cod-Question Today
carries the criticism an essential step further. It, (00, is already to be found in
Kant. Precisely because the concept of God is a necessary and supreme concept,
it is a limit-concept which the mind cannot more fully define. It is ·an abyss on
the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay'.'''' Kant concludes that
we can use this concept only in a regulative and not in a constitutive way. 101M
It is at this point that the later Schelling begins his critique of the ontological
argument. According to him, in the idC:1 of God thought constructs something
'in the presence of which thought falls silent and reason humbles itself', and
in which reason 'is carried outside of itself in a state of unqualified ecstasy'_
When it proposes this idea it is "as it were rendered immobile, as it were
rendered paral ysed' .'" Therefore Schell ing characterizes this entire philosoph y
with its ascent through dialectic as a negative philosophy. Admittedly, thought
cannot rest comem with this negative outcome. Man longs for meaning and
he can find this only in absolute freedom. "" Schelling therefore drafts a second,
positive philosophy. Its starting point is necessary being, interpreted as absolute
freedom, and it seeks to show that this absolute freedom is the Lord of being,
that is, God. It thus follows a course opposite to that of the ontological
argument: It moves not from concept to existence but from existence (Q nature
or concept. Jj I Schelling's purpose, then, is to show the divinity of the absolute
and to 'conceptualize the absolute in the form of God t • IS ! Here, according
to Schelling, is the difficulty encountered by the whole of metaphysics.
Metaphysics has identified the concept of supreme existence with [he concept
of God; in so doing it became an onto theology. Schelling'S thesis in opposition
to ontotheology is: 'The necessarily existent is not necessary, but is in actuahty
the necessary, necessarily existing essence of God.'Jjj This non-necessary but
factual connection cannot be shown a priori, but only a posteriori. This is done
not by having thought ascend from experience to God but rather by having it
descend to experienced reality in order (Q conceive reality in the light of what
necessarily exists and thus to prove that what necessarily exists is Lord of
being, or God.'H Schelling himself, indeed, did not apply this brilliant insight
in a consistent way. Had he remained consistent with himself, he would not
have begun his positive philosophy with speculative considerations on the
intra-divine powers; he could only have projected it as a renection on the
historical self-manifestation of God.

In contemporary philosophy, the ontological argument is once again being

more and more widely accepted, although in a form that corresponds to a
changed context of the problem. '" It is no longer possible today, of course,
to accept without qualification the Platonic idea of participation which
forms the background of the argument, since this idea already presupposes
the existence of God and simply shows the intrinsic necessity of the
presupposition. We must start with the more restrictive post Hegelian
context for the problem, in which thinking, which since Anselm's time
has established itself as pure thought set free of all ties to theological
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 113
justifications, finds itself in an aporia with regard to the God-question. It
must necessarily think an ultimate, absolute and infinite, but it is no longer
able to grasp this conceptually and to define its nature univocally. In the
end thinking necessarily transcends itself, inasmuch as it thinks something
which it is essentially incapable of thinking out any further, because the
infinite cannot be captured in any finite concept. God, therefore, can be
known only through God; he can be known only when he himself allows
himself to be known. [n the final analysis, that is also the meaning of the
Augustinian doctrine of illumination, and Anselm's argument is in that
tradition. It was along this line, too, that the theologians of the Tubingen
School, especially J. E. Kuhn, tried to restore the ontological argument. '"
According to Kuhn, the arguments which start from experience - the
cosmological, anthropological and historico-philosophical proofs - have
probative force only in the light of the idea of God that is innate in man.
This idea is already part of us in a general and still indefinite form by reason
of the image of God that is in us as creatures; the idea is renewed, deepened
and defined by the revelation of God. Consequently the proofs of God do
not introduce the idea of God for the first time; they do not produce the
idea but rather explicitate and concretize it and prove its truth by way of
a reAective meditation on the world. The idea of God is as it were the light
that illumines these considerations. [n contemporary theology it is W.
Pannenberg who most fully represents Anselm's concern as modified in
the modern age. According to him, the historically transmitted idea of God
must be measured by its own implications. The idea of God as, by
definition, the reality which determines everything must be substantiated
by the experienced reality of man and the world.' Pannenberg says that
this method 'is identical in form with the ontological proof of the existence
of God, the self-proof of God' .157
As compared, then, with the aporia of pure thought in its movement
from below to above, the ontological argument effects an intellectual
turnabout and in its thinking moves from above, interpreting reality from
the standpoint of the historically transmitted idea of God, which in pure
thought sheds only a very general, indefinite and ambiguous light. This
argument thus effects a definition of the idea of the absolute, which is itself
indeterminate, and it intellectually substantiates this definition by means
ofthe reality of world, man and history. The substantiation is accomplished
in such a way that in the reAective contemplation of reality the idea of God
shows itself capable of opening up reality, making connections visible,
facilitating life and encouraging freedom. The connict between faith and
unbelief is therefore not a disagreement about some kind of other or higher
world but about the understanding and existence of the reality of man and
114 The God-Questioll Today
world. hith in God thus makes a claim: the believer soes more. It aims 10
show, in the empirically ascertainable, something more than is empirically
ascertainable. It opens up the sign and symbol dimension of reality. The
parabolic and metaphorical language of faith shows reality itself to be
a parable. This 'more' is not susceptible of proof in the sense of an
incontrovertible demonstration. But in the light cast by an unconditional
option for meaning a plurality of signs and pointers 10 meaning yield a
certainty at the level of the whole person.

It was J. H. Newman especially who worked out this proof from probabili-
ties.I5H Newman is panicularly interested in knowledge of the concrete.
Abstract conclusions are of no real help in this area; at both ends they are as
it were suspended in the air: on the side of the first principles which they must
in every instance presuppose, and on the side of the results achieved, which
never reach down to concrete reality. When we deal with concrete knowledge,
the only possible way to proceed is through a cumulus of probabilities which,
taken together, lead to certainty. Such a procedure admittedly requires a
certain intuition, an instinct, a discernment, a power of Judgment; Newman
himself speaks of an illative sense, which acts as a light illumining our concrete
deductions. In this respect he is at onc also with the Neoplaconic and
Augustinian doctrine of knowledge, which speaks of an illumination. Pascal
speaks in a comparable way of the knowledge of the heart: 'The heart has irs
reasons of which reason knows nothing. '1$9 As examples of this kind of concrete
reasoning process Newman cites the archeologist, who from individual finds
reconstructs an entire world with its cultural life, or the lawyer who from clues
reconstructs the course of a crime, or the doctor who from particular symptoms
of illness forms a comprehensive diagnosis. In each case a degree of brilliance
and originality is required. Put more generally and in the terms I have been
using, this means: only in the light of pre-apprehension of unconditioned
meaning can we grasp the connections of meaning in the reality of our
experience.

The option for meaning that is made in faith in God proves itself adequate
to our experience of reality by virtue of the fact that since it is a pre-
apprehension of irreducible mystety, it cannot claim to be a complete
explanation of reality and all its phenomena. On the contrary, the option
for meaning that is present in faith is supremely critical of any total
explanation of the world. This option brings with ir a decided capacity for
being critical of ideologies, because ir points beyond all absolutizarions of
finite values - possessions, power, pleasure, honour, or nation, race or
class to an ever greater freedom, and thus constantly makes us frce and
keeps history open·ended. It has not only an affirmative function bur a
critical one as well. The credibility of the faith is thus shown precisely in
 Experience of God and Knowledge of God 115
the fact that it has no need of suppressing any kind of experience of reality.
It has no need of putting on ideological blinders and of reducing the many-
leveled and ambiguous whole of reality to a single dimension, be this the
dimension of the positivist or the spiritualist, the pessimist or the optimist.
Faith can do justice to both the greatness and the wretchedness of man.
It is not possible apodictically to demonstrate the validity of this outlook
to anyone; it is possible, however, to bear witness to it with good arguments.
It becomes evident only to one who is ready to enter into it and change his
views; one who, in Augustine's terms, purifies his heart and, in the language
of the Bible, contemplates reality with the eyes of the heart. This means
that in faith man finds the meaning of his existence, provided that he makes
a personal commitment to faith. Faith itself rejects the philistine view that
truth and goodness will 'prevail' 'by their own power' and without a
commitment of the person. Faith is the noble and courageous decision to
accept the risks life entails and in the process to risk life itself.
Faith in God is the foundational and primordial act of the spirit. Faith
engages neither the mind alone nor the will alone, but the whole person.
Knowing and willing are thus parts of a single act of faith; in faith the two
meld into an inner unity. For this reason, faith in God is neither a purely
intellectual belief-faith nor a purely volitional decision-faith nor a matter
simply of feeling. It is an act of the whole person, an act in which alone the
person reaches fully human stature.
With this recapitulatory thesis we have reached the goal of our reflections
on the problem of natural theology. The question with which we began
was the question of the human accountability of faith in God and in his
revelation. The result of our reflections is this: man is the being who in the
experiences of his life, in his speaking and in his knowing, pre-apprehends
the absolute mystery of an unconditioned, perfect freedom. It is this
believing and hoping pre-apprehension that sets the mark of freedom on
his knowing and acting in this world. Consequently he is in quest of signs
in which the absolute mystery of an unconditioned freedom addresses him
and communicates itself to him. He is the being who lives in the presence
of the infinite mystery and who waits and hopes for the free self-revelation
of this mystery. He goes in search of signs and words in which God reveals
himself to him.
 v
Knowledge of God in Faith

1. The revelation of God

The result of all that has been said so far can be summed up thus: the divine
mystery is manifest in the midst of our world. We can encounter it in nature
which, being God's creature, points to its creator; in the mystery which
becomes visible within man himself; and in history which is vitalized by a
hope that looks for more than history. The mystery of man, of his world
and of history points beyond itself. To this first thesis we must, of course,
add a second: in the mystery of man and his world God is also hidden. We
can grasp the 'that' of this mystery, but its 'what' is concealed from us. As
a result the mystery remains indeterminate for pure thought and is
susceptible of varying interpretations. There are indeed arguments which
explain this mystery as an existent, holy mystery that is distinct from the
world. But a final clarity in this area is not possible to isolated thought.
We cannot penetrate the nature of the mystery, because all the similarity
that marks our statements about it is accompanied by an ever greater
dissimiliarity. The inner nature of this divine mystery is therefore hidden
from us, inaccessible, a closed book. As finite beings, all of our living,
thinking and acting is always already being done in the light of a pre-
apprehension of the infinite; but this 'infinite' is only a pre-apprehension
and not a concept; it is a limit-concept which we are unable to turn into a
concept. Our thinking is always struck dumb in its presence. If the infinite
is to be accessible to us, it must disclose and make itself known to us; it
must reveal itself. For this reason revelations are an essential parr of all
religions.!
At all times and in all religions human beings have looked for traces and
signs that would help them grope after the mystery of God. The word
"revelation' serves as a categorical expression forthosc worldly experiences,
 Kltow/edge of God i/l Faith 117
areas of experience and aspects of experience in which man sees signals,
signs and symbols in which the inexpressible divine mystery is disclosing
itself to him. Revelation is therefore first of all an indirect experience, that
is, 3" experience 'in, with and under' other experiences in which God or
the divine makes its appearance (theophany) or makes his will known
(divination). Among such experiences are astonishing - i.e., wonder-
awakening - experiences in nature (storms,lightning, thunder, gales, sun,
etc.), in inter-personal encounter (especially the fascination of man and
woman for one another), in history (victories and defeats, the establishment
of cities and states, etc.); also cultural events, dreams and the interpretations
of dreams, the drawing of lots as oracles, the ordeal (understood as a
'judgment of God'), and so on. Ecstatic phenomena such as auditions and
visions playa role no less than do tradition, reAection, meditation and
contemplations.
These experiences are accessible to people generally and can nowadays
be scientifically 'explained', at least in principle, by psychology, for
example, or sociology. But for the religious man something more takes
place in, with and under these worldly experiences; he sees them as signs
and symbols of the divine mystery revealing itself. For religious man a new
horizon and all-embracing coherence makes itself known in and under
these worldly experiences which are available to everyone; for him a light
is turned on, as it were, in which the whole of reality is seen in a new way.
In the terminology of contemporary linguistic philosophy we may speak
of disclosure situations in which a particular event opens up a total meaning
and a total context.' We must therefore distinguish between the categorical
concept of revelation (revelations) in the sense of individual revelatory
events and the transcendental concept of revelation, that is, that supra-
categorical occurrence in which the mystery that holds sway in and above
all realiry discloses itself.' In this second sense of the word, revelation is
not a given but something that gives itself; not a fact, but an occurrence (a
verbal noun). And since this occurrence is the basis of religious faith, it
cannot in turn be justified. One 'has' it only insofar as one accepts to be
involved in it and opens oneself to it, and therefore in an act of religious
faith (these two words being understood here in a provisionally very broad
and general way).
Faith in this broad sense is not a categorical belief in certain suprarational
truths; rather it is the fundamental choice whereby the person opens
himself to this dimension of divine mystery and, in terms of it, understands
and encounters life, world, man and history. Religious faith does not have
its existence, therefore, at the level of a regional and categorical act; it is
neither an act of understanding alone nor willing alone nor feeling alone.
118 The God-Question Today
Religious faith exists at the level of a decision regarding life, a decision that
embraces the whole person and all his acts. It is a kind of primordial choice,
a fundamental option, a decision in behalf of a certain understanding of
reality as a whole, together with a decision to adopt a specific practical
attitude to this reality. As a responsible human act the decision is a response
to revelation; the person knows himself to be invited, challenged and
supported by this revelation. His decision is an act of primordial trust,
understood as an act of self-giving.
Biblical revelation freely acknowledges the existence of such revelatory
events outside the 'official' salvation history of the Old and New Test-
aments. The Bible tells us in various passages of 'saintly pagans' who are
witnesses to the living God: Abel, Enoch, Melchizedek, Job, and others.
After all, God 'desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge
of the truth' (I Tim. 2.4). For this reason the Second Vatican Council
teaches:
Throughout history even to the present day, there is found among
different peoples a certain awareness of a hidden power, which lies
behind the course of nature and the events of human life. At times there
is present even a recognition of a supreme being, or still more of a Father
... The Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these
religions. She has a high regard for the manner of life and conduct, the
precepts and doctrines which, although differing in many ways from her
own teaching, nevertheless often reflect a ray of that truth which
enlightens all men.'
The meaning of this general histoty of God's revelation is first made known
to us when we reach the history of special revelation, that is, the history of
revelation as set down in the Old and New Testaments. For in the general
history of revelation the picture of God remains ambiguous. Alongside
noble insights is often to be seen the grimacing of the demonic. A further
consideration is that God does not will to approach man solely as an
individual, independently of his reciprocal ties with others, but also wills
to reveal himself to man as a social and historical being. His will is to
gather human beings into a people and ro make this people the light of the
nations (lsa. 42.6).'
The theological concept of revelation is admittedly a very obscure one
and extremely hard to pin down.' The usual procedure is to start with
individual revelations or truths of revelation; by 'truths of revelation' is
meant individual truths which are not accessible to the unaided human
mind and which God, through his messengers of revelation, authoritatively
sets before human beings for their belief. This authoritarian understanding
 Kllowledge of God ill Faith 119
of revelation, which is modelled on the phenomena of information and
instruction, by its nature comes into inevitable conflict with the responsible
use of human rcoson and human freedom. It is therefore significant that
more recent theology usually replaces this authoritarian understanding of
revelation with another that is based on the model of communication. In
this new context theologians speak not of revelations in the plural but of
revelation in the singular, with revelation understood not as a revelation
of objective facts but as a self-revelation of a person. What God reveals is
first and foremost not something but himself and his saving will for
humanity. In revealing himself and his mystery, he also reveals to humanity
themselves and their own mystery. Revelation is thus the determination of
the indeterminately open mystery of humaniry and its world and history.

This newer understanding of revelation can appeal [Q scripture. Of course,

when we ask what scripture understands by revel3tion, we must be aware that
the Bible contains no concept of revelation in the strict sense of the term. The
Bible is familiar rather with a great variety of phenomena which it interprets
with the aid of concepts that are likewise quite varied. It speaks, for example,
of unveiling, of granting knowledge, of coming to light, of making plain, of
appearing. 'The best known of the phenomena which it interprets with the aid
of these various concepts is the prophetic communication of revelation. In the
prophets we constantly find such phrases as: 'Thus says the Lord'; 'Go, and
say to this people' (lsa. 6.9); 'Go and proclaim in the hearing of Jerusalem,
Thus says the Lord' Ger. 2.2). The authoritarian understanding of revelation,
which I mentioned a moment ago, can to a certain extem appeal to this
language of the prophets. But the prophetic language in turn must not be
isolated from the fact that in what they say the prophets remind the people of
God's great acts in the past and announce a present and future action of God.
The prophets arc thus concerned with an authoritative interpretation of the
history in which God is revealing himself to his people. Thus the prophetic
type of revelation leads over into the narrative form of revelation as we find it
especially in the historical books of the Old Testament, in the New Testament
Gospels and in the Acts of the Apostles. In the telling of this history the
historical events are interpreted as God's revelation. In this history God speaks
to human beings and deals with them as with his friends.
Revelation takes still another form in the Torah. Here too it is linked to
revelation in the history of salvarion: 'I am the l.ord, your God, who brought
you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage' (Ex. 20.2; d. Deur.
5.6). The acts by which God established his covenant with his people dictate
the human conduct that is in keeping with the covenant. At this point the
personal character of revelation emerges wirh particular clarity. Revelation is
rhus an invitation and challenge to covenant and communion with God. But
only in the doing of the truth does the human person accede to the light of the
120 The God-Questioll Today
truth Uohn J.2\). Different again is the form revelation takes in the wisdom
literature: wisdom as revelation of reality and its laws, with the accompanying
conviction that only in Israel and in the law has wisdom found its definitive
dwelling (Sir. 24.8ff.). Revelation also occurs in the songs of the Old and New
Testaments, in the prayers of complaint, praise 3nd petition, and especially in
the psalms, where the life and experiences of those praying become a revelatory
history of God's dealings with men. In the apocalyptic literature, finally,
revelation takes the form of bringing 10 light the eternal divine decree of
salvation :lnd in unveiling the mystery 'which was kept secret for long ages'
(Rom. 16.25; d. Eph. 1.9). The eschatological disclosure of the mystery of
God takes place, according to the New Testament, in Jesus Christ as he is
attested by the church.
Thus the entire history of revelation in the Old and New Testaments is one
long illustration of what the New Testament sums up when it says: 'In many
and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the prophets; but in these
latter days he has spoken to us by a Son' (Heb. 1.1-2).

From the various types of revelation in the Bible it follows that as

underslOod by the Bible revelation is not simply something that is manifestly
present in the world or which through meditation and reflection human
beings are able by their own power to read off from the world. It is rather
a free self-disclosure of God, not deducible from anything else, by which
alone man and the world are brought into the light of the truth. Conse-
quently revelation does not occur always and everywhere but here and now.
It is historical revelation, and always accompanied by an indispensable
temporal reference.
More specifically, according to the Bible revelation takes place through
words and deeds. 'Word' includes the prophetic word but also the word
of the law (instructions) and the words of wisdom and of song (songs of
praise, petition, and lament). Revelation through deeds occurs in creation
(according to the wisdom literature), and above all in God's historical acts
of salvation. Revelation through word and revelation through acts are
intrinsically related to each other. The word-revelation interprets the act·
revelation; it is related by way of remembrance, interpretation and promise
to the act-revelation in creation and history. Conversely, the act-revelation
reinforces the word; the word-revelation is thus demonstrated and
confirmed by historical experience.'
In the human realm, word and act or deed are already the ways in which
persons reveal and communicate themselves. Withoutsuch revealing words
and actions another person is a closed book to us; by means of them he
discloses himself and allows himself to be known. Thus the historical
character of revelation is also the corporeal-symbolic aspect of an irreduc-
 Knowledge of God in Faith 121
ible personal freedom which without this revelation would be hidden from
us. Biblical revelation is thus not primarily a revelation of objects, not a
revelation of truths, teachings, commandments, and 'supernatural' reali-
ties, but a personal self-revelation of God. What God primarily makes
known to us in revelation is not various truths and realities but himself
and his saving will for human beings.' This personal character of God's
revelation finds varied expression in the Bible. In God's self-disclosure the
pronoun 'I' is constantly being used in a very emphatic manner. This is
true especially of the self-presentation formula: 'lam the Lord, your God'
(Ex. 20.2; Deut. 5.6; d. Ezek. 20.5; Hos. 12.10; etc.). In fact, revelation
occurs precisely in order that we may know that he, the Lord, is our
God (Ex. 6.7; Ezek. 20.26, 38, 42, 44). In Yahweh's self-revelation his
personality is brought with special impressiveness in the metaphorical
language of the Bible, according to which God reveals his face (Ex. 34.20;
Deut. 10.8; 18.7; Ps. 86.9; etc.), his heart (Hos. I 1.8; Jer. 31.20; etc.), and
his name (Ex. 6.3; John 17.6; etc.). All this shows that in his revelation
God is not an It but an I and a Thou.'
This self-disclosure of God occurs historically 'in, with and under' words
and deeds. It thus makes use of many different forms of categorical
revelation.,oThe one revelation occurs in many individual revelations. The
climax and completion ofthis historical revelation is Jesus Christ." In him,
personal content and historical form become identical. For in Jesus Christ
the form is the form of God's self-communicating and self-emptying love.
This radically self-giving and self-emptying love is the utmost that is
possible for God. It is therefore not an ultimately arbitrary decree of God
that turns Jesus Christ into the completion of God's historical revelation;
rather it is because of the intrinsic nature of this revelation that he is its
fulfillment than which no greater historical fulfillment is possible. Jesus
Christ is that 'than which a greater cannot be thought', and he is therefore
in person the eschatological self-definition of God. Anyone who sees him
sees the Father Uohn 14.9). For this reason, a Christian doctrine of God
cannot be concerned with 'just any' God but only with the one God of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of Jesus Christ. As Love (I John 4.8,
16), he is the definitive determination of the mystery of God and man. In
this eschatological self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ a Christian
doctrine of God has both its ground and its content, and by this self-
revelation it must be constantly judged anew.
The personal self-disclosure of God in his word is answered by faith as
a personal self-giving of man to God." Since faith is the answer to God's
word which finds expression in word and deed and is summed up in Jesus
Christ, it always has a concrete content. It finds God not in vague feeling
122 The God-Questioll Today
but in concrete words, events, human beings. But faith is far more than an
acceptance-as-trueof revealed truths and facts. It looks beyond the concrete
forms which revelation tak~s and in them seeks the God who is personally
revealing himself. The basic form of faith is therefore not: 'I believe that
... ' or 'I believe something', but rather: 'I believe you' and 'I believe in
you'. As Augustine and Thomas Aquinas showed, faith contains three
elements: credere Dell"" to believe that God is; credere Deo, to give
credence to God in the sense of trusting God; and credere ill Dell"', to
move toward God, to rely on him and depend on him." Faith is therefore
not a simple act of understanding (an acceptance-as-true) or of the will
(trust) or of feeling; it is rather a life-project that lays hold of all these
powers and indudes them, and a comprehensive mode of existing. Faith
is at the same time an act (fides qua creditllr) and a content (fides qllae
creditur). Faith is the comprehensive re-action of the human being to the
prior action of God in revealing himself; it is a trusting in God and a
building on God, a gaining of a foothold in God, a saying of 'Amen' to
God, with all the consequences this entails. To have faith is to take God
seriously as God, without reservations; it is to give him the honour and to
glorify him as Lord; it is to acknOWledge his lordship with praise and
thanksgiving.
What is the ultimate ground and justification for such a comprehensive
faith? This is one of the most difficult questions raised in fundamental
theology, and I cannot go into it in detail in the present context.'4 Our
various reflections up to this point have already made it dear that in the
final analysis we cannot justify faith by rational proofs or historical
documents. The ultimate cannot be justified by the penultimate, the all-
embracing and infinite by the finite; since God is the one than whom a
greater cannot be thought, it is impossible to find a greater and more
comprehensive horizon in view of which and within which we can conceive
him. Much less can freedom be proved; it can only be known and
acknowledged in freedom. Reason and history provide indications which
show faith to be reasonable; but these indications themselves become fully
certain only in the light of faith or, more accurately, in the light of the self-
revelation of the truth of God, which truth shines out in the act of faith
itself. Scripture tells us that no one can come to faith in Jesus Christ unless
the Father draws him Uohn 6.44). For this reason it is true that 'he who
believes in the Son of God has the testimony in himself' (I John 5.10). For
this reason the First Vatican Council defined that 'inspired and assisted by
the grace of God, we believe, not because we have grasped the inner truth
of things by the naturollight of reason, but because of the authority of the
revealing God himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived'." It is to
 KllOwledge of God in Faith 123
be observed that this definition says, not that we believe on the authority
of God who commands (al/thoritate Dei imperantis), but rather that we
believe on the authority of God who reveals (al/ctoritate Dei revelantis).
The ultimate ground of faith is thus the unveiled truth of God itself. It is
the very truth of God that enlightens man in faith and convinces him.'·
This enlightenment does not take place 'vertically' from above, as it were;
it takes the form, rather, of a coming of the light in and through the
historical forms of revelation. In the final analysis the enlightenment comes
through the self·evidence of God's love, which cannot be demonstrated
from outside but can only convince by its innate power. For love alone is
credible. 17
Only where God is acknowledged as God in faith does his divinity make
itself felt in the world; only where he is thus glorified as Lord is it possible
for his glory to radiate out and for his lordship to take historical shape.
Thus revelation does not occur in the form of something objectively
ascertainable which is then subsequently known by faith. It occurs in
human faith and in the mode of life that develops out of this faith. The
truth of revelation is thus the truth of witnessing (martyria). This means,
further, that God's revelation never exists in itself but only in a human,
historical mediation. We encounter the self-revealing God only as the God
who is hidden in his human and historical revelatory forms. The profession
of faith in God on the basis of his revelation never does away with the
mystery of the God who is hidden from man, but rather brings this mystery
to bear on man. Revelation within history is therefore an image and
likeness, a foretaste and anticipation of the eschatological revelation in
which we will see God face to face (I Cor. 13.12) as he is (I John 3.2). In
revelation there is an anticipatory appropriation of the eschatological
meaning and eschatological fulfillment in which God will be all in all (I
Cor. 15.28). For this reason every historical form of revelation points
beyond itself to the mystery of God.

2. The hiddenness of God

'Self·revelation of God' means that the mystery which makes itself known
to man is not simply a kind of code for the depth·dimension of man himself
and the world. It is not a predicate to be applied to the world but rather a
holy mystery that is independent of the world, a self·sufficient subject who
can speak and act. The mystery is not a silent mystery concerning which
man in turn can only only keep silence; it is a mystery that utters itself, one
that addresses us and that we can address in turn. But such revelation is
something other than an enlightenment in a superficial sense of the term.
 124 The God-Qllestiol! Today
In the act of revealing himself God does not do away with his own mystery;
he does not unveil it in such a way that we are now well informed about
God. Revelation consists, rather, in God making known his hidden mystery,
that is, the mystery of his freedom and his person. Revelation is thus
revelation of the hiddenness of God."
This hidden ness and mysteriousness of revelation is abundantly brought
out in the Bible. In the accounts of manifestations of God there is never
talk of God taking a visible form. In every case all that is visible are the
signs of God's presence: the burning bush (Ex. 3.2), the pillar of cloud at
the exodus from Egypt( Ex. 13.21 ); clouds and tempest on Sinai (Ex. 19.9,
16; d . Deut. 4.33-36). Moses is expressly told that he cannot see the face
of God, 'for man shall not see me and live'; he may only see God's back
(Ex. 33.20).
Especially significant is the Old Testament prohibition of images: 'You
shall not make for yourself a graven image' (Ex. 20.4; Deut. 5.8). We
would misunderstand the prohibition if we were to interpret it as indicating
that the worship of God was marked by a high degree of spirituality and
if we were to take it as meaning that the adoration of God is more a matter
of the heart than the eye and that it is not possible to make a visible
representation of the invisible God. Our starting point in understanding
the prohibition must rather be the notion current in the ancient world,
according to which the divinity is present in hiS image and the world in its
totality makes the godhead transparent. The prohibition ofimages is meant
to state precisely that this notion contradicts the very essence of the
revelation of Yahweh. Neither through images nor by speaking the name
of God can human beings gain power over God. God's freedom to reveal
himself when, where and how he will must remain inviolable.
This then means that the commandment forbidding images is bound up
with the hidden way in which Jahweh's revelation came about in cult
history ... The relentless shattering of cherished concepts of God ...
stands in a theological relationship which is perhaps hidden, but which
is, in actual fact, very close to the commandment forbidding images.
Any interpretation which deals in isolation with the impossibility
of representing Jahweh by an image, and which does not see the
commandment as bound up with the totality of Jahweh's revelation,
misses the cruci31 point.!,1
Thus the Old Testament prohibition of images transcends the alternatives
of idolatry and iconoclasm. It is meant to safeguard the hidden ness that is
part of God's revelation .
The dialectic of God's revelation and his hidden ness is still present at

l-r. ---- - ~- ·.1- -.V- -..-__ -

 Kllowledge of God ill Faith 125
the climax of revelation in Jesus Christ. As the eternal Son of God Jesus
Christ is the image, the icon of God the Father (II Cor. 4.4; Col. 1.15), the
radiance of his glory and the perfect copy of his being (Heb. 1.3). In him
is made vividly clear who God is: he is the God with a human face. Whoever
sees him sees the Father Uohn 14.9). But this seeing is a seeing by faith.
For in Jesus Christ 'being in the form of God' has shared in the emptying
out 'in the form of a slave' and in the 'obedience unto death on a cross'
(Phil. 2.6-8). But the language of the cross is a shocking scandal to the
Jews and foolishness to the pagans; only for believers is the cross the power
and wisdom of God (I Cor. 1.23f.).ln God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ
God is therefore - as Martin Luther puts it in his theologia crllcis - hidden
slIb contrario, 'under his opposite'.'· This hidden presence of God in Jesus
Christ is in a manner continued in his presence in the brothers and sisters
of Jesus Christ, especially the poor, the lowly, the sick, the persecuted, and
the dying (Matt. 25 .31-46). Theologically, therefore, the hidden ness of
God does not refer to a DeliS absoilltlls who is other-worldly and distant,
but to the DeliS revelatlls who is present amid the alienations of the world.
In the death and resurrection of Jesus the reign of God is present under the
conditions of the present aeon: God ruling in human weakness, wealth in
poverty, love in abandonment, fullness in emptiness, life in death.
In the apocalyptic literature the revelation of the mysteries or mystery
of God becomes the express theme. The unveiling (apokalypsis) of divine
mysteries is even the real themeoflateJewish apocalyptic." The 'mysteries'
here are hidden realities which have been prepared in heaven since the very
beginning and are to be made known at the end of time, and into which
the apocalyptic seer has been given insight even now through mysterious
images, visions, and so on. The revelation of these eschatological mysteries
is the revelation of the mystery of time and the historical eras. The focus
of these mysteries is God's eschatological decree of salvation, a decree that
has been effectively carried out since the very beginning but will emerge
from its hidden ness only at the end of time and then openly shows its
effectiveness. These apocalyptic writings intend to offer not confused
speculations but concrete words of consolation and hope. At a difficult
moment of history believers are told that the coming of God's reign is
absolutely certain. The New Testament takes over this apocalyptic concept
of mystery. Jesus speaks of the mystery of the reign or kingdom of God,
and says that it is revealed to the disciples but hidden from others (Mark
4.11; d. Matt. 13.11; Luke 8.10). What is new by comparison with Jewish
apocalyptic is the fact that it is Jesus who reveals this mystery of God's
kingdom and that he does so not only through his words and his actions
but through his entire person. He is in his person the revelation and carrying
126 The God-Questioll Today
out of the mystery of God." The Pauline and even more the Deutero-
pauline letters take up this theme. Jesus Christ is the accomplishment of
the eternal and hitherto hidden mystery of God, that is, of the eternal
decree of his will. The mystery that has thus manifested itself inJesus Christ
is made plain, communicated and proclaimed through the preaching of
the apostles and the testimony of the church (d. Rom 16.25; I Cor. 2.1-6;
Eph. 1.9; 3.9; Col. 1.26f.; I Tim. 3.9, 16).
The most emphatic summation of this conviction of faith is to be found
in Isaiah: 'Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself' (45.15). The Bible
regards it as obvious that in this sense God is invisible (Rom. 1.20; Col.
1.15) and incomprehensible (Ps. 139.6; Job 36.26); that his thoughts
and decrees are unfathomable (Rom. 11.33f.); and that he dwells in
unapproachable light (I Tim. 6.16).

The theological tradition was fully aware of the mysteriousness of God. From
the beginning it taught that God is invisible (invisibilis), incomprehensible
(incomprehensibilis) and ineffable (ineffabilis),23 It was obliged to defend this
teaching especially against the Eunomians, in the context of the disturbances
caused by Arius. The Eunomians claimed the possibility of an exhaustive,
adequate and comprehensive knowledge of God even in the present life. In
opposition, the fathers - especially Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of
Nyssa and Chrysostom - developed the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of
God." John Damascene sums up the teaching of the Greek fathers in a lapidary
statement: 'The divine nature is ineffable and incomprehensible.''' All the
great theologians of the West- Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury 1 Bonaventure,
Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and, not least, Nicholas of Cusa - bear
unanimous witness that the supreme knowledge of God is (0 know that he is
unknowable. A docta ignorantia (Nicholas of Cusa) is the most that is possible
for us human beings. 26 These insights have also become part of the church's
official teaching. An avowal of the Deus invisibilis occurs even in the early
professions of faith; the confession of DeliS incomprehensibilis is to be found
above all in the Fourth Lateran Council (1215)27 and the First Vatican Council
(1869-70)."
It is admittedly striking that the theological tradition says almost nothing of
the hiddenness of God and prefers to speak of his incomprehensibility. From
the viewpoint simply of terminology there is a shift of accent here as compared
with the Bible. The tradition usually meditated on the mystery of God nor in
terms of the history of salvation and revelation but in epistemological and
metaphysical terms, seeing it as the mystery of the infinite being of God which
is beyond the reach of finite human knowledge. Such an approach did not
bring out the full depth of the biblical teaching on the hiddenness of God. In
modern times, moreover, a concept of knowledge became prevalent in which
knowing was understood as grasping or conceiving, thoroughly penetrating
 KIJDIIAedge of God ill Faith 127
and even controlling. This rationalistic ideal of knowledge led to the disinte-
gration of the theological category of mystery in Enlightenment theology. In
their efforts to counter this trend, theologians developed a concept of mystery
that focused negatively on the non-conceivable and supra-rational. Mystery
was now an impassable boundary for knowledge, rather than the ultimate
overflowing fulfillment of all knowing. This led to an understanding of mystery
that was narrowly anti-rationalistic: a mystery in the strict sense (mystcrill1t1
stricte diettlm) is a truth which is absolutely inaccessible to human reason; if
we are to know it, revelation must not only set the mind in motion (so that we
might subsequently gain insight), but it, together with faith, remains the sole
abiding basis of our knowledge.
In this understanding of mystery there is a twofold narrowing of vision. 1.
The concept of mystery is defined in a purely negative way in relation to human
re::lson. The fact is overlooked that the human mind ilS such is so consciruted
that it reaches beyond itself into an impenetrable mystery. There is also a
failure to see thar the revelation which makes this mystery known as mystery
is for this very reason man's salvation. In this positive understanding of it, the
mystery of God is nor a mystery for the mind but a mystery of salvation. 2.
The concept of mystery, because it is thus negatively defined by contrast with
categorical knowledge, itself falls indirectly under the control of that ideal of
knowledge. Theologians taking this approach no longer speak of the one
mystery of God but of many mysteries (mysteria). No longer are the saving
events and the reality of salvation in their totality a mystery, but only
'the higher and nobler part of ir [Christianity), (Trinity, incarnation, grace,
rranssubstantiation, etc.}.l'l The incomprehensibility of God becomes one
divine attribute alongside others and therefore no longer even an attribute that
systematically determines and grounds the whole. In short: the mystery of God
is itself conceived categorically as one of the mysteries.

It is thanks especially to Karl Rahner that we now have a more profound

theology of mystery.'· He has shown that while the tradition does maintain
the incomprehensibility of God, it does not give this a determining role in
the formation ola system. In the tradition the incomprehensibility of God
is simply one divine attribute alongside others, but it does not become the
dimension that determines, grounds and qualifies all other statements
about God; it does not become the recapitulatory statement about God,
in the sense that anyone who docs not speak of God's hiddenness is not
speaking of God at all but only of an idol. Rahner's own point of departure
is the human being as a being of mystery. In every concept they have,
human beings are directed beyond all concepts to a nameless reality that
cannot be circumscribed or comprehended. Mystery is even the a priori
condition for all categorical knowledge. Thus the knowledge of mystery is
not a defective kind of knowledge, not something negative, not a boundary
128 The God-Question Today
of knowledge, but the original type of knowledge that alone makes all
other knowledge possible. Man's fulfillment consists not in penetrating the
mystery of God but rather in having this mystery come definitively into his
ken. The revelation of the mystery of God is the response to the mystery
of humaniry. Revelation does not, however, signify an 'enlightenment'
(Au(kliirung); it does not bring dissonances into harmony and do away
with the mystery. Rather it is the revelation precisely of mystery and thus
the definitive acceptance of the mystery of humanity. Knowledge of God's
incomprehensibility is therefore the beatifying fulfillment of the human
person.
The revelation of God as mystery means, in positive terms, that God is
a Freedom which is reserved to itself and withdrawn from our grasp. The
revelation of God is the revelation of him as a Freedom that discloses itself
and offers itself to us, a freedom in love. The mystery of divine revelation
is thus his free self-communication to us in love. This self-communication
in love is the single mystery of revelation, the basic mystery which interprets
itself and unfolds in the many mysteries of faith. Christians are convinced
that the self-interpretation of the one mystery of God takes place definitively
and comprehensively in Jesus Christ; he is God's self-communication in
person, he is the mystery of God made manifest. This self-communication
of God is made present to us in the Holy Spirit. For we can accept the
mystery of God as mystery only if God himself gives us the power to accept
it. God can be known and acknowledged only through the power of God.
For this reason we need a new self-communication of God to us whereby
we become sons and daughters of God in the image of the only Son of God,
Jesus Christ. This gracious self-communication of God in the Holy Spirit is
only a kind of deposit or pledge that will be completed in the eschatological
vision face to face. All of revelation is thus concerned with the revelation
of the single mystery of God the Father's love that communicates itself
through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. The trinitarian profession of faith
is therefore not only the summation of the revelation of the mystery of
God; it is also the concrete exposition of the hidden ness of God, which is
the origin, goal and essential content of all revelation.
As a result of what has been said here three statements may be made
about the mystery of God.
1. In the Bible, the proposition that God is mysterious and hidden has
for its context not a theory aboutthe scope and limits of human knowledge,
but the self-revelation of God. It is a theological and not an epistemological
proposition; it is the first word in the knowledge of faith which God gives
to us, and not the last word in human self-knowledge. Consequently, when
the Bible speaks of the mystery and hidden ness of God, it means something
 Knowledge of God in Faith 129
different from when Plato and especially Plotinus talk about the idea of
the Good and the One being above all existence and essence, or when Kant
says that the rational idea of God is beyond our power and a real 'abyss
on the verge of which human reason trembles is dismay'. The mystery of
God is not the ultimate, still attainable but ever withdrawing horizon of
our knowledge; rather, it is the foundational content of God's revelation.
It is positive, not negative; it is not a word that condemns us to silence, but
a word that enables us to speak or, mote accurately, to praise and honour
God, to adore and glorify him. This does not mean that we are fully
informed aboUl God. Revelation as revelation of the mystery of God is not
an enlightenment in the sense that it removes the mystery from God; rather
it is the definitive establishment and confirmation of this mystery. The
believer is not better informed about God than the unbeliever, and
theologians are not God's 'privy councillors'. On the contrary, the unbel-
iever thinks he really knows all about God; the believer, on the other hand,
knows that he cannot provide himself with answers and that the answer
which God gives him is a message about an abiding mystery. If, then, we
speak of the revelation of God, we must stress both words: revelation, in
which God communicates himself to be known by human beings, and the
fact that it is the revelation of God, a revelation in which God is both
subject and object and in which he makes known his utter hidden ness and
his being utterly beyond our power to manipulate and dispose of him.
2. In the Bible, the proposition that God is mysterious and hidden refers
not to his being as withheld from man but to his being as offered to man
and to his eternal decrees of salvation and their execution in history. God's
hiddenness is not God's being-in-itself prior to, beyond and 'behind' the
history of salvation, but his being-far-us and being-with-us in history.
Therefore the revelation of the mystery of God does not lead us, as it does
in Neoplatonism, 'to the nihilistic heights of a purely negative concept
of God that lacks all content'," or to an unobjective, indeterminate
transcendence that can be expressed only in cipher form, but rather to the
God of human beings who descends into the determinations of space and
time, to the God who condescends. God's hidden ness is hidden ness within
revelation; more concrete, the hiddenness of his glory in the suffering and
death of Jesus Christ. The theology of God's hiddenness is in the final
analysis the theology of the cross (thea/agio crucis). The mystery of God
is therefore also not, as in nominalism and many statements of Luther and
Calvin, a hidden remnant and dark border, as it were, consisting of God's
unfathomable majesty that strikes anxiety and terror into human beings;
the mystery of God is rather his saving will, his turning to us, his total and
unreserved self-communication in grace Of, in a word, his love. It is for
130 The God-Question Today
this reason that the New Testament can summarily define the mystery of
God as love (I John 4.8,16). It does not mean that God is der liebe Gatt
(the dear, kindly God) in the innocuous sense in which we tend to use the
phrase. It means rather that the incomprehensible mystery to which man
is introduced is not one of remote, judgmental distance but one of
gracious, giving, protecting nearness, by means of which human beings are
unconditionally and definitively accepted in Jesus Christ.
3. The revelation of the mystery and hidden ness of God is not a
message concerned with theoretical speculation, but a 'practical' messageof
salvation. It is a message both of judgment and of grace. It is a message of
judgment because it ultimately says that man has no power over the
mystery of God either through knowledge or through action. To that
extent the revelation of the mystery of God is a judgment on human hybris
which wants to be like God (Gen. 3.5). The revelation of God is thus a
judgment on all home-made idols, on our images of God, and on the things
of which we make absolutes that enslave us instead of setting us free. But
insofar as the revelation of the mystery of God reminds us of our limits
and sets us straight, it also confers a benefit on us and conveys a message
of grace. It abrogates the law of achievement, of the will to achievement
and of the pressure to achieve, and tells us that we cannot and need not
give fulfillment to our own lives. We are definitively accepted with our
limitations; we must therefore not only know our limitations, but we can
and may also accept them. As those who have been unqualifiedly accepted
by God we must affirm both ourselves and all others. In the language of
theology: the revelation of the mystery of God abrogates the law of self-
justification through works and proclaims the gospel of grace as alone
justifying. Thus the revelation of the mystery of God is the revelation of
the mystery of our salvation; it is the fundamental and central saving truth
of the Christian faith. Our profession of faith in the revelatory and saving
action of God the Father through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit sets forth
the implications of this one mystery of our salvation.
 PART TWO

The Message about the God of

Jesus Christ
 I

God, the Father Almighty

1. The problem of an almighty Father-God

The Christian confession of faith begins with the sentence: '( believe in
God, the Father almighty." This statement sums up in a valid and binding
way the essential message of Jesus: the coming of the reign of God and
specifically of the God whom Jesus called 'my Father' and whom he taught
us to invoke as 'our Father'. At the same time, the indeterminate and
ambiguous concept 'God' is specified and interpreted by the concept
'Father'.
This interpretation, it must be admitted, hardly makes the God-question
any simpler for us today. On the contrary, the statement, so central to the
New Testament, that God is the Father of Jesus Christ and the Father of
us all, has today become difficult for many to understand and assimilate.
This observation is all the more momentous since 'father' is a primordial
word in the history of cultures and religions. In the course of history down
to the present, 'father' in this context has been understood as meaning far
more than simply ' begetter'. The father is the creative source and at the
same time the protector and nourisher of life. One's life depends on one's
father, but at the same time the father makes this life something independent
and accepts it as such. Thus the father represents the binding order of life.
He represents power and authority as well as gift, goodness, solicitude and
aid. After along prior history this picture of the father has become uncertain
to us today.' M. Horkheimer observes that there are no fathers any more,
if by 'father' you understand what society has for centuries understood by
it." In continuity with S. Freud, A. Mitscherlich speaks of a society without
fathers.' The question that arises here is an obvious one: if the experience
of a human father is lacking or if the experience is even a primarily negative
134 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
one, how is it possible to have a positive relationship to God as Father?
How will we be able to proclaim and confess God as the Father almighty?
The background of this 'collapse of the father' (H. Tellenbach) contains
many and varied elements. From a sociological standpoint we might take
as our starting point the termination of the patriarchal form of society by
our modern industrial society that is based on exchange. When everything
is based on an exchange of services of equal value, and when everything is
geared to independence, promotion, progress, emancipation and self-
fulfillment, there is no longer any place for authority and rank, certainly
not for the authority of the ancient and the primitive. Like society at large,
the structure and culture of the family, and with these the authority of the
father, have been caught up in a process of revolutionary transformation
and even of dissolution. The problem here is not only the protest against
and rejection of the father, but the father's own renunciation of responsible
fatherhood and of any binding and responsible authority.
S. Freud analysed the problem from the standpoint of depth psychology'
and A. Mitscherlich has carried the analysis further while adding the
viewpoint of social psychology. Freud explains the ambivalent attitude to
the father as a father-complex and more specifically as an Oedipus complex.
According to Freud, this is at the heart of all neuroses. For the rebellion
against the father and the murder of the father led to a struggle of all
against all, to a chaos that begot anxiety, and to a reign of terror. As a
result, human beings embark on a search for the lost father, and endeavor
to give new life to the ideal of fatherhood. According to Freud, it is
Christian doctrine that most clearly bears witness to the primal guilty act.
Christ sacrifices his own life and thus frees the multitude of his brothers
and sisters from original sin. But in the very act by which he offers to the
Father the greatest possible atonement, he also reaches the fulfillment of
his own wishes against the Father. He himself becomes a god alongside
and even in place of the Father. The religion of the Son eliminates the
religion of the Father. These theses of Freud are more than questionable
from the historical point of view. From a psychological point of view,
however, they do make intelligible the difficulties many people have with
God as Father. They explain the God-complex (Richter)' or, to put it more
strongly, the way people suffer from God, as impressively described by,
for example, T. Moser in his book 'Poisoning by God'.' Finally, these ideas
make understandable the paradox involved in the death-of-God theology,
which boils down to the slogan: God is dead, and Jesus Christ is his only
Son. Here we have an extreme theology of the Son that has radically freed
itself from the Father-God.
The broad connections thus established by sociology and depth psycho-
 God, the Father Almighty 135
logy also provide the context for the modern women's liberation movement
and its accompanying feminist theology.' The protest against the patriar-
chal form of society and against the selting of man above woman leads the
movement and the theology 10 criticize the idea of a Father-God, since
they see in this the sacralization of the patriarchal relationship and the
ideological exaltation of male superiority and of the repression of both
women and womanly values. This criticism need not lead, as it does in M.
Daly,' 10 a post-Christian religion of the mother goddesses; it may instead
lead, as it does in R. Ruether, to an emphasizing of the prophetic criticism
that has for its point of departure the biblical understanding of God as
Father. 10 This prophetic criticism is based on the idea that God is the Father
of all human beings and that he alone is truly the Father (Matt. 23.9). If
this is so, then there must be no oppression of one human being by another,
since all of them are brothers and sisters. Of course, they are brothers and
sisters only so long as they have God as their common Father. Viewed in
this light, feminist theology is a challenge 10 reflect more profoundly and
more critically on the idea of father and gain a new grasp of its meaning.
The sociological and psychological approaches already bring us 10 the
threshold of the radically metaphysical dimension of the father problem.
The problem must be underslOod, in the final analysis, against the back-
ground of the modern philosophy of emancipation, of which the emancip-
ation of women is but one aspect, though an important and typical one."
Emancipation in the sense of liberation from all imposed dependencies is
a watchword that applies to the whole modern age and its experience of
reality; it is also a fundamental his tori co-philosophical category that helps
characterize the modern processes of enlightenment and liberation." For
while emancipation in Roman law meant the graciously granted liberation
of slaves or the release of the adult son from his father's authority, it has
come 10 mean in the modern age the autonomous self-liberation of the
human person or social groups (peasants, citizens, proletarians, Jews,
Blacks, women, colonial territories, etc.) from intellectual, legal, social or
political tutelage, from discrimination, or from a domination perceived as
unjust. The extent 10 which at the end of the modern age emancipation
has become an all-embracing ideological category may be seen from K.
Marx's definition: 'Every emancipation is a restoration of the human
world and of human relationships 10 man himself.'1.1
We must not, of course, fail to realize that behind the philosophy of
emancipation and its accompanying loss of the father there ultimately lies
a new form of gnosis. By gnosis I mean here an altitude of mind that can
develop in varied cultural contexts. It was an attitude that became
particularly dangerous to Christianity during the cultural collapse of the
136 The Message abol/t the God of jesl/s Christ
Hellenistic world in the second century after Christ. The world was no
longer experienced as an ordered, harmonious cosmos, as it had been in
the dassical age of Greece, but rather as alien, sinister and menacing.
Anxiety about life became widespread; the basic mood was a sense of being
lost in the present world. The experience of alienation led to an attempt to
break out of a cosmos and its structures that were felt to be a prison, and
to an abandonment of the material world in order to rescue the truly
divine in man. H. Jonas gives the following summary description of this
Promethean rebellion on the part of man as he seeks to free himself from
the traditional father-religions:
That turning-point in the history of religions (or myths) was in truth a
real revolt against the gods a~d a collapse of the gods, and the establish-
ment (dear in terms of myth) of a new dominion; in allegorical symbols
we experience on the scene of world-history the replacement of the old,
powerful father-religions by religions of the son, the replacement of
cosmic religion by acosmic religion: 'man' or the 'son of man' is exalted
above the ancient gods and becomes the supreme god or the divine center
of a religion of salvation ... The great gods who arc fathers of the world,
and who themselves had come to the fore in historical time and were
characteristic of a millennial stage of human culture, now everywhere
abdicate their power."
G. Bornkamm observes: 'Notthe least reason why the Christian faith stood
up against the drag of this religious movement and did not succumb to it
is that due to the crucified Jesus who was Son it had a renewed faith in
God as Father and therefore could not abandon the world which is God's
creation. 'IS
We can hardly be mistaken if we daim that today again Christianity is
undergoinga similar test. Modern science and technology and the industrial
society which these have made possible have eroded the concept of a
metaphysical order. They were a gigantic attempt on man's part to
understand and control the world and man's material, physical, biological,
sociological and economic dependencies. At the end of this development
man is in the position of the sorcerer's apprentice who can no longer free
himself from the spirits he has summoned up.'· The world that he himself
projected and constructed has become a barely intelligible system with its
unavoidable constraints; it has become a kind of second-order destiny.
Once again anxiety is spreading abroad, and the anxiety often turns
into a cynical contempt for the world. Nietzsche foresaw the nihilistic
consequences of the death of God, and said: 'There is no more up or down,
we plunge in all directions and wander as through an infinite nothing.' ''
 God, the Father Almighty 137
In this situation in which all thinking based on a metaphysical order has
collapsed Christianity must raise anew the question of the ground of all
reality, the ground from which everything comes and which sustains
everything and assigns everything its measure. Christianity must learn once
again to affirm the world as coming from God's positive creative will and
10 defend it and man's natural ties 10 it against a radical denigration of
them. Only in this way is it possible 10 resist the loss of all norms, direction
and stability and 10 re-establish the security within which alone freedom
is possible and meaningful. We must therefore reflect anew on the first
article of the faith and ask ourselves what it means to confess God as the
Father almighty.

2. The Christian message of God the Father

(a) God as Father in the history of religions
The idea of the Godhead as Father of the world and of human beings is
extremely old.'" The invocation of the divinity under the name of father is
one of the primordial phenomena of the hislOry of religions. It is found in
simple and undeveloped religions and among culturally advanced peoples,
among the inhabitants of the Mediterranean area as well as among the
Assyrians and Babylonians. Everywhere the divinity is understood as
Father of the universe, the one from whom everything comes and who
controls everything. A central dogma of Greek religion was that Zeus is
the father of gods and men. In the mystery religions, too, the invocation
of God as 'father' was current. Both Pia IOnic and Stoic philosophy, each
in its own way, accepted this idea and the vocabulary a!lendant on it and
integrated it into its philosophical speculation. The concept of father was
especially helpful in understanding God as ultimate source and as the
principle which establishes the unity and connectedness (relatedness) of all
reality.
Behind this mythical and philosophical language of fatherhood there are
essentially two influences. First, there is the idea of a begetter; this
presupposes the existence of an overarching oneness of life that embraces
God, the world, and human beings. There is nothing in myth of a divine
transcendence in the biblical sense, still less of a purely natural or secular
and immanentist idea of the world. The divine is the depth dimension of
the world; it is as it were a predicate applied to a cosmos that is underslOod
as numinous.'· Second, behind the use of the name 'Father' for God in the
hislOry of religions there is an apotheosis and sacral legitimation of the
position of the father of the family as master of the household and as
138 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
domestic priest. In the ancient world, 'father' was not only a genealogical
concept but also a sociological and juridical concept; particularly in the
Latin and Roman world the pater familias ('father of the household') and
the patris potestas (paternal authority) played a very prominent role. 2•
'Father' was a symbol and summation of what was ancient and venerable,
of authoriry, of the power that not only bestowed but also sustained life.
To that extent the concept of father combined the motifs of strictness and
respect with those of kindness and solicitude. Consequently we have fallen
victim to misunderstanding if we interpret and criticize the patriarchal
order in the light of the Marxist ideology of domination and exploitation.
The auctoritas or authority of the father is based on the fact that he is the
source and augmenter of life (auctoritas is from the verb augere, to
augment, increase).
The father is essentially the source on which the child indeed depends
but to which it also owes its existence. He is the source that renders the
child an independently existing entiry and justifies that existence. The
father-child relation is thus a symbol of the human condition as such; it
gives expression to the fact that human freedom is a conditioned and finite
freedom. The abolition of the father is made possible only by indulging in
a hybrid utopianism that combines absolute freedom and an inhuman kind
of human mastery. Since, however, the father-child relation is not only an
inalienable aspect of being human but also cannot be replaced by other
relation, 'father' is a primal word in the history of humanity and religion;
it cannot be replaced by another concept and cannot be translated into
another concept. It is against this background that the full extent of the
present crisis becomes visible.

(b) God as Father in the Old Testament

The God of revelation is a God of human beings, and he speaks the
language of human beings. The primal word 'father' is therefore also a
basic word in biblical revelation." On the other hand, the t~o motifs -
the genealogical and mythological and the sociological and juridical -
which underlie the use of the concept 'father' in the history of religions
were no small obstacle to the acceptance of word into the Bible. For the
God of the Bible is not simply the depth dimension of the world; he is the
freely acting lord of history.ll
The Old Testament gives central importance to the 'God of the fathers'
(Ex. 3.13; etc.), the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and to the people
of Israel as son of God, not on the basis of natural descent but on the basis
of historical election and vocation (Ex. 4.22; Hos. 11.1 ;ler. 31.9). The
 God, the Father Almighty 139
fatherhood of God and the sonship of Israel are therefore based not on
myths but on the concrete experience of a saving divine historical act. The
divine sonship thus established is still regarded by Paul as the greatesl of
Israel's privileges (Rom. 9.4).

Allusions [0 Ihe mythological underslanding of God's falherhood are admitt-

edly not entirely absent from Ihe Old Teslament (e.g. Deul. 32.8; Ps. 29.1;
89.7; elc.); Ihey are, however, sublimated almosl [0 Ihe poinl of being
unrecognizable. The mythologoumenon of Ihe falher of the gods is 'no
more than a stylistic intermezzo, a poetic formulation' which 'abandons the
mythological concept'.!) If God is said on one occasion [0 have 'begmten' the
king (Ps. 2.7), the relationship Ihal is meant is not one of kinship bUI one
established by an aCI of choice which we mighl besl describe as an aCI of
adoption.

Taking as its point of departure the idea of vocation and election, the Old
Testament is able to make ils own in a critical way the legitimate point of
the mYlh. For the concept of covenant points back to the concept of
creation. God's sovereign call and choice presupposes that he is the master
of all reality, that is, that he is the Father who has created everything (Deut.
32.6; Mal. 2.10) and that he is therefore ground and lord of all reality (lsa.
45.9f.; 64.7). However, the father motif that is based on the idea of the
covenant does not simply point back [0 creation; it also points forward.
Only in the final age will people say to the children of Israel: 'You are "the
sons of the living God'" (Has. 2.1; d. II Sam. 7.14; Ps. 89.27). In the Bible,
therefore, the historical basis of the father motif is to be seen not only in
the idea of origin and of the authority of what is ancient, venerable and
primeval, but also in the idea of the future and of hope in the new. This
primordially new reality consists ultimately in the forgiving and merciful
paternal love of God (Has. 1 1.9; Isa. 63.16;Jer. 31.20). 'As a father pities
his children, so the Lord pities those who fear him' (Ps. 103.13). Israel can
always call upon this merciful love of the Father with the repeated cry:
'Thou art our Father' (lsa. 63.15f.; 64.7f.). The devout Jew of the Old
Testament is already able to call upon this Father-God as 'Father' with
great reverence and confidence (Sir. 23.1; 51.10). God is in a special way
'Father of the fatherless' (Ps. 68.6). It can be said of him that even if 'my
father and my mother have foresaken me ... the Lord will take me up' (Ps.
27.10).
The aspects which I have just pointed out show that the covenantal idea
of God as Father can be turned in a prophelic and critical way against the
concrete fathers of this world. In all truth the dignity of father belongs to
God alone. It is not any earthly father bUI God, from whom all falherhood
140 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
is derived (Eph. 3.15 ), who defines what true fatherhood is. According to
the Bible, therefore, our talk of God as Father is not simply a sacral
apotheosis of paternal authority; God's fatherhood, being the source, is
also the norm of paternal authority and the critical standard by which it
is judged. At the same time, any sexist misunderstanding of the religious
concept of father is also excluded. This is clear, for example, from the fact
that the Old Testament can also translate the Father's loving mercy into
the language of womanliness and motherhood. (lsa. 66.13).
The new form which the Old Testament gives to the father motif as
compared with the form it has in the history of religions brings out what
is proper and specific to Old Testament faith in God: namely, God's
freedom and sovereignty, and his transcendence which is a freedom in love
and therefore manifests itself historically as a descent into immanence and
as a being-with-us. As Father, God is not only the origin but also embraces
present and future; he is a God of history. Judgmental distance and
redemptive nearness, judgment and grace, omnipotence and merciful
forgiveness: in the Old Testament father motif all these are integrated into
a unity-in·tension. The tension point beyond the uniry and presses for a
final clarification.

(e) God as Father ill the New Teslamelll

In the New Testament the Old is brought to its superabundant fulfillment

by the fact that the word 'Father' or 'the Father' becomes Ihe name for
God. There is a broad consensus among exegetes that this practice goes
back to Jesus himself. The name 'Father' for God is found on his lips no
less than 170 times in the Gospels. It is even possible to detect in the gospel
tradition a growing tendency to include the description of God as Father
in the sayings of Jesus. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this
to the operation of a later community theology. The tendency is due rather
to the recollection of Jesus' characteristic way of speaking of God as 'my
Father', 'your Father', and even 'the Father' or 'the heavenly Father'.
In Jesus himself the practice of speaking of God as Father is connected
with the center and horizon of his entire preaching and ministry: the
message of the coming of God's reign."

The concept 'reign of God' is a relatively late abstract formation for the verbal
statementthatJahweh is "ord or King iPs. 47.6-9; 93.8; etc.). The idea ofthe
reign of God does not therefore, have to do, primarily with a kingdom
understood in spatial terms, but with the historical manifestation of God's
lordship through events, with the revelation of his glory and with the proof of
 God, the Father Almighty 141
his divinity. In the final analysis the reign of God represents a radicalizing
interpretation of the first commandment and its justification through God's
control of histoty: 'I am the Lord your God ... You shall have no other gods
before me' (Ex. 20.2f.). For this reason, the message of the coming of God's
reign is directly and inseparably connected in the preaching of Jesus with a call
to conversion and faith (Mark 1.15).
Because the reign of God and its coming are the doing and concern of God
alone, they cannot be merited, caused or coerced by either religious and ethical
achievements or by political struggles. The reign of God is given (Matt. 21.43;
Luke 12.32) and bestowed as an inheritance (Luke 22.29). This state of affairs
finds its clearest expression in the parables: the coming of God's reign in
God's own marvelous accomplishment and without relation to any human
expectations, resistances, calculations or plans. We cannot 4bring it to pass' by
conservative or progressive activity, by any evolutionary or revolutionary
practice; all we can do is prepare for it by conversion and faith. Only in exterior
and interior poverty, weakness and powerlessness can the human being be
attuned to the godliness of God. He can only pray: 'Thy kingdom come' (Matt.
6.10; Luke 11.2). One who thus believes and prays may experience the
omnipotence of God (Mark 9.23); therefore the principle holds that he who
prays already receives (Luke 11.9f.; Matt. 7.71.). Prayer made in faith is not
only assured of a future hearing; it itself is already an anricipation of the reign
of God because it makes room for God to be Lord and to act. It is not academic
discourse about God but talking with God or prayer that is for Jesus the vital
context (Sit: im Leben) of authentic theology.

The reign of God is thus characterized for Jesus by an absolute lack of

world·immanent conditions and a pure graciousness. His concern for
sinners and the godless is as it were only one side of his message; his talk
of God as a loving and merciful Father is the other and the one that is
objectively foundational. [t makes it utterly clear that God's reign has its
source in God alone, and that it is therefore pure grace, unalloyed mercy.
That these two aspects belong together is strikingly shown in Jesus' parable
of the lost or prodigal son, which might more accurately be called the
parable of God's fatherly love (Luke 15.11-32). Man's salvation consists
not in a departure that is meant as a protest and an assertion of emancip.
ation, but in a return to the house of the Father - though admittedly a
Father who does not humiliate the prodigal but restores him to his rights
as son. God's reign does not suppress man's freedom; rather it raises it up
from degradation and restores it to its rightful place.
Also characteristic of Jesus' ministry and preaching is the way in which
he connects the coming of God's reign as the reign of love with his own
coming.!-' He tells the parable of the lost son as a response to the grumbling
of the Pharisees over his association with sinners (Luke 15 .2). The point
142 The Message about the God of jestls Christ
he wishes to make is this: as I behave toward sinners, so too does God. He
dares to act as it were as God's substitute. If he drives out demons, then
the reign of God has come (Matt. 12.28; Luke 11.20). Correspondingly it
is he who first reveals God to us as a Father. In this connection the cry of
jubilation in Matt. 11.27 is especially important: 'All things have been
delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father,
and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son
chooses to reveal him.' According to this saying, 'the Father' or 'my Father'
is a revelatory term that expresses a revealed christology.Jesus himself and
he alone it is who discloses God to us as Father and teaches and empowers
us to pray: 'Our Father' (Matt. 6.9).
The truth about the Father is no naturally known general truth as it is
in Stoicism, but a historical, revealed truth that is connected with the Son.
Only through the Son does it become known that God is the Father of all
human beings; he makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends
rain on the just and the unjust (Matt. 5.45); he is solicitous for all, even
for the birds of the air and the grass of the field (Matt. 6.26, 32) and for
the sparrows in their flight (Matt. 10.29). Thus we find that in the preaching
of Jesus the application of 'father' to God has the same basic structure as
in the Old Testament: a truth revealed at one point in history but disclosing
the universal meaning and ground of all reality. What is new in the
New Testament is the concentration of revelation in the person of the
eschatological revealer of the Father; through him Old Testament revel-
ation is brought to its surpassing fulfillment.
Along with this christological concentration there is a further distinction:
the unparalleled intimacy that attaches to Jesus' use of 'Father'. This
becomes clear above all in the characteristic word Jesus uses in addressing
God: Abba. It is quite certain that in this use of Abba we have the very
word of Jesus himself. Otherwise there would be no explaining why we
find the Aramaic word even in originally Greek texts of the New Testament
(Gal. 4.6; Rom. 8.15). Evidently Abba was a word which the later church
regarded as especially important and sacred, being characteristic of Jesus'
relationship to God. Abba has its origin in the speech of children; it is
originally a child's babble, comparable to 'papa' or 'dada'. But it was also
applied to other esteemed persons with whom one had a confidential
relationship ('Little father'). Consequently, when applied to God Abba
expressed a great and even familiar intimacy and personal closeness which
every Jew must have regarded as shocking. On the other hand, we must
not read into the word a commonplace familiarity with God or even a
degrading of God's divine stature. In Jesus' usage Abba has for its context
the proclamation of the coming reign of God. The Father-God is at the
 God, the Father Almighty 143
same time the Lord God whose name must be hallowed, whose kingdom
is coming, and whose will must be done (Matt. 6.9f.). God our Father is
also the Fa ther almighty, crea tor of heaven and earth, and the eschatological
judge who will pass sentence on all injustice and sin (Matt. 7.21; 18.23-35).
In the final analysis Jesus' message about the Father sums up the whole
of his message in a most personal way. It is the answer to man's hope,
which can find its fulfillment only in the unconditional and definitive
acceptance of love, and it is the answer to the question about the ground
of all reality, a ground which is not at man's disposal and in which he can
share only through faith - not because God is distant but precisely because
he is dose to us in love, and love can only be a gift.
The New Testament writings are a faithful echo of Jesus' message about
the Father. In Paul, God (theos) and Father (Pater) are indissolubly
connected. In the greetings at the beginning and the blessings at the end of
the Pauline letters the apostle always speaks of 'our God and Father' or
'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ' (I Thess 1.1; Gal. 1.3; I Cor.
1.3; II Cor. 1.2; Rom. 1.7; Phil. 1.2; etc.). Paul's statements about the
Father evidently have the liturgy and prayer for their Sitz im Leben (vital
context or sociological context). The.. liturgically influenced greetings and
blessings of the Pauline letters are already preparing the way for the forms
used in later dogmas. Paul uses 'Father' almost as a proper name for God;
but it never appears without an ensuing mention of him as 'Father of our
Lord Jesus Christ'. In Paul's eyes Jesus is the Son who alone makes us to
be sons and daughters (Rom. 8.15; Gal. 4.6). The Father is the origin,
point of departure and goal of the redemptive work of Jesus Christ. From
him come blessing, grace, love, mercy, consolation and joy. For this reason
he must be the addressee of prayer, praise, thanksgiving and petition. But
for Paul, to have God for Father does not mean an enslavement; on the
contrary, to have God for Father means a being freed from slavery and
anxiety and a being established as mature sons and daughters (Gal. 4. Iff.;
Rom. 8.15ff.). Maturity to Paul does not mean, however, acting according
to arbitrary and selfish whim; rather, it means a freedom that shows itself
in love and service. According to Paul, then, the revelation of the lordship
and glory of the Father means the coming of the reign of freedom in love.
In an even more decisive way John develops the linguistic usage of Jesus
in the light of theological reflection. In many passages he speaks in an
unqualified way of 'the Father' and 'my Father'. The message of Jesus
regarding the Father is here broadened until it becomes an explanation of
the whole idea of revelation. The Father is the origin and content of
revelation, and the Son is the revealer. These ideas find expression as early
as the Prologue. Because Jesus alone is eternally with the Father and, in
144 The Message abol/t the God of Jesus Christ
fact, is himself God and rests on the Father's bosom, he is able to bring
knowledge of the Father (1.18). He comes by order of the the Father (5.43);
whoever sees him sees the Father (14.7-10). The purpose of his life's work
is to reveal the name of the Father (17.6, 26). The arguments with the Jews,
which become critical in the Gospel of John, have to do in the last analysis
with the relationship between Jesus and the Father. Jesus is accused not
only of violating the sabbath but of calling God his Father and thus making
himself equal to God (5.18; d. 8.54). The confession of God as the Father
of Jesus Christ is thus in John's view the properly and specifically Christian
element, which he puts into words by saying: 'God is love' (I John 4.8,
16).
It can be said by way of summary that when the New Testament speaks
in a concrete and determinate way of God as ho theos, the Father is always
meant, except for a few 3nd disputed inst3nces (e.g., Rom. 9.5f.)." In other
words, the New Testament, interprets the word God, which in itself is
3mbiguous, by the word Father. God is thus defined 3S the originating but
himself unor\gin3ted source of all reality. To that extent the New Testament
accepts, in its own f3shion, the basic question of ancient philosophy: the
question of the ultimate ground that gives existence, unity and meaning to
all reality and is at the same time the ultimate goal of human action. Of
course, when the Bible speaks of God as the Father, its meaning goes
beyond this abstract philosophical idea of God. By calling him 'Father', it
is s3ying that he is a person31 being who 3ctS and speaks freely in history
and enters into a covenont with hum3nity. As Father, God is 3 God with
3 personal face; he has 3 name and can be invoked by his name. The
personal freedom of God is the reason why God is the liberating origin of
all reality; why he therefore freely accepts wh3t he makes; why he is
freedom in love. As freedom in love God is not only the origin but 31so the
future of history; he is a God of hope (Rom. 15.3). In f3ct, we might sum
up the New Testament proc13mation of God in this formula: God is the
One who loves freely and remains free in his love.

(d) God as Father ill the history of theology and dogma

Early Christi3n theology followed the Bible in speaking of God as F3ther
and described him simply and without qualification 3S 'the Father'."
Justin, Iren3eus and Tertullian show the S3me usage. Whenever reference
is made to 'God', it is 31ways the Father who is meant.
Origen approaches the matter more critically and distinguishes between
ho theos (with the article) 3nd theos (without the article). Ho theos
designates the Father; he is aI/tot/leOS, very God, God in the proper sense.
 God, the Father Almighty 145
The Son, on the other hand, is theos; he is of divine origin, an idea which
in Origen reAects a subordinationist tendency that finds expression in his
characterization of the Son as dellteros theos (a second or secondary
God)."
The basic conviction that 'God' means first and directly the Father also
finds expression in the church's early professions of faith. These early
professions of faith are always directed to 'God, the Father almighty'."
Correspondingly the Father alone is regarded as the unoriginated origin
(archi) of all reality, the principillm sine principio.'· Especially indicative
is the language of prayer in the earliest liturgies. The oldest eucharistic
prayer that has come down to us is addressed to the Father: 'We thank
you, our Father, for the holy vine of David your servant, which you have
given us to know through Jesus your servant; to you be honor for ever.'''
The Council of Hippo (393) expressly orders that 'when the service is
celebrated at the altar, prayer is always to be addressed to the Father'.32
This is why the liturgical doxology takes this form: 'Glory to the Father
through the Son in the Holy Spirit'.JJ Not only the Eastern Church but the
Roman liturgy as well has retained this form of prayer down to the present
time in the ending of the orations (presidential prayers) and in the great
doxology at the end of the eucharistic canon: 'Through him, with him, in
him, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, all glory and honor is yours, almighty
Father, for ever and ever.'

Different emphases are indeed already to be heard in the Apologists of the

second century (Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch). These
men are writing for the educated individuals of the pagan world and are
therefore compelled to speak their language. The Apologists took advantage
of the fact that the word Father had been used as early as Plato to characterize
the supreme being in whom everything has its origin." In Neoplatonism (and
also in gnosticism) the Father is the supreme reality beyond being, whereas for
the Stoics the description of God as Father is meant to express the unity of
nature between God and the world and the kinship among all human beings."
Justin takes this as his point of contact when he describes God as 'Father of
the universe' and 'Father of all human beings'." This kind of language
undoubtedly has a basis in the Old and New Testaments, but its use leaves out
the christological mediation of the Fatherhood of God. The Fatherhood of
God seems to be almost an idea accessible to reason, although Justin expressly
insists that the fullness of the Logos has appeared only in Jesus Christ. The
whole approach had in its favor the fact above all that the word 'Father' was
particularly suited to be the focus of a synthesis between the philosophical
question of the ultimate ground (arche; principium) of all realiry and the
biblical message concerning the origin and goal of creation and salvation
146 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
hiSlory." What the Bible says about the Father could be taken as an answer
(for which philosophy itself paved the way) to the basic question asked in
philosophy.
The attempt of the Apologists to present the Christian message in the garb
of philosophy was a courageous and necessary step. It was not the result of a
feeling of weakness but rather an expression of the vitality of early Christianity
which thereby pressed forward with bold missionary zeal into a new cultural
realm. Such attempts, of course, rardy succeed on the first attempt. The step
taken by the Apologists led intially to a crisis, because these men did not
distinguish dearly enough between two different questions: the relationship
between the world and God as its source, and the relationship of Jesus as Son
to the Father, or, to use another terminology, between the eternal and the
temporal Fatherhood of God. The two questions were even frequently mixed
in togethet. This was especially the case with Arius, who understood the Son
as a kind of mediator in creation (3 demiurge) and as the supreme creature. It
took the two councils of Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381) to bring
clarification, as they defined the Son to be the same (or: one) in substance with
the Father (homoousios) ." It was thus determined that God is from eternity
the Father of a Son who is of the same substance as himself." Within God,
then, the Father is origin (arche) and source (pege), as the Greeks expressed
it,<lO or principle, as the Latins expressed it.41 In relation to what is outside of
God, on the other hand, creation and the history of salvation are the work of
the entire Trinity."l The Greek Fathers in particularu set great store on the
doctrine, for which Origen had already provided the foundations," that the
Farher is the origin and source of the Godhead;,u John Damascene summarizes
it once again in his De fide or/hodoxa, which became practically the textbook
of the Eastern Church." But Augustine, too, who became the founder of
Western theology, writes that 'the Father is the source (prillcipium) of the
entire Godhead (divini/as) or, perhaps better, deity (dei/as)'. The Councils of
Toledo adopted the same language and described the Father as 'therefore the
source and origin of the whole Godhead· ... Even in Thomas Aquinas there is
an echo of this usage." Of all the Scholastics, Bonaventure is the most emphatic
in describing the Father as the auctor (author) and fOn/alis pleni/lldo (fontal
fullness) of the Godhead, and in making innascibili/as (impossibility of being
begotten or born) his essence. SU
The clarifications made in the course of the history of theology and dogma
also had negative effects. The emphasis on the true divinity of Christ led to the
term 'God' being increasingly used not for the Father but for the one divine
being possessed in common by Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The change could
be seen even in the liturgical language of the church. Thus in Basil the liturgical
doxology 'Glory be to the Father through the Son' was changed to read: 'Glory
be to the Father with the Son and with the Holy Spirit'," until finally it became:
'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit.' The effects
became especially clear in Augustine'S doctrine on the Trinity, which was to
 God, the Father Almighty 147
be so normative for the Latin West, and in particular in the prayers Augustine
composed. It is clear, of course, that in the many prayers in his Confessimrs he
also addresses God as Father; usually, however, he adopts the language of the
Old Testament psalms and addresses him as 'God' or 'Lord'. But where he
adopts a language of his own, he uses remarkably abstract and philosophical-
sounding expressions: '0 eternal truth and true love and beloved eternity!'52
These changes in the language of prayer point to a danger: that the
intra-trinitarian Fatherhood of the Father may become irrelevant to God's
relationship with the world and human beings, so that the Trinity becomes a
doctrine which is of interest to theologians but irrelevant to the world and
history. Thus we find that in their treatises De Deo tlno (on God as One) the
Scholastics can speak of God, his nature, his attributes and thus also about his
relation to the world without saying a word about the Father; of this they wait
to speak until they come to the treatise De Deo trino (On God as Triune). This
division of the one doctrine of God into two distinct treatises, De Dea IIno and
De Deo trillO, is, however, highly problematical when seen from the standpoint
of the scriptural witness and the early tradition, according to which the one
God is always the Father.'" I shall therefore attempt to develop the material
concerns of the treatise De Dea uno in the form of a doctrine on God the
Father.
This development shows that even in the history of dogma and theology
there are no gains without losses. The definitions that bring clarification also
narrow the focus. We do not risk losing the gains they brought when we
attempt to recover that which, as seen from the vantage point of our present
knowledge of the history of theology, was either short-changed or simply lost.
The attempt to articulate the Christian faith in the language of the day reflects
not 50 much a problem peculiar to a past age as a perennial task of preaching
and theology. The communication of a philosophical and theological doctrine
of God is therefore not an outmoded speculative problem but an attempt to
give an intellectually honest account of the Christian message about the Father.
Given the contemporary challenge in principle to the very idea of God and in
particular to any talk of a Father-God, the task has become a significantly
more urgent one than it was in e:ulier centuries.

3. Theological definition of the essence of God

(a) The de{initioll of God's essellce in the horizon ofWestem metaphysics
While the philosophical inquiry into the ultimate ground (arche) of all
reality is different in many respects from the biblical message about God
as Father, that is, as the personal origin and source of all reality in
the orders of creation and redemption, there is nonetheless an internal
correspondence between them. This fact led at a very early date to a
synthesis of the two approaches taken by faith and reason. In the course
148 The Message abollt the God of Jeslls Christ
of this theological reflection on the testimony of scripture and tradition
there arose a theological definition of God's essence which then served as
a foundation for the entire theological tradition. The biblical name for
God yielded a theological statement about the being of God. This synehesis
locates us at the point where all the problems of the traditional doctrine
on God intersect.
The starting point for this reflection was the Old Testament revelalion
of the name of God in connection with the burning bush in Ex. 3.14."
According to the Hebrew text, God reveals himself to Moses as 'I am there
who am there.' The Hebrew verb hayah, used here, which we usually
translate as 'to be,' means basically 'to effect, be effective'." This passage
of revelation, then, is not concerned with God's mere existence or with
God as absolute Being. God's statement is a promise, a pledge that he is
there, i.e., is with his people in an active, effective way. The second part of
the statement adds that God is there as the one who is there, that is, he is
present in a manner that cannot be calculated or defined. God's protecting
and rescuing presence remains a mystery of his freedom. His being-
there is absolutely certain, yet it is not at our disposal; God is always
unconditionally true to his promise, yet always new in the way he carries
it out. This historical self·definition of God is also given in other passages
of scripture: God is the first and the last (Isa. 41.4; 44.6; 48.12; Rev. 1.17).
He is the Alpha and the Omega (Rev. 1.4). But the Septuagint had already
translated the promise of being-there into a statement about being: 'Ego
eimi ho on' (I am the One who is). The Vulgate follows suit: 'Ego Slim qui
slim' (I am who am) . English translations have traditionally followed the
same line: 'I am who am' or 'I am who I am'. In these translations the
historical promise becomes a metaphysical statement and a definition. But
the transition can be seen already taking place within the Old Testament,
when Wisdom 13.1 describes God as tall onta, 'him who exists'.
This transposition of the name of God into a definition of essence, after
showing up in the Bible itself and in the translations of it, was taken as a
foundation by the later tradition. We find the Jewish religious philosopher
Philo of Alexandria already claiming on the basis of Exodus 3.14 that
God's name is 'he who is' (ho 011) or 'that which is' (to all)." Philo set a
precedene with this thesis and it occurs repeatedly in the fathers of the
church." Augustine thought it possible to claim that on this particular
point Philo and Moses were saying the same thing." Athanasius, who led
the fight at the Council of Nicaea, interprets in this light the conciliar
assertion that the Son is from the being of the Father." The medieval
Scholastics accepted this synthesis and made it the basis of their systems."
It is obvious, of course, that the synthesis altered not only the interpretation
 God, the Father Almighty 149
of the Bible but philosophy as well. We must not assume that thinkers of
the stature of Origen, Augustine and Thomas accepted traditional thought
patterns in an unintelligent way; rather, all of them endeavoured to apply
the formulas in a critical and creative way. This can be shown in all great
theologians; I shall restrict myself in what follows to Thomas Aquinas.
Thomas Aquinas justifies the identification of the biblical name of God
with the philosophical concept of being by this argument, among others,
that being is the most universal of all concepts. The more comprehensive
a concept, the more suited it is to being applied to God, since God embraces
all being in himself. Thomas is here indirectly taking from Gregory of
Nazianzus, by way of John Damascene, the idea of being as pe/aglls
sllbstantiae infinitllm et indeterminatllm (an infinite and unbounded ocean
of being).'o He links this idea with Neoplatonist images. In Neoplatonism
Being (ip",," esse) stands at the apex of the pyramid of the Ideas; it is the
first perfection after the One of Supra-Being. Thomas adopts this idea of
ipsllm esse as the supreme Idea, but he himself calls it esse COlllmllne, i.e.,
being in general, in which all existent things, but not God, participate."
For, as the origin of all being, God does not 'have' being but rather 'is'
being. Unlike Neoplatonism, therefore, Thomas does not think of God as
beyond being but rather as ipsl/III esse sllbsistens, subsistent being itself, in
whose being all other existing things share.·' For this reason God does not
participate in esse commune; rather, esse commune participates in God;ti)
it is the first and proper effect produced by God .... As subsistent being,
God is then himself the origin and ground, or, in biblical language, the
Father, of all reality.
This doctrine of God as subsistent being enables Thomas to save God's
transcendence in relation to the world. For there is an infinite qualitative
difference between the being-being of God and the having-being of
creatures. When God is defined as iPSlI1II esse sllbsistens, he is not being
located within an ontological continuity that embraces both God and the
world; on the contrary, Thomas expressly maintains that God is not in
any genus nor even included in being.·' He is infinitely exalted above all
other reality. On the other hand, Thomas' definition of God, unlike that
of Neoplatonism, also enables him to maintain the immanence of God in
the world that goes with the idea of creation. For if God is the reality that
embraces all being, it is not possible to think of his relation to the world
and man as one purely of opposition; if God were simply opposed to the
world, he would be limited by the world and would therefore be a finite
being. But if God is thought of as Being in itself, then everything that exists
participates in the reality of God; then God is in all things.·· He is therefore
not simply the distant and inaccessible one who is beyond being, rather,
150 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
he is the God who is present in the world; he is omnipresent. Thus God is
both transcendent and immanent.
From the definition of God as ipsum esse sllbsistens it follows that as
the fullness of being God is not subject to any deficiency of being (=
potentiality), but is unqualifiedly the absolutely perfect being and therefore
pure actuality (actlls purus). This identity of essence and existence in God
is the reason both for his simplicity and his immutability. It means that
God does not realize his essence in successive moments or acts but simply
is his essence. 67 The eternity of God means, therefore, not simply that God
is without beginning or end, but rather that he is simultaneously beginning
and end. Since he does not need to realize his being through any succession,
his eternity consists in the tota simlli et perfecta possessio (instantaneously
whole and perfect possession) of his being. 6H
The immutability and eternity that are entailed in the definition of God
as ipsum esse subsistens do not mean that God is in every respect a fixed
and motionless being. On the contrary, for from this definition it follows
that he is pure knowing" and therefore has life in the highest possible
degree. 7o Even, and in fact precisely, the God who is conceived with the
help of the categories of classical metaphysics is not a dead God but in the
highest possible measure a living God.
What Thomas expresses with the help of the concept of ips'lII' esse
subsistens, later theologians, following the church fathers, tried to express
with the help of the concept of aseity.7' In so doing, they did not understand
aseity only according to the immediate sense of the word, that is, as
something negative. They meant to say not simply that God does not owe
his existence to another, but rather that he exists exclusively by himself or
that, without having become and in complete independence of any other
reality, he is the absolutely unconditioned reality. Aseity is thus also
understood in a positive sense; it says that God is the self-explanatory
reality and that he is being by reason of his very essence. But asiety does
immediately express only the negative side, whereas the concept ipsllln
esse subsistens expresses the positive ground, 'God is ipsm1l esse sllbsistens'
must therefore be taken as the properly metaphysical definition of God's
essence.

The now classical synthesis of Thomas Aquinas is an impressive work of

genius. But is it tenable? The more deeply one goes into it, the more one has
the impression of walking a lonely ridge between two abysses. The synthesis
has been radically challenged in our century, especially by dialectial theology.
E. Brunner regarded the translation of the name Yahweh into the concept of
being as a 'tragic misunderstanding' and 'an error that bore disastrous fruit'on
 God, the Father Almighty 151
It must be responded, however, that Brunner himselfhas utterly misunderstood
Thomas. In using the concept of ipslllIt esse subsistens Thomas is not trying to
do what Brunner accuses him of doing, i.e. to locate God within a continuity
of being that includes both God and world; on the contrary, he is seeking to
maintain the transcendence of God. At the same time, however, there is a
kernel of truth in Brunner's criticism. The differences between the biblical
name for God and the traditional definition of God's essence are obvious. The
Bible is talking not of God's being but of his being there, in the sense of being
with us and for us. The classical definition of God's essence is incapable, at
least at first sight, of expressing this living God of history and his intensely
personal nature. God seems rather to become an abstraction, something
neutral, even a faceless conceptual idol [0 whom we may ascribe everything
else, but not the traits of personality. The philosophy of being seems incapable
of doing full justice to the testimony of scripture.
The most penetrating criticism of the onto theo-Iogical constitution of
a

metaphysics and the theo·onto-Iogical constitution of theology comes from

M. Heidegger. He summarizes 3S follows: 'Man can neither pray nor sacrifice
to this God. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor
can he play music and dance before this God.' In fact, Heidegger even thinks
that god-less thinking which feels obliged to abandon the God of philosophy,
God as callsa 5//i, is perhaps closer to the divine God. 'God-less thinking is
more open to Him than onto-thea-logic would like to admit.''' Yer this
criticism, too, is at least not fully just to the intellectual achievement of Thomas
Aquinas. The definition of God as by essence ipslIIIl esse sltbsist'"s has for its
purpose precisely to differentiate God from esse commune. It is at least very
open to question whether Thomas can be accused of a forget/ullness of being
in the sense Heidegger gives to this phrase. 74
J. E. Kuhn in particular has shown the great extent to which the Scholastic
synthesis includes the idea of God's personality, which is so central to the
Bible. Kuhn attempts a synthesis of the various Scholastic definitions of God's
essence.'S His point of deparmre is infinity, which is the Seatist definition of
God's essence. Infinity distinguishes God from all finite creatures. But this
negative approach would turn into a pantheism unless we were to go along with
many Thomists and define God positively as absolute spirit (intellectuality), to
whose essence it belongs to be infinite, not simply in intention (as in the case
with the human spirit) but actually. But spirituality in turn implies reOectiveness
and thus a conscious being·in-himself and for-himself; in an absolute spirit
this means aseity. When the aseity of God is thus combined with his spirituality,
his freedom is established. God can therefore be defined as absolute freedom
and absolute person. In thus synthesizing the various Scholastic views Kuhn
showed at the same time the extent to which the classical metaphysical
definition of God's essence is thoroughly scriptural in what it says; it does not
hide the personal face of the Father but endeavors to give the biblical message
an intellectual form and to defend it before the bar of thought.
152 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
Kuhn's interpretation accomplished sOinething further: it showed the
connection that exists between the classicill metaphysical definitions of God's
essence and a definition formulated in the context of the modern philosophy
of freedom. It made it dear that there can be no exclusive opposition between
the two but rather that there are intrinsic continuities.
The man who vemured furthest in this question was the Wiirzburg dogmatic
theologian H. Schell, who defined God as callsa 5IIi." In doing so he was gOing
back to Neoplatonism and to occasional formulas found in many of the church
fathers; at the same time, he was making a Ionk with the modern phIlosophy
of self-positing freedom. According to Schell, no nature and no mht>T("nrh
inactive substamial being can precede absolute freedom, which in thi. ""peCI
differs from finite freedom. In Schell's view, rhcretore,l,od 'I!l.nm hr . . l.t lI41tum
or being and only then active; he is primordIal deed and Iherdore primordial
datum'; he is 'the eternal actuation of infinite active power . .. the actuation
of self-conscious truth and holiness'. Later on, Schell spoke somewhat more
reservedly of the subsistent reality and subsistem act of God, rather than of self-
causation and self-position. This definition of God as causa sui was rejected
by most theologians because a being that causes itself must act before It eXlstSj
it must be before it is, and this violates the principle of contradictIOn. In
addition, most theologIans feared that the idea of self-realization would
introduce becoming and therefore potenciality into God. These objections arc
irrefutable, given the presuppositions of classical metaphysics. Bur they do nO[
come to grips with Schell's concern, which has vahdlty despIte hIS not
fully successful formulations. His purpose is to overcome a reificatory and
substantia list understanding of being and, on the basis of modern thought, to
conceive God as being-in-action, as freedom and life. In so domg, Schell came
far closer not only to the modern intellectual starting POint but also to the
biblical understanding of God than did hIS Scholastic adversa rIes, who managed
to have his work PUt on the Index in 1898. To the detriment of the ChrIStian
faith they thus prevented his approach to the problem from bearing fruit In a
new synthesis of faith and knowledge that would respond to the mtellectual
situations of the modern age. Should ninctcenth~ and twentieth-century
theology have shown less courage for a critical and creative syntheSIS than the
church fathers of the first cemuries showed?

(d) The definition of God's essence in the horh:oll of the modcm

philosophy of freedom
While classical metaphysics moves in thought from being to freedom and
understands freedom as the highest form of being, that is, as being that
exists in itself and independently, modern philosophy starts with the subject
and more particularly with freedom and proceeds then to think of being
in the horizon of freedom. Kant speaks in this connection of a Copernican
revolution," which Fichte even more categorically defined as an option
 God, the Father Almighty 153
for freedom." Not observable fact but free activity is the reality that
alone brings the self-disclosure of the world. Being, therefore, is act,
accomplishment, happening, event. Not self-contained being but ex-
istence, or freedom that goes out of itself and fulfills itself in action, is now
the starting point and horizon of thought. It is clear that, given the horizon
of this new srarting point and this new mode of thought, God tOO must be
thought anew.
At first glance there seems to be an inherent relation between biblical
thought and modern thought. Efforts have therefore been made at times
to represent modern thought as a secularized version of biblical thought
and as the realization of the latter in the wordly sphere. But we must not
overlook the dangers which the modern srarting point represented for the
Christian understanding of God. In the philosophy of freedom there was
constant danger of God becoming a moment or element in the self-
realization of the subject and his freedom; God was then the medium of
moral freedom and the summation of the kingdom of freedom, but no
longer a personal being over against man." The danger showed itself in
paradigmatic fashion in the 'atheism controversy' which Fichte set in
motion in 1798 with his article 'Concerning the Foundation of Our Belief
in the Divine Government of the World'. Since 'persons' exist only over
against other persons of our world, Fichte concluded that personality
implies limitation and finiteness and therefore cannot be predicated of
God.'· We find a similar objection being raised in our own century by K.
Jaspers;"' it also inspires trends in modern theology which for fear of
objectifying God reject theism"' or prefer to define God as suprapersonal
rather than personal."' This problem is not a new one. It is to be found nor
only in the pantheistic and panentheistic currents of the modern age - in
the world-centered piety of Goethe and the philosophy of G. Bruno and
B. Spinoza - but also in the monistic undetstanding of reality that
characterizes the Asiatic high religions, especially Buddhism, which is
unwilling to ascribe either positive or negative attributes to God. The
concept of person, especially in its application to God, is perhaps the most
difficult point in the dialogue between Christianity and the Eastern
religions.
A definition of God's essence in the horizon of freedom can already be
justified, in a first reflection, in terms of the classical concept of person. For
on the one hand the classical definition of the person includes individuality
in the sense of an irreplaceable and inalienable uniqueness. Boethius'
definition of person became normative for the entire tradition: 'naturae
rationalis indiuidua substantia (an individual substance possessing a
rational nature',8" This individual mode of existence of.3 spiritual nature
154 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
seems to imply finiteness and therefore to exclude application of the
concept of person to God. On the other hand, however, rationality and
therefore infinity is part of the person. According to Thomas, who follows
Aristotle, even the finite spirit is 'quodammodo omnia (in a way all things)';
it is directed without limit to the whole of reality. Ex·istence - a being out
of itself and beyond itself - therefore belongs to a spiritual nature. This
aspect was brought out especially by Richard of 5t Victor in his definition of
person: 'llaturae intel/eetualis ineommtlnieabilis existentia (an intellectual
nature existing incommunicably)' ." Each person, while being unique, is
at the same time ordered to reality in its entirety. Even in the finite world,
therefore, the person is characterized by a tension between an always
concrete and irreplaceable individuality and an unlimited openness to the
whole of reality. In other terms: in the person the whole of reality is present,
but always in a unique way. The person is Do sein (being there), that is,
the person is the 'there' of being." The finite person is in an intentional
manner the subsistence of being and to that extent is a stlbsistCIIs inten·
tionale. Because the whole of being is 'there' in an intentional way in the
person, the person cannot be subordinated and sacrificed to any supposedly
higher goal, value, coherence or whole; its personhood is instead the basis
of its unconditional dignity, because of which it is never a means to an end,
but always an end in itself.
With the classical concept of person as our starting point we can now in
a second act of reflection reproduce the anthropological shift characteristic
of the modern age. This need not lead the understanding of God into the
aporias already mentioned. For, because of its dynamic ordering to the
totality of being the person cannot find full satisfaction in anything finite,
in any finite values whether material or spiritual, nor even in finite persons.
This accounts for the restless and unquiet constant movement and self·
transcending of man. The human person can reach definitive fulfillment
only if it encounters a person who is infinite not only in its intentional
claims on reality but in its real being; that is, only if it encounters an
absolute person. Thus a more appropriate concept of person as the always
unique 'there' of being leads necessarily to the concept of an ab50lute, a
divine person." Ifwe understand the person as an always unique realization
of being, then the category of person as applied to God does not mean an
objectification of God. On the contrary, the concept of person is able to
express in a new way the fact that in God being subsists in a unique way,
that is, that God is ipsunl esse subsistetlS.
The definition of God as a person both includes and goes beyond the
classical definition of God's essence. It no longer looks at God in terms of
substance and therefore does not define him as absolute substance, but
 God, the Father Almighty 155
thinks of him rather in the horizon of freedom and defines him as perfect
freedom. This definition of God as essentially person has the advantage
that it is more concrete and alive than the abstract metaphysical definition
adopted by the tradition. It is also closer to the biblical picture of God as
Father. This is especially so because personality necessarily says relation-
ality. A person exists only in self-actualization in response to another
person and as ordered to other persons. In the concrete a human person is
not even able to live unless accepted and affirmed by other persons and
unless he or she receives and at the same time gives love. We attain to
fulfillment only by emptying ourselves out in love, so as to realize our own
intentional infinity. Seen in the horizon of the person, the meaning of being
is love. This thesis is of basic importance for a proper understanding of the
personality of God. To call God a person is to say that God is the subsistent
being which is freedom in love. Thus the definition of God's essence brings
us back to the biblical statement: 'God is love' (I John 4.8,16).
It is obvious, of course, that we can apply the category of person to God
only by analogy. This does not mean that God is less a person than we are,
but rather that he is a person in an incomparably higher way than we are.
But the statement that God is person in an incomparably higher way than
we are is to be distinguished from the thesis that God is supra-personal.
When all is said and done, this thesis really says nothing, because 'person'
is the highest category we have at our disposal. We can predicate the
category in an analogous way, but to try to move beyond it into a
higher, supra-personal dimension would mean leaving behind the realm of
meaningful and responsible language. God's essence would then disappear
into utter vagueness, indeterminacy and generality. This would be to
misunderstand the biblical God, who has a concrete name. The category
of person has three positive values:
1. The category of person holds fast to the truth that God is not an object
or thing that can be observed and thus pinned down; he is, instead, a
subject that exists, speaks and acts in a freedom which cannot be reduced
to anything else. The category of person thus protects the unmanipulability
and hiddenness that God displays in the revelation of his name. Since
according to the Scholastic tradition 'persona cst ineffab;/;s (the person is
ineffable', the category of person keeps God from being assumed into some
general concept or system. Thus the definition of God as a person stipulates,
paradoxically, that in the final analysis God cannot be defined. As a person
God is utterly and irreplaceably unique.
2. The category of person holds fast to the truth that God is not a
predicate either of the world or of man; it emphasizes the fact that God is
a sovereign sub;ect. He is not the explanation and ideologization of the
156 The Message abollt the God of Jeslls Christ
world, or man, or any ideas, movements and interests. Therefore he may
not be appropriated ideologically in behalf of any intra-worldly interest;
we may not take his name in vain and misuse it, but must rather regard it
as holy. God is therefore 10 be distinguished from idols, which are
absolUlizations of wordly values (power, money, sexuality, reputation,
success, and so on). To put it in modern terms: faith in God as underslOod
in the Bible has as one of its functions to exercise a critique of ideologies.
Through a prophetic criticism of the idols and absolutizations of every
kind that enslave human beings this faith can promote the freedom of man
and protect the transcendence of the human person." Acknowledgment
of God's reign means freedom for man. But since God is,to an incomparably
higher degree than the human person, an end in himself and never a means
to an end, this concentration on the illlra-worldly relevance of faith in God
is subject 10 certain limits which may not be violated. The concept of
person precludes any reduction of God 10 a function, whetherthe intention
be conservative and affirmative or progressivist and critical. The primary
thing is not the significance of God for us, but the acknowledgment of the
Godness of God and the adoration and praise of him. 'We praise you for
your glory.' The concept of person thus gives expression 10 the glory and
holiness of God.
3. The category of person nOl only asserts the existence of God as a
unique subject; it also says that God is the reality which determines
everything. It takes seriously the fact that God is not simply an other-
worldly being and not simply a person over against other persons, but
rather is in all things, can be found in all things, and in particular can be
encountered in all human beings. Yet even this does not say enough. When
we define God, the reality that determines everything, as personal we are
also defining being as a whole as personal. This entails a revolution in the
understanding of being. The ultimate and highest reality is not substance
but relation. For ArislOtle, relation belongs among the accidents which are
added 10 substance; he even regards it as the weakest of all entities. BUI
when God reveals himself as the God of the Covenant and of dialogue, the
God whose name means being-for-us and being-with-us, then relation
takes priority over substance. For then the free turning of God 10 the world
and 10 us grounds all intra-worldly substantiality. The meaning of being
is therefore 10 be found not in substance that exists in itself, but in
self-communicating love. The biblical idea of God thus has a positive
significance as well as a negative. It says that the human person is accepted
and loved without qualification 35 a person. Wherever, then, love 'occurs',
there too the definitive meaning of all reality is realized in an anticipatory
way and there 100 the reign of God has come, even if only in a fragmentary
 God, the Father Almighty 157
and provisional manner. To believe in God the Father almighty means,
then, to believe in the omnipotence of love and in love's eschatological
victory over hatred, violence and egoism; it entails, too, the duty of living
by this omnipotence and for this victory.
At this point a question arises which is utterly decisive for the further
progress of our discourse about God. What does it mean to say that 'God
is love'? After all that has been said thus far it certainly does not mean that
that short statement can be inverted and that we can say 'Love is God'. To
accept such an inversion is to fail to realize that God is a subject; it is to
locate God once again under some more universal notion. But the ultimately
decisive question is this: for whom is this love which is God himself? Is
God in his love a pure outpouring of himself upon the world? Is it
impossible, therefore, as Hegel claimed, for God to be without the world?
If this is so, is he still God? Or must we rather say that God is love within
himself? That he is communication and self-emptying within himself? Is
God not only Father of the world and of human beings but first of all
Father of his eternal consubstantial Son? Thus the definition of God's
essence as perfect freedom in love turns us back, as does the biblical image
of God as Father, to the christological ground for the way the Bible talks
about God.
 II

Jesus Christ, Son of God

I. The question of salvation as point of departure for the God-question

The church's profession of faith is not concerned with God in an unspecified

sense of this word; its faith is in the God of Jesus Christ, the God who is
the Father of our Lord Jesus ChriS!. For this reason, after confessing God
as the Father almighty, the creed continued: ... 'and in Jesus Christ his
only Son'. The question of God is therefore inseparable from the quesnon
of Christ. But, once again, the creed does not speak of Jesus Christ as God's
Son in an abstract way; it adds the meaning for us of this central point of
the Christian faith: 'who for us men and for our salvation came down from
heaven.' The question of Christ and therefore the question of God as well
is placed within the framework of the question of salvation. The Christian's
concern is not with God in himself but with God-for-us, the God of Jesus
Christ, who is a God of human beings (Heb. 11.16). A preaching and
teaching about God that spoke of God in himself without saying what he
means for me and for us would be irrelevant and suspect of being an
ideology. The concern is therefore always with the concrete God who is
the salvation of human beings and whose glory is man alive.' In setting
forth this thesis, the Christian profession of faith reverses the basic dogma
of the modern critique of religion: God is not dead; he is the living God of
human beings and is professed as being the hope and fulfillment of man.
In making the question of salvation the point of departure for the
question of God and of Christ we are, of course, opening ourselves to very
serious objections, especially in our day. The obvious question arises: if
God is and if he is truly a God of human beings, what is the source of evil,
of unmerited suffering in all its varied forms? Why and for what purpose
is there exploitation and oppression, guilt, anxiety, sickness and death,
persecution and rejection? Not least of all: why and for what purpose is
 jesus Christ, SOli of God 159
the suffering of children who are not only personally innocent but are
exposed to suffering without any possible protection? These experiences
of unmerited and unjust suffering are existentially a much stronger
argument against faith in God than are all the epistemological and scientific
arguments, all the arguments used by critics of religion and ideology, all
the other philosophical arguments of whatever kind. These experiences
are in fact the rock on which atheism stands.> No one has formulated this
argument more forcefully than Epicurus. Either God wants to get rid of
evil but cannot - and then he is helpless and not God; or he can get rid of
it but chooses not to - then he himself is wicked and at bottom is really
the devil; or he does not want to and is not able - then both olthe previous
conclusions follow or he wants to and is able to - but then whence comes
evil?' A. Ca",us gives the argument in this form: 'Either we are not free
and God the all-powerful is responsible for evil. Or we are free and
responsible but God is not.' All the Scholastic subtleties have not made
this paradox any more telling nor, on the other hand, have they been able
to take the edge from it.4 After the dreadful horrors our century has seen,
post-Auschwitz theology believes it now impossible to speak responsibly
of a God who is both omnipotent and good.'
The objections raised here against the Christian message of redemption
were raised against Christianity from the beginning by Jewish theologians.
How is it possible to claim that the world has been redeemed when it is in
such an obviously unredeemed state? Like Christianity, Jewish theology
maintains, of course, that God is a God of human beings, a God who
speaks and acts in history. But, in addition, it has 'always maintained a
concept of redemption as an event which takes place publicly, on the stage
of history and within the community. It is an occurrence which takes place
in the visible world and which cannot be conceived apart from such a
visible appearance." That kind of redemption is still an eschatological
hope for Judaism.
We encounter this hope in a secularized form in the various modern
utopian visions, among which the faith in evolutionary progress and the
revolutionary utopianism of Marxism with its corning kingdom of freedom
have been the most influential. Both of these assume that man must take
his destiny into his own hands and be the author of his own happiness.
When its radic.1 implications .re accepted, this modern idea of human
autonomy excludes in principle any idea of a mediator and therefore any
idea of a redemption that is not a self-redemption and self-liberation of
m.n by himself. 7 In this perspective the hope of redemption .nd liberation
by God seems to suppress human freedom, to devalue its efforts, even to
condemn man 10 prove passivity and pure endurance, and thus to .. nction
160 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
the status quo.' It seems to take away man's responsibility for himself and
conditions in the world; the idea of a substitute or representative redeemer
seems a refusal to take such a responsibility seriously.
The passage of time has made it clear that the modern Enlightenment
was based on an abstract picture of man. It failed to see that human
freedom is a situated freedom and therefore is subject to physiological,
biological, sociological, economic and psychological conditions, so that
the person does not unqualifiedly 'possess' freedom and the ability to use
it, provided only that he or she wants to. The freedom of the individual is
interwoven with <1 universal situarion of disaster. Every attempt to alter
this situation is itself subject to the conditions created by the disaster. The
result is an unending satanic cycle of guilt and revenge, violence and
counter-violence. There is therefore no revolution that will not later be
betrayed. In addition, there is the finiteness of man, which finds its starkest
expression in death. Death is, above all else, a sign that all of man's
attempts to deal with his disastrous situation must remain fragmentary and
ultimately fail. At best man can limit evil; attempts to eliminate it always
end in violence and totalitarianism, which are themselves evils.
These insights into the suffering that is inherent in human existence have
changed the situation of theology. Whereas modern theology's partner in
dialogue used to be the enlightened unbeliever, the partner in dialogue of
any contemporary theology is suffering man who has concrete experience
of the persisting situation of disaster and is therefore conscious of the
weakness and finiteness of his human existence. This suffering can take
many forms: exploitation and oppression, guilt, sickness, anxiety, persecu-
tion, rejection, and the many shapes of death.' And all these experiences
of suffering are not peripheral and residual aspects of existence, not the
shadow side of human life, as it were; rather; they characterize the human
condition as such. Nietzsche rightly observes that the depth of suffering of
which human beings are capable almost determines the order of their
rank. 1O A theology that takes the human experience of suffering as its
starting point starts, therefore, not with a borderline phenomenon but
with the center and depths of human existence.
There is another reason why the question of God and the question of
suffering belong together. We would not be able to suffer from our situation
unless we had an at least implicit pre-apprehension of an undamaged,
happy fulfilled kind of existence; unless we were at least implicitly looking
for salvation and redemption. Only because we as human beings are meant
for salvation do we suffer at our disastrous situation and rebel against it.
If we had no 'longing for the wholly other' (M. Horkheimer), we would
make the best of what is and accept what is not. Experiences of suffering
 Jesus Christ, Son of God 161
are experiences of a contrast; it is precisely in our wretchedness that we
also experience our greatness (B. Pascal). Therefore even the atheism for
which this world is everything suffers shipwreck on the reef of suffering.
'For even the abolition of God docs not explain suffering and does not
assuage pain. The person who cries out in pain over suffering has his own
dignity, which no atheism can rob him of.'''
If hope is to be at all possible in the face of the universal situation of
suffering and disaster, if in the face of injustice that cries out 10 heaven
human beings are not to surrender their dignity, then a new beginning
must be possible that cannot be derived from the conditions present in our
situation, and there must be a final authority that is above all injustice and
will have the last word to say at the end of history. Thomas Aquinas
formulated this idea with unparalleled intellectual boldness, by reversing
the thesis that evil is an argument against God and saying: 'quia rna/urn
est DeliS est (because evil exists, God exists).' '' For hope in the face of
despair is possible only in the light of redemption." Ir would be futile to
seek an absolute meaning without God. I '
The question of God, then, and the question of suffering belong together.
But the question of suffering also alters the question of God. The attempt
to articulate the question of God in the perspective of the question of
suffering has traditionally been called 'theodicy.''' The term occurs as such
for the first time in Leibnitz, 16 but the idea itself if far older. The point has
always been to justify God despite the existence of evil. Because of the
presuppositions of the Christian faith two possible solutions were excluded
in advance, since they would have attacked the Christian concept of God
(and indeed any rational concept of God) at its very roots. I refer to the
attribution of evil to God himself (monism) and the attribution of evil to
a primordial evil principle which is independent of God (dualism). Plato
had already realized that from God only good can comeY All the more
then must Christian theology, which defines God as absolute freedom in
love, exclude both dualism, which limits the absolute freedom of God, and
monism, which jeopardizes his love. The traditional solution, therefore,
was that God can only allow freedom for the sake of good, as a means to
achieve the purposes of divine providence and bring order into the universe.
Consequently, God allows evil either as a punishment for sin and a test
and purification for man, or clse as a way of bringing out the full riches
and variety ofthe universe and the beauty ofthe good." There has recently
been a comparable attempt to explain evil as an unavoidable by-product
of evolution. " Leibniz went furthest in this direction when he sought to
prove that the present world is the best of all conceivable worlds, and in
this way to justify God. But this optimistic version of theodicy is almost
162 The Message abotlt the God of Jestls Christ
indistinguishable from a pessimistic, even tragic view of the world. Finite-
ness must be understood as a metaphysical evil and to that extent turned
into a human evil, while evil understood as a service to the good is in the
last analysis stripped of its evilness. But this way of mediatizing evil
ultimately outmanoeuvers freedom and at bottom fails to take it seriously.
Wha t is left, in this expla nation, of respect for the su ffering of the individual,
who is not simply a particular instance of something universal nor simply
an element in a world-order, however magnificent? D. Solie goes so far as
to characterize these attempted solutions of the problem of theodicy as
theological sadism.!· In any case, Dostoievsky rightly objected that such
harmony is secured at too great a cost: 'Therefore I hasten to return my
ticket of admission'.ll
Despite these legitimate criticisms, there is a valid insight in traditional
theodicy: that for all its horror evil is only a secondary reality which can exist
only by contradicting the good and can be experienced as evil only in the
framework of the good. But this valid basic insight needs to be plumbed
far more than it is in traditional theories. For the relativity of evil by
comparison with the good allows no harmonization and adjustment and
certainly no balancing of the one against the other. On the contrary, the
relativity of evil brings out the contradictory character of evil. Because of
this internal contradiction, evil is ultimately not nothing, but it is in itself
an emptiness. " For this reason, scripture tells us, the sinner has forfeited
his right to exist; he merits death. This amounts to saying that the real
problem is not the justification of God but the justification of the sinner.
The very fact that despite his sin the sinner continues to live shows that sin
is always encompassed by an ever greater love which, precisely by accepting
and justifying the sinner, exposes and overcomes the vanity of evil. An
answer to the problem of evil and suffering becomes visible here in the
mode of hope; precisely because it takes both sinful man and suffering
man seriously, it redeems sin and suffering by an ever greater love. The
hope is hope in the coming of absolute love that identifies itself with
suffering and with the sufferer in the world. For sufferers the quest for God
is a quest for a divine com-passion (in the proper sense df this word), an
identification of God with the suffering and death of human beings.
The coherence of the question of God, the question of salvation, and the
question of Christ has now become clear. The very nature of things makes
it clear that for the Christian faith Jesus Christ or, more accurately, the
cross of Christ is the place where the real decision is made on the question
of God. The question of God, when given concrete form in the presence of
evil and suffering, can therefore be answered only christologically and
staurologically in the form of a the%gia ,,"cis (theology of the cross).
 jesus Christ, Son of God 163
When Christian faith undertakes such an answer, it is not answering the
question of the meaning of suffering by an appeal to an abstract cosmic
order. The good to which God orders everything has, according to the
Bible, a concrete name: Jesus Christ, for whom everything was created
and in whom all things hold together (Col. 1. 16f.). He is the concrete
predestination of all reality (Eph. 1.4); God intends to unite all things in
him at the end (Eph. 1.10) and so be 'all in all' (I Cor. 15.28).

2. The salvi tic proclamation of Jesus the Christ

(a) The messialtic promise of salvation in the Old Testament

The Acts of the Apostles proclaims that Jesus is the Messiah or, as the
Greeks would say, that he is the Christ (Acts 17.3; 18.5 etc.). It thus
proclaims that Jesus of Nazareth is the fulfillment of the messianic
expectation of the Old Testament and the eschatological bringer of
salvation. This messianic consciousness impressed itself so deeply on
Christanity that the original confession 'Jesus is the Christ' could later on
turn into the proper name 'Jesus Christ'. Accordingly, the followers of
Jesus of Nazareth were quite soon called 'Christians' (Acts 11.26), that is,
Messiah-people. Because of this conviction regarding the messiahship of
Jesus the christological interpretation of the Old Testament became
fundamental for the New Testament and for the interpretation of scripture
in the early and medieval church.

The opposition which Judaism raised against this christological use of the Old
Testament has been taken up in :1 new way in modern biblical criticism. The
majority of critics are of the opinion that the messianic hope plays only a
secondary role and represents only a secondary current of thought in the Old
Testament, and is by no means to be regarded as thecenter of the Old Testament
or the key to its understanding. What is central to the Old Testament is rather
the promise that God himself will be the salvation of his people; the focus of
interest is in the coming of God and his kingdom and not in the coming of the
Messiah. By and large, modern biblical criticism has also adopted a second
presupposition, namely, that while Jesus understood himself wholly against
the background of the Old Testament, he did not think of himself as the
Messiah and did not proclaim himself to be the Messiah." If these two
principles of biblical criticism are valid, then the question becomes unavoidable
of (he continuiry between the Old Tesramcm and the New, and even between
Jt."Sus and Christi.miry, as the latter is already attested in the New Testament.
Does Jesus even still belong to Judaism, as M. Buber and R. Bultmann both
claim, though on the basis of very differenr presuppositions?!."' Moreover, what
164 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
legitimacy has Christianity, if it cannot appeal either to the Old Testament or
to Jesus himself?

This much is now clear: the messianic claim of Christianity obviously

compels the question of the relation between the coming of Jesus and the
coming of God. The messianic question can be answered if we raise the
question of the relation between Jesus and God, and thus the God-question
itself.
The messianic question cannot be answered if we take as our basis only
isolated passages of the Old Testament. The reason is that certainly
messianic prophecies are not very numerous. The situation changes when
with H. Gese we take as our point of departure the entire combined witness
of the Old and New Testaments." The basic structure of biblical revelations
assigns a fundamental importance to a mediator of revelation. For the
personal encounter of God with human beings is part of biblical revelation,
and in this encounter human beings are represented by individuals from
among them, in accordance with the law of representation.
The history of revelation, which has the idea of representation as a
distinguishing mark, entered a new phase with the institution of the Davidic
monarchy. The early Israelite tradition had begun with the experience of
the exodus, that is, with the liberation from slavery under the Egyptian
monarchy; as a result, that tradition had been inherently anti-monarchical
(d. Judg. 9.8-12; I Sam. 8.1-22). Now, however, the Davidic monarchy
had brought peace at home and abroad. As a result, the office of king could
be thought of as an institution through which Yahweh acted to save, and
even as 'an institutional guarantee of that history of his people's liberation
which Yahweh himself had inaugurated'." In the prophecies of Balaam
(Num. 24) and Nathan (II Sam. 7), but especially in the royal psalms (Ps.
2; 45; 72; 89; 110), the monarchy was given theological legitimacy. This
development took place as a result of contact with, or at least by analogy
with, the ideology of kingship in the ancient Ncar East: the king was given
the title of Son of God and enthroned, he was promised the whole ea rth as
his realm, and finally he was assured of victory over all enemies. Such
influences from the outside world around Israel were possible only if
analogous approaches to problems had already taken shape in Israel's own
tradition; these made such a takeover possible and then could, with the
help of the outside influences, be further interpreted and formulated. In
other words, there must have been an internal preparation for the external
influence. H. Gese finds this point of contact in the Zion tradition. When
the ark of God is transferred to Zion, God takes possession of a piece of
ground; he enters into the space of the present world. God becomes earthly;
 Jesus Christ, Son of God 165
he condescends to dwell here. For this reason, the son of David who is
enthroned on Zion is at the same time a Son of God. The Bible, of course,
understands this divine sonship not in physic.1 terms, as the surrounding
world did, but in the context of the historical f.ith in election, .nd therefore
in • demythologized sense, which we can best describe as adoptionist."
At his enthronement and .doption as son of God each son of David was,
of course, given a cloak to wear that was too big for him. Existing power
relationships were in flagrant contrast with the elevated cI.ims made for
him. Every enthronement therefore r.ised the question: are you he th.t is
to come, or must we wait for .nother? As a result, the Davidic monarchy
pointed beyond itself; it w.s • promise of • future fulfillment and almost
necessarily gave rise to messianic expectations. It could not bur awaken
hopes of a new son of David who would truly be God's Son and the
definitive bringer of universal pe.ce .nd s.lv.tion."
Messianic hopes in the narrow and proper sense of the term came into
existence only after the C3t3strophe of the destruction of Jerusalem .nd
.fter the collapse of the historic.1 mon.rchy due to the afflictions of the
exilic period. Th.t period brought a sweepingeschatologiz.tion of all ide.s
of s.lv.tion. The gre.t saving .cts of the past - the exodus, the coven.nt
at SiMi, .nd the establishment of the D.vidic mon.rchy - were projected
into the future in .n even more ex.lted form." The situation in which the
messi.nic ide. originated shows that it is not a legitim.tion of existing
power relationships, but rather. critic.l .nd utopion reverse im.ge of the
experiences Isr.eI h.d of its historic. I kings .nd now of the political
institutions of the v.rious occupying powers.'·

Individual messianic expectations took varying forms. The most importane of

these expectations is to be seen in the Emmanuel prophecy of Isaiah. The
promise to King Ahaz that a virgin would conceive a child and bear a son (Isa.
7.14) was origin.lly a promise that judgment would fall on the unbelieving
House of David; later on it turned into a promise of salvation in the form of a
new messianic king. 'For to us a child is born, to us a son is given; and the
government will be upon his shoulder, and his name will be called "Wonderful
Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace". Of the increase
of his government and of peace there will be no end, upon the throne of David,
and over his kingdom, to establish it, and to uphold it with justice and with
righteousness from this time forth and for evermore' (Isa. 9.5ff.). Isa. 11.2
adds the promise of the Spirit; to a vision of peace among the nalions is added
one of universal cosmic peace (Isa. 11.6-9). The prophet Zechariah makes his
own this hope of a iust and non-violent, humble and poor pdnce of peace:
'Rejoice greatly, 0 daughter of Zion! Shout aloud, 0 daughter of Jerusalem!
Lo, your king comes to you; triumphant and vicroriou5 is he, humble and
166 The Message abotlt the God of Jestls Christ
riding on an ass, on a colt the foal of an ass .... He shall command peace to
the nations; his dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the River to the
ends of the earth' (Zech. 9.9f.; d. Jer. 23.5; Micah S.H.). This spiritualizing
tendency led to a twofold messianic expectation: alongside the Davidic
anointed appeared a high-priestly Messiah (Zech. 4.1-4), hope of whom lived
on subsequently at Qumran. In Ezekiel, the promise that Yahweh himself will
be the eschatological shepherd of his people is connected with a promise to
appoint a single shepherd, a servant David (34.23). Only in the Maccabean
period, a time of persecution, does the messianic hope gradually take the form
of an individual, personal figure. The Messiah is now seen as a warrior and
even as a martyr (Zech. 13.7). There is also the Pharisaic Messiah, who is an
observer of the Law,J\ Finally, in the apocalyptic literature, beginning in Daniel
7, the figure of the Messiah is fused with the figure of the apocalyptic Son of
Man. He brings not only a new period but a new aeon, that is, a radically and
qualitatively new beginning after the complete collapse of the old aeon, a new
beginning that is nO[ only national bur universal and cosmic. According to (he
metaphorical discourses of the Book of Enoch, this son of man figure is
endowed with the spirit of wisdom" (d. already Sir. 24.1Off.).

Thus all the major lines of Old Testament tradition converge in the
expectation of a Messiah: Davidism, prophetism, sapiential theology and
apocalyptic. All these movements find their fulfillment in Jesus the Christ,
the poor, non-violent, humble and suffering Messiah, the coming Son of
Man, who as the Logos is Wisdom itself. In him God has definitively
brought to fulfillment the promise regarding Zion; in him God has
definitively entered into history in order to establish his rule as a kingdom
of freedom in love. Jesus Christ sums up and at the same time goes beyond
the Old Testament hope." What, then, is new and specifically Christian in
the New Testament?

(bi Ministry and preaching ofJestls of Nazareth

There is today a broad consensus among exegetes that New Testament
christology 34 has its starting point and original basis in the disciples' faith
that Jesus, who had been crucified, was raised from the dead. According
to this view, there was no explicit christological profession of faith
before Easter. All the biblical titles indicating Christ's high estate: Christ
(Messiah), redeemer, servant of God, Son of God, and so on, are post-
Easter confessional testimonies which Jesus did not expressly claim for
himself. The one exception is the idea of 'Son of Man' which in the Gospels
occurs, with one exception, only on the lips of Jesus, but which did not
form part of a later confession of faith.
 JeslIs Christ, SOil of God 167
At the center of the preaching and ministry of Jesus is not the person of
Jesus himself but the coming reign of God. Mark 1.15 given a valid
summation of this central and all-inclusive content of the ministry and
preaching of Jesus: 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at
hand; repent, and believe in the gospel.' Attempts have often been made
to remove the message of the kingdom of God from its central place in the
preaching of Jesus. According to A. von Harnack Jesus' real concern is
with the fatherhood of God and the infinite value of the human souL"
According to H. Conzelmann the preaching of Jesus, the doctrine of God,
eschatology and ethics are juxtaposed in a relatively unconnected way."
But it can be shown that all these themes have an intrinsic connection with
Jesus' message about the kingdom of God and that the latter is the center,
and provides the framework, of his entire preaching."

In the Old Testament 'kingdom of God' is a relatively late abstraction based

on the statement: 'Yahweh is (has become) king' (d. Ps. 93.1; 96.10; 97.1;
99.1)." It follows from this that in the reign of God the Old Testament is
asserting not primarily a kingdom in the sense of a space ruled by God, but
rather Godts exercise of lordship here and now in history, or the revelation of
the Godness of God. In the Old Testament this exercise of lordship is already
connected with the reign of justice, peace and life. The concept of the reign or
kingdom of God therefore sums up the entire Old Testament history of promise
and hope. Jesus deliberately makes all this his own: 'The blind receive their
sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear. and the dead
are raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them' (Matt. 11.5).
But Jesus also connects his message about the kingdom of God with the
apocalyptic idea of a new aeon. The linking of the two ideas is made clear by
the fact that Jesus also describes the kingdom of God as a rcalm of salvation
which human beings can inherit (Matt. 25.34) and enter (Mark. 9.46). The
incorporation of this apocalyptic idea has two results. On the one hand, it
becomes clear that the reign of God is entirely God's very own doing, which
we can neither plan for nor bring to pass; it is not a better world but 3 new
world. It is therefore also not a supreme good, not the kingdom of the spirit
and of freedom, as liberal theology maintained, and not a social and political
utopia, as political theology, old and new, often would like it to be. On the
other hand, the message of the reign of God, precisely when understood in the
apocalyptic framework, subsumes not only the quest and hope of Israel but
also the human quest of peace, freedom justice, and life. It is the irreducible
new beginning which God alone can provide; but this new brings the old to a
superabundant fulfillment. The revelation that God is indeed God means at
the same time the realization of the humanity of human beings. the salvation
of the world. Therefore, in the context of his preaching of God's kingdom, and
especially in his parables, Jesus is able to rediscover the world 35 God's creation
168 The Message abol/t the God of Jesl/s Christ
and prodaim God as lord of all reality. The mirades of Jesus, the historical
nucleus of which is indisputable, are signs and anticipations of this new and
r<conciled world that has been made whole.
The fact that God's reign comes wholly from God and thus brings the world
to its salvadon does not mean that God's action eliminates human action;
rather, the coming of God's reign categorical1y demands human action, while
also making this action possible and setting It free. This is not [Q S3Y that we
can plan, effect and build the reign of God. No, that reign is God's doing. But
as God's saving act for the sake of human beings it does not ignore the latter.
The concrete coming of the rcign of God is therefore bound up with conversion
and faith. The response of man is a consriturivc clement in the coming of God's
reign. This reign would nO[ make its way into our history if it did not make its
way into hearts and therefore into the freedom of faith. God's reign is therefore
entirely God's doing and entirely man's doing. But it is not an act of violence;
it comes by man allowing it to be bestowed on him and by his giving it in turn
to others. The reign of God consists in the coming of God's non-violent Jove
into the world.
Here we have reached the new element in Jesus' preaching of the kingdom
of God. Jesus prodaims the r<ign of God not under the sign of judgment, as
John the Baptist still does, but under the sign of grace, forgiveness, mercy and
love. He proclaims God as a Father who loves human beings, forgives sin, and
makes sinners his children once more (Luke 15 ). This merciful and forgiving
love of God is unconditional. Jesus does in fact think of himself as sent only
to Israel; but the unconditionality of the salvation he proclaims is the material
basis and point of departure which could lead after Easter to the missionary
proclamation that disassociated salvation from membership in Israel and thus
from the Jewish Law. Consequently, even though Paul did not know Jesus
personally, he underslOod him best when he transposed Jesus' message of the
basi/eia into a prodamation of justice from God through faith alone. John also
understood correctly, though differently, the meaning of Jesus' preaching when
he summed everything up in the statement: 'God is love' (I John 4.8, (6).

What is new about the message of Jesus is not only its content but also the
fact that he linked his 'cause', namely, the kingdom of God, indissolubly
with his own person. We hear over and over of 'now', 'today' (d. Luke
4 .21; 1O.23f.; Matt. 11.5). The connection between the decision one makes
regarding his person and message and the eschatological decision of the
Son of Man when he comes for judgment is dearest in Mark 8.38: 'For
whoever is ashamed of me and my words in this adulterous and sinful
generation, of him will the Son of man be ashamed, when he comes in the
glory of his Father with the holy angels. ' In the decision of faith or unbelief
the eschatological judgment is already being made. In the ministry,
preaching and whole person of Jesus God's 'cause' is already present and
 Jestls Christ, SOli of God 169
at work; in Jesus the condescending movement of God, which can already
be seen in the entire Old Testament, reaches its climax. In Jesus, God has
definitively entered the time and space of this world. For this reason
the Davidic expectations of an eschatological kingship as well as the
expectations of the prophets, have been fulfilled in Jesus.
Even though Jesus does not explicitly claim christological titles, and
even though in particular he does not speak of himself as the Son of God,
the claim does find indirect and implicit expression of a very emphatic
kind. This indirect christology of Jesus himself can be shown in various
ways.
A first way starts from the preaching oEjesus. At first glance Jesus comes
on the scene like a rabbi, a prophet or teacher of wisdom. But closer
examination discovers some characteristic differences between him and
the three groups named. The contemporaries ofJesus were obviously aware
of the difference, for they asked one another in astonishment: 'What is
this? A new teaching! With authority ... ' (Mark 1.22,27; etc.). When
Jesus contrasts the words of the Old Testament with his own 'But I say to
you ... '(Matt. 5.22,28; etc.), he is not only givinga binding interpretation
of the Old Testament Law but at the same time going beyond it. His
formula 'But I say to you ... ' sets his words alongside and even above
what 'was said to the men of old', that is, what God himself had said under
the former covenant. In his 'But I say to you ... ' Jesus is thus claiming to
speak the definitive word of God. And in uttering this definitive words he
speaks differently from the prophets. He never says, like the prophets;
'Thus says the Lord', 'Oracle of Yahweh'. Unlike the prophets, Jesus does
not distinguish his own words from the word of God_ He says simply:
'Amen, amen, I say to you.' He evidently understands himself to be the
mouth of God, the voice of God. This is a claim without parallel in Judaism.
A second way of bringing out the implicit christology of Jesus himself
takes for its starting point the ministry and conduct of Jesus. One of the
best attested traits of Jesus' ministry is that he used to eat at table with
sinners and tax collectors; in other words, that he associated with those
who at that times were labeled as godless. He was therefore abused as the
companion of sinners and tax collectors (Matt. 11.19). This conduct on
the part of Jesus had only an indirect connection with his criticism of
society or with social changes. In the East a sharing of the table meant a
sharing of life; in Judaism, it meant in particular a communion in the sight
of God. Every meal was ultimately a prefiguration of the eschatological
meal and of eschatological communion with God. The meals Jesus takes
with sinners and tax collectors are therefore eschatological meals, anticipa-
tory celebrations olthe banquet of salvation in the final age. When therefore
170 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
Jesus accepts sinners to share his table with him, he is indirectly accepting
them into communion with God. Once again, then, this behavior of Jesus
toward sinners implies an unparalleled christological claim. Jesus himself
voices it indirectly: when he is attacked for his behavior toward sinners
(Luke 15.2), he narrates the parable of the lost son, which is really a parable
of the Father's forgiving love (Luke 15.11-32). Jesus thus identifies his
own activiry with the action of God toward sinners. Jesus acts as one who
stands in God's place. In him and through him God's love and mercy
become real here and now. It is not a long step from this to what Jesus says
in John: 'He who has seen me has seen the Father' Uohn 14.9).
There is still a third way of bringing out the implicit christology of the
earthly Jesus. It can hardly be denied that as a historical fact Jesus gathered
a band of disciples and, in particular, that the choice of the Twelve goes
back to him. At first glance, Jesus is here acting simply like a Jewish rabbi
who gathers a group of disciples. But there are significant differences
between discipleship under the rabbis and discipleship under Jesus. The
difference is already clear from the fact that one could not ask Jesus to be
accepted as a disciple; Jesus chose with sovereign freedom 'those whom he
desired' (Mark 3.13). Furthermore, there is no question, as there was with
the rabbis, of a temporary master·disciple relationship that would last until
the one-time disciple became a teacher in his turn. There is but one teacher
(Matt. 10.24f.; 23.8). Therefore the ties binding the disciples of Jesus to
their master are more extensive than with 'the rabbis: they share his
journeying, his homelessness, and his dangerous destiny. There is an
in divided community of life, a sharing of destiny for better or for worse.
The decision to follow Jesus means a breaking of all other ties; it means
'leaving everything' (Mark 10.28); ultimately one risks one's life and even
the gallows (Mark 8.34). Such a radical and wholehearted following
amounts to a confession of Jesus and thus implies a christology. The
christology implied in following also shows that not only is there a material
continuity of confession in the pre-Easter and post-Easter periods but also
that there is a sociological continuity between the pre-Easter and post-
Easter groups of disciples.
Finally, there is a fourth way. The most important pointer tp an indirect
christology in Jesus himself is the way he addresses God. It can hardly be
denied that Jesus called God Abba and that the manner in which he did so
was characteristic of him. Also significant is the fact that he always
distinguishes between 'my Father' (Mark 14.36 par.; Matt. 11.25 par.)
and 'your Father' (Luke 6.36; 12.30,32) or 'your heavenly Father' (Mark
11.25 par.; Matt. 23.9). He never includes himself with his disciples by
saying 'our Father'. The Lord's Prayer IS not evidence to the contrary,
 Jesus Christ, Son of God 171
because he begins it by saying: 'When you pray, say ... '(Luke 11.2; Matt.
6.9). This differentiated usage is maintained throughout all the strata of
the New Testament down to the classical formulation in the gospel of
John: 'My Father and your Father' Uohn 20.17). There are good reasons
for asserting that the substance of this differentiation goes back to Jesus
himself. This exclusive 'my Father' points to an incommunicable and
unique relationship between Jesus and God. The linguistic usage renders
perceptible his special consciousness of being Son. Whether or not he
explicitly claimed the title 'Son' for himself, the way in which he speaks
implicitly says that although all are the children of God (Matt. 5.9, 45), he
is God's Son in a special and unique way. He is the Son, who alone makes
of us the sons and daughters of God.
This indirect approach to the 50n-christology is not simply a new
argument and justification for the traditional dogmatic christology, which
is also the christology contained in the post-Easter testimony of the New
Testament. Rather we have here, even materially, a new christological
starting point. This is so in two respects. First, we no longer start, like the
two-nature christology of Chalcedon, with the question of the relation
between the human and divine natures in Jesus Christ; rather, we see the
two-nature doctrine as indirectly and in its substance grounded in the
relationship of Jesus to his Father." In his being as Son Jesus has his radical
origin in God and radically belongs to God. The turning of Jesus to the
Father implies the prior turning of the Father to Jesus. The relation ofJesus
to the Father implies the prior relation of the Father to him, the self-
communication of God to him. The subsequent 50n-christology is therefore
simply the interpretation and translation of what is secretly present in
Jesus' obedience as Son and his self-surrender as Son. What Jesus lived out
ontically before Easter is interpreted ontologically after Easter. But there
is more. The new approach provided by an indirect christology makes it
possible, secondly, to link christology and soteriology right from the start.
Jesus is the mode in which the self-communicating, self-outpouring love
of God exists on the human scene; he is this for us. The being of Jesus is
thus inseparable from his mission and his service; conversely, his service
presupposes his being. Being and mission, ontological christology and
functional christology cannot be played off against each other; they cannot
even be separated from each other, for they condition each other. The
function of Jesus, his being-there (Dasein) for God and for others, is at the
same time his very being.
The indirect christology ofthe earthly Jesus is thus a personal summation
of his message about the coming reign of God as the reign of love. He is
this reign of God in his very person. Henceforth there can be no more talk
172 The Message abollt the God of Jeslls Christ
of God that ignores Jesus; in Jesus God defines himself in an eschatological
and definitive way as the Father of Jesus Christ; Jesus therefore belongs to
the eternal being of God. In his person he is the definitive interpretation of
the will and being of God. In him God has entered history once and for all.
Finally, I must mention a third and perhaps decisive novelty about the
ministry and preaching of Jesus. The revolutionary novelty and even
scandal of the cross for Jews and Gentiles alike (I Cor. 1.23) becomes clear
to us if we consider the popular Jewish messianic expectation and the
abhorrence felt by Romans at execution by crucifixion.'· Many exegetes
today are admittedly of the opinion that Jesus himself did not understand
his death as a saving event." On the other hand, we may point to the fact
that his violent death was a consequence of his ministry and preaching.
Jesus probably glimpsed the possibility of a violent end, for the hostility of
his adversaries and their intention to trap him were only too clear. He had
before his eyes the fate of the prophets and especially the fate of the Baptist.
He knew the Old Testament songs about the Servant of God in Second
Isaiah and the late Jewish ideas about the death of the just man. (Wisdom
2.20) and the expiatory significance attached to it (II Macc. 7.18, 37f.; II
Macc. 6.28f.; 17.22). Since he understood his entire existence as one of
obedience to the Father and service to human beings, it is certainly natural
to think that he made use of these pregiven ways of interpreting his own
destiny. How else are we to explain that the primitive community at a very
early stage preached the cross as an act of redemption? This was done
especially in the tradition about the Last Supper (Mark 10.22-25 par.; t
Cor. 11.23-25) and in the saying about ransom in Mark 10.45. In their
basic content these pericopes most likely go back to Jesus himself.42
The basileia message of Jesus and a soteriological understanding of his
death are in no way exclusive of one another. On the contrary, the violent
death of Jesus is as it were the concrete form taken by the breakdown of
the old aeon. Here God's omnipotence is completely absorbed into outward
weakness; here God takes the human condition, the human destiny, upon
himself, with all its consequences. He enters into abandonment by God.
There is no longer any human situation that is in principle cut off from
God and salvation. To that extent the death of Jesus on the cross is
not only the extreme consequence of his courageous ministry but a
recapitulation and summary of his message. The death of Jesus on the cross
is the final elucidation of what had been his sole concern: the coming of
the eschatological reign of God. This death is the form in which the reign
of God becomes a reality under the conditions of the present aeon; it is the
form in which the reign of God comes to pass in human weakness, riches
in poverty, love in abandonment, fullness in emptiness, life in death.
 Jesus Christ, SOli of God 173
(c) The Son-ehristology of the New Testament
Soon after the death of jesus the New Testament was proclaiming that
after his ignominious death on the cross jesus was established as Son of
God through his resurrection and exaltation (Rom. 1.3f.) and that he who
is in the form of God (Phil. 2.6) is the Son whom God had sent into the
world (Gal. 4.4; Rom. 8.3). For Paul the message about the Son of God is
the central content of his gospel; he describes the latter simply as 'the
gospel concerning his [i.e., God's JSon' (Rom. 1.3 ). Finally, in the Prologue
of his Gospel john sums up the New Testament profession of faith by
proclaiming jesus Christ as the Word of God that in the very beginning is
with God and in fact is God Uohn 1.1) and that in the fullness of time
became flesh (1.14). At the end 01 his Gospel there is this comprehensive
confession: 'My Lord and my God' Uohn 20.28).

The question at this point is: 'how could such a development take place?
Liberal theology, represented by, for example, A. von Harnack, saw the
development as a suppression of the historical Christ by the pre-existent Christ
of speculative and dogmatic theology. 'The living Christ seems to have
been transformed into a confession of faith, and devotion to Christ into
Christology.''' Harnack therefore called for a return to the simple gospel of
jesus. According to the history of religion school, whose theses R. Bultmann
recapitulated in an impressive way;~01 the adoption of motifs from Hellenistic
piety and philosophy brought about a Hellenization of the gospel, a process
that has begun even in the New Testament itself.·' Scholars pointed variously
to parallels from Greek mythology orphilosophy or from the mystery religions,
to ideas of 'divine men' (theio; a"dres), or, above all, to the gnostic myth of
redemption. All these theses have since proved to be pseudo-scientific myths
inspired by fantasy. Our sources for the mystery religions and gnosticism come
only from the second and third centuries AD; there is no justification for
projecting these witnesses back into the first century and postulating an
influence on early Christianity; there is better reason to ask whether on the
contrary the sources in question were not influenced by Christianity.
The situation is different with regard to influences from the world of the
Old Testament and judaism. The title 'Son of God' has a firm basis in the royal
messianism of the Old Testament.oIf> For this reason it is not an accident that
the two royal psalms, Ps. 2 and 110, could become the most important supports
for the early church's christological proof from scripture. Ps. 2.7 says: 'You
are my son. Today have I begotten you' (d. Ps. 110.3). In the New Testament,
too, the Davidic sonship of the Messiah and the divine sonship of jesus are
seen as closely connected (Rom. 1.3f.; Luke 1.32-35). jesus' characterization
of himself as Son of Man inevitably called attention as well to the statements
in the apocalyptic literature about exaltation and pre·existence, as these are
to be found in the metaphorical discourses of the Book of Enoch and IV
174 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
Esdras. 47 Most important, of course, is the idea of wisdom as a preacxisrenr
hypostasis that is already present at the creation (Prov. 8.22ff.) and that looks
everywhere for a place to dwell but finds it only in Israel on Zion (Sir. 24.8-12).
The parallels to the idea of the Logos in the Prologue of John's Gospel
are obvious." The writings of the Jewish religious philosopher, Philo of
Alexandria, show how easy it was to connect these Jewish specu13tions on
wisdom with Greek philosophical ideas. As a result all the essential components
of New Testament christology were prepared in the Judaism of the inter-
testamental period.

But the New Testament christology is not simply reducible to such Jewish
ideas. It is completely original and represents an unparalleled innovation."
The message of the exaltation and pre-existence of the crucified Jesus was
an intolerable scandal to both Jews and Greeks. The material basis of New
Testament christology can therefore be looked for only in the preaching
and ministry of the e3rthly Jesus himself as well as in the experience of
Easter that overcomes the scandal of the cross and in the message thereof.
According to the conviction of almost all exegetes the message of the
resurrection and exaltation of the crucified Jesus must be considered
the point of departure for the development of christology in the New
Testament.
Given this point of departure the Son-christology of the New Testament
was inevitable. The categories supplied by the history of religions served a
secondary purpose: to help give expression to an originally Christian
matter. The idea of pre-existence, in particular, proved to be not only
helpful but even necessary in the effort to hold fast to the unique filial
relationship of Jesus to God as expressed in his use of 'Abba' in addressing
God. Only the idea of pre-existence could guarantee that in the earthly life
and in the cross and resurrection of Jesus God himself was involved
and that in Jesus Christ God was revealing himself definitively and
eschatologically. The eschatological character of the person and work of
Jesus made it necessary, in the very narure of things, to say that Jesus
belongs to the eternal being of God. Otherwise Jesus could not have
'defined' God in an eschatological and definitive way. Furthermore, only
thus could the universal significance of Jesus Christ as the fulfillment not
only of the Old Testament but of all reality have been adequately expressed.
This makes it clear that in the Son of God statements of the New
Testament we are dealing not with speculations inspired by theory but with
soteriologically motivated assertions in which the issue is the definitiveness
and unsurpassableness as well as the universaliry of salvation. It must be
maintained that Jesus Christ is the only Son of God, who makes us in turn
 jesus Christ, 5011 of God 175
the children of God (Rom. 8.14-17; Gal. 3.26; 4.5); in him God has
predestined us '10 share in the being and image of his Son' (Rom. 8.29).
These theses can easily be substantiated with the help of the most
important passages embodying the Son-chrislOlogy of the New Testament.
At the same time and by the same means it can be shown that this Son-
christology is not simply a late product of New Testament development
but is already present in the earliest, pre-Pauline strata of the New
Testament. According 10 the general judgment of exegetical scholarship
Rom. 1.3f. is such a pre-Pauline confession of faith: 'his Son, who was
descended from David according 10 the Aesh and designated or: constituted
Son of God in power according 10 the Spirit of holiness by his resurrection
from the dead'.'°This ancient 'two-stage chrislOlogy' contrasts, on the one
hand, the messianic dignityuf Jesus which has 10 do with the earthly hislOry
of salvation and is based on Davidic descent, and, on the other hand, his
divine glory and 10 that extent his divine sonship which are based on his
resurrection from the dead. Expressed here is the idea that because he is
Son of God Jesus fulfills the messianic hope of the Old Testament in a
qualitatively new way that is mediated by cross and resurrection. As the
Messiah on the cross he is also the Messiah in the Spirit. The striking thing
is that this ancient confession as yet says nothing explicitly about pre-
existence. Paul, who already presupposes the idea of pre-existence, inter-
prets the ancient confessional formula by using 'Son' as title of the subject
even of the first part of the confession. He is clearly saying that Jesus does
not first become Son by reason of the resurrection but is already the Son
even during his earthly life. But this assertion of pre-existence is not an
invention of Paul the Apostle; he has taken it from the tradition. This is
shown by the so·called mission formulas in Rom. 8.3 and Gal. 4.4 (d. also
John 3.17; (John 4.9f., 14). Talk olthe Son being sent by the Father clearly
presupposes the pre-existence of the Son.
The most important pre-Pauline testimony is the hymn 10 Christ in Phil.
2.6-11. 'Who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality
with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a
servant [or: slavel, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in
human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even
death on a cross.''' There can be no question here of my going into all the
complicated exegetical problems which this passage raises. There is a broad
consensus among exegetes that this hymn 10 Christ is pre-Pauline. Generally
speaking, the exegetes are also in agreement that the self-emptying is of
the pre-existent Christ and not of the earthly Jesus. The incarnation of the
pre-eXlSlent Christ thus begins a journey of self-emptying that reached
its completion on the cross; the incarnation is understood in the light of
176 The Message aboul the God of Jesus Christ
the cross and as directed to the cross. The decisive question, then, is what
is meant by the self-emptying (kenosis). In the literal sense the term
ekenolhelt means 'he made himself empty'; a person described in the New
Testament as keltos is one who is empty-handed because he has been
deprived of something he previously possessed. A person who makes
himself em pry gives up his wealth and becomes poor. The hymn co Christ
is therefore in agreement with II Cor. 8.9, where it is said of Jesus Christ
that 'though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so that by his
poverty you might become rich'. The riches of Jesus Christ are described
by the term morphe theO/t, and his poverry by morphii dolt/olt. The term
morphe may mean either the outward phenomenal form or visible figure,
or else the being itself. A third interpretation, often offered at the present
rime, which explains morphe as meaning status, position, attitude, and so
on, is inferred from biblical thought patterns, real or supposed, rather than
documented lexicographic.lIy. Since it is not possible to spe.k of God
h.ving .n outward form and since in the New Testament the verb
melamorphousthai always refers to a transformation in the orderof being,
it is hard to avoid concluding that the present p.ssage is speaking of
'essential form'.
This important text, then, is speaking of Jesus Christ who from eternity
existed in the essential form of God, but then emptied himself to the extent
of suffering death on the cross and was finally exalted co be Kyrios i.e.,
world-ruler possessed of divine rank. The christology of pre-existence .nd
the christology of cross or kenosis and exaltation are united in • v.st drama
that embraces heaven and earth. Chriscology here emerges within the
framework of soteriology. That is, because the pre-existent Christ, God's
equal, in ftee obedience takes upon himself the lot of a slave, anankii
(necessity) or inevitable domination by the cosmic powers is replaced by
freedom under the new Lord of the world. There is thus a change of reigns,
but a change accomplished not by violence but through the obedience and
weakness of the cross.
Pauline assertions about pre-existence are thus located within a firm
prior tradition. An important fact about these assertions is that Paul is not
interested in formal and abstract pre·existence as such. Rather he fills the
statements about pre-existence with a specific content; in every case the
statements are sotetiological statements. This is shown by the consecutive
clause that is at times added to the mission formula and clarifies the
soteriological significance of the statement about pre-existence; these
clauses assert liberation from the power of sin and the establishment of a
relation of filiation between human beings and God. The fact thaI the
mission is in the nesh and under the law shows that early chriscology was
 Jeslls Christ, SOli of God 177
not solely a christology of the incarnation but also and above all a
christology of the cross. The handing-over formulas, which are analogous
to the mission formulas, also make this point clear (Rom. 8.32; Gal. 2.20;
d. John 10.11; 15.13; IJohn 3.16).52 They show that the point to be made
when pre-existence is asserted is that in Jesus Christ God's eternal self-
giving love has entered once and for all into history in order that this self-
disclosure of God's freedom in love may ground the freedom of the children
of God. In the incarnation of the Son of God an exchange therefore took
place: 'He was rich, yet for your sake he became poor, so that by his
poverty you might become rich' (II Cor. 8.9; d. Gal. 4.5; 2.19; 3.13; II
Cor. 5.21; Rom. 7.4; 8.3f.). The soteriological and universal cosmic
significance of the assertion of Jesus as Son of God is again taken up and
developed in the hymn to Christ in Col. 1.15-17. Jesus Christ is here said
to be 'the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation'; 'All
things were created through him and for him. He is before all things, and
in him all things hold together.''' Behind this statement about Christ as
mediator of creation there is once again a soteriological concern; the .:lim
is to prove the universality of the salvation given through Christ and at the
same time to assert that all other 'principalities and powers' have been
deposed and that we are bound to no other Lord save Jesus Christ and are
to live in the world with a Christian freedom.
The most important statements of a Son-christology and the ones most
momentous for subsequent development are in the writings of John. The
Prologue" of the Fourth Gospel already makes three basic assertions:
Verse la begins: 'In the beginning was the Word.' Here it is said that the
Word which became flesh in Jesus Christ (1.14) already was in the
beginning, that is, that it exists in an absolutely timeless and eternal way.
This is why Jesus Christ can say of himself in the Fourth Gospel: 'Before
Abraham was, I am' Uohn 8.58). Verse Ib continues in greater detail:' And
the Word was with God.' This being with God is described in 1.18 as a
personal communion, a communion in glory (17.5), love (17.24) and life
(5.26), so that in the Fourth Gospel Jesus can say of himself: 'I and the
Father are one' (10.30). A climax is reached in verse Ie: 'And the Word
was God.' 'God' without an article is a predicate here and not the subject;
it is therefore not identical with ho theos, of which we spoke earlier. What
is being said is that the Word is divine in nature. Despite all the distinction
between God and Word and tWO are united by the one divine nature. But
this statement about essence is ordered to a soteriological statement. For,
as the eternal divine Word, Christ is truly light and life (1.4). In him is
revealed therefore the origin and goal of all reality.
What the Prologue presents in a kind of programmatic fashion is often
178 The Message abollt the God of Jeslls Christ
the subject of discourse in the gospel that follows. At the climax of the
dispute berween Jesus Christ and the 'Jews' the statement is made that 'I
and the Father are one' (10.30). And at the end everything is once again
summed up in Thomas' profession of faith: 'My Lord and my God' (20.28).
finally, in 20.31 we are told that the purpose of the entire Gospel is 'that
you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing
you may have life in his name'. In like manner the First Letter of John ends
with the statement: This is the true God and eternal life' (5.20).
It is neither possible nor necessary to present in detail all the New
Testament statements having to do with a Son-christology: that Jesus
Christ is the image of God (Rom. 8.29; II Cor. 4.4; Col. 1.15), the radiant
light of God's glory and the perfect copy of his nature (Heb. 1.3), the
epiphany of God (I Tim. 3.16; II Tim. 1.9f.; Titus 3.4). There is one and
the same theme in all these statements: Jesus Christ is the word and image
of the Father, and in him the hidden God is revealed to us. But the revelation
is a revelation on the cross, a revelation in hiddenness; God reveals his
power in weakness, his omnipotence is at the same time an omnipatience
or omni-suffering; his eternity is not a rigid immutabiliry but movement,
life and love that communicates itself to that which is distinct from it. The
Son-christology thus implies both a new interpretation of God and a
change in our reality. The revelation, krisis and even revolution in the
picture of God leads to the krisis, transformation and redemption of the
world. It is only tOO easy to understand that this new picture of God, as
it has emerged in Jesus Christ, could not but lead to violent opposition
and that its implications could be brought to light only through lengthy
debate_

(d) The expla1lation of the divine sonship ofJeslls Christ in the history of
dogma and theology
It is not possible to provide here a complete picture of the development of
christological teaching in the early church. I must be satisfied with
highlighting a few decisive phases and a few Leitmotifs of this develop-
ment." In the earliest phase the development of christology was naturally
shaped by rwo rypes of discussion: the discussion with Judaism and the
discussion with Hellenism.

The encounter with judaism and its suict monotheism led [Q the danger of
diminishing the true divinity of Jesus Christ. The Jewish Christian group that
sought to rank Christ with the prophets, the specially graced and chosen ones
of God, or the angels, have come to be known as the Ebionites. We find the
 JeslIs Christ, Son of God 179
same approach being taken again in the adoptionist christology of Theodorus
the Tanner and his disciple Theodotus the Money-Changer. This christology
is fully developed in Paul of Samosata, who presents the man Jesus Christ as
endowed with an impersonally conceived power (dynamis).
The other extreme is found in Hellenistic circles, where there is a diminish-
ment of the true humanity of Jesus Christ. The Docetists, as they are called,
sought to resolve the difficulty created by the incarnation, which was unworthy
of a God, and by the scandalous suffering of the Son of God. They did so by
adopting a dualistic and spiritualistic approach, and ascribing to Christ only
the semblance of a body or at least only the semblance of suffering. The later
New Testament writings, in particular the First and Second Letters of John
and probably the Letter to the Colossians and the Pastoral Letters, had already
had to resist preliminary forms of this docetist error. The confession of Jesus
Christ as having truly come in the flesh is regarded in these writings as the line
of demarcation between Christianity and non·Chrisrianity or even ~tnti·
Christianity (I John 4.2f.; d. 4.15; 5.5f.; II John 7). Ignatius of Antioch then
launches himself unreservedly into the battle. His line of argument is wholly
soteriological: every denial of the reality of the humanity of Jesus means a
denial of the reality of our redemption, for if Jesus only seemed to have a body,
then he only seemed to redeem us (Smym. 2); then the eucharist too is only an
illusion (Smryn. 7); then, finally, it is senseless for us to suffer in body for Jesus
and to endure persecution for him (Smym. 4.1). The whole of Christianity
then evaporates into a mere semblance of reality. Thus Ignatius already
achieves a christological vision in which the unity of Christ's twO modes of
being (flesh - spirit; having become - not having become; from Mary - from
God; etc.) is explicitly highlighted (Eph. 7.2).
The great divergence of views regarding the proper understanding of Jesus
Christ came in the second and third centuries in the struggle with gnosticism. 56
In this struggle Christianity was compelled for the first time to set forth its
teaching on God, redemption, man and the world in a systematic way; only
now did this teaching take a firm didactic and institutional form. There is, of
course, a good deal of disagreement among scholars on the origin and nature
of gnosticism. We know today that gnosticism already existed in pre-Christian
times as a syncretistic religious movement and that, as the Qumran texts show,
it had gained entrance into Judaism. The widespread and speedy success of the
gnostic current of thought was based on a new experience of God, world and
man that had no previous parallel in antiquity. The human being of late
antiquity no longer felt at home in the universe; he experienced the world
rather as alien and impenetrable, as a prison and a rigid system from which he
sought liberation. At the center of the extreme dualism that characterized
gnostic thinking stood the enigmatic figure of the god 'Man' who had fanen
into the sphere of matter and who liberates his self, which has been thrown
into the world and almost buried there, through knowledge (gnosis) of the
right path. In this context, therefore, redemption is conceived in physical terms
180 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
as redemption from matter and the body, and not, as in Christianity, in spiritual
terms as redemption from sin that is conceived as disobedience to God. Over
against Christian dualism which is historical and based on freedom, gnosticism
set a metaphysical dualism in which God is the totally other, alien and new,
unknown and unworldly God, while redemption consists in an emancipation
from the pre-given order of things. Irenaeus of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria,
Tertullian and Hippolytus rook up the cudgels against this teaching which
threatened the very foundations of Christianity. They were obliged to defend
the reality of creation, no less than the reality of God and redemption, against
the calumnies leveled against them.
Once the church's theologians had defended the reality of the God of history
who speaks, acts and is present corporeally in Jesus Christ, the christological
problem in the narrow sense inevitably made its appearance: how enn God be
and remain God and yet be truly present in history? Celsus, an opponent of
Christianity, and a shrewd one, had already noted this problem: 'Either God
really changes himself, as they claim, into a mortal body ... or he does not
change, bur makes onlookers think he has so changed, and thus leads them
into errors and tells lies.'51 The debate over this question was the major theme
in the fourth-century conflict with Arius and Arianism. It was in this context
that the Council of Nicaea (325) issued its deeision which was to be normative
for the whole subsequent tradition.
The conflict had long been in the making, at least since the Apologists of the
second century had taken over the Logos concept of Greek philosophy (bur by
that time for practical purposes an idea that had invaded every part of life) in
order ro clarify conceptually the relation between the Father and the Son. The
way had been paved for this step by the wisdom literature of the Bible and by
John's hymn ro the Logos in the Prologue of the Fourth Gaspe\. The acceptance
of the Stoic Logos doctrine now turned the wisdom teaching and the Logos
idea of John into a comprehensive doctrine that explained everything: God,
world and history. The Logos was conceived as the rational principle at work
in the cosmos and in history. He is present in fragmentary form in every reality
(logos spermatikos), but only in Jesus Christ has he appeared in his full form."
As far as the relation of the Logos to God is concerned, Justin thinks of it in
subordinationist terms. The Logos is God's first production;S!II only in view of
the creation of the world does he become independent in relation to what is
outside God,60 that is, he becomes a divine person but one subordinate to the
Father." In developing this teaching the Apologists were able to call upon the
anthropological distinction between the immanent Logos (logos elJdiathetos)
and the expressed Logos (logos prophorikos) and apply it to God."
The Apologists with their first attempts were soon outstripped by [wo men
of genius who determined the course of the entire subsequent development:
Tertullian in the Latin West and Origcn in the Greek East. With a sure touch
and with juridical preciseness Tertullian had by abour 200 already coined the
decisive concepts used in later trinlurian theology.1Ol By so doing he spared the
 Jesl/s Christ, S01l of God 181
West a good deal of the protracted and wearisome debate that the East was to
endure. But in Tertullian there is still a subordinationist tendency. The Logos
indeed exists prior to the crcation of the world, but it is only through creation
that he achieves his 'complete birth' (nativitas perfecta}." The Son proceeds
from the Father as the fruit from the root, the river from the source, the ray of
sunlight from the sun." The Father alone possesses the entire fullness of
divinity, the Son has only a part of it."
The theology of Origen (t 253-54) is doubtless superiono thatofTertullian
in speculative power. We are confronted in him by one of the greatest and
boldest of all theological projects. Origen unhesitatingly asserts the eternity of
the Son." The Son is the brightness of the Light." He is a hypostasis that is
substantially distinct from the Father" and is not a part of the Father.'o On
the other hand, he is not unqualifiedly good as the Father is;" he is not 'very
God' (alltotheos) but a 'second God' (dellteros theos}." The transcendental
attributes of the Father take form and figure in the Son." The Son is therefore
mediator of rcdcmption. H Even though Origen's intention is first and foremost
to do biblical rheology within the framework of the church's tradition, his
theology nonetheless represents the birthday of speculative theology, and one
in which the influence of Platonic thinking is unmistakable."
This encounter with contemporary philosophy was neither a calamity nor
a mere accident, as objecmrs to the Hellenization of Christianity believe; it
was hermeneutically necessary and was in the final analysis the form which
aggiornamento or 'updating' took at that time. On the other hand, the steps
then taken did ultimately lead to the crisis that is associated with the name of
Arius. The crisis was at bottom nothing else than the outbreak of fever in a
process that in its germinal stage was marked by a hidden virulence of which
the Apologists had little conception. For the Logos of the Stoics was essentially
monistic and made sense only in relation to the world. In later Middle
Platonism, on the other hand, there was an excessive emphasis on the absolute
transcendence, invisibility and unknowableness of God; in this context the
Logos served as a principle of mediation. The result was the danger of
subordinationism, that is, of making the Son less than the Father. The Logos
is begotten by the Father with a view to creation; the procession of the Logos
from the Father is thus made dependent on crcation. The Bible's soteriological
teaching on salvation was in danger of turning into cosmological speculation,
and this danger became acute in Arius, a 'leftist' disciple of Origen. 7' Arius
ventured to remedy in a one-sided way the imperfections in theological
subordinationism. For him God is ineffable, unbegotten, free of becoming,
without origin and immutable, as he is in Middle Platonism. The basic problem
then became how to mediate between the indivisible being which is incapable
of becoming, and the world of becoming and multiplicity. Here was the
usefulnessofthe Logos, a second God (dellteros theos), whom Arius understood
as being the first and most excellent creature and at the same time mediaror in
creation. Consequently, the Logos was crcated out of nothing, in time, as
182 The Message abol/t the God of jesl/s Christ
mutable and fallible; only because of his ethical behaviot has he been adopted
as Son. In Arius' thinking the God of the philosophers has evidently supplanted
the living God of history. His theology represents an extreme Hellenization of
Christianity.

The Council of Nicaea 77 was convoked in order to reach a decision in the

debates caused by Arius' teaching and to restore unity to the church and
the empire; it did not enter into the speculative questions raised by Arian
teaching. Its sole aim was to defend the teaching of scripture and tradition.
To this end it had recourse to the baptismal creed - whether of the church
of Caesarea or of the church of Jerusalem - and to the essential biblical
formulations contained in this confession of faith it made interpretative
additions which were intended to exdude Arius. The decisive statement in
the creed of Nicaea is as follows: 'We believe ... in one Lord Jesus Christ,
the Son of God, the only-begotten generated from the Father, that is, from
the being (ousia) of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God
from true God, begotten, not made, one in being (homool/sios) with the
Father, through whom all things were made, those in heaven and those on
earth. For us men and for our salvation He came down, and became flesh,
was made man. '78
The Nicene profession of faith is important in several respects:
1. It responds to the tension between tradition and interpretation. It
does not try to present abstract speculation but is a liturgical confession
originating in biblical and ecdesial tradition. The new dogma is thus meant
to serve faith and be an interpretation of the tradition. The church bases
its faith not on private speculation but on common and public tradition
that is articulated above all in the church's liturgy. But it understands this
tradition not as an inflexible letter but as a living tradition that develops
under the pressure of new questions. The use made of Hellenistic concepts
does not, therefore, represent a diminution or weakening of Christianity;
at issue was the self-assertion and not the self-surrender of Christianity. In
the final analysis, the Nicene creed was the aggiornamento or updating of
that age, the hermeneutically necessary effort to express the permanently
valid Christian message in the language of the day and in response to new
questions. The supposed 'Hellenization' was in fact a sign of incarnational
power and spiritual presence.
2. The 'new' statements about the nature of God represent not a
Hellenization but a de-Hellenization of Christianity. Arianism was an
illegitimate Hellenization that dissolved Christianity into a cosmology and
a morality. The Council's intention, on the contrary, was to hold fast to
what the New Testament says about the Son and to reaffirm that in Jesus
 jesus Christ, SOli of God 183
Christ God himself has made his appearance. For this reason, the Council
has to say that Jesus Christ belongs on the side not of creatures but of God,
and that he has not been created but begotten and is of the same being
(/10"'001/5;05) as the Father. The idea expressed in 110111001/5;05" does
indeed come from the teaching of the Valentinian gnostics on emanation
and was therefore highly suspect to many of the Fathers at Nicaea and
especially to many bishops and theologians after Nicaea. But in using the
term the Council had no intention of 'Hellenizing' the concept of God that
is found in revelation and in the church's kerygma and superimposing on
it a philosophical concept of being. Its concern was rather with the truth
that the Son is by his narure divine and stands on the same level of being
as the Father, so that whoever encounters him encounters the Father
himself. For this reason it was also not the Council's intention to explain
more precisely how this oneness of being in God the Father and God the
Son is related to the distinction berween the two. Like most conciliar
decisions, that of Nicaea was an ad hoc solution. The clarification of such
a statement as Nicaea's is the task of subsequent theological reception and
interpretation.
3. The concern in the conciliar statement of Nicaea is not a speculative
one bur first and foremost a soteriological one. Athanasius, the champion
of the church in the struggle with Arius, insisted over and over again: if
Jesus Christ is not the true Son of God, then we have not been redeemed
by him, that is, he has not made of us the sons and daughters of God.
Athanasius is even able to say: 'He did not, because he was a man,
subsequently become God, but because he was God, he subsequently
became man in order to make Gods of us.'"· The teaching on the true
divinity of Jesus Christ must therefore be understood in the framework of
the entire soteriology of the early church with its idea of redemption as the
divinization of the human person. This teaching on divinization is much
criticized nowadays, as though it called for a magical natural transform-
ation. On the basis of a mistaken appeal to Ignatius of Antioch"' interpreters
speak disparagingly of a pharmacological process. They overlook the fact
thar in Athanasius 'divinization' means simply rhat through the action of
him who is Son of God by nature we become the children of God through
grace and divine acceptance," because we receive the Holy Spirit who cries
out in us: 'Abba, Father!'" The whole idea is thus a thoroughly biblical
one; in contrast to similar sounding Hellenistic notions there is here not
the slightest blurring of the distinction between God and man, and the
thought is concerned not with natures but with persons.
4. Nicaea's concern, then, is to maintain the teaching olthe Bible against
a philosophical falsification of it. On the other hand, the Council is able
184 The Message abotlt the God of jestls Christ
to ward off the attack only by taking up the same weapons and speaking
the language of philosophy as it adopts the non· biblical concept of
homootlsios. To this extent the dogma of Nicaea means the entrance of
metaphysical thinking about substance into the preaching of the church
and into theology. Thereafter the eschatological and historico·salvational
thinking of the scriptures was often overlaid by speculation and to some
extent even supplanted by it. This is the kernel of truth in the thesis about
the de·eschatologization of Christianiry being both a presupposition and
a consequence of its Hellenization." The immediate consequence of the
shift - but a consequence contrary to the intentions of Nicaea - was that
the traditional picture of God had imposed upon it the Greek idea of the
immutability, impassibility and dispassionateness (apatheia) of God. It
was no longer possible to give full value to the kenosis statements of
scripture, which are very closely connected with the biblical assertions
about the incarnation. The incarnation of God - which was Athanasius'
central theme - and especially the suffering and death of God became a
problem precisely after Nicaea. We are becoming fully conscious of this
same problem only today when we have reached the end of metaphysics
in its classical form . For us the question is whether a God incapable of
suffering can help us in our suffering. Is such a God still a God of human
beings and of history? Is he even the God revealed to us through the
incarnation and cross of Jesus Christ?
In solving one problem while remaining faithful to scripture and trad·
ition, Nicaea created another for which we today must find a new solution
on the basis of Nicaea. The dogma stated by the first ecumenical council
thus makes it already clear that dogmatic formulations are never simply
the concluding clarification of a dispute but arc at the same time always
the beginning of new questions and problems. Precisely because dogmas
arc trlle they are in constant need of new interpretation.

3. Theological interpretation of the divine Sonship of Jesus Christ

(a) Logos·christology
Theology is 'faith in search of understanding'; its intention is not simply
to ascertain the self·revelation of God in an extrinsic and positivist way
but also to understand it from within. This kind of understanding is gained
by trying to grasp the many truths of revelation in their internal connection
with one another and thus as forms of the one mystery of God, and by
trying to relate the one mystery of God to the mystery of man so that an
analogous conceptualization of the divine mystery may become possible.
 Jeslls Christ, SOli of God 185
This second attempt in particular was important for christo logy. The very
statement that Jesus Christ is Son of God already represents an analogy
from the human realm that expresses both the oneness of being and the
distinction of God the Father and Jesus Christ. But in order to keep the
relation of Jesus Christ to his Father free from all-too·anthropomorphic
ideas of nalUral generation, and in order to be able to say that Jesus and
his Father have not only the same being but a single being, there was need
in addition of an analogy from the spiritual realm. There was need, as it
were, to conceptualize the image of the Son, and this was accomplished
with the aid of the concept of 'word'. Thus the decisive step in christology
was the interpretation of the biblical image of Jesus Christ as the Son of
God by means of the concept 'Word of God'.
This step from image to concept had already been prepared for in Old
Testament wisdom literature and was expressly taken in the Prologue of
John." The thesis that the Johannine concept of Logos was of gnostic
origin was popular for a long time, but today scholars are laying much
greater emphasis on its Old Testament and primitive Christian rOOts. John
harks back to the biblical understanding of 'word' and to Jesus' own
implicit claim of being the final and definitive Word of God. The absolute
use of the term 'the Word' is not, of course, to be derived solely from the
Old Testament and Jewish tradition. In this mailer John is located rather
in the intellectual and spiritual world of Jewish Hellenism, represented
by the Jewish religious philosopher Philo, who linked Old Testament
speculation on wisdom with Greek philosophical speculation on the Logos.
On the other hand, the differences between Philo and the Prologue of John
must not be overlooked. Philo has nothing of a personal conception of the
Logos and even less of the idea of an incarnation; for Philo, unlike John,
the Logos is a power intermediate between God and the world. The
synthesis offered in the Prologue of John must therefore be regarded as an
independent achievement which operated in the framework of biblical and
early Christian thinking but served to disclose to Hellenistic Jews the being
and meaning of Jesus.
The Logos christology of the Gospel of John proved to be immensely
influential for the course of history, for it was taken over by the entire
Christian tradition. We find the same approach already being taken by
Ignatius of Antioch, by Justin and the other Apologists, by Irenaeus of
Lyons and even more by the later fathers." And yet, despite its solid biblical
basis, it soon led, as I have shown, to a serious crisis; it was from this crisis
that classical christology emerged in the fourth century. The crisis resulted
from the different understandings of the Logos in Greek philosophy and
in the Bible. The concept of Logos had served Greek philosophers since
186 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
Heraclitus as a way of expressing the intrinsic rationality and coherent
meaning of all reality." The Logos is the reason that governs and unifies
all reality. But this coherent meaning and rationality that marks all reality
first reveals itself in the rational mind of man. Only through human reason
and the human word - both of them being defined as Logos - is the
knowableness of reality actually brought to light." The Logos concept is
therefore concerned with the revealed ness of being in thought and thus
with the unity of thinking and being. As a result, there is a formal
correspondence berween the biblical understanding of 'word' and the
Greek understanding of Logos, but at the same time a radical difference in
content. Despite the difference in Content both are interested in the
revelation of reality. But what for the Bible is an irreducible historical event
is conceived in Greek thought as being the inner substance of reality.
Consequently, the overall understanding of God, world and man that is
contained in the Greek concept of Logos is marked by a monistic tendency
which could not be taken over by Christian theology. The situation changed
in late antiquity when the experience of a harmoniously ordered universe
was undermined. The divine was no longer understood as the deepest
ground of reality; God was now conceived rather as an absolutely transcen-
dent and unknowable and even an alien God. In this new situation the
Logos served as mediator berween this transcendent God and the world.
But this dualistic conception of things again left no place for the biblical
faith in creation as well as faith in the God of history and human beings.
Given this complicated situation and set of problems it is understandable
that an authentic Christian Logos·christology became possible only after
a lengthy process of purification and critical discernment.
In this process a reflection on the relation between the interior word and
the exterior word proved useful. Greek philosophy had long since done
the preliminary work on this question. In his dialogue Cratyills Plato
discusses the position of the Sophists according to whom the external word
is only an ultimately arbitrary sign based on convention. According to
Plato this view of the Sophists is intrinsically untenable because any
convention can be established only in and through language, so that
language is already presupposed. Plato therefore asserts a correspondence
berween external word and internal word, that is, between internal
understanding and the ourward form this understanding takes in words.
He understands the external word to be an image and sign of things."' But
for Plato the knowledge ofthings is not due primarily to sensible experience
of things and therefore not to the external word, but to internal insight
into reality itself.'" For this reason knowledge, according to Plato, is in the
final analysis, a wordless dialogue of the soul with itself."
 Jeslls Christ. SOli of God 187
Plato's reflections led. especially in Augustine, to a clarified Logos-
christology. Augustine understands the outward word as a sign 'of the
word that shines forth within ... All words, whatever the language in
which they achieve the status of sound, are also thought in silence"" The
decisive thing for Augustine, then. is the interior word, which has the
greater right to be called ·word'. This interior word arises through a
creative act which is comparable to an act of generation and in which
something distinct from the begetter and yet consubstantial with it emerges.
'When we speak what we know, a word is inevitably born from the
knowledge contained in our memory; this word is fully of the same kind
as the knowledge from which it is born. The idea which is formed of the
known object is the word which we speak in our heart"" 'The spirit
retains, hidden away in the treasury of the memory, everything which it
has appropriated and knows by its own power or through the bodily senses
or through the testimony of others. Out of this the true word is begotten
when we express what we know: I mean the word that precedes every
spoken sound and even every thought of spoken sound .... Even though
Augustine is fully aware of the difference between divine knowledge and
human knowledge," he is nonetheless convinced that he has found an
analogy for understanding the relation of Father to Son, the distinction
between them and also their sameness and unicity of being. 'The word of
God the Father is the only-begotten Son, who is like and identical with the
Father in everything: God from God, light from light, wisdom from
wisdom, essence from essence ... Therefore the Father begot his Word,
which is identical with himself in all respects, by expressing himself as it
were.·~6

Thomas Aquinas accepted and developed this conception of Augustine.

But he states more clearly than Augustine that the word is a process
(processio), an event and an accomplishment; showing very great courage
in the light of the history of philosophy. he also describes this word as an
intellectual emanation. The thing that is peculiar to this word-occurrence
is that there is no going from one subject to another and that the emergence
of the word takes place rather in the knowing subject himself," so that it
is possible to speak of this word as a perfectio opermltis (a perfection of
the agent)." For the higher a being is, the more independent it is and the
more fully it is concentrated within itself and reflected back upon itself.
The highest form of such interiority belongs to the spirit, which reflects on
itself and is thus able to understand itself. But whereas the human spirit's
self-consciousness yields but an image of its being, in God being and
consciousness coincide; in knowing himself God docs not simply have an
intellectual image of himself, but his being is identical with this image or
188 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
word. The act of divine self-knowledge is thus an act of intellectual
generation, an emanation of the spirit. There is of course a difference here
as compared with the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation, inasmuch as
that which is begotten is not a lesser being but possesses the same
ontological reality as the being of God." Were one to deny this generation
of the Word, one would be forced to deny that God is life and spirit and
to maintain that he is dead and without spirit. loo The living God can
therefore be thought of only as Father and Son, while a non-trinitarian,
purely monotheistic God would in fact have to be declared dead.
The explanation of the divine sonship of Jesus Christ by means of the
concept of word not only helps Thomas to explain this individual, though
admittedly central, dogma of the faith; the explanation also enables him
to grasp in faith the whole of reality. Because in a single act God understands
both himself and everything else, the eternal Word is an expression and
representation not only ofthe Father but of creatures as well. To state this
more accurately: in his Son, the eternal Word, the Father knows not only
himself but also created reality.IDI Thomas is thus able, with the help of
the concept of word, to make it intelligible that all things have been created
in Jesus Christ and for him (Col. 1.16f.) and that from eternity we have
been known and chosen in him (Eph. 1.4f.).
It is impossible to deny the spaciousness, depth and coherence of this
classical Word-theology. It has a very satisfactory basis in scripture and
tradition, and is a help that cannot be overvalued for a deeper understanding
of revelation and of the latter's internal coherence and its correspondence
to human knowledge. Logos-christology can help us understand that in
Jesus Christ God's innermost being as well as the ultimate ground and
meaning of all reality are made known to us. It explains how Jesus Christ
is the head of the whole creation and how in him as the single Word of the
Father all of reality finds expression and its deepest meaning. Only one
who knows Jesus Christ has an ultimate understanding of man and the
world.
Nonetheless, questions remain. Does not this theology of the word have
its ultimate center of gravity in philosophy rather than in theology? And
even when viewed simply from the standpoint of philosophy does the signi-
ficance of the word and of language find its proper expression? Does the
interior soliloquy of the soul yield an adequate understanding of the word,
or must we not rather start with dialogue and therefore with the external
word, with the word as a self-emptying? These questions lead in turn to
the properly theological question. Does the classical Logos-christology
adequately express the intentions of the biblical theology of the Word, as
these are shown to us in the Prologue of John? Can it explain why the
 Jeslls Christ, SOli of God 189
culmination of the Prologue of John is the statement: 'The Word became
nesh'? 'Flesh' designates the human person in its frailty and subjection to
death. The incarnation thus already suggests a christology of the cross and
of kenosis, according to which in Jesus Christ God empties himself and, as
it were, reveals himself in his opposite, so that God's revelation of himself
is at the same time a revelation of his hidden ness. This element of self·
emptying is neglected in the classical Logos·christology. This fact constrains
us not indeed to renounce the classical solution but rather to take it a step
further and deeper in light of the idea of self·emptying.

(b) Kmosis-christology
If we take the testimony of the New Testament consistently as our
starting point and if we make this testimony the basis for the speculative
development of our faith in Christ, then we must take seriously the fact
that the Gospels are 'passion narratives with extended introductions' (M.
Kahler). The cross is then not simply the consequence of the earthly
ministry of Jesus but the very goal of the incarnation; it is not something
adventitious but the meaning and purpose of the Christ· event, so that
everything else is ordered to it as to a goal. God would not have become
truly a human being had he not entered fully into the abyss and night of
death. But this means that we must approach the question of the nature of
Jesus' divinesonship not from the vantage-point of his eternal and temporal
birth but from that of his death on the cross. The starting point of
christological renection must be the giving of the Son by the Father and
the self-giving of the Son to the Father and for the many, rather than the
generation of the Son by the Father as conceived according to the analogy
of the production of the intellectual word.'·!
Basic to such a christological approach is the hymn to Christ in Phil.
2.6-11, which speaks of the kenosis or emptying (Greek: ke/losis) of him
who was in the form of God and accepted the form of a slave.103 In
interpreting this important text we must take careful note of the fact that
it is not speaking of a transformation of nature, still less of a de-divinization
of God. Such an interpretation would contradict not only 11 Cor. 5.19:
'God was in Christ', but also what is said here in Philippians, for according
to this text the kenosis consists in the taking of the form of a slave and not
in the surrender of the form of God. Augustine is fully correct in his
interpretation: 'It was thus that he emptied himself: by taking the form of
a slave, not by losing the form of God; the form of a slave was added, the
form of God did not disappear."·' On the other hand, it is only with this
interpretation that the real problem becomes clear. We must negotiate the
190 The Message abo/lt the God of Jes/ls Christ
narrow path of making him who is God's equal the subject of the emptying
and of taking this emptying seriously while yet not depriving him of his
divinity. How is it possible, then, that the immutable God should at the
same time be mutable? How can the history of God in Jesus Christ be so
thought that it really affects God and is God's very own history, while at
the same time God remains God? How can the impassible God suffer?
The Bible makes unavoidable the question of the suffering of God. The
Bible tells us over and over that God is affected by the action and suffering
of human beings or, as the c,ase may be, allows himself to be affected
through compassion, anger and pity (Gen. 6.6; Ps. 78.41; Isa. 63.10; Hos.
11.8f.;Jer. 31.20; etc.).105 Consistently with this, rabbinical theology often
speaks of the pain in God. lo, The New Testament continues this line of
thought by telling of the anger of Jesus (Mark 3.5), his compassion (Mark
6.34), and his weeping over Jerusalem (Luke 19.41). Fundamental in this
context are the words of Jesus about being abandoned by God (Mark
15.34; Matt. 27.46) and the statement of principle in the Letter to the
Hebrews: 'We have not a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our
weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we arc, yet
without sinning' (4.15). 'He can deal gently with the ignorant and wayward,
since he himself is beset with weakness ... Although he was a Son, he
learned obedience through what he suffered' (5.2, 8; d. 2.18; 4.15). It is
impossible to dismiss all this as simple anthropomorphism, or to ascribe
it solely to the human nature of Jesus, while leaving his divinity untouched
by it. Forthe kenosis is that ofthe pre-existent Son of God (Phil. 2.7), and
it is the humanness of God that has made its appearance (Titus 3.4). In his
humanness, then, and in his living and dying Jesus Christ is the self-
interpretation of God.
The fathers were compelled to differentiate this God of history as
understood in the Bible from mythological conceptions of gods who
undergo becoming and who suffer and change, and of their mythologically
interpreted incarnations. In effecting the differentiation the fathers were
to appeal to motifs of Greek philosophy and its axiom of God's impassibility
(apatheia: the apathia-axiom).107 In the process they doubtless often
defended God's impassibility in a way that betrays the influence more of
Greek philosophy than of the testimony of the Bible. lOB It is not the case,
however, as is often claimed, that the fathers simply took over the apathia-
axiom and thus abridged the Bible's testimony regarding the living God of
history. 109
The early fathers simply let the paradox stand. According to Ignatius of
Antioch, 'The timeless and invisible one became visible for our sake; the
incomprehensible and impassible one became capable of suffering for our
 jestls Christ, SOI/ of God 191
sake. 'liD Irenaeus l l l and Melito III use similar language. Tertullian, known
for his paradoxes, says: 'God's Son was crucified, and precisely because it
was ignominious I am not ashamed of it. God's Son also died, and this is
credible precisely because it was in such bad taste. He died and rose again,
and this is certain because it is impossible.'II' In other passages he speaks
of the Delis mortlllls (dead God)' 14 and the Delis crt/ci{ixlls (crucified
God).11S He thus anticipates the formula of the Scythian monks in the
theopaschite controversy of the sixth century: 'One of the holy Trinity
suffered in the flesh.' ""
A mode of expression that was less bizarre and that showed a balance
achieved through reflection was very difficult for the fathers because they
regarded pathos (suffering) as a non·free external passive experience l17
and even as an expression of the human fallenness brought about by sin. II.
Given such presuppositions, such pathe (sufferings) could be ascribed to
God only insofar as he freely accepted them, with the result that in him
they would not be the expression of finiteness, lack of freedom, and
sinfulness but, on the contrary, an expression of his power and freedom.
This is the line taken in the response of Gregory Thaumaturgus l " and
Hilary"O and even of Augustine: 'If he was also weak, this was due to his
own fullness of power.'12I Gregory of Nyssa is very emphatic: 'But his
descent into lowliness represents a cerrain excess of power, so that even
what is as it were contrary to his nature is not a hindrance [0 him.'I22 From
here it is but a relatively short step to the most important patristic discussion
of the apathia-axiom, that of Origen. lll Origen moves beyond the idea of
free acceptance to that of love. If the Son had not from eternity felt
compassion for our wretchedness, he would not have become man and
would not have allowed himself to be crucified: 'First he suffered, then he
came down. What was the suffering he accepted for us? The suffering of
love.' Not only the Son but the Father as well is not simply 'impassible':
he tOO 'suffers something of the suffering of love'. I" Here a solution is
insinuated which has its basis in the innermost being of God himscif, in his
freedom in love.

Unfortunately, the Scholastic tradition took hardly any advantage of these

rudiments of a solution in the theology of the fathers. III A shift from the one-
sidedly metaphysical theology of Scholasticism came only with Luther's
theology of the cr055. 126 Luther was attempting a consistent exposition not of
the cross in the light of a philosophical concept of God, but of God in the light
of the cross. In his teaching on the communicat;o idiomatum (communion of
properties; reciprocal predication of properties) he tries to transfer to the
human nature all the sublime statements proper to the divine nature; in
192 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
particular, the humanity of Christ is made to share in the omnipresence of the
divinity. Conversely, the divinity shares in the abjectness of the humanity and
in its suffering and death.'" In Ihis he was opposed especially by the Calvinists
with their Extra Calvinistic"m, by which they sought to maintain the transcend-
ence of the Logos in relation to Jesus Christ. Ill!
The still unsettled problem led to the kenoticism controversy of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, first berween Chemnitz and Brentz and later between
the schools of Giessen and Tubingen. According to both schools the human
nature of Christ participates in the omnipresence, omniscience and omnip-
otence of (he divine majesty. According to the Giessen school, however, the
incarnate Word renounces the use of these attributes (kenosis chreseos, a
kenosis of use); the Tiibingen school, on the contrary, maintained that he
simply hid these attributes and did not reveal them externally (hem),i, hrypseos,
a kenosis of concealment). No matter which of the two approaches is taken,
it is clear that Luther's doctrine on the communication of idioms leads to
aporias that are hardly soluble. It ends up opposing the picture of Jesus that is
given to us in the scriptures. For if the humanity of Jesus participates in the
attributes proper to the divine majesty, how is it still possible to maintain that
Jesus is ~uthentically human? If, on the other hand, the divinity itself suffers,
how are we to understand the abandonment of Jesus on the cross by God?IU
German idealism made a new attempt to give intellectual form to the kenosis
teaching of scripture. For Hegel the absolute is not a substance but a subject;
this subject exists, however, only in emptying itself out to what is other. It is
of the essence of the absolute Spirit that it reveal and manifest itself, that is,
that it show itself in and for what is other and so become objective to itself. DO
It is thus of the essence of the absolute Spirit that it establishes within itself the
distinction from itself; that it be identical with itself in distinction from itself.
In Hegel's mind this theory is a philosophical exegesis of the biblical saying
that God is love. For it belongs to love to find itself in the other, in self-
emptying. 'Love is a differentiation of two who nonetheless are not unqualifi-
edly distinct.'''' In this self-emptying, death is the highest point of finiteness,
the supreme negation, and therefore the best way of seeing the love of God. In
this way Hegel manages to conceptualize the death of God. As I noted earlier,
he cites the Lutheran hymn: '0 great affliction, God himself is dead,' and he
speaks of this event as 'a monstrous, fearful idea that confronts the mind with
the deepest abyss of estrangement'.ll! But love means that in the midst of
division there is at the same time reconciliation and union. Thus the death of
God means at the same time the removal of alienation, the death of death, the
negation of negation, the reality of reconciliation. The message of God's death
means therefore that God is a living God; that he is able to take negation into
himself and at the same time cancel it in himself. The basic problem of Hegelian
philosophy is its irremediable ambiguity. If God must necessarily externalize
himself, then he cannot be God apart from the world.'" But in that case the
distinction between God and world is cancelled out in a dialectical process.
 jest/s Christ, SOli of God 193
This leads to the question whether Hegel has not turned the scandal of the
cross into a speculative Good Friday. For if the cross can be speculatively
understood, it is dialectically cancelled out and reconciled. But then it is no
longer an irreducible historical event, but simply an expression of a principle
of love, a necessary destiny of God. If, however, the death of God is conceived
as necessary, is it still being taken seriously? Is not the full depth of human
suffering simply by-passed? At this point the words of Goethe would apply:
'There the cross stands, thickly wreathed in roses,l Who put the roses on the
cross?''''ln summary: on the one hand, the modern philosophy of subjectivity
offers new intellectual possibilities of mastering the problem of the suffering
of God, for which a solution is hardly possible in the metaphysically oriented
theological tradition; on the other hand, this philosophy in turn contains
undeniable dangers, since it is exposed to the temptation of emptying the cross
of Christ (I Cor. 1.17).
The possibilities and dangers of thinking that takes its direction from Hege!
become dear in the kenmic theory of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The intention of this theology is to preserve the christological tradition of the
early church and at the same time to develop it. We find the new approach to
christology in the kenoticists of the nineteenth century: G. Thomasius, F. H.
R. Frank, W. F. Gess. Their teaching has been described as 'the complete
kenosis of the mind'; K. Barth's view is that 'there is even worse than that to
be said of it'. For in fact the kenoticists were compelled to surrender the divinity
of Jesus Christ, a move which, however, brought them only scorn and mockery
from the liberals. The Anglican kenoticists at the end of the last and the
beginning of the present century were likewise influenced by Hegel, but they
made an independent attempt to reconcile patristic theology with the realistic
picture of the man Jesus of Nazareth that had emerged from the study of the
Gospels. The emphasis in the writings of these men was therefore more on the
empirical side of the self-consciousness of Jesus. To be mentioned here are C.
Gore, F. Weston, C. E. Rolt, W. Temple, R. Brasnett, and others. Hegel's ideas,
combined to some extent with those of Boehme and Schelling, also exercised
an influence on some Russian Orthodox theologians and thinkers, especially
on Soloviev, Tarajev, Bulgakov, and Berdyaev. Close to them in many respects
is the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Vnamuno, who in turn influenced
Reinhold Schneider.
The same problem, mediated through the post-idealist critique of Hegel,
has been taken up again today, although with changed premises, by many
contemporary Catholic and Protestant theologians: K. Rahner, H. Vrs von
Balthasar, H. Muhlen,j. Galot, H. Kung, W. Kasper,j. Moltmann, E. junge!,
G. Koch, and others.'" On the basis of entirely different presuppositions the
same problem is taken up in process theology (c. Hartshorne, j. B. Cobb, S.
Ogden, and others), which makes use of A. N. Whitehead's distinction between
primordial nature and consequent nature of God.ll& It is not always clear in
these theologians how the legitimate concern expressed in the immutability
194 The Message abollt the God of jeslls Christ
axiom can be respected. K. Kitamori's Theology of the Pain of God , }1 shows
how rdevant a theology of the passion and of suffering is for Asiatic thinking.
The last offshoots of this kenoticist tendency are to be found in the death-of-
God theology which, being a momentary fad, a may-fly, is itself already dead.'"

This survey shows that the biblical and ecclesial confession of Jesus as the
Son of God is something that theology has still not completely assimilated.
The theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the attempt on a
grand scale to effect a new interpretation of the concept of God and his
immutability in the light of that confession or, more accurately, in the light
of the cross of Jesus Christ, and so to give new relevance to the biblical
understanding of the God of history. It has become clear in the process
that there are valid points of contact in patristic theology. But the attempt
to understand God and Jesus Christ in terms of the kenosis idea must be
antecedently aware that such an understanding must not turn into a
wisdom of this world but must hold fast to the folly of the message of the
cross, which is the wisdom of God (d. I Cor. 1.18-31 ). The point of
departure for such an attempt can therefore only be the testimony of the
Bible and not some philosophy or other, whether classical metaphysics
with its apathia-axiom, or idealism with its conception of the necessary
self-renunciation of the absolute, or modern process philosophy. We must
therefore resist all the attempts, anticipated long ago in gnosticism, to turn
the cross of Christ into a world principle, a world law or a world formula
or to explain it as a symbol of the universal principle of 'dying and living
again' (Stirb lind Werde).'"
The decisive argument can be set forth in two steps:
1. On the cross the incarnation of God reaches its true meaning and
purpose. The entire Christ-event must therefore be understood in terms of
the cross. On the cross God's self-renouncing love is embodied with
ultimate radicalncss. The cross is the utmost that is possible to God in his
self-surrendering love; it is 'that than which a greater cannot be thought';
it is the unsurpassable self-definition of God. This self-renunciation or
emptying is therefore not a self-abandonment and not a self-de-divinization
of God. The love of God that is revealed on the CtOSS is rather the expression
of God's unconditional fidelity to his promise. It must be said of the living
God of history that precisely as the God of history he remains true to
himself and cannot deny himself (II Tim. 2.13). The cross is therefore not
a de-divinization of God bur the revelation of the divine God. It is by the
very unfathomableness of his forgiving love that he proves he is God and
not a man (Has. 11.9). For the Bible, then, the revelation of God's
omnipotence and the revelation of God's love are not contraries. God need
 Jeslls Christ, SOli of God 195
not strip himself of his omnipotence in order to reveal his love. On the
contrary, it requires omnipotence to be able to surrender oneself and give
oneself away; and it requires omnipotence to be able to take oneself back
in the giving and to preserve the independence and freedom of the recipient.
Only an almighty love can give itself wholly to the other and be a helpless
love.
God's omnipotence is therefore his goodness. For goodness is to give
oneself away completely, but in such a way that by omnipotently
taking oneself back one makes the recipient independent ... It is
incomprehensible that omnipotence is not only able to create the most
impressive of all things - the whole visible world - but is able to create
the most fragile of all things - a being independent of that very
omntpotence. 140
Here we have reached the key point: God's self-emptying, his weakness
and his suffering are not the expression of alack, as they are in finite beings;
nor are they the expression of a fated necessity. If God suffers, then he
suffers in a divine manner, that is, his suffering is an expression of his
freedom; suffering does not befall God, rather he freely allows it to touch
him. He does not suffer, as creatures do, from a lack of being; he suffers
out of love and by reason of his love, which is the overflow of his being.
To predicate becoming, suffering and movement of God does not, therefore,
mean that he is turned into a developing God who reaches the fullness of
his being only through becoming; such a passage from potency to act is
excluded in God. To predicate becoming, suffering and movement of God
is to understand God as the fullness of being, as pure actualiry, as overflow
of life and love. Because God is the omnipotence of love, he can as it were
indulge in the weakness of love; he can enter into suffering and death
without perishing therein. Only thus can he redeem our death through his
own death. In that sense Augustine's statement is valid: 'Slain by death, he
slew death.'''' 'He destroyed our death by dying and restored our life by
rising' (Hymn to the Cross). Thus God on the cross shows himself as the
one who is frec in love and 35 freedom in love.142
2. If God shows himself as the one who loves in freedom and who is free
in loving and if the cross is the eschatological self-revelation of God, then
God must in himself be freedom in love and love in freedom. Only if God
is in himself love can he reveal himself as such in an eschatological and
definitive way. From eternity, therefore, God must be self-communicating
love. This in turn means that God possesses his identity only in a distinction
within himself between lover and beloved who are both one in love. Here
we have a starting point for the understanding of the Trinity, and one that
196 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
proceeds not from knowledge in the word but from self-communicating
love. This starting point helps us to do greater justice to the phenomenon
of self-emptying, which is essential to love, than is possible when, with the
tradition, we take the word as the starting point. On the other hand, since
love presupposes and includes knowledge of the beloved, this approach is
broad enough to integrate and make fruitful the profound insights of
Logos-christology. In addition, there is the factthatcontemporary linguistic
philosophy starts with the external, spoken word and not with the interior
word as Plato and Augustine did, and that it understands the spoken word
as a self-surrender on the part of the speaker and as a turning to other
human beings. This is a further point of view which allows Logos-
christology to be taken into a kenosis-christology, that is, a christology
of self-emptying and self-surrender, and thereby to be developed and
deepened.
There is a basis in the tradition for thus taking love as the point of
departure. As early as Origen we find the teaching that the Son proceeds
from the will, that is, from the love of the Father.'" It is Augustine, above
all, who recognizes that the Trinity discloses itself in light of the concept
of love. 'see, there are three things: lover, beloved and love. What is love
but a kind of life that unites or endeavors to unite two with one another,
namely, lover and beloved?'''' Augustine did not, however, pursue this
insight further. Or, more accurately, he begins with love but then introduces
the element of knowledge by arguing: 'The spirit cannot love itself if it
does not know itself.' 'Thus the spirit, its love and its knowledge form a
kind of trinity.'''' Within the approach by way of love there is thus the
basis for the theology of the word, but the latter was subsequently
developed, for the most part, in isolation. The only real exception is the
approach of Richard of st Victor (twelfth century) who thinks consistently
in terms of love. '46 I shall be discussing him in greater detail later on.
Love entails a unity that does not absorb the other person but rather
accepts and affirms the other precisely in his otherness and only thus
establishes him in his true freedom. Love, which gives to the other not
some thing but its very self, involves, in this very self-communication, a
self-differentiation and self-limitation. The lover must take himself back
because his concern is not with himself but with the other. More than this,
the lover allows the other to affect him; he becomes vulnerable precisely
in his love. Thus love and suffering go together. The suffering of love is
not, however, a passive being-affected, but an active allowing others to
affect one. Because, then, God is love he can suffer and by that very fact
reveal his divinity. The self-emptying of the cross is therefore not a
de-divinization of God but his eschatological glorification. The eternal
 Jesus Christ, Son of God 197
intra-divine distinction of Father and Son is the transcendental theological
condition for the possibility of God's self-emptying in the incarnation and
on the cross. This statement is not simply a more or less interesting piece
of speculation; it signifies that from eternity there is place in God for man,
place also for a genuine sym-pathy with the suffering of human beings.
The Christian God, that is, the God who is thought of in terms of Jesus
Christ, is therefore not a God of a-pathia, but in the real sense of the term
a God of sym-pathy, a God who suffers with man.
This 'sym-pathetic' God as he reveals himself in Jesus Christ is the
definitive answer to the question of theodicy, the question on which theism
and atheism alike founder. If God himself suffers, then suffering is no
longer an objection against God. On the other hand, if God suffers, this
does not mean that he divinizes suffering. God does not divinize suffering,
he redeems it. For the suffering of God, which springs from thevoluntariness
of love, conquers the fateful character of suffering, which attacks us from
without as something alien and unintelligible. Thus the omnipotence of
God's love removes the weakness of suffering. Suffering is not thereby
removed, but it is interiorly transformed - transformed into hope. Kenosis
and suffering now no longer have the last word; the last word belongs to
exaltation and transfiguration. Once again, then, kenosis-christology
points beyond itself to a christology of Easter exaltation and transfigur-
ation, and is very closely connected with pneumatology. For according to
scripture the eschatological transformation and transfiguration of the
world is the work of the Spirit of God. Because according to the theological
tradition the Spirit unites lover and beloved, Father and Son, in their very
distinction, he is also the power that brings the world to its eschatological
transfiguration and reconciliation.
 III
The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life

1. Problem and urgency of a theology of the Holy Spirit today

'I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life': thus begins the third
section of the Christian confession of faith. Only with this final statement
does the confession reach its end and completion. For the life that has its
origin in the Father, and is given to us in the Son, is made our interior,
personal possession by the Holy Spirit, operating through the ministry of
the church. That which has its origin in the Father and its center in the Son
reaches its completion in the Holy Spirit.
The statement about the Holy Spirit is, of course, also full of intellectual
difficulties. As a matter of fact, the Holy Spirit does not play an outstanding
part in the average ecclesial and theological consciousness. The Holy Spirit
is the most mysterious of the three divine persons, for while the Son has
shown himself to us in human form and we can form at least an image of
the Father, we have no concrete grasp of the Spirit. Not without reason
has he frequently been called 'the unknown God'. Forgetfullness of the
Spirit is a charge often leveled against the Western ttadition in particular,
and it is true that the triad, Father- Christ- Spirit is replaced, in the minds
of many by the triad God- Christ- church. l I will have occasion to discuss
in greater detail the reasons and consequences of this forgetfullness of the
Spirit.
The real intellectual difficulties in pneumatology are to be seen as
springing not primarily from the ecclesial and theological tradition but
rather from the intellectual situation of the age and its lack of 'spirit'. The
loss of the dimension and reality which Western thinking has described by
the term 'spirit' is perhaps the most profound crisis of the present time.'
The discovery of the world of the spirit was the great accomplishment of
Greek thought, and Christian theology was able to make use of it in a
 The Holy Spirit, Lord alld Giller of Life 199
manner both critical and creative. In Western philosophy spirit used to be
not simply one reality among others, but the truest of realities. In the
philosophy of the modern age, spirit even became the dominant basic
concept; spirit was for it the totality that gave meaning and unity and
grounded everything else amid the multiplicity of phenomena. The spirit
which permeated all reality made it possible to recognize what was one's
own in what was alien and to be at home in it. After the passing of Goethe,
Hegel and Schleiermacher this philosophy of spirit suddenly collapsed.
Since that time the idealist interpretation of spirit has largely yielded the
field to a materialistic and evolutionary interpretation. Reality is no longer
viewed as a manifestation of spirit, but rather spirit is understood as an
epiphenomenon of reality, being conceived as a superstructure built on the
economic and social process or as a surrogate and sublimation of man who
is defined as a being made up of needs. Finally, a positivist and supposedly
'exact' understanding of science demanded the renunciation of the concept
of 'spirit' because of its multiplicity of meanings and the impossibility of
providing an exact definition of it; it demanded that we remain silent
regarding that which we cannot define with precision. It is obvious that
this kind of materialist and positivist thinking could not but give way to
nihilism and turn into a devaluation and revaluation of all previous ideas,
values and ideals, which now become suspect of being mere ideological
cloaks for individual and collective interests.
What I have been saying represents, of course, only one half of our
situation. For that which past European history understood by 'spirit' is
present anew today in the mode of absence and in a way that is truly
terrifying. Our experience is of the spiritless condition of a reality which
has lost its soul and turned into a facade, a reality in which every
organization of things can only be felt as a form of coercion and in which
the isolated subject finds himself confronted by impenetrable processes
that generate anxiety and a sense of oppression. The experience is accom-
panied by a search for what used to be meant by spirit, but in the form
now of various utopian visions of a better, more human, and reconciled
world. Two such visions in particular call for mention: the utopian vision
of evolution or progress, and that of revolution. The two have in common
that they want to turn a reality alien to man into a human world in which
will be brought to pass something of 'that which manifested itself to
everyone in childhood and wherein as yet no one dwelt: home' (E. Bloch).
Yet both of these utopian visions must today be regarded as shattered. The
collapse of the vision of progress is evident on a wide scale in view of
external economic conditions and of the dangers lurking in technological
development. In the interim it has also become clear that any revolution is
200 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
subject to the conditions of injustice and violence which it is resisting, so
that the injustice and violence of which the revolution itself makes use
bring into the desired new order of things the seeds of new injustice and
new violence. Therefore no revolution is possible that will not later be
betrayed as the formerly oppressed become oppressors in their turn. The
flight to the interior and the flight to ecstasy, whether religious ecstasy or
one of its surrogates, are evidently not solutions. Moreover, even in these
kinds of flight the cry for the spirit cannot be missed.
The only real replacement for human fulfillment and for the utopian
ideal of a reality that is unrent, undivided, and successful is art. According
to classical philosophy the beautiful is the sensible manifestation of the
idea; it is freedom made manifest or, in the language of today's thinkers,
the anticipation of definitive reconciliation.' In a work of art, then, there
is, at least according to the classical understanding of art, a foretaste of
that which Christian faith looks to with hope as to be accomplished by the
Holy Spirit; the transfiguration of reality. On the other hand, contemporary
artists think It possible to carry out the task of art only in the form of
criticism, protest and negation, given the spiritless condition of the present
age. Where all idea of the spiritually supra-sensible has been abandoned
and the beautiful has been separated from the true and the good, as in
nihilism,' the beautiful can only be understood as taking the form of a life-
enhancing ecstasy, an affirmation of the sensuous, a will to appearances,
or pure form. In contemporary art, therefore, the question is largely
left unanswered how a transformation of the world and man, a real
reconciliation of the world and man, are possible. The question is raised
of that which used to be expressed in the term 'spirit', but no answer is in
sight. The Christian message of the Holy Spirit raises this question and
intends to provide a super-abundant answer to it. It is the answer to the
distress of our times and the crisis of our age.

2. The Christian message of God's life-giving Holy Spirit

(a) The Spirit of God il! creatiol!
The basic meaning of the Hebrew and Greek words for 'spirit', namely
ruach and pneuma, is 'wind, breathing, breath'; the second meaning -
since breathing is the sign of life - is 'life, soul'; the final, transferred
meaning is 'spirit'.' The spirit or spirits played an extensive role in
the many myths and popular religions of the ancient world. Especially
widespread in divination and poetry was the idea of the life-giving and life-
engendering power of the spirit as well as its power to sweep along, throw
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 201
into ecstasy, inspire and, in the literal sense, 'enthuse'. The spirit was thus
a dynamic and creative reality that gave life to everything, raised or
snatched human beings out of the everyday, fixed order of things, and
brought about the extraordinary and the new.
In the time of the pre·Socratics the concept of spirit had already become
part of philosophy. According to Anaximenes, air is the origin of all things;
it holds everything together and surrounds the whole universe. 6 According
to Aristotle the pneuma is the breath of life that animates all living things. 7
Finally, Stocism made the pneuma the basis of a universal speculative
theory, looking upon it as the power and life that orders the universe and
all individual beings, including God.' But even in this speculative use the
original basic meaning of the word 'spirit' is preserved. By this I mean that
pneuma was never something purely spiritual; rather it was always linked
to a corporeal substratum, and was even itself only a sublimated form of
the material. It was an intra-worldly, impersonal, vital natural power that
dwelt in the organism of the cosmos and in all its parts. In Greek thought
pneuma therefore remained something neutral and never became a person.
The description just given already indicates both the connection with
and the difference from the biblical understanding of spirit. In the Bible,
too, the spirit is the vital principle of the human being, the seat of its
sensations, intellectual operations, and attitudes of will. On the other hand,
spirit is not a principle immanent in man's nature, but rather designates
life as given and authorized by God. 'When thou hidest thy face, they are
dismayed; when thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their
dust. When thou sendest forth thy Spirit [or: breath], they are created; and
thou renewest the face of the ground' (Ps. 104.29f.; d. Job 34.14f.).
Yahweh's Spirit is thus the creative power of life in all things. His Spirit
moves over the primeval waters at the beginning of creation (Gen. 1.2).
'By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the
breath of his mouth' (Ps. 33.6; d. Job 33.4). The Spirit of God gives man
his artistic sense and his shrewdness, and bestows insight and wisdom on
him.
The Bible thus has something in common with the religious outlook and
the philosophy of antiquity. According to both, everything that exists exists
only through sharing in the divine fullness of being. But, in contrast to the
religions, the Spirit of Yahweh is not an impersonal principle that is
immanent in the world. On the contrary, his Spirit is characterized by its
difference from the weakness and frailty of man and from human power
and wisdom (lsa. 31.3); it is beyond man's ability to penetrate and explain
(Isa. 40.13). The biblical conception of the Spirit is thus marked by the
same transcendence that characterizes the whole biblical conception of
202 The Message about the God of fes"s Christ
God. Only in this sense is the Spirit of God the creative life-giving power
of God, the power that produces, sustains, rules and directs all things. The
Spirit is the Spirit"s creator that is at work throughout the whole of created
reality. 'The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and that which holds
all things together knows what is said' (Wisdom 1.7; d. 7.22-8.1).
The teaching on the Holy Spirit must therefore be located within a
universal perspective. This teaching is concerned with life as such and with
the meaning of all life, with the origin and goal of life, with the power that
gives life. Pneumatology is concerned not with some special esoteric
knowledge but with a completely exoteric reality. Pneumatology is there-
fore possible only through looking for and listening to the traces, expect-
ation and futilities of life, through attention to the 'signs of the time' which
are to be found everywhere that life breaks forth and comes into being,
everywhere that new life as it were seethes and bubbles, and even, in the
form of hope, everywhere that life is violendy devastated, throtded, gagged
and slain. Wherever true life exists, there the Spirit of God is at work. 'He
is the gravitational pull of love, the attraction upward, that resists the
gravitational pull downward and brings all things to their completion in
God."

(b) The Holy Spirit ill the history of salvatioll

The church's creed says of the Holy Spirit: 'He has spoken through the
prophets.' Evidendy, then, as far as the church's confession of faith is
concerned, the Spirit is not simply God's creative power but also his power
over histoty; through the Spirit he intervenes by word and action in history
in order through him to bring history to its eschatological goal: God all in
all. (I Cor. 15.28).
In the Old Testament we find prophetic inspiration coming from the
Spirit as far back as Moses (Num. 11.25) and Joshua (Num. 27.17) and
Balaam the seer (Num. 24.2); we find it frequently in the Book of Judges,
in the cases of Othniel, Gideon, Jephthah and Samson Uudg. 3.10; 6.34;
11.29; 13.25; 14.6, 19; etc.) and in Saul, last of the judges and first of the
kings (I Sam. 10.6; 19.24). From David onward, thecomingofGod'sSpirit
no longer takes the form solely of an unexpected, sudden event, a striking
ecstatic and charismatic phenomenon, a kind of 'happening'. Rather, the
Spirit remains upon David and rests on him (I Sam. 16.13; d. the prophecy
of Nathan, II Sam. 7). Finally, the inspiration of the writing prophets by
the Spirit is attested by Third Isaiah (Isa. 61.1), Ezekiel (2.2; 3.24) and
Zechariah (7.12; on prophetic inspiration d. I Peter 1.11; II Peter 1.21).
The salvation-historical and eschatological goal of this activity of the
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 203
Spirit finds expression in the great writing prophets, especially Isaiah and
Ezekiel. The coming Messiah (lsa. 11.2) or Servant of God (Isa. 42.1) is
promised as one filled with the Spirit. The Spirit of God will change the
wilderness into a paradise and make it a place of justice and righteousness
(lsa. 32.16f.). He will raise the expiring people to new life (Ezek. 37.1-14)
and create a new heart in them (Ezek. 11.9; 18.31; 36.27; cf. Ps. 51.12).
Finally, in the last time there will be a universal outpouring of the Spirit
'on all flesh' Uoel 3.1£.). In all these texts the Sp;rit is conceived of as
the power that produces a new creation. The entire creation that now
impatiently waits amid groans will be led by the Spirit to its goal, which is
the kingdom ofthe free children of God (Rom. 8.19f.). This does not mean
that the Spirit will act only in the future and not in the present. 'My Spirit
abides among you; fear not' (Hag. 2.5). But the present action of the Spirit
has for its purpose the eschatological transformation and fulfillment. 'Not
by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, says the Lord of hosts' (Zech.
4.6). As God's power over history the Spirit will effect the transformation
and transfiguration of the world in a non-violent way, because the change
will first take place in the human heart.
The New Testament proclaims that this kingdom of freedom has begun
in Jesus Christ. All four evangelists place at the beginning of their Gospels
the account of the baptism of Jesus by John and the descent of the Spirit
onJesus (Mark 1.9-11 par.).w According to the predominant view among
exegetes the baptism of Jesus is one of the surest facts of his life. The
evangelists however, do not, report it as a call-vision and a datum in Jesus'
biography; they understand it theologically and as an interpretative vision
which explains the entire messianic activity of)esus in a summary way and
in terms of its source. According to Mark the baptism of Jesus is 'the
beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God' (Mark 1.1). For
the apocalyptic motifs - the opening of the heavens, the sound of God's
voice, and the coming of the Spirit who has been promised for the last
times - are intended to make just one point: with the coming of Jesus
Christ the eschatological time of salvation has begun; he is the messianic
bearer of the Spirit of God; he is the Servant of God, who does not cry out
or lift up his voice, does not break the bruised reed or quench the dimly
burning wick, and truly brings justice (lsa.42.2f.). In his 'inaugural sermon'
at Nazareth Jesus is therefore able to claim that Isa. 61.1 is fulfilled in him:
'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach
good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives
and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are
oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord' (Luke 4.18f.).
According to the view of all four evangelists, in the time before Easter
204 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
Jesus was the exclusive bearer of the Spirit. In his own preaching and
activity, statements about the activity of the Spirit play no part. This
becomes espedally clear in the much-debated saying about blasphemy
against the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12.311.; Luke 12.10). Here a contrast is
established between the time when the Son of man is active on earth and
exerdses authority and the time when the Spirit will be at work. John 7.39
says explidtly: 'As yet the Spirit had not been given, because Jesus was not
yet glorified.' Yet Matthew is already concerned to look back and connect
statements about the Spirit with the activity of Jesus. According to the
older version of a saying of Jesus in Luke 11.20, Jesus expels demons 'by
the finger of God', but Matthew's version of the saying reads: 'if it is by
the Spirit of God that I cast out demons ... 'The earthly activity of Jesus
is then consistently interpreted in pneumatological terms in Luke (4.14,
18; 10.21). In keeping with this, the two infancy narratives of Luke and
Matthew see Jesus as being from the moment of his conception not only
the bearer of the Spirit but the creation of the Spirit (Luke 1.35; Matt.
1.18,20).
The older New Testament tradition connects the activity of the Spirit
with the resurrection and exaltation of Christ. Typical of this view is the
andent piece of tradition in Rom. 1.31. which confesses of Christ that he
was 'constituted Son of God in power according to the Spirit of holiness
by his resurrection from the dead'. Finally, the Letter to the Hebrews says
that it was by the power of the Spirit that Christ offered himself to God in
sacrifice on the cross (9.14).
The New Testament itself makes no effort to harmonize these various
strands of tradition. Their common denominator is. of course, quite dear;
in the entire ministry and activity, life death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ, in his person as well as in his work, the Spirit is bringing about the
eschatological fulfillment. Consequently, the pericope on the baptism of
Jesus makes it clear that what takes place in Jesus the exemplar at the
baptism takes place ever anew in the baptism of Christians as images of
Jesus: the Spirit of God lays hold of the baptized person and gives him a
share in the eschatological divine sonship.
In describing the post-Easter aClivity of the Spirit the New Testament
again shows several theologicallraditions:
According to Luke's Acts of the Apostles the presence and aClion of Ihe
Spirit characterizes the age of the church, which lasls from the ascension
oEJesus to his rerurn. The Spirit is given to Ihechurch al Pentecost (2.1-13).
In Ihe Pentecosl pericope there are clear echoes of the Sinai event, for
Pentecost has to do with the new law and the covenant which embraces
nor only Israel bUI Ihe pagan nations as well. From what had been the
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 205
pagan peoples (ethnii) emerges the people (laos) of God (15.14). But echoes,
too, of the confusion of languages at Babel (Gen. 11.1-9) are to be heard
in the account of the miracle of speaking (or hearing) on Pentecost. The
divided and estranged peoples can once again understand one another by
the power of the one Spirit. Thus is fulfilled the prophecy of Joel that in
the final time God will pour out his Spirit on all flesh (2.16-21). It is also
the Spirit that leads the young church on its missionary way and guides it
as it goes. According to Luke the Spirit acts in a somewhat disconnected
way; that is, there are, as it were, a series of repetitions of the Pentecostal
miracle in Jerusalem (2; 4.25-41), Samaria (8.14-17), Caesarea
(10.44-48; 11.15-17), and Ephesus (19.1-6). Here the Spirit manifests
himself in striking miracles and extraordinary charisms such as glossolaly
and prophecy. But Luke is also aware of the connection between baptism
and the communication of the Spirit (1.5; 2.38; 9.18; 10.47; etc.) and
between the laying on of hands by the apostles and the bestowal of the
Spirit (8.14-17). Above all, despite the great emphasis on the freedom of
the Spirit, Luke is also concerned to show the continuity of the Spirit's
activity. Even though the Spirit keeps on opening up new mission fields
and new tasks, there is a continuous history that begins in Jerusalem and
has Rome for its goal. For this reason, the collection taken up in the Gentile
Christian communities for the poor of Jerusalem as a sign of abiding union
with the mother community of Jerusalem is also, in Luke's mind, an
inspirationofthe HolySpirit(11.27-30;24.17; Gal.2.10; Rom. 15.26-28;
I Cor. 16.1-4; II Cor. 8.4, 6-15). In his idealized and exemplaristic
description of the primitive community of Jerusalem Luke is thus able to
tell us how the Spirit acts in the church: by effecting a communion
(koinonia) in apostolic faith, celebration of liturgy, and service that reaches
the point of sharing earthly goods (2.42-47).
According to the writings of Paul, the Spirit has a fundamental part to
play in Christian life and in the church. According to Paul, Christians are
even defined by the fact that they possess the Spirit of God and allow him
to guide them (Rom. 8.9, 14). 'To be in Christ' and 'to be in the Spirit' are
interchangeable expressions for Paul. On the other hand, thepneumatology
of Paul the Apostle is clearly distinguishable from that of Luke. Paul does,
of course, know of extraordinary gifts of the Spirit; he claims to have them
himself. But the important thing for Paul is that the Spirit works not
only externally but also internally, not only in striking, extraordinary
phenomena but in ordinary Christian life. He is not simply the power that
makes the extraordinary possible, but the power that enables us do
the ordinary in an extraordinary way. In dealing, therefore, with the
 -

206 The Message abol/t the God of Jesl/s Christ

enthusiastic tendencies especially of the Corinthian community, Paul
emphasizes two criteria in particular for the 'discernment of spirits':
1. The confession of Jesus Christ as Lord: 'No one can say "Jesus is
Lord" except by the Holy Spirit' (1 Cor. 12.3). In Paul's view, the Spirit is
the Spirit of Christ (Rom. 8.9; Phil. 1.19), the Spirit of the Lord (Jl Cor.
3.17), and the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4.6). The famous formula: 'The Lord
is the Spirit' (II Cor. 3.17) means that the Spirit is the effective mode of
presence and the present effectiveness of the exalted Lord in the church
and in the World.
2. Paul connects the efficacious action of the Spirit with the building up
of the community and with service in the church. The Spirit is given for
the advantage of all; the various gifts of the Spirit are therefore meant for
mutual service (I Cor. 12.4-30). There can be no question, therefore, of
invoking the supposed charismatic structure of the Pauline communities
against an institutionally structured church. Quite the contrary, for Paul
lays decided emphasis on the fact that God is a God not of confusion but
of peace (I Cor. 14.33). The Spirit works, therefore, not through opposition
of his gifts to each other, but through their combination and mutual
support. He is inseparably linked to baptism (I Cor. 12.13) and the
preaching of the gospel (I Thess. l.5f.; I Cor. 2.4f., 13,; etc.) Above all,
however, the charisms are not to be understood as external activities in the
church but as varied expressions of the one grace of God (Rom. 12.6; d.
the identification of charism and eternal life in Rom. 6.23). The various
gifts of grace, thus understood, bring with them a diversity of functions.
The greatest of these gifts of the Spirit is love (I Cor. 13.13). In love. the
Spirit becomes the norm and the source of power for Christian life.
According to Paul, Christian existence in the Spirit consists in our
allowing ourselves to be led not by the Aesh but by the Spirit; in our doing
the works not of the Aesh but of the Spirit; in setting our hearts not on
what is passing but on what is abiding (Gal. 5.17-25; 6.8; Rom. 8.2-15).
In positive terms, life in the Spirit means openness to God and neighbor.
Openness to God finds expression above all in the prayer 'Abba, Father!'
(Rom. 8.15, 26f.; Gal. 4.6). Because of the Spirit we possess the freedom
of the children of God; we have access to God and know that in every
situation we are under his protection. Galatians 5.13-25, finally, makes it
dear that to walk in the Spirit means to serve one another with love. Love
of God and of neighbor is true Christian freedom in the Spirit (Gal. 5.13).
For the free person is not the one who does whatever he wants; one who
acts in that manner is very much unfree because he is the slave of himself,
his moods, and his changing circumstances. The free person is rather one
who is free from himself and thus able to be there for God and for others.
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 207
The selflessness of love is true Christian freedom, and it is this that provides
the context for the fruits of the Spirit: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness,
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. (Gal. 5.22f.). Through
all these fruits the Spirit is bringing into existence the kingdom of the
freedom of God's children (Rom. 8.8-10). Our present experience of the
Spirit and his freedom is really only a first installment (Rom. 8.23; II Cor.
1.22; 5.5; Eph. 1.14). As a result, the Christian who lives in the Spirit is
caught in a tension between the 'already' and the 'not yet'. To live by the
Spirit means above all, therefote, to live our lives in the power of hope and
to await the definitive transformation of the world and OUt own bodies.
In John 11 the eschatological charactet of the Spirit finds an expression
peculiar to the Fourth Gospel. God himself is Spitit and wishes to be
worshipped eschatologically in Spirit and in truth Uohn 4.24). Unless,
therefore, a man is born again of watet and Spirit, he cannot enter the
kingdom of God Uohn 3.6). As John expressly points out, the Spirit tests
permanently on Jesus Uohn 1.32). Jesus is the eschatological revealer
because he gives the Spitit without limit Uohn 3.34; d. 7.39). His words
are spirit and life Uohn 6.63). But like the Synoptic writers John is also
aware of the difference between the earthly life of Jesus and the time of his
glorification. Only after he has been glotified can the Spirit be given Uohn
7.39; 16.7). At his death Jesus surrenders his spirit Uohn 19.30) and gives
it to the church, which is represented beneath the cross by John and Mary.
After his resurrection Jesus expressly communicates his Spirit to the
disciples: 'Receive the Holy Spirit' (20.22).
The Spirit who is present after the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus
is also called by John the 'Paraclete', that is, the helper and supporter (not:
consoler). This Paraclete is identified with the Spirit of truth Uohn 14.17;
15.26; 16.13) and, as a 'second' or 'another' supporter, is paralleled with
Jesus. As Jesus has been sent by the Father and proceeds from the Father,
so the Spirit too proceeds from the Father Uohn 15.26), but he is given
because of the prayer of Jesus Uohn 14.16) and in the name of Jesus
(14.26). His function is to teach the disciples evetything and to remind
them of everything that Jesus had told them Uohn 14.26); he will bear
witness to Jesus (15.26) and will lead the disciples to the complete
truth, not saying anything on his own authority but glorifying Jesus and
proclaiming his word Uohn 16.13f.). The Spirit acts, moreover, not only
in the preaching of the community of disciples but also in its sacraments;
he is associated especially with baptism Uohn 1.33; 3.5) and the eucharist
Uohn 6.63; IJohn 5.6-8). This activity of the Spirit can be carried out only
amid confrontation with the world that does not believe and therefore
cannot receive the Spirit Uohn 14.17). In relation to the world it is the
208 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
Spirit's task to convict the world and make known what sin, justice and
judgment are LJohn 16.8). The faithful, however, who are recognized by
the Spirit, by their confession of Jesus Christ, and by their love (I John 4.6,
13), have already reached eschatological fulfillment. They no longer need
to be taught by anyone (I John 2.27); they no longer need to inquire, and
their joy is complete LJohn 16.20-23). Thus in the coming of the Spirit the
second coming of Jesus is already taking place; the Spirit is the reality of
eschatological fulfillment; he is the way in which God, who is Spirit, is
present in the world.
The experience of the early church is renected in the first Leiter
of Clement: 'All were granted a profound and blessed peace and an
unquenchable desire to do good; and the fullness of the Holy Spirit was
poured out on them.''' All the early Christian writers tell first and foremost
of the gifts of the Spirit in the communities."

The struggle with the movements ofenthusiasrs that have continually appeared
on the scene in the course of the church's history led unintentionally to a
repression of the charismatic element and a certain institutionalization of the
Spirit. Montanism in the second half of the second century already marks an
important (urning-point,14 As the danger grew of the church becoming
'bourgeois't Montanism sought to revivify the original enthusiasm. The call to
conversion in face of the imminent end of (he world, together with an ethical
rigorism and ecstatic forms of communal life, awoke a powerful echo in hearts.
Tertullian set up 30 opposition of principle between (he ecc/esia spiritus
(church of the Spirit) and eeelesia /lltIIlen,s episcoportlm (the church which
consists of a number of bishops),15 Irenacus takes a different approach: he sees
the Spirit of God as active in the church, which is made up of followers of the
apostles. The church is the vessel in which the Spirit 'rejuvenates and keeps
rejuvenating' faith; 'Where the church is, there the Spirit of God is; where the
Spirit of God is, there the church is and all grace.''' According to the Apostolic
Traditio" of Hippolytus of Rome it is the Spirit who guarantees the preservation
of the tradition;" therefore 'let him [the believer] hasten to the church where
the Spirit flourlshes.'u
Because of the polemic against the Montanists and later against enthusiasts
generally, the striking charisms gradually faded away. Bur the charismatic
dimension of the church lived on in the martyrs, as it did in monasticism, from
which many bishops came, and later in the sainrs.l'J But even though there have
been repeated severe struggles between charismatic movements marked by
uncontrolled enthusiasm and often by a rigoristic undersrandingof the church's
holiness, and the institutional great church, the church's theologians have
never allowed themselves to be forced inco setting up an opposicion of principle
between Spirit and institution; they have rather seen the church 3S the place
and even the sacrament of the Spirit, and the Spirit as the vital principle or soul
 The Holy Spirit, Lord alld Giver of Life 209
01 the church.'" On the other hand, a certain absorption 01 the Spirit by the
church is unmistakable in this approach.
Beginning in the twellth and thirteenth century the discussion 01 the reality
and ellective action 01 the Spirit in history took on a new dimension. Joachim
01 Flora, a Calabrian abbot," prophecied a coming new age 01 the church, an
age 01 the Spirit which would replace the age 01 the Father (the Old Testament)
and the age 01 the Son (the clerical church) with an age 01 monks, contempla-
tives, and viri spirituales (men 01 the Spirit). In this outlook the hope 01 the
eschatological transformation by the Holy Spirit became the expectation of a
renewal within history. In being thus historicized, the Spirit became a principle
of historical progress. While this renewal and progress was originally thought
of by the Fraticelli as a renewal of the church,Joachim's ideas were soon given
a secularized form. In that form these ideas became the source of the modern
idea of progress and the various modern utopias. We find Joachim's ideas
reappearing, transformed, in Lessing, Kant, Hegel, Schelling and Marx, and
even in the dreadful dream of a Third Empire. In the present as in the past,
Joachim's ideas or fragments of them have been at work in many rheological
trends and movements of renewal within the church.
The church's theologians have taken a critical attitude toward joachim's
ideas. Bonaventure was able, indeed, (Q find one posirive element in Joachim's
thinking, inasmuch as Francis of Assisi was for Joachim an eschawlogical
sign. 12 But on the key issue Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas rook the same
stand: there is no salvation-historical advance beyond Jesus Christ; the Holy
Spirit must therefore be understood as the Spirit of Jesus Christ. Thomas
himself was extremely harsh in his judgment of Joachim; he would have
nothing to do wirh any theological interprerarion of individual historical
evenrsP In his view the new coven<lnt consists in 'the grace of the Holy Spirit,
which is given through faith in Christ' ('gratia spirillls sallcti, quae dalllr per
fidem Christi'). The 'new law' (lex lIova) or 'evangelical law' (lex evallgelica) is
therefore primarily an 'inward implanted law' (lex indita) and only secondarily
connected with anything external; externals serve only in preparation and
implementation. Therefore the law of the new covenant is a law of freedom
and not of the lener that kills; it is not law but gospel." Every historicization
of the acriviry of the Spirit must therefore fall short of the gospel and turn inro
a new legalism.

The church's pneumatology was therefore inspired chiefly by the intention

of safeguarding the unity of the history of salvation and of understanding
the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the Spirit who is inseparably
connected with the person and work of Jesus and whose task it is ro make
the person and work of Jesus present in the church and the individual
Christian and thus bring them to their completion. The new thing which
the Spirit brings is that he constantly makes Jesus Christ present anew in
his escharological newness. The Spirir's work is renewal in the newness of
210 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
Jesus Christ. This means that we are continually linked to the humanity of
Jesus and that the tension between letter and spirit cannot be overcome
through historical progress. Rather, the transition from letter to spirit must
be repeated over and over, without the tension ever being removed within
history. These concerns on the part of ecclesial tradition are undoubtedly
faithful to the testimony of scripture. At the same time, however, the
struggle with the various movements of enthusiasm led to certain narrow-
ings of vision in the tradition: on the one hand, to an identification of the
Spirit with the church or, more accurately, with office in the church, and,
on the other, to a restrictive spiritualization. The freedom and universality
of the Spirit no longer received their full due. Finally, talk olthe Holy Spirit
was largely restricted to the doctrine of the Trinity, where indeed it had its
proper place but also where it could bear little fruit. Thus it was not only
the struggles with the enthusiasts but also the very teaching of the church
on the Holy Spirit as a divine person that led to a certain forgetfulness of
the Spirit. Of this I shall now speak in greater detail.

(e) The Holy Spirit as a persOII

According to the creed, the Holy Spirit is not a mere impersonal gift, nor
is he simply God in his creative, life-giving and saving presence in the world
and in the church; he is also a personal giver of these gifts, he is the third
Person of the Trinity. In the New Testament the confession of the Trinity
appears only in rudimentary form; this is true in particular of the personal
aspect of the Holy Spirit. Nonetheless there are clear indications that the
Bible, too, understands the Spirit as being nO! simply an impersonal gift
but a personal giver.
The wisdom literature of the Old Testament already contains the idea
of hypostases which enjoy a relative independence over against God.
Among these belong especially wisdom, and the pneuma which is largely
identical with wisdom (Wisdom 1.6f.; 7.7, 22, 25). In post-biblical Judaism
categories proper to the person are applied to the Spirit, who is said to
speak, cry out, admonish, grieve, weep, rejoice and console; he is even
represented as speaking to God. He appears as a witness against human
beings, or is presented as their advocatc. 2S
The New Testament uses similar language. It speaks of the Spirit
groaning and praying in us; the Spirit pleads for us with God (Rom. 8.26).
The Spirit bears witness to our spirit (Rom. 8.16). He distributes gifts as
he chooses (I Cor. 12.11). He speaks in the scriptures of the old covenant
(Heb. 3.7; I Peter 1.11 f.; II Peter 1.21) and in the church (I Tim. 4.1). He
instructs the community (Rev. 2.7). All these statements indicate a person
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 211
or at least a personification. In the Gospel of John, the Spirit is the church's
helper and supporter Uohn 15.26). He is in particular the 'other' helper
alongwithJesus Uohn 14.16) and must therefore be understood as personal
by analogy with Jesus Christ. He is sent by the Father in the name oOesus,
but also possesses an independence over against the Father (I John 2.1);
he is not only the returning Christ, but also bears witness to Jesus Uohn
15.26). It is worth noting, too, that though 'Spirit' is a neuter noun in
Greek, he is described inJohn 14.26 by a masculine and therefore personal
demonstrative: 'that one' (ekeinos). In all this we can see clear indications
of a relative independence of the Spirit and of a personal understanding of
his being. In keeping with this, the New Testament already has trinitarian
formulas (Matt. 28.19; II Cor. 13.13; etc.), which I shall be discussing in
detail later on.26
More important than individual passages is the objective context into
which they fit. The question is: what is it that materially necessitates such
statements as indicate the relative independence of the Spirit and his
character as a person? In order to answer this question we shall take as
our point of departure the function of the Holy Spirit. According to the
New Testament it is the task of the Spirit to give a universal presence to
the person and work oOesus Christ and to make these real in the individual
human being. The task is carried out, however, not mechanically but in
the freedom of the Spirit. For 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is
freedom' (II Cor. 3.17). The Spirit does not teach a doctrine of his own,
independent of that of Jesus Christ, but he does teach in the prophetic
mode by leading men to the complete truth and making known what is to
come Uohn 16.13). This freedom of the Spirit is incompatible with the
Spirit being simply an impersonal principle, a medium or dimension;
rather, the freedom of the Spirit presupposes the relative independence of
the Spirit. The explicit acknowledgment of the independent personality of
the Spirit is therefore anything but speculative indulgence; at issue in it is
the reality of Christian salvation: the Christian freedom that is based on
the freedom of God's gift and grace. The development of the full doctrine
on the Holy Spirit thus has for its vital context (its Sitz illl Leben)
an experience, namely, the experience of the irreducible freedom that
characterizes the activity of the Spirit. This is the objective fact which
allows the New Testament to take over certain ideas from post-biblical
Judaism, use them for its own purposes, and at the same time develop
them, on the basis of its own experience, into a confession of the Trinity.

Despite these New Testament beginnings, explicit clarification took a long

time,Z7 In a famous address Gregory of Nazianzus traces the slow advance of
212 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
the revelation of the mystery of God. As he puts it, in the Old Testament the
mystery of the Father was revealed, while the Son remained in the shadows;
the New Testament reveals the Son and insinuates the divinity of the Holy
Spirit. Only at the present time, however, is the Spirit revealing himself more
dearly.28 As a matter of fact, early Christian writers show some obscurity with
regard to the Holy Spirit. He is frequently confused with the Son." At bottom,
the thinking of the Apologists was binitarian rather than trinitarian. Yet
clarification came relatively soon in connection with the baptismal confession
of faith. Like Matt. 28.19, the Didache10 andJustin l l are already familiar with
a trinitarian baptismal confession. In Irenaeus of Lyons12 and Tertullian H the
baptismal confession in its trinitarian form is perfectly clear. The rules of faith
proposed by Irenaeus" and Tertullian" bear witness to the same faith. In
connection with the baptismal confession we find Irenaeus already explaining
that there are three key points of faith" and that all heresies are based on a
denial of one or other of these three points. J7
In Jewish Christianity the theologicol clarification seems to have been
effected initially with the help of apocalyptic images." The first more specul-
ative essays to come with Tcrtullian in the Latin West J9 and Origen in the
East;'10 in both men the explanations show a subordinationist tendency. The
question of subordinationism did not become acute, however, until the fourth
century when, as I indicated earlier, Arius, an Origenist, denied the true divinity
of Jesus Christ. In the final phase of the Arian controversy the same problem
arose in an acute form with regard to the Holy Spirit. The Macedonians or, as
the case might be, the Pneumatomachians (lit., 'battlers against the Spirit')
were at bottom biblicists who refused to accept metaphysical claim as part of
their faith. They understood the Spirit as a serving Spirit, as an interpreter of
God or as a king of angelic being; for them he was either a creature or a being
intermediate between God and creatures. These views were opposed especially
by the three great Cappadocians: Basil the Great (On the Holy Spirit), Gregory
of Nazianzus (Fifth Theological Oration), and Gregory of Nyssa (Great
Catechetical Oration, d. 2). The dispute came out into the open in 374 when
Basil replaced the traditional liturgical doxology 'Glory be to the Father
through the Son in the Holy Spirit' with a new and unfamiliar one: 'Glory be
to the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit'. This doxology placed the Spirit
on the same plane as the Father and the Son. In his book On the Holy Spirit
Basil defends this new formula with, among other arguments, an appeal to the
baptismal confession of faith. Athanasius also entered the controversy (Four
Lellers to Serapion). He argued soteriologically as he had in the dispute about
the true divinity of Jesus Christ: The Holy Spirit can give us a share in the
divine nature and divinize us only if he himself is God." In the view of the
Fathers, therefore, the issue was not a speculative problem but a fundamental
question of salvation.

The Council of Constantinople (381)'2- which historically was a synod

 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 213
of the Eastern Church and became an ecumenical council only because it
was received, especially by the Council of Chalcedon (451) - dealt with
this dispute about the Spirit. The Council composed a didactic document
(Tomas ) which has been lost; we know its content, however, from a letter
which the Synod of 382 sent to Pope Damasus and the Western Synod
which he was chairing in Rome (382). This document speaks of the single
divinity, power and substance (ollsia) of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit,
to whom belong equal honor and dignity and eternal dominion and
who exist in three perfect hypostases or persons." Accordingly, the
Pneumatomachians are anathematized in canon 1, along with the Arians
and other heretics." The Western Synod of 382 under Damasus taught
objectively the same doctrine." Along with the Tomas, which used
technical theological language, the Council of Constantinople also
proposed a confession of faith or, more exactly, made its own the confession
which Epiphanius gives us in his Ancoratlls. 46 In this confession the doctrine
on the Holy Spirit in the Nicene confession of faith is expanded: 'We
believe ... in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from
the Father, who with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified,
who has spoken through the prophets.''' This teaching of the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan creed, the church's great confession of faith, is binding
on all churches of the East and West down to the present time.
It is striking that the article of faith on the Holy Spirit does not use the
term homoousios that is used in the article onJesus Christ. But churchmen
had learned a lesson from the confusion that followed on Nicaea; it is
likely, therefore, that they deliberately avoided this disputed term, which
was open to misunderstanding and was not attested in scripture. None-
theless, the teaching on the divinity of the Holy Spirit was made fully clear
(as can also be seen from the Tomos). The Spirit was described as Kyrios
and thus given the title which was the Septuagint translation of Adonai,
the Hebrew name for God. It was recognized, of course, that the title 'the
Lord' (ho Kyrios) was reserved to Jesus Christ, and therefore the Spirit was
called to Kyrion. The Holy Spirit is thus one who belongs to the category
of Lord and is God. The term 'Giver of life' expressed the same idea in
terms of action and function. For the point of this term was to say that the
Spirit is not only the gift of life but also the giver of the gift, the originator
of spiritual life - something that can come only from God. The term also
makes clear the soteriological and existential character of the confession
of faith in the Holy Spirit. The Fathers consistently argued that if the Holy
Spirit is not truly God, then we are not truly divinized by him.
The further expression, 'who proceeds from the Father', is based on
John 15.26 and is meant to explain the relation of Father and Spirit within
214 The Message abollt the God of Jeslls Christ
the Trinity. The Spirit must not be allowed to be thought a creature of the
Father; at the same he must not be said to be begotten by the Father as the
Son is; he stands in a unique relation to the Father as his origin. In the West
the Spirit's relation to the Son was defined only later on by the addition of
the filioqlle ('and from the Son'), in a way, admittedly, that led to a still
unresolved conflict with the East." In the next clause: 'who with the Father
and the Son is worshipped and glorified', the doxological motif finds
expression which had already played a key role for Basil at the beginning
of the controversy. Emphasis is placed on the idea that the same worship
and glorification belongs to the Spirit as to the Father and the Son, and
even that he is to be worshipped simultaneously with the Father and the
Son. Finally, in the anti-gnostic; formula, 'who has spoken through the
prophets', the role of the Holy Spirit in the histoty of salvation is brought
out. The Old and New Testaments are linked by the one Spirit; they are
related as promise and fulfillment.
Through its reception by the Council of Chalcedon (451), the 'Nicene-
Constantinopolian Creed,' as it is called, became the common possession
of all the churches of East and West. It is one of the strongest ecumenial
bonds and can stand as a basic expression of the Christian faith. This is true
as well of its teaching on the Holy Spirit. All subsequent pneumatological
statements are at bottom only interpretative extensions of this confession;
this is true not least of the well-known addition in the Western form of this
confession, an addition not found in the Eastern form, according to which
the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (fi/ioqlle). In its
original form the confession left a question open at this point. It explained
the divinity of the Holy Spirit as a presupposition of his function in the
history of salvation; it also explained the relation of the Spirit to the Father,
but left open the relation of the Spirit to the Son. This relation is not simply
a speculative question; the issue in it is rather the precise determination of
the relation of the Spirit to the salvific work of the Son and - as part of this
work - to the church. The common confession left room here for various
theological interpretations which later led to serious con fliers and became
an occasion for the division between the Eastern and Western church. We
must now turn to a consideration of these divergent theologies of the Holy
Spirit.

3. Theology of the Holy Spirit

(a) Different theologies ill East alld West
A theology of the Holy Spirit labors under special difficulties. It is not
possible for us human beings to speak of the mystety of God except by
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giller of Life 215
using human images and likenesses. Even the scriptures use a variety of
images to describe the action of the Holy Spirit: breath, air, wind, water
of life, fire or tongues of fire, ointment and anointing, seal, peace, gift,love.
Each of these images attempts to describe the one action and being of the
one Spirit of God from a different angle. The various images can therefore
ground diverse approaches to rheological understanding.
This is precisely what happened in the diverse rheological approaches
of East and West." There was a common ground of faith as attested in
scripture and tradition, bur the result was diverse rheologies of the Holy
Spirir. The differences have to do with both images and concepts and
ulrimately wirh the overall conception of pneumarology. Unfortunately,
however, rhe developmenr did not stop a poinr when there was still a
legitimate and desirable unity pervading a plurality of speculative theo-
logies. Instead, the theological differences made their way into the confes-
sion of faith of the Western church, and specifically in the much debated
addition to the Nicene-Constanrinopolitan creed: 'who proceeds from rhe
Father and rhe Son (filioql/e)'. The fi/ioql/c is not present in the original
text or in the creed of the Orthodox Church down to rhe present time.
Its introduction into the Latin confession of faith turned a theological
difference into a dogmatic belief, which was subsequently interpreted as a
difference separating the churches and is still an unresolved point of
controversy between East and West. The controversy is intelligible and
resolvable only againS! rhe background of different theologies of rhe Holy
Spirit.

The different conceptions are based, to begin with, on rhe different images
used in order to gain a deeper faith-understanding of rhe doctrine of the Holy
Spirit. The dominant model of Larin rheology rakes for irs point of departure
rhe soul's rwo faculries of knowing and willing. The Farher, who knows and
expresses himself in his Son as in his Word, also wills or is moved by love to
unire himself ro this image of himself; in like manner, rhe Son gives himself
whoHy ro rhe Farher in love. This loving grasp and embrace is nor a generative
process comparable to rhe production of the Word by knowledge, in which
something substantially the same yet different emerges; rather, there is a
movement of the will, which seeks the union of what is distinct. Since the
beloved exists in the will of the lover as a power rhar moves and impels, the
beloved can be described as 'spirit' in the sense of :1 power that impels from
within. M. Scheeben has an even better explanation of how a reciprocal love
between Farher and Son can be described as 'Spirir': 'When we wish to express
the intimacy of union between two persons, we say that they are of one spirit,
or even that they are one spirit'.50
This interpretation of rhe Holy Spirit as mutual and reciprocal love between
216 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
Father and Son is an essential of Latin pneumatology, which was established
especially by Augustine. 'The Holy Spirit is in a sense the ineffable communion
of Father and Son.''' 'This ineffable embrace of the Father and his Image is
not unaccompanied by pleasure, love and joy. This love, this joy, this bless-
edness, this happiness, or however this reality is to be described in a way
worthy of God has been called "use'" by Hilary. 'In the Trinity this "use" is
the Holy Spirit, who is not begotten but is the sweet blessedness of the
Begetter and the Begotten.''' This is how Anselm of Canterbury'" and Thomas
Aquinas,s.. in particular, understood the Holy Spirit in continuity with Augus-
tine. Latin theology thus uses a symmetrical represenrational model, according
to which the movement of trinitarian life is rounded off in the Holy Spirit in a
kind of circular movement. But Latin theology was not able consistently co
follow through on this model. For Augustine and the rest of the Western
tradition also wished to regard the Father as sole origin. Therefore, despite his
firmly asserted thesis that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son,"
Augustine also insists that he proceeds originally (prillcipaliter) from the
Father." Thomas Aquinas accepts this formula and describes the Father as the
principiwn or fOilS fOfius triuitatis (source or fountainhead of the entire
Trinity)." It follows from this that the Son derives from the Father his power
to produce the Spirit; Thomas is therefore also able to say that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Father through the Son. Only in Anselm of Canterbury is
no room made for this point of view. Unfortunately, it was Anselm who
influenced the rater theological tradition at this point!
Alongside this model a second is to be found in Latin theology; its point of
departure is an analysis of love. According to Augustine, love has three
elements: the lover, the beloved, and the love itself.s8 Later on it was Richard
of St Vicror in particular who developed this approach; Alexander of Hales,
Bonaventure and the Franciscan School took it over from himY' According to
Richard St Vicror, perfect love, which is God, is wholly ce-static. It therefore
exists as Father, that is, as pure giver (gratllitlls). As gift wholly given away it
also exists as Son, that is, as gift wholly received from another (debitlls) and
wholly given away in turn (gratllitlls). Finally, it exists in the Holy Spirit as gift
wholly received (debitus); the Spirit is the common beloved (colldilectllS) of
Father and Son. He is gift in an unqualified sense.'" This second model has the
advantage that, unlike the first, it docs not understand the Holy Spirit as the
mUluallove of Father and Son, but more clearly and consistently brings out
the status of the Father 3S the source which gives love to the Son, a love which
the Son, who possesses it as given [0 him by the Father, together with the
Father who possesses it as ungiven, then bestows on the Spirit.
The Greeks, [00, use human images and analogies for understanding the
Son and the Spirit of God. But, unlike the Latins, the Greeks take as their
starting point not the interior word but the external, spoken word. For us
hum:ln beings this external word is associated with breath :lS :l movement of
the air. 'When we spe:lk a word, this movement of the air produces the voice,
 The Holy Spirit, Lord alld Giver of Life 217
which alone makes the meaning of the word accessible [Q others.' In an
analogous manner, in God, too, there is a breath, namely, the Spirit 4 w hich
accompanies the word and reveals its efficacy'.61
Latins and Greeks thus start with different representational models. From
the divergent images used come different theological conceptions. According
to the Latins the Spirit proceeds from the reciprocal love of Father and Son;
the Greeks, on the other, speak only of a procession of the Spirit from the
Father. This does not mean that for the Greeks the Spirit is not also the Spirit
of the Son." For 'he proceeds from the Father and rests in the Word and reveals
him'.63 In this sense the Spirit 'proceeds from the Father, is communicated
through the Son, and is received by every creature. He creates by his own
power, makes all things be, sanctifies and holds together.''' The advantage of
this conception is that it maintains the position of the Father as sole source
within the Godhead and that the relation of the Spirit to activity in the world
is brought out more clearly than in the Latin conceptions, which are in danger
of turning the life of God in the Holy Spirit into something self-enclosed and
not turning outward to the world and history.
The different analogies used are matched by different concepts. The common
basis for the formation of concepts is John 15.26, where the Spirit is described
as one 'who proceeds from the Father' ("0 para tal/ patros ekporel/etai). All
the traditions have in common that in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed
they replace para with ek and replace ekporel/etai in the present tense with the
participle ekporeuomcllon, in order to bring out not only the temporal
procession but the abiding eternal procession.(;S The difference between Greeks
and Latins began when the Vulgate translated ekporel/etai as procedit, for
processio in Latin theology has a much more general meaning than ekporclIsis
in Greek theology. EkporclIcsthai means 4emcrge from, go forth from, stream
forth from'. In this sense the concept is applicable only to the Father, the first,
unoriginated origin; the co-operation of the Son in the procession of the Holy
Spirit, on the other hand, must be described by the verb proienai. Latin does
not make this fine distinction. According to Latin theology processio is a
general concept that can be applied to all of the inter-trinitarian processes, that
is, not only to the coming forth of the Spirit from the Father, but also to the
generation of the Son and to the breathing of the Spirit through the Son. As a
result, Latin theology is faced with a problem that does not have a parallel in
Greek theology. For Latin theology too must hold fast to the distinction
between the processio of the Son from the Father and the processio of the Spirit
from the Father. If the Spirit proceeded from the Father in the same manner
as the Son, there would be two Sons and no longer any distinction between
Son and the Spirit. Given the presuppositions of Latin theology, the distinction
between Son and Spirit can be preserved only by giving the Son a role in the
procession of the Spirit from the Father, whereas he does not have an active
role in his own procession from the Father. Admittedly, he plays a part not
principaliter, that is, as an origin, but only in virtue of the being he has received
218 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
from the Father. For this reason, Latin theology has always insisted that in the
procession of the Holy Spirit Father and Son form a single principle." In fact,
Latin theology can even say with Thomas Aquinas that the Spirit proceeds
from the Father through the Son. The disadvantage, of course, is that the
(i/ioql/e does not express in credal form the differentiation of roles which is
accepted in Latin theology.
The Greek theology of the Spirit likewise has its weaknesses. It is able to
express the special role of the Father in the procession of the Spirit, but in its
dogmatic credal formulas it is completely silent about the relation of the Spirit
to the Son. Simply to leave open the relation of Son and Spirit is, not of course,
a solution. For according co the scripture, in terms of the economy of
salvation the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father Uohn 15.26), but he is also
communicated by the Son Uohn 14.16,26). But if the economy of salvation
and the theology of the inner life of the Trinity should not diverge but rather
correspond, and if the Son has a share in the sending of the Spirit in the history
of salvation, then he cannot fail to have a share in to the intra·trinitarian
procession of the Spirit. According to the scriptures, after all, the Spirit is the
Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4.6) or the Spirit of Jesus Christ (Rom. 8.9; Phil. 1.19).
According to Rev. 22.1 the water of life 'nows (ekporel/Omelloll) from the
throne of God and of the Lamb'.
These data from the Bible are probably the reason why the Greek fathers of
the first centuries did not object to early formulations of the (ilioqllc or its
equivalents in Ambrose, Augustine and Leo the Great. More th3n this,
formulations are (0 be found in some Greek fathers, especially Arhanasius,
Cyril of Alexandria and even Basil, that sound like the Western (ilioqllc." The
Greek fathers do, of course, speak mostly of a procession of the Spirit from
the Father through the Son," a formula which is not wholly foreign to the
Latins; this is tfue especially of Tertullian/''1 who, even before Augustine, had
Inid the foundation of Latin teaching on the Triniry. An interesting formula,
which combines the concerns of both West and East, is to be found In
Epiphanius of Salamis, who speaks of the Spirit 'who proceeds from the Father
and receives from the 50n'.70 While Epiphnnius seeks to medinte bctwcen the
two traditions from the side of Latin theology, Mnximus the Confessor in the
seventh century starts with Greek presuppositions in his efforts to mediate; "
in the later patristic period, as the latter is drawing to its close, he IS an
important witness to ecumenical unity between East and West.

The points of contact just indicated cannot and should not blur the
differences between the two traditions; they were to show, however, that
in the early centuries these differences were never taken as a challenge to
the common faith and that, on the contrary, because of the common
biblical basis and a common tradition there were bridges of many kinds
between East and West. Both theologies were trying to say objectively the
same thing. They bore witness to one and the same faith but in different
 The Holy Spirit. Lord and Giller of Life 219
conceptual forms. In other words, they were complementary theologies.
each internally consistent and coherent but each also irreducible 10 the
other. The difference in terminology presented no problem at all in the lirst
eight centuries; it was never an occasion for controversy, much less for 3
rupture of ecclesial communion.

The {ilioqlle first became a problem when the Latins turned their theological
formula into a dogmatic confessional formula and thus unilaterally changed
the originally common text of the creed. The change lOok place initially in
various provincial Synods of Toledo in the fifth to the seventh centuries. n The
background of this development has still not been fully clarified. It is probable
that in the {ilioqlle these ptovincial synods were reacting against an offshoot
of Arianism, namely, Priscillianism. The imention of the fjlioqlle, in this case,
was to assert the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father and to emphasize
the point that the Spirit is the Spirit not only of the Father but also of the Son.
These 3fC concerns that were shared by the East 3S well. If is clear, therefore.
that the {ilioqlle was in no way originally directed at the East but represented
a development peculiar to the West at a rime when contacts with the East had
already been greatly weakened. so that eventually mutual understanding
ccased. To this extent, then, the {ilioqul! is the Western form in which the
Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed was received.
The controversy over the Latin tradition and reception broke out only when
Charlemagne atthe Council of Frankfurt (794) objected to the Second Council
of Nicaea (787) and its confession of the procession of the Holy Spirit 'from
the Father through the Son' and proclaimed instead the {ilioqlle which had
meanwhile been received in the West. The Council of Aachen (809) officially
added the {ilioqlle to the creed. For our present purposes we may ignore the
political background of all this, although it did determine the emotional
c1ima£t:. Rome was very reserved and even opposed (Q the development. Pope
Leo IIJ dolended Nicaea and thus the tradition and set himself against the
Carolingian council. He maintained his position when Frankish monks in the
monastery of St. Sabbas in Jerusalem introduced the {ilioqll' into the creed of
the Mass and gave occasion for considerable controversy. The pope defended
the teaching contained in the {ilioqlle but he refused its incorporation into the
creed. Pope Benedict VIIJ took a different attitude when Emperor Henry II
demanded that the (ilioqll' be incorporated into the creed of the Mass at his
coronation in 1014. With the agreement of the pope a new confessional
tradition was begun in the West. 7J
The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and in particularthe Second Council of
Lyons (1274) defined the Western doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit
from (he Father and the 500.7'" Lyons rejected the Eastern misunderstanding
(which has lasted in part down to our own day) of the {ilioqlle: that there are
two principles or origins in the T riniry. According to the teachingof the Lateran
Council. Father and Son form a single principle in the procession of the Holy
220 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
Spirit. In a certain sense it can even be said that the West emphasizes the unity
of the Trinity even more than the East docs, since in the {ilioque it insists on
the equality and even singleness of substance of the Spirit with the Father and
the Son and, with regard to the distinction of persons, shows that the intra·
trinitarian movement of life and love between Father and Son ends in the Holy
Spirit as the bond of unity.
The introduction of the {i/ioque created a canonical as well as a dogmatic
problem for the East. From the canonical standpoint the East objected to the
introduction of the (iUoque as Illicit according to the canons. It saw in the
aCllon a viola lion of the seventh canon of the Council of Ephesus (431 ), which
had forbidden the formation of a different confession of faith (helera pislis)."
The Latins, however, saw in the {jlioquc not a different faith but an explication
of one and the same faith as had been professed by Nicaea and Constantinople.
It was above all Patriarch PhOlius in the ninth century who lOok up the
objective dogmatic question: - He opposed the Latin {ilioqlle and set in its
place the formula ek mOIlOll lOll palTOs (from the Father alone). This formula
has a legitimate meaning when ekporcltsis is given its strict Greek meaning
and taken in the Augustinian sense of prillcipaliler procedere. But with the
polemical meaning given it by Photius this formula is itself a novelty. In thIS
Monopatrism the texts of the Greek tradition that had asserted ::t procession
from the Father through the Son, or something comparable, were brushed
aside, and any agreement with the West was rendered impossible. The Greek
church canonized Photius' views, although without shelving the older fathers,
as Photius had. The Greek tradition is broader and richer than it seems to be
when viewed through Photius' polemical spectacles.
Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century lOok a further and much more
decisive s[ep in [he theological dispute." According to him there IS no real
indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the faithful; what is poured out upon the
faithful is not the substance of God but only the uncreated action, radlonce
and glory (energeia); only his uncreated gift and not the giver himself. For this
reason it is not possible to argue back from the economic Trinity to the
immanent Trinity. The question then arises whether this radical theo!og;a
negat;va does not make the immanent Trinity irrelevant to the history of
salvation and deprive it of any role therein. The Neopalamite theologians of
our century (especially V. Lossky,1H have renewed this rejection in principle of
the {ilioqlfe; they see in Latin filioquism the root of all Latin heresies including
even the dogma of papal primacy. According 10 Lossky the {ilioqlfe connects
the Holy Spirit in a onesided way to the Son; this kind of christomonism no
longer assures the freedom of the Spirit in the church. On the other hand, since
V. Bolotov, church historian at St Petersburg, published his 'Theses on the
Fi/ioqlle',7'J a more historical judgment has to some extent prevailed even in
the Orthodox churches; these now regard the {ilioqlle as canonically irregular,
but not as a dogmatic error,
In the West [he view can be found at an early date that non-acceptance of
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 221
the (ilioqlle is heretical. But the positions of the great theologians of the high
Middle Ages on this matter are far more nuanced than is usually assumed.'.
In consequence, there was good reason (0 expect reunion with the Greeks at
the Council of Florence (1439--45)." The Council was aware of the Greek
distinction according to which the Son is indeed callsa of the procession of the
Spirit but not, like the Father, its prillcipimll. To that extent, the Council
acknowledges the formula 'through the Son', although it interprets this as
equivalent to the Western (ilioqlle which, it says, was rightly and reasonably
added to the creed." Because of this Western attitude it is understandable that,
even apart from political and emodonal reasons, the East was not satisfied
with the reunion offered and did not receive it. For the present-day Roman
Catholic Church the decisions of Pope Benedict XIV (1742 and 1755) are
normative: the Uniate Eastern Churches are allowed the use of the unaltered
creed of 381. This is to acknowledge thalthe formulas used in the two churches
are complementary.
The churches of the Reformation took over the confession of faith in its
Western form and therefore with the addition of the (ilioqlle. In the present
century K. Barth in particular has expressly defended the (ilioqlle."
Only with the contemporary ecumenical discussion has the question entered
a new phase." The discussion has led to the feeling that the West should restore
the original text by striking the (ilioqlle from the creed, and thus create the
conditions for a new dialogue on the Holy Spirit. But this suggestion would
produce fruit only if the East were at the same time to acknowledge that in
what it intends to say the (ilioqllc is not heretical but theologically legitimate.
In other words, East and West must reciprocally acknowledge the legitimacy
of their divergent theological traditions. Of course, if this acknowledgement
were to be given, there appears to be no reason why the West should renounce
its confessional tradition. Conversely, the West need not impose its traditio"
on the East. Such a unity in multiplicity is, in my view, a far morc appropriate
ecumencial goal than a monolithic confessional unity would be. In order to
reach this goal, it is necessary, of course, that the conversation between East
and West on the theological motives behind the (ilioqtte or its rejection be
carried to a signific.ntly deeper level. For in the final analysis, as the Neopala.
mite controversy has shown, the issue here is not a remote and abstract
theological problem but the relation between the economic Trinity and the
immanent Trinity or, to pm it more concretely, the way in which the Holy
Spirit works in the faithful and in the church.

In light of what has been said, any further ecumenical dialogue on the
(ilioqlle faces a twofold task. On the one hand, it must achieve a recognition
that East and West have two different traditions, based on a common faith,
which are both legitimate and which can therefore acknowledge and
complement each other, without either being reducible to the other. There
are present here complementary theologies and complementary formulas.
222 The Message about the God of jesus Christ
The essential concern of the (ilioque is twofold: to preserve the consubstan-
tiality (homoousios) of the Father and the Son, and to emphasize the fact
that according to the scripture the Holy Spirit is always the Spirit of Jesus
Christ, the Spirit of the Son. Conversely, the East is more concerned than
the West to maintain the monarchy of the Father and the freedom of action
of the Holy Spirit. These concerns are not contradictory, although no one
has as yet succeeded in reducing them to components and thus cancelling
while also preserving them in a higher, single theology of the Holy Spirit.
On the other hand, as the fact just noted shows, the dialogue between
East and West must make it dear that the two traditions are dealing with
different problems. The East in its confession of faith leaves open the
relation of the Spirit to the Son; the West for its part has difficulty in
conceptually distinguishing the relation of the Spirit to the Son from the
relation of the Spirit to the Father. The ultimate question that waits in the
background is that of the relation between the activity of the Holy Spirit
in the economy of salvation as the Spirit of Jesus Christ, and the being of
the Spirit within the Trinity. A dialogue on the different formulas of the
past must be conducted with an openness to the future, in order to bring
clarification to the still unresolved problems on both sides.
Only the future can show whether such a dialogue can lead to a new
common formula that accepts both traditions and at the same time opens
a way forward. One possible formula would be: 'qui ex Patre per Filium
procedit' (who proceeds from the Father through the Son). But more
important than such a commonly accepted formula is unity in the objective
truth. I have no doubt that such unity exists today despite all the differences
in images, concepts and accents, and that the differences of the theologies
in this area do not amount to a difference that should divide the churches.
Likewise more important than a new commonly accepted formula is that
the misunderstandings of the past should stimulate us to be sensitive to the
concerns of the other tradition and thereby to clarify and enrich our own
tradition, thus deepening the existing unity in truth and making both
parties more dearly conscious of it. The issue here is not a useless quarrel
about words but a deeper understanding of our salvation, that is, the
question of how the salvation effected by Jesus Christ is communicated
through the Holy Spirit. Is the Holy Spirit himself the gift of salvation, or
is salvation an uncreated or created gift that is distinct from the giver? In
what manner are we incorporated into the life of the triune God? These
are questions truly worth discussing. A hasty elimination of the (ilioque
could easily tempt us to leave problems untouched instead of seeking an
answer to them.
 The Holy Spirit, Lord alld Giver of Life 223
(b) Suggestiolls for a theology of the Holy Spirit
A more profound theology of the Holy Spirit"' is confronted with the
difficulty that, unlike the Father and the Son, the Spirit is faceless as it were.
He is like the wind that blows where it will: 'You hear the sound of it, but
you do not know whence it comes or whither it goes' Uohn 3.8). Thomas
Aquinas long ago acknowledged the linguistic problem in speaking of the
Holy Spirit.'. The Holy Spirit is often described as 'the unknown God'."
H. Urs von Balthasar calls him the Unknown One beyond the Word." In
a special way the Holy Spirit expresses the mystery of God whose depths
no one knows but he (I Cor. 2.11). It is possible within limits to see the
differences berween the latin and Greek conceptions of the Holy Spirit,
which found critical expression in the latin addition of the {ilioqu. to the
creed, as originating ultimately in the fact that the Greek emphasize
especially the incomprehensibility of God and the mysteriousness of the
Spirit, while the latin doctrine of the Trinity with its analogies from the
life of the human soul strike the Greeks as rational or even rationalistic.
The Greeks regard the theological deductions which lead to the {ilioqu. as
an intolerable injection of rational thinking into the realm of the mystery
of God. This is not to deny, of course, that in its own way latin theology
likewise intends to preserve the mysteriousness and non-manipulable
freedom of the love and grace of God, which the Holy Spirit is in person.
In view of the mysteriousness of the Holy Spirit a theology of this divine
Person is possible only if we take as our point of departure what the word
of God reveals to us about him and what we know of the activity and
effects of the Spirit in the history of salvation. The starting point must not
be speculation, Neoplatonic or idealistic, but the experience of the Spirit
in history: such experience as is attested and authentically interpreted in
scripture and in the traditions that explain scripture. The basis of a theology
of the Holy Spirit is not to be found in analogies from the life of the human
spirit. The latin tradition in particular has been accusromed to such
analogies ever since Augustine; in them the Son is correlated with know-
ledge through the interior word and the Spirit with the will and the loving
union of Father and Son. Such analogies can indeed shed some light as
supplementary aids to understanding; the starting point and foundation,
however, even in Augustine, is the testimony of faith to the action of the
Spirit in the history of salvation. Only in Scholasticism, and especially in
Anselm of Canterbury and (with less genius, but with more hair-splitting
to make up for the lack) in the decadent controversies of the thirteenth and
fourteenth century schools, did such speculative deductions gain pride of
224 The Message about the God of Jesus Christ
place, whereas Thomas Aquinas is still resolute in starting from the faith
of the church and the experience of the Spirit as gift.
Of the many images which scripture uses in describing the action and
effects of the Holy Spirit (breath, ait, wind, water of life, fire or tongues of
fire, ointment and anointing, seal, peace), the most inAuential in the history
of theology has been the characterization of the Holy Spirit as gift and, in
connection with this, a~ love. According to scripture the Spirit is God's
eschatological gift; as such he completes the works of God. The scriptures
regard the Spirit as the gift without qualification (Acts 2.38; 8.20; 10.45;
11.17; Heb. 6.4; d. John 4.10). New Testament statements about the
Spirit aretherelore frequently accompanied by the verbs 'give' and 'receive'.
Through the gift of the Holy Spirit the love of God is poured out in our
hearts (Rom. 5.5). This means that the Spirit is even now given to us as a
first installment of eschatological fulfillment (II Cor. 1.22; Eph. 1.14).
With sighs he is already bringing about the eschatological fulfillment of
creation in the kingdom of the freedom of God's children (Rom. 8.1811.).
The same language recurs in the fathers of the church. Following Hilary,"
Augustine in particular developed a pneumatology of the Spirit .s gift'·
which Peter Lomb.rd>' and Thom.s Aquin.s" took up .nd c.rried further.
In addition, the Greek fathers emph.sized the point th.t.s eschatological
gift the Spirit is the sanctification, fulfillment, completion and go.1 of all
realiry; he effects the divinization of m.n and reality so that God m.y be
all in all (I Cor. 15.28)."
It is the task of theology to develop these d.ta of scripture .nd tradition
into a theology of the Holy Spirit. This does not mean drawing conclusions
from the data of scripture and tradition as though they were premises, and
thus p.ssing from the realm of binding faith into the realm of non-binding
private speculation. The point is, r.ther, to penetr.te more deeply into the
inner spirit and meaning of what is believed, in order to reach an
understanding of that which is believed (intellectus fidei). This is done by
seeking to grasp the intern.1 connection between the various experiences
and interpretations of faith (nexus mysteriorum), as well as their mutual
correspondences (ana/ogia fidei), and thus come to understand the one
mystery that is manifested in the various mysteries of faith. The point,
therefore, is not to do away with the mystery by rationalizing it but to gain
a deeper understanding of the mystery as mystery.
This penetration and understanding of the depths of the divinity is not
possible to the human spirit by its own power, but is the doing solely of
the Spirit of God (I Cor. 2.11). Theology itself is therefore a spirit-ual
process, something done in the Holy Spirit. For if we could grasp the
mystery of God with our finite intellectual powers, we would degrade his
 The Holy Spirit, Lord alld Giver of Life 225
divinity; in knowing him we would misunderstand him; in trying to
conceive him we would be laying violent hands on him. If God is to remain
God in our knowing of him and not turn into an idol which we knock
together or tailor to our own measure, then God must not only reveal
himself to us 'objectively' but must also grant us the 'subjective' power to
know him; he must give us the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of faith (II Cor.
4.13) who enlightens the eyes of our heart (Eph. 1.18). He is the Spirit of
wisdom and understanding (Isa. 11.2). Only through the Holy Spirit is it
possible for us to address God as Father (Rom. 8.15; Gal. 4.6). The Spirit
gives us the ability and power to recognize as such the love of God that is
given to us in Jesus Christ and to take delight in it. In the Holy Spirit who
is God in us we are able to acknowledge God over us, God the Father, as
the one who in his Son is God among us. The Spirit enables us to recognize
God's grace as grace; through him we are able to grasp God's gift as a gift,
his love as his love; the Spirit is the subjective possibility of revelation."
Since the Spirit, in an eschatological and definitive way, reveals God's
eschatological giftness and eschatological love in us and for us, he must
also be in himself God's graciousness. For if he were not God's love and
giftness in himself 'first of all' but were this only for us, he could not reveal
to us the Godness of God, which, as we saw earlier, consists in the freedom
of his self-communicating love. The Spirit would then not reveal God as
he is but only God as and insofar as he shows himself in history. In order
that the Holy Spirit may be the subjective possibility of the eschatological
and definitive revelation of the love and thus the Godness of God, he must
himself be this freedom in love; that is, he must be God's love in person.
He must be not only God's gift but also the giver of this gift; he must
embody in a manner personal to himself that which God is by his nature.
This thesis is not an arbitrary inference from the Spirit's action in the
history of salvation to his personal divine being. That kind of inference
must inevitably be powerless in the face of the mysteriousness of the Spirit.
We can say nothing about the inner divine being of the Spirit that is not
revealed to us by the Spirit himself and attested in scripture. The only thing
in our power is to be led and enlightened by the Spirit so as to know the
internal connection and internal correspondence berween what revelation
says about the action of the Spirit in the history of salvation and what it
says about his divine being.
These reflections are confirmed and carried further by Augustine's
comments on the subject. Augustine asks himself the question: how is it
possible to call the Spirit the gift and love of God when love and giftness
are the very nature of God and therefore common to all the divine persons?
In his answer he distinguishes berween love in the substantial sense and
226 The Message abollt the God of Jeslls Christ
love in the person31 sense. In the substantial sense love is the very being of
God and common to all the divine persons; in the personal sense it is said
in a special way of the Holy Spirit. 9s According to Augustine, then, the
Holy Spirit expresses in a personal manner the giftness and love of the
Father and the Son; he is in his very person the reciprocal love of the Father
and the Son. 96 Unlike the Son he proceeds from the Father qllomodo datlls
(as given) and not qllomodo nallIs (as born)." The Spirit thus shows that
the giftness and love of God do not first become a reality in the form of a
gift made in the course of history, but are instead a reality from all eternity;
in other words that God is from eternity 'givable' (dO//abi/e)." The Spirit
is thus 'God in such a way' 'that he can at the same time be called the gift
of God'." Here we have the deepest reason why the Holy Spirit as gift is
at the same time giver of the gift.
We may sum up and say that the Holy Spirit reveals, and is, the giftness
of God as gift, love as love. The Spirit thus expresses the innermost nature
of God - God as self-communicating love - in such a way that this
innermost reality proves at the same time to be the outermost, that is, the
possibility and reality of God's being outside of himself. The Spirit is as it
were the ecstasy of God; he is God as pure abundance, God as the overAow
of love and grace. IOU On the one hand, then, the immanent love of God
reaches its goal in the Spirit. But at the same time, because in the Holy
Spirit the Father and the Son as it were understand and realize themselves
as love, the love of God in the Spirit also moves beyond God himself.
This loving streaming-out-beyond occurs not in the form of a necessary
streaming-out but in the personal manner of voluntary sharing and free,
gracious self-communication. In the Spirit God has as it were the possibility
of being himself by emptying or divesting himself. In the Holy Spirit God
is eternally givable. With this in mind the fathers often compared the Spirit
to the wafted perfume of an ointment lOl orthought of him as the radiating
beauty of God, the traces of which can be seen in created beauty, in the
wealth of created gifts, and in the abundance that marks creation. IOI
As completion within God the Spirit is, then, also the eschatological
completion of the world.
This theology of the Holy Spirit affords correctives to numerous tenden-
cies in Eastern theology as well as to the Neo·scholastic type of Western
theology. Unlike the Palamite theologians, I understand grace not as
uncreated energy but as the real self-communication of God in and through
the indwelling of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit. Through the indwelling
of the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us, we participate in the divine
nature (Il Peter 1.4). But, differently from what took place in the self-
communication of the Son of God, we do not, through the Spirit, become
 The Holy Spirit, Lord alld Giver of Life 227
children of God by reason 01 a generation, that is, substantially; rather we
become sons and daughters 01 God through gilt and grace or, in other
words, we become children 01 God by adoption. (Rom. 8.15,23; Gal. 4.5).
In thus taking seriously what the New Testament says about the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit and in speaking not only of an indwelling 01
God that is simply appropriated to the Holy Spirit but rather 01 a
personal (hypostatic) indwelling, I also diller lrom Neo·scholasticism in its
understanding 01 grace as a created reality distinct from God. 10' Grace is
rather first 01 all uncreated grace, God's sell-communication in the Holy
Spirit. To say this is not to exdude created grace. For uncreated grace
changes the human person within; it has created ellects, and it requires an
acceptance by man that is possible only through grace. Therefore uncreated
grace, or the indwellingol the Holy Spirit, requires created grace to prepare
the way lor it, just as it also has created grace lor a consequence. It is
impossible, therefore, to conceive 01 the sell-communication 01 God in the
Holy Spirit apart lrom the manilold gifts 01 the Holy Spirit that are distinct
lrom God and therefore created.
All this makes it dear that a theology of the Holy Spirit as both giver
and gilt, and thus a theology 01 the Holy Spirit as sell-g,ft, is the ultimate
ground or, in other language, the transcendental theological condition for
the possibility 01 the reality and ellective realization 01 the salvation that
is bestowed on us through Jesus Christ. It is also dear, then, that the
theology 01 the Holy Spirit does not take us out of the realm of faith but
on the contrary leads us more deeply into to. This theology proves its value
by giving us a deeper understanding 01 what salvation really is. Thomas
Aquinas, in particular, has given a magnificent explanation 01 how the
action and ellects 01 the Holy Spirit are to be understood in the light 01 the
Holy Spirit as divine love in person.''''
Since the Spirit is divine love in person, he is, first 01 all, the source 01
creation, lor creation is the outflow of God's love and a participation in
God's being. The Holy Spirit is the internal (in God) presupposition of this
communicability of God outside olhimself. But the Spirit is also the source
of movement and life in the created world. Wherever something new arises,
whenever lile is awakened and reality reaches ecstatically beyond itself, in
all seeking and striving, in every lerment and birth, and even more in the
beauty of creation, something 01 the activity and being 01 God's Spirit is
manilested. The Second Vatican Council sees this universal activity of the
Spirit not only in the religions 01 mankind but also in human culture and
human progress. lOS We may even say that because the Spirit is the inner
condition for the possibility 01 creation, the latter is already always more
228 The Message abollt the God of jeslls Christ
than pure nature.'.' Through the presence and action of the Holy Spirit
creation already always has a supernatural finality and character.
Secondly, the Holy Spirit is in a special way a source in the order of
grace. He is at work everywhere that human beings seek and find friendship
with God. A loving union with God is possible for us only through the
Holy Spirit. 107 Through the Spirit we are in God and God is in us. Through
him we are God's friends, sons and daughters, who, because we are
impelled from within, serve God not as slaves but as free beings and who
are filled with joy and consolation by this friendship with God. The grace
of the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Jesus Christ, is thus, as
Thomas Aquinas has shown, the law of the new covenant. This law is a
law written in the heart, as interior law that moves us from within, and
therefore a law of freedom.'·' Joy in God is the real freedom of the children
of God. This freedom manifests itselfin the many charisms (I Cor. 12.4-11 )
and fruits (Gal. 5.22f.) of the Holy Spirit. The supreme gift and fruit of the
Spirit is love (I Cor. 13), for he is truly free who is not tied to himself but
can surrender himself in the service of love (Gal. 5.13). This freedom that
is given by the Spirit shows itself most fully in a love that renounces self
even in the situation of persecution and suffering. In perseverance under
persecution and in the patient endurance of suffering, the interior independ-
ence of the powers and principalities that press on us from without reaches
its most complete form. Not without reason is the Spirit often described
both in scripture Uohn 15f.) and in tradition as strength (rob"r) for
resistance. He is at the same time the Spirit of truth Uohn 15.26; 16.13)
who brings true reality to light despite efforts to distort and suppress it by
violence and lies, and thus allows the splendor of God's glory to radiate
upon the world once again. This healing and transforming power of the
Spirit finds its most beautiful expression in the well known hymns to the
Holy Spirit Velli Creator Spirittts ('Creator Spirit, come'; ninth century)
and Velli Sancte Spirittts ('Come, Holy Spirit'; twelfth century). In these
hymns the Spirit is described as the life·giving creative Spirit who, as the
Holy Spirit, also fills the heart with the breath of the grace-life of love. He
expels the powers of evil, deanses what is soiled, fructifies what is arid,
gives warmth to what is cold and heals what is ill. In the sanctifying action
ofthe Holy Spiritlhe eschatological transformation and fulfillment of man
and world dawns in us.
Thirdly, what has been said of the Spirit has consequences for the
understanding of the church. If the Spirit is the authentic presence and
realization of the salvation given through Jesus Christ, then whatever is
external in the church - scripture and sacraments, offices and certainly the
discipline of the church - has for its sole task to prepare men for receiving
 The Holy Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life 229
the gift of the Spirit, to serve in the transmission of this gift, and to enable
it to work effectively .'09 This means that the reign of Christ extends beyond
and embraces more than the visible church. Wherever there is love, the
Spirit of God is at work, and the reign of Christ becomes a reality even
without institutional forms and formulas. 110 It also means that the Holy
Spirit is the internal life'principle or soul of the visible church. 11I The
church must live by the power of the Spirit and constantly renew itself by
that power. The constant presence and operation of the Spirit keeps the
church always young. The action of the Spirit in the church takes the form
of making Jesus Christ present ever anew in his newness. 1I2 Precisely as
the Spirit of Jesus Christ the Spirit is the Spirit of freedom from the letter
that kills. The Spirit preserves the church in its fidelity to tradition by
leading it in a prophetic way into the entire truth and making known to it
what is coming Uohn 16.13). He is not a kind of ideological guarantee of
the church's status quo, but rather the Spirit of continual renewal. Above
all, he makes known to the church ever new missionary opportunities, and
points out ever new ways for it to go. He urges the church to heed his
action in the 'signs of the times', to interpret these, and in their light to
gain a deeper understanding of the Christian message.
In all these ways, the Spirit, who searches and knows the depths of the
godhead (I Cor. 2.11), enables us to gain an ever deeper knowledge and
ever greater love of God. Therefore it is he who also leads us into the depths
of God by enabling us to know who God is as Father, Son and Spirit. He
discloses to us the triune being of God and makes possible that knowledge
of the Trinity in which the deepest mystery of the God of Jesus Christ finds
its abiding and binding expression.
 PART THREE

The Trinitarian Mystery of God

 I

Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity

1. Preparation in religious history and in philosophy

The confession of one God in three persons is rightly regarded as proper

and specific to Christian faith in God.' This trinitarian confession is not,
however, a specific difference that is added as a Christian characteristic,
or perhaps oddity, to a general religious conception of God of one kind or
another, rather, it is the Christian form of speaking about God, that at the
same time claims to express the eschatologically definitive and universal
truth about God from which alone all other talk about God can derive its
full truthfulness. It is the objective and even objectively necessary and
binding formulation of the eschatological revelation God has given of
himself in Jesus Christ through the working of the Holy Spirit. The
trinitarian confession is therefore the recapitulation and summary of the
entire Christian mystery of salvation, and with it the entire reality of
Christian salvation stands or falls. It is no accident that this confession has
for its vital context (Sifz ill! Leben) not the unworldy speculations of monks
and theologians but the act of becoming a Christian, that is, baptism,
which is administered in all churches 'in the name of the Father and of the
Son and of the Holy Spirit'. Becoming a Christian, like being a Christian,
is unconditionally linked to the trinitarian confession.
But it is precisely at this point, which holds the entire edifice together
like the keystone of a Gothic arch, that difficulties of understanding become
particularly numerous. And in saying this I am far from thinking chiefly of
logical difficulties or of the certainly far from simple problems raised by
biblical theology and by the history of religions and of dogma. Far more
important is the question of the practical relevance to Christian life. It is a
fact that many Christians correctly repeat the trinitarian profession of
faith, for example, when they recite the creed during the celebration of the
234 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
eucharist; it is also a fact that these same people can make very little use
of it in their Christian lives. Karl Rahner's observation that most Christians
are in practice strict monotheists is probably correct.' The widespread
custom, which occasionally makes its way even into official documents, of
speaking of a personal God instead of a !ripersonal God, as the trinitarian
confession requires, fully confirms Rahner's thesis. Before discussing
the strictly theological problem; of the trinitarian confession, we must
therefore concern ourselves first with approaches to the understanding of
the Trinity, in order thus to advance to the theological dimension proper,
within which alone this confession can become relevant for us. In these
preliminary considerations I am not yet concerned to justify the trinitarian
faith, but only to offer some preparatory and introductory reflections that
will bring to light the question to which the confession claims to provide
the answer.
The church's doctrine of the Trinity has obviously never made the
completely absurd claim that is constantly attributed to it, namely that 1 =
3. The attribution would be correct only if the doctrine claimed that 1
person = 3 persons, or that 1 divine substance = 3 divine substances; that
is, if it claimed that God is both unity and trinity in one and the same
respect. Such a claim would violate the principle of contradiction, according
to which one and ~he same reality cannot in one and the same respect be
simultaneously one and three. But what the doctrine of the Trinity asserts
is that in God there is a unity of substance and a trinity of persons or a
unity of substance in a trinity of persons. The one and the three refer,
therefore, to entirely different aspecrs, and therefore there is no inherent
contradiction. This negative statement can be supplemented by a positive
statement. In the trinitarian confession of faith the problem is not an
arithmetical and logical one, that is, one that is relatively superficial from
the existential standpoint. Rather, in the numbering of one and three as
well as in the reciprocal relation between them, what is being articulated
are age-old problems associated with man's understanding of reality and
himself. The issue is the ultimate ground and meaning of all reality.
It is quite easy to show that the question of unity is a basic problem of
humanity.' Unity is necessarily presupposed if a being is identical with
itself and therefore identifiable. Everything that exists is given only in the
mode of unity. 'Unity' here means that the being is undivided in itself and
differentiated from others. Unity is therefore an all-inclusive (transcend-
ental) primordial and foundational determination of being.· Unity as a
transcendental determination of being is not equivalent to a number; on
the contrary, unity is the presupposition of numerability and the measure
of numbers.' The unity that is quantitative and can be counted is the maS!
 Establishmellt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 235
inferior form of unity; it is derived and presupposes the higher forms of
unity. Thus a plurality of beings is thinkable only becauseof the overarching
unity of the species and genus. It makes sense to talk of 'three or four men'
only if these three or four share the same human nature, or, in other words,
only on the supposition of a specific unity and of the universal concept
'man 'that is based on this specific unity. Numerical unity thus presupposes
the unity of species and genus. The question that arises at this point is
whether beyond the distinct genera of reality there is a unity that embraces
all of reality.' Only at this level does the question of unity become
existentially urgent. For without such an all-embracing unity amid the
multiplicity of the realms of reality the world would be nothing but a dust-
heap piled up at random and lacking in any order and meaning.' The
question of the unity of reality amid the multiplicity of the realms of reality
is therefore the same as the question of the intelligibility and meaning of
reality. Only within the horizon of this question can the meaning of the
monotheistic faith in God be fully grasped.
The question of unity amid the multiplicity of reality had already been
raised by myths in their own fashion. 8 The multiplicity of gods in polytheism
is at bOllom an expression ofrhe multi-levelled, broken and unsynthesizable
character of reality. The genealogies of the gods, on the other hand, are
already an attempt to introduce order and unity into this multiplicity. Most
rciigions, too, are not simply polytheistic; rather they acknowledge a
supreme God or an inclusive divine reality that manifests itself in the many
gods. Thus as early as 1350 BC there was in Egypt an enlightened allempt
under lkhnaton to establish a monotheism of the sun-god Aton. In
particular, Buddhism and Hindu Brahmanism are religions which maintain
that all reality is a single entity.
From its very beginnings in Heraclitus and Parmenides, Western thought
has concerned itself with the problems of unity. As early as the sixth century
BC a radical critique of religion brought Xenophanes to this insight: 'There
is one god, among gods and men the greatest, not at all like mortals in
body or in mind." Such insights as this are still at work in Aristotle, who
ends the eleventh (theological) book of his Metaphysics with the well-
known verse from Homer's Iliad: 'It is unprofitable to have many rulers.
Let one be sovereign.' 10 This doctrine of monarchy, that is, of a single ruler
and a single origin, served Aristotle as both a political and a metaphysical
program; more accurately, in his view the political order had a metaphysical
and theological basis. This political and metaphysical theology of unity
was further developed by the Stoics. According to them it is the one, divine
world-reason that holds everything together and orders it; this world-
reason is reflected above all in human reason who is charged to live in
236 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
accordance with the order of nature. II The philosophy of unity attained
its supreme form in Neoplatonism. Aristotle has already seen that the
supra-categorical, transcendental one which is beyond all the genera cannot
be conceptualized and that our thinking must begin with the One and lead
back to it.12 Plotinus went a step further. Since all existence presupposes
unity, the One must be beyond existence; it is beyond being and is therefore
ineffable; only through an ecstasis of reason can contact be made with
One.\J
A properly understood conception of unity does not, therefore, lead to
a closed system in which evetything can be derived from a single principle.
The question of unity leads rather to an open system insofar as the principle
of this unity eludes purely rational thought. With the philosophy of
Aristotle and Thomas one must say that unity as a transcendental predicate
of being applies analogously and not univocally to the various spheres of
being. The question of the unity of all reality - a unity without which
meaningful speech, thought and action and, in the final analysis, meaningful
human existence are impossible -leads ultimately to a mystery. Thus the
Neoplatonic philosophy of unity was not simply abstract speculation but
the foundation of an entire spirituality and mysticism. Its purpose was that
the soul should be increasingly purified of the multiple and manifold in
order to ascend to the One and come in contact with it in a mystical ecstasy.
This mysticism also had a lasting effect on the Christian tradition. Augustine
writes in his Confessions:
Lo, my life is scattered. And your right hand laid hold of me ... so that
... I might be gathered together in striving for the One .... But now
my years pass amid groans, and you, Lord, my Father and consolation,
are eternal; but I am fragmented into successive times whose order I do
not know, and in the tumult and vicissitudes of things my thoughts and
the innermost vitals of my soul are torn apart, until at last, purged and
wholly melted down in the fire of your love, I flow together in unity in
you. l <4
The question of Trinity or threeness, as much as the question of unity,
is a primordial question of man and mankind. Schemata involving three
(triads, ternaries) make their appearance wherever reality resists the innate
need ofthe human spirit for unity. Threeness thus represents the multiplicity
and manifoldness of reality. Now, since a triad has a beginning, middle
and end, it is not just any kind of plurality. Three is the simplest and the
same time the most perfect form of plurality: it is an organized plurality
and therefore unity in multiplicity. For this reason Aristotle calls it the
number of completeness. IS
 Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 237
Myths and religions are full of triads. In Greek mythology the regions
of the world are divided among the three sons of Chronos: Zeus, Poseidon
and Hades. We often find three-headed or three-bodied divine personages.
In cultic rituals and in music and architecture rhythms based on three have
a privileged place. Everyone is familiar with the threefold repetition
of oaths; elsewhere, too, trigemination or triplication in language and
literature is an important srylistic device. Finally, division into threes is a
favorite scheme for thinkers (e.g., antiquiry, Middle Ages, modern times).
Neoplatonic philosophy in particular is full of ternaries. Plotinus summed
up the universe in three concepts: the One, spirit, soul. In lamblichus,
Prod us and Dionysius the Areopagite all of realiry is comprehended with
the aid of the law of division into three." Especially important in antiquiry
were speculations regarding the triangle, which the Pythagoreans were
already looking upon as not only a geometrical and arithmetical principle
but a cosmic principle as well." Plato developed this idea and interpreted
the various rypes of triangular surfaces as the basic building blocks of the
world. J8 A Christian use of the triangle as a symbol was, however, rendered
impossible for a long time because the triangle was originally also a sexual
symbol, and as such contained a reference to the primordial, maternal
ground of all being. Only since the fifteenth century has the triangle served
as a symbol of the Triniry.
Such ternaries and triads are also richly attested in the Old and New
Testaments." Nonetheless, the Christian doctrine of the Triniry is not to
be derived from such symbols and speculations. 20 For nowhere do we find
the specifically Christian idea of a single divinity in three persons, that is,
of the uniry of three divine persons in a single being. In contrast to the non-
Christian ideas and speculations which I have been mentioning, uniry in
triniry according to Christianity is not a cosmological problem that
embraces both God and the world, but a strictly theological and even
intradivine problem. For this reason the Bible nowhere justifies the Christ-
ian doctrine of the Triniry with the aid of such cosmological speculations.
The doctrine has its basis solely in the history of God's dealings with human
beings and in the historical self-revelation of the Father through Jesus
Christ in the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, it is not unimportant that in
summing up the uniry and comprehensiveness of its message and of reality
itself Christianity, in a manner analogous to that of mythology and
philosophy, holds fast to the uniry and triniry of the ultimate primordial
ground. In its own special way, then, the trinitarian confession proper to
Christianity is an answer to the primordial question of man and mankind.
In a way that distinguishes Christianity and is peculiar to it alone, the
confession of one God in three persons answers the primordial question
238 The Triltitarialt Mystery of God
of the human person: the question of unity in multiplicity, of unity that
does not absorb multiplicity but turns it into a unified whole, a unity that
is notimpoverishment but fullness and completion. The distinguishing
element in Christianity is ultimately this: that the ultimate ground of the
unity and wholeness of reality is not a scheme, a structure, a triadic law or
abstract principle; according to the Christian faith the ultimate ground
and meaning of all reality is personal: one God in three persons.

2. Theological foundations in revelation

(aJ The IInity of God
The Christian confession of faith begins with the statement: 'Credo ilt
llllllltl Dell/It- I believe in the one God.' In these words the creed legitimately
sums up the faith of the Old and New Testaments. We read in the Old
Testament: 'Hear, 0 Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord; and you shall
love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and
with all your might' (Deut. 6.4-5; d. II Macc. 7.37).21 This basic statement
later became part of the Shema, the prayer which every Jew was obliged
to recite twice daily. The New Testament takes over the Old Testament
faith in the singleness of God (Mark 12.29, 32), and in its missionary
preaching contrasts it anew with the polytheism of the Gentiles (Acts
14.15; 17.23; I Cor. 8.4; Rom. 3.29f.; Eph. 4.6; I Tim. 1.17; 2.5). In the
perspenive of the history of religions, Christianity is therefore reckoned,
with Judaism and Islam, among the monotheistic religions.
The biblical faith in one God has a long history which is not without its
importance for a theological understanding of the doctrine. In the beginning
the Old Testament accepts, with a relative lack of embarrassment, the
existence of alien gods (cf. Gen. 35.2, 4; Josh. 24.2, 14). The oneness of
the biblical God shows itself initially only in the fact that Yahweh is
superior to the other gods; he makes an exclusive claim and shows himself
a jealous God who will suffer no other gods besides himself (Ex. 20.3ff.;
34.14; Deut. 5.7). In the beginning, this intolerance extends only to the
worship of other gods, because such worship indicates a lack of trust in
Yahweh. One who adores mher gods docs not love Yahweh with his whole
heart and soul and strength. Initially, then, the monotheism was of the
practical order. The question of the existence or non-existence of other
gods was not yet raised; it is likely even that their existence was accepted
as a fact (cf. Judg. 11.24; I Sam. 26.19; II Kings 3.27). But beginning with
Elijah, the prophets engaged in a resolute battle against all syncretistic
deviations; Yahweh was now regarded as the one and only God. The 'other
 Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 239
deities' were explained as being nonentities (Isa. 2.8, 18; 10.10; 19.3;Jer.
2.5,10,15; 16.19) and non-gods Uer. 2.11; 5.7). Finally, we read in Second
Isaiah: 'There is no other god besides me' (lsa. 45.21; d. 41.28f.; 43.10).
Yahweh is now the God of all peoples (d.lsa. 7.18; 40.15ff.).
This history makes two points clear:
1. In the Bible, monotheism is not a philosophical question but the fruit
of religious experience and an expression of practice based on faith. At
issue is a practical monotheism. Faith in the one God is therefore not
primarily a matter of intellectual verification. The issue in this profession
of faith is, rather, a radical decision in behalf of the one thing necessary,
of that which alone suffices because at bottom it is everything. For this
reason it can lay total claim to human beings. In confessing the one God,
the ultimate issue is a radical decision between faith and unbelief, a radical
answer to the question of where alone and in all situations unconditional
trustworthiness is to be found. The issue is conversion from the non-
existent gods to the one true God (Acts 14.15). The problem or issue here
is not one that is outmoded and belongs to the past. False gods take many
forms. One's false god can be mammon (Matt. 6.24) or one's belly (Phil.
3.19); it can be one's honor Uohn 5 .44) or the Baal of unrestrained pleasure
and uncontrolled sensuality. In the final analysis, one's false god can be
anything in this world that is absolutized. But the truth is that you cannot
serve two masters (Matt. 6.24). God alone is God; on him alone can one
build unconditionally, in him alone can one trust without reserve. One
who in addition to believing in the one God also serves false gods does not
really believe and trust in God. The confession of faith in the one God is
therefore a radical decision that obliges the person to a continual conver-
sion. At issue is the one thing on which everything else depends and which
determines whether our way leads to life or to death (Mark 10.21; Luke
IQ.42).
2. The oneness of God involves far more than a quantitiative and
numerical unity. The creed does not mean simply that thete is only one
God and not three or four gods. The singleness and uniqueness of God is
qualitative. God is not only one (,1/1115) but also unique (IIniclIs); he is as it
were unqualified uniqueness. For by his very nature God is such that there
can only be one of him. From the nature of God as the reality that
determines and includes everything his uniqueness follows with intrinsic
necessity. 'If God is not one, then there is no God.''' Only one God can be
infinite and all-inclusive; two Gods would limit one another even if they
somehow interpenetrated. Conversely: as the one God, God is also the
only God. The singleness of God is therefore not just one of the attributes
of God; rather his singleness is given directly with his very essence.
240 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
Therefore, too, the oneness and uniqueness of the biblical God is anything
but evidence of narrow-mindedness. On the contrary, for precisely as the
one and only God he is the Lord of all peoples and of all history. He is the
First and the Last (lsa. 41.4; 43.10f.; 44.6; 48.12; Rev. 1.4,8,17), the
ruler of the universe (Rev. 4.8; 11.17; 15.31.; 19.6). The oneness of God
is at the same time his universality which binds all human beings.
In their message of the one God, the Old and New Testaments are
responding to a primordial question of the human race: the question of
the unity to be found in all the multiplicity and fragmentation of reality.
Polytheism gives expression to the manifoldness and fragmentation of
realiry and to the impossibiHty man feels of reducing it to unity. But as I
indicated earlier, thinking men, human beings looking for meaning, could
not be satisfied with this state of affairs. For this reason monotheistic
tendencies are to be found in the religions and philosophies of antiquity;
they provide parallels to the Old Testament.
Early Christianity was able to make use of these tendencies." The early
Christian Apologists constantly appealed to the idea of the monarchia
(oneness) of God." Evidently, the doctrine of the monarchia of God had
its set place in the instruction that accompanied Christian baptism. 2S In a
letter to his namesake, Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria, Pope Dionysius
says that the divine oneness is a most august part of the church's teaching."
This conviction of scripture and tradition found binding expression in the
church's profession of faith in one God who is creator of heaven and
earth. I7
This monotheistic confession links Christianity to Judaism and Islam.
On the other hand, Christianity is distinguished from these others by its
concrete understanding of unity as unity in trinity. The question which
Judaism and Islam then address to Christianity is this: has not Christianity
by its confession of the Trinity proved unfaithful to its confession of the
one God?
The answer to this question emerges if we trace the speculative considera-
tions which the church fathers offered from a very early date as they made
use of Greek philosophical thought on the nature of God's oneness. We
find such considerations as early as Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen," and
at a later time in Thomas Aquinas, among others. 2' In these reflections an
effort is made, first of all, ro ground the oneness and singleness of God in
the very concept of God. The absoluteness and infinity of God leave no
room for a second God. If there were several gods, they would limit one
another and God would no longer be God but a finite being. Secondly,
absolute oneness entails absolute non-division and therefore absolute
simplicity. God's unity thus excludes materiality, since this is by its nature
 Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 241
quantitative and therefore characterized by multiplicity. If the unity of
God is thought out in a radical manner, it entails God being a pure spirit
who in his absolute simplicity must be thought of as being absolutely
transcendent in relation to all that is finite and especially to all that is
material. In other words, if the idea of God's unity is thought through
completely, it necessarily leads to the idea of the infinite qualitative
difference between God and the world. The absolute unity of God means,
thirdly, that the unity of God and the unity of created reality may no longer
be confused as they are in ancient philosophy. If God is thought of as
transcendent, then he can no longer be the immediate principle of unity
amid the multiplicity of the world. The problem of the one and the many
must be given a different answer than in ancient thought, once the idea of
God's unity is radically thought through and once the transcendence of
God, which is immediately connected with his unity, is taken into account.
The problem of the one and the many must now be seen as a problem
of the unity of the world as well as a problem of the unity of God. In
relation to God the question is this: is the radically conceived unity of God
thinkable at all without at the same time thinking of a differentiation
within God himself that does not cancel out the unity and simplicity of
God, but on the contrary is required to make these meaningful? Without
such a multiplicity in unity would God not be an utterly isolated being
which would need the world for a counterpart and thereby lose its divine
status? Such considerations lead to the conclusion that the assertion of
God's unity does not exclude the question of the Trinity, but rather includes
it. Against this background it is understandable that in the eyes of the
church fathers the confession of the Trinity can become the concrete form
taken by Christian monotheism. 30 We must now turn to a detailed
discussion of how this can be so.

(b) The living God (Old Testament preparation)

It is the irrevocable conviction of the Old Testament that Yahweh is one
and unique (Deur. 6.4). He is a jealous God who suffers no other gods
alongside himself (Ex. 20.5; Deur. 5.7). Where such language as this is
used, there seems to be no room, in principle as much as in fact, for a
trinitarian revelation of God. Such a revelation seems antecedently
excluded. So, at least, it seems to Judaism and Islam. They are correct
insofar as nothing is said in the Old Testament about the trinitarian
structure of God. On the other hand, there are significant bases in the Old
Testament for the later trinitarian faith. These are to be found, above all,
in the many statements, so fundamental to the Old Testament, about God
242 The Tr;//;tar;a/, Mystery of God
as a living God (Ps. 42.3; 84.3;Jer. 10.10; 23.26; Dan. 6.27; etc.). Forthe
Old Testament, God in his oneness and uniqueness is at the same time the
fullness of Iife.Jl In this observation we have the justification, to some
extent, for the trinitarian exegesis of various Old Testament passages by
the fathers of the church.

There arc a number of passages in the Old Testament in which God is depicted
as speaking of himself in the plural; in these especially the fathers of the church
saw imimations that there is more than one person in God. They appealed, for
example, [0 the statement: 'let us make man in our image, after our likeness'
(Gen. 1.26; d. 3.22; 11.7; Isa. 6.8). Contemporary exegetescannot acceptthis
explanation. Also improbable is the explanation often given in the P;1St, that
we have here a 'plural of majesty': God speaks of himself as 'we' just as kings
and popes used to speak of themselves as 'we'. It is likely, in fact, that the
plural is the stylistic device know as the 'plural of deliberation': the plural used
when a person is taking counsel with himself and engaging in soliloquy." The
we-formulas do at least suggest, however, that the God of the Old Testament
is not lifeless but a living God, characterized by a superabundant fullness of
vitality and compassion.
For the church fathers and the medieval theologians a further important
element in the biblical basis for the confession of the triune God was the
manifestation of God in the form of three men or angels to Abraham under
the oaks of Mamre (Gen. 18). This scene is extremely rich in meaning not only
for theology but also for the history of piety and art. We find it in many
iconographic represcnt3cions and in particular in Rublev's famous fifrcenth -
century icon. lJ But once again it is less easy for us to accept this imerpretation
of the passage. On the other hand, the passage does suggest" mysterious
interaction within the one God who speaks and acts and manifests himself in
three figures. Finally, the church fathers cited the two angels near the throne
of God in Isa. 6, and the triple 'Holy!, offered to God. This interpretation, too,
seems impossible to us today. Once again! however, it has great symbolic
importance, for in its own way it shows that in {he time of the church fathers
the trinitarian confession did not originate in pure theory and abstract
speculation but rather had its vital context (Sitz ill! Leben) in the doxology,
that is, in the liturgical glorification of God."

More important than the texts thus far mentioned is the figure of the 'angel
of Yahweh' (Illa/ak" ja"we) in the Old Testament. He accompanies Israel
on its journey in the wilderness (Ex. 14.19), helpsthose in need (Gen. 16.7;
I Kings 19.5; I Kings 1.3), and protects the devout (Ps. 34.8). He makes
known God's power (Zech. 12.8) and knowledge (II Sam. 14.20). While
in these passages the angel of Yahweh is a revelatory figure distinct from
God, at other times he is identical with Yahweh (Gen. 31.11, 13; Ex. 3.2,
 Establishmellt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 243
4f. ). The 'angel of the Lord' thus represents an effort to bridge the gap
between the being of God, which to man is incomprehensible and hidden,
and God's active and substantial presence in history.J> The angel of Yahweh
thus prefigures the whole later problem of the identity and difference
between God in himself and the form he takes in revelation. It also brings
out in a most expressive manner the fact that the Old Testament God is a
living God of history.
In the later writings of the Old Testament the conviction that God is
superabundant life finds expression in passages that talk of various
hypostases. The most important ofthese is divine wisdom, which is spoken
of as a kind of hypostasis distinct from God (d. especially Provo 8). Also
noteworthy arc the personifications of the divine Word (Ps. 119.89;
147.15ff.; Wisdom 16.12) and the divine Spirit (Hag. 2.5; Neh. 9.30; lsa.
63.10; Wisdom 1.7) . 'These personifications bear witness to the wealth of
life in Yahweh and, from the viewpoint of the history of revelation, are a
first hesitant anticipation of the disclosure in the New Testament that the
one divine substance is marked by a pluripersonal fullness of being.'''
These personifications provided the New Testament with a point of
departure.
Behind these various hints and indications there is a common objective
question. By its very nature the Old Testament understanding of God as
personal inevitably led to the question: who is God's appropriate vis-a·
vis? An I wit.hout a Thou is unthinkable. But is man, the human race, or
the people the appropriate or proper vis·a·vis for God? If man were God's
sale vis-a-vis, then man would be a necessary partner of God. Man would
then no longer be the one who is loved with an abyssal free and gracious
love, and God's love for man would no longer be God's gracious act but
rather a need of God and a completion of God. But such a conclusion
would be utterly contradictory to the Old Testament. The Old Testament
therefore raises a question to which it gives no answer. The Old Testament
picture of the living God is not finished and complete but open to the
definitive revelation of God. It is only 'a shadow of the good things to
come' (Heb. 10.1).

(c) The basic trillitarian structllre of the revelation of God (establishment

of the doctrille ill the New TestamCllt)
The New Testament" gives an unequivocal answer to the question, left
open in the Old Testament, of God's vis-a-vis. It tells us that Jesus Christ,
the Son of God, is the eternal Thou of the Father, and that in the Holy
Spirit we human beings are accepted into the communion of love that
244 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
exists between Father and Son. Consequently the New Testament is already
able to sum up the eschatologically definitive self-revelation of God in the
sentence: God is love (I John 4.8,16). The trinitarian confessions of faith
that are attested in the New Testament are a sj)elling out of this sentence
which interprets the revelational event that has taken place in Jesus Christ.
Given this thesis, which I shall justify below, it is not enough simply to
set forth the individual trinitarian confessional statements of the New
Testament. It is necessary rather to understand these statements of revel-
ation as the interpretation, supplied by revelation itself, of the revelational
event, and this trinitarian interpretation must in turn be seen as an
explication of the New Testament's essential definition of God as love. I
shall therefore proceed in three stages: 1. the trinitarian structure of the
revelational event; 2. the trinitarian explanation of this event in the New
Testament; and 3. the connection between this explanation and the
essential definition of God that is given in the New Testament. Only if this
three-stage demonstration is successful can we avoid a naive biblicist
fundamentalism that relies on isolated dicta probantia (proof texts), and
at the same time make it clear that the confession of the Trinity is far from
being a later, purely speculative addition to the original faith in Christ, an
addition that is more or less superfluous and certainly unimportant in
identifying the Christian faith. It can be shown, on the contrary, that the
trinitarian confession provides the basic structure and ground plan of the
New Testament witness, and that with it the belief in the God of Jesus
Christ stands or falls.
The basic form taken by the New Testament revelational event consists
in this, that Jesus reveals God as Father not only by his words and actions
but also by his whole life and person. In the process Jesus reveals God as
his own Father in an utterly unique and non-transferable way, while it is
only through Jesus that we in turn become the sons and daughters of this
Father. 3M In the unique and non-transferable Abba relation which Jesus
has to God, God is revealed as being eschatologically and definitively
'Father'. The eschatological character of this revelation indirectly makes
it clear as well that from eternity God is the God and Father of Jesus Christ
and therefore that as Son of God Jesus belongs to the eternal being of God.
Thus the New Testament statements about Jesus as Son are the legitimate
and necessary explication of the Abba relation of Jesus to God. In this
Abba relation our own filial relation to God is at the same time disclosed
and rendered possible. To those who believe, that is, who in union with
Jesus and in his name rely wholly on God, everything is possible (Mark
9.23); they share in the omnipotence of God, for to God everything is
possible (Mark 10.27). In the Synoptic Gospels this participation in the
 Establishmellt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 245
power (dYllamis) of God has as yet no fixed name. Only after Easter are
the acceptance of believers into the relation of Jesus to the Father, and their
participation in the power of the Father, ascribed to the action of the
Pneuma. From this point on it is said that we are God's sons and daughters
in the Pneuma. This pneumatological interpretation, like the christological,
is grounded in the revelatory event itself.
The trinitarian explanation of the event of revelation is found in all the
important strands of New Testament tradition. It is already in the Synoptic
tradition and, significantly, at the beginning of the Synoptic Gospels, in
the accounts of the baptism of Jesus. Mark places the baptism of Jesus"
as a programmatic statement at the beginning of his Gospel; it is meant as
a summation of the entire gospel (Mark 1.9-11; d. Matt. 3.13-17; Luke
3.21f.). The passage on the baptism has a clear trinitarian structure: the
voice from heaven reveals Jesus as the beloved Son, while the Spirit descends
upon him in the form of a dove (Mark I.lOf. par). In the Lukan version of
the cry of jubilation, Jesus, at the high point of his ministry, 'rejoiced in
the Holy Spirit' and praised God as 'Father, Lord of heaven and earth'
whom no one knows 'except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses
to reveal him' (Luke IO.21f.; d. Matt. 11.25-27). According to Acts, the
preaching of the apostles likewise begins in trinitarian form: God has raised
Jesus to life and exalted him; after Jesus himself had received from the
Father the promised Holy Spirit, he poured it out upon them (Acts i.32f.).
Finally, Stephen, the first martyr, is filled with the Holy Spirit and, looking
up to heaven, sees the glory of God and Jesus standing at the right hand of
God (Acts. 7.55f.).
The most important witness to the Trinity in the Synoptic tradition and
even in the New Testament as a whole is undoubtedly the baptismal
command in Matt. 29.19: 'Go therefore and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit.'40 Even if the text does not represent a trinitarian reflection in the
later sense of this phrase, that is, if it does not as yet reflect on unity and
trinity in God, it nonetheless proves a clear basis for such reflection, because
it sets Father, Son and Spirit side by side as full 'equals'. The baptismal
command is generally regarded today not as a saying of the historical Jesus
himself but as a summary of the early church's development and practice
which had been guided by the Spirit of Jesus Christ and to that extent were
authorized by Jesus himself. What I have said thus far also shows that the
baptismal text is not a novelty but simply gives concise expression to the
basic trinitarian structure of the Synoptic tradition and even of the entire
New Testament. At the same time, the summary makes it clear that
the trinitarian confession is not the result of theoretical reflection and
 246 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
speculation. Rather, it summarizes the entire saving event which we
appropriate in baptism. Consequently, it is baptism, that is, the act in
which Christian existence is grounded, which is the vital and sociological
context (the Sit. im Leben) of the trinitarian confession. The trinitarian
confession thus expresses the reality from which the church and the
individual Christian draw their life and for which they must live. The
trinitarian confession is therefore the short formula of the Christian faith.
The baptismal command, consequently, is rightly regarded as the most
important basis for the dogmatic and theological development of the
church's doctrine of the Trinity.
Later trinitarian doctrine is not based solely on the Synoptic tradition.
The leners of Paul are likewise filled with trinitarian formulas. An allusion
to the trinitarian structure can even be found in the old two-stage
christology of Rom. 1.3f., according to which Jesus Christ is established
as Son of God in power by the Father through the Spirit of holiness. Gal.
4.4-6 contains a complete summary of the Christian message of salvation:
'But when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son ... so that we
might receive adoption as sons. And because you are sons, God has sent
the spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, "Abba, Father!'" (cE. Rom.
8.3f., 14-16). But 3 trinitarian structure characterizes not only the> non-
recurring action of God in the history of salvation but also his ongoing
action in the church. In explaining the unity and multiplicity of charisms
in the church Paul writes: 'Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same
Spirit; and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; and there are
varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every
one' (I Cor. 12.4-6). It is not surprising, therefore, that when Paul sums
up the whole reality of salvation in a doxology, he again uses trinitarian
formulas. The most important of rhese is the liturgical conclusion of the
Second Letter to rhe Corinthians: 'The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and
the love of God and rhe fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all' (II
Cor. 13.33). Thus whenever Paul wishes to express the entire fullness of
rhe saving event and of the reality of salvation, he has recourse to trinitarian
formulas.
The Deutero-Pauline letters take over this trinitarian structure from the
letters of Paul. In the prologue of the Lener to the Ephesians this structure
is expanded into a hymnic exposition of God's plan of salvation. It speaks
of the work of the Father who has predestined everything (1.3-11), the
work of the Son in whom the fullness of rime has come (1.5-13), and the
work of the Holy Spirit who has been given to us as the seal and pledge of
eschatological salvation (1.13f.; cE. I Peter 1.2; Heb. 9.14). This trinitarian
structure is also applied to the church. In Eph. 4.4-6 the unity of rhe church

• - - -. --~ - ----~ - -.-

. -- .. - ..,;"jj .
 Esta/,/is/lIIlC1rt of the Doctriue of the Tri:rity 247
is based on the Trinity: There is one body and one Spirit ... ; one Lord,
one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of us all.' The church is thus
'a people brought into unity from the unity of the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit' (Cyprian). In the Johannine tradition of the New Testament
we even find the beginnings of trinitarian reflection. The first half of the
gospel of John (1-12) has basically a single theme: the relation of the Son
to the Father. On the other hand, the Johannine farewell discourses of the
second half (14-17) are concerned with the sending of another Paraclete
(14.16), his procession from th. Father (15.26), his sending by Jesus Christ
(16.7), and his task of recalling and making present the work of Christ
(14.26; 15.26; 16.13f.). In John 14.26 the trinitarian unity of the two
themes emerges clearly: 'But the Counselor, the Holy Spirit, whom the
Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your
remembrance all that I have said to you' (d. 15.26). The high point of this
reflection is provided by what is known as the priestly prayer of Jesus."

The Leitmotiv or dominant theme is stated in the vety first verse: the gloty of
the Father and the Son. This glory includes salvation or, to use John's term,
life. In turn, life consists in knowing the only true God and Jesus Christ whom
he has sent, (17.3). In John, 'to know' is more than a simple act ofthe intellect;
true knowledge includes acknowledgment of the lordship (in being and action)
of God; it includes the glorification of God. Those who know God as God and
acknowledge and glorify him, are in the light; they have discovered the meaning
of their life and the light that shines in all reality Uohn 1.4). Doxology is thus
at the same time soteriology.
The theme is then developed in detail. The Son glorifies the Father by
bringing to completion the work the Father has given him (17.4) and specifically
by revealing the Father's name to men (17.6), leading them 10 faith (17.8) and
sanctifying them in truth (17.17, 19). Parallel with the glorification of the
Father through sanctification in truth is the communication of life. The Father
has this life in himself; he has also granted the Son to have life in himself (5.26)
and to bestow it on men (17.2). This life consists in knowing that Jesus ChriS!
is life, because he is life from life, God from God, light from light (17.7). Life
consists therefore in knowing the glory which Jesus has with the Father, even
before the world existed (17.5). 'I desirethatthey ... behold my glory which
thou haS! given me in thy love for me before the foundation of the world'
(17.24). Those who acknowledge this facr share in this same eternal love
(17.23,26) and in the glory ofthe F3!her and the Son (17.22). The knowledge
and confession of the eternal divine sonship of Jesus brings communion with
him and through him with God (17.21-24).
The glorification of the Father by the Son thus has for its goal the participation
of the disciples in this glorification and in eternal life. Thus Jesus' prayer of
praise to the Father leads in the sc:ccmd part to a prayer of petitionj doxology
248 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
leads to epidesis. Theobjectof the petition is that the disciples may be preserved
in truth (17.11) and may .bide in unity with one .nother, with Jesus .nd,
through Jesus, with God (17.21-24). This prayer of Jesus for his disciples is,
in the final analysis, a proyer for the sending of the other Por.dete, the Spirit
(14.16). This Spirit is the Spirit of truth (14.17), who will guide the disciples
into the whole truth (16.13). He does this by glorifying Jesus (16.14) and
bearing witness to him. He does not speak on his own authority but only of
what Jesus is and of what is from the Father (16.14f.; eI. 14.26). Through the
action of the Spirit, then, the union of Father and Son becomes the union of
the disciples among themselves. The Spirit drows the f.ithful into the unity
which is the mork of the divine being (el. 10.38; 14.10f., 20, 23; 15.41.;
17.21-26).

The unity of Father and Son thus becomes the ground that makes possible
.nd vitalizes the unity of the faithful, and the unity of the latter is in turn
to be a sign to the world (17.21). The revel3tion of eternal love leads to
the gathering of the scattered flock under. single shepherd (10.16). The
unity, peace .nd life of the world thus come .bout through the revel3tion
of the glory of the F3ther, Son and Holy Spirit. The trinit3rian doxology
is the soteriology of the world.
In the First Letter of John we find v.rious trinitarian groupings (4.2;
5.6-8). These indude the so-called Johannine Comma [section of a
sentence]: 'There are three who give testimony in heaven: the F3ther, the
Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one' (I John 5.7f.).
This trinitari.n formul. is generally regarded today however, as a later
insertion.·' Extremely import.nt is the summorizing statement that God
is love (I John 4.8,16). This means, to begin with, that in the revelational
event which is Jesus Christ God h.s shown himself to be love. But
this revelational event consists precisely in m.king known the eternal
communion of love, life and reciproc.1 glorification between Father, Son
and Spirit, in orderth3t through this revebtion the disciples and, with their
help, mankind may be drawn into this s.me communion of love and life.
The revelational statement 'God is love' is therefore at the same time a
statement about the being of God and, as such,. st3tement about salvation.
Only because God is love can he reveal and communicate himself to us as
love. The unity of church .nd world, the peace and reconciliation of
mankind have their ultimate ground and ultimate possibility, .s seen by
Christians, in the acknowledgment of the glory of God in the love of Father,
Son and Spirit. This summary of the entire New Testament mess.ge alre.dy
lays the found3tion for the 13ter specul3tive development of the doctrine
of the Trinity, a development which h.s for its sale aim to understand the
 Establishmellt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 249
trinitarian confession of scripture in terms of its deepest roots and in the
overall context of the whole reality of salvation.
The New Testament message thus proves to be trinitarian not only in
the details of what it says but also in its basic structure. In saying this, I
oppose the thesis of O. Cullmann that the basic structure of the New
Testament profession of faith is purely christological, so that 'when all is
said and done the development of christological formulas ultimately
distorted the interpretation of the essence of Christianity'" This thesis is
antecedently improbable in view of the fact that the revelation in the New
Testament presupposes Old Testament revelation and brings it to its
transcendent fulfillment. Therefore, contrary to what O. Cullmann bel-
ieves, the New Testament docs not concern itself solely with the journey
of Jesus Christ to the Father; rather, faith in Jesus Christ is based in turn
on the testimony of the Father (Matt. 3.17; 17.5; John 5.37f.). People
believe in Jesus because the Father has raised him from the dead and
established him as Lord. Moreover, the saving act of Jesus Christ includes
the sending of the Holy Spirit. Only in the Holy Spirit is it possible to
confess Jesus as Lord (I Cor. 12.5f.), and only in the Spirit do we have a
share in the reality of Jesus. Consequently, a christological confession is
possible only in the form of a trinitarian confession. Faith in Christ and
existence as a Christian depend on the confession of the Trinity.

(d) The trillitariall con(ession as mle o( (aith

The early post apostolic church was fully aware of the trinitarian structure
of Christian salvation." This is clear both from the writings of Ignatius of
Antioch" and from the First Letter of Clement. 4' Athenagaras, one of the
Apologists, writes around 175 that the very desire Christians have is
already enough to make them understand 'what the union of the Son with
the Father is, what communion the Father has with the Son, what the Spirit
is, what the union of these three is and what the distinction among the
united, namely, the Spirit, the Son and the Father'.4' This short passage
basically anticipates all the questions taken up in the later doctrine of the
Trinity. So too the decisive term and concept, trias or trinitas, are already
to be found in Theophilus of Antioch and Tertullian. 48 It would obviously
be a complete misinterpretation to see in this a degeneration following
immediately upon the New Testament age and stemming from the swift
invasion of Hellenistic speculation. The context from which the trinitarian
confession drew its life was not pleasure in theoretical speculation but the
life and practice of the church, especially baptism and the eucharist.
The most important vital context (Sitz im Leben) for the trinitarian
250 The Trillitariall Mystery of God
confession of faith was baptism. Both the Didache49 and Justin 50 bear
witness to a trinitarian confession at baptism. The basic structure of the
later creed had already developed out of this confession as early as the last
third of the second century." Irenaeus, who is also familiar with the
trinitarian baptismal confession,52 already speaks of the three main
doctrines of the faith: God the Father, creator of the universe - the Word
of God, God's Son, who brings communion and peace with God - the
Holy Spirit, who re-creates human beings for God." In Hippolytus of
Rome we then find the later tri-membered creed in the form of the three
questions at baptism." In continuity with Paul, Tertullian sees the church
as founded upon the trinitarian confession: 'For where the three are, that
is, the Father, the Son and the Spirit, there too is the church which is the
body of the three.''' Cyprian says the same thing a hundred years later,56
and the Second Vatic"n Council accepts his trinitarian definition of the
church as 'a people brought into unity from the unity of the Father, the
Son and the Holy spirit'.57 Finally, Hilary of Poitiers" and Augustine'"
understand the mystery of the Trinity to be fully expressed in the baptismal
command.
Along with baptism, the eucharist in particular provided the vital context
for the trinitarian confession. This was true especially of the East, where
the baptismal confession did not play the same role that it did in the West.
While the eucharistic prayer in the Didache does not yet explicitly mention
the Holy spirit,60 the prayer recorded by Justin does already have a
trinitarian structure. 61 The same is true of the eucharistic prayer in the
Apostolic Tradition of Hippolytus. This prayer says, in part: 'We thank
you, God, through your Son Jesus Christ whom you sent to us at the end
of days as Savior and liberator ... And your Son was revealed by the Holy
Spirit .. .' The prayer ends with a doxology addressed to the Father in the
Holy Spirit 'through your Son Jesus Christ'62Thesame trinitarian structure
can be seen in the epicleses, the conclusions of orations, and the doxologies.
These are addressed to the Father, through his Son Jesus Christ, in the
Holy Spirit." Only later on, when the Arians sought to deduce from this
type of prayer the subordination of the Son, and the Pneumatomacheans
argued from it to the subordination of the Holy Spirit, did paratactical
formulas come into use: 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the
Holy Spirit. '64 Basil's work 011 the Holy Spirit is an extended reflection on
the liturgical doxology and on the meaning of the prepositions 'through',
'in', 'from', and 'with' that are used in it. In its early stages, therefore, the
doctrine of the Trinity was regarded not as indulgence in private speculation
but as a reflection of the liturgy and the doxology.
On this basis of faith that was lived and prayed, Irenaeus and Tertullian
 Establishmellt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 251
developed the rule of faith or of truth (ka"')1l tes pisteos or tes aletheias;
regula (idei or veritatis). The rule of faith is not identical with the baptismal
symbol, but represents, rather, a symbol or creed aimed at countering the
gnostics. Furthermore, it is not a rule for faith, but rather the rule which
consists of the faith preached in the church. It is the norm provided by the
faith of the church or, if you will, by the truth of faith; it expresses the
normative character of the truth as attested in the preaching of the church.
Consequently, the rule of faith is not a set of individual formulas such as
arc contained in creeds and dogmas, but rather a concise normative
summary of the entire faith which the church has received from the apostles.
It is all the more significant, then, that these summaries are thoroughly
trinitarian in character."S They provided not only the early Christian
thinkers already mentioned but also such later 'speculative' theologians as
Origen"" and Augustine"7 with the basis for their teaching on the Trinity.
This fact tells us that in their teaching on the Trinity the early theologians
of the ch u rch were expounding not their pri vate reflections and speculations
bur the common, public faith of the church that was binding on all. They
were defending this faith against denials and misinterpretations and, not
least, making it more accessible in the interests of a deeper understanding
of the faith and the growth in love. The trinitarian doctrine of the early
church is thus 'the' rule of faith and, as such, the normative exposition of
the truth of Christianity. It is the church's normative explanation of the
scriptures. It is the summation of the Christian faith.

3. History of theological and dogmatic development

A doctrine of the Trinity, as distinct from a trinitarian confession, appears
when there is not only the confession of the same shared divine dignity of
Father, Son and Spirit, but also reflection on the relation between faith in
one God and this trinity of persons and on the relation of Father, Son and
Spirit among themselves. The confession states in the form of an assertion
what is attested in narrative form in the documents of revelation; the
doctrine of the Trinity, on the other hand, takes a speculative form. It
establishes a kind of 'mirror' (speculum) relation between the individual
statements of the confession; to the extent that each is reflected in the
others, it becomes clear that there is a reciprocal correspondence and
intrinsic connection among them (the nexus mysteriorum) and that they
form a structure and an organized whole (hierarchia veritatum). The
doctrine of the Trinity seeks, therefore, to reconcile the trinitarian state-
ments of scripture and tradition, to bring to light their internal harmony
and logic, and thus to make them plausible in the eyes of faith.
252 The Trinitariall Mystery of God
The first hesitant 3uempts at a theological rcOeetion on the rctnttarian
confession of the church are to be found in Jewish C:uistianity. Admittedly,
we have only fragmentary knowledge in this area, since the relevant traditions
were not subsequently developed further but on the contrary were even
deliberately suppressed." It is clear that in the teaching of Jewish Christianity
on the Trinity a fundamental role was assigned to apocalyptic and rabbinic
ideas of two angelic figures that stand as witnesses or paracJetes at the right
and left sides of the throne of God. The stimulus to these ideas came from the
story of the three men or angels who visit Abraham (Gen. 18) and, above all,
from the vision of the seraphim in 1541. 6.1-3."'1 It soon became clear, however,
that a trinitarian doctrine involving angels could nO[ express the divine rank
of Jesus and the Spirit, bur was leading instead to a subordinationist conception
of them such as actually developed in heretical Jewish Christianity, among the
Ebionites.'o In light of this development the speculation on the Logos that
arose in early Hellenistic Christianity can be understood as an attempt (0 de·
apocalypticize the idea of the Trinity,11 It has to be said, however, that the
Apologists, the first to follow this path, were still unable to avoid the danger
of subordinationism. The Logos was regarded very much as a second or
secondary God (dellleros Iheos), and the Spirit even as a servant (hyperales)
of the Logos. A Judaizing curtailment of the doctrine was thus followed by a
Hellenizing reduction in which the Father, the Son and the Spirit were located
in a kind of hierarchically descending pattern."
The valid theological explanation of the doctrine of the Trinity" was
achieved in the Hellenistic world in two phases: in the conflict with gnosticism
in the third century and in the conflict with Hellenistic philosophy, which
radicalized the direction taken by the Apologists and in the fourth century
made its way into the church through Arius. This division of phases is, of
course, to some extent a schematization, since there arc numerous connections
between the two conflicts, as is clear especilllly in the person of Origen, the
greatest theologian of the early church.
The first phase in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity occurred in
the conflict with gnosticism. Gnosticism,'" 3 generic concept that sums up a
many-leveled and multiform memality, whose origin and nature has not yet
been fully explained, arose out of the collapse of the cosmos-oriented .hinking
of amiquity. The men and women of late antiquity no longer experienced the
world as a cosmos or ordered universe, bur rather felt themsdves to be
estranged from the world even while they lived in it. The divine, as a result,
became the totally other, an inconceivable and ineffable Absolute." The
resultant problem of communication between God and the world was solved
by the gnostics with the aid of the concept of emanation (aporrhoia; probole),
which they regarded as fundamental. By it they meant that from the primal
source, by reason of a necessity internal to God, reality flows forth in a series
of descending steps, each more tenuous in character than the one beforc,16
With the help of such speculations as these the gnostics believed they could
 Establishment of the Doctrille of the Trillity 253
attain to a superior grasp of Christianity. But the gnostic dualism of God and
world was no less unacceptable to the Christian faith in God as creator than
was the bridging of the abyss between God and the world by all kinds of
intermediate entities which then blurred the original distinction between the
two. For early Christianity, therefore, the very foundations and essence of
what is Christian were at stake in the dispute with gnosticism, and this in
regard both to its picture of God and to its understanding of the world. The
issue in this struggle was the continued existence or disappearance of the
Christian faith.
The decisive figure in this struggle was Irenaeus of Lyons. For Irenaeus, 'true
gnosis is the teaching of the apostles and the ancient doctrinal structure of the
church that is meant for the enrire world'," Therefore over against gnasis he
sets the rule of faith: the apostolic faith, attested in the church, regarding the
one God, who is the almighty Father and the creator of heaven and earth, the
one Jesus Christ, who is God's Son, and the one Holy Spirit." According to
Irenaeus, no one has any knowledge of the supposed emanation; after all, one
cannot call it ineffable and then try to talk about it and, as he remarks
sarcastically, speak of it as though one had been present as midwife at the birth
of the Son. 7 'i Irenaeus docs not, of course, stop at this negative answer. He
begins an intellectual analysis by showing the internal contradiction in the
gnostic doctrine of emanation: that which comes forth from the source cannot
be utterly alien to it. If in human generation mind is continued in the begotten
person, then this will certainly be true in God who is totally mind." Here the
way is opened to an understanding of 'emanation I in which there is no
attenuation of being and no gradation, but rather a relation of originated to
origin at the same level. The key to this correction is that Irenaeus replaces the
materialistic understanding of God by the gnostics with a concept of God as
pure spirit. The gnostic doctrine of emanations presupposes some kind of
divisibility of the divine and thus a quantitative, material understanding of
God. By understanding God to be pure spirit Irenaeus preserves the unity and
simplicity of God that excludes any divisibility.
The action of lrenaeus in laying the foundations of an emanation at one and
the same level of being and thus of later trinitarian doctrine is connected with
his thinking in terms of salvation history. As lrenaeus sees it, the unity of God
excludes any dualistic separation of creation from redemption and grounds
the unity of the divine plan of salvation and, in particular, the unity of creation
and redemption; this unity is summed up and 'given a head' (anakephalaiosis)
in the unity of manhood and Godhead in Jesus Christ." Irenaeus' basic thesis
is: it is one and the same God who acts in the order of creation and in the order
of redemption." Irenaeus thus defends not only the dignity of creation against
the gnostic defamation of it but also the meaning of redemption: 'The Word
of God became man and the Son of God became the Son of man in order that
man might receive the Word inco himself and, being adopted, might become
the son of God. '113 The soteriological meaning of the incarnation requires in
254 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
rurn the eternal existence of the Son and the Spirit.s4 The latter are as it were
the two hands of God in the carrying out of his plan of salvation." The unity
of God thus grounds the unity of the order of salvation. while the order of
salvation in turn presupposes the consubstantialiry of the Son with the F:nher.
In this brilliant vision of Irenaeus the economic Trinity and the immanent
Trinity arc onc.
Irenacus' grandiose vision had subsequently to be spelled out in greater
conceptual detail. Two theologians in particular devoted themselves to this
task at the beginning of the third century; Tertullian in the West and Origen
in the East established a specific Christian doctrine of the Trinity. It is clear
that such pioneering efforts could not escape uncenainties in expression and
ambiguities in content. Nonetheless each made 3 beginning on which later
generations could build.
Tertullian thought of himself as a churchman. for whom. as for lrenaeus.
the regllia fidei. or faith handed down in the church from the beginning. was
the foundation and norm of his thinking. MII Here was the decisive difference
from gnosticism. On the sure foundation of the church's confession of faith,
TerlUliian was able to make critical use of the idea of emanation by excluding
any and every separation of the emergent from its sourcetl7 and linking the idea
of emanation with the idea, originally completely alien to it, of writas
substallliae (oneness of substance}.KI The consequence of this line of thought
was that the Trinity could no longer have the cosmological funcllon it had for
the gnostics and that the way was thus opened for the doctnne of an immanent
Trinity, a doctrine that for Tertullian as for Irenaeus was soteriologically
motivated. For only if God himself has become man can the humanity of Christ
be the sacramelltum humollae sa/utis (sacrament of human sa/vation).tI'I
Terlullian's doctrtne of the Trinity thus preserved both the mOllarchia of the
Father, from whom everything proceeds, and the oikonomia,'IU that is, the
concrete ordering of this monarchia, by re:1son of which the Father gives the
Son a participation in his dominion and exercises this dominion through him.'I1
T ertullian is thus able to preserve unity in God and yet expound the distinction
as well. In this he differed from the Modalists. from whom TerlUliian
differentiates himself especially in his discussion with Praxeas. The ModalislS
see in the Son and the Spirit only different manifestations of the Father; they
forget that the Father is a Father only in relation to the Son and conversely."
It must therefore be said with regard to the mritas in triltitatem thaI the Three
differ non statu sed Bradu. nee s"bstmrtia sed forma. non potestate sed specie
('not in condition but in degree; not In substance but in formi not in power
but in kind').'H Contrary to what the Gnostics say, there is no separation; but
contrary to the mod.:J.lists there is a distinction of persons, not of substances.'N
Tertullian's formul.:J. is unriv.:J.lled in ItS accuracy: Tres unltm sunl nOll lInus
(the three are one substance, not one person ).'I j Thus, despite the persistence
of some expressions that sound subordinationist,Yi Tertullian created a new
 Establishme1lt of the Doctrine of the Trinity 255
theological language and thus laid the foundations of the specifically Christian
doctrine of the Triniry.
Tertullian's clarifications exercised a normative influence especially on the
Western doctrine of the Trinity, which thus acquired firm basic traits at a
relatively early stage. His inAuence can be felt especially in the clash of the two
Dionysiuses. In a letter which Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, wrote in 262 to his
namesake, Bishop Dionysius of Alexandria," Dionysius of Rome objected
both to the (supposed) tritheism of his fellow bishop in Alexandria and to the
modal ism of Sabellius. The divine uniry may not be dissolved into three f"lly
separate divinities (tritheism), nor may Fatherand Son be identified (modalism).
If we ask, however, how these two truths are to be thought of as compatible,
we will find no answer as yet in Dionysius. It is of interest, on the other hand,
that like Terrullian, Dionysius sets the mOllarchia as resident not in a single
divine substance but in the Father, to whom the Son is united and in whom the
Spirit abides and dwells. Here the bond of uniry in the Triniry is the Father,
and not the Spirit, as Augustine will later maintain.911 A century later in the
Latin West Hilary will still be proposing a view similar to that of Dionysius."
Thus there was established in the Latin West a conception of the Trinity which
went a long way towards meeting the Eastern concern to preserve the
mOllarchia of the Father. Yet even here there was conflict between East and
West. The rcason is that Dionysius of Alexandria was a disciple of Origen and
to that exrent representative of Eastern thinking. In what does the difference
consist?
The normative theologian of the East was Origen. Like Irenaeus and
Tertullian he thought of himself primarily not as a philosopher but as a biblical
theologian for whom Jesus Christ is the truth; more specifically, he thought of
himself as an ecclesial theologian for whom the ecclesiastica praedicatio
(preaching of the church) is the norm according to which scripture is to be
interpreted. 100 Thus the boundaries were clearly drawn in relation not only to
gnosticism but also to purely philosophical speculation in the form of
Platonism. Nonetheless Origen goes more deeply than Irenaeus or Tertullian
into gnostic and philosophical specularions, in order that in response to them
he may for the first time project :1 comprehensive Christian view of reality.
Origen's basic difference from gnosticism consists in his agreement with
Platonic philosophy that God is a purely spiritual being. 101 Origen is therefore
compelled to reject the concept of emamuion because of its materialistic
assertion of the divisibility of the divine. 101 He must look for some other way
of deriving all reality from God who, in a thoroughly Platonic fashion, exists
beyond spirit and essence lO') as Unity (marlas) and Oneness (he"as).I04
In formal terms Origen follows the same path as the gnostics: the multiplicity
of realiry is due to a graduated decline from that transcendent uniry to which
in the end it will return. lOS Whether and to what extent Origen also accepted
the idea of successive cycles of worldS1tl6 is a question we may leave untouched
here. The more important thing is that while he takes over the formal gnostic
256 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
scheme, he introduces radical material corrections. First of all, he understands
reality [0 be God's free crearion. I07 which remains always subject to divine
providence; secondly, he sees the entire development as originating in a free
decision of the will and thus makes freedom the vehicle of the world process; ,.8
finally, he sees everything as subject to God's judgment at the end.'.' As a
result, Origen's entire system has a voluntaristic or, as we would say today,
historical character which is profoundly opposed to the naturalism inherent
in the gnostic idea of emanation llO
In Origen this comprehensive vision of reality, in which everything proceeds
from God and returns to him, has in irs turn trinitarian presuppositions. For
both the coming forth and the rerum take place through Jesus Christ in the
Holy Spirit. To begin with, God creates and rules the world through his Son.'"
The latter proceeds eternally from God; not, however, 'materialistically'
through generation as with the gnostics, but spiritually in a procession that is
due to the will and, more specifically, to 10ve. lIl Also important for Origen, as
it had already been for Tertullian, is the comparison of the relation between
Father and Son with the relation between a light and its brightness.· n Despite
many formulas that suggest subordinationism Origen's intention at every point
is to maintain the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. II " Since the Son
springs from freedom in love and at such is a draft and prototype of the
world,' IS God rules the world through him in a non-violent and non-coercive
way, since the world is antecedently ordered, rather, to freedom. 116 The Logos
is for us the image of God' 17 and the way to knowledge of the Father."" We
can understand the Son, of course, only through the Holy Spirit.'" Just as God
acts through Christ in the Spirit, so we return to the Father through Christ in
the Spirit. Consequently, Origen too, despite numerous ambiguous statements,
has a soteriological reason for not allowing an ontological subordination of
Son and Spirit to the Father. Those who want to be reborn to salvation need
the Father, the Son and the Spirit, and are unable to receive salvation if the
Trinity be not complete. 120 This soteriological vision and the spirituality and
mysticism based on it carries Origen beyond Irenaeus inasmuch as they become
the basis for a comprehensive vision of reality. This explains why this brilliant
synthesis has so many levels and facets.
Origen was in antiquity and still is today a sign of contradiction. Epiphanius,
Jerome and Theophilus were already bringing severe indictments against him.
A hundred years later Emperor Justinian condemned some theses regarded as
Origenist.' 21 The relation between Origen himself and the Origenism
(especially of Evagrius Ponticus) that was condemned is still difficult to
determine, and scholars disagree about it.lll What seems certain is that the
'Left Origenist' tendency led via Lucian of Antioch to the heresy of Arius which
brought the church into new and difficult conllicts just when it had surmounted
the conflicts with gnosticism and the persecutions against Christians. On the
other hand, it was only amid these new confusions and through the clarifications
 Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 257
ultimately achieved that Origen's brilliant insights could become fruitful for
the church.
Let me sum up. Despite all the lacunae and obscurities that still remained,
the work of Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen enabled the church to come to
grips with the speculations of the gnostics and develop a trinitarian doctrine
of its own in which the economic Trinity and the immanent Triniry are
inseparably conjoined. The subordinationist tendencies discernible in both
Tertullian and Origen were due at bottom to an excessive linking of the two
approaches and a lack of adequate distinction between them. The inner logic
of development as well as external challenges made a clear distinction between
time and eternity, God and world, the task of the next phase of development.
This second phase of the development is distinguished chiefly by the name
of Arius and by the direction taken in Arianism. Under the influence of Middle
Platonic philosophy Arius radicalized the subordinationist tendencies present
in the tradition up to this point. He worked out a system in which God and
the world were radically separated and therefore had to be linked by the Logos
understood as an intermediate being. 123 In so doing, Arius really did not take
seriously the radical distinction between God and world with which he had
begun; he overlooked the fact that there can be no mean between God and
creatures, but only an either-or. As in the debate with gnosticism, so too in the
debate with ,Arius the issue was not a matter of detail and certainly not a
peripheral matter, but the entire Christian vision of God and the world. In
fact, as Athanasius in particular made dear,IH the Christian understanding of
salvation itself was at stake. For in the hands of Arius the Christian doctrine
of salvation was in danger of turning into a piece of speculation about the
cosmos, a philosophical wisdom regarding the world.

The outcome of the Arian conflict (in which the outcome of the gnostic
conflict played a part) and subsequent developments was the definition by
the Council of Nicaea (325) of the oneness in being (hollloollsios) of the
Son with the Father,12S and the definition by the Council of Constantinople
(381) of the Spirit as having the same dignity as the Father and the Son.126
The confession of Nicaea culminates in the statement that the Son is one
in being (ho",00lls;05) with the Father. But the term hOllloollsios soon
proved to be 'the sensitive point of the Nicene symbol, the arrow stuck in
the side of Arianism, and the sign of contradiction that was to be debated
for over half a century'.l27
The concept did have several disadvantages: it was not biblical but
gnostic in origin; in addition, it had been condemned in a different but not
fully explained sense at a Council of Antioch which had been convoked in
269 against Paul of Samosata; finally, even its content was not completely
unambiguous. The intention of the concept was to express the truth that
the Son is not created but begotten and that he belongs on the side not of
258 T"e Trinitarian Mystery of God
creatures but of God. The question that arose, however, was this: docs
"0"'00IlSi05 mean the same being with the Father or of one being with the
Father? The first interpretation could be misunderstood as tritheistic, the
second as modalist. The answer to the question emerges from the context
rather than from the term and concept itself. After all, the confession of
Nicaea begins with a confession of the one God, the Father, who by his
nature can only be one and unique. The Son, who is no less divine than the
Father, is of the being and hypostasis of the Father (being and hypostasis
still had the same meaning at Nicaea). It follows that the Son likewise
possesses the essentially unique and indivisible divine being that is proper
to the Father. The unity of being and not merely the sameness of being in
Father and Son is thus clear only as a conclusion from the whole tenor of
the confession. 12 !!
This interpretation of "0",00Ilsi05 has certain implications for the
doctrine of the Trinity that underlies and is implicit in the Nicene creed:
1. The Council docs not proceed monotheistically from the one being of
God and then speak in trinitarian language of the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit as the three ways in which this one being concretely exists. The creed
starts rather with the Father and understands him as the 'summit of unity'
in which the Son and the Spirit are comprehended. We thus have a genetic
conception of the divinity, in which the divinity originates in the Father
and streams forth in the Son and the Holy Spirit.'"
2. The Council obviously lacks the conceptual tools for expressing in an
adequate way the unity of being and distinction of persons. At this point
Nicaea presses beyond itself. The clear distinctions which Tertullian had
already made could win adherence only after a long and difficult process
of clarification.

The needed clarification was won in the half-century between Nicaea (325)
and Constantinople (381). The Semi-Arians were of the opinion that the
homoollsios meant a modalisric blurring of the distinction between Father and
Son, and they sought to rescue the distinction by adding a single letter to the
word and speaking instead of ho",o;oIlS;OS (i.e., like the Father butnor identical
with him), This compromise was untenable because it did not do justice to the
profound concern expressed in the "omooIl5;05. A solution began to emerge
when Athanasius, the great champion of the Niccne orientation, effected a
rapprochement at the Council of Alexandria in 362 by accepting a distinction
between three hypostases and one being. This meant that two concepts used
as identical at Nicaea were now differentiated. ull
The more precise conceptual clarification of this distinction was the work
of the three Cappadocian Fathers (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazaianzus,
and Gregory of Nyssa). Basil followed the Stoics in looking upon the being
 Establishmellt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 259
(ol/sia) as something general and not limited to a particular entity. Thus the
generic concept 'man' is the common predicate of any individual human beings.
The hypostases (hypostaseis) , on the contrary, are the concrete individual
cmbodimems of this common being. Hypostases come into being as complexes
of idiomato, i.e., individualizing characteristics. These idiomata arc here
understood nor as accidents bur as constitutive elements of the concrete
cxis(cnr. 1J1 Peculiar to the Father is the fact that he owes his being to no other
cause; peculiar co the Son is his generation from the Father; peculiar to the
Holy Spirit is that he is known after and with the Son and that he has his
substance from the F3ther.lJ!
\V/cstcrners had trouble with this distinction, because hypostasis was often
translated into Latin by the word substantia. DJ It would seem to Westerners,
therefore, that three hypostases meant three divine substances, thus leading to
trithcisrn or a doctrine of three Gods. Conversely, Tertulliilnts distinction
between natura ilnd persona WilS difficult for the East, because persona was
translated as prosop01f; prosopoll, however, meant a mask, that is, a mere
appearance, and thus suggested modalism. For this reason Basil issued a
warning that, as understood in the confession of faith, the persons (prosiipa)
in God exist as hypostases. 1H Once this equivalence was generally accepted,
all the major church provinces were saying materially the same thing despite
the different concepts used: Caesarea (Basil), Alexandria (Athanasius), Gaul
(Hilary), Italy and especially Rome (Damasus). Thus after one of the most
turbulent periods in the history of the church all the presuppositions for a
solution were at hand.

The resolution came with the Council of Constantinople (381) and its
reception by the Roman synod under Pope Damasus (382). In its doctrinal
letter Constantinople gave expression to the distinction between the one
substance (ol/sia; sl/bstalltia) and the three perfect hypostases (hypostaseis;
sllbsistelltiae).IJS This meant that the Nicene formula, according to which
the Son is from the being (ol/sia) of the Father was now dropped. lJ6 But
the Roman synod, like Pope Damasus in his doctrinal letter of 374,Jl7
spoke of one sllbstalllia and three personae.'" The difference was not
merely one of terminology. While the creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople
start with the Father and then confess the Son and the Spirit to be one in
being or substance with the Father, the West replaces this dynamic
conception with a more static approach that starts with the one substance
and then says that it subsists in three persons. But these differences were
not regarded at that time as dividing the church. The two formulas bring
out the possible plurality and wealth of theologies that are based on a
single common faith. A synthesis of the two differenct vocabularies and
approaches came only at the fifth ecumenical council, the Second Council
of Constantinople (553), which combined them in one and the same
260 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
formula. Meanwhile Boethius and Leontius of Byzantium had clarified the
concept of person, which the East had originally found so difficult. \J9 As
a result the Council could take hypostasis and person as synonyms, and
state: 'If anyone does not confess that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one
nature (physis; natllra) or essence (ollsia; sllbstantia), one might and
power, a Trinity one in being (hornoollsios), one Godhead 10 be worshipped
in three hypostases (hypostaseis; sllbsistelltiae) or persons (prosopa;
personae), anathema sit."'O The Council then adds 10 this static and
extremely abstract technical theological definition a statement that is more
dynamic in character and based on the history of salvation: 'For one is the
God and Father from whom all things are, one is the Lord Jesus Christ
through whom all things are and one the Holy Spirit in whom all things
are,'I"1
A comparison of the two formulas shows the long and difficult road
travelled in the doctrinal development leading from the Bible to the 'fully
developed' dogmatic confessional formula. These passionate debates were
'not involved in useless hair-splilling and conceptual quibbles. The aim was
the greatest possible fidelity and exactitude in the interpretation of the
biblical datum. This last was so new and unparalleled that it turned all
traditional conceptual thinking upside down. It was therefore by no means
enough simply 10 apply concepts from Greek philosophy 10 the traditional
confession of faith. All such allempts ended in heresy. The need was 10
reAect on the data of scripture and tradition and 10 break away from the
one-sidedly essentialist thinking of Greek philosophy and into a personalist
thinking that did justice 10 the scriptures, thus laying the foundation of a
new type of thought. From the theological standpoint, this shift made it
possible to bring out the specifically Christian form of monotheism as
distinct from that of either Judaism or paganism. To that extent, the
wearisome and difficult debates with gnosticism and with the heresies of
right and left retain a permanent basic significance for the church and its
identity. No wonder, then, that in the later period the formulas we have
been examining were constantly repeated.'" The best known example is
the QlliClllllqlle, also know as the (Pseudo-) Athanasian Creed. ~'J Of
course, the price to be paid for this conceptual clarity also became clear in
the course of time. This consisted in the increasing danger that the abstract
conceptual formulas would become independent and lose their character
as interpretations of the historical action of God through Christ in the
Holy Spirit. The vital historical faith of scripture and tradition threatened
to rigidify into abstract formulas which are .materially correct but which,
isolated from the history of salvation, become unintelligible and function-
less for an existential faith.
 Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 261
The Nicene-Constantinopolitan confession was thus, on the one hand,
the result of long and passionate debate; as such it has remained down to
our own day the common foundation for all churches of both East and
West. On the other hand, that confession was also the point of departure
for further theological reflection. After Nicaea and Constantinople this
reflection led to a momentous change of perspective. Tertullian and Origen
were still taking as their starting point the divinity of the Father and then,
in the interests of the economy of salvation, asserting the equality of Son
and Spirit with the Father. 14 ' Origen even distinguished within this one
economy specific areas of operation for Father, Son and Spirit.'" Basil,
however, rejected this view, 146 andon the basis of the one nature theologians
now concluded that the three divine persons act together in all operations
ad extra. This thesis was common to the fathers of both East and West,'47
although the Eastern fathers brought out more clearly the fact that this
common action still expresses the internal trinitarian structure of God;
that is, that the Father acts through the Son in the Holy Spirit.'48 The shift
in outlook shows most clearly in the liturgical doxologies, thus indicating
once again that these were the Sit: im Leben of the trinitarian confession
of faith. In the original liturgical doxology glory is given to the Father
through the Son in the Holy Spirit. But Basil already makes a change which
is then taken over at Constantinople: the Spirit is glorified together with
the Father and the Son. Thus a doxology based on the one nature or
substance of God takes its place alongside the doxology that reflects the
history of salvation: 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy
Spirit.'J49

This development took place in both East and West, although in different
circumstances. In both cases the need was to eliminate (he last traces of
Arianism. In the East these traces took the form chiefly of Eunomianism, which
reduced Arian thinking to a formal, dialectical, almost rationalistic system,lSO
In order to counter it, the Greek Fathers were compelled to emphasize the
mysteriousness of God and the eternal processions in God.'" As a result, they
no longer started with the order found in the economy in order then to make
their way back to the order within God. Trinitarian theology and the economy
were henceforth separated. The emphasis on the Father having shown his face
to us concretely in Jesus Christ was replaced by a radically negative theology
afa Neoplatoniccast, in whichgrearcrsrress was pur on the incomprehensibility
of God than on the truth that the Incomprehensible had, in an incomprehensible
way, made itself comprehensible in Jesus Christ. l52 God's trinitarian being was
regarded as unknowable in itselfj only its rays, or energies, 3rc knowable. ISJ
Hints in this direction that are to be found in the Cappadocian Fathers were
262 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
developed in the fourteenth century, especially by Gregory Pal am as. The
Trinity thus ccased to have any function in the economy of salvation. IH
It is obvious that the West, too, regarded the incomprehensibiliry of the
Trinity as beyond question. U5 But there, especially in Augustine, analogies
between the human spirit as image of God and the T riniry played a key role.
In the West, the conflict with Arianism led to such an emphasis on the
homoousios that the one nature or substance of God became the basis on
which the entire doctrine of the Trinity was explained. Over and over we find
in Augustine such statements as: the Trinity is the one true God, 1J6 or: God is
the Trinity.1.S7 The distinction of the three persons was made within the one
nature and, in the final analysis, remained a problem for Augustine.'" This
Augustinian tendency was accentuated in Anselm of Canterbury,159 The term
of this development in the Latin West was the formula of the Fourth Lateran
Council, according to which in their action ad extra the three divine persons
are a single principle of operation. "'This applied not only to the act of creating
but also to the history of salvation. Thomas Aquinas even held the thesis that
in the abstract anyone of the divine persons could have become man. 161 Even
in the early Middle Ages, however, and cert.inly in Thomas himself there were
contrary tendencies in the direction of 3 Trinity that reflects the economy of
salvation; of these I will be speaking further on. "1 But in late medieval
Nominalism a complete sep:u3rion was made between God's being in itself
and God's action in the history of salvation, and the potetttio ordinala or
'ordered power' of God th.t is reve.led in the history of s.lvation threatened
to give place to a divine freedom that is completely arbitrary in its exercise 16)
and no longer bears the stamp of the inrra·divine trinitarian Structure.
The Reformers took over the trinitarian confession,164 but it was no more
fruitful in their case than it had been in Scholasticism. With some anenuations
the trinitarian confession has also become part of the basic unifying formula
of the World Council of Churches. " .• In practice, however, many churches and
even many Catholic communities and Catholic Chrisrians seem to regard this
confession .s no more than. relic of venerable antiquity. The difficulty is that
the churches have all too long emphasized and defended the intern.l triuneness
of God without saying wh.t this should me.n for us. The doctrine of the
immanent Trinity, which was originally mean{ to be the basis and guarantee
of the doctrine of the economic Trinity, has in practice become 3n independent
entity. No wonder, then, that at the time of the Enlightenment people asked
what practical value it had. Since the answer was 'None', the doctrine of
the Trinity was either jettisoned IN or, at best, preserved, from a sense of
duty, .s a kind of appendix. Characteristic of this second appro.ch is F.
Schleiermacher's thesis in his The Christian Faith: 'Our faith in Christ and our
living fellowship with Him would be the same although we had.no knowledge
of .ny such tr.nscendent f.ct {as the Trinityl, or although the fact itself were
different: 167 And in fact many, if not the majority of Christi3ns today are in
practice pure monotheists, i.e., believers in a monopersonal God.
 Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity 263
This situation, in which living and experiential faith is in danger of losing
the basic structure proper to it as Christian, poses a powerful challenge to
theologians. They will not succeed in once again making the trinitarian
confession a vital part of experiential faith unless they are able to bring
home to Christians the importance of this confession for their salvation.
This in turn means that they must pay greater attention to the connection
between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity. The soteriological
motives which in Irenaeus and Tertullian and especially in Athanasius lead
to the development of the homool/sios doctrine, must once again be
emphasized so that the Trinity may recover its importance for man and his
salvation. There is need, in addition, to highlight once again the brilliant
insights of Origen as clarified and purified with the aid of Nicaea and
Constantinople 3nd, in response to the neo-gnostic currents of our time,
to develop a comprehensive and specifically Christian vision of reality on
the basis of the trinitarian confession. There is need, in other words, to
hold fast to the Nicene·Constantinopolitan confession of the independent
reality of the immanent Trinity, while at the same time saying what this
doctrine means for us within the economy of salvation. Here we have the
basic task of a contemporary doctrine of the Trinity.
 II
Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity

1. The point of departure

(a) Tile Trinity as mystery o{ {aitll
The history of modern thought is not only a history of the destruction of
the trinitarian confession; it is also a history of the many attempts made
to reconstruct the doctrine of the Trinity.' Admittedly, the credit for having
kept alive the idea of the Trinity belongs less to theology than to philosophy.
For while the theologians were either transmitting the doctrine of the
Trinity in a Scholastically correct but uncreative way or else, as in the
theology of the Enlightenment, were dismissing it with the aid of a great
deal of exegetical and historical erudition, thinkers like Spinoza, Lessing,
Fichte, Schelling> and Hegel were trying to revitalize what the theologians
were treating, in one way or other, as a dead object. But the philosophers
were doing this in a manner which the theologians and the churches rightly
regarded as highly suspect and even downright unacceptable. Gnostic and
Neoplatonic ideas which the churches all thought had been eliminated
came alive again in a new form by way of Eckhart and Boehme. If the
church did not wish to surrender the identity and continuity of its tradition,
along with the insights gained therein, it could only react negatively.
Unfortunately it did not have available an Origen or a Basilar an Augustine
who might have handled this necessary clash in a creative way and drawn
strength from the very strength of the opponent for a deeper understanding
of his own tradition, so as to achieve a new synthesis and thus a renewal
of the tradition itself.

It was Hegel who attempted the most important and momentous of these new
approaches. In his philosophy of religion (to which I limit myself here) Hegel
st:lrts from the modern alienation and separation between religion and life,
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 265
between weekday and Sunday.' As a result of this separation, the weekday
becomes the world of the finite, lacking in any true depth, while religion for
its part is emptied of all concrete content; religion turns cold and dead,
wearisome and burdensome. 'Religion shrivels and becomes a maner of mere
feeling, an empty elevation of the spirit to something eternal, and so on. -of For
this reason theology has been reduced to a minimum of dogmas. 'Its content
has become extremely attenuated despite all the talk and erudition and
argumentation.'s But the exegesis and history serve in fact only to do away
with the basic doctrines of Christianiry. The symbol, the regula fidei, is no
longer regarded as binding.' 'As a result, people have only a general knowledge
that God is, and they regard him simply as a supreme being that is empty and
dead in itself and cannot be grasped as a concrete content, as spirit ... If God
as 'spirit' is not to be simply an empty word for us, then he must be conceived
as a triune God." In this respect, according to Hegel, there is a great deal more
dogmatic theology in philosophy than in dogmatic theology itself.'
Hegel's intention, therefore, is to recover the living God and for him this
means the triune God. But he wants to do this in his own fashion. He wants
to reduce the naive represeneacion of Father, Son and Spirit to concepts; he
wanes to understand God as a spirit whose essence it is to make himself an
object for himself in order then to remove this distinction through love.' His
intention, therefore, is to go beyond the abstract concept of God as supreme
being and to think God as a spirit who becomes objective to himself in the Son
and then recovers himself in 10ve.1O Hegel is here expressly harking back to
gnostic and Neoplatonic thinking. 1I In the final analysis the divine Triniry is
the interpretation of the statement that God is love. For 'love is a distinguishing
of two who nonetheless are not simply distinct in relation to one another'.1l
This in turn means that the divine Trinity is a mystery for the imagination and
for abstract thought but not for speculative thinking. 'The nature of God is
not a mystery in the usual sense of the word, least of all in the Christian religion.
Here God has given himself to be known as he is; here he is made plain.''' It
was this reduction of religion to the level of the imagination and the speculative
sublimation of religion in an absolute concept that first and foremost elicited
the opposition of the theologians and the churches. They saw in Hegel's
approach a failure to preserve the mystery and hidden ness of God."
It would be wrong, however, to dismiss Hegel's speculation about the Trinity
as simply a new form of gnosticism. For from one point of view it is directly
opposed to the gnostic systems. The gnostic systems organize their thinking in
a scheme of descent and decline, whereas Hegel's thinking must be regarded
as a scheme of ascent and progress. At the beginning stands something abstract
and general, namely, the Father, who then first defines himself in another self,
namely, the Son, and finally, in a third, the Spirit, becomes a concrete idea.
Admittedly, this process does not produce anything new. 'The third is also the
first'; 'What is produced already exists from the beginning.' 'The process, then,
is simply a game of self·preservation, of self·confirmation.'1S It is a fact,
266 The Trillitariall Mystery of God
however, that truth can be identified only with the whole, and that the whole
exists only at the end. Hi In a sense Hegel has thus rediscovered the eschatological
dimension ofthe Trinity, which the theological tradition had largely forgotten
and according to which God will be 'all in all' (I Cor. 15.28) only at the end
when the Son hands the kingdom over to the Father. But despite this point of
contact, Hegel's thinking on the whole runs counter to the traditional view.
For according to the biblical and traditional conception, what stands at the
beginning is not emptiness but the fullness of being, namely, the Father as
origin and source. Consequently, while it is possible to argue about whether
Vatican I understood Hegel correctly, it did in fact make an important point
when it condemned the proposition that 'God is the universal or indefinite
begin which, by self-determination, constitutes the universality of beings
differentiated into genera, species and individuals.'17
This condemnation at the same time alludes to a third area of problems in
the debate with Hegel, and in fact to the basic problem: Hegel's determination
of the relation between God and world. He does not indeed simply identify
the procession of the Son with the act of creation; nor does he understand the
world-process and the historical process as simply a theogonic process in which
God becomes and finds himself. He keeps the levels clearly distinct. But how
does he do so? For Hegel the Son is the abstract determination of otherness,
while the world is the concrete realization of otherness, so that 'in themselvt!s'
the two are the same." For Hegel it i, valid to say: 'Apart from the world God
is notGod.'19 'God is creator of the world; it belongs to his being, to his nature,
to be a creatof. '20 Consequently for Hegel the distinction between the economic
Trinity and the immanent Trinity is in the last analysis an abstract onc;
considered concretely and in themselves, the two coincide. 'Spirit is the divine
history, the process of self-distinction, sepaution, and return.' This process
takes three forms: one in the realm of thought, aparc from the world; an ocher
in the realm of representation, in the world and its history; and the other
in the community,21 in Ilnd for whose consciousness Jesus Christ is the
mllnifestlltion of God, Ilnd in which therefore the eternlll movement which is
God rellches consciousness!! Ilnd God IlS Spirit is present. H 'This Spirit insofllr
as it exists Ilnd reaches self-realization is the community.'!" God and world;
the history of salvation, the history of the world, and the history of the church:
all these are here dialectically aufgehobell (reduced to components, annulled,
preserved, and elevated to a higher level) in one another, but in such a way
that the decisive point of the Christian faith is in danger of being lost: God as
freedom that exists in and for itself and that communicates itself in [he freedom
of love. But God thus understood presupposes the real and not simply abstract
distinction between the immanent and economic Trinities. At this point, which
is the main point, Hegel's thinking remains profoundly ambivalent and
irremediably ambiguous.
Given the ambiguiry of Hegel's thinking it is not surprising that his system
should have been received in various ways. Some, e.g., Ph. K. Marheineke,
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 267
,pproached it from the ecclesi,1 ,nd orthodox st,ndpoint; others, e.g., L.
Feuerbach and K. Marx, were expressly interested in a critique of religion. For
Feuerbach the mystery of theology is ,nthropology, while the mystery of the
Trinity is the mystery of communal, socict<ll life; it is the mystery of the
necessity of the Thou for the I; it is the truth that 'no being whatsoever, be it
m,n or God or be it called "spirit" or "I", can be true, perfect ,nd absoillte
being in isolatio,,; that the trllt" and perfection are only the ,m;on and unity
of beings that arc similar in essencc',B The Trinity is therefore a projection
and, so to speak, an encoded representation of human intcrsubjectivity and
love. The human soul, which in the p,st supplied im,ges ,nd ,nalogies of the
Trinity, now becomes the prototype ,nd the re,lity. For Feuerbach this
'mounts to saying that faith is to be replaced by love. For it is faith that sets
God apart and [Urns him into a particular being; it thus separates believers
from unbelievers and is the contrary of love, which embraces everything. Love
makes God a universal being and convens the statement that God is love inro
the statement that love is God." On the other h,nd, Feuerbach is far from
sharing the n,ivete of m,ny theologi,ns of our own d,y who think they c,n
give Christianity a new opportunity in the time ahead by 'sublimating' a
dogmatically defined f,ith in the practice of love. Feuerbach is ,ware that in
setting f,ith aside for the sake of love he is striking a decisive blow at
Chriscianity: 'Christianity owes its perpetuation to the dogmatic formulas of
the Church: l ? He does not reflect, however, that to maintain the Godness of
God is ,Iso to defend the hum,nness of m,n. For the preservation of
the difference between lovers that remains even in love also preserves the
unconditional dignity and unconditional worth of the individual person within
the human genus into which Feuerbach and, even more resolutely, Marx wish
to ,bsorb the individu,J.2K The transcendence of God proves to be the sign ,nd
safeguard of the transcendence of the human person. 29

Although theologi,ns hove a good de, I to learn from modern philosophy

and in particular from Hegel, at the decisive point they must say a resolute
No. Reason cannot prove the necessity of the Trinity either from the
concept of absolute spirit or from the concept of love. The Trinity is a
mystery in the Strict sense of the term. 3D What is said in the scriptures
applies here: 'No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows
the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal
him' (Matt. 11.27; d. John 1.18). No one knows God exceptthe Spirit of
God (I Cor. 2.11). The thesis regarding the Trinity as a strict mystery is
directed primarily against ration,lism which seeks to prove the doctrine of
the Trinity by reason, whether it does this by w'y of the history of religions
from the so-called extra-biblical parallels, or speculatively from the essence
of divinity or the essence of hum,n consciousness. The thesis is ,Iso directed
against semi-rationalism, as it is called, which admits that prior to the
268 The TrillitarialJ Mystery of God
revelation of them we cannot deduce the mysteries of faith, but then goes
on to assert that once they have been revealed we are able to understand
them." It is a fact, of course, that the theological tradition offers rational
arguments for faith in the Trinity. But the analogies from the life of the
human spirit which Augustine in particular introduced into the discussion
serve only to illustrate and never to demonstrate the truth of the Trinity."
Admittedly, some medieval Scholastics (especially Richard ofSt Victor and
Anselm of Canterbury) did try to produce rationes necessariae (demonstra-
tive reasons) for faith in the Trinity." The question is, however, whether
their cogent rational arguments were not in fact simply arguments of
suitability and did not in fact presuppose the trinitarian faith and argue in
the light of it. It was only with Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas that
a clear distinction was made between faith and knowledge; not until the
modern age were the two separated. Therefore in the medieval theologians
I have been discussing there may have been an exaggerated intellectual
optimism, but we can hardly speak of them as rationalists in the modern
sense of the word.
The positive reason for the basic incomprehensibility of the Trinity even
after it has been revealed is that even in the economy of salvation God is
revealed to us only in the medium 01 history and in the medium 01 human
words and deeds, or, in other words, in finite lorms. What Paul says holds
at this point too: we see in a mirror and not face to lace (I Cor. 13.12). Or,
to use the language of Thomas Aquinas: even in the economy 01 salvation
we know God only indirectly through his effects. These effects are clearer
and less ambiguous in the history 01 salvation than they are in creation;
nonetheless, they enable us to know only that God is and that he is triune,
but do not permit us to understand his essence (quid est) from within. We
are therefore united to God as to one unknown (quasi ignoto )." Nowadays
we would say rather that we know the triune God only through his words
and actions in history; these are the real symbols 01 his love that freely
communicates itsell to us. God's Ireedom-in-Iovein the form ofagratuitous
sell-communication would in fact be annulled if it could be shown to be
rationally necessary. The revelation given in the history of salvation does
not therefore explain the mystery of God to us but rather leads us deeper
into this mystery; in this history the mystery 01 God is revealed to us as
mystery.
There are three points in particul3r that remain incomprehensible and
impenetrable to our minds: 1. the absolute unity 01 God despite the
distinction 01 persons; 2. the absolute equality of the persons despite the
dependence 01 the second on the first and 01 the third on the first and
second; 3. the eternity of God as Father, Son and Spirit despite the lact
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 269
that they are established as such by the activities of generation and
spiration. But then, do we even grasp the absolute simpliciry of God despite
the multipliciry and differentiation of his attributes, or his absolute
immutabiliry and eterniry despite the multipliciry of his activities and of
his involvements in history? No, God is unknowable in every aspect of his
being and not just in his internal personal relations. Neither the That of
the triune God nor his What (his inner nature) nor his How are accessible
to our finite knowledge."

Up to this point, in dealing with the mysteriousness of the Trinity I have been
taking 'mystery' in its Scholastic sense: a mystery is a truth which in principle
transcends the powers of the human mind, is certified only by a divine
communication, and, even after its communication, cannot be positively
understood. 36 In this Scholastic approach mystery is understood, first of all, as
u property of a proposition. It speaks of mysteries in the plural; it is asserted
that there are many mysteries of faith, but there is no explicit reflection on
whether these many mysteries are simply aspects of a single mystery. Secondly,
mystery is understood in terms of reason, without the question being asked
whether this reference is not too narrow and superficial and whether the
standpoint adopted should not rather be that of the human person as a whole
and the mystery of its existence. Thirdly, the revelation of mystery is understood
as a transmission of true propositions (revelation as supernatural information
and instruction) rather than being conceived as a personal communication.
Fourthly, mystery is defined in a purely negative way as the unknowable and
incomprehensible. Fifthly, and consistently with such a definition, mystery is
thought of as something provisional; it will someday be eliminated, when we
see God 'face to face' in the beatific vision. No account is taken of the fact that
mystery is essentially connected with the self-transcendence of the human spirit
and with the Godness of God and that it is to this extent something positive.
This Scholastic concept makes it possible to distinguish a mystery from a
riddle and a problem, both of which in principle can be gradually solved,
whereas in principle mystery cannot be thus removed. But such a concept of
mystery is not clearly distinguished from the everyday use of this word and
from the unpleasant associations of secrecy connected with it. Such terms as
secret diplomacy, secret police, military secrets and secretiveness suggest a
distressing lack of openness and so on; they suggest the painful need of locks
and keys. Especially in its religious application, the word mystery, thus
understood, becomes suspect. It seems to abet a flight from the bright light of
the intellect into the half·darkness of feeling and to provide religious justific-
ation for mental fatigue and even intellectual dishonesty. Against this back-
ground itis understandable that the attack of the Enlightenment on Christianity
should have found expression especially in hostility to the concept of mystery.
The very title of Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) by John Toland, an
English deist, is typical. And in fact the concept of mystery can become 'the
270 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
refuge of rendencies' 'which distort Christian ralk abour God and blur rhe
distinction between belief and superstition'.J7

A positive and more complete concept of mystery can be elaborared

along two lines. To begin wirh, ir can be shown from philosophy and
anthropology rhat because of the self·rranscendence proper to their spirit,
human beings are beings of ineradicabie mystery. The mystery in rhis case
is not something that merely accompanies the other, rationally explicable
traits of his existence; it is the all-inclusive totaliry of rheir exisrence, rhat
which alone makes possible, comprehends and per mea res everything else."
This many·faceted mystery of man determines revelation inasmuch as it is
an image and likeness of rhe mystery of God and his freedom. Theologically,
therefore, there are not many mysteries of all kinds, bur only one mystery:
God and his saving will as carried out rhroughJesus Christ and in rhe Holy
Spirit. The entire Chrisrian economy of salvation is rhus a single mystery
that can be summed up in one sentence: rhrough Jesus Christ and in the
Holy Spirit God is the salvation of man." This triune mysrery can be
broken down into thr.. mysteries: the rriune being of God, rhe incarnation
of God in Jesus Christ, and man's salvarion in the Holy Spirit, a salvation
which finds is escharological complerion in the vision of God face ro face.
In rhese rhree mysreries rhe one mystery of the self·communicating love of
God is seen from various angles: in itself - in Jesus Christ - in all the
redeemed.· o The mystery of the triune God as it exists in God himself is
here both the presupposition or intrinsic ground as well as the deepest
realiry of the mysteries of the incarnation and grace. The T riniry is the
mystery present in all mysteries; it is, without qualification, the mystery of
the Christian faith.
If mystery is understood in this positive sense and if the correspondence
between the mystery which is man and the mystery of God is seen, then
the Christian mystery cannot be simply non-rational or, worse still,
contrary to reason. This positive understanding excludes not only the one-
dimensional leveling down of faith and knowledge but also the dualistic
definition of the two as antithetical in irrationalism and lideism. Fideism
constantly appeals to the well-known saying of Tertullian (although it is
the sense and not the words as such that are to be found in this writer):
Credo quia absurdum est (I believe because it is absurd).·' In the Middle
Ages this critical attitude toward reason is to be seen in, for example, Peter
Damian and Bernard of Clairvaux; it occurs then in late medieval
Nominalism, in the supernaturalism of the Reformers, in the debate be-
tween P. Bayle and Leibniz, in Kierkegaard and in early dialectical theology.
In response to this atritude it must be said:
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 271
Reason that claims to lack any intrinsic connection with revelation and
to be separated from and opposed to it by an unbridgeable chasm is no
less dangerous than reason that asserts itself as equal in rank with
revelation ... In the final analysis, the claim that we cannot simultane-
ously hold fast in faith to the truth of revelation and have confidence in
the knowledge of it which the mind can acquire turns out to be identical
with the claim that we do not need both together and that speculative
reason attains to full knowledge of the same content which the believer
accepts on entirely external authority. In other words, once the human
spirit becomes a thinking spirit it necessarily ceases to be a believing
spirit; conversely, it can only believe when it ceases to think. This
statement holds true in both approaches, so closely allied are the two
extremes. 41

The light of divine truth does not need this kind of artificial eclipse in
order to reveal its brilliance. '43 Revelation is 'supra-rational, not irrational
or anti-rational. It represents an enrichment of reason, not a spurning or
constriction of it. '44
The correspondence between the mystery of man and the mystery of
God means, to begin with, that reason can show that what the mystery of
the Trinity asserts is not contradictory or nonsensical. It does not amount
to the absurd claim that one equals three, or similar nonsense.·' On the
positive side, there arc three ways of attaining to a deeper understanding
of the mystery of the Trinity as accepted in faith: 1. by examination of
analogies from the natural world; Augustine in particular travelled this
path in his teaching on the Trinity; 2. by showing the nexl/s mysterioTllm
(the connection of the mysteries with one another) or the hierarchia
veritattlll' (the hierarchy of truths):46 all the mysteries of faith together
form a structured whole, and by reason of the internal harmony and
coherence of this structure the individual truths of faith become credible
and intelligible. As far as the doctrine of the Trinity is concerned, this
connection between the truths of faith means showing that the economic
Trinity and the immanent Trinity are inseparable and, furthermore, that
the trinitarian confession provides the basic structure for all the other
truths of faith as well as their overarching context. 3. The third way is by
showing the connection between the trinitarian faith and man's meaning
and goal, namely, eternal communion with God, which is given through
Christ in the Holy Spirit.·' We may combine these three ways and say that
the mystery of the Trinity can be understood as a mystery if it can be shown
that it proves its worth as an interpretation of reality, that is, of the order
of creation and the order of redemption.
272 The Trillitarian Mystery of God

(b) Images and likenesses {or the trinitarian mystery

The First Vatican Council stated that with the help of grace reason can
gain a certain understanding of the mysteries of God 'from the analogy
with the objects of its natural knowledge'." Theologians reflecting on the
doctrine of the Trinity adopted this principle at a very early stage and
looked to the natural world for images, parables and analogies that would
enable them to penetrate more deeply into the mystery of the Trinity. As
early as the second century we find the ciassical comparison with fire,
which is not diminished by the fact that another fire is lit from it." Another
ancient comparison, between the source of light, the light and the radiance
of the light'· played an important role later on, especially in Athanasius. 51
In fact, this image even made its way into the church's confession of faith:
'Light from Light, true God from true God'." Tertullian introduced a
series of other comparisons: root and fruit, source and stream, sun and ray
of the sun."
Augustine was the most prolific of these theologians in discovering traces
(vestigia) of the Trinity in creation. The whole eleventh book of his De
Trinitate is devoted to this subject. In addition to the images already
mentioned," Augustine points out that according to Wisdom 11.20, God
has arranged all things 'by measure and number and weight'. In this triad
he sees an image of the divine Trinity." But for him the true image of God
is man (Gen. 1.28)" and, more specifically, the human soul. 57 This idea of
man as image of God is the starting point for Augustine's psychological
speculation on the Trinity, which in turn determined the course of all later
reflection on the mystery of the Trinity in Latin theology. Here again
Augustine can refer back to earlier beginnings and especially to the
comparison with the interior word and with the will, these being analogies
customary ever since the Apologists and Origen." Within Latin theology,
Augustine could build especially on preliminary work done by Tertullian,
Hilary and Ambrose." In the final analysis, however, Augustine proceeds
in a fully independent manner; his psychological doctrine of the Trinity is
the product of his own genius.'· With great speculative power and depth
Augustine detects in the human spirit ever new ternaries: mens - tlotitia-
amor (mind - knowledge - love), memoria - intelligelllia - voltllltas
(memory - intelligence - will), and others. I shall speak of these in detail
further on.
There is, of course, a question that needs to be answered: what do these
analogies really achieve? They are doubtless not meant as proofs in the
strict sense of the term; they are not a demonstration but a subsequent
illustration that presupposes the confession of the Trinity. They represent
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 273
an attempt to put the mystery of the Trinity in the language of our present
world. Admittedly, then, they move within a hermeneutical circle. They
not only interpret the Trinity in terms of the world and more particularly
of man but, conversely, they also interpret the world and man in the light
of the mystery of the Trinity; on the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity
they postulate a particular model for human knowing and loving. This
reciprocal clarification has its basis in the correspondence (analogy)
between God and world, the order of creation and the order of redemption.
It is understandable, then, that because of his divergent conception of
analogy" Karl Barth should sharply criticize the doctrine of the vestigia
trillitatis. He is afraid that this ambivalent undertaking may lead to a high-
handed justification of the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of man's
understanding of the world and himself and thus to a defection from
revelation. He therefore regards the attempt to find traces of the Trinity as
frivolous and as distracting us from the real task, which is not to illustrate
revelation but to interpret it, that is, to make it intelligibile in its own
terms." Catholic theology, which persists in maintaining the analogy
between God and world, cannot accept this radical criticism. Riskiness is
not a theological argument for abandoning a task seen as necessary; it is
rather a challenge to do the task well, accurately and conscientiously.
One point in Barth's criticism is indeed valid: that theological under-
standing must come primarily not from without, that is, from analogies
with the world, but from faith itself or, more accurately, from the
"exus mysteriorum or internal unity of the various assertions of faith. 63
The real vestigium trillitatis is therefore not man but the God·man Jesus
Christ. A real understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity from within is
gained only in the light of the economy of salvation. This brings us to the
approach to the doctrine ofthe Trinity that is predominant today: namely,
the unity of the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity.

Ie) The ullity of immallellt Trinity alld ecollomic lrillity

Since the Trinity is without qualification the mystery of faith, faith alone
must provide the approach to the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore we
cannot start from modern philosophy or from any analogies drawn from
the created realm; philosophy and analogies can only have subsequent
auxiliary role in attaining a deeper understanding. The real starting point
for understanding musr be found in the economy of salvation. It is in this
sense that K. Rahner has laid it down as the basic principle that 'the Trinity
of the economy of salvation is the immanent Trinity and vice versa'. ,. K.
Barth had already written a comparable statement: 'The reality of God in
274 The Trillitariall Mystery of God
His revelation is not to be bracketed with an "only", as though somewhere
behind His revelation there stood another reality of God, but the reality of
God which meets us in revelation is His reality in all the depths of eternity .'b'
Even an important Orthodox representative of Neopalamite theology, J.
Meyendorff, proposes comparable theses. He says that God's being for us
belongs to his being in himself."" It can be said, then, that what K. Rahner
sets down as a basic principle, reflects 3 broad consensus among the
theologians of the various churches. At the same time, the axiom sums up,
in a critical and purified form, the results of an exchange of views with
Hegel and Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher observed that 'we have no
formula for the being of God in himself as distinct from the being of God
in the world'.67 This thesis retains its validity even though Schlciermacher
himself drew false conclusions from it. In a way less open to misunder-
standing than Schleiermacher's F.A. Staudenmaier, a representative
of the Tubingen School, had already, in debate with Hegel, anticipated
Rahner's basic axiom in his thesis regarding the 'vanity of the distinction
between Trinity of being and Trinity of revelation'.b'
With Karl Rahner we may adduce three arguments in justification of the
basic principle Or axiom:
1. Man's salvation is and can be nothing less than God himself; it cannot
be simply a created gift distinct from God (gralia creala, 'created grace').
God's action through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit is therefore truly God's
saving action only if in it we arc dealing with God himself and if God
himself is there for us as he is in himself. The economic Trinity would thus
be deprived of all meaning if it were not at the same time the immanent
Trinity. In addition, the eschatological character of the revelation in Christ
makes it a necessity that in Jesus Christ God should communicate himself
unreservedly and in a manner which cannot be surpassed. In the Christ-
event there cannot be some unilluminated fringe and residue of a DeliS
abscondiltls left lurking 'behind' the DeliS revelaills. Rather, the DeliS
abscondiltls is the DeliS revelaills; the irremovable mystery of God is the
mystery of our salvation. For this reason the so-called Athanasian Creed,
which contains the most comprehensive doctrine olthe Trinity to be found
in any creed, begins by saying: ·Qu;cmuque vult sa/urts esse, allte omnia
OPIIS esl, III lelleal . .. (whoever wishes to be saved must, first of all, hold
.. .).'69
2. There is at least one case in which this identity of economic and
immanent Trinity is a defined truth of faith: the incarnation of the Logos,
or hypostatic union. Independently of the unproved and in fact false
Scholastic opinion that in the abstract anyone of the three divine persons
could have become man, it is a fact that in Jesus Christ not God in general
 EX/Jositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 275
but second divine person, the Logos, became man and this in the sense that
he docs not simply dwell in the man Jesus but is the subject (hypostasis) in
which the humanity of Jesus subsists, so that the humanity of Jesus is not
sImply an external garment but a real symbol of the Logos.7o In the man
Jesus Christ it is God's very Son who speaks and acts. In the case of the
incarnation, then, the temporal sending of the Logos into the world and
his eternal procession from the Father cannot be completely distinguished;
here immanent Trinity and economic Trinity form a unity.
3. The salvation brought to us by the Son of God consists in our
becoming sons and daughters of God in the Holy Spirit; that is, the self-
communication of God, which belongs by nature to the eternal Son of
God, is given to us through grace in the Holy Spirit. Admittedly, with few
exceptions the Scholastic theologians have asserted that, despite what
scripture suggests, we may not speak of a personal indwelling of the Holy
Spirit in Christians; according to most Scholastics scripture justifies only
an indwelling that belongs to God as such and therefore to all three persons
and that is only imputed (appropriated) to the Holy Spirit. But there are
speculative objections, as well as solid biblical objections, to this thesis."
In this context, therefore, we may take as our starting point the assertion
that grace is the free self-communication of God in the Holy Spirit; even
in the tradition established by the Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity the
Holy Spirit is precisely the eschatological gift in which God communicates
himself. We may therefore say, too, that in the outpouring of the Spirit
which brings the economy of salvation to its conclusion economic Trinity
and immanent Trinity form a unity.
In K. Rahner, the original purpose of the axiom, which IS justitied
in the three ways just described, was to overcome the non-functionality
of the doctrine of the Trinity and to link the doctrine once again with the
history of salvation, thus making it intelligible once again to the believer.
In this perspective the axiom is correct, legitimate and even necessary.
The identification of the immanent and economic Trinities as established
in this axiom is, of course, susceptible of several meanings and open to
various misinterpretations. It would certainly be a misinterpretation if as
a result of this identification the economic Trinity were stripped of its
proper historical reality and were understood simply as a temporal
manifestation of the eternal immanent Trinity; if, for example, we were
not to take seriously the truth that through the incarnation the second
divine person exists in history in a new way; and if, therefore, the eternal
generation from the Father and the eternal mission to the world were no
longer to be distinguished as well as internally connected. Today, of course,
the opposite misinterpretation is more likely: the identification is taken to
276 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
mean Ihat Ihe immanenl Trinity is dissolved in the economic Trinity, as
Ihough Ihe elernal Trinity first came inlo exislence in and Ihrough hislory.
In elernity Ihe dislinclions between Ihe Ihree persons would Ihen al best
be modal, and would become real only in hislory.n Finally, Ihe axiom is
being complelely misunderstood when it is turned inlo a pretext for pushing
Ihe immanenl Trinity more or less out of the picture and limiting oneself
more or less to consideration of Ihe Trinity in Ihe economy of salvalion."
Such a course only deprives Ihe economic Trinity of all meaning and
significance. For il has meaning and significance only if God is present in
Ihe histoty of salvalion as Iheone who he is from eternity; more accuralely,
if God does nol simply show himself to us as Father, Son and Spirit in the
hislory of salvalion, but is in fact Father, Son and Spiril from all elernity.
If, then, the axiom which states Ihe identity of the immanenl and
economic Trinities is not to lead to Ihe dissolution of the immanent Trinity
inslead of 10 ils subslanliation, Ihis identilY must nol be understood along
the lines of the lautological formula A = A. The 'is' in this axiom musl be
understood as meaning not an identificalion but rather a non-deducible,
free, gracious, historical presence of the immanent Trinity in Ihe economic
Trinity. We may therefore rephrase Rahner's basic axiom as follows: in
the economic self-communication the intra -trinitarian se1 f-commu nica tion
is present in the world in a new way, namely, under the veil of historical
words, signs and actions, and ullimately in Ihe figure of Ihe man Jesus of
Nazareth. The need is to maintain nol only the kenotic characler of Ihe
economic Trinity but also ils character of graciousness and freedom in
relalion 10 Ihe immanent TrinilY and thus to do juslice 10 Ihe immanent
myslery of God in (nol: behind!) his self-revelation,7'
To highlighllhe gracious freedom and Ihe kenolic aspecl of Ihe economic
Trinity is at the same time to emphasize the apophatic character of the
immanent Trinily, that is, Ihe fact thaI it eludes all language and thought.
The immanent Trinity is and remains a mysterium stricte dictum in (not:
behind!) the economic Trinity. This means Ihal we cannot· deduce Ihe
immanent Trinity by a kind of extra pol ali on from the economic Trinity.
This was cerrainly not the palh the early church followed in developing
Ihe doclrine of the Trinity in the form of confession and dogma. As we
have seen, Ihe early church's slarting point was ralher Ihe baptismal
confession of failh, which in turn was derived from the risen Lord's
commission regarding baplism." Knowledge of the trinitarian myslery
was thus due directly to Ihe revelalion of Ihe Word and nOI 10 a process
of deduclion. This revelation in word is for its parI the interpretation of
the saving event Ihal lakes place in baplism, Ihrough which Ihe saving
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 277
event accomplished by Jesus Christ is made present by the power of the
Spirit.
We come, therefore, to the conclusion that like all revelation, the
revelation of the trinitarian mystery of God is given not in words alone nor
in saving acts alone but in word and act, which are inter-related. The
trinitarian baptismal confession and the eucharistic doxology are intended
to interpret the trinitarian reality of salvation which is made present in
baptism and the eucharist and in which God is our salvation through Christ
in the Spirit; conversely, this saving realiry turns revelation into a word
that is living and has power over history." Once it is understood in terms
of the history of revelation, the axiom regarding the unity of the immanent
and economic Triniry shows itself to be one from which it is not possible
to deduce the immanent Trinity and which cannot be used in order to
reduce the immanent Trinity to the economic Triniry. Rather, this axiom
presupposes knowledge of the immanent Trinity and is meant to interpret
and concretize the immanent Triniry in an appropriate way.

2. Basic concepts of the doctrine of the T riniry

(aJ The classical basic concepts
The doctrine of the Trinity, as found in the manuals of dogmatic theology,
begins with the doctrine of the immanent Trinity and specifically with the
eternal processions of the Son from the Father and of the Holy Spirit from
the Father and the Son; only at the end of the treatise do the manuals deal
with the mission (sending) of the Son and the Spirit into the world in the
history of salvation. Thus the dogmatic theology of the manuals follows
the order of being, in which the eternal processions are antecedent to the
missions and provide the basis for them. However, if we follow the order
of knowledge, then we must begin with the missions as these occur in the
history of salvation and with the revelation of these in words, and then
come to know the eternal processions via the missions as their ground and
presupposition. In the following discussion I shall follow this second path
because it seems more in keeping with the nature of our human knowledge,
which always starts from experience, and because it also seems more
appropriate in view of the biblical witness.'Tfhe starting point and basic
category of a doctrine of the Trinity that is based on the history of salvation
must be the concept which in the traditional presentation of the Trinity
comes only at the end: the concept of mission or sending. The scriptures
tell us ofthe Son being sent by the Father (Gal. 4.4; John 3.17; 5.23; 6.57;
17.18) and ofthe Spirit being sent by the Father (Gal. 4.6;John 14.16,26)
278 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
and the Son (Luke 24.49; John 15.26; 16.7). While the mission of the Son
in the incarnation takes visible form, the mission of the Spirit in the
indwelling of the Spirit in the hearts of those who have been justified (I
Cor. 3.16; 6.19; Rom. 5.5; 8.11) is invisible but does not utterly elude
experience. The documents of the mag;ster;ml! also use the concept of
mission or sending. 78
The concept of mission includes two aspects or factors. 79 In keeping
with my approach from the history of salvation I shall deal with these in
an order which reverses that followed in traditional theology. 1. The
mission has for its goal the presence of the Son or the Spirit in the world
and in history. As compared with the omnipresence of God that is entailed
by God's very nature, this is a new, free and personal kind of presence. 2.
The mission presupposes and has for its origin the eternal dependence of
the Son on the Father and of the Spirit on the Father and the Son. The Son
is eternally from the Father; the Spirit is eternally from the Father and the
Son. The mission in time thus presupposes the eternal procession and adds
to it a new, historical mode of presence in the created world.'. The mission
can therefore be regarded as a reproduction and diffusion, and even a
prolongation of the eternal procession."
The concept of mission thus leads to the concept of the intra-divine
procession of the Son from the Father and of the Spirit from the Father
and the Son (or originally [pr;llcipaliter) from the Father and, in a mode
bestowed on the Son by the Father, from the Son as well)." The scriptures
only allude to these processions. For when they speak of the Son coming
forth or proceeding (Vg.: ex Deo processi) from the Father Uohn 8.42)
and of the Spirit proceeding (Vg.: qu; a Patre procedit) from the Father
Uohn 15.26), they are referring directly to the coming forth in time, or to
the missions. Only indirectly is the eternal procession also expressed, in
the form as it were of a transcendentally and theologically necessary
condition for the possibility of the temporal procession. The eternal
procession signifies an eternal relation of origin.
For an accurate grasp of the concept of procession we must distinguish
between a procession to the outside, in which that which (or he who)
proceeds emerges from his origin and passes beyond it (processio ad extra
or processio trallsiells), and a procession in which that which (or he
who) proceeds remains within his origin (process;o ad ;lIIra or process;o
immallC/ls)." It is in the first manner that creatures come forth from God;
it is in the second that the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Spirit
from the Father and the Son. For given the unity, simplicity and indivisibility
d the divine being, only a process;o ;mmallells is possible in God. For the
same reason the immanent processions in God cannot be understood 3S
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 279
spatial or temporal movements, but are rather 'the foundation of the order
of life and existence in God'. They are the immanent vital processes and
vital movements in God. They are not a kind of graduated development
of God out of the abyss and darkness 01 his mysterious being into the light
of clear sell-knowledge. There is no temporal succession in God, but only
an eternal active reality (actus pllrus) 01 immense power, inexhaustible
fullness 01 life, and yet profound interiority and repose.'·

On the basis of the scriptures, tradition has endeavored to give more precise
expression to the two processions in God.1IS The procession of the Son is
described as generation, that 01 the Spirit (on the basis of John 15.26) as a
procession in a narrower sense. In view of the original meaning of the word
'spirit' (namely wind, breathing, breath), traditional theology describes the
procession of the Spirit as a 'breathing' or spiration (spiratio). But while
the concept of generation is immediately intelligible, we experience some
embarrassment in our attempts to characterize the procession of the Spirit.
This conceptual poverty is only apparently lacking in Eastern theology. Because
Eastern theology has no general concept to cover the intra-trinitarian 'comings
forth', it is able to reserve the concept of 'procession' to the Spirit. lifo Yet we
look in vain to this theology for some more precise explanation of the concept.
As far as I know, the only attempt at such an explanation thar is to be found
in the tradition comes in Albert the Great,H7 to whom M. J. Scheeben refers.1I1!
According to Albert processio signifies an ecstatic going-beyond-oneself and
self-transcending, a being-out-of-oneself such as is proper to love. As we
compare the internal procession of the Son that is, his generation, with the
procession of the interior word in the act of knowledge, so we compare
procession of the Spirit, that is, his spiration, with the being-out-of-oneself or
ec·stasy of love. Thus the Son is the Word and Wisdom of the Father, while
the Spirit is the love 01 the Father and Son and the bond ollove between them."

The processions in God in turn are the basis of relations in God. Relation
means reference to another.'"' The concept of relation therefore has three
elements: a subject (terminlls a quo), a term (terminus ad quem) and a
foundation. There is a relative opposition berween the subject and term of
the relation. The two processions in God yield four such relations:
I. The relation of the Father to the Son: active generation (generare) or
Fatherhood;
2. The relation of the Son to the Farher: passive generation (generar;) or
sonship;
3. The relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit: active
spiration (spirar.);
4. The relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son: passive
spiration (spirari).
280 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
Three of these relations are really distinct from each other: fatherhood,
sonship and passive spiration. Active spiration, on the other hand, is
identified with fatherhood and sonship and belongs to Father and Son in
common, whereas passive spiration is really distinct from fatherhood and
sonship. This means that the two processions in God ground three really
distinct relative oppositions. The latter are the prototypes and primal
ground of the dialogical and relational interaction and co-presence of
Father, Son and Spirit in the history of salvation.
It was the brilliant insight of the fourth- and fifth-century fathers - an
insight with a basis in Athanasibs,91 and developed in the East especially by
Gregory ofNazianzus, 92 and in the West even more clearly by Augustine"-
that fatherhood, sonship and passive spiration are relational realities, so
that the distinctions in God affect not the one divine substance or
one divine being but only the relations in God. This insight was later
incorporated into official church teaching." It led to the basic trinitarian
principle: 'In Deo omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio
(In God everything is one where there is no opposition of relationship). '95
The statement that the distinctions in God are in the form of relations is
of fundamental importance because it represents a break-away from a one-
sidedly substantialist type of thought. The final word belongs not to the
static substance, the divine self-containment, but to being-from-another
and being-far-another. In the created world rclations presuppose sub-
stance. Relations are essential only to the full self-realization of the being;
they do not exhaust the reality of the being. A human being is and remains
a human being even if he selfishly closes himself against relations with
others; in fact he may not be regarded exclusively as a relational being that
has meaning and value only to the extent that it exists for others and for
the whole, since the human person has value and dignity in himself. In
God, however, ·such distinctions between substance and relation are
rendered impossible by the simpliciry and perfection of the divine being.
In God substance and relation are really identical; God is relation and
exists only in the intra-divine relations; he is wholly love that surrenders
and bestows itself. This relational reality of God, which is identical with
his being or substance, presupposes real, mutually distinct relational
realities. To that extent the distinction between the one substance of God
and the relations is not a purely mental one (distinctio rationis ) but one
that has a foundation in reality (distillCtio virttlalis), in that the relation is
directed to a term which is really distinct from the substance.'6 Thus the
distinctions based on the relations once again bring out the ecstatic
character of God's love.
The three mutually opposed relations in God - fatherhood, sonship and
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 281
passive spiration - are abstract expressions for the three divine persons.
Person (hypostasis)," as used in the early church and by the Scholastics,
means the ultimate subject of all being and action (principi,,,,, ql/od). The
Mture, for its part, is that by which the person or hypostasis is and acts
(principiI/III qllo). The person or hypostasis is both irreducible to anything
else and incommunicable to others; to that extent it is a unity distinct from
every other such unity: the one here, the other there. For this reason the
classical definition of' person is: 'Persona est natllrae ral;mralis individuo/is
substantia (3 person is an individual substance of a radonal nilrure).''' The
weakness of this definition, which comes from Boethius, is that it seems
to understand personality and individuality as identical. Individuality,
however, defines a what and not a who; it describes the person's nature,
not the person as such. Nonetheless the content of Boethius' 'individuality'
is incommunicability, an immediacy based on an ultimate indivisibility
and unity." This aspect finds expression especially in the definition
of person that is given by Richard of St Victor: 'lIatllrae rationalis
incomnumicabilis existentia (an incommunicable existence of a rational
nature),'IOO At bottom, Thomas Aquinas has the same thought in mind
when he replaces the concept of substance (which is related to the concept
of nature) with that of subsistence: that which is the subject that 'srands
under' the nature or substance. lol This conceptual refinement has import-
ance not least for the doctrine of the Trinity. For talk of three substances
is easily interpreted as meaning three Gods. Whereas if we speak of three
subsistences, we are saying that the numerically one divine nature or
substance is 'possessed' by three subjects or that it exists in three relatively
distinct modes of subsistence.
In what does the ultimate, indivisible unity and therefore the ground of
distinction in God consist? According to what has been said thus far it
consists of the relations. This explains Thomas' definition of the divine
persons: the divine persons are subsistent relations.l oz In fact, if not in
terminology, this doctrine was also adopted by the Reformers; in our day
it has been put forward among others by K. Barth. ID ]

This definition of the divine persons as subsistent relations can be undersmod

in two ways. First, the relation may be understood as the foundation of the
subsistence, as in Anselm of Canterbury. 104 In this view an abstract approach
with the nature as its point of departure predominates over the concrete
approach based on the history of salvation. Then, of course, it is easy to lapse
into modalism, since the persons seem [0 be simply modes of subsistence of
the one nature. Second, the persons may be understood as grounding the
relations. This is nO[ to be interpreted as meaning that the persons are
282 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
temporally prior to the relations; that is impossible since the persons arc
identical with the relations. The sense is rather thilt the persons are logically
prior [0 the relations. This is the explanation given by Thomas Aquinas. UlS On
this point he is m.teri.lly close to the E."ern undetst.nding of the Trinity,
which starts not with the one nature but with the hypostases and is therefore
closer to the conclCle .nd .. Iv>lion-historical language and thought of the
Bible.

The persons are distinguished from one another by their characteristic

properties (idiomata hypostatika, 'personal properties').lo. Materially
identical with the properties",e the notions (gllorismata ), the attributes of
the divine persons by which they are known and distinguished. Such
personal properties (i.e., properties distinguishing the persons) are: father-
hood, sonship, and passive spiration. The difference between the Eastern
and Western doctrines of the Trinity can be seen in the divergent responses
to the question of the role played by innascibility (agel1lliisia ) as property
of the Father. 'o , Since the Eastern theologians start with the Father as
unoriginated origin and as source of the Trinity, they see innascibility as
the decisive property of the Father. The mainstream of the Western Latin
tradition, however, sees innascibility as a property of the person of the
Father but not as a property constitutive of the person. This view is
connected with the fact that Western theologians usually see the persons
as constituted and distinguished by the relations. Innascibility, however,
is as such a denial of a relational dependence and cannot, therefore, be a
properry constitutive of a person. The East, on the other hand, regards this
properry as the starting point for the entire doctrine of the Trinity; this is
because the Eastern theologians take innascibility as expressing the fact
that God in his love is pure origin, receiving nothing from anyone, or that
he is pure giving and unqualified bestowing.
The properties are to be distinguished from the appropriations, that is,
the attribution of properties or activities which belong in common to all
three persons because of their common nature but which are assigned to
a particular person because they show a certain kinship with the property
of that person. loa Thus power can be appropriated to the Father, wisdom
to the Son, and love to the Spirit. The appropriations are meant to illustrate
the properties and distinction of persons in God.

At this point a serious logical difficulry arises. How can the absolute unity and
simplicity of God permit of any numbering, any counting? Numbers, after all,
have meaning only in the realm of the quantitativcj there can be no counting
in the sphere of pure spirit, which is the sphere of God. As Basil says, God is
'wholly beyond number'. I . . Or, as Augustine says, because God is not
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 283
quancitativc, he is not tripartite; the three persons cannot be counted up; God
is not greater than each individual person." O In this sense we must join the
Eleventh Council of Toledo in saying of the Trinity that it 'is not without
number; yet it is not comprised by number (nee rccedit a lIumera nee capilllT
"wucro)'.111 The question, then, is whether and to what extent talk of "three'
persons is logically meaningful.
The point which prompts the question already makes it clear that in the
realm of the spirit and above all in the realm of God number can only be
predicated analogously, if at all. The application becomes meaningful only if
we reflect on the ground and meaning of the possibility of numbers and
cQunting, namely, unity as a transcendental property of being and one that
adds nothing to being except a negation of division. This kind of unity belongs
to every existent reality, although differently depending on its existential rank.
Such unity belongs in the highest degree to the person, which is an 'individual'
in the sense of possessing an ultimate undividedness and therefore incommunic-
ability. When we talk of three persons in God, we are saying materially that
the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are each that kind of undivided and indivisible
ultimate uniry.11l
Since the number three is here used only analogously, it follows that the
concept of person is not applied to the three persons as a generic concept. 11l
The meaning of person here cannot be derived from any presupposed generic
concept of person. We must rather heed what Hilary says and not determine
the meaning of the reality from the words used but rather understand the
words used in the light of the reality.'" This point can also be made clear by
looking at the reality, for in God it is not only the unity but also the distinction
that is always greater than in the created world. In other words: not despite
the fact that God is absolutely undivided unity but precisely because of this
fact, he can and must also be infinite differentiation, and therefore he permits
of pcrsonal distinctions which in each case are rcalized with an infinite
differentiation by the mode of subsistence in which the one divine nature exists.

All the trinitarian concepts thus far examined lead to a final, all-inclusive
basic concept: the being-in-one-another and mutual penetration of the
divine persons, or the trinitarian perichoresis. 1U This concept has a
scriptural basis in John 10.30: 'land the Father are one' (d. 14.9ff.; 17.21).
This being-in-one-another and mutual penetration are attested in the
tradition at a very early stage. II. Hilary has a classical formulation of the
relationship of Father and Son: 'One from the Other, and both are One;
not One made up of Two, but One in the Other, because in the Both there
is no otherness."17 'God in God, because he is God from God."" Augustine
observes: In the Trinity 'there is no mixture or confusion. Each person is
in himself, and yet three are each wholly in the others; each of them in the
other two or the other two in each of them, and thus all are in all.''''
284 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
Following Fulgentius of Ruspe,l2o the Council of Florence describes as
follows this reciprocal coinherence: 'On account of this unity the Father
is wholly in the Son and wholly in the Holy Spirit; the Son wholly in the
Father and wholly in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit wholly in the Father
and wholly in the Son.''''

The concept of perichoresis occurs first in Gregory of Nazanzius, although it

is there applied to the relation between the two natures in Christ. I:!:! It is John
Damascene who first applies the concept to the relation between the persons
in the Trinity,lll The Greek word peric/}iiresis was initially translated as
circumsessio (e.g., in Bonaventure), but from the thirteenth century on circum·
insessio is also found (e.g., Thomas Aquinas). The former term denoted a
more dynamic reciprocal penetration, while the latter signified a more static
coinherence in repose. This translation with its variants once again points to
differences between the Greek and Latin orientations, but also to different
orientations even within the Latin doctrine of the Trinity. The Greeks start
with the hypostases and understand the perichoresis as an active reciprocal
penetration; the perichoresis is as it were the bond uniting the persons. The
Latin theologians, on the contrary, usually start with the unity of the divine
nature and understand the perichoresis more as a reciprocal coinherence on
the basis of the one nature. In the Latins the perichoresis represents not so
much movement in God as repose in God. Here, too, Thomas Aquinas seeks
a synthesisj he bases the perichoresis both on the one nature and on the
relations of origin. 1:!4

Pastorally as well as speculatively the doctrine of the perichoresis is of

greatest importance, because it obviates both trithcism and modalism. The
three persons are (in the language of christology) 'without confusion and
without separation'.'" From the speculative standpoint, the perichoretic
unity in the Trinity provides a model for the union between Jesus Christ
and human beings Uohn 14.20; 17.23), among human beings Uohn 17.21),
and between God and man. We might take it as axiomatic that in the unity
established by Jesus Christ unity and independence increase in direct
and not in inverse proportion. Ever greater unity means ever greater
independence, and conversely true independence is to be achieved only
through and in unity in love. The unity with God that is established by
Jesus Christ neither absorbs nor dissolves the human person; it means,
rather, an abiding distinction and thus is the basic for authentic independ-
ence and freedom. In Christianity the mysticism of unity between God and
man and between man and Christ is a mysticism of encounter, friendship
and communion with God; it is realized in and through human encounter,
friendship and communion, and in turn radiates outward into human
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 285
friendship and communion and attains its full stature in these. Here once
again it becomes clear that the trinitarian mystery is the deepest ground
and ultimate meaning of the mystery of the human person and of the
latter's fulfillment in love.

Ie) The language of 'three persolls'

Once the foundations had been laid in the fourth century for the church's
doctrine of the T riniry and the concepts used in it, this doctrine and these
concepts remained for a millennium (apart from a few disputes in the
twelfth century) the undisputed joint possession not only of the churches
of the East and the West but also of the churches of the Reformation and
the Catholic Church. Anti-trinitarian trends came into existence only in
the modern period: the Socinians and Arminians of the seventeenth century
began the movement, and the high point was reached in eighteenth-
century rationalism, which left its clear mark both on the theology of the
Enlightenment and on liberal theology. The objections raised were of many
kinds. But if we leave aside the historical arguments (exegetical and those
from the history of religions and of dogma) and look at the arguments
based directly on the content of the teaching, then one objection stands
out as more important than the others: modern subjectivity and the modern
concept of person which it has produced. In the modern period, person is
no longer understood in ontological terms but is defined as a self-conscious
free center of action and as individual personality. I,.
This modern ideal of person was quite compatible with the idea of a
personal God. But once this new concept of person was accepted, the idea
of three persons in one nature became impossible, not only logically but
psychologically as well. For the modern self-conscious person could see in
other persons only competitors. The combining of oneness and threeness
became an insoluble problem. But even the idea of a unipersonal God -
which was not a Christian but an Enlightenment notion; in the final
analysis it was the heresy of Christian theism - soon proved to be
an untenable post-Christian fossil. Modern critics of religion, and L.
Fcuerbach in particular, had an easy time of it when they set out to show
that this idea is a projection of human self·consciousness and when K.
Marx analysed it as an ideological construct of the bourgeois subject.
The possibility or impossibility of absorbing the modern concept of the
person into the doctrine of the Trinity has been and still is a disputed matter
in which there is far more at issue than a clever game among professional
theologians and more, even, than a pastoral strategy for semantic adapt-
ation to a changed situation. At issue in this question is, rather, the correct
286 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
conception of the center and basic structure of the Christian message in
the context of modern thought. The issue is the Christian answer to the
situation of atheism that has been brought about by Christian theism.
Above all, the issue is how, in continuity with and yet also in opposition
to the spirit of the modern age, the human person can be properly
understood as the image of the trinitarian God.
The traditional concept of person is undoubtedly an ancient and
venerable one. Admittedly, it is not found in scripture, but the same is true
of many important dogmatic concepts; this is certainly not a sufficient
reason for excluding it from use in dogmatic discourse. 'Not biblical' is far
from the same as 'unbiblical' or 'antibiblical'. The decisive question is not
whether a concept as such occurs in scripture, but whether it represents an
objectively valid interpretation of the biblical testimony. The tradition
undoubtedly regarded the concept of person as that kind of valid interpret-
ation, and as such the concept formed part of the church's official
language beginning with the Second Ecumenical Council, the Council of
Constantinople (381). J27 The language of 'one God in three persons' thus
has the authority of tradition behind it. ' " Tradition as such is not, of
course, a decisive :trgument. But it becomes one when it gives an objective
interpretation and more precise statement of an original statement of
revelation itself. According to the Catholic view the church can unequivo-
cally raise this kind of interpretation of scripture to the rank of a proposition
of faith. If the church does this and commits itself definitively to it, then
such a proposition is a dogma and no longer merely a theological statement
which in principle can always be revised. The status of dogma does not, of
course, mean that the content conveyed by a particular word cannot be
expressed better, more unmistakably and more profoundly by other
words,129
It is with the last-named kind of development that we arc concerned
here. For the same tradition that transmits the concept of person also
shows an awareness of the problematic character of the concept of person.
Jerome in his day was already of the opinion that the language of
three hypostases was like honey in which poison was concealed.lJ. Even
Augustine was conscious of being in a predicament. He is aware of a
linguistic inadequacy and a poverty of concepts, and he asks: three what?
His answer: 'Three persons - not because I want to say this but because I
may not remain silent.'131 Anselm of Canterbury even speaks of 'three
something-or-other (tres nescio qll;d),.lJl Thomas Aquinas, too, realizes
that the adoption of the concept of person, which is not in scripture, was
due to the need of debating with heretics. 'H Finally, Calvin, who takes his
 ExpositiOlt of the Doctrille of the Trillity 287
stand on the doctrine of the Trinity as found in the early church, speaks
sarcastically of the three mannikins in the Trinity.134
The problem was rendered even more acute in the modern age because
the concept of person changed in relation to that which was current in the
early church and in the Middle Ages. Ever since Locke, 'person' has been
looked upon as characterized by self-consciousness: a person is a thinking,
rational being endowed with understanding and reflection and capable of
knowing itself as itself and as the same thinking being through different
times and in different places; this continuity is possible only by reason of
self-consciousness, which is inseparable from and essential to thinking.'"
The ontological definition of person was thus transformed into a psycho-
logical definition. Kant added a definition geared to morality: 'A person is
a subject who is capable of having his actions imputed to him.'13. The
definition of person which had been current in the early church and in the
Middle Ages and which the doctrine of the Trinity presupposes, thus
became open to misunderstanding and even became unintelligible. For the
one divine nature evidently excludes three consciousnesses. Now, since the
church is not master of the history of concepts and since it must speak
within a concrete pre-given linguistic situation and make itself understood
therein, the question arises of whether the church in such a situation cannot
best ensure the objective continuity of its confession by varying the
linguistic expression of it; whether, therefore, in the doctrine of the Trinity
it should renounce a concept of person that has become unintelligible and
open to misunderstanding and replace it with a better one.
Two suggestions have been made. They come from a well-known
Protestant theologian and well-known Catholic theologian. On the Prot-
estant side, and for the reasons already indicated, K. Barth suggests that
we 'do not say "person" but "mode of being", with the intention of
expressing by this concept the same thing as should be expressed by
"Person", not absolutely but relatively better, more simply and more
clearly.'''' K. Rahner rightly judges that such a change is in danger of being
misunderstood along modalist lines. He therefore prefers to speak instead
of 'three distinct manners of subsisting'.138 Like Barth, his intention is not
to eliminate use of the concept of person; he simply wants to use his own
terminology as well, in order to make it clear that the concept of person as
used in the doctrine of the Trinity is not perfectly clear and obvious. In
addition, Rahner makes unequivocally clear the difference between his
suggested language and that of modalism. Moreover, he can appeal in
behalf of his suggestion to comparable formulas in Bonaventure and
Thomas Aquinas. 139 All in all, we must agree that his suggestion is at least
288 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
a possible and permissible contribution to discussion in the framework of
a Catholic dogmatics.
In a technical theological context Rahner's suggestion can certainly
provide the service he claims for it. It is another question, however, whether
it is also kerygmatically meaningful-and that, after all, is Rahner's primary
concern. It must in fact be said that if the concept of person is open to
misunderstanding, the concept of 'distinct manner of subsistence' is
unintelligible. Even more than the concept of person it is part of a special
code language of theology. Independently of its philosophical use and its
'technical' definition the term 'person' immediately conveys some sort of
meaning to every human being, whereas 'distinct manner of subsistence'
is an exclusively metalinguistic concept which as such is antecedently
unsuited for use in preaching. Furthermore, it is not enough that the
trinitarian confession should be marked by logical clarity; this confession
is also to be fit for doxological use. But no one can invoke, adore and
glorify a distinct manner of subsisting. Finally, for anyone not trained in
Scholastic theology, even the concept 'distinct manner of subsisting' can
easily be misunderstood as modalist. And nowadays is not modalism or a
weak theism a far greater danger than the tritheism which Barth and Rahner
conjure up? If, then, we are not to conjure up new misunderstandings and
if we are not to turn the trinitarian confession completely into a book with
seven seals for the 'ordinary' Christian, we have no choice but to retain
the traditional language of the church and interpret it to the faithful. As a
matter of fact, Karl Rahner's reflections can be helpful in this area, even
though his suggestion for a terminology is unsatisfactory.
All that has been said thus far is at best a preparation for the solution of
the problem. For the critical acceptance of the modern concept of person
is more a problem of content than of terminology. From this standpoint
Barth and Rahner have only apparently rebuffed the modern concept of
person as unusable; in reality they have in large measure accepted it.
Precisely because they no longer think of God as absolute substance (as
the early church and the Middle Ages did) but think of him rather as
absolute subject, they have no place for three subjects but only for three
modes of being or distinct manners of subsisting. To put it more clearly:
because Barth and Rahner accept the modern concept of subject or person,
they come to more or less negative conclusions regarding the three
persons. 140 But the conclusion is neither cogent from the standpoint of the
traditional doctrine of the Trinity nor necessaty from the standpoint of the
modern concept of person.
From the standpoint of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity it is clear
that the unity of being in God entails unity ofconsciousness.1t is impossible
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trillity 289
to accept three consciousnesses in God. But given this presupposition,
which strictly speaking is self-evident in the context of the church's doctrine
of the Triniry, Rahner too quickly concludes: therefore no three centers of
consciousness and action. In thus rejecting the modern concept of person,
Rahner is entirely dependent on Neo-scholasticism.'" B. Lonergan, who
otherwise is also within this tradition, has gone into this question more
fully in the framework of the traditional terminology and has been able to
show that in this question, as in others, the original Scholasticism was
substantially more open than Neo-scholasticism, with its constricted
apologetical outlook.''' For, according to the traditional terminology, we
must say that the one divine consciousness subsists in a triple mode. This
means that a triple principiuln or subject of the one consciousness must be
accepted and, at the same time, that the three subjects cannot be simply
unconscious but are conscious of themselves by means of the one conscious-
ness (principiuln quo). This assertion follows, on the one hand, from the
fact that the divine persons are really identical with the one being and
consciousness and, on the other hand, from the fact that they proceed from
spiritual acts of knowledge and love, so that between them there exists a
spiritual relationship which by its very nature cannot but be conscious. We
have no choice, then, but to say that in the Trinity we are dealing with
three subjects who are reciprocally conscious of each other by reason of
one and the same consciousness which the three subjects 'possess', each in
his own proper way.'43
With the modern concept of person as his starting point, H. Miihlen in
particular has taken an important step forward in applying personalist
categories to the doctrine of the Trinity.'44 For what Rahner describes is
in fact not at all the full modern understanding of person but rather an
extreme individualism in which each person is a center of action who
possesses himself, disposes of himself and is set off over against others. But
Fichte and Hegel had already moved beyond such a point of view.'45 Ever
since the time of Feuerbach modern personalism, as represented by M.
Buber, F. Ebner, F. Rosenzweig and others, has made it entirely clear that
person exists only in relation; that in the concrete, personality exists only
as interpersonality, subjectivity only as intersubjectivity. The human person
exists only in relations of the I-Thou-We kind.'4' Within the horizon of
this modern understanding of person, an isolated unipersonal God is
inconceivable. Thus it is precisely the modern concept of person that offers
a point of contact for the doctrine of the Trinity.
It is clear that personalist categories can be applied only analogically to
the Trinity. This means that every similarity is accompanied by an even
greater dissimiliarity. Since in God not only the unity but also the
290 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
differentiation and therefore the opposition is always greater than in
human interpersonal relationships, the divine persons are not less dialogical
but infinitely morc dialogical than human persons are. The divine persons
are not only in dialogue, they are dialogue. The Father is a pure self-
enunciation and address to the Son as his Word; the Son is a pure hearing
and heeding of the Father and therefore pure fulfillment of his mission; the
Holy Spirit is pure reception, pure gift. These personal rclations arc
reciprocal but they are not interchangeable.'" The Father alone speaks,
the Son responds in obedience; the Father, through the Son and with the
Son, is the giver, the Holy Spirit is pure recipient. In his answer, therefore,
the Son is not thought of as also speaking; the Spirit is not thought of as
also giving. It does not follow from this, however, thatthere is no reciprocal
Thou. Responding in obedience and owing one's being to another are
also forms of Thou-saying, but a Thou-saying that takes seriously the
uniqueness both of one's own and of the other's person. In other words:
in God and am.;mg the divine persons, and because of, not despite, their
infinitely greater unity, there is also an infinitely greater inter-relationality
and interpersonality than in human inter-personal relations.
J. Ratzinger in particular has made his own these insights. According to
him, the concept of person 'by reason of its origin expresses the idea of
dialogue and of God as a dialogical being. It points to God as the being
who lives in the Word and subsists in the Word as I and Thou and We'.'"
Ratzinger is aware of the revolution which this concept of person as
relation represents. '" Neither the substance of the ancients nor the person
of the moderns is ultimate, but rather relation as the primordial category
of reality. The statement that persons are relations is, of course, first of all
simply a statement about the trinity of God, but important conclusions
follow from it with regard to man as image and likeness of God. Man is
neither a self-sufficient in-himself (substance) nor an autonomous indivi-
dual for-himself (subject) but a being from God and to God, from other
human beings and to other human beings; he lives humanly only in 1-
Thou-We relations. Love proves to be the meaning of his being.

3. Systematic understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity

(a) Unity in trinity
From the very beginning, the God-question, as we have seen, has been
bound up with the question of the unity of all reality. ISO This generalization
holds for the religions as well as for philosophy. The question of unity is
not a purely academic one; in the final analysis it is the question of salvation.
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 291
Only where unity exists can there be meaning and order; disruption,
alienation and chaos, on the other hand, arc the signs of disaster. From the
philosophical standpoint unity is the presupposition of truth, goodness
and beauty; for all these transcendental properties of being signify in their
different ways an order and coordination which presuppose unity in the
sense of self-identity and arc the ground for unity in the sense of wholeness
and integrity. To say this much is already ro suggest a second point: that
unity is unthinkable without multiplicity, at least in the finite world. As
Blaise Pascal purs it: 'Multiplicity which is not reduced rounity is confusion.
Unity which does not depend on multiplicity is tyranny'.'SI The question
of unity is therefore the question of how multiplicity and variety can be so
brought into unity that the unity docs not swallow up the multiplicity in a
rotalitarian way and, on the other hand, that the unity is not located
beyond all the multiplicity and radically separated from the world, as it is
in Neoplaronism. In other words, what solution is possible that is not
either pantheistic or dualistic?
God's oneness and uniqueness is a part of the basic Old Testament
message that is fully accepted in the New Testament.'Slln proclaiming this
message the Bible is in its own way responding ro a primordial question of
the human race. For in the Bible the one God is the ground of the unity of
salvation history in the orders of creation and salvation, and this under
both the old and the new covenants. Salvation history has for its goal
eschatological shalom: the salvation and wholeness of the human person
as part of one human race in one world in which God is 'all in all' (I Cor.
15.28). Faith in the one God who effects salvation through the one Lord
Jesus Christ and communicates this salvation in the one Spirit with his
many gifts is therefore the salvation of humanity; in this one God, human
beings find their identity and wholeness, for they are taken into the unity
of Father, Son and Spirit. According to John 17.21, the unity of Father and
Son is the ground of the unity of their disciples; and the unity of the latter
is in turn directed ro the unity ofthe world.l5lln other words: the Christian
doctrine of the Trinity is the Christian form of monotheism that can and
must prove its worth as the Christian answer ro the world's quest of
salvation.
In the hisrory of theology and dogma this problem was debated and
settled under the rubric of 'monarchianism'. That debate gave expression
as it were ro the primordial philosophical concern to trace everything back
ro a single supreme principle, as in the prophetic message regarding Yahweh
as the sale God. The monarchy of God was therefore an essential part of
early Christian catechesis. ". It is all the more surprising, therefore, that
the concept of monarchy, originally so basic and venerable, should soon
292 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
have lost its importance as applied to God. The reason for this development
is that at an early date heresies made their appearance which adopted as
their slogan: 'Monarchiam tenemus (We hold fast to the monarchy).''''
Tertullian called such people 'Monarchians'.'56 These errors appeared in
the second and third centuries in two forms. m The subordinationist
Monarchians (a simpler form in Theodotus the Tanner and Theodotus the
Money-Changer; a clearer form in Paul of Samosata) endeavored to
preserve the monarchy of God by subordinating the Son and the Spirit to
the one God. The modalist Monarchians (initially Noetus and Praxeas; a
more developed form in Sabellius) sought to do the same by understanding
Father, Son and Spirit to be three modes (modi) or three faces or masks
(prosopon, which later = person) of the one divinity. Both interpretations
conflicted with the New Testament language of the one God, the one Son
of God and the one Holy Spirit.
But there was more. Aristotle had already seen that underlying mono-
theism there is an entire political and metaphysical program.''' This
analysis was borne out in the debates over Christian monotheism. Arianism,
the fully developed form of subordinationist Monarchianism, started with
a radical separation of God and the world and was therefore compelled to
join the two by means of the Logos as an intermediary being. On the other
hand, for modalistic Monarchianism, as for Stoicism, God and the world
were pantheistically identified, so that the divine showed itself over and
over again in the history of the world in constantly new forms.'" The two
conceptions got tangled up in positions contradictory to the Monarchian
concern that inspired them. The first of the two ended up in a polytheism
in which the one divinity expressed itself in the world in and through
all sorts of subordinate divine beings. The second position ultimately
amounted to atheism,J6O for if everything is God, then nothing is God; God
adds nothing to the existence of the world. Pantheism is thus simply a more
refined form of atheism. This makes it clear that these two errors,
subordinationist and modalist Monarchianism, are not solely of historical
interest but have an abiding relevance. They represent two possible - or
impossible - ways of thinking about the relationship between God and the
world; they crop up ever anew in theology, and in response to them the
Christian understanding of God and the resultant Christian relation
between God and world must likewise be expounded ever anew.'''
Basil clearly recognized the importance of the issue. He saw in subordina-
tionist monarchianism a relapse into polytheistic paganism '62 and in
modalist monarchianism a 'Judaism in Christian clothing'.'·] He found
himself caught up in a battle on two fronts.''' Thus it is that in the effort
to preserve and defend the biblical trinity-in-unity of God against pagan
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 293
polytheism and Jewish monotheism the real issue is the proper and specific
character of Christian monotheism.
The Christian response to heretical Monarchianism, along with the
development of a Christian monotheism, was no easy matter, and it took
time. A first, still provisional and inadequate answer is found in Tertullian
and, in a different form, in Origen. Tertullian had recourse to the political
concept of monarchy, which did not at all exclude the idea of the monarch
giving his son a share in his rule or even exercising his rule through his
son. 165 This conception has the advantage of making possible a salvation-
historical vision of the Trinity. But the subordination ism it implies leads
indirectly to a pagan polytheism in which the one invisible divine being
encounters us in many subordinate intermediate forms. The only way of
making valid progress at this point was to reAect on the metaphysical
implications of the divine oneness.
lrenaeus, Tertullian and Origen were already moving in this direction
when in their opposition to gnosticism they explained the unity of God
along the lines of simplicity and spirituality."6 A graduated participation
in the divine being of God was thus excluded. Athanasius made this idea
of the simplicity and indivisibility of God a cardinal point in his refutation
of Arius."7 Precisely because God is indivisibly one, the Son and the Spirit
cannot be a kind of partial God and certainly not a second and third
divinity. The subordination ism of the Arians was thus excluded from the
nature of God. The three great Cappadocian fathers argued along the same
lines: Basil at the head, his friend Gregory of Nazianzus, and his brother
Gregory of Nyssa. Basil distinguished between one according to number
(the numerically one) and one according to nature or substance (the
essentially one). The numerically one presupposes quantity, and there can
be no question of it in connection with God; '" the essentially one entails
the simplicity of the purely spiritual, by reason of which God is wholly
beyond number and is therefore one not according to number but by
nature.'" The nature of God and its oneness thus excluded not only a
threeness with various levels (subordinationism) but also a threeness at the
same level (tritheism).
The question of how any trinity at all is thinkable within this essential
unity becomes thematic in Gregory of Nazianzus. He makes reference to
Plotinus, according to whom the many cannot be conceived without the
one, but neither can the one be thought of without the many. Plotinus
concludes from this that the one overAows into the many. Gregory
emphatically rejects this necessary overAow, because it is incompatible
with the concept of the divinityYo The intrinsic basis for this rejection is
clear: if God necessarily overflows out upon the world, or in other words,
294 The Trinitarian Mystery of Cod
if God needs the world in order to be able to be the one God, then he is
not really God at all. The transcendence and freedom of God are preserved
only if the world is not necessary for God to be himself. If, then, both the
unity of God and the unity of Cod are to be conceivable, the reconciliation
of unity and plurality must take place within God himself. We can put this
point more precisely: if the unity of God is to be conceivable, then it can
be conceived, on the one hand, only in relation to multiplicity and, on the
other, only as qualitatively distinct from multiplicity and therefore only as
absolutely transcendent. Both of these conditions are met in the confession
of the trinity that is immanent in the unity of God. Later on, John
Damascene developed this idea with full clarity: if we look at God from
below, we encounter a single being; but if we express what this being
comprises or what it is in itself, we must speak of the trinity of persons. 171
In this sense the Christian confession preserves the monarchy of God, but
it concretizes and states in detail what this monarchy is in its inner nature.
To that extent the trinitarian confession is monotheism in concrete form.l72
The doctrine of the three-in-oneness of God ... means ... not a removal
or even a mere querying, but rather the final and decisive confirmation, of
the insight that God is One.'l7.1 The trinitarian doctrine is concerned with
the self-communication of God. 174 It says that the one God is not a solitary
GollY'
The church's confession of faith incorporated these clarifications. In
fact, in the matterofthe unity of God the creed is remarkably unambiguous.
Ever since Nicaea and Constantinople I and II it has not simply confessed
the one being and the one substance of God; '7' it has also rejected not only
tritheism 177 but also a collectivist and symbolical understanding of a unity
modelled on a community of persons, as proposed by Joachim of Flora. m
The official language of the magisterium is extremely precise and differenti-
ated in this area. The Eleventh Provincial Council ofToledo (675) remarks
with regard to the concept of trinitas: 'not threefold but Trinity'.17' The
Roman Catechism expressly observes that we were baptized not in the
names but in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit.". Finally, in the Bull Auctorem fidei (1794) Pius VI states that we
can talk of God as 'in three distinct persons (in tribus person is distinctis)',
but not as 'divided into three persons (in tribus personis distinctlls)'. " ,
The modern age has to a Brent extent abandoned this concrete Christian
monotheism in favor of the abstract theism of a unipersonal God who
stands over against man as the perfect Thou or over man as imperial ruler
and judge.'" In the final analysis this conception is the popular form of a
Christianity half under the influence of the Enlightenment, or else the
religious remnant of Christianity in a secularized society. From the theo-
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 295
logical standpoint we must speak more accurately of the heresy of theism.
This theism with its unipersonal God is untenable for a variety of reasons.
For one thing, if we imagine God as the other-worldly counterpart of man,
then despite all the personal categories we use we will ultimately think of
him in objectivist terms as a being who is superior to other beings. When
this happens, God is being conceived as a finite entity who comes in conflict
with finite reality and the modern understanding of it. Then we must either
conceive God at the expense of man and the world, or conceive the world
at the expense of God, thus limiting God in deistic fashion and finally
eliminating him entirely with the atheists. This conversion of theism into
a-theism also takes place for another reason: theism almost necessarily
falls under the suspicion voiced by the critics of religion, that the theistic
God is a projection of the human ego and a hypostatized idol, or that
theism is ultimately a form of idolatry.
This legitimate criticism of a feeble theism must not, of course, be
replaced by an ambiguous and wavering conception of a Christian a-
theism. l83 Nor should the search for a position beyond theism and atheism
be expanded into a rejection of monotheism. A trinitarian God that is not
at the same time the monotheistic God must necessarily lead to a kind of
tritheism. ". In response to atheism, the need is rather to show the trinitarian
confession to be the Christian form of monotheism, and to make it clear
once again that the Trinity is the condition for a consistent monotheism.
Against all the incorrectly posed questions it must be made clear that in
the doctrine of the Trinity there is no question of denying either the
revelation of the Trinity or the divine unity both as revealed and as known
to reason. The church does not hold on to the unity of God despite the
doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, in the doctrine of the Trinity it is precisely
holding fast to Christian monotheism. It even maintains that the doctrine
of the Trinity is the only possible and consistent form of monotheism 18'
and the only tenable answer to modern atheism.
The considerations thus far proposed on trinity in unity are still very
formal and abstract. They seem far removed from the concrete language
the Bible uses in speaking of God the Father who reveals his love and
communicates himself to us through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. In fact,
however, my intention in these considerations has been to express and
safeguard this gracious freedom of God in his self-communicating love.
Their point has been, against all emanationist systems, whether gnostic or
Neoplatonic, that there is no necessary overflow of the divine One out
upon the many of the world; that God rather reconciles unity and
multiplicity within himself; that within his very being he is overflowing
love and that only because he is love within himself can the overflow of his
296 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
love upon the world be conceived as not necessary but free and gratuitous.
Only because God is love within himselfcan he be love for us. Consequently,
the abstract and formal considerations I have set forth are a way of saying:
God is love. Love is that which reconciles unity and multiplicity; it is the
uniting unity in the threeness.

Such is the common conviction of both the Eastern and the Latin Western
traditions. However, the East and the West have developed differenttheological
systems on this common basis. 1M6 The twO systems may be described somewhat
schematic.lly .s follows. In their theology of the Trinity the Greeks st.rt with
the three hypostases or persons; "lore precisely, they start with the Father as
origin and source within the Godhead. Their concern is to protec(the monarchy
of the Father, who as sole origin ensures unity in the Trinity. According to the
Greek understanding it is the one God the Father who bestows his divine
nature on the Sao, so that the Son possesses the one identical divine nature
with the Father. The s.me holds for the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the
Father and receives the one divine nature from the Father (through the Son).
The Greek conception thus starts with the persons and advances from one
person to another. Unity is assured by the Father 35 origin and source of the
divinity and as principle of its unity~ the one nature is thus envisaged only
indirectly.
The Latin approach is different and has largely been determined by the
genius of Augustine. The Latins begin directly with (he one divine nature or
the one divine substance and one divine being. The three persons come into
view only mediately as three personal, i.e., distinct manners in which the one
substance subsists. The one divine being does not exclude the three persons
(that would be Sabellianism), but rather exists only in these three person. I
manners of subsisting. Nonetheless, the one divine being is the basis on which
everything is built in the effort to understand the three persons in God. For
knowing and willing arc the essemial activities of the spiritual nature. In
knowing himself, God begets his eternal Word; he is therefore Father and Son.
The Holy Spirit then proceeds as the third person from the mutual love of both
Father and Son. In this concepcion of the Trinity, unity in trinity is made
psychologically intelligible; for this reason historians speak of a psychological
doctrine of the Trinity in Augustine. The difference between the Greeks and
rhe Latins can be formulated thus: The Greeks say 'One God in three persons',
the Latins say 'Three persons in God.'
The difference berween the two .pproaches can also be brought out with
the help of im.ges. The line is • suitable im.ge for the Greek conception: the
Father begets the Son, and through the Son the Holy Spirit proceeds from him.
In the procession of the Spirit the life process in the Trinity reaches its
completion, while at the same time in the Spirit it also presses out beyond itself.
A triangle or a circle is a more suitable image for the Lacin conception: [he
Father begets the Son; the circle of trinitari.n life is then closed in the Spirit as
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 297
the reciprocal love between Father and Son. The Greek conception is thus
more open to the world, while the Latin is more self-enclosed. This difference
can also be seen in artistic representations of the Trinity. The classical artistic
representation of the Trinity in the Orthodox Church is of the three men or
angels visiting Abraham (Gen. 18) - three figures who, however, in Rublev's
famous ikon are depicted as forming an incomparably beautiful unity. The
most important ecclesiastical representation of the Trinity in the Western
church is the 'Throne of Grace', in which the three persons form a single united
figure: the Father sits on the throne and holds the cross with the Son on it,
while between the two the Spirit hovers in the form of a dove.
Each of the two conceptions is magnificent in its own way, but each also has
its dangers. It is clear that the Greek conception is more concrete and more
biblical and reflects the history of salvation. But it formally asserts the inner
unity of the three persons rather than makes this unity intelligible from within.
The Latin conception is by comparison the fruit of greater reflection and
speculative thought, but it is also more abstract. It is in danger of being unable
to bring out fully the distinction of the three persons and, ultimately, in danger
of letting the three persons evaporate as it were into mere modi, modes of
being of the one divine nature. This danger is especially present in the form
which Anselm of Canterbury gave to the Latin doctrine of the Trinity. As a
result, the Western conception has often been subjected to rather sharp attacks
from Orthodox theologians, who even accuse it of being a radical revision of
the trinitarian dogma. 11I7 Even among Catholics a latent preference for the
Eastern conception is ascertainable today.
The dash of the two approaches comes to a head especially in the dispute
about the fjlioqlle.'HK The Greeks accuse the Latin formula of eliminating the
monarchy of the Father and dissolving the unity in God because it accepts two
processions in God; they object, in addition, that it identifies the Spirit with
the nature common to the Father and the Son and therefore unable to ensure
the hypostatic independence of the Spirit. The Latins dismiss these objections
as misunderstandings of their conception of the Trinity. They, too, say that it
is from the Father that the Son has his 'power' to spirate the Spirit; consequently
the Spirit proceeds pri/lcipaliter from the Father, so that the latter's monarchy
is preserved in the Latin conception no less than in the Greek. Finally, even in
the Latin conception the Spirit does not proceed from the one divine nature
but from the two persons (duo spiralltes) who as persons form a single principle
in the procession of the SpiritlM9
More important than such disputes, which arc basically fruitless because
they are based on mutual ignorance or misunderstandings, is the realization
that the contrast between the two conceptions makes a valid point but also
that these schematic generalizations do not do justice to a historical reality
which shows far more diversity.190 Thus in the East alongside the conception
of the Cappadocians there is also that of the Alexandrians, and especially of
Athanasius, which corresponds more to the Latin conception. Even John
298 The Trillitariall Mystery of God
Damascene, who sums up the patristic tradition in a way that has become
normative for Orthodoxy, starts with the one God and only then passes on to
<I presentation of the three hYPOSf3SCS. IY1 Elsewhere, too, among the Greek
falhers we come upon formulas that have a very essentialist ring; for example,
God from God, Light from Light, Essence from Essence, Wisdom from
Wisdom, and so on. III:! Conversely, in addition to the essentialist tradition
which was established by Augustine and was intensified to the extreme by
Anselm of Canterbury'" and whIch is represented today by K. Banh and K.
R3hner,I'I~ there is also a more 'personalist' tradition. It was 3dopted in
antiquity by Hilary of POlliers and In the Middle Ages by WIlliam of 5t
Thierry,'''! the friend of Bernard of Clairv3ux and the adversary of Abelard, 3
modalist. Its most important representative is Richard of St. Victor, who wrote
the most important treallse on the Trmity between Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas. He was followed by Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure. I"''' In their
own way all of these theologians make their own the concern which the Greeks
sum up In the 'monarchy of the Father' and which Augustine too respects,
since he -like Bonavcnrure and Thomas Aquinas later on - teaches that the
Spirit proceeds princlpaliter from the Father. A doctrine of the Trmity that is
decidedly based on the history of salvation is to be found in the M,ddle Ages
in Rupert of Deutz, Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Anselm of Havelberg, and
others.I'J1
In this as in many other questions Thomas Aquinas sought for a syntheSIS
that would strike a balance between the various conceptions; he ended with
one that is really not very far removed from that of John Damascene, whose
writings Thomas knew well and esteemed highly.1 Q H Thomas Aquinas is thus
proof that we must not exaggerate the differences between East and West. The
differences exist, but they do not reach up to heaven, and the walls that have
often been artificially erected arc transparent and permeable in both directions.
As Thomas Aquinas in particular shows, the Western tradition is In a position
to make its own all the concerns of the East and to elevate these to 3 higher
level of reOection.

The defect in the main strand of Western tradition is that it interprets

the mediation of trinity to unity as a matter of knowing and willing and
therefore 01 essential actions of God. This brings with It the danger that
the persons may be misunderstood .s ideal phases in the self-fulfillment of
the absolute spirit. This tendency, which ultimately leads to modalism, can
be avoided only if we keep in mind that the spirit, and especially the
absolute spirit, subsists concretely only as a person and that as far as man
is concerned everything depends precisely on this understanding of God
3S person. For human beings, as persons, can find their salvation only in
the absolute person of God. But according to the scriptures and the early
Christian tradition the person God whom we seck is the Father. Therefore
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trilrity 299
the doctrine of the Trinity must start with the Father and understand him
as origin, source and inner ground of unity in the Trinity. We must start
with the Father as the groundless Ground of a self-communicating love
which brings the Son and the Spirit into being and at the same time unites
itself with them in one love. If we thus take God's sovereign freedom in
love as the starting point and focus of unity in the Trinity, we are moving,
unlike the predominant Latin tradition, not from the nature of God but
from the Father who originally possesses the being of God that consists in
love. For love cannot be thoughtofexcept as personal and inter-personal. \99
The person, therefore, cannot exist except in self-communication to others
and in acknowledgment by others. For this reason, once God is thought
of from the start as personal, the oneness and unicity of God cannot
possibly be conceived as meaning a solitary God. Here we have the deepest
reason why the theistic notion of a unipersonal God cannot be maintained.
Such a view will be compelled to look for a counterpart for God, find it in
the world and man, and, by setting up a necessaty relation between God
and the world, be unable any longer to preserve the transcendence of God
and his freedom in love. If we want to maintain, in an intellectually
consistent way, the biblical message about God as absolute person and
perfect freedom in love, the trinitarian confession of faith becomes plausible
to the believing mind.
The objection against this thesis, that it infringes upon the mysteriousness
of the Trinity, is not a real objection. The difference (which is not open to
inspection by the human mind) between love among human beings and
love in God consists in this, that a human being has love while God is love.
Because a human being has love and this love does not constitute his entire
being, he or she is united to other persons through love without thereby
becoming one being with them; among human beings, love grounds a close
and profound communion of persons but not an identity of being. God,
on the contrary, is love, and this nature of his is absolutely simple and
unique; therefore all three persons possess a single being; their unity is a
unity of essence and not simply a communion of persons. The trinity in
the unity of the one essence is the unfathomable mystety of the trinity; we
can never plumb it by reason but can only make it accessible to the believing
mind in rudimentary ways.

(bi Tr;'lity in Imity

Since the trinity of persons in the unity of the one divine nature is an
unfathomable mystery for the human mind, the starting point for a
systematic understanding of the trinity of divine persons can only be
300 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
revelation. In order to understand this mystery of triniry in unity as a
mystery we must therefore start not with the one divine nature and its
immanent essential actions (knowing and willing) but with the revelation
of the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit. It is in the perspective of
this one mystery of the Christian reality of salvation that we must seek to
understand the mystery of the three divine persons. Along these lines we
have at the present time two approaches in particular that seek, each in its
own way, to understand the salvation-historical or economic Triniry by
way of the immanent Trinity, and this in terms either of the root of the
Triniry itself (K. Barth)2•• or of a systematic conception (K. Rahner).2.'
The two theologians proceed in quite different ways that are characteristic
of the theological thinking of each. Both have in common, however, that
they do not start with the formula una substantia - tres personae (one
substance, three persons) and that they think of God not as substance but
as subject, whether as subject of a self-revelation (K. Barth) or as subject
of a self-communication (K. Rahner).

K. Barth starts with the concept of revelation because he is convinced that this
contains within itself the problem of ,he Trinity.2.2In his view, the roO! of the
doctrine of the Trinity is the statement: 'God reveals Himself as the Lord,'20J
This sentence means that God is 'the same in unimpaired unity, yet also the
same in unimpaired variety thrice in a different way', namely, as revealer,
revelation and revealedness. 204 Revelation is 'the self·unveiling, imparted to
men, of the God who according to His nature cannot be unveiled to men'.
Because he is so sovereignly free, God 'can become so unlike Himself that He
is God in such a way as not to be bound to His secret eternity and eternal
secrecy, but also can and will and really does assume ,emporal form'.2.s But
in this process he himself remains the Revealer. Precisely as Deus reve/atlls he
is still the Deus absconditus. 206 He is the sovereign subjectofhis own revelarion.
Finally, revelation also means revealedness, for revelation also includes the
self-unveiling that is granted to men. It is a hislOrical event through which the
existence of certain human beings is so affected that while they cannot indeed
grasp God, they are able to follow him and respond to him.'07 Barth's doctrine
of the Trinity thus brings out ,he unchangeable subjectivity of God2.' and is
thereby a variant on the modern theme of subjectivity and its autonomy.209
The three modes of being in which the Trinity manifests itself belong to the
self-constitution of the absolute subject. This is a distinctly modern or, more
accurately, a distinctly idealist pattern of thought, which links Barth 10 Hegel
despite all the material differences between them. 2I •
We find a similar thought structure in K. Rahner. In keeping with his
anthropological approach to 'heology his starting point is of course the
subjectivity not of God but of man. This means that he aims to understand ,he
mystery of the Trinity as a mystery of salvation. Salvation occurs when man's
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 301
indigent telatedness to an absolute mystery is filled by the irreducibly free and
gracious self-communication of this mystery. In this sense Rahner can 53Y:
'Man is the event of a free, unmerited and forgiving, and absolute self-
communication of God.'ll1 The concept of self-communication includes 'the
absolute nearness of God as the incomprehensible mystery which remains
forever such 'the absolute freedom . .. of this self-communication', and 'that
t1

the inner possibility of the self-communication as such .. . can never be

perceived'.'" The doctrine of the Trinity emerges from this concept of self-
communication by way of a kind of transcendental reflection on the condition~
of its possibility.'" The Trinity is thus the condition for the possibility of
human subjectivity.
Rahner's starting point for a systematic understanding of the Trinity is
thus the basic concept of his theology of grace: the concept of divine self-
communication. According to Rahner, there are in fact two different but
interrelated and mutually conditioning modes of free, unmerited sel f·communi-
cation on God's part: in Jesus Christ and in the Spirit. The two can be
understood as moments in the one self-communication. 1H For self-communic-
ation signifies both origin and future (event of the radically new), history and
transcendence, offer and acceptance, and, finally, rrmh as revelation of one's
own personal being and love as the freely offered and freely accepted self·
communicacion of the person. us Bur this .self-communication in the history
of salvation would nOl truly be God's self·communication unless it also belong-
ed to God in himself, that is, unless the economic Trinity were also the imma-
nent Trinity.116 In the final analysis, by means of this transcendental theological
deduction Rahner has renewed the essentials of Augustine'S trinitarian specula-
tion, although in doing so he has proceeded nOl by way of the ana/ogia entis
but by way of a synoptic presentation of the hiscory of salvation itself. Accor-
ding to Rahner, too, there are two moments, knowledge and love, which yield
tWO distinct manners of subsisting of the self-communicating God or, more
specifically, of the Father.It' Rahner can therefore summarize as follows the
meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity: 'God himself as the abiding holy mystery,
as the incomprehensible ground of man's transcendent existence is not only
the God of infinite distance, but also wants 10 be the God of absolute closeness
in a true self-communication, and he is present in this way in the spiritual
depths of our existence as well as in the concreteness of our corporeal history:111
We cannot but admire the coherent way in which with the economic Trinity
as his staning point Rahner attempts a theology of the Trinity from within;
how althe same time he theologizes on the Trinity in the context of the modern
philosophy of subjectivity; and how, last but not least, he succeeds in doing
justice to the meaning of the formulas of the classical tradition. The result is
undoubtedly a bold and successful design that can only be classed with other
great productions of Christian theology and that can best be compared with
Anselm's deduction of the doctrine of the Trinity from rationes necessariae.
302 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
This new approach of Karl Rahner has, of course, some major consequences.
This is already dear from the fact that in Rahner's Foundatiolls of Christiall
Faith the doctrine of ,he Trinity no longer provides the supporting framework,
as i, did in 'he creed of ,he early church and in ,he 'heology which in'erpre'ed
'hat creed. In fact, ,he doctrine of 'he Trinity does no, even form a special part,
bu, only a sub-section of abou, four pages, 'wo of which are spent on a cri,ical
discussion of the uaditional doctrine of the Trinity, so that the positive
presentation is compressed into abour two pages. This external allocation of
space already makes i, dear ,ha, ,he doctrine of ,he Trinity has handed over
'0
its structuring role theological an'hropology and is now studied only os a
condition for 'he possibility of ,he doctrine of grace. This change of function,
secondly, has importan, effects on the inner meaning of 'he doctrine of the
Trinity. For when it is developed, as i, is in Rahner, entirely under the sign of
soteriology, it loses its character of doxology. While the subjec,ivi,y of man is
in danger of being lost in Barth's thematizing of God as absolute subject in his
,heology of the Trinity, it is the Thou of God that is in danger of being lost in
Rahner's thematizing of the subjectivity of man in his theology of the Trinity.
Rahner does succeed in taking seriously the modern idea of man's subjectivity
(although this is conceived in narrowly individualistic terms), but he does not
succeed in thinking ,he Trinity in 'he mode of subjec,ivity. This accounts for
his radical rejection of the modern concep' of person as u,ilizable in 'he
doctrine of the Trinity.ll9 As I said earlier, we cannot invoke, adore and glorify
'distinct manners of subsisting'. We can only fan silent before Rahnrr's
ul,imately nameless mystety of God. It is not without reason 'hat a well-
known, beautiful, attractive and profound little book of Rahner on prayer
bears the title 'Words into Silence',21o
Thirdly, when place and meaningful form are ,hus changed, al,erations in
internal structure are unavoidable. Since in Rahner's theology of the Trinity
evetything focuses on ,he relation and unity of God and man, ,here is really
no room left for the relations and unity of the trinitarian persons themselves.
They are moments in the economic self-communication of God to man, but
not subjects of an immanent self-communication. Rahner does succeed in
showing more clearly than Scholasticism has done the inalienable function of
each of the three divine 'persons' in the histoty of salvation. He repeatedly
attacks the view that in the abstract each of the ,hree persons could have
become man. But he does not succeed in arguing back from this to the immanent
properties of the persons. His trinitarian specuhnion thus stops short of the
'0
goal; it is unable show clearly in wha, 'he special character and difference
of each hypostasis consists and what comprehensible meaning each has. Nor
may one say that from an existential and soteriological standpoint such
questions are simply an unimportant ,heological parlor game. For if the
immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, then deficiencies in the doctrine of
the immanent Trinity must necessarily influence the understanding of the
Trinity in the history of salvation. If the divine hypostases in God are not
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 303
subjecls, Ihen Ihey cannol speak and acl as subjecls in Ihe hislOry of salvation.
This consequence shows up clearly in Rahner's statements about the hypostatic
union. To Ihe question: 'Which I speaks in Jesus Chrisl?' he righdy answers Ihal
we must attribute to Jesus a genuine human and creaturely self-consciousness if
we are not to fall into a new form of monophysitism. 211 But it is not so clear
in Rahner Ihal Ihis human I subsisls in Ihe hYPoslasis of Ihe Logos, so Ihal in
Jesus Chrisl Ihe Logos himself speaks and aCls; il is not so dear Ihal in Ihe man
Jesus Chrisl God is nOI only presem in a unique and unsurpassable way bUI
Ihal in addition Jesus Chrisl is Ihe Son of God.'" In facI, Rahner sees
Ihe hYPoslalic union more as a unique and unsurpassable mode of a self-
communication that is in principle promised to all human beings; he sees it as
an intrinsic moment and a condition for the universal bestowal of grace on
spiritual creatures,21J Given his approach, this is a consistent position, but also
one Ihal shows Ihe inherenl limilations of Ihe approach ilself.

We can develop our own syslemalic approach 10 Ihe doctrine of Ihe Trinity
if, while bearing in mind all Ihe queslions and answers of Ihe Iradition, we
lislen once again 10 Ihe lestimony of scrip lure, which is Ihe primordial
documenlOf Ihe faith. I shall once again sIan wilh Ihe final prayer of Jesus,
Ihe so-called high-priesdy prayer in John 17, which, as we saw earlier,
provides Ihe dearesl New Teslamem basis for a doclrine of Ihe T rinily .224
This prayer was utlered al Ihe momem when Jesus saw his hour coming,
since Ihe eschalOn was al hand (17_1,5,7). As a resull, Ihis prayer, spoken
al Ihe momem of depanure, comains as il were Ihe leslamem of Jesus. AI
Ihe momem of complelion il once again summarizes Ihe overall meaning
of Ihe saving work of Jesus Chrisl, and il does Ihis in Irinilarian form. The
high-priesdy prayer comains Ihe emire doclrine ohhe Trinity in basic form
and in a nUlshell.
1. The meaning of the doctrine of the Trinity. The high-priesdy prayer
begins wilh Ihe words: 'Falher, Ihe hour has come; glorify Ihy Son Ihal Ihe
Son may glorify Ihee' (17.1). The reference is 10 Ihe eschalOlogical hour,
Ihe hour when Ihe emire work of salvalion is compleled in a comprehensive
and surpassing manner. This completion takes place in Ihe cross and
exallalion of Jesus as Ihe eschalOlogical revelalion of God. When Ihe Falher
glorifies Ihe Son by exalting him, Ihe Falher himself is in lurn glorified by
Ihe Son; in Ihe glorification of Ihe Son Ihe Falher's own glorificalion is
made manifesl. The Son's glory is Ihal which he has from elernity wilh Ihe
Falher (v. 5). The eschalOlogical revelalion, Ihen, is a revelalion of Ihe
elernal being of God, a revelalion of Ihe Godness of God. It is said Ihal
from elernilY God possesses Ihe glory of his Godness because Ihe Falher
glorifies Ihe Son and the Son in lurn glorifies Ihe Falher.
Now Ihe failhful are incorporaled into Ihis elernal doxology. They have
304 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
accepted and acknowledged the revelation of the Father's glory by the Son
and of the Son's gloty by the Father. The Son is therefore glorified in them
(v. to). This glorification takes place through the action of the 'other
Paraclete', the Spirit of truth. He guides the faithful into the whole truth;
but because he says nothing on his own authority but only says whatJesus
is and what Jesus has from the Father, he too acknowledges the glory of
the Son and of the Father (16.13-15). The Spirit is, and effects, the concrete
presence of the eternal doxology of Father and Son in the church and in
the world. He is the eschat~logical accomplishment of the glory of God;
he is its presence within the confines of his lOry. This is possible only because
he himself proceeds from the Father (15.26) and because as Spirit of truth
he is the revealedness and radiance (doxa) of the eternal glory of God.
The intention of the trinitarian confession is thus not really a teaching
about God but the doxology or eschatological glorification of God. The
doctrine of the Trinity is as it were simply the grammar of the doxology.
The trinitarian confession is concerned with the 'Glory be to the Father
through the Son in the Holy Spirit'. In this liturgical hymn of praise the
eternal glory of God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit is revealed in an
eschatological and definitive way. The eschatological glorification of God
is at the same time the salvation and life of the world. 'This is eternal life,
that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast
sent' (v. 3). In the intention of scripture this confession is not abstract
speculation but participation and communion of life. The issue in the
trinitarian confession is therefore communion with God. The doctrine of
the Trinity acquires its meaning from the unity-in-tension of doxology and
soteriology. There is no need to choose between the approaches of Karl
Barth and Karl Rahner.
The unity-in-tension of doxology and soteriology means that the
acknowledgment of God's glory does not represent a humiliation for
humanity. The acknowledgment of God's absolute subjectivity does not
mean a suppression of our subjectivity; on the contrary, this acknowledg-
ment redeems, liberates and fulfills humanity. Thus the trinitarian confes-
sion is the final concrete determination of our undetermined openness and
of the idea of God that gleams indeterminately therein and lights the way
for all thinking and action. us It is the surpassing answer 10 the question
which we do not simply have but are. The meaning of humanity and the
world, and the life and truth of humanity and the world, consist in the
glorification of the triune God, and through this glorification we are
incorporated into the intra-trinitarian glorification and we have commun-
ion with God. In the trinitarian confession, then, the meaning of Jesus'
message about the coming of God's reign is fulfilled in an anticipatory
 Exposition of the Doctrille of the Trinity 305
manner. For that message 100 is concerned precisely with the revelation of
the lordship and glory of God as life of the world and fulfillment ofhuman
hope."'ln its deepest meaning the doctrine of the Trinity is the normative
explanation of jesus' message about the kingdom. It sums up the core of
jesus' message and is the summation of the Christian faith.
2. The content of the doctrine of the Trinity. According to the high-
priestly prayer, the glorification of God and the life of the world consists
in knowing and acknowledging the God of jesus Christ as 'the only true
God' (v. 3). Unity and uniqueness are essential predicates of God. Once
again, then, there is question of the knowledge of the nature of God, of
God's Godness. This knowledge of the oneness of God is distinguished
both from philosophical monotheism and from the monotheism of the Old
Testament by the fact that it includes knowledge of him whom the Father
has sent (v. 3) and who is one with the Father (v. 21£.). The world has not
known the oneness of God; he alone who from eternity is one with the
Father has brought knowledge of this oneness and has revealed the name
of the Father (v. 25f.; d. 1.18). Knowledge of the unity and oneness of
God is possible only through knowledge of the unity between Father and
Son. Into this oneness, 100, the faithful are 10 be incorporated. They are 10
'be one even as we are one' (v. 22), and they are 10 be made perfect in this
oneness (v. 23). This unity of the faithful among themselves as well as with
the Father and the Son is the work of the Spirit, according to john as well
as the rest of the New Testament. This connection is clearly brought out
in john 14.15-24. The coming and remaining of the Spirit is at the same
time the return of jesus and his dwelling in the faithful, so that he is in
them as he is in the Father.
The revelation of the Trinity is thus the revelation of the deepest and
utterly hidden nature of the unity and oneness of God, which in turn
grounds the unity of the church and, via the church, the unity of the world.
In its content, then, the doctrine of the Trinity is the Christian form of
monotheism. More accurately: the doctrine of the Trinity concretizes the
initially abstract assertion of the unity and oneness of God by determining
in what this oneness consists. The oneness of God is defined asa communion
of Father and Son, but indirectly and implicitly also as a communion of
Father, Son and Spirit; it is defined as unity in love.
The precise meaning of unity in love becomes known by contrasting it
with other forms of unity.'27In the material world we encounter quantit-
ative unity and therefore units that can be counted. Each of these units is
composed of various linked entities; science has not succeeded, at least
thus far, in throwing light on the ultimate and smallest units. The
delimitation and numerical pooling of such quantitative units presupposes
306 The Trinitariall Mystery of God
universal concepts of species and genus. These generic and specific unities
are the work of the human powers of abstraction. They presuppose the
unity of the person. The person is a unity that exists in and for itself and
is therefore capable of bringing into focus and reflecting on its own multiple
dimensions in self-consciousness. But even though the person is a unity
that cannot be communicated to a higher unity, its existence is nonetheless
possible only in co-existence with other persons. The human person is
possible only in the plural; it can exist only in reciprocal acknowledgment,
and it finds its fulfillment only in the communion of love. Persons thus
exist only in mutual giving and receiving.
In this final observation we have developed a preapprehension that
enables us to understand the unity in love which according to the Gospel
of John exists in God and is the very being of God. It is, of course, only a
preapprehension that can be applied only analogically to God. For in the
human realm the co-existence of persons is an expression of their finiteness
and neediness. Human persons are dependent on each other in a great
variety of ways. No single person is wholly identical with himself; none
exhausts the nature of humanity and all of its possibilities. Among human
beings, therefore, communion in love is always erotic as well; that is, the
love is a love that seeks fulfillment. All this is excluded from God by his
very nature. God docs not possess being; he is Being in absolute perfection
that has no slightest trace of neediness. He is therefore absolute oneness,
perfect self-identity and complete self-possession, personal unity in the
most perfect sense.
And yet if God is not to be understood as a solitary narcissistic being
who (to put it paradoxically) would be highly imperfect by reason of his
very perfection and would inevitably suffer from his own completeness,
then God can only be conceived as co-existent. On the other hand, if God
is to remain God and not become dependent on the world or man, then he
must be co-existent within himself. Within the unity and simplicity of his
being he must be a communion in love, and this love cannnot be a love
marked by need but only a love that gives out of the overflowing fulness
of his being. This is why in his farewell prayer Jesus speaks repeatedly of
giving (vv. 2., 6, 2.2). Because God in his perfection and simplicity is
everything and does not possess anything, he can give only himself. He can
only be a pure giving and bestowing of himself. God's oneness must be
thought of as love that exists only in the giving of itself. In God, therefore,
the communion of love is not a communion of separate beings, as it is
among men, but a communion within a single nature. The principle is valid
here: 'Alii have is yours and a\l you have is mine' (17.10 JB). Augustine
has formulated this truth with the utmost accuracy: the Trinity is the one
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 307
and only God, and the one and only God is the Trinity.228 The doctrine of
the Trinity is therefore concrete monotheism.
The understanding of God as communion-unity has far-reaching impli-
cations for our understanding of reality. Monotheism has always been a
political program as well as a religious: one God, one realm, oneemperor. 229
This connection is clear in John J7 from the fact that the unity in God is
the model and ground of the unity of the church and that the unity of the
church in turn is the sacrament, that is, the sign and instrument, of the
unity of the world (v. 23). But what kind of unity is meant? Evidently not
a rigid, monolithic, uniformist and tyrannical unity, which excludes,
absorbs or suppresses every kind of otherness. A unity of that kind would
bean impoverishment. God's unity is fullness and even overnowing fullness
of selness giving and bestowing, of loving self-outpouring; it is a unity that
does not exclude but includes; it is a living, loving being with and for
one another. This trinitarian understanding of unity as communion has
implications for the political sphere in the broadest sense of this term and
therefore for the formulation of the goals of unity in the church, in society
and in the human race; in other words, for the peace of the world. E.
Peterson has proposed the thesis that the doctrine of the Trinity puts an
end to political theology.2JO It would be more accurate to say that it puts
an end to a particular political theology that serves as an ideology to justify
relations of domination in which an individual or a group tries to impose
its ideas of unity and order and its interests to the exclusion of others. The
doctrine of the Trinity inspires an order in which unity arises because all
pool what they have and make it part of the common store. Such a
vision is as far removed from a collectivist communism as it is from an
individualistic liberalism. Forcommunion does not eliminate the individual
being and rights of the person but rather brings these to fulfillment through
the giving away of what is the person's own and the reception of what
belongs to others. Communion is thus a union of persons and at the same
time maintains the primacy of the always unique person. This primacy,
however, finds its fulfillment not in an individualistic having but in giving
and thus granting participation in what is one's own.
K. Hemmerle has expounded the consequence for Christian spirituality
of such a trinitarian understanding of unity as communion-unity.2lI The
resultant spirituality is contemplative, but in all things it pays heed to the
traces of love that it finds in all things and most of all in the cross of Jesus
Christ. The self-giving of God in Jesus Christ is not only the ground but
also the abiding measure upon which this spirituality repeatedly focuses
its gaze in order to make it its own measure. While contemplative, this
spirituality is also active and involved in the world. It attunes itself to God's
308 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
self-giving for men. It thus becomes a service in the world and for the
world. Finally, in its contemplation and its action it is community-
orientated and ecclesial. It draws its vitality from union with others. It is
not dependent on the pleasure and disposition of the individual, but
recognizes 'binding obligations' in the full sense of the phrase.
3. The abiding problem of the doctrine of the Trinity or, better: The
mystery of the Trinity. I said above that that the trinitarian communion-
unity is radically different from communion-unity among human beings
in that it is a unity in one and the same being and not simply a communion
of separate beings. The ana logy here involves an always greater dissimilarity
despite all the similarity. The concrete mode of trinitarian unity amid the
distinction of persons is therefore for us a mystety that cannot be eliminated.
Recent discussion of an appropriate understanding of person as applied to
the Trinity only shows once again the difficulties and aporias that face all
theological thinking at this point. But even in this most difficult of all
questions in the theology of the Trinity the high-priestly prayer offers us
points of contact and guides for further and deeper reflection. The answer
is once again suggested by the movement of giving and receiving, the
movement of love, which God is. For if we pay careful attention to the text
we see that in this movement there are three distinct relations.
The Father is purely a giver and sender. He is thus the unoriginated
origin of divine love, a pure source, a pure outflowing. The Son receives
life, glory and power from the Father; but he does not receive it in order
to keep it for himself, to possess it, and to take full enjoyment of it for
himself; rather, he receives it in order to empty himself of it (Phil. 2.6f.)
and to pass it on. love that terminated in the two-in-oneness of the lovers,
and did not selflessly press out beyond itself, would be only another form
of egoism. The Son is therefore the mediator; he is even pure mediation, a
pure passing-on. Finally, in the Spirit the faithful receive the gift of the
Father through the Son, so that they may share in this gift. The Spirit is
nothing by himself; he is a pure receiving, pure donation and gift; as such
he is pure fulfillment, eternal joy and blessedness, pure endless completion.
Since he is the expression of the ecstasy of love in God, God is, in and
through him, an eternal movement of pure exuberance reaching beyond
himself. As gift within God, the Spirit is God's eschatological gift to the
world; he is the world's definitive sanctification and completion.
Perfect and complete communion within the one being of God thus also
includes distinctions in the way this one being is possessed. In the Father,
love exists as pure source that pours itself out; in the Son it exists as a pure
passing-on, as pure mediation; in the Spirit it exists as the joy of pure
receiving. These three modes in which the one being of God, the one love,
 Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity 309
subsists, are in some sense necessary because love cannot be otherwise
conceived; to that extent the trinitarian confession has an intrinsic plaus-
ibility for the believer. The Trinity nonetheless remains a mystery because
there is a question here of a necessity in love and therefore in freedom, a
necessity which cannot be deduced in advance of its self-revelation and of
which there can be no rational grasp after it has been revealed. The logic
of love has its own internal coherence and its own power to convince in,
and not despite, its irreducible and unfathomable freedom.
Each of the three modes in which the one love of God subsists is
conceivable only in relation to the other two. The Father as pure self-giving
cannot exist without the Son who receives. But since the Son does not
receive something but everything, he exists only in and through the giving
and receiving. On the other hand, he would not have truly received the
self-giving of the Father were he to keep it for himself and not giveit back.
He exists therefore insofar as he receives himself wholly from the Father
and gives himself wholly back to the Father, or, as it is put in the farewell
prayer of Jesus, glorifies the Father in his turn. As an existence that is
wholly owed to another, the Son is therefore pure gratitude, eternal
eucharist, pure obedient response to the word and will of the Father. But
this reciprocal love also presses beyond itself; it is pure giving only if it
empties itself of, and gives away, even this two-in-oneness and, in pure
gratuitousness, incorporates a third in whom love exists as pure receiving,
a third who therefore exists only insofar as he receives his being from the
mutual love between Father and Son. The three persons of the Trinity are
thus pure relationality; they are relations in which the one nature of God
exists in three distinct and non-interchangeable ways. They are subsistent
reiations.2J2
These considerations bring us back by a new path to the Augustinian
and Thomist concept of trinitarian person as subsistent relation. I have
rendered this concept concrete with the help of the reflections offered
by Richard of St Victor. At the same time, I have found a systematic
conception of the doctrine of the Trinity in which the concerns of the Greek
and Latin doctrines of the Trinity can be aufgehoben (set aside, preserved
and elevated to a higher level) in a higher unity. In principle, this view of
the Trinity begins, as does the Greek, with the Father, the unoriginated
origin; but insofar as it conceives the Father as pure love, as pure self-
giving, it is able to understand the processions of the Son and of the Spirit
according to their inner 'logic', after the manner of Latin theology, and to
conceive these processions, in faith, as forms of the one impenetrable and
incomprehensible love of God and as expressions of the one mystery of
salvation.
310 The Trinitarian Mystery of God
The question remains, of course: what is the value of such a systematic
exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity? What does it have to do with the
doxological and soteriological meaning of the confession of the Trinity? I
have already given a first answer to this question: our concern is with the
intellecttls fidei, an understanding of the faith from within. What is meant
is not a rationalistic understanding, an understanding according to the
criterion and in the framework of the human reason, which would then,
by comparison with faith, be the greater and more comprehensive power
that could serve as measure and standard. The 'understanding of faith' is
rather a conceptualizing on the basis of faith and an understanding in faith;
it is an understanding that does not lead away from faith to a supposedly
higher knowledge. The aim is a deeper initiation into the faith itself, a
faith-filled understanding of the mystery as mystery, and specifically as the
mystery of an unfathomable and for that very reason convincing love.
In these remarks I have already anticipated a second answer. Because
the mystery of love is the supreme criterion and one established by
revelation itself, it yields further criteria for understanding the reality in a
new and more profound way. By way of analogy the trinitarian commun-
ion-unity shows itself to be the model for a Christian understanding of
reality. The development of the doctrine of the Trinity means a breaking
out of an understanding of reality that is characterized by the primacy of
subject and nature, and into an understanding of reality in which person
and relation have priority. Here the ultimate reality is here not the
independent substance but the person, who is fully conceivable only in the
relationality of giving and receiving. We might even say: the meaning of
being is the selflessness of love. Such a 'trinitarian ontology',m like any
other ontology, cannot of course be convincingly established by induction.
Self-assertion, blind facticity, abstract historicity or the irreducible
obscurity of reality constantly make their presence felt and seek to
contradict such an interpretation. The interpretation is nonetheless plaus-
ible because it does justice in a greater degree to the human experience of
reality while bracketing none of that experience. In addition, it is capable
of incorporating and 'letting stand' those experiences of reality that will
not fit into any system: guilt, loneliness, the grief caused by finiteness,
failure. In the final analysis, it is an interpretation in the key of hope, an
anticipation of the eschatological doxology under the veil of history.
Finally, the trinitarian confession yields a model for a Christian spirit-
uality of hope and of the selfless service that hope inspires. For the
trinitarian persons are characterized by their selflessness. They are, each
in his own way, pure surrender, self-emptying. Their eternal keno tic
existence is the condition for the possibility of the temporal kenosis of
 Exposition of the Doctrille of the Trinity 311
the Son, and thus a type of Christian humility and selfless service.>"
Consequently it is the very nature and content of the trinitarian confession
that causes it to be pronounced in the act of baptism, which grounds
Christian existence. This confession is the very heart not only of the
Christian faith but also of the following of Jesus, which is based on this
faith, and of the Christian's being incorporated into the death and
resurrection of the Lord.
4. The systematic place of the doctrine of the Trinity follows from the
point just made. This doctrine is in a sense the summation of the entire
Christian mystety of salvation and, at the same time, its grammar. It is its
grammar because it is the intrinsic condition for the possibility of the
histoty of salvation. Only because God is perfect freedom in love within
himself can he also be freedom in love in dealing with what is outside of
himself. Because in his very being he is one with himself through being
with and in another, he is able to empty himself out in histoty and in this
very emptying reveal his glory. Because in himself God is pure gift, he is
able to give himself in the Holy Spirit; as the innermost being of God, the
Spirit is at the same time the outermost, the condition for the possibility
of creation and redemption. Consequently the trinitarian confession is at
the same time the summary of the entire Christian mystery of salvation.
For the fact that God the Father is the salvation of the world through Jesus
Christ his Son in the Holy Spirit- this fact is the one mystery of faith which
is contained in the many mysteries of faith. The Father as unoriginated
origin in God is also the ground and goal of the history of salvation; from
his all comes forth and to him all returns. The Son as pure communication
in God is the mediator whom the Father sends and who in turn gives us
the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, finally, as completion in God is the eschatological
completion of the world and man. Just as he is God's way to what is outside
himself so also he effects the return of all created reality to God. Through
the Spirit soteriology ends in doxology; at the end of time all of reality will
be incorporated into this doxology when God is 'all ill all' (I Cor. 15.28).
Finally, the thesis that the doctrine of the Trinity is the grammar and
summation of the entire Christian mystety of salvation provides us with
the answer to the much-discussed question of the place of the doctrine of
the Trinity within dogmatic theology.2lS Given the importance of the
doctrine of the Trinity, the question and its answer are not simply a matter
of scientific organization but much more one of theological content that
has serious implications and determines the overall theological approach
to a dogmatic theology.
Three classical solutions call for discussion. The first solution, which
received its classical formulation in Thomas Aquinas, puts the doctrine of
312 The Trillitariall Mystery of God
the Trinity at the beginning of dogmatic theology, in keeping with a
dogmatic epistemology. In practice the treatise De Deo uno precedes the
treatise De Deo trino. This arrangement implies a twofold preliminary
theological decision: it presupposes the priority of theologia (the study of
God in himself) over oeconomia (the study of God's action in creation and
history); and it takes seriously the fact that in the history of salvation and
in the theo/ogia which interprets it the most important thing is God's deeds
and words and therefore that everything in theology must be studied slIb
ratione Dei (in the light of God). The positioning of the treatise De Deo
uno before the treatise De.Deo trino implies, in addition, a choice of the
Western theology of the Trinity as established chiefly by Augustine, a
theology that starts with the. one essence of God, deals with the three
persons in terms of this one essence or nature, and thus leads in practice
to stripping the Trinity to a large extent of any function in the economy of
salvation. Despite its being placed before the other dogmatic treatises the
doctrine of the Trinity is, in this approach, largely without influence on
the further presentation of dogmatic theology.
The second solution is represented by the renewed Protestant theology
of our century, which has received its classical formulation in Karl Barth.
In this theology the salliS Christus (Christ alone) is not simply a basic
material theological principle which says that all salvation comes to us
through Christ alone. Rather it is also a fundamental formal theological
principle that says we can speak of God only through Jesus Christ and his
mediation. Given the critical assessment of natural theology to which this
salliS Christlls principle leads, it follows that even the prolegomena to
dogmatic theology-or, as post Barthian theologians like to say, theological
hermeneutic - must already speak of christology and the doctrine of the
Trinity. The prolegomena are now no longer simply a preamble to dogmatic
theology but rather that which has to be said first and foremost in dogmatic
theology itself, an instruction on the correct way to speak of God. It follows
from this basic approach that the distinction between the treatises De Deo
uno and De Deo trino is abandoned and the doctrine of the Trinity is shifted
into the dogmatic prolegomena or, if you will, dogmatic hermeneutic, thus
becoming the grammar for all other dogmatic statements. The result of
such an a·theistic theology which is so radically grounded in christology
is that the difference between it and real atheism is emphatically asserted
in faith but hardly demonstrated in an intellectually satisfactory way.
At this point a third solution suggests itself. This is an approach
consistently taken by F. Schleiermacher, the father of Neoprotestantism
and one that is being attempted today even in Catholic theology, as, for
example, in the 'Dutch Catechism'."6 In this approach the Trinity is
 Expositioll of the Doctrille of the Trillity 313
regarded as the crowning conclusion and to that extent the summation of
all dogmatic theology. It is sufficiently clear from Schleiermacher that in
this approach the doctrine of the Trinity can also become in practice a
mere appendix. The intrinsic reason for this is easy to understand: if the
doctrine of the Trinity is treated simply as a summation, then it is difficult
to show how it can also serve as the grammar for all other dogmatic
statements. The doctrine of the Trinity necessarily ceases to be the basic
proposition of theology and becomes instead a postscript to theology.
From the idea, just mentioned, of the doctrine of the Trinity as the
grammar of theology in its entirety it follows that an introductoty treatise
De Deo trino is indispensable atthe beginning of dogmatic theology. 'But
this initial treatise should not be an attempt to cover a theme which can be
then marked as read, but a preliminary orientation with regard to a theme
which is still to be dealt with.'2J7It might perhaps be said more accurately:
this treatise would have to deal with a theme that subsequently keeps
surfacing in different variations as in a fugue. For dogmatic theology does
not form a system in the sense that everything can be logically deduced
from a principle. It is a structured whole in which each partial statement
reflects the whole in a different way. For if the Trinity is the one mystery
in the many mysteries, then in the nature of things there is a 'perichoresis'
of the individual dogmatic treatises, each of which deals with the whole
from a particular point of view. In the theology of the Trinity the one
theme that is present in the many themes of dogmatic theology becomes
itself thematic. But in this reflection on the oneness and wholeness of
dogmatic theology the theology of the Trinity presupposes not so much
the other dogmatic treatises as the church's confession of faith, which it
reflects upon in its entirety in the perspective of its ultimate ground and
ultimate goal. The material object of the doctrine of the Trinity is thus the
entire confession of faith with all three of its parts: 'I believe in one God,
the Father almighty ... And in one Lord, Jesus Christ ... I believe in the
Holy Spirit.' The formal object or point of view from which the doctrine
of the Trinity deals with the whole of the Christian faith is God as ground
and goal of all these confessional statements. The material dogmatic
statements made in the other treatises are intelligible as theological
statements only when their formal object is first named; that is, when it
has been made clear what we as Christians mean when we speak of God,
namely, the God of Jesus Christ to whom we have access in the Holy Spirit.
In view of all these considerations we must maintain the priority of the
treatise on the Trinity over the other treatises.
If, however, we are to avoid the negative consequences which this
approach has had both in classical Catholic and in modern Protestant
314 The Trillitariall Mystery of God
theology, we must reflect anew on the inner structure of the doctrine of
God or, concretely, on the relation between the treatise De Deo 11110 and
the treatise De Deo trino. We must therefore take seriously the fact that
when we speak of God and to God we always mean - according to the
Bible and the early church - the Father who is known to us through the
Son in the Holy Spirit. The one God, as Augustine repeatedly insists, is
therefore the triune God. This means that we cannot first speak in a general
way about the being of God and only then of the three divine persons. On
the contrary, after the fashion of the Eastern doctrine of the Trinity, we
must start with the Father as the origin and source of the Trinity and show
that the Father possesses the one divine substance in such a way that he
gives it to the Son and to the Spirit. In other words, the abstract doctrine
of the being of God must once again be incorporated into the doctrine of
the concrete revelation of God's being and thus into the doctrine of the
Triniry.lt is to the creditofthedogmatictheology presented by M. Schmaus
that it made a significant advance in this direction. 238 This new approach,
which we owe to the tradition of the Eastern church, need not lead to an
abandonment ofthe achievements of Augustinian trinitarian theology. For
if we start with the Father as the origin and source of the Trinity we are
led to conceive of the one divine nature as love. Then it becomes possible,
more than in Eastern theology, to understand the Triniry entirely in terms
of its innermost root, as is done, for example, by Richard of St Victor; that
is, as the mystery of perfect love that communicates and empties itself and,
to that extent, as the grammar and summary of the entire Christian mystery
of salvation.
This approach from the economy of salvation likewise need not lead to
the dismissal of natural theology and, with it, of the legitimate concern at
work in the old treatise De Deo tina. For the economy of salvation
presupposes the natural or, beller, the creaturely quest of man for God
and responds to it in a surpassing manner.219 The trinitarian self-revelation
of God is thus the surpassing answer to the question and quest which man
not only has buds: the question and quest of God. The trinitarian revelation
and the trinitarian confession of faith are the ultimate, eschatological
and definitive determination of the indeterminate openness of man. The
doctrine of the Trinity is concrete monotheism. This thesis closes the circle
of our reflections, which began with the contemporary atheistic situation.
It has been shown that the trinitarian confession is the Christian answer
to the challenge of modern atheism. This thesis brings me to a concluding
summary reflection.
 ExpositiOl' of the Doctrine of the Trinity 315

(c) Conc/usion: the trinitarim. confession as the m.swer to modem atheism

The journey from the situation that is given its character by modern atheism
to the trinitarian confession offaith has been a long one; for many, perhaps
too long. It seems to them that the real question calling for an answer today
is the question of God's existence and not that of his inner mystery. In
addition, they regard the theology of the Trinity as often nothing but an
impertinent prying into the mystery of God. They are therefore more or
less content with a theistic confession of faith. But this kind of theological
contentment has, I think, been shown in the chapters of this book to be
based on an inherently untenable position. A theistic faith today is a
Christian faith which has already been undermined by the Enlightenment
and atheism, and in the nature of things it repeatedly turns into the atheism
which it is intended to prevent, but whose arguments it cannot defend itself
against. In the face of the radical challenge to the Christian faith, help will
come not from a feeble, general and vague theism but only from a decisive
witness to the living God of history who has disclosed himself in a concrete
way through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit.
The way beyond theism and atheism, as travelled today by many
inAuential representatives of Protestant theology, is safe from the dangers
which threaten theism only if it docs not throw the baby out with the bath
water; that is, if it does not answer the questions of atheists by avoiding
the problems of natural theology and making a direct leap into a supposedly
radical faith and if it does not hastily extend its criticism of theism to a
criticism of monotheism. For monotheism is the answer to the question
raised at the natural level about the unity and meaning of all reality. It is
precisely this ambiguous and open question that is specified in a concrete
way by the trinitarian self-revelation of God, so that the trinitarian
confession is concrete monotheism and as such the Christian answer to the
God-question of the human person. The God of Jesus Christ - that is, the
God who gives himself to be known through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit
- is the ultimate, eschatological and definitive determination of the
indeterminate openness of man; he is therefore also the Christian answer
to the situation created by modern atheism. As a result, the proclamation
of the triune God is of the greatest pastoral importance in the present-day
situation.
It is obvious that the complicated exegetical, historical and speculative
questions with which the theology of the Trinity must grapple are not the
direct object of the proclamation of the trinitarian mystery of God. The
discussion of such questions is necessary in order to defend the confession
against challenges, to make it at least possible to discuss the doctrine with
316 The TrinitariQ/1 Mystery of God
its 'cultured despisers', and, more important still, to open up the doctrine
to those who venerate it in faith. Such discussions are therefore of
fundamental importance for the proclamation of the doctrine, even if only
indirectly.
The direct object of the proclamation, as the church's confession of faith,
is the economic Trinity and the God of Jesus Christ who in the Spirit gives
us life and freedom, reconciliation and peace. Of course, the proclamation
cannot stop there. For according to the Lord's farewell prayer true life
consists precisely in knowing and glorifying God. For its own sake therefore
soteriology must pass over into doxology. For amid all the vicissitudes and
instability of history man's salvation consists in having communion with
the God who through all eternity is love. It is precisely an anthropologically
oriented theology that must also be a theological theology which takes into
account that the ad maiorem homillis sa/litem (to the greater salvation of
man) is possible only by way of the ad maiorem Dei g/oriam (to the
greater glory of God). It is therefore possible for theology to develop the
anthropological relevance of what it says only if it remains theology and
does not turn into anthropology. It is the acknowledgment of the Godness
of God that leads to the humanization of man.
It is undoubtedly pleonastic to speak, as I did at the beginning of this
book, of theological theology as a program; the formula 'theological
theology' makes sense only as a polemical formula which serves to remind
theology of its own proper theme. The challenge raised by atheism and,
even more, by the crisis in atheism must cause theologians to attend once
again to the theological dimension which is denied by atheism and has
been suppressed or simply forgotten, and to revive an awareness of it as
the one supremely important thing for man. This is all the more necessary
because the proclamation of the death of God has meanwhile led to the
public proclamation of the death of man. If this answer is not to stop half-
way and is to allow the God of Jesus Christ to have his full impact, then
the answer must take the form of the confession of the Trinity. Precisely
because this confession takes seriously the Godness of God, his freedom
in love, it is able to rescue the freedom in love and for love that has been
given us by God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit, and'thus to rescue
the humanity of man at a time when it is most threatened.
 Abbreviations

An Bib Analecta biblica, Rome

BEvT Beiu,ge zur evangelischen Theologie, Munich 1935ff.
BGPTM Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Thcologie des
Mittel.lters, Munster 1891ff.
BSLK Die Bekeml,n;sschri{tell deT evollgelisch·/uter;schen Kirche,
ed. the Deutscher Evangelische Kirchenau5schu5S, G6ttingen
'1956
CA Confessio Augllslana, in BSLK
Cath Catholica. Jahrbuch liir KOlltroverstbeo/ogic, (Paderborn)
Munster J 932ff.
eel Corpus Chriscianorum, Series Latina, Turnholt 1953ff.
COD Conciliorum oecumenicomm decreta, ed. J. Alberigo et aJ.
Bologn. '1973
eSEl Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticomm la/lltomm, Vienna
1866ff.
DBSllp Dictiomlaire de Ja Bible: Suppleme"t, Paris 1928ff.
DS H. Denziger and A. Sch6nmeczer (eds.), Enchiridioll
symbolorum, de{i"itiomtm et dec/araf;amm, de rebus /idei et
marum, Frciburg JJ1965
DTC Dicti01Ulaire de theologie catholiqlle, Paris 1930ff.
ECQ Eastem Churches Quarterly, Ramsgate 193M£.
EKKNT Evangelisch·katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
EKL Evallgelischcs KirchelllexikolJ, ed. H. Brunotte imd O. Weber,
Gottingen J 965ff.
EvT Evallgelische Theologie, Munich 1934ff.
Flannery A. Flannery (ed.), Vatican COllncill1: The COllciliar011d Post·
Conciliar Documents, Collegeville 1975
FS Festschri(t
FZTP Freiburger zeits,hri{t {iir Theologie II"d Philosophie (before
J 914,}ahrbltch (iir Philosophie IIIld speklliative Theologie;
1914-54, Divlts Thomas), Fribourg
Ges Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei
J.hrhundcrte, Leipzig J 897ff.
Gcs. Schriften Gesammelte Schriften
Greg Gregorianum, Rome 1920ff.
HDG H.ndbuch dcr Dogmengeschichte, Freiburg 1951 ff.
HPG Handblt,h philosophi"h" Grrmdbegri((e
318 Abbreviations
HTG Handbuch theologischer Gmndbegriffe, ed. H. Fries, 2 vols.,
Munich 1962-63
HTKNT Herders theologischer Kommentar zurn Neue" Testament,
Freiburg
HWP Historisches Worterbllch der P/,,/osophie, Basic 1971ff.
]TS ]ournal of Theologieal Studies, London 1899ff.
KD Lexik011 (iir Theologie rmd KiTChe, cd. j. Hofer and K. Rahner,
Freiburg'I9571f.
MTZ Miinchener theo/ogische Zeitsch,i{t, Munich 1950ff.
Mysal Mys/eri"", salu/is. Gru"d,iss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatlk,
ed. J. Feiner and M. L6hrer, Einsiedeln - Zurich - Cologne
196511.
ND J. Neuner and J. Dupuis (cds.), The Christian Failh;1I the
Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, Staten Island,
NY 1982
NZST Nelle Zeitschrift (ii, systematische Theologie, Berlin 1959ff.
Ph] Philosophisehes ]ahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft, Fulda
188811.
PhRu Philosophische Rtmdschall
QD Quaestiones dispucacae, Freiburg
PG Pacrologia Graeca, cd. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1857-66
PL Pacrologia Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris 1878-90
RAC Reallexikon (iir Antike tmd Christe,ltum, ed. T. Klauser,
Stuttgart 1941ff.
RevSR Revue des sciences religieuses, Strasbourg 1921 ff.
RGG Die Religion in Geschichte tmd Gegemvart, Tubingen
'195611.
SacMu"di Sacramentum mllndi
SANT Studien zurn Alren und Neuen Tescamem
SC Sources chretiennes, Paris 1941 ff.
Sehol Seholastik, Freiburg 192611.
ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae
SludGe" Studiwn Generale, Berlin - Goctingen - Heidelberg 1948ff.
Theol. Phil. Theologie tmd Philosophie, Freiburg 1966ff.
TDNT Theological Dictiouary o( the New Testamertt, ed. G. Kittel,
Grand Rapids 1964ff.
TLZ Theolog;sche Literaturzeittmg, Leipzig 1878ff.
TPS The Pope Speaks, Washington DC 1954-75, Huntington Ind.
I 975ff.
TQ Theologisehe Quartalsehrift, Tiibingcn 181811.
TRE Theologisehe Realellzyk/opiidie, Berlin 197411.
TRu Theologische RWldschau, Tubingen 1897ff.
TTZ Trierer theologische Zeitschri(t (umil 1944: Pastor BOIlIlS),
Trier 1888ff.
TU Texte mId UrttersuclJlmgen Zllr Geschichte der altchristlichell
Literatur, Leipzig-Berlin 1882ff.
veara Verbu", caro
VF Verkiindiglmg Jmd ForsclJJmg
 Abbreviations 319
WA Martin Luther, Werke, Kritische Gesarnt3usgabe ('Weimarer
AusS.be') Weimar 188311.
WW Gesammelte Werke
WWeis Wissenschaft wId Weisheit
ZKG Zeitschri(t (iir Kirchellgeschi,hte, (Gotha) Stungart 188711.
ZKT Zeitschri(t (iir katho/ische The%gie, Innsbruck and Vienna
1876ff.
ZNW Zeitschri!t {iir die IIeutestamentliche Wisse1lscbaft lind die
Ku"de deT iilteren Kircbe, Berlin 1900ff.
ZST Zeitschri(t (iir systematische The%gie, (Gutersloh) Berlin
192311.
ZTK Zeitschri(t (iir The%gie lind Kirche, Tubingen 1891 ff.
 NOTES

PART ONE

Chapter I God as a Problem

1. DS 150; ND 12.
2. What Vatican II says of scripture in particular is true of faith generally: its
object is 'the truth which God' I\as revealed 'for the sake of our salvation' (Dei
Verbum 11). In saying this the Council does not intend to delimit the material
object of the statements of faith or scripture, hut rather to define the formal object
in the light of which all [he statements of faith 3nd scripture are (0 be understood.
3. Cr. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 1,7: 'In sacred doctrine 311 subjects are treated in
terms of God, either ~C3USC they are God himself or because they are related to
him as their origin and end. It follows from this that God is indeed the object of
this science.'
4. Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei VIII, 1 (CCl 47, 117), who defines theology
as 'thought or speech about the divinity' (de diuinitate ratio sive serulO).
5. M. Buber, Meetings, la Salle III. 1973,50--1.
6. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2, 3.
7. Anselm of Canterbury, Pros/ogiml 2.
8. Ibid., 15.
9. BSLK 560.
10. P. Tillich, Systematic Theology 1, Chicago 1951, 11, etc., especially Iliff.
11. R. Bultmann, 'What Does It Mean to Speak of God?', in Faith and
Understanding 1, ET l. P. Smith, london and New York 1969,53.
11. G. Ebeling, Dogmatik des christliellell Glaubens 1, Tubingen 1979, 187.
13. K. Rahner, Foundations ofChrist;an Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of
Christianity, ET W. V. Dych, london and New York 1978,65-6.
14. This is the justifiable starting point of W. Weischedel, Der Gott der
Philosophen. Gnmdleg.mg einer philosophische" Theo/ogie ;m Zeitalter des
Nihilism"s, 2 vols., Munich 31975.
15. There is a synthesis, including an application to the God-question, in E.
Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, New Haven 1950,21 ff.
16. Thus G. Ebeling, op. cit., 168-9.
17. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1, 2, 3, argo 1 and 2.
18. Anselm, Pros/ogio", Prooemium 1.
19. It is not possible here to go into all the theoretical problems oJ rheology as a
science. Cf. W. Kasper, The Methods of Dogmatic Theology, ET J. Drury, New
York 1969; id., 'Dogmatik als Wissenschaft. Versuch einer Neubegrundung', TQ
157,1977,189-103; id. 'Wissenschaftliche Freiheit und lehramtliche Bindungder
 Notes to pages 7-9 321
katholischen Theologie', Esse"er Gespriiche ZWII Thema Staat mId Kirche 16,
Munster 1982, 12-44, especially 26fl. (bibliography in all three works).
20. Cf. M. Eliade, COSIIIOS alld History. The Myth of the Etemal Relllm, ET W.
R. Trask, New York 1954,3-4
2 t. M. Heidegger, Erliilfltermrgen 411 HOiderlitrs DichtwIg, Frankfurt 1951,27.
22. M. Buber, The Eclipse of God, ET M. Friedman et al., New York 1953.
23. D. Bonhoeffer, Letters alld Papers frolll Prisoll, ET Frank Clark et al., The
Enlarged Edition, London and New York 197\.
24. A. Delp, 1m Angesic"t des Todes. Geschriebell zwische1l Vcrhaftm,g ,Old
Hillri,htllllg 1944-45, Frankfurt, '1963.
25. Vatican II, Caudillm et spes, 19.
26. On secularization: K. Lowirh, Meaning in History: The Thea/agica/lmplica-
tiolls of the PlJilosophy of History, Chicago 1949; T. Rendtorff,C/1IIrch alld
Theology: The Systematic Functioll of the Church Concept in Modem Theology,
ET R. H. Fuller, Philadelphia 1971; id., Theorie des Christelltllllls. Historisch-
tlJeoJogische Studien III seiller IIClIl.e;tli,he1l Ver(assrmg, Gutersloh 1972j F.
Gogarten, Despair alld Hope for Ollr Tillie, ET T. Weiser, Philadelphia 1970; J.
B. Metl, Theology of the World, ET W. Glen-Doepel, New York 1969; id., Faith
i" History and Society: Toward a Practical Fmtdamental Theology, ET D. Smith,
New York 1980; P. L. Berger, The Sacred Callopy: Elements of a Sociological
Theory of Religioll, Garden Cil)' NY 1967; H. Lubbe, Siikularisierung. Geschichte
eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs, Freiburg, and Munich 21975; H. Blumenberg, Die
Legitmitiit der Nettuit, Frankfurt 1966; id., Siikularistiermtg Hnd Selbstbehaup-
tung, Frankfurt 1974; d. W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions ilt Theology III
(American tide The Idea of God alld Humall Freedom), ET R. A. Wilson, London
and Philadelphia 1973, 178-91; W. Kasper, 'Autonomie und Theonomie. Zur
Ortsbestimmung des Christentums in der modernen Welt" in Ampruch der
\Virklichkeit ulld christlicher Glaube. Probleme ./Ild Wege theologischer Ethik
hwte (FS A. Aller), ed. H. Weber and D. Mieth, Dusseldorf 1980, 17-41; K.
Lehmann, 'Prolegomena zur theologischen Bew5higung der S5kularisierungsprob-
lematik', in his Gegenwart des Glaubens, Mainz 1974,94-108; U. Ruh, 'Sakularisi-
erung', Christlicher Glallbe in modenter Gesellschaft18, Freiburg- Basle- Vienna
1982,59-100 (bibliog.).
27. Thus E. Trocltsch, Das \Vesen des modcmen Geistes, Gesammelte Schriften
4, Tubingen 1925 - Aalen 1966,334.
28. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, ETT. M. Knox, Oxford 1942,51,84,124.
29. This aspect has been brought out especially by W. Dilthey, \"(/eitallschalllmg
Imd Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance tmd Reformation WW 2; Stuttgart
.nd Gottingen s 1957, 254fl., ere.
30. K. Hall, 'Die Geschichte des Worts Beruf', in his Gesammelte Allfsiitz.e zur
Kirchengeschichte 2. Der Westen, Tubingcn 1928, 189-219; M. Weber, The
Protestallt Ethic alld the Spirit of Capitalislll, ETT. Parsons, New York 1958.
31. On the b.sis of research done by J. Habermas, R. Koselleck, M. Riedel, B.
Grocthuyscn, D. SchelJong, L. Goldman and others, the category of 'bourgeois
society' has been taken as the basis, especially in the new political theology ofJ. B.
Metz, for a hermeneutic of Christianity in the context of the concemporary
historical and social situation. Cf. J. B. Men, Faitl, in History and Society (n. 26)i
id., The Emergent Church: The Futllre of Christianity itt a Postbollrga;s World,
ET P. Mann, New York 1981. There is a good and balanced summaI)' in W. Muller,
322 Notes to pages 9-12
'Burgerrum und Chrisrcntum', Christlicher Glaube in modcmer Cesellschaft 18,
Freiburg - Basic - Vienna 1982,5-58 (bibliog.). The approach is a stimulatmg
one and opens up avenues. But we also see its limitations. For the bourgeOIsie
which has existed from the twelfth century down into the nineteenth and twentieth
underwent important changes during this long period of time, and who knows
what capacity for change it may not display in the future as well? 'Bourgeois' is
therefore a generic historical concept that stands at a high level of abstraction and
is nO[ suited, as such, for describing the concrete situation of our own day. Unless
one states precisely the meaning attached to the term, it can only be a defamatory
one nowadays; its emotional overtones prevent rational discussion. In addition, it
overlooks the great accomplishments of bourgeois civilization in favor of a one·
dimensional, more or less Marxist criticism: the value of individual freedom, the
universal rights of the human person as a free being, the idea of tolerance, and so
on. Instead of prematurely proclaiming a post-bourgeois religion, we ought to be
seeing to it that these ideas, which are Christian in their inspiration, 3re put mto
practice and respected in the religions and churches. This is not to deny the limits
or the critical state of bourgeois civilization. But these cannot be overcome by an
abstract denial of what is bourgeois, but only by a transformational insertion of
the bourgeois legacy into the larger context. As will be shown in a moment, this
larger context does not consist only in the political dimension of religion as
contrasted with the privatization of religion in a bourgeois culture. For on closer
examination, bourgeois religion proves not to have been so unpolitical; in fact, it
was overly political. It did not so to speak sleep through the new social problems
because it was unpolitical; rather, it was unwilling to acknowledge these social
problems b~cause it was the prisoner of existing social structures and proVided
these with legitimacy. Consequently, the loss of the political dimension cannot be
the reason for the failureofbourgeois religion. Forthis reason a more comprehensive
point of departure is needed than the one we find in political theology.
32. H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pads, Prolegomena 11 (cd. P. C. Molhuysenj
Leiden 1919,7).
33. Cf. below, 20ff.
34. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, or the Reflective Philosophy of Sub;ectwity ;11
the Complete Rallge of Its Forms as Karltlall, Jacobian alld Fichtean Philosophy,
ET W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany 1977,57.
35. Ibid., 190; id., The Phenomenology of Mind, ET J. Baillie, rev. 2nd cd.
London 1949,752-3; id., Vorleslmgell iiber die Philosophie der ReliglOlI, 3. Teil,
Die absolute Religion (cd. G. Lasson, 157f. ). IThere is an English translation of
this last work, by E. B. Spiers and J. B. Sanderson: Lectures 011 the Philosophy of
Religion (3 vols.; London 1895; reprinted New York 1962), but I have decided
not to use it in the present book but to translate directly from the text proVided by
W. Kasper. Tr.J.
36. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, no. 125, ET W. Kaufmann, New York 1974,
Vintage Book ed., 18 J.
37. L. Kolakowski, 'Die Sorge urn Gatt in unserem scheinbar gottlosen Zeitalter',
in his Der "ahe Imd der feme Gott. Nichttheologische Texte zltr Gottesfrage""
20. jahrhundert. Ein Lesebuch, Berlin 198 I, 10.
38. M. Buber, Meetings (n. 5), 5 J.
39. For more detailed justification of this statement d. below, 77f., 87f.
 Notes to pages 13-18 323
40. Ariswric, Mctapbysica II, 994a-b. For the concept of problem in Aristotle
cf. his Topica to4b.
41. for the concept of mystery cf. below, 124ff.
42. Vatican II, Gaudill'" ct spes, 25.
43. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica 111, 1003a. I cannot here go into the history ofthe
concept of metaphysIcs and into the changes that have taken place in the under-
standing of metaphysics and correspondingly in the meaning of the claim that the
era of metaphysics is over. Nor is it possible here to define in a more detailed
way the relationship between theology and philosophy. Cf. below, 65ff. 94ff.
44. H. U. von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit. Eille theologische Asthetick, 111/1: 1m
RaulII der Metaphysik, Einsiedeln 1965,974.
45. Vatican II, Gaudium el spes, 76.
46. Kolakowski, 0p. cit. (n. 37), 21.

Chapter II The Denial of God in Modern Atheism

1. On the concept of atheism and on the history of the concept, d. W. Kern,
AtheislUlls - Marxrsnllls - Chris/emu",. Beitriige zltr Diskuss;olJ, Innshruck 1976,
ISH. Basic works on atheism: H. ley, Geschichte der Aufktarullg I/Ild des
Athe;smus, 3 vols., Berlin 1966-72; F. Mauthner, Der Atheismus rmd seille
Geschichte im Abendland, 4 vols., Stuttgart and Berlin 1920-23, reprinted
Hildeshcirn, 1963; C. Fabro, God in Exile: Modem Atheism, ET ed. A. Gibson,
Westminster Md. 1968; W. Schutte, 'Atheismus', HWP 1,595-9.
2. Cf. Kern, op. cit., 17H.
3. justin, Apologia 1, 6 (Corpus Apol., ed. v. Otto, 20-22). Cf. A. Harnack, Der
VoruJUr{ des AthewlIlIs tit dell drei erstelt Jahrlumderten, TU 28, Leipzig 1905; N.
Brox, 'Zum Vorwurf des Atheismus gegen die alte Kirche', TTZ 75,1966,274-82.
4. Cf. G. Ebeling, 'Rudimentary ReflexlOns on Speaking Responsibly of God',
in Word alld Faith, ET j. W. leitch, london and Philadelphia 1963, 374ff.
5. Cf. W. Kasper, 'Thconomic und Autonomic. Zur Ortsbestimmung dcs
Christentums in der modcrncn Welt', in H. Weber and D. Mieth (cds.), AIIspmch
der \Virklichkeit Imd christlicher Glaube. Probleme mId Wege theo/ogischer Ethik
hellte fFS Alfolls Auer), Dusseldorf 1980, 17-41.
6. R. Descarres, Meditatiolls all First Philosophy 11, 25(20), ET L. j. laOeur,
Indianapolis 1978,24.
7. A Discourse ort Method IV, H., in A Discourse on Method and Selected
Writillgs, ET J. Veitch, New York 1957,28.
8. Meditatiolls all First Philosophy 11, 28(22) (laOeur, 27): The Prillciples of
Philosophy I, 7 (Veitch, 186).
9. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reaso/I, Preface [0 2nd ed., 1787, ET j. M. D.
Meiklejohn. in Kant, Great Books of the Western World 42, Chicago 1952,7.
10. On this interpretation d. W. Schulz. Der Gott der IIeuzeitlichell Metaphysik,
Pfullingen 1957, 22H., 31 H. Augustine is already familiar with this kind of thinking:
COllfessiolls X, 6, 9ff.; 8, 12ff.; 25, 36ff. (CCl27, 159ff., 16lf., 174f.). Augustine
even has the formula: 'Si enim (allor SlIm' ('If I am deceived, I exist', De civitate
Dei XI, 26; CCl 48, 345f.). But Augustine'S thinking is located wholly in the
theological order.
11. Cf. R. Pohlmann, 'Autonomie', HWP I, 701-19; M. Welker, Der Vorgallg
Autonomic. Philosophische Beitrage zltr E;,tsicht in theolog;sche Rezeption Imd
324 Notes to pages 18-21
Kritik, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1975; W. Kasper, 'Autonomie und Theonomic' (n. 5);
K. Hilpert, Ethik mId Ratioltalitiit. U1ttersuclmngen lUT Alltonomieproblem Imd
zu seiner Bedeutung fiir die theo/ogische Ethik, Moraltheologische Studien,
Systematische Abteilung 6, Freiburg 1978j E. Amelung, 'Autonomic', TRE 5,
4-17.
12. Cf. below.
13. Cf. E. Troeltsch, Das Wesen des modemeu Geistes, Ges. Schriften IVj
Tiibingen 1925 - Aalen 1966,324; W. Dilthey, Weitallschallllllg lII,d Allalyse des
Menschen seit Renaissance Imd Reformation, WW II, Stuttgan and G6uingen
1969, 90ff., and frequently.
14. Kant, FIII,damelltal Prillciples ofthe Metaphysic of Morals, ETT. A. Abbott,
in Kallt (n. 9), 271 .
15. Ibid., 279.
16. Ibid., 260
17. Hegel, Fa,th alld Kllowledge, ET W. Cerf and H. S. Harris, Albany 1977,
189-91.
18. There is an important differentiation and classification in Gaud;",,, e/ spes,
19f.
19. Cf. below.
20. Cf. K. Lehmann and A. B6hm, 'Die Kirchc und die Herrschaft dec Ideologien',
Halldb"eI, der Pastoraltlreo/ogie 1112, Freiburg - Basic - Vienna 1966. 109-202.
21. K. Rahner, 'Science as a "Confession", in his Theological Investigations 3,
ETK.· H. and B. Kruger, London and Baltimore 1967,390; d. id., 'The Acceptance
In Faith of the Truth of God', Theological Investigations 16, ET D. Morland,
London and New York 1979, 169-70; 'Religious Feeling Inside and OutSIde the
Church', Theological Investigations 3, 390; .Atheism', SacMlmdi 1, 117-22.
22. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zaratlmstra, ET W. Kaufmann, New York, 1954,
Zarathustra's Prologue 5 (Kaufmann, 17-18).
23. This is true especially of behaviorism. Cf. B. F. Skinner, BeY011d Freedom
and Dignity, New York 1971.
24. For a history of the problems tackled in the natural sciences and a history of
the relation between theology and the natural sciences d. A. C. Crombie, Augllstme
to Calileo: Tire History ofScierlCe AD 400-1650, London 1952; F. Wagner, Die
Wissellsel,aft ,,,,d die gefiilrrdete Welt, Munich 1964; N. Schiffers, Fragell der
Physik an die Theologie. Die Sakularisiertmg der Wlissenschaft mId das Heilsver·
langen nach Freiheit, Dusseldorf 1968; W. Heisenberg, Physik Imd Philosophie,
Stuttgart z1972; C. F. v. Weizsacker, Die Tragweite der Wlissenschaft I, Stuttgart
s 1972; N. M. Wildiers, The Theologian and His Universe: Theology and Cosmo·
logy from the Middle Ages to the Presellt, ET P. Dunphy, New 'York 1977.
Important for the Scholastic prehistory are the works of A. Meier, especially An
der Gre"ze von Scholastik rmd Natrmvissellschaft. Studien zur NaturphilosoplJle
des 14.jalrrlr,,,,derts, Essen 1943.
25. On the 'Galileo Case' : F. Dessauer, Der Fall Galilei ,Old wir. Abe"dlandische
Tragodie, Frankfurt 31951; A. C. Crombie, 'Galileo's Conception of Scientific
Truth', in Literature and Scie1lce. ProceedilJg$ of the Sixth Triemrial Congress,
Oxford 1954, Oxford 1955, 132-38; E. Schumacher, Der Fall Cali/ei. Das Drama
der Wissenschaft, Darmstadt 1964; G. de Santillana, 'Galileo e 101 sua sorre', in
Fortulla di Gali/eo, Biblioteca di cultura moclerna 586, Bari 1964, 3-23; P.
Paschini, Vita e opere di Cali/eo Cali/ci, Rome Z 1965 ; H. Blumenberg, 'Das
 Notes to pages 21 - 25 325
Fernrohr und die Ohnmacht dec Wahrheit', in Siderells Nw,cius lI.a., ed. H.
Blumenberg, Frankfurt 1965, 7- 75; O. Lorerz, Galifei ulld das Irrtllm der
Inquisition. Natllrwissenschaft - Wahrheit deT Bibel - KiTche, Kevdaer 1966.
26. This failure is cautiously acknowledged by Vatican II in Gaudillnt et spes,
26, where the Council also speaks of the legitimate autonomy of the sciences.
27. C. F. v. Weizsacker, Der Garten des Menschlichen. Beitroge ZIIT geschicht-
lichen Anthropo!og;e, Munich and Vienna 1977, 22,93, 460, etc.
28. H. Blumenberg, Die kopemikanische Wende, Frankfurt 1965. Cf. especially
M. Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in The Question conceming
Technology, alld Other Essays, ET W. Lovitt, New York 1977, 115-54
29. W. Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conceptioll of the Universe, ET A. J.
Pomerans, London 1958, 7ff., 59ff., 78ff.
30. Cf. the survey in S. Pfiirtner, 'Pantheismus', LTK 8, 25-29. For modern
pantheism d. W. Dilthey, 0p. cit. (n. 13), 283ff., 326ff., 39lff.
31. Cf. the survey in F. Uberweg, GrtllldrtSs der Geschichte der Philosophie 3,
Darmstadt 1957, 30f., 48f., 6321.
32. B. Spinoza, Die Ethik nach geometrischer Methode dargestellt, ed. O.
Baensch, Hamburg 1955, 187, 194.
33. Ibid., 32.
34. Cf. E. Spranger, Weltfrolllllligkeit. Eill Vartrag, Ges. Schriften IX, ed. H. W.
Biihr, O. F. Bollnowetal., Tubingen 1974,224-50.
35. A. Einstein, Lener to Max Born, 4 December 1936, in Albert Einstein,
Hedwig and Max Born, Briefwechsel1919- /955, Munich 1969, 1291.; d. 1181.,
224.
36. F. H. Jacobi, 'Uber die Lehre des Spinoza', in Brie(ell an Herm Moses
Melldelsohll, WW lVII , ed. F. Roth and F. Koppen, Leipzig, 1819 = Darmstadt
1976,216.
37. L. Feuerbach, 'Preliminary Theses on the Reform of PhIlosophy' (1842), in
Z. Hanfi (ed.), The Fiery Brook: Selected Writillgs of Ludwig Feuerbach, Garden
City 1972, 153-4.
38. Hegel, EIlz.yklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenscha(ten 1111 Grtmdrisse
(1 830), S50, ed. F. Nicolin and O. Poggcler, Hamburg 1959,76.
39. Cf. the following surveys: J. T. Engert, 'Deismus', LTK 3, 195-9; E.
Troeltsch, Der Deismus, Ges. Schriften IV, Tiibingen 1925 = Aalen 1961,429-87;
W. Dilthey, op. cit. (n. 13), 90ff., 246ff.; J. T. Engert, 'Zur Geschichte und Kritik
des Deismus', BOllner Zeitschri(t (iir Theologie und See/sorge 7, 1930,214-24; W.
Philipp, Das \Verden der Au(kliirmrg m the%giegeschichtlicher Sicl;t, Gottingen,
1957.
40. Cf. Hegel, Vorlesllllgell iiber dell Begriff der Religiollll (cd. Lasson, II).
41. Cf. W. Heisenberg, The Physicist's COllceptiOlI of Nature (n. 29), 78ff., 86ff.
42. Cited in W. Kern, op. cit. (n. 1),27.
43. Cited ibid.
44. For the history of materialism: F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus
mrd Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegemvart, 2 vols., Leipzig 1921; E. Bloch,
Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte rmd Substanz., Frankfurt 1972;
N. Lobkowicz and H. Ottmann, 'Materialism us, Idealismus und chrisdiches
Weltverstandnis', in Christlicher G/aube in modemer Gesellscha(t 19, Freiburg-
BasIc - Vienna 1981,65-141.
45. On this point d. G. Almer, Schop(wrgsglaube fOld Entwiklrmgsgedanke in
326 Notes to pages 25- 28
der protestamischen TheoJogie zwischen Ernst Haeckel lInd Teilhard de Chard;n,
Zurich t 965; id" Charles Darwin und Emst Haeckel. Ein Vergleich naeb theolog;~
schell Aspektell, Zurich 1966.
46. W. Heisenberg. Der Teil tmd dos Gonte. Gespriichc 1m Umkrcis deT
Atomphysik, Munich 1969, 116-30,279- 95; id., 'Naturwissenschah und religiose
\Va.hrheit', in Schritte iiber die Grenze, Gesammelte Redell Imd AHfsiitz.e~ Munich
31973, 335-51, esp. 347; P. Jordan , Der Naturwissenschaftler vaT dCT religiOse"
Frage. Abbruch eiller Maller, Oldenburg· Hamburg ' 1948; W. Weidlich, 'Zum
Begriff Gorces im Felde zwischen Theologie, Phllosophie und Naturwissenschaft',
ZTK 68, 1971, 381-94; C. F. v. Wetzs3cker, Die Eillhe;/ der Nowr. S(udicn,
Munich 21971; id., Der Gartell des Mellsch/ichell (n. 27), 441/1.; id., 'Gotteslrage
und N:aturwisscnschaften', in M. Hengel and R. Reinhardt (cds.), HeMe VOl'
Gatt reden, Munich and Mainz 1977, 162-80; M. Schramm, 'Thcologie und
Naturwissenschafte - gestern und heute', TQ 157, 1977,208-13.
47. Cf. below, 881.
48. Cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reasoll, ET T. A. Abbott, in Kant (n. 9},
34411.
49. F. W.J. Schelling, Philosophische Briefe ;iber Dogmatismus lind Kritizismus
(1795), WW I, ed. M. Schroter, 214. On this poinr d. W. Kasper, Das Abso/ute ill
der Ges,hichte. Philosophie w,d Theo/ogie de, Geschichte in der SPiitph,losoph,e
Scbellings, Mainz 1965, 188.
50. J. G. Fichte, Uber den Grund m,seres Gfaubells an eine gatt/klle W'eltregler-
illIg, WW III, ed. F. Medicus, 1291.
51.1bid. 131; d. 400.
52. CI. Kasper, op. cit. (n. 49), esp. 18lff.
53. Hegel, Faith mId Know/edge (n. 17), 190; id., Tbe Phenol/lell%gy of Mind,
ET J. Baillie, rev. 2nd cd., London 1949.752-3.782; id .• Vorlesrmgen iiber die
Pbi/osophie der Religion 1112, ed. G. Lasson, 1551/.
54. Cf. K. Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche. The Revolution in Nineteenth-
Celllury Thougbt, ET D. E. Green, New York 1964; Anchor Books ed. 1967,
339-47.
55. Ibid., 345.
56. Cf. H. Kung, Mensclnverd,mg Gottes, fine Einf;ihrzmg ill Hegels theologi-
sches De"kell als Prolegomena Zit ciner kiinftigell Christologie, Okumenische
Forschungen 1, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1970. 503-22. In literature the
radical change is most clearly marked in H. Heine; d. E. Peters and E. Kirsch,
Rcligiollskritik bei Heinrich Heine, Erfuner Theologischc Studicn 13, Leipzig
1977.
57. On Feuerbach's criricism of religion: G. Nlidling, Ludwig Fetlcrbachs
Rcligiousphilosophie. Die Au{losrmg der Tbeo/ogie ill Authropo/og;e, Paderborn
!1961; M, von Gagern, Ludwig Fellerbach. Philosophic rmd Religimlskritik, Die
'Neue' Philosophic, Munich and Salzburg 1970; M. Xhaufflaire, Fellerbach et la
theo/ogie de la seclllar;satioll, Paris 1970; H. J. Braun, Die ReligiollSphilosophie
Feuerbachs. Kritik rmd Amra/nne des Religiose", Stuttgart 1972; E. Schneider, Die
Theo/ogie ,md Fellerbachs Religio1lskritik. Die Reaktioll des Theo/ogie des 19,
jahr/umderts allf Ludwig Fellerbachs Re/igionskritik, Gorringen 1972; H. Llibbc
and H. M. Soss (cds.), Atheismus ill der Diskussioll. KOlltroversen um L. Feuerba,h,
Munich and Mainz 1975; H. Fries, 'L. Feuerbachs Herausforderung an die
Theologie', in Gla"be ,md Kirche als Allgebot. Graz - Vienna - Cologne 1976,
 Notes to pages 28-30 327
62- 90. On the acceptance of Feuerbach in Protestant theology cr.
E. Thies (ed.),
Ludwig FelU!rbach, Darmstadt J976.
58. CI. A. Schmidt, Emallzipatorische Silllllichkeit. Ludwig Feuerhachs anthro-
pologischer Materialismus, Munich 1973.
59. Cf. K. Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right',
in T. B. 8otromore (ed.), Karl Marx: Early Writings, New York 1964,43.
60. Marx, 'Luther 3S Arbiter between Strauss and Feuerbach" in L. D. Easton
.nd K. H. Cucldat (eds.), Writillgs of the Youllg Marx 011 Philosophy and Society,
G.rden City 1967,95.
61. L. Feuerbach, The Essellce ofChristiallity, ET G. Eliot (1854), New York
1967, Torchbook ed., 2.
62. Ibid., 2.
63. Ibid., 5.
64. Ibid., 12-13
65. Ibid., 63
66. Ibid, 29-30
67. Lectures 011 the Essence of Religion, ET R. Manheim, New York t967, 234.
68. The ES5e/"C of ChristiOllity, 26, 27.
69. Ibid., 33.
70. Ibid, 184.
71 Ibid., 271.
n Ibid., 276, 278.
73. Ibid., 32.
74. Cf. M. Duber, 'Zur Geschkhte des diaJogischen Prinzips', in WW I, Munich
1962,2931.
75. Feuerb.ch, 'Prtnciples of the Philosophy of the Future', in Hanfi (cd.), op.
cit. (n. 37), 244.
76. Ibid.
77. 'The Necessity of a Reform of Philosophy', in Hanfi, 148-9.
78. 'Notwendigkeit einer Vcranderung', in K. Lowith (cd.), Kleine Schri(tell,
Fronkfurt 1966, 231 n. 1 (not in the English version J.
79. K. Barth, Prolcstarlt Theology ill tlJe Niueteellth Century: Its Backgrouud
alld History, London' 1972,536-7.
80.J.-P. Soune, 'EXistentialism Isa Hum3nism'.in W. Kaufm3nn (ed.). Existellli·
ali'lII frolll Dostoievsky to Sartre, New York 1956,287-311, esp. 288-9, 294-6,
310-11. Cf. C. Hasenhuttl, Gott olllle Gott. Ein DIalog lIIit ). P. Sartre, Craz and
Vienna 1972.
81. On Freud's criticism of religion: A. Pic, Freud et la religion, Paris 1968; K.
Sirk, S. Freud ,wd die Religion, Munsterschwarzach 1970j J. Scharfenberg,
Sigmlmd Freud ,Old seme Reltgionskritik als Herauslorerrmg liir den ,""stlichell
Gla"bell, Gottingen J 1971; id., Religion zwischen Walm Imd Wirlichkeit. Cesam·
melle Beilriige zur Korrelalio" VOII Thcologie mId Psychoanalyse, Hamburg 1972;
H. Zahrnt (cd.), Jesus fwd Freud. Ei" Symposion von Psychoa1lalYlikcm Imd
Theologell, Munich 1972; E. Nase and J. Scharfenberg (eds. ), Psychoaltalyse Itlld
Religiorl, Darmstadt t 977. On the interpretation of Freud's work generally: E.
Jones, The Life alld lVork of Siglllltlld Freud, 3 vols. London and New York
1953-7; P. Rlcoeur, Freud and Plnlosophy: All Essay Oil JlIlerprctalion, ET D.
Savage, New Haven t 970j W. Loch, Zltr Theone. Teclmik "nd Therapie der
PsycllOanalyse. Frankfurt 1972; A. Mitscherlich, Ocr Kampl u", die Erim,crwrg.
328 Notes to pages 31 - 34
Psychoottalyse {iir {ortgeschrittcncll Allfa1lger, Munich 1975. In this conttxt the
debate over the books of J. Pahier, Au 110m d" Perc. Recherches thea/og/ques e/
psychoallalytiq"es, Paris 1972, and Qualtd je dis Dielt, Paris 1977, is of some
importance. The Declaration (3 April 1979) b)' the Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith on Pohier's second book may be found in TPS 24, 1979,227- 8.
82. Freud, The Future of an lII"s;o", ET W. D. Robson-Scott, rev. J. Str3chey,
London 1961; New York 1964, Anchor Books cd., 30.
83. Ibid., 47.
84. Ibid., 71.
85. Ibid., 81- 82.
86. On Marx's criticism of religion: M. Reding, Thomas von Aqu;" ,,,,d Karl
Marx, Graz 1953; R. Garautly, Gott isl tot, Frankfurt 1969; V. Gardavsky, God
/5 Not Yet Dead, ET V. Menkes, London and Baltimore 1973; G. M. M. Cottier,
L'athe;sme dll jemlc Marx. Ses origines hegeliemlcs, Pans 1969; W. POSf, Kritik
der Religion be; Karl Marx, Munich 1969;J. Kadenbach, Das Rcligionsverstiindnis
von Karl Marx, Munich - Paderborn - Vienna 1970; R. Garaudy, From Anathema
to Dialogue: The Challenge of Marxist~Christiall Cooperation, ET L. O'Neill. with
Replies by K. Rahner and J. B. Metz, ET E. Quinn, London 1967; H. Rolfes (cd.),
Marx;sm"s Wid Christentlml, Mamz 1974; V. Spiilbeck. Neomarxisnms Imd
Thealogie, Freiburg 1977. On Marxism in gtneral:J. M. Bochenski, Der sowjetrus-
s;sche dialektische Materialismus. Munich - Salzburg - Cologne 1958; G. A.
Wetter, Dialectical Materialism, ET P. Heath, New York 1958,j. Habermas, 'Zur
philosphischen Diskussion urn Marx und Marxismus', In Theorie r",d Praxis,
Neuwied·Berlin, ' 1969, 261- 335 [not includL-d in the abridged Theory alld
Practice, ET j. Viertel, Bosto", 1973]; I. Fetscher, Karl Marx tmd der Marxlsmus.
Vall der Philosophie des Proletariats zur prolctarischell \Veltallschammg, MUnich
1967 j K. Hilrtmann, Die Marxschc Theoric, Berlin 1970; L. Kolakowski, Main
Currellts of Marxism: Its Origins, Growth alld Dissolutio1l, ET P. S. Falla, 3 vols.,
New York 1978 (1981).
87. M:lrx, 'Comribution [0 [he Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', 10
Bottomorc, op. cit. (n. 59), 43.
88. Ibid., 44.
89. 'Theses on Fcucrbach', no. 6, in Easton and Guddat, op. cit. (n. 60),401.
90. 'Contribution to the Critique .. :, in Bottomore, 43.
91. 'Nores to the Doctoral Dissertation', in Easton and Guddat, 51; d. 'The
Leading Article in No. 179 of the KOI"ischc Zcitrmg: Religion. Frl'C Press, and
Philosophy', in Easton and Guddat, 109-30; 'Contribution to the Critique .. .', in
Bottomore,51.
92. 'Theses on Feuerbach', no. 11, in Easton and Guddat, 402.
93. Ibid., no. If. (402-3).
94. 'On the jewish Question', in Socromorc, 30-3 I j 'Contributlon to the
Crique .. :, in ibid., 52.
95. Zur Kritik der Natiollal6kollomie - OkOllOmiscb - pIJi/osophischr Manus·
kripte, in Werke - Schriften - Briefe I, cd., j. H. Lieber and P. Furth, Darmstadt
1962,488.
96. 'On the jewish Question', in Bonomorc,31; 'Contribution to the Critique ... '
in ibid., 57-8.
97. Contribution to the Critique ... ', in ibid., 51.
98. Ibid., 43-44.
 Notes to pages 34-38 329
99. Capilal, ET S. Moore and E. Avcling, reprinted New York 1967,1,71.
100. Ibid., J. 72.
101. Z"r Krilik der NatiOllalokollomie (n. 95), 595.
102. On this point cf. Fetscher, op. cit. (n. 86),215.
103. Marx, Tbe German Ideology, in Easton and Guddat, 414.
104. Ibid., 438
105. Capital I, 79.
106. 'Contribution to the Critique .. .o, in Bottomore,44.
107. Ibid.
108. Some surveys in this area: W. Kern, 'Gesellschaftsthcorie und Mcnschenbild
In Marxismus und Christentum', in id., Atheism"s, Marxism"s, Chris/cilIum,
Bcttriige ZIlT Diskussion, Innsbruck 1976,97-118 i id., 'Die marxistische Religions·
kritik gegenkritisch betrachtet', in ibid. 119-33, esp. 127f.; id., 'Die ReIigionskritik
desMarxismus', in H. Rolfes (ed.), Marxismlls-Christclltlmr, Mainz 1974, 13-33,
esp. 27-30; H. Vorgrimler, 'Zur Geschichte und Problematik des Dialogs', in ibid.,
245-61; M. Prucha, 'Wandlungen im Chacackter des marxistisch-christlichen
Dialogs', in ibid., 262-75.
109. Cf. Apostolic Lener Octogesima advellietls, no. 33f.
I 10. Cf. Marx, Letter of 25 September 1869 to F. Engels, in Karl .'vlorx and
Frredrich Engels, Selected Correspolldellce: 1846-1895, ET D. Torr, New York
1942,263: 'This tour in Belgium, stay in Aix·La·Chapelle and voyage up the Rhein
have convinced me that priests, especially in the Catholic districts, must be
energetically attacked. I shall work on these lines through the International. The
curs (e.g., Bishop Kender in Mainz, the parsons at the Dusseldorf Congress, etc.)
are flirting, where they find it suitable, with the labour question.' Cf. Marx and
Engds, The Comm,,,,ist MQ1,i(esto.
II J. E. Bloch, Das Prilllip Hoffllllllg, Frankfurt 1959, 1413.
112. Jd., AtheIsm i" Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom,
ET j. T. Swann, New York 1972,9.
113. K. Rahner. 'Marxist Utopia and the Christian Future of Man', in Theological
Illvestigatiolls 6, ET K.·H. and B. Kruger, London and Baltimore 1967,57-68.
114. The interpretation of Marxism as secularized messianism is already to be
found in S. N. Bulgakov,Sozialismus im Christellillm? (1909-10) Gotcingen 1977.
This Interpretation exercised a strong influence especially on K. Lowith, Mcau;"g
ill HIStory: The Theologicallmplicatiolls of the Philosophy of History, ChIcago
1949,33-53.
115. Marx, ZlIr Krillk der Nationalokollolllie (n. 95), 605f.; cf. 645.
116. 'On the Jewish Question', in Bonomore, 11.
117. 'Contribution to the Critique .. :, in ibid., 52.
118. V. Gardavsky, God Is Not Yet Dead (n. 86), 154.
119. 'Synodenbeschluss: Kirche und Arbeiterschaft" I, in Gememsame Synode
der 8isliimcr iu der Bmtdcrsrepublik Deutsch/auds. O{fizieJ/e Gesamtallsgabe,
Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1976,327.
120. M. Weber, The Proteslanl Ethic alld Ihe Spirit ofCapilalislll, ETT. Parsons,
New York 1930.
121. Vatican II, Gaudi"", et spes. 12.
122. Ib,d., 25.
123. Ibid., 76.
124. Ibid., 2 I.
330 Notes to pages 39-40
125. This point of view derives from W. Bcnjamin~ 'Theses on the Philosophy
of History', in his ll1u",illations, ET H. Zohn, New York 1968,255-66. It hOlS
been taken over into 3 theological framework and further developed there especially
by H. Peukert, \'(Iissenschaftstheorie - Handbmgstheorie - F,mdame1ltale Theo~
logie. Analyse" ttlr Allsatz tmd Status ,heologiscbcr Theor;cbildw,g, Dusseldorf
1976,283ff.
126. On Nietzsche: K. L6wlth, Nietzsches PI"losophiederew;gen \Viederklmft
des Gleichcn, Berlin 1935; H. de Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, ET E.
M. Riley, New York 1950; K. Jaspers, Nietzsche wId das Christellttlm. MUnich
1952; id" Nietzsche. Ei"fiih,w,g ill das Vers/iind,,;s seines PhiJosphierens, Berlin
J19S0;J. B. Lou, Zwischen Sc/igkeit "nd Verdammnis. Ein Beitrag llldem Yhema:
Nietzsche tOld das Christent",,,, Frciburg 1953; E. Benz, Nietlsches Ideeu Zllr
Geshicbte des Christeutums r",d der Kir,he, Leldcn 1956; G. G. Grau, Christlicher
Glaube wrd intellektuelle Redlichkut. Eine religiollSgeschichtliche St"dic iiber
Nie/zsche, Frankfurt 1958i B. Welte, Nietzsches AtheismHs und das Chr;stelltlltJI,
Frelburg 1953; M. Heidegger, 'The Word of Nietzsche: "God Is Dead"·, in his
The Questio1l catlCern;ng Technology, and Other Essays, ETW. Lovitt, New York
1977, 115-54; id., Nietzsche, 2 vols. Prullingen, 1961; E. Biser, 'Gatt ist tot.'
Niet:zsches Destruktion des christ lichen BeuJIIsstse;,zs, Munich 1962; id., 'Nietz-
sches Kritik des christlichen GottesbegnHs und 1hre rheologischen Konsequenzen'.
Ph) 78, 1971, 34-64, 295-304; W. Muller-Lauter, Nietzsche, Seille Phi/osop/lle
der GengellSiitt.e tmd die Gegeltsiitze schIer Philosophic, Berlin 1971 j E. Fink,
Niett.sches Philosophic, Stutcgart )1973.
127. Nletlsche, Human AII·Too-H"malt, no. 1, ET H. Zimmern in O. Levy
(cd.), Complete Works of Nietzsche, reprinted New York 1964,631. Cf. The Gay
Science, Preface to the second edition, no. 3, ET W. Kaufmann, New York 1974,
Vintn.ge Books cd., 36.
12M. Beyolld Good alld Evil, Part I, 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers', ET W.
Kaufmann, New York 1966, Vintage Books cd., 9-31.
129. The Will to Power, no. 493, ET W. Kaufmann and R. j. Hollingdale, New
York 1967,272.
130. 0" the GelJealogy of Morals, Part III, no. 12, ETW. Kaufmann, New York
1967, Vintage Books ed. 1969, 119; 11" Will to Power, no. 259 (Kaufmann-
Hollingdale, 149).
131. Beyolld Good alld Evil, Prdace (Kaufmann, 3).
132. Human All-Too-Human, no. 1 (Zimmern, 2).
133. Thus Spoke Zaratlmstra, Part II, no. 12: 'On Self-Overcoming' (Kaufmann,
lIS); Beyolld Good alld Evil, nos. 13 and 258 (Kaufmann, 21, 202), etc.
134. Nietzsche very often speaks of the Dionysian versus the Apollonian: The
Birth of Tragedy, ET W. Kaufmann, New York 1967, Vintage Books cd., paSSlmj
The Gay Scie",c, no. 270 (Kaufmann, 327-31)i Twilight of the Idols, 'Expeditions
of an Untimely Man', no. 20, ET R. j. Hollingdale, Baltimore 1968,72; Nietzsche
contra \'Vagner, 'We Antipodes" in \VI. Kaufmann (cd.), The Portable Niet:.sche ,
New York 1954,669-71; The Will to Power, nos. 417,1050 (Kaufmann and
Hollingdale 224, 539).
135. Beyolld Good alld Evil, Preface (Kaufmann, 3).
136. The Gay Science, no. 344 (Kaufmann, 280-82).
137. Ibid. (Kaufmann, 283).
138. Ibid., Appendix of Songs (Kaufmann, 351).
 Notes to pages 40-43 331
139. Ecce Homo, Parr IV, 'Why I Am a Destiny', no. 8, ET W. Kaufmann, New
York 1967, Vintage Books cd. 1969,334.
140. The Allti.Christ, no. 40, ET R. J. Hollingdale, Baltimore 1968, 153.
141. M. Heidegger, 'The Word of Nietzsche: "God Is Dead" , (n. 86).
142. Nietzsche, Th. Allti·Christ, no. 18 (Hollingdale, 128).
143. The It' illto Power, no. \052 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 543).
144. Ecce Homo, Part IV, 'Why I Am a Destiny', no. 9 (Kaufmann, 335); ef.
The IVillto Power, nos. 401 and \052 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 217 and 543).
145. The GaySeiellec, no. 125 (Kaufmann, 181 ).
146. Ibid., no. 343 (Kaufmann, 279).
147. Ibid., no. \08 (Kaufmann, 167).
148. Ibid., no. 343 (Kaufmann, 280).
149. Ibid., (Kaufmann, 279).
ISO. Ibid., no. 125 (Kaufmann, 181).
151. The Allti·Christ, no. 18 (Hollingdale, 128).
152. The lViII to Paluer, Preface, no. 4 (Kaufmann and Hollingdalc, 4).
153. Ibid.
154. The Ami·Christ, no. 58 (Hollingdale, 182).
155. The lVillto Power, no. 2 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 9)
156. Ibid., no. 598 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 325).
157. Ibid., no. 12A (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 13).
158. Ibid., no. 23 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 18).
159. Ibid., no. 866 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 464).
160. Thus Spoke Zaratlmstra, Part I, no. 22: 'On the Gife-Giving Virtue'
(Kaufmann, 79).
161. Ibid., Zarathuma's Prologue, no. 3 (Kaufmann, \3).
162. Ibid., no. 7 (Kaufmann, 20).
163. Ibid., nos. 3 and 4 (Kaufmann, 12 and 15).
164. Ibid., no. 3 (Kaufmann, 13).
165. Ibid., no. 9 (Kaufmann, 23).
166. Ibid., Part I, no. 4: 'On the Despisers of the Body' (Kaufmann, 34-5).
167. The GayScicllee, no. 125 (Kaufmann, 181).
168. Thus Spoke Zaratlmstra, Part II, no. 2: 'Upon the Blessed Isles' (Kaufmann,
86).
169. Ibid., Part I, no. I: 'On the Three Metamorphoses' (Kaufmann, 25-7).
170. Ibid., Part II, no. 20: ' On Redemption' (Kaufmann, 141); ef. Part III, no.
12: 'On Old and New Tablets' (Kaufmann, 208-9).
17J.lbid., Part IV, no. 19: 'The Drunken Song' (Kaufmann, 318).
172. Ibid., Part III, no. 2: 'On the Vision and the Riddle' (Kaufmann, 155-60).
173. Ibid., Part III, no. 13: 'The Convalescent' (Kaufmann, 217-18).
174. Ibid., Part IV, no. 10: 'At Noon' (Kaufmann, 275-8).
175 . Ibid., Part IV, no. 20: 'The Sign' (Kaufmann, 324).
176. The lVillto Power, no. 1041 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 536).
177. Ecce Homo, Part II, 'Why I Am So Clever', no. \0 (Kaufmann, 258); ef.
The Will to Power, no. 1041 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 536); etc.
178. F. Schiller, Die Gotter Crjechenlalfds, S:imtliche Werke I, ed. G. Fricke and
H. G. Gopfert, Munich '1960, 169-73.
179. F. Holdcrlin, Palmos, Samtliche Werke II, ed. F. Beissnec. Stuttgart 1953,
173.
 332 Notes to pages 43-50
180. M. Heidegger, Erliiltterungen Zit H6lderli1lS Di,htung, Frankfurt 195 I,
38f., 61f., 73, etc.
18t. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zaratl1llstra, Part III, no. 8: 'On Apostates'
(Kaufmann, 182); repeated in Part 111, no. 12: 'On Old and New Tablets'
(Kaufmann, 203).
182. The Will to Potuer, no. 1038 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 534).
183. Ibid., no. 1034 (Kaufmann and Hollingdale, 533).
184. Thus Spoke Zaratl1llstra, Part IV, no. 5: The Magician' (Kaufmann, 255).
185. Ttuilightofthe Idols, Section , "Reason" in Philosophy', no. 5 (Hollingdale,
38).
186. The Cay Science, no. 354 (Kaufmann, 300); c/. Beyo1ld Cood and Evil,
Nietzsche's Preface and nos. 20,34,54 (Kaufmann, 2, 27-8,47, 67).
187. Twilight ofthe Idols, Section , "Reason" in Philosophy', no. 5 (Hollingdale,
38).
188. The Anti-Christ, no. 30 (Hollingdale, 142).
189. Ibid., nos. 29 and 33 (Hollingdale, 141, 146).
190. Ibid., no. 34 (Hollingdale, 147).
191. cr. Nietzsche's criticism of Jesus in Thus Spoke Zaratlmstra, Part I, no. 21:
'On Free Death' (Kaufmann, 73): 'He died too early: he himself would have
recanted his rCOlching, had he rcached my age. Noble enough was he to recant.'
192. Thus Spoke Zarat/mstTa, Pafr I, no. 22: 'On the Gift-Giving Virtue'
(Kaufmann, 74-9).
193. J. C. Fichu:, Riickerwmerrmgen, Amworlell, Fragen (1799), WW III, ed.
F. Medicus, 235.
194. Fichte, Appellatio1l all das Publiku"" WW 111,176.
195. L. Feuerbach, 'Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy' (1842), in
Hanfi, op. cit. (n. 37).

Chapter III The Predicament of Theology in the Face of Atheism

1. There is 3 classical formulmion of both approaches in Thomas Aquinas, ST
I, 1,8.
2. Cf.J. M. Gonzales-Ruiz, 'L'areismonella Bibbia' tin L'oteismo cDtJtemporaueo
4, Turin 1969,5-20.
3. Cf. A. M. Javierre, 'L'ateismo nei Padri della chiesa" in ibid., 4, 21-42.
4. Anselm of Canterbury, Pros/ogio" 3f.
S. Thomas Aquinas, De ver. 22, 2 ad I; I" I SCIlt., d. 3, q. 1,3.2.
6. 1d., ST 11-11, 2, 3 ad 5; D. vcr. 14, II.
7. Id., De ver. 14, 11 ad 7.
8. Id., ST 1·11, 89, 6; d. M. Seckler, l"st;nkt Imd G/aube"swille )rae/] Thomas
VOII Aquin, Mainz 1961,237-58.
9. DS 29011.; ND 41 111-2.
10. COD, 804f.
II. DS 3004, 3006; ND 113,216.
12. DS 3021-23; ND414-16.
13. Cf. A. Rohrbasser (cd.), Hdlslehre der Kirche, FreiburgiSwitz. 1953, no.
184,1093-5.
14. Cf. ibid., no. 992-6.
15. Cf. ibid., no. 736, 751, 936, 1589. In addition, in his Encyclical Humam

, - _~ - - 'I _____- ........

 Notes to pages 50-52 333
gelteris (1950) Pius XII again emphasizes the possibility of natural knowledge of
the personal (!) God, although he does discuss in derail the difficulties against this
position. Cf. DS 3875, 3992; ND 144,2135.
16. John XXIII, Encyclical Mater et Magistra (1963),207-15.
17. Paul VI, Encyclical Ecclesiam Sliam (1964), 96-8.
18. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, 19. Cf. P. 'Ladriere, L'atheisme au Condie
Vatican II" Archives de socio/ogie des religions 16, 1971, no. 32, 53-85; C.
Moeller, 'History of the Constitution', in H. Vorgrimler (ed.), Commentary 011 the
Domments of Vatican 115, ET W.]. O'Hara, New York 1969, 1-76;]. Ratzinger,
'Commentary on Part I, Chapter I, Articles 19-22', in ibid., 143-63; J. Figl,
Atheisnms als theologisches Problem. Madelle deT Auseinalldersetztmg in deT
Theo/ogie der Gegeltwart, Tubinger Theo!. Stud. 9, Mainz 1977,31-81.
19. R. Garaudy, From Anathema to Dia/oglle: The Challenge of Marxist-
Christian Cooperation, ET L. O'Neill, with Replies by K. Rahner and]. B. Metz,
ET E. Quinn, London 1967.
20. Vatican II, Gat/dillffl et spes, 21. It is important that the documents use the
word reprobat instead of danmat. It is also significant that despite numerous
petitions to the contrary the Council avoids specifically naming and condemning
communism. Cf. Ratzinger, art. cit., 151-2, 149-50.
21. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, 19.
22. Ibid., 21.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 22.
26. cr. especially 'he Encyclical Redemptor homillis (1979).
27. Cf. Rarzinger, art. cit., 154f.
28. Ibid., 145.
29. Ibid., 150.
30. Contemporary discussion of the God-question (exclusive of writers to be
discussed subsequently in the rext): J. Lacroix, The Meartirtg of Modem Atheism,
ET G. Barden, New York 1965; H. Gollwitzcr, Die Existe1tz Gottes im Bekemrtllis
des Glallbells, Munich 1963; J. c. Murray, The Problem of God: Yesterdayalld
Today, New Haven 1964; H. Zahrnt, The Qllestioll of God: Protestant Theology
in the Twentieth Century, ET R. A. Wilson, London 1969; id. (ed.), Gespriich iiber
Gott. Die protestantische Theologie im 20. Jahrlmndert. E;'I Textbuch, Munich
1968; id., What Killd of God? A Qllestioll of Faith, ET R. A. Wilson, London
1971; C. H. Ratschow, Gott existiert. Eine dogmatische Studie, Berlin 1966; N.
Kutschki (ed.), Gott hellle. Fiillfzelm Beitrage Zllr Gottesfrage, Mainz and Munich
1967; H.]. Schultz (ed.), Wer ist das eigelltlieh - Gott?, Munich 1969; E. Castelli
(ed.), L'analyse drt langage theologique. Le nom de Dietl, Paris 1969; W. Kasper,
Glallbe lind Geschichte, Mainz 1970, esp. \01-43; E. Core,h and ]. B. Lotz,
Atheismus kritisch betrachtet, Munich and Freiburg 1971 j E. Biser, Theologie Imd
Atheismlls, Anstosse Zit e;'ler theologisdlell Aporetik, Munich 1972; J. Blank et
al., Gott-Frage lind nroderner Atheisnllls, Regensburg 1972;J. Ratzinger (ed.), Die
Frage lIach Gott, QD 56, Freiburg- Basle- Vienna 1972; H. Fries (ed.), Gott, die
Frage unserer Zeit, Munich 1972; id., Abschied von Gott? Eine Herausforderrmg
- Versuch einer Antwort, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna .11974j K. Rahner (ed.), 1st
Gott noch gefragt? Zur Ftmktionslosigkeit des Gottesglaubens, Dusseldorf 1973j
B. Casper, Wesen tmd Grenzen der Relig;onskritik. Feuerbach - Marx - Freud,
334 Notes to pages 52-54
Wiirzhurg 1974; R. Schaeffler, Die Religionskritik sltchl ihren Parmer. Thesen ZIIT
cillef erneucrten ApoJogctik, Freiburg - Basic - Vienna 1974j J. Moller, Die
Chance des McnschcIJ- GOligenannt. Was Vermm(t ,md Erfahrrmg 1I0lt Gott sage"
komren, Zurich - Einsiedeln - Cologne 1975; W. Kern, Atheismlfs, Marxism"s,
Christentmn, Innsbruck 1976; H. Doring. Abwese"heil Gottes. Fragen lind
Autwortell helltigcr Thco/ogie. Paderborn 1977; H. Kung, Does God Exist? A"
Answer for Today, ET E. Quinn, Garden City and London 1980; W. Brugger,
S"mmc ci"er philosophischen Gotteslehrc, Munich 1979; H. R. Schlette (cd.), Der
modem AgnostizismJls, Dusseldorf 1979; K. H. Weger (ed.), Religionskritik VOlt
der Au(kliirrmg his ZJlrGegellwart. Autore,,~Lexikon VOII Adamo bis \Vittgensteill,
Freiburg - Basic - Vienna 1975i id., Der Mensch vor de", Allspruch Gottes.
GlaubeJlsbegri;udmrg ill eiller aglloslischell Well, Graz- Vienna - Cologne t 981.
31. On K. Rahner's theologictll approach: B. van der Heijden, Karl RaImer.
Darlegllttg .md Kritik seiner Grm.dposili01I, Einsiedeln 1973; K. Fischer, Der
Mensch als Gehcinmis. Die Authropologie Karl Ralmers, Okumenische
Forschungen illS, Freihurg- Btlsle- Vienna 1974i K. Lehmann, <KtlrI Rahner', in
H. Vorgrimlerand R. van derGucht(eds.), Bilallz der The%gic im 20.Jahrhtmdert.
Balmbrechende Thealogell, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1970, t 43-81; P. Eicher,
Offenbartmg, Prinzip netlzeit/icher The%gie, Munich 1977i K. H. Weger, Karl
RaImer. Au Imroductio" to His Theology, ET D. Smith, New York 1980; W.
Kasper, 'Karl Rahner - Theologe in einer Zeit des Umbruche', TQ 159,1979,
263-71. Karl Rtlhner laid the foundations for this theory in his earty work, Spirit
in the World (I 939), ETW. V. Dych New York 1967; he developed it along rcligio-
philosophical lines in his Hearers of the Word, ET M. Richards, New York 1969;
it is summarized in Foundatiolls of Christian Fa;th: An Imrod"ctiall to the Idea of
Christianit)" ETW. V. Dych, New York and London 1978.
32. K. Rahner. <Atheism and Implicit Christianity', in his Thea/ogicallnvestlga-
tions 9, ET G. Harrison, London and New York 1971, 145-64; Theological
Considerations on Secularization and Atheism', in ibid., 11, ET D. Bourke, New
York 1974, 166-84; 'Atheism', SacMlllldi I, 117-22.
33. Cf. J. Figl, op. cit. (n. 18), 175f.
34. This thesis is 3lre.:ldy present in Heidcggcr's BeillgandTime, ET J. M3cqu:uric
and E. Robinson, London and New York 1962, 19,43,487, etc.; d. id., 'What Is
Metaphysics?', ET R. F. C. Hull and A. Crick in Martin Hcidcgger, Ex;steuce and
Beillg, Chicago 1949, 355ff.; id., HolztVege, Frankfurt 1957, 195f., 238-47, etc.
35. <The Age of the World Picture', in his The Questi01I co"ceming Teclmo/agy,
alld Other Essays, ET W. Lovitt New York 1977, lIS-54; id., 'The Question
concerning Technology', in ibid., 3-35.
36.ldentityalld Differellce, ET J. Stambaugh, New York 1969,72.
37. 'The Word of Nietzsche: God Is Dead'. in The Question co,,,enung
Techllology, 104-6.
38. 'What is Metaphysics?', 378.
39. For what follows cC. especially B. Welte. <Die philosophische Goneserkcnntnis
und die Moglichkcit des Atheismus', in his Zeit tmd Geheim"is. Philosophische
Abhond/wIge" Zll' Sachc Gottes in der Zeit deT \Velt, Frciburg - BasIc - Vienna
1975, 109-23; id., 'Versuch Zllr Frage nach Gatt', ibid., 124-38; id., ReligIOns-
philosophie, Freiburg- Basle- Vienna, 1978, 150-65.
40. This post-nihilist position is also to be found in H. Kling, Docs God £t:;st?
(n.30).
 Notes to pages 54-56 335
41. For Welte's interpretacion of Eckhart, cf•• Meister Eckhart als Aristotelikcr',
in his Allf der Spllr des Ewigen. Philosophische Abhandillngen iiber verschiedene
Gege1lstii"de deT Religion Imd deT Tbeologie, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna, 1965,
197-210j id., Meister Eckbart. Gedattke11 zu seille" Gedanken, Freiburg - Basle
- Vienna 1979.
42. Cf. Welte, 'Nietzsches Arheismu5 und das Christentum" in his Auf deT SPliT
des Ewigell, 22S-6\.
43. Cf. Figl, op. cit., 2051.
.. 44. For what follows d. H. Urs von Balthas3f, Herrli,hke;/. fille theo/ogische
Asthetick 11111, Einsiedeln, 1965, 943-S3; id., 'Ocr Zug.ng zur Wirklichkeit
Gottes', Mysall, 15-45.
45. Herrlichkeit 11111, 945.
46. 'Oer Zug.ng .. .', IS.
47. PIOIo, Republic VI, 505.-509c; Ep. Vll, 341c. Other philosophical testi·
monies in Balthasar, 'Oer Zugang .. .', 22f.; Balthasar also refers to Thomas
Aquinas, De vcr., 22, 2, ad 2.
48. This is the formula of E. Jungd, Ullterll1egs :wr Sache. Theolog;sche
Bemerklmgell, BEvT 61, Munich 1972, v, ;:md often.
49. Cf. H. Urs von B.lth... r, The God.Questioll alld Modem Mall, ET H, Graef
(original title Sciellce, Religion alld Christiallity, Westminster, Md. 1958), 11 1-19.
On [his basic theme in Balthasar's thinking, d. H. P. Heinz, Der Gatt des }e-mchr.
Der chr;stologisc!Jc Allsatz Hans Vrs von Da/thasars, Disputationes Theologicae
3, Frankfurt 1975.
SO. I limit myself here to the political theology represented by J. B. Metz. Metz's
most important statements on the subject are: Theology of the World, ET \VI. Glen-
Ooepel, New Yorkond London 1969,89-97, 107-24; 'Apologetics t. Apologetics
in General', SacMtmdi I, 66- 70; id., Faith ilr History and Society: Toward a
Practical FtmdamelltaJ Theology, ET D. Smith, New York 1980; id., The Emergellt
Church: The Future of Chrisltaflity;" a Postbourgois WorM, ET P. Mann, New
York 1981. Fordiscus~ion: H. Pcukert (cd.), Diskuss;oll zlfT'politischcll Theologie',
Mainz and Munich 1969; H. Maler. Kritik der politischell The%gie, Einsiedcln
1970; G. Bauer, Christliche Hoffmmg ,md mellsc/JJicher Fortschrilt. Die poJitische
Theologil! VOII}. B. Metz als christJichc Degriilldtmg gescllschaftlicher Veralllltlor-
/1I11g des Christell, Mainz 1975; S. Wicdcnhofer. Politische Theologie, Stuttgart
1976, with bibliography. CI. .Iso the bibliography in Metz, Faith ill History alld
Society, 77 nn. 1- 2.
51. I shall mention here only a few works from a very extensive literature: G.
Gutierrez, A Theology of LlberatlOlI, ET Sr. C. Ind •• nd J. E.gleson, Maryknoll,
NY and London 1973; H. As~mann, Theology for a Nomad cb""h. ET P. Burns,
London .nd Maryknoll, NY 1975; L. Segundo, The Liberatioll of Theology, ET
J. Drury, Maryknoll, NY .nd London 1976; J. M. Bonino, Doi11g Theology ill Q
Revolutionary SituatIOn. Philadelphia, and London 1975; P. Hunermann and G.
D. Fischer (cds.), GOIl im Allfbruch. Die Provokatio1l der Jate;lIomerikanischen
Theologie, Frciburg - B.,le - Vienna 1974; K. R.hner et al. (eds.), BefreiCllde
Theologl(!. Der Beitrag Lateinamcrikas zur Theologie der Gegemvart, Stuttgart
1977.
52. Metz, Faith in History and SOCIety. 46.
53. Ibid., 136-53; d. id., The Emergellt Chureh, 82-94; L. Boff, Die
336 Notes to pages 56-59
Nellcmdeckrmg der KircIJe, Bas;sgemei"dcII ill Lateiuamerika, M3inz 1980, A,
Exeler and N. Mene (eds.), Theologie des Volkes, Mainz 1978.
54. Merz, Faith ill History alld Society, 60, 67fl.
55. Cf. above, 14f.
56. CI. especially J. B. Metz, Followers of Christ: The Religiolls Life alld the
e/mrel" ETT. LinlOn, New York 1978.
57. On the concept of prilcrice and on irs history ;md problems d. M. Thcunisscn,
'Die Verwirklichung dec Vcrnunfr. Zur Thcoric~ Praxis-Dlskussion im Anschluss
an Hc:gd" PbRu, 1970, Be.heft 6; P. Engelhardt (cd.), Zu, TheaTre der Praxis.
Interpretat;onell Iwd Aspekte. Walberbcrger Studu!n def Albcrtus-Magnus-Aka -
demic, PhiJosophische Relhc 2, Mainz 1970; L. Bertsch, rheologie zw;sche"
TheaTie rmd ['rax;s. Beilrage lll' Gmndlegtmg der praktischclI Thea/ogie. Frank-
furt 1975; K. Lehmann, '035 Theorie-Praxis-Problem und die Bcgriindung der
Praktischen Thcologie', in F. Klostermann and R. Zcrfass (cds. ), Praktische
The%gie Hellte, Munich and Mainz 1974, H1-102; R. Hubner, Yheoric ,md
Praxis - eine Hacbbegelsche Abstraktlo", Frankfurt 1971.
58. T. W. Adorno, 'Marginalien lur Theorie und Praxis', in hIS Stic!nvorte.
Kritische Modelle I, Frankfurt 1969, 173.
59. Men has tried to do justice to this vicwpoint in his thesis on memoria. For
the most recent statement of this thesis d. Faith i" History and Society, 184-204.
But he discusses this basic category only in the framework of past and present
philosophical concepts of memoria and pays hardly any attention to [he biblical
and sacramental-liturgical meanmg of anamnesis-memoria.
60. The literature on Barth has grown bcyond all bounds since he wrote. I limit
myself to the presentation by Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth,
ET J. Drury, New York 1971, which is stillaurhorirative for the Catholic view of
Barth and for the criticism of Barth generally. Theft! is an excellent survey of the
emire discussion of Barth in E. Jungel, 'Karl Barth', TRE 5, 251-68.
61. CI. below, 74fl.
62. K. Barth, T"e Epistle to t"e Romalls, ET E. C. Hoskyns, London 1933,28.
63. Ch"rc" Dogmatics Ill, ET G. T. Thomson, Edinburgh 1936, x.
64. Ibid., 44, 385f., etc.
65. C""rc" Dogmatics 1/2, ETG. T. Thomson and H. Knight, Edinburgh 1956,
280.
66. Ibid., 302f., 314.
67. Ibid., 320.
68. Ibid., 303.
69. Ibid., 326.
70. Cf. the sratemems in Church Dogmatics 111/2, ET G. W. Bromiley and T. F.
Torrance, Edinburgh 1961-62, 220f., 323f., on the allalogia rclatiollis (analogy
of relation), which is different from the allalogia ClltiS (analogy of being) and yet
in its content approximates very closely co what Catholics rnean by the latter. Barth
goes still further in elmrc" Dogmatics lV/3.
71. On D. Bonhoeffer, d. E. Bethge, Dietrich 80"hoeff.,. Mall of Visioll - MOlt
of Cot/rage, ET E. Mosbacher et al. London and New York 1970; E. Feil, Die
Theologie Bonhoeffers. HermelJeutik - Christologie- \Vcltverstandis, Gescllschaft
und Theologie: Systcmatische Beitrage 6, Munich and Mainz 1971.
72. D. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papcrs from Priso", ET Frank Clarke et al' l The
Enlarged Edition, London and New York 1971.
 Notes to pages 59- 61 337
73. Ibid., 360-1.
74. Ibid., 362.
75. H. Braun, 'Die Problematik ciner Theologie des Neuen Testaments', in his
Gcsammelte SllIdiclI z.ltm Nelle" Testament tord seiner Umwelt, Tiibingen 1962,
341.
76. D. Solie, Atheistise" a1l Gatt glaubcJI. Bei/riige zur Thea/og;e, Olten -
Freiburg 1968.
77. Id" Das Recht eln anderer ZlI werden. Theo/ogische Textc, Theologic und
Politik I, Neuwied-Bcrhn 1972,86.
78. Atheistisc" an Gatt glaubclJ, 79.
79. Ibid., 82.
80. Ibid., 81, 86.
81. Id., Chrisl Ihe Represellialive: All Essay ill Theolog), afler Ihe 'Dealh of
God', ET D. Lewis, London and PhiladelphIa 1967, 11-12.
82. For discussion: H. Gollwitzer, VOII deT SteUver/Teltmg Gottes: Chris/lieber
Glaube ill deT ErfahYl",g der Verborge"heit Gottes. Zum Gcspriich mit Doro/hee
Solie, Munich ! 1968 id., Die Ex;ste1lz GotttS im Bekeml/nis des Glaubcms, BEvT
3, Munich, S1968; W. Kern, Atheism"s - Marxmmts - Chr;stentum. Beitrage zur
Disk"ssioll, Innsbruck - Vienna - Munich 1971, 134-51, especially 137f.; H. W.
Bartsch (ed. ), Post RU/lmamJ /oclltum. Zur Mainzer Diskussioll der Proff!ssorell
D. Helmllt Gol/witz.cr IIlId D. Herbert Braun, Vol. 2, Thcologische Forschuns37,
Hamburg-Bergstedt, ' 1966; Figl, op. cit., 225- 8.
83. Cf.]. Bishop, Die 'Goll-isl'lot-Theologw', qusseldorf 1968; S. M. Daeckc,
Der Mylhos valli Tode Galles. Eill krilischcr Uberblick Hamburg 1969; L.
Scheffczyk, GOllloser GOllesglaube, Regensburg 1974.
84. ]. A. T. Robimon, HOllesl 10 God, London and Philadelphia 1963. For
discussion: H. W. Augustin (ed. ). Diskussion Ztl Bischof Robillsons Gott ist allders,
Munich 1964; E. Schlllebeeckx, Persoltale Begegmmg mit Gott. Ei"e A1I1worl an
Jolm A. T. ROVUlSOII, Mamz 1964; id., Nelles Glaubensllersta"d"is. Honesl to
Robillso1t. Mainz 1964.
85. J. Motrrnann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the FOlmdatioll
aIJd Criticism of ChristJau Theology, ET R. A. \VJlson and John Bowden, London
and New York 1974.
86. Ibid., 207- 19.
87. Ibid., 251.
88. Ibid., 25- 8.
89. Ibid., 252.
90. Cf. H. Urs von Balthasar, The Theolog), of Karl Barlh.
91. Cf. E. Przywara, Ana/ogia elltis. Metaphysik. Schriften 3, Einsicdeln 1962.
206f.
92. L. Gilkey, Namillg the Whirlwind. The Rellewal of God·Lauguage, Indiana-
polis and New York 1969.
93. A. N. Whirehead. Process and Reality. All Essay in Cosmology, New York
1929; C. Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity. A Socia/ Conception of God, New
Haven 11964;]. B. Cobb, A Chrisliall Nalural Theology. Based ollihe Thollghl
of Alfred Norlh Whitehead, Philadelphia and London, 1960; S. M. Ogden, The
Reality of God, New York and London 1967.
94. W. Pannenberg, 'Types of Atheism and Their Theological Significance', in
his Basic QuestiollS in Theology, ET G. H. Kehm, 2 vols., London and Philadelphia
338 Notes to pages 61-65
1970-71, 1, 184-200; Id., 'The Question of God', ibid., 1,201-33; id., BaSIC
Questio"s in Theology III (American [ide The Idea of God alld Human Freedom ),
ET R. A. \'(Illson, london and Philadelphia 1973.
95. Basic QllestlOlls III/The Idea o( God, 87-8.
96. Ibid., 100.
97. Ibid., 141- 2.
98. G. Ebeling, \lIort IIIld Glallbe 3 vols., TUbingen 1960-75 (Vol. I of \lIord
alld Faith has been rran.lal<d by J. \'(I. leitch, london and Philadelphia 1963); id.,
LlI1herstudu!1Il. TGbingcn 1971,221-72; id., Dogmatik des ,hristlic/u!IJ GlaulJt!1ls
I, Tiibingen 1979.
99. E. jiingel, God as the Mystery o( the \'IIorld, ET O. l. Guder, Grand
Rapids 1982. id., EutspreclJtwgclI: Colt - \'(Iahrheit - M(mscb. TbeoJoglscbe
f.rorte'''lIgen. BEvT gg, Munich, 1980.
100. M. Luthcr, Der grosse Katechism"s, in BSLK, 560.
101. Ebelmg, Dogmatik des cbrrstUchen Gloubells 1,216; d. 212fr.
102. Luther, ibid.
103. l. Feuerbadl, The Essellcc o(Christiallity, ET G. Eliot (1854 ), New York
1967, Torchbook cd., 12.
104. Cf. especially G. Ebeling, God alld Word, ET j. \'(I. leitch, PhIladelphia
1967; id., Doglllatlk des christlichell Glallbells I, 60ff., 189ff.
105. God alld Word, 28; same Idea in E. jiingel, God as the M),stery o( the
\'IIorld, 203ff., 307ff.
106. Ebel!ng, ihid., 19.
107. Ibid., 31 ; d. the title of jiingel's principal work: 'God as the Myswry of the
\'(Iorld' .
108. Ibid., 44.
109. Ebeling, Dogmatik des chris/lichen ClauiJells 1,209, 218f.; id., Ltltherstu·
die" I, 216f.; Jungcl, Entsprechrmgen, 169.
110. Ebeling, Dogmatik des cbristlichelJ Glaubens 1,234.
II J. Ibid., 219ff., 230ff.
112. Ibid., 212.
113. Ibid., 224
114. Jungd, ElIIsprechwrgell, 202-51.
115. Ebeling, Dogmatik des christlichcn Gaube"s I, 230ff., who refers to E.
Jungel, The Doctri"e of the Trinity: God's Being Is ill Becoming, Gr::md Rapids
and Edinburgh 1976.
116. Cf. l. Oeing-Hanhoff, 'Die Krise des Gottesbegriffs', TQ 159, 1979,
especially 291-4, although what lor jiingd is a problem becomes here the object
of unhesitating criticism.
117. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 12, 13 ad J. I am indebted to my colleague M.
Seckler for the reference to this passage and its importance.

Chapter IV Experience of God and Knowledge of God

1. On the problem and concerns of natural theology: G. Sohngen, 'Naturlichc
Theologie', LTK 7; 811-16; H. Urs von Balthasar, The Theology o( Karl Barth,
ET J. Drury, New York 1971; K. Riesenhubcr, Existel1zcrfahrrmg ,md Relig;o1l,
Mainz 196M; id., 'Natural Theology', SacMrmdi 4,167-71; B. \Velte, Heilsver-
stand"is. Philosophisc/Jt! Vora"ssetl,mgell :mu Verstiilldl1is des Christelll"ms,
 Notes to pages 65-78 339
Freiburg- Basle- Vienna, 1966; K. RahncT, Hearers of tbe \Vord. ET M. Richards,
New York 1969. From the vantage-point of Protestant theology: H. J. Birkner,
·.~aturliche Theologic und Offcnbarungsthcologie. Ein theologiegeschichdicher
Uberblick', NZST 3, 1961,279-95; C. Gestrich, 'Die unbewalrigte nariidiche
Theologie', ZTK 68, 1971, 82-120; E. Jiing~l, 'Das Dilemma der nariirlichen
Theologie und die Wahrheit ihres Problems. Uberlegungen fiir ein Gesprach mit
Wolfhart Panncnberg', in his EntspreclJlmge1l," Gott - Wahrheit - Mensch.
Theologischc Erortcrzmgen, BEvT 88, Munich 1980, 158-77; id., 'Gelegcnrliche
Themen zum Problem deT natiirlichcn Theologic', ibid., 198-10 I; id., 'Gatt - urn
seiner selbst willen interessant. Pladoycr fUr cine natiirlichere Theologic', ibid.,
193-7.
2. Justin, Apol. I, 46 (Corp"s Apol. 1, ed. Otto, 128-30); Apol. 11, 8; 10; 13
(ibid., 220-3, 224-9, 236-9).
3.lren.eus, Adu. Haer. 11, 9. 1 (SC 294, 82-5).
4. Justin, Apo/. 11, 6 (Corp"s Apol. 1, 212-17); John Damascene, De {ide orth.
I, 1 (Die Schriftell des Johan"es VOlt Damaskus, ed. B. Kotter, II, Berlin and New
York 1973,7).
5. Tertullian, Adu. Marc I, 10 (CCl 1,451).
6. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 2, 2 ad 1.
7. DS 3009; ND 119. Cf. H. J. Pottmeyer, Der Glaube uor dem Allspruch der
\fIissenschaft. Die Konstitution iiber den katholischen Glauben 'Dei Filius' des
I. Vatikaltischen KonZlls Imd die rmveroffentlichten Voten der vorbereitendelJ
Kommissioll. Freiburger Theol. Studien 87, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1968.
8. DS 3004, 3026; ND 113, liS.
9. The idea that it can be proved occurs first in the anti-modernist Oath: DS
3538; ND 143/1.
10. Vatican II, Dei Verbum, 6.
11. V3[ican II, Gaudium et spes, 19-22.
12. Vatican II, Dignitatis I",manae. 14.
13. Plato, Republ;c 11, 379a.
14. Aristotle, Metaphys;ca VI, 1026a.
IS. Augustine, De c;u;tate De; VI,S (CCl 47, 170-2).
16. Ibid., VI, 6 (CCl 47, 176-8).
17.Tertullian,Apo/.17,6(CCl I, 117-18).
18. On this developrnent d. G.S6hngen, 'NatiirlicheTheologie', L TK7, 811-16.
19. Cf. M. Seckler, 'AufkHirung und Offenbarung" in Christlicher Glaube ilt
lIIodemer Gesellschaft 21, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1980,5-78.
20. Cf. H. J. Birkner, 'Natiidiche Theologie und Offenbarungstheologie' (n. I),
279ff.
21. M. luther, Ellarrat;o Psalm; LI (1532), WA 40/2, 327f.
22. K. Barth, Natural Theology, ET london 1946.
23. Cf. Barth, Church Dogmat;cs Ill.
24. Cf. Birkner, art. cit., 293ff.
25. On the concept of nature d. Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth (n. I),
217ff.
26. Cf. R. Schaeffler, Fiihigkeit zur Erfahrtmg. Zltr transzendelltaien Her-
me1teutik des SprechelJs VOII Gott, QD 94, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1982.
27. Cf. W. Weischedel, DerGottder Phi/osophell. Grtmdleglll,geillerphi/osophi.
schell The%gie ;m Zeita/ter des Nihilismlts, 2 vols., Darmstadt 1971-72.
340 Notes to pages 78-87
28. Thomas Aquinas, ST!, 1,8.
29. There is already a suggestion of this in Aristotle, Metaphysica XI, 8, t 0743.
30. On the problem of experience of God: H. G. Gadamer, Trlltl, and Method,
ETG. Barden and}. Cumming, London and New York 1975,378-87; K. Lehmann,
'Experience', SacMundi 2, 307-9; P. L. Berger, A Rumollr of A1lgels: Modern
Society and the Rediscovery of the Supematllral, Garden City, N. Y. and London
1969; id., The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion,
Garden City, N.Y. and London 1967; W. Kasper, Glaube lind Geschichte. Mainz,
1970, \20-43; K. Rahner, 'The Experience of God Today', in Theological
Investigations II, ET D. Bourke London and New York 1974, 149-65; M.
Milller, Erfahrmlg lind Geschichte. Grrmd:t;;ge cifler Philosophic der Freiheit als
transz,e"delJtale Erfahmllg, Freiburg and Munich 1971; E. Schillebecckx, The
Understanding of Faith: Interpretatiolf a"d Criticism, ET N. D. Smith, London
and New York 1974; id" Jesus: A" Experiment in Christo/ogy, ET H. Hoskins,
London and New York 1979,636-68; id., Christ: The Experi""e of Jesus as
Lord, ET John Bowden, London and New York 1980; id., bJterim Report 011 the
Books Jesus and Christ, ET John Bowden, London and New York 1981; ,d.,
'Erfahrung und Glaube', in Christlicher Glaube ill modemer Gescllschaft 25,
Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1980,73-116; A. Kessler, A. Schopf and C. Wild,
'Erfahrung" HPC I, 373-86; J. Splett, Gottcserfahrullg im DenkcII, Frankfurt
1973; G. Ebeling, 'Die Klage liber das Erfahrungsdefizit in der Theologie als Frage
nach ihrer Sache', in Wort mtd Gla"be 3, Tiibingen 1975,3-28; D. Tracy, Blessed
Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology, New York 1975;}. Track,
'Erfahrung Goues. Versuch einer Annaherung', KD 22,1976,1-21; D. Mieth.
'What Is Experience?', in E. Schillebeeckx and B. van lersel (eds.), Revelation and
Experience, Concilium 113, New York 1979,40-53; B. Casper, 'Allragserfahrung
und Frommigkeit', in Christlicher Gla"bc hI modcmer Gesellschaft 25, Freiburg
- Basic - Vienna 1980, 39-72; R. Schaeffler, Fiihigkeit zur Erfahrtmg. Zur
transzcndelltalell Hcrmcllcutik des Sprec/u!1Js tlOII GolI, QD 94, Freiburg - Basle
- Vienna 1982.
31. Cf. A. M. Haas, 'Die Problcmatik von Sprache und Erfahrung in der
deutschen Mystik', in W. Beierwaltes, H. Urs von Balthasar and A. M. Haas,
G"mdfrageJI der Mystik, Einsiedeln 1974,75 n. 1.
32. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, 980a·b.
33. G. Ebeling, an cit. (n. 30), 22; E. Jiingel, Utllertvegs z"r Sache. Theo/ogische
Bemerk"ngeIJ, BEvT 61, Munich 1972,8.
34. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zaratlmstra, Part III, no. 2: 'On the Vision and
the Riddle' (Kaufmann, 157).
35. Nimschc, Beyond Good alld Evil, no. 270 (Kaufmann, 220).
36. J. Lotz, Tra11Szelldetllale Erfalmmg, Freiburg - B'lSle - Vienna 1978; K.
Rahner, 'The Experience of God Today' (n. 30), 160ff.; id., Foulldations of
Christiall Faith, ET W. V. Dych, New York and London 1978,66-8.
37. The cheory of disclosure-simations was developed chiefly by I. T. Ramsey,
especially in his Religious Language: An Empirical Placil1g ofTbeo/ogical Phrases.
London '1969. It was further developed by A. de Pater, Theo/ogische Sprachloglk,
Munich 1971.
38. R. Otto, Thc Idca of the Holy, ET}. W. Harvey, New York 1923, '1950.
39. Augustine, COllfessiolls I, 9, II (CCL 27,199-200).
40. On the problem of religious language: F. P. ferre, Lauguage, Logic a"d God.
 Notes to pages 87-91 341
London and New York 1961, G. Ebeling, Illtroductioll to a Theological Theory
of Lallguage, ET R. A. Wilson, London and Philadelphia 1973; H. Fischer,
GlaubensQlIssage wId Sprachstruktllr, Hamburg 1972; D. M. High, Language,
Persons and Belief, New York 1967; A. Grabner-Haider, Sem;otik Imd Thea/ogie.
ReligiOse Reden zwische1l analytischer ,ard hermeneutischer Philosophic, Munich
1973; id" Glaubenssprache. Ihre Struktur ,urd Anwendbarkeit in Verkiindigung
,ard Thea/ogie, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1975, J. SpJeu, Reden aus GJauben.
ZlIm christUchell Sprechen vall Gatt, Frankfurt 1973; j. Macquarrie, God-Talk:
An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology, London and New
York 1967; B. Casper, Sprache ulld Theo/ogie. Eille phi/osophische Hillfiihrtmg,
Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1975; W. D. Just, Religiose Sprache Imd analytische
Philosophie. Si"" lOrd U"si"n religioser Aussagen, Stuttgart 1975; H. Peukert,
WI isseuschaftstheorie - Handlrmgstheorie - Fundamentale Theo/ogie. Analysen zu
Ansatz rmd Status theo/ogischer Theoriebild,mg, Dusseldorf 1976; J. Track,
Sprachkritische U,rtersllclnmgen Z1l1n christlichen Reden von Gott, Forschungen
zur sys[ema[ischen und okumenischen Theologie 37, Gorringen 1977; j. Meier zu
Schlochter"., Glaube - Sprache - Erfa/mlltg. Zur Begriilld,lItgsfahigkeit der
religiosen Uberzeugrmg, Regensburger S[udien zurTheologie 15, Frankfurt 1978;
T. W. Tilley, Talkillg of God: All Illtroductioll to Philosophical Allalysis of
Religious Langllage, New York 1978; E. Biser, Religose Sprachbarriere". Aufbau
einer Logaporetik, Munich 1980; I. U. Dalferth, Religiose Rede vo" Gott, BEvT
87, Munich 1981; R. Schaeffler, Fiihigkeit zur Erfa/mlltg (n. 26)
41. L. Wittgens[ein, Tractatlls Logico-Philosophiclts, ET D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinness, Oxford and New York 1961,3.
42. Ibid., 4.003 (37).
43. Ibid., 6.52 (149).
44. Ibid., 6.522 (150).
45. Ibid., 7 (lSI).
46. Cf. W. Heisenberg, The Physicist's COllceptiO/, of the Ulliverse, ET A. J.
Pomerans, London 1958, 17f., 21, 28f.
47. K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London and New York
1959.
48. H. Albert, Traktat iiberkritische Vermmft, Die Einhei[ derGesellschaftswis-
senschaften. Studien in den Grenzbereichen der Wirtschaf[s-und Sozialwissensch-
aiten 9, Tubingen 21969; id., Pliidoyer fiir kritische" Rationalismus, Munich
)1973. On H. Albert: K. H. Weger, Vo", Ele"d des kritische1l Rationalismus.
Kritische Allseinat,dersetz,mg iiber die Frage der Erkennbarkeit Gottes bei Hans
Albert, Regensburg 1981.
49. T. S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScie"ti(ic Revollltions, Chicago 1962.
50. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ET G. E. M. Anscombe,
Oxford 1953, no. 43, p. 20.
51. Especially: I. T. Ramsey, Religious Lallguage: All Empirical P1acillg of
Religious Phrases, London '1969.
52. W. A. de Parer, The%gische Sprachlogik, Munich 1971.
53.). L. Austin, How To Do Thillgs With \"(lords, Oxford 1962; id., Philosophical
Papers, Oxford 1961.
54. j. R. Searle, Speech-Acts: An Essay in the Philosoph)' of Language, London
1969; id., Philosophy of Lallguage, London 1971.
55. K. O. Apel, 'Der transzendentalhermeneutische Begriff der Sprache', in his
342 Notes to pages 91-96
Transformation der Philosophic II. Dos Apr;or; deT Kommllll;katio1lsgemeinschaft,
Frankfurt 1973.330-57; id., 'Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft uod
die Grundlagen der Ethik. Zurn Problem eioer rationale" Begrundung dec Ethik
im Zcitalter der Wissenschaft', ibid., 358-435.
56. J. Habermas, ·Wahrheitstheorien'. in Wirklichkeit Imd Re{1exiOfI (FS \Valter
Sc!mlz), cd., H. Fahrenbach, Pfullingen 1973, 211-65; id., 'Vorbereitende Bemer-
kungcn zu ciner Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz'. in J. Habermas and N.
Luhmann, Theorie deT Gesellschaft oder Sozialteclmologie - Was leistet die
Systemforseh,mg?, Frankfurt 1975, \01-41, esp. 123ff.
57. H. Peukert, op. cit. (n. 40), 209ff., 230ff.
58. C. W. Morris, FOllndations of the Theory ofSiglls, Chicago 1938, 1964, 6.
59. L. B. Puntci, 'Wahrheit', HPG 3, 1649-68; J. Simon, Wahrheit als Freiheit.
Zur En(IV;cklrmg der Wahrheitsfrage in deT "cucrell Philosophic, Berlin and New
York 1978, Iff., 1 Iff., 27ff.
60. M. Heidegger, Unterwegs :wr Sprache, Pfullingen, J 1965.
61. H. Gadamer, Trllth alld Method (n. 30).
62. P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Irtterpretat;ons: Essays in Hermeneutics, ET
D. Ihde, Evanston 1974, id., Metapher. Zltr Hermene,.tik religioser Sprache,
Sondcrhaft Evangeliseher Theologie, Munich 1974, 24-45; id., 'Stellung und
Funktion der biblischen Sprachc', ibid., 45-70.
63. E. Jungcl, 'Metaphorische Wahrheit. Erwagungen zur theologischen Rele-
vanz der Metapher als Beitrag zur Hermeneutik einer narrativen Theologie', in
Elltsprecl"/Ilgell (n. 1), 103-57.
64. On the doctrine of analogy: G. Kittel, 'analogia', TDNT 1, 341-48; E.
Przywara, Altalogia entis. Metaphysik - Ur - struktllr "nd All-rhytlmms, Schriften
3, Einsiedeln 1962 (contains Analogie eutis. Metaphysik, 1932); id., DeliS Semper
Maior. Theologie der Exerzitte11, 3 vols., Freiburg 1938-40 (reprint, with the
addition of 'Theologoumenon und Philosophoumenon der Gessellschaft Jesu',
Vienna and Munich 1964); id., 'Die Reichweite der Analogie als katholischer
Grundform', Sehol. 15, 1940,339- 62,508- 32; E. Coreth, 'Dialektik und Analogie
des Scins. Zum Seinsproblem bei Hegci und in der Scholastik', Sehol 26, 1951,
57-86; id., 'Analogia entis I', LTK 1, 468- 70; L. B. Puntci, Allalogie ,/lid
Geschichtlichkcit I. Philosophiegeschichtlich-kritischer Versllch iiber das Gnmd·
problem der Metaphysik, Philosophic in Einzeldarstellungen 4, with a Preface by
Max Muller, Freiburg- Basle- Vienna, 1969, W. Pannenberg, 'Analogie', RGG
1,350-3; id., 'Analogie', EKL 1, 13f.; W. Kluxen, 'Analogie I', HWP 1,214-27;
J. Track, 'Analogic', TRE 2, 625- 30 (with abundant bibliography).
65. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 13,5 and 10.
66. Ibid., a. 5 ad 1: 'All univocal predications depend on a single predicate which
is not univocal bur analogical, namely, being.'
67. E. Jungcl, 'Zum Ursprung der Analogie bei Parmenides und Heraclit', in
EmspreclJJmgelJ (n. 1),52-102.
68. Plato, Timaells 31a; d. 53c, 56c, 69b.
69. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea II, 5, 1106a.
70. Aristotle, Metaphysiea V, 6, 10 16b-1017a.
71. Ibid., IV, 2, 1003a.
72. Ethiea Nieomaehea I, 4, lO96b.
73. For the history of negative theology d. J. Hochsraffl, Negative Theologie.
Ein Vers"ch ZlIr Vcrmittlzmg des patristischert Begnffs, Munich 1976; W. Kasper,
 Notes to pages 96-97 343
'Atheismus und Gones Verborgenheit', in Christlicher Glaube iTt modemer
Gesellschaft 22, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1982.
74. This idea is already in Plato, Republic VI, 508b, and fully in Plotinus,
Emteads V, 4; VI, 9.
75. Plotinus Ellneads VI, 9.
76. Oionysius the Pseudo·Areopagite, De coelesti hierarchia II, 3 (SC 58, 77-80).
77. The formula has a basis in Socrates (Apo/. 23b) and Augustine (Ep. 130, 15,
28 = PL 33, 505f.; 197 = PL 33, 899ff.), and occurs as such in Bonaventure,
Breviloqllirml V, 6, 7; II Sent., d. 23, 2.2, q. 3, and especially in Nicholas of Cusa,
De docla ignorantia, Opera I, ed. P. Wilpert, Berlin 1967.
78. 05 806; ND 320.
79. This is [rue also and not (e:lst for E. Przywara, who in his A1Ialogia entis (n.
64), 206, has this co say about the analogy of being: 'The allalogie emis is thus
only the expression of the fact that at the very st3rring point of thinking as thinking
the most remainderless potentiality of the creacurely is actuated (down to the very
poteUlia oboediell/;alis itself}. It is nor 3 principle by which the creacurely is grasped
and can therefore be manipulated but in which [he cre.1turely soars unhindered
with all or its potentiality: On przywarll d. B. Genz, Glattbellsllleit als Analogie.
Die theo/ogische Ana/ogie-Lehre Erich Przywaras wrd irh Ort ill der AIIse;nander-
setzmrg um die alla/ogia fidei, Dusseldorf 1969.
80. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 13, 2f.
81. E. Heintel, 'Transzendenz und Anlliogie. Ein Beitragzur Frageder bestimmren
Negation bei Thomas von AquinO, in H. Fllhrenbach (ed.), \Virklichkcit .",d
Ref/exioll (FS Walter Sci",h), pfullingen 1973, 267-90.
82. Cf. '<lux en, art. cit. (n. 64), 221ff.
83. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 13; De nom;nibus divinis, esp. aa. 8-11.
84. cr. G. Schngen, 'Bonaventurll als Kbssiker der ana/agia fidei', \VWeis 2,
1935,97-11; L. Berg, 'Die Analagiclehre des heiligen Bonaventura', SludGe" 8,
1955,662-70;]. Rarzinger, 'GratiapraesUppOf,;t1tatumm. Erwagungen uberSinn
und Grenzen eines scholastischen Axioma', in J. Ratzinger and H. Fries (eds.),
f.illsi,ht WId Glaube (FS Gottlieb So/mgell), Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1962,
135-49.
85. G. S6hngen, 'Analogia fidei: I. Gorr.hnlichkeit allein aus Glauben?', Cath
3,1934, 113-36; id" 'Analogia fidei: II. Die Einhcit in der Glaubcnswissenschaft',
ibid., 176--208; id., 'Analogia entis oder analogia fidei?' WWeis 9, 1942,91-100;
id., 'Analogia entis in analogia fidei', in Amwort (FS Karl Barth), Zollikon-Zurich
1956,266--7 I; id., Allalogia I/Ild Metapher. Kleille Philosophic IlIId The%gie dcr
Spracile, Freiburg and Munich 1962.
86. H. Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth (n. 1), 217-46.
87. J. Duns Scotus, I Sellt., pol., q. 1 schol. Cf. E. Wolfe!, Seillsstruktur IlIId
Tr;'ritiitsproblem. Umersuclnmgen zltr Grrmdleg""g der natiirlichen The%gie
bei Johannes Drms Scows, BGPTM IllS, Munster 1956; M. Schmaus, Zur
Diskussion jiber das Problem der U"ivozitiit ;m Umkreis des Jobam,es Duns
Skollls, Ba yerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse
1957, Heft 4, Munich 1957.
88. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Ill, X. Cf. H. Diem, 'Analogia fidei gegen
analogia en tis. Ein Beitrag zur Konrro\'crsetheologie', EvT 3, 1936, 157-80;
W. Pannenberg. 'Zur Bedeutung des Analogiegedankcns bei Karl Barth. Eine
Auseinanderserzung mit Urs von Balthasar', TLZ 78, 1953, 17-24; E.Jungel, 'Die
344 Notes to pages 97-101
Moglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogic. Eine
Untersuchung zum Analogievcrstandnis Karl Barths', EvT22, 1962,535-57; H.
G. Pohlmann, Ana/agia emis oder Ana/agia {ide"? Die Frage deT Anaiogie be; Karl
Barth, Gottingen 1965; K. Hammer, 'Analogia relationis gege" analogla ends', in
Parrhesia (FS Karl Barth), Ziirich 1966, 288-304; E. Mechels, A/lQlogie bei
Erich Przywara wId Karl Barth. Das Verhiiltnis VOII Offenbartmgstheologie rmd
Metaphysik, Neukirchen·Vluyn 1974. CI. also the writings of G. 50hngen and H.
Urs von Balthasar listed in nn. 85 and 86.
89. K. Barth, Chltrch Dogmatics, 11112, 2201., 3231.
90. Similarly W. Pannenberg, 'Moglichkeiten und Grenzen def Anwcndung des
Analogicprinzips in der cvangelischen Theologie', TLZ 85, t 960, 225-28; id"
'Analogy and Doxology', in Basic Questions in Theology, ET G. H. Kehm, 2 vols.
London and Philadelphia 1970-71,2,212- 38
91. J. Moller, VOIl BeWlIsstse;l1 ,II Sein. Grmrdlegmrg einer Metaphysik, Mainz
1962, 179fl.
92. Cf. below, 105f.
93. On the question of the knowledge of God and the proofs of God's
existence: H. Ogiermann, Hegels Gottesberveise, Rome 1948; Id.,Sein ZEI Golt. Die
philosophische Gottesfrage, Munich 1974; F. van 5teenberghen, Hiddell God.
How Do We KllowT//at God Exists?, ETT. Crowley, 5t Louis 1966; W. Cramer,
Gottesbeweise lind ihre Kritik. Priifzmg ihrer Beweiskraft, Frankfurt 1967; j.
Schmucker, Die primaTe" Quellcn des Gottesglallbells, QD 34, Freiburg- Basle-
Vienna 1967; id" Das Problem der K01ltingenz der \Velt, QD 43, Frclburg - Basic
- Vienna 1969; Q. Huonder, Die Gottesbeweise. Geschichte tOld Sc!Jicksal,
Stuttgart and Mainz 1968; C. Bruaire, Die AlI(gabe. Gott Zit dtmken. Religiolls-
kritik, onto!ogischer Gottesbeweis, die Freiheit des Me11schen, Frciburg - Basic
- Vienna 1973; J. Splett, Gotteserfahrrmg im De"ken. 2ur phiiosophiscIJen
Rechtfertiglmg des Redens VOII Gott, Freiburg and Munich 1973 i E. Hirsch, Das
E"de aller Gottesbeweise? Natllrwissellschaftler antworten allf die religiOse Frage,
Hamburg 1975; J. Fellermeier, Die Philosophie auf dem Weg ZII Gott, Munich-
Paderhorn - Vienna 1975; W. Kern, 'Der Gonesbeweis Mensch. Ein konstruktivcr
Versuch', in Athe;smus, Marxismus, Christemum. Beitrage ZIIT Diskussion,
Innshruck 1976, 152-82; B. Welte, Religionsphilosophie, Freihurg - Basle -
Vienna 1978; W. Brugger, S",nme einer philosophischen Gotteslehre, Munich
1979; K. H. Weger, Der Mensch vor dem Allspruch GotleS. Glaubellsbegriilldlll1g
ill ciner agllostischen Welt, Graz - Vienna - Cologne 1981.
94. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De ver. 1, 9c.a: 'Truth is known by the imellect
inasmuch as the intellect reflects on its own act and not only knows its own act but
also knows the proportion of its act to the object.'
95. Aristotle, Metaphysica I, 98b·b.
96. Cf. Kern, art. cit. (n. 93),1541.
97. CI. W. Pannenberg, 'The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of
God as a Dogmatic Problem of Early Christian Theology', Basic QuestiOlls in
Theology (n. 90), 2, 119- 83.
98.John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa I, 3, Schriftell, ed. Kotter (n. 4), 2, 10ff.
99. Thomas Aquinas, STI, 2, 3; CG I, 13; 15; 16,44.
100. Kant, Critique of Pure ReasOll, ET J. M. D. Meiklejohn, in Kant, Great
Books of the Western World 42, Chicago 1952, 188.
 Notes to pages 102-106 345
101 M. Hcidegger, 'What Is Metaphysics?', ET R. F. C. Hull and A. Crick, in
Heidcgger, Existence and Beillg, Chicago 1949,380.
102. J. Schmucker, Das Problem der Kolltil/gel/z der IVelt (n. 93).
103. On wonder as the origin of philosophizing: Plato, TheatelJlS 155dj Aristotle,
Metaphysica I, 982b: 'It was because men were curious that they began to
reflect a.nd still do.' Cf. H. J. Verweyen, Onto/ogische Voraussetzrmgcn des
Gla"bcusaktcs. Zltr transzendentalen Frage nac" der Moglichkeit VOII Offenba-
rIIl/g, Diissel4.orf 1968, esp. 159ff.; H. Urs von Balthasar, Herrlichkeit. Eil/e
theologische Asthetik, 111/1: 1m Rallm der Metaphysik, Einsiedeln 1965.
104. F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophic der 0ffel/harmlg, WW, Erg. Bd. 6, ed. M.
Schroter, 57f., 155ff.
lOS. Justin, Apologia II, 6, Corpus Apo/.I, ed. v. Otto, 213-17; Grigen, Comra
eelsllm 1,4 (SC 132, 84-87); Augustine, De spiritll et littera 12 (Pl 44,211 II.);
De civitate Dei VI11, 6 (CCl 47, 222fl.).
106. Tertullian, Apolog. 17, 6 (CCl I, 117f.); De testimol/io al/imae (CCl 1;
173-83); Adv. MarciO/!em I, 10,3 (CCl 1,451): 'The soul precedes prophecy.
For the knowledge the soul has from the beginning is a dowry from God; it is the
same and no different in Egyptians and Syrians and people from Pontus.'
107. Augustine, COllfessiolles I, I, I (CCl27, 1); cf. 111, 6,11 (CCl 27, 321.);
X, 25, 36 (CCl 27, 174); 26, 37 (CCl 27, 174f.); 27, 38 (CCl27, 175).
108. Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, 26 (CCl 48, 345 I.).
109. Augustine, CO/lfessiolles X, 26, 37 (CCl 27,1741.).
110. Thomas Aquinas, De ver. 22, 2 ad 1.
llt. Descartes, Meditations on the First Philosophy III, ET L. J. lafleur,
Indianapolis 1978,33-50.
112. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Kmlt (n. 100), 344ff.
113. J. Marichal, Le poillt de dipart de la metaphysiqlle, esp. Cahier V: Le
Thomisme devant la philosophie critique, Museum lessianum, Sect. phil. 7,
Brussels and Paris '1949. Further philosophical development especially in E.
Coreth, Metaphysik. Eine methodisch-systematische Crlmdleglmg, Innsbruck -
VIenna - Munich '1964.
114.J. H. Newman, All Essay ill Aid ofa Grammar of Assent (1870), New York
1906.
115. H. Krings, 'Freiheit. Ein Versuch, Got! zu denken', Ph] 77, 1970,225-37;
id., with E. Simons 'Gott', HPC 2, 614-41.
116. B. Pascal, Pensies, fro 418 (Br. 233), ET A.J. Krailsheimer, Pascal's Pellsies,
Baltimore 1966, 151.
117. While pagan writers (Polybius, for example) saw the power of fate at work
in history, the church fathers spokeof the providence of God as directing every thing,
and even of a divine plan for educating man: Irenaeus, Adv. haer.ll, 28, 3 (SC 294,
274-9); IV,20, 111. (SC 100,62511.); 38,3 (SC 100,952-7); Clement of Alexandria,
Stromata VII, 7 (PG 9, 449b-472a); Origen, COlllra Celsltm IV, 99 (SC 136,
430-5); Augustine, De vera religiolle XXV, 46 (CCl 32,216); De civitate Dei V,
18; 21-26 (CCl 47, 151-4, 157-63); VII, 30-2 (CCl 47, 2111f.).
118. K. lowith, Meatring in History: The Theological Implications of the
Philosophy of History, Chicago 1949.
119. Hegel, Die Verlllmft ill der Geschichte (ed. J. Hoffmeister), 28ff., 28, 77,
etc.
346 Notes to pages 106- 110
120. J. S. Orey, Die Apo/ogetik als wissenschaftliche Nachweislmg der GOlllid,·
keit des Chr;slentums in seiner Erscheimmg II, Mainz 21847.
121. W. Pannenberg, 'Redemptive Event and History', Basic Questions in
Theology (n. 90), I, IS-80; 'Hermeneutic and Universal History', Ibid., 1,96- 136;
'On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic', ibid., 1, 137-81.
122. Cf. above, 35f., 55f.
123. Cf. above, 33f.
124. Cf. above, ibid.
125. j. de Vries, 'Reahsmus" Philosophisches Wiirterimch, ed. W. Brugger,
Freiburg-Basle- Vienna 14 1976,316- 18. Forthe history: H. Krings, 'Realismus',
LTK 7, 1027f.; id., 'Die Wandlung des Realismus in der Philosophic der Gegcn·
wart', Ph] 70,1962,1- 16.
126. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De ver. I, 1-4.
127. Cf. W. Schulz, Phi/osophie in der veranderten Wlelt, Pfullingen 1972,10,
143f., 470ff., 602ff., 841 H.
128. On what follows d. R. spaemann, 'Gesichtspunkte der Philosoph ie', in H.
J. Schultz (ed.), WIer ist das eigentlich.GolI? Munich 1969,56-65; id., 'Die Frage
nach cler Bedeutung des Wartes '~Gott" " 1llternatio1lale Katholtsche Zeitschrift
I, 1972, 54-72.
129. Aristotle, De anima III, 8, 431 hi Thomas Aquinas, De ver. 1, 1; ST I, 14,
1; etc.
130. This aspect of amicipation of the whole in the detail has been developed
especially by W. Pannenberg. Critical distinctions are made in E. Schillebeeckx,
'Erfahrung und Glaube', in Christlicher Glaube itt modemer Gesellscbaft 25,
Freiburg~Basle- Vienna 1980, 103H.
131. M. Horkheimer, Die Seh"sllcht nach demganz Anderett. Ein Iltterview mit
Kommentar von Hellmut Gumn;or, Hamburg 1970,62.
132. H. Peukert, Wissetrschaftstheorie - Handillngstheorie - F",rdamelltale
Theo/ogie (n. 40), 293ff.; J. B. Men, Faith ill History alld Society: Toward a
Practical Flmdamelllal Theology, ET O. Smith, New York, 1980. 109ff.
133. M. Heidegger,ldelltityalld Differellce, ET J. Stambaugh, New York 1969,
42. The concept of ontotheology is already to be found in Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason (n. 100), 190.
134. On the ontological argument: K. Kopper, Re{1exion wrd Raisomremeltt
im ontologischell Gottesbeweis, Cologne 1962, C. H. Hanshorne, Allselm's
Discovery: A Re-exam;'Jation of the Oltt%gica/ Proof for God's Existence, La
Salle, III. 1965, D. Henrich, Der DrJt%gische Gottesbeweis. Sein Probe/m Jmd
seine Gesch!.chte in der Nel/zeit, Tubingen 21967; H. K. Kohlenberger, Simi/itudo
lind ratio. Uberlegllllgen zur Methode bei Anselm von Canterbury, Munchener
philosphische Forschungen 4, Bonn 1972; J. Brechtken, 'Das Unum Argumentum
des Anselm von Canterbury. Seine Idee und Geschichte und seine Bedeutung fUr
die Gottesfrage von heure', FZTP 22,1975,171-203; K. Barth, Allselm: Fides
quaerens intellectum. Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God ill the Colttext of
His Theological Scheme, ET I. W. Robertson, London and Richmond, Va. 1960.
135. Anselm, Pros/ogioll, Preface.
136. Ibid., ch. I, ET J, Hopkins and H. Richardson in Anselm ofCallterb"r), I,
London and New York 1974,93.
137, Ch. 2 (ibid.).
138. Ch. 15 (104).
 Notes to pages 110-117 347
139. Anselm, Monologion, ch. 64 (73).
140. Anselm, ProsloglOn, ch. 2 (94).
141. Ch. 3.
142. Thomas Aquinas raises this objection, ST I, 2, 1 ad 2.
143. Kant, Critiql/e of PI/re Reason, on Kant (n. 100), 181.
144. Augustine, De Itbero arbitrio II, 6,14 (CCL 29, 2461.).
145. Ibid., 11,12,34; 15,39 (CCL 29, 260f., 263f.).
146. Hegel, Voriestlllgen iiber die Philosophie der Religion 111 (ed. Lasson),
207- 25.
147. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, in Kallt. 185.
148. Ibid., 187.
149. F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbartlllg (n. 104), 161, 163, 165.
150. Ibid., 45f., 91ff., 125ff., 203ff.
151. Ibid., 168.
152. Ibid., 170.
153. Ibid., 169.
154. Ibid., 57ff., Iliff., 130f.
155. The process began with Karl Barth's interpretation of Anselm (d. n. 134).
Barth takes Anselm's argument to be a strictly theological implementation of his
program of {ides quaerells brtellectu",; that is, Barth rakes the argument as showing
the internal coherence and reasonableness of faith. In taking this approach Barth
does not, of course, do full justice [0 the onwiogical profoundity of the argument.
156. J. E. Kuhn, Katholische Dogmatik 112: Die dogmatische Lehre von der
Erkemrtnis, den Eigemchaften wrd der Einheit Gotts, Tiibingen 21862, 648-68.
157. W. Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy ofScience, ET F. McDonagh,
London and Philadelphia 1976,300.
158. Newman, Grammar of Assent (n. 114); chapters 8-9.
159. Pascal, Pells,"s, fro 423 (Br. 277), in Krailsheimer (n. 116),54.

Chapter V Knowledge of God in Faith

1. On the concept of revelation: R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De revelatione per
ecclesiam catholicam proposita, Rome 1931; R. Guardini, Die Offenbarung,
WUrzburg 1940; P. Althaus, 'Die Inflation des Begriffs Offenbarung in der
gegenwiirtigen Theologie', ZST18, 1941, 131-49; H. Schulte, Der BegriffOffellba·
rung im Neue" Testament, Munich 1949; K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111 and 2;
W. Pannenberg et al., Revelation as History, ET D. Granskou, London and New
York 1968; H. Fries, 'Offenbarung. III. Systematisch', LTK 7, 1109-15; D.
Uihrmann, Das Offenbanmgsverstiindnis bei Pauills und in paulinischen Gemein-
den, Neukirchen • Vluyn 1965; R. Latourelle, Theology of Revelation, Staten
Island, NY 1966; A. Dulles, Revelatioll Theology: A History, New York 1969; F.
Konrad, Das Offenbamngsverstiindnis in der evangelischen Theo/ogie, Munich
1971; M. Seybold, H. Waldenfels et al., OffenbarulIg, HOG 111 and 2, Freiburg-
Basle - Vienna 1971, 1977; P. Eicher, Offenbanmg. Prillzip nel/zeitlicher Theo-
logie, Munich 1977; P. Ricoeur et al., La revelation, Brussels 1977; M. Seckler,
'De; verbum religiose audiens: Wandlungen im christlichen Offcnbarungsvcr-
standnis', in J.J. Petuchowski and W. Strolz (eds.), Offenbarllng im jiidischen und
christlichen Glallbensverstiindnis, QD 92, Freiburg-Basle- Vienna 1981,214-36.
2. Cf. above, 85, 90.
348 Notes to pages 117-124
3. P. Eicher, op. cit. (n. I).
4. Votican II, Nostra aetate, 2 (Flannery, 738-39).
5. Vatican II, L"men gentium, 9.
6. It is obviously impossible for me to present here 3 complete doctrine of
revelation. To do so would amount to seuing down the entire treatise on revelation
that is pan of fundamental theology, and this is evidently not feasible. My discussion
of the subject will be limited to what is relevant to a doctrine of God.
7. Vatican II, Dei verbum, 2.
8. This point is already made in Vatican I: Ds 3004; ND 113. It is made even
more clearly in Vatican II, Dei verbum, 2.
9. Cf. A. Deissler, Die Grmrdbotschaft des Alten Testamellts. £in theologischer
Durchblick, Frciburg - Basle - Vienna' 1972, 43ff.
10. This aspect has been brought out especially by H. Urs von Balthasar. In what
follows I am essentially adopting his standpoint. Cf. especially his The Glory of
tile Lord: A Theological Aesthetics 1,Seeing IIJe Fam., ET Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis,
cd. Joseph Fessio and John Riches, San Francisco and Edinburgh 1982, esp. Part
3; 'The Objective Evidence'.
I!. On this cf. below, 166f1.
12. Vatican II, Dei verbum,S.
13. Augustine, In Johannis Evangelium tractatus 26, 6 (CCl 36, 286f.);
Ellarrationes ill Psalmos lXXVII, 8 (CCl 39, \o72f.); Thomas Aquinas, ST II-II,
2,3. Cf. J. B. Men, 'Credere Deum, Oeo, in Deum', LTK 3, 86-8.
14. On the problem of the justification of faith: S. Haren<, 'Foi', DTC 6,1920,
55-514, esp. 109-15; H. lang, Die Lehre des HI. Thomas von Aquill VOII der
Gewissheitdes iibernau'irlichen Glaubens, Augsburg 1929; R. Aubert, Le probleme
del'actedefoi, Louvain l 1950j A. Brunner. Glaubemtd Erkemrtllis. Philasophisch~
theo/ogische Darlegllllg, Munich 1951; J. Triitsch, 'Glaube und Erkennt",s', in J.
Feiner et 01., Fragen der Thea/ogie heute, Einsiedeln - ZUrich - Cologne 1957,
45-68; F. Malmberg, 'Analysis fidei', LTK I, 477-83;J. Beumer, 'Glaubensgewiss-
heir" LTK 4 941-42; M. Seckler, Instinkt wrd G/allberlswille nach Thomas VOII
Aquin, Mainz 1961 jJ. Alf:lro, 'Faith' and 'Motive of Faith', SacMr",di 2,313- 22,
322-24.
IS. Ds 3008; ND 188.
16. Thomas Aquinas,STII·Il, 1, lc: 'If then we consider the object of faith under
its formal aspect [i.e., that by reason of which we assent] this is nothmg clst: than
the first Truth itself:
17. H. Urs von Balthasar, Love Alolle, ET A. Oru, New York 1969. {The German
title of this book is Glaubhaft ist ",rrdie Liebe- love Alone Is Cr~dible. Tr.]
18. On God's mysteriousness and hiddenness: R. Garrigou .. Lagrange, Le seilS
d" mystere, Paris 1934j P. Siller, Die Incomprehensibrlitas De; bei Thomas VOlt
Aqtlill, Innshruck 1963j id., 'Unbegreiflichkeit', LTK 10,470-2; P. Wess, \'(/ ie von
Gott spreche,t? Eine Auseinandersetzuug mit Karl Raimer. Graz 1970; K. Rahncr,
'The Hiddenness of God', in Theological itrvestigatiolls 16, ET D. Morland,
london and New York 1979,227-43; 'An Investigation of the Incomprehensibility
of God in st Thomas Aquinas', ibid" 244-54; C. Schiitz, Verborgenheit Gottes.
Marthls Bubers \Verk - Eine Gesamtdarstellmrg, Zurich - Einsiedeln - Cologne
1975; W. Kasper, 'Atheismus und Ganes Verborgeoheit in theologischer Sicht', in
Glaube i" modemer Gesellscbaft 22, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1982,32- 52. Cf.
Part I, chapter 4, n. 73, and, further on in this chapter, nn. 29- 31.
 Notes to pages 124-134 349
19. G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, ET D. M. G. Stalker, 2 vols.,
Edinburgh and New York 1962-65, 1,218.
20. M. Luther, Heidelberger Disputation (1518" WA I, 134,362. CI. W. von
Loewenich, Luther's Theology of the Cross, ET H. j. A. Bouman, Minneapolis
1976; E. jungel, 2ur Freiheit eincs Christenmenschen, Munich 1978,28-53.
21. G. Bornkamm, 'Mysterion', TDNT4, 802-28.
22. CI. below, I 66fl.
23. DS 16,2931., SOl, 525, 683, 800, 853,3001; ND 4, 61 If., 627/1, 308,19,
24,327.
24. j. Hichstaffl, Negative Theologie. Eill Versuch Zltr Vermittlllllg des patristi-
schell Begriffs, Munich 1976,99-119; E. Muhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes
bei Gregor von Nyssa, Gottingen 1966.
25. john Damascene, De fide orlhodoxa I, 12 (Schriflerr II, ed. B. Kotter, 35f., .
26. Nicholas of Cusa, Of Leamed Igllorallce, ET G. Heron, London 1954.
27. DS 800; ND 19.
28. DS 3001; ND 327.
29. M. j. Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christiallily, ET C. Vollert, St Louis 1946,
15. Scheeben is here objecting to the still worthwhile article ofW. Mattes (of the
Tubingen School" 'Mysterien', Kirchelllexikon 7, 1851,428-37; in the spirit of
the church fathers Mattes is here pointing oUt that the whole of Christianity is ;)
single mystery.
30. K. Rahner, 'The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology', in Theological
IlIvesligaliO/IS 4, ET K. Smyth, London and Baltimore 1966, 36-73. On the
Protestant side d. G. Ebeling, 'Profanit5t und Geheimnis', in Wort wrd Glaube 2,
Tubingen 1969, 184-208.
31. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 1111, ETT. H. L. Parker el al., Edinburgh 1957,
179fl. [but I have not been able to find the quoted words in the ET. Tr.).

PART TWO

Chapler / God, the Father Almighty

I. DS 30; ND 5.
2. H. Tellenbach (ed." Das Valcrbild ill Mythos Iwd Geschichte, Stuttgart 1972;
id. (ed." Das Vaterbild in! Aberrdlalld, 2 vols., Stuttgart 1978; id. (ed." Vaterbilder
;n dell Kllltllre" As;e"s, Afrikas lInd Ozeaniens, Stuttgart 1979. Cr. G. Marcel,
'The Creative Vow as Essence of Fatherhood" in Homo Viator, ET E. Craufurd,
Chicago 1951,98-124.
3. M. Horkheimer, Kritische TIJeor;e, 2 vots., Frankfurt 1968; in the present
context d. I, 277f('; id., Die Selmsucht nach dem gam: AlIderen. Ein Interview
",it Kommetttar VOlt H. GlIm,,;or, Hamburg 1970.
4. A. Mitscherlich, Auf de", \Vag zur vater/osell Gesellschaft. Ideell Zlir Sozia/·
psychologie, Munich 1963.
5. Especially important are Freud's Totem and Taboo, ET A. A. Brill, London
and New York 1938; The Fut",e of all lIIusioll, ET W. D. Robson-Scott, rev. j.
Strachey, London and New York, 1961; Civilizatiolt and Its Discomellts, ET J.
Strachey, London and New York, 1961; Moses alld M01lOtheis11t, ET K. Jones,
London and New York 1939.
350 Notes to pages 134-144
6. H. E. Richter, Der Gotteskomplex. Die Geburt lind die Krise des Clat/bens
an die Allmacht des Menscl1C/', Hamburg 1979.
7. T. Moser, Gottesvergi(t,mg, Frankfurt 1976.
8. Cf. rhe survey in j. B. Merz and E. Schillebeeckx (eds.), God as Father?,
Concilium 143, New York 1981.
9. M. Daly, Beyolld God the Father, Boston 1973.
10. R. R. Ruether, New Woman/New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human
Liberatioll, New York 1975.
11. Cf. M. Greifenhagen, 'Emanzipation', HWP 2, 448f.i G. Rohrmoser,
Emanzipation zmd Freiheit, Munich 1970; R. Spaemann, 'Autonomie, Miindigkeit,
Emanzipation'. in Kontexle 7, Stuttgart - Berlin 1971,94-102.
12. j. B. Merz, 'Erliisung und Emanziparion', in L. Schcffczyk (ed.), Erlos,mg
,/lid E/llanzipation, QD 61, Fre,burg-Basle- Vienna 1973, (12~0) 121.
13. K. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in Karl Marx, Early Writings, ET ed. T.
B. Bottamare, New York 1964,31.
14. H. Jonas, Gnosis lind spotantiker Geist, 1. Die mytho/ogische Gnosis,
Giirringen '1964, 219.
15. G. Bornkamm, 'Das Vaterbild im Neuen Testament', in H. Tellenbach (ed.),
Das Vaterbild in Mythos ,/lid Geschichte (n. 2), (136-54) 153.
16. j. W. Goerhe, Der Zallberlehrling, WW I, Zurich '1961, 149ff.
17. F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, no. 125, ETW. Kaufmann, London and New
York 1974, Vinrage Books cd., 181.2.
18. In addirion to rhe Iirerarure already cired d. especially G. Schrenk and G.
Quell, 'Parer', TDNT 5,946-1016 (in rhis conrexr, 948-59).
19. Cf. above, 16f., 116ff.
20. Cf. Schrenk and Quell, art. cir., 950-1; A. Wlosok, 'Vater und Varervorsrel-
lungen in der romischen Kultur', in H. Tellenbach (ed.), Das Vaterbild im
Abendland (n. 2), I, 18-54.
21. Cf. Schrenk and Quell, art. cir., 981-1016; W. Marchel, Abba, pere! La
priere du Christ et des chretiens, AnBib 19a, Rome 1971 ;J.Jeremias, Abba. Stlldien
zur nelltestame1ltlichen Theo/ogie Imd Zeitgeschichte, Gottingen 1966 (partial ET
by john Bowden, The Prayers of ]eslls, London 1967); L. Perlirr, 'Der Varer im
Alren Testamenr', in H. T ellen bach (ed.), Das Vaterbild ill Mythos ,/lid Geschichte
(n. 2),50-101; G. Bornkamm, 'Das Vaterbild im Neuen Testament', ibid., 136-54.
22. Cf. above, 16£., 116ff.
23. Schrenk and Quell, art. cir., 966.
24. From the boundless literature d. H. Kleinknecht, G. von Rad, K. G. Kuhn
and K. L. Schmidr, 'Basileus', TDNT I, 564-93; N. Perrin, The Killgdom of God
in the Teaching of Jesus, London 1963; R. Schnackenburg, God's Rule and
Kingdom, ET J. Murray, London and New York 1963; H. Schurmann, 'Das
hermeneutische Hauptproblem der Verkundigung Jesu', in H. Vorgrimler (ed.),
GOII ill Welt (FS Karl Rahller), 2 vols., Freiburg-Basle- Vienna 1964, 1,579-607;
H. Merklein, Die Gottesherrschaft a/s Handlungsprinzip. U1ttersllclnmg zltr Ethik
]esll, Forschung zur Bibel 34, Wurzburg 1978.
25. Cf. below, 168ff.
26. This has been brought our especially by K. Rahner, 'Theos in the New
Testament', in Theological Investigations 1, ET C. Ernst, London and Baltimore
1961,79-148.
27. Cf. Didache 1,5 (SC 248, 144ff.); justin, Dialoglls cllm Trypholle 74,1; 76,
 Notes to pages 144-148 351
3; 83, 2; etc. (Corpus Apol. II, ed. von Otto, 264ff.); Clement of Alexandria,
ProtreptiCl/s X, 94, 3 (SC 2, 162).
28. Origen, Contra Celsum V, 39 (SC 147, 117-21); III Joall. VI, 39 and 202
(SC 157, 1581.,2801.).
29. Cf. DS 1-5; only DS 6 dilfers.
30. CI. DS 60, 75, 441, 485, 490, 525, 527, 569, 572, 683, 800, 1330f.; ND 16,
308,3 to, 19, 325f.
31. Didaeh. 9, 2 (SC 248, 174{(.).
32. A Schindler, 'Gott als Vater in Theologie und Liturgie der christlichen
Antike', in H. Tellenbach (ed.), Das Vaterbild im Ab."dlalld (n. 2), I (55-69) 66.
33. On the entire problem d . J. A. Jungmann, The Place of Christ ill Liturgical
Prayer, ET A. Peeler, Staten Island, NY 1965.
34. Plato, Timaells 28c.
35. SchIndler, art. cit., 57f.
36. Justin, Dialogus 56, 15; 60,3; 61, 3; 63, 3 (Corpus Apo/. II, I 86f., 21Of.,
212f.; 222f.).
37. W. Pannenberg, 'The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept 01 God as
:1 Dogmatic Problem of Early Christian Theology', in Basic QutstiotlS in Theology,
ET G. H. Kehm, 2 vols., Philadelphia 1970-71,2,119-83.
38. Cf. below, I 82ff., 257f.
39. OS 125f., 150; NO 7f., 12.
40. Cf. John Damascene, De {ide orthodoxa I, 8 (Sehrift.", cd. Kotter, Z, 18-31).
41. CI. Augustine, De Trillitatc IV, 20 (CCL 50,195-202); Thomas Aquinas,
STI, 33,1.
42. OS 800,1331; ND 19,326.
43. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio II, 38 (SC 247, 138-4\).
44. Cf. Y. Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit 3. The River of Life FlolUS in the
Eastand 11/ the West, ET David Smirh, London and New York 1983, 133-37.
45. Origen, In Joan. 11,20 (SC 120, 220).
46.John Damascene, De {ideorthodoxa I, 8; 12 (Sehriften, ed. Kotter, 2,18-31,
35f.).
47. Augustine, De Trinitat. IV, 20 (CCL 50,195- 202).
48. OS 525, 568; NO 308.
49. Thom;ls Aquinas. 111 I Sent., d. 28, q.• ,3. 1i I" III Sent., d. 25. q. 1, :1. 2;
STI,33,1;39,5.d6.
50. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 27, p. I, q. 2 ad 3; d. 28, q. 1-3; d. 29, dub. I;
Brevlioqu;um p. I, c. 3.
51. Bosil, De spiritu sancto 61. (SC 17, 126ff.).
52. Augustine, Confessiones VII, 10, 16 (CCL 27, 103f.).
523. K. Rahner, 'Remarks on the Dogmiltic Trearise "De Trinirate"" in
Theo/ogiealillvestigations 4, ET K. Smyth London .nd B.ltimore 1966,77-102.
53. For the interpretation d., in addition [0 the relevant commentaries, M.
Suber, Moses, Oxford 1946, 39-55; T. C. Vriezen, "Ehje 'aser 'chiC', in W.
B.umg.rtner et al., Festschrift fiir A. Bertholet, Tubingen 1950,498-512; A.
Dcissler, Die Grrmdbotschaft des Alten Testamettts. Em theo/og;scher Durchblick,
Freoburg - Basic - Vienn., '1972, 48ff.
54. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought compared with Greek, ET J. L. Moreau, London
and Philadelphi. 1960, 38{(.
352 Notes to pages 148-154
55. Philo, Qllod Delis sit ill/mlllabilis 14 (philollis Alex. opera, ed. P. Wendl.nd,
2, Berlin 1897,72); De vita Mosis 14 (ibid., 4, 136f.); De Abraham 24 (ibid., 28).
56. Athanasius, De sYllodis 35 (PG 26, 7531.); Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio II,
45,3 (SC 247, 148); Gregory of Nyssa, COlltra Elllromilllll I, 8 (PG 45, 255ff.);
Hilary, De Trillitate I, 5 (CCl 62, 41.).
57. Augustine, De civitate Dei VIII, II (CCl47, 227f.); De Trillitate V, to
(CCl50, 217f.).
58. Athanasius, Dedecretis lIicaenoe sy"odi (PG 25, 449); d. Cyril of Alexandria.
De Trinitatedialogil (PG 75, 672BD).
59. Thomas Aquinas, ST!, 13, It.
60. Ibid.
61. Cf. K. Kremer, Die neuplatonische Se;'lsphi/osophie WId ibrt \Virktmg allf
Thomas von Aqlli1l, Leiden 1966.
62. STI, 3, 4; 7, 1; etc.
63 . Slimma (amra Gemiles I, 26.
64. ST!-II, 66, 5 ad 4.
65. ST!, 3, 5.
66. ST I, 8, 1.
67. ST!, 9, If.
68 . ST!, to, t.
69. ST!, 14,5; 19, 1.
70. ST!, 18,3.
71. Cf. F. lakner, 'Aseit.t', L TK 1,92 If.
72. E. Brunner t Dogmatics 1. The Christian Doctrine of God, ET O. Wyan,
london and Phil.delphia 1950, 120.
73. M. Heidegger, Identityalld Diff.TeI"e, ET j. Stambaugh, New York 1969,
72.
74. CE. G. Siewerth, Dos Schicksal der Metapbysik va" Thomas lU Heidcgger,
Einsiedeln 1959.
75. j. E. Kuhn, Katholische Dogmatik 1/2. Die dogmatiscl,. Lehre vall der
Erkellllll,is, dell Eigellschaftell,md der Eillheit GotleS, Tubingen 1862, 758ff.
76. H. Schnell, Katholische Dogmatik I, Munster 1888, 238fl.
77. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ET j. M. D. Meiklejohn, in Kant, Great
Books of the Western World 42, Chicago 1952,7.
78.J. G. Fichte, 'Uberden Grund unseres Glaubens cine g6rtliche Weltregierung',
WW 1lI, ed. Medicus, I 19-33.
79. Cf. above, 26f.
80. Fichte, op. cit.
81. K. jaspers, Philosophical Faith and Revelation, ET E. B. Ashton, New York
1967,14IH.
82. On the death-of-God theology d. ]. Bishop, Die Gott-ist-tot Theo/ogie,
Dusseldorf 1968; D. Solie, Christ the Represelllative: All Essay in Theology after
the 'Death of God', ET D. lewis, london .nd Philadelphia 1967; id., Atheistiscl,
an Gatt glauben. Beitriige .IIr Theologie, Ohen-Freiburg 1968.
83. H. Kiing, Does God Exist? All AnsIV" for Today, ET E. Quinn, New York
and London 1980, 631-5.
84. A. M. S. Boethius, Liberde persolla et dllabll' lIatllris 3 (Pl64, 1343).
85. Richard of St Victor, De Trinitat. IV, 22, 24 (ed. Ribaillier, 187f., 189f.).
86. CI. M. Muller and W. Vossenkuhl, 'Person', HPG 2,1059-70.
 Notes to pages 154-161 353
87. H. Krings, 'Freiheit, Ein Versuch, Gott zu denken', Ph, 77,1970,225-37;
id., 'Freiheit', HPG 1,493-510; H. Krings .nd E. Simon, 'Gott', HPG 2, 614-41.
88. Vatican II, Ga"dium et spes, 76.
Chapter 1/ jesus Christ, Son of God
I.lrenaeus, Adv. haer.lll, 20, 2 (SC 211, 388-93).
2. G. Buchner, Danlolls Tod, Act 3, cited in J. Molrma"n, The Trinity and the
Killgdom of God, ET M. Kohl, London .nd New York 1981,48. On the whole
problem d. W. Kasper, 'Das Bose 31s rheologisches Problem', in Cbristlicher
Gla"be ill modemer Gesellschaft 9, Freiburg- Basle - Vienna 1981, 176-80.
3. Cited in L.ct.ntius, De ira Dei \J (PL 7,121).
4. A. Camus, The Myth of Sisyph"s a"d Other Essays, ET j. O'Brien, London
and New York 1955,42.
5. Cf. R. L. Rubenstein, After A"schwitz: Radical Theology a"d COli temporary
,,,daism, Indianapolis 1966.
6. G. Scholem, 'Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism', in
The Messimlic Idea;1I Judaism and Other Essays Oil Jewish Spirituality, ET M. A.
Meyer and H. H.lkin, New York 1971, 1.
7. Cf. K. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in Karl Marx, Early Writi"gs, ET ed.
T. B. Bottomore, New York 1964, 11.
8. E. Bloch in p:1rricular has endeavored to make a place in the Marxist system
for the positive, utopian, world-transforming impulses unleashed by the idea of
redemption, although in the process he imposes a strictly atheistic interpretation
of them. Cf. Das Pril/<ip Hoffmmg, Frankfurt 1959; Atheism il/ Christianity: The
Religiol/ of the Exodlls al/d the Kil/gdol1l, ET j. T. Swann, New York 1972.
9. On this subject d. E. Schillebeeckx, Christ: The ExperiCllce ofJeslls as Lord,
ET john Bowden, London and New York 1980, 670ff.
10. F. Niensche, Beyol/dGood al/d Evil, no. 270, ETW. Kaufm.nn, New York
1966, Vimage Books cd., 220; Nietzsche cotttra Wagner, 'The Psychologist Speaks
Up', no. 2, ET W. Kaufmann in The Portable Niet<sche, New York 1954,678-9.
11. Moltmann, op. cit., 48 .
12. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Getttiles III, 71.
13. T. W. Adorno, M;,zima MoraUa. Re/lectiOfIS from a Damaged Life, ET E. F.
N. jephcott, New York 1978,247.
14. M. Horkheimer, Die Sehnsllcht "ach dem gauz Andere". Eiftl"terview mit
Kommentar vall H. Cmmt;or, Hamburg 1970, 69.
15. Cf. A. D. Sertillanges,.. Le probleme dll mal, 2 vols., Paris 1948-51; F.
Billicsich, Das Problem des Ubels ill der Philosophie des Abel/dlandes, 3 vols.,
V,enna .nd Col,!gne 1952-59; T. Haecker, Schopfer m,d Schiipf,mg, Munich
21949; B. Welte, Uberdas Bose, QD 6, Freiburg-Basle- Vienna 1959; P. RicDeur,
Fallible Mall, ET C. Kelbley, Chic.go 1965; id., The Symbolism of Evil, ET E.
Buchanan, New York 1967; K. Luthi, Got~.l.md das Bose, Zurich 1961; Y. Congar,
'Schicksal oder Schuld? Das Problem des Ubels und des Bosen', in j. Hiittenbiigel
(cd.), Gott - Mensch - Universum. Der Christ vor dell Fragen der Zeit, Graz -
Vienna _. Cologne 1974, 653-75; j. Marit.in, God alld the Permissiol/ of Evil, ET
j. W. Evans, Milwaukee 1966; W. Brugger, Theologia Natllralis, Pullach 1954,
369-90; O. Marquardt, 'Idealismus und Theodizee', in Schwierigkeitell mit der
Geschichtsphilosophie, Frankfurt 1973,52-65; W. Kern .ndj. Splerr, 'Theodicy',
SacM,mdi 6,213-18; L Oeing~Hanhoff and W. Kasper, 'Ncgacivirar und Boses',
354 Notes to pages 161-166
in Christlicher Glaube ill moderner Gesellschaft 9, Freiburg- B351e- Vienna 198 t,
147-201.
16. G. W. leibniz, Theodicy: Essays all tbe Goodllcss of God, tbe Freedom of
Mall, and the Origin of Evil, ET E. M. Huggard, New Haven 1952.
17. Plato, Rcpublic379.
18. Augustine, De ordille I, 7; II 7 (CCl 29,97-9,117-20); Ellebiridioll 11
(eel 46,69-70); Th,Jm3s Aquinas, STI, 22, 2; 42, 2; Summa contra Gentiles III,
71.
19. CI. especially P. Teilhard de Chardin, Tbe Pbellomelloll of Mall, ET B. Wall,
london and New York 1959,309-11.
20. D. S611e, Sufferillg, ET E. R. Kalin, Philadelphia 1975, 22ft.
21. F. M. Dostoicvsky, The Brothers Karamazov, Book 5, ch. 4, ET D.
Magafshack, Harmondsworth and Baltimore 1958,1,297.
22. CI. Kasper, art cit. (n. 15), 193ft.
23. E. Zenger, 'Jesus von Nazaret und die messi:mischen Hoffnungen des
alnesramentlichen Israels', in W. Kasper (cd.), Chns/%gische Schwerpmtkte,
Dusseldorf 1980, 37-78.
24. M. Buber, Two Types of Faith, ET N. Goldhawk, london 1951; R.
Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, ET K. Grabel, 2 vols., New York and
london 1951-55, I, If.
25. H. Gese, 'Ocr Messias', in his Zur biblisclJen TlJeologic, Altlcstamcnt/i,lJe
Vortrage, Munich 1977, 128-51.
26. Zenger, art. cit., 43.
27. H. Gese, 'N;:uus ex virginc', in Vom Sinai zum Zion. Alttestamentli,he
Beitriige Z'IT biblischen Thco/ogie, Munich 1974, 136.
28. G. von Rad, Old TestafflCllt Theology, ET D. M. G. Stalker, 2 vols.,
Edinburgh and New York 1962-65, 1, 320fl.
29. Ibid., 2, 1161.
30. Zenger, art. cie., SO.
3t. H. L. Strack ~nd P. Billerbeck, Kommemar zmu Neuc" Testament ailS
Talmlld lind Midrasch 1, Munich 1922, 6ff.
32. Ellaeh 45-50, in R. H. Charles (ed.), Th. Apocrypha alld Pselldepigrapha
of the Old Testamen/, Oxford 1913, 2, 213-18.
33. Gese, 'Der Messias' (n. 25), 150f.
34 V. Taylor, The Names ofJesus, London 1954j W. Marxsen, The Beginllings
of Christo/ogy: A S/Ildy ill Its Problems, Philadelphia 1969, H. Ristow and K.
Matthiae (eds.), Der historische Jesus .md der kerygmatische Christtls. Be;triige
zum Chr;stllsverstond"is in Forsc/Jlmg m,d Verki;,rdigung, Berlin 1960; R.
Bultmann, 'The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus', in C. E.
Braaten and R. A. Harrisville (cds.) The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ,
Nashville 1964, 15-43; id.,jeslls a .. d the Word, ETL P. Smith and E. H. lantero,
New York 1934; F. Hahn, The Titles of jeslls ill Chris/o/ogy: Their His/ory ill
Early Chris/iallity, ET H. Knight and G. Ogg, london and New York 1969; id.,
'Methodenprobleme eincr Christologie des Neuen Testamems', VF 2, 1970,3-41;
L Cerfaux, Christ in the Theology of St Palll, ET G. Webb and A. Walker, New
York 1959; R. H. Fuller, The Foundations of New Testament Christo!ogy,
Philadelphia and london 1965; M. Hengel, The SOli of God: The Origin of
Christolagy alld the History of jewish·Hellettistie Religion, ET John Bowden,
london and Philadelphia 1976; W. G. Kummel, 'Jesusforschung scit 1950', TRII,
 Notes to pages 166- 174 355
NF 31, 1965-66, 15-46,289- 315; O. Cullmann, The Christ%gy of the New
Testa",ellt, ET S. C. Guthrie and C. A. M. Hall, Philadelphia and London' 1963;
X. Uon-Dufour, The Gospels alld the jeslls of History, ET j. McHugh, New York
1967; W. Trilling, Fragell :wr Gescbichtlichkeit fesu, Dusseldorf 1966; id.,
Christusverkii"digwrg in dell sYlJoptlschen Evangelien. Beispiele gatttmgsgemiisser
Allslegwlg, Munich 1969; H. R. Balz, Methodische Probleme der neutestament-
lichen Christ%gie, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1967i E. Schweizer, Jesus, ET D. F. Green,
Richmond 1971; G. Bornkamm, jeslls of Nalareth, ET I. and F. McLuskey with
j. M. Robinson, London and New York 1960; H. Braun, jesus of Nalareth. The
Man alld His Tillie, ET E. R. Kalin, PhIladelphia 1961; j. Gnilka,jeslls Christlls
"a," den {,iihe" Zeu811;ssen des Glollbens, Munich 1970i J. Jeremi3s, Nelli
Testament Theology I. The Proclamatlotl ofJesus, ET John Bowden, London and
New York 197 t j G. Schneider, Die Frage IIoeh Jesus. Christus-Aldsagen des Neuen
Testaments, Essen 1971; H. Schurmann, Das Geheimnis jes". VersJlche zur
jesllsfrage, Leipzig 1972; K. Rahner and W. Thusing, A New Christology, ET D.
Smith and V. Green New York and London 1980; H. Kung, On Beillg a Christian,
ET E. Quinn, New York and London 1976; C. H. Dodd, The FOlillder of
Christiallity, London and New York 1970; W. Pannenberg,jesus. God m,d Man,
ET L. Wilkins and D. A. Priebe, Philadelphia and London '1972; E. Schillebeeckx,
jesus: An Experiment i" Christ%gy, ET H. Hoskins, London and New York
1979; W. Kasper,jesliS/he Christ, ET V. Green, London and New York 1976; W.
Thusing, Die lIeutestame"tlichen The%ge" rmd jesus Christus 1, Dusseldorf
1981.
35. A. von Harnack, What Is Christia"ity?, ETT. B. Saunders, London and New
York '1901, 63.
36. H. Conzelmann, 'jesus Christus', RGG 3, 633f.
37. H. Merklein, Die Gottesherrscbaft als Handlzmgsprinzip. Utrtersuchzmg ZUT
Ethik jesll, Forschung zur Bibel 34, Wiirburg 1978,31 ff.
38. G. von Rad, 'Basileus', TDNT I, 570.
39. W. Kasper,jeslls the Christ (n. 34), 233.
40. M. Tullius Cicero, Oratio pro C. Rabirio perduellionis reo, cap. 5.
4 t. R. Bultmann, 'The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus' (n.
34),23-4.
42. R. Pesch, Wie jesus das Abendmahl hie/to Der Grund der Eucharistie,
Freiburg - Basle - Vienna '1978.
43. A. von Harnack, Lehrbllch der dogmellgeschichte I, Tiibingen '1931, 121
[1 have not been able to find the passage in the ET: History of Dogma I, ET N.
Buchanan, New York 1958, reprint. Tr.)
44. R. Buhman", Primitive Christianity and Its Contemporary Setting, ET R.
H. Fuller, London and New York 1956; id., Theology of the New Testament (n.
24); id., 'The Christology of the New Testament', in Faith and Understanding I,
ET L. P. Smith, New York 1969,262-85.
45. Cf. M. Hengel, The Son of Cod (n. 34).
46. H. Gese, 'Der Messias' (n. 25), 129ff.
47. Elloch 37-41, in R. H. Charies, op. cit. (n. 32), 2, 208-13.
48. R. Schnackenburg, The Gospel of johll I, ET K. Smyth, London and New
York 1968,481-93; H. Gese, 'Der johannesprolog', in Zurbiblischen Theo/ogie (n.
25),152-201; E. Schweizer, Neotestamentica. Deutsche lind Englische Aufsiitte.
1951-1963, Zurich and Stuttgart 1963, 110-21.
356 Notes to pages 174-181
49. Hengel, op. cir. (n. 34), 59.
50. Cf. E. Kascmann, Commelltary all Romans, ET G. Beomiley, Grand Rapids
.nd london 1980, 1OfI.; H. Schlier, Der Romerbrief, HTKNT 6, Freiburg - B.sle
- Vienn. 1977, 24fl.; U. Wilckens, Der Brief an die Romer 1, EKKNT 611,
Neukirchen - Vluyn - Ziirich 1978, 64fl.; Hengel, op. cir., 59fl.
51. CE. E. Lohmeyer, Kyrios Jesus. Eine Unters",hw'g 411 Phil 2, 5- 11,
Sirzungsberichre der Heidelberger Akad. der Wissen., Phil·hiS!. KI., 1927-28,4.
Abh.ndlung, Heidelberg '1961; E. Kasemann, 'Krirische An.lyse von Phil 2,
5-11', in Exegetisclu Vers",he und BesinnungcH 1, Gottingen 1970,51-59; G.
Bornkamm, 'Zum Verstandnis des Christus·Hymnus Phil 2, 6-1 I" in Studien ,II
Antike lind Urchristtlltllm. Gesammalte Allfsatu 2, Munich 1959, 177-87; j.
Gnilka, Der Philipperbrief, HTKNT 10/3, Freiburg - B.sle - Vien .. 1968; C.
Hofius, Der ChristJIshymm,s Philipper 2, 6-11. UntersudJJmg Zft Gestalt Imd
Aussage eines urchristlichen Psalms, Tubingen 1976.
52. Cf. W. Popkes, Christus traditus. Eine UnterslIclmng ,11m Begriff der
Dahingabe;m Neuen Testament, Zurich 1967.
53. j. Gnilk., DeT Ko/osserbrief, HTKNT 1011, Freiburg - Basle - Vienn. 1980,
51£r.j E. Schweizer, Der Brief an die Kolosser, EKKNT, Neukirchen - Vluyn -
Ziirich 1976, 50fl.
54. R. Bulrm.nn, The Gospel of jolm: A Commentary, ET G. R. Be.,ley.
Murroy, R. W. N. Hoare .nd j. K. Riches, Oxford .nd Philodelphi. 1971, 1311.;
R. Schnackenburg, The Gospel of john 1 (n. 48), 232fl.; F. M. Broun, jean
Ie theo/ogien. Les grandes traditions d'[srael d'accord des ecritllres d'apres Ie
quatrieme evangile, Paris 1964; R. E. Brown, The Gospel according to John, AB
29A, G.rden City 1970.
55. CI. A. Grillmeier, Christ ill ChristIan Tradition 1, ET john Bowden, Oxford
.nd ArI.nr. 1975; A. Gilg, Weg I/Ild Bedelltllllg der altkirchlichen Christologle,
Munich 1955; C. L. Preseige, God in Patristic Thought, London :1952. I. Owz
de Urbina, Nieee et Const011t;nople, Histoire des candles oecumeniques, cd. G.
Dumeige, 1, Paris 1963 i J. Liebaert, Cbristo/ogie. VOII der Apostolrscbell ZeIt bis
%wn KOllzil VOII ClJolkedon (451), mie einer biblisch.christologischen Einlelfung
von P. l.maccho, HDG 11111., Frdburg - B.sle - Vienn. 1965; P. Smulders,
'Dogmengeschichrliche und lehromrhche Enrfaitung der Christologic', Mysallll11,
389-475.
56. A. Orbe, Cristo/agio g1l6stica, 2 vols., Madrid 1976j H.Jonas, Gnosis WId
spiita",iker Geist, Goningen 11965.
57. Origen, Contra Cel",m IV, 18 (SC 136, 224-29).
58. justin, Apologia I, 46; II, 8; 10; 13 (Corp"s Apo/. I, cd. von 0110, 128fl.,
220fl., 224-8, 2361f.).
59. justin, Apologia I, 21 (ibid., 64-8).
60. justin, Apologia II, 6 (ibid., 212- 16); Dialoglls CIIm Tryphollc 61 (Ibid., II,
212-16); Arhen.goros, SlIppitcatio pro Clmstiallis (TU 412, 8- 10).
61. justin, Apologia I, 13 (ibid., 40fl.); d. Dialoglls Cllm Tryphollc 56; 128
(ibid., 186-96,451-4).
62. Theophilus of Anrioch, Ad AlltolYCllm 2,10; 2, 22 (SC 20,122-4,154).
63. Tertullian, Adv. Praxcall 2; 8, 25 (CCl 2, 1160f., 1167f., 11951.); Dc
p"dicitia 21, 16 (CCl2, 1328).
64. Terrulli.n, Adv. Praxeall7 (CCl2, 116511.); Adv. Hermogcllem2 (CCl 1,
397f.).
 Notes to pages 181-188 357
65. Tertullian, Adv. Praxean 8 (CCL 2,11671.); d. 13 (CCL2, 1173-6).
66. Ibid. 9(CCL 2, I 168f.).
67. Origen, De prillcipiis I, 2, 2 and 9 (SC 252, 1121f., 128H.); IV, 4,1 (SC 268,
400-5).
68. De principiis I, 2, 5 (SC 252, 118-21); IV, 4,1 (SC 268, 400-5).
69. Ibid., I, 2, 7 (SC 252, 124f.).
70. Ibid., I, 2, 2 (SC 252, 112-15); De oratione IS, 1 (GCS Orig. 2, 3331.).
71. De principiis IV, 4, 1 (SC 268, 400-5).
72. Ibid., I, 2,13 (SC 252,140-43); III Joall.ll, 6 (SC 120, 210-13).
73. Contra Celsum V, 39 (SC 147, 116-31).
74. De principiis I, 2, 8 (SC 252, 126-9).
75. Ibid., 11, 6, 1 (SC 252, 308-11); COlllra Celsum lll, 35 (SC 136, 821.).
76. Grillmeier, op. cit., (n. 55), 1,219-48.
77. Ortiz de Urbina, op. cit. (n. 55); J. N. O. Kelly, Early Christiall Creeds,
London and New York 21960, 205-30; Grillmeier, op. cit., I, 249-73 (with
bibliography).
78. OS 125; ET in NO 7.
79. H. KraIt, 'Homoousios', ZKG 66,1954-55,1-24; A. Grillmeier, 'Homoou-
sios', LTK 5, 467f.; F. Ricken, 'D35 Homoousios von Nikaia als Krisis des
alcchristlichen Platonismus', in B. Welte (ed.), Zu, Friihgeschichte der Christ%gie,
QO 51, Freiburg- Basle- Vienna 1970,74-99.
80. Athanasius, Adv. Ariallos I, 39 (PG 26, 91-4); 11, 47, 59, 691. (PG 26,
245-48,271-4,293-6).
81.lgnatiusol Antioch, Ad Ephesios 20, 2 (PatresApostolici, ed. Funk-Oiekamp,
2,204).
82. Athanasius, Adv. Ariallos I, 38; lll, 19 (PG 26, 89-92, 361-4).
84. Ibid., 11, 59 (PG 26, 271-4).
84. cr. M. Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma: An Historical Study of
Its Problem, ET S. G. F. Brandon, New York 1957.
85. Cf. above, n. 48.
86. Ignatius of Antioch, Ad Magnesias 8, 2; Ad Ephesios 3, 2; 17, 2 (PatTes
Apostolici, ed. Funk-Diekamp, 2,86,184,200); Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone
61 (Corpus Apol. 11 ed. von Otto, 212-16); Athenagoras, Supplicatio pro Christ-
iallis 10 (TU 4/2,101.); Irenaeus, Demonstratio (TU 31/1, 29 22).
87. Cf. H. Kleinknecht, 'Lego, 3: The Logos in the Greek and Hellenistic World',
TDNT 4, 80ff.
88. H. Krings, 'Wort', HTG 2, 83S-4S.
89. Plato, Cratylus 434b.
90. Ibid., 438a-439b.
91. Plato, Sophist 363c, 364a.
92. Augustine, De Trillitate XV, II (CCL SOA, 486-90).
93. Ibid., XV, 10 (CCLSOA, 483-6).
94. Ibid., XV, 12 (CCLSOA, 490-4).
9S.lbid., XV, 13 (CCLSOA, 4941.).
96. Ibid., XV, 14 (CCL SOA, 496f.); d. III Joam.is Evallgeli.lII. trac/a/lls I, 8-10
(CCL 36, 4-6).
97. Thomas Aquinas, STI, 27, I; 34,1.
98. Thomas Aquinas, De pot. 10, 1.
99. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gemiles IV, 11.
358 Notes to pages 188-192
100. Thomas Aquinas, De pot. 10, I.
101. Thomas Aquinas, STI,34, 3j De veT. 4,5.
102. On what follows d. H. Urs von Balthasar, 'Mysrcrium Paschale" in MysaJ
11112, 133-326.
103. For [he interpretation cf., in addition to the literature listed in n. 51, P.
Henry, 'Kenose', DBS S, 7-161; L. Oeing·Hanfoff, 'Der in Gottesgestalt war ... ',
TQ 161, 198 1,288-304. For the history of theexegesis of this passage: J. Gewiess,
'Zurn altkirchlichen Vestiindnis der Kenosisstelle', TQ 128, 1948,463-87.
104. Augustine, Serlll. 4, 5 (CCl 4 I, 2 If.).
105. J. Scharbert, Der Schill.,,; im Altell Testamellt, Bonn 1955, 215ff.
106. P. Kuhn, Goltes Selbstcmiedrigllng ill dCT TheoJogie 4~r Rabbb,clI, Munich
1968; id" Gottes Trailer und Klage in deT rabbinisc/Jen Uberliefenmg, lei den
1978.
107. Cf. W. Maas, Die U'lVcriilldcrlichkeit Gottes. Zum Verhiilt"is VOlt griec/,·
iscl,·philosophischcr turd christlicher Gotteslehre, Paderbornec theologische
Studien 1, Munster - Paderborn - Vienna 1974, 34ff.
108. This is true, for example, of Clement of Alexandria; d. Maas, ibid., 125ff.
109. This can be seen from the very fact that the fathers of the church, following
scripture, often atcribute to God such emocions:ls anger, love :lnd pity.
110. Ignatius of Antioch, Ad Po/ycarplllll 3, 2 (Patres Aposto/ici, ed. Funk-
Diekarnp,2,188ff.).
1 I 1.1renaeus, Adv. Haer. IV, 20, 4 (SC 10012,634-7).
112. Meli.o of Sardis, It, Pascha 3 (SC 123, 60-2).
113. Tertullian, D. carlle C/rristi 5,4 (CCl 2, 88t).
114. Tcrtullian, Adv. Marciollelll II, 16,3 (CCl, 493).
I 15. Ibid., II, 27, 7 (CCl 1,507).
116. Cf. R. lachenschrnid, 'Theopaschisrnus', LTK 10, 83.
117. Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei VIII, 17 (CCl 47, 234f.).
118. Cf. Athanasius, Adv. Ariallos 111, 32-34 (PG 26, 389-98); Gregory of
Nyssa, COlltra EIIIIOllli'lII' VI (PG 45, 721B-725B).
119. Cf. H. Crouzcl, 'La Passion de l'lmpassible\ in L'hommedcvallt Die" (FS
H. de LII"ac), Theologie 56, Paris 1963, 1,269-79.
120. Hilary, De Trillitate V11I, 45; X, 10,24 (CCl 62A, 357f., 466f., 478f.).
121. Augustine, De civitate Dei XIV, 9 (CCl 48, 425-30).
122. Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica maglla 24, I (PG 45, 64f.).
123. Origen, De prillcipiis II, 4, 4 (SC 252, 288f.).
124. Origen, HOllliliae ill Ezechielem 6, 6 (GCS Orig. 8, 383ff.); d. Comrnerrt·
ari",,, ill Epistlliam ad Romallos VII, 9 (PG 16, 1127C-I BOA).
125. Cf. Thoma, Aquinas, STI, 13, 7; De pot. 7, 8-1 1.
126. luther. Displltatio Heidelbergae "abita, Theses 19f. (WA 1,254); d. W.
von Loewcnich, Llttller's TllCO/Ogy of the Cross, ET H. J. A. Bouman, Minneapolis
1976.
127. Cf. P. Althaus, The Theology of Martill Lllther, ET R. C. Schultz,
Philadelphia 1966, 193-99; T. Beer, Der frahliclle IVechsel'lIId Streit. Grrllldzi,ge
der The%gie Luthers, Einsiedeln '1980, esp. 323-453.
128. J. C3lvin, 11I51;llItio ehristianae religionis (1559) II, 13,4 (Opera selteta III,
ed. B. Barth 3nd W. Niese, Munich 1928,456-8), ET Calvin's Institutes, LCe,
london and Philadelphia 1960, 480f. Cf. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 112, 159-71.
119. Cf. M. Lienhard, L"ther. Wilness to Jesus Chr;st: Stages alld Themes of
 Notes to pages 192-200 359
the Reformer's Christology, ET E, H, Robertson, Minneapolis 1982; Y. Congar,
'Regards et reflex ions sur 13 christologie de Luther', in A. Grillmeier and H. Baeht
(eds.), Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart III, Wurzburg
'1973,457-86.
130. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesllngen iiber die Philosophie der Religion 1112 (ed.
lasson),53f.
131. Ibid., 75.
132. Ibid., 158; cf. id., Faith and Knowledge, or the Ref/ective Philosophy of
Subjectivity in the Complete Range of Its Forms as Kantian, Jacobian and
Fichtean Philosophy, ET W. Cerf and H. S. Harris Albany 1977, 190; id., The
Phenomenology of Mind, ET J. Baillie, rev. 2nd ed., london 1949,753,780.
133.ld., VorleSlmgell iiber die Philosophie der Religion III, 148.
134. Cited by J. Moltmann, The Crttci{ied God: The Cross of Christ as the
FOlllldation and Criticism of Christian Theology, ET R. A. Wilson and John
Bowden, london and New York 1974,35.
135. Cf. the survey in H. Kling, Menschwerdzmg Gottes. E;'lc Einfiihrung in
Ijegels theolog;sches Denken als Prolegomena Zit einer kiinftigen Christologie,
Okumenische Forschungen I, Freiburg - Basle - Vienna, 1970, 637-70;]. Galot,
Vers une nouvelle christologie, Paris 1971, 67-94j id., Dieu sOllffre-t-il?, Paris
1976.
136. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, New York
1960,524.
137. K. Kitamori, Theology of the Pain of God, Richmond, Va and london
1965.
138. J. Bishop, Die Gott-isHot· Theologie, Dusseldorf 1968; S. M. Daecke, Der
Mythos vom Tode Gottes. Eill kritischer Uberblick, Hamburg 1969; H. M. Barth,
'Der christologische Ansatz dec nordamerikanischen Tod-Gottes-Theologie', KD
17,1971,258.
139. Cf. H. Urs von Balthasar, 'Mysterium Pasch ale', in Mysall1ll2, 164fl.
140. S. Kierkegaard, ]ollmals and Papers, ET H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong, 2,
Bloomington 1970,62 (no. 1251).
141. Augustine, In Joalll/is Evangelillm tractatus XII, 10f. (CCl 36, 1261.).
142. K. Barth, Chllreh Dogmatics 1111, S28: 'The Being of God as the One Who
lives in Freedom' 1257ff.).
143. Origen, De prillcipiis I, 2, 5 (SC 252,118-21); IV, 4, I (SC 268, 400-5).
144. Augustine, De Trillitate VIII, 10 (CCl 50, 290f.); cf.IV, 2 and 4 (CCL50,
2941., 297-300).
145. Ibid., IX, 3 and 4 (CCl 50, 295-300).
146. Richard of St VICtor, De Trillitate (cd. J. Ribaillier); on Richard cf. below,
216.

Chapter 11/ The Holy Spirit, lord and Giver of Life

I. CI. Y. Congar, I Believe ill the Holy Spirit 3. The River of Life Flows ill the
East alld ill the West, ET David Smith, london and New York 1983, 165f.
2. L. Oeing· Hanhoff, 'Geist', HWP 3,154-212.
3. Plato, Phaedo 251d; Symposium 2093-212; Augustine, l]e vera relig;one 41,
77 (CCl 32, 2371.); G. W. F. Hegel, VorleSlmgell iiber die Asthetik I (WW XII,
ed. H. Glockner), 153ff.
360 Notes to pages 200-211
4. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, no. 822, ET W. Kaufmann and R. J.
Hollingdale, New York 1967,435.
S. Literature on biblical pneumato)ogy: F.Buchsel. Dc, Geist Goues;m Nellc"
Teslame"" Giitersloh 1926; H. Kleinknecht cl al., 'Pneuma', TDNT 6, 332-455i
C. K. Barrett, The Holy Spirit alld the Gospel Traditioll, london and Philadelphia
21966; I. Hermann, Kyrios lind Pneuma. St"dien Zrtr Chris/ologie der paulinischell
Hauptbriefe, SANT 2, Munich 1961; E. Schweizer, Neolestamcntica. Deutsche
lind Ellgllsche Allfsat", 1951-1967, ZUrich and Stuttgart, 1963, 153-79; K. H.
Sehdkle, Theology of the New Testament 2, ET W. A. Jurgens, Collegeville 1976,
231-35; Y. CongaT, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, I, The Experiencc of the Spinto
london and New York 1983, 3ff.
6 . Anaximenes, Frog",. 2, in H. Diels and \VI. Kranz (cds.), Die Fragmellle dCT
Vorsok,atiker 1, Berlin, 61951, 95.
7. Aristotle, De motu attimali"", 10,70301.
8. H. Kleinknecht, 'Pneuma', TQNT6, 354-5.
9. Augustine, COllfessiolles XIII, 7, 8 (CCl 27, 245).
10. Cf. F. Lenrzen·Dcls, Die Taufe }esu "aeh de" Synoptikem. Litcrarkritische
,md gattm,gsgeschi'htliche Untersuchungen, Frankfurter theologische Studien 4,
Frankfurt 1970.
11. H. Schlier, 'Zum BegriEf des Geistes nach den Johannesevangelium', in his
Besinmmg allfdas Nellc Tes/ament, Exegetische Aufsatze und Vonrage 2, Freiburg
- Basle- Vienna 1964,264-71 Inot included in the ET: The Relevallce of the New
Testament, ETW. J. O'Hara, New York 1969. Tr.].
12.1 Clem 2, 2 (Dieapostolischell Yater, ed. J. A. Fischer, Darmstadt 1956,26).
J3.1 Clem 38, I (ibid., 72); 46, 6 (ibid., 82); Didach. 11,8 and 12; 13 (SC 248,
184fl., 186ff., 190); Justin, Dialoglls CIIm Trypholle 39, 2-5; 82; etc. (Corplls
Apol. II, ed. von Otto, 296-9, etc.).
14. Eusebius, His/oria Ecclesiastica V, 3-4,14-19 (GCS 911, 432f., 458-81).
15. Tertullian, De plld. 21,17 (CCl 2, 328).
16.lrenaeus, Adv. haer.lII, 24,1 (SC 211, 471-5).
17. Hippolytus, Traditio Apostolica, Pro!., in G. Dix (cd.), The Treatise 011 the
Apostolic Traditioll of St. Hippolytlls of Rome, london 1937, I I.
18. Ibid., 31; 35 (Dix, 57f., 6lf.).
19. Y. Congar, op. cit., I, 68fl.
20. Augustine, Serm. 267,4 (Pl 38,1231); d. below, n. II J.
21. On Joachim of Flora d. E. Benz, Ecclesia spiritualis. Kirchenidee mId
Geschichtsthcologieder (rallziskanischclI Reformatioll, Stuttgart 1934; K. Lowith,
Meaning in History: The Theo/ogicallmplicatiolls of the Philosophy of History,
Chicago 1949, 145-59; Congar, op. cit., I, 126ff.; H. de lubac, La posterite
spirituelle de Joacbim de Fiore, Paris and Namur 1979.
22. Cf. J. Rarzinger, The Theology of History ill St. BOllavelltllre, ET Z. Hayes,
Chicago 1971.
23. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1,39,5; I-II, 106,4; d. M. Seckler, Das Heil ill der
Geschichte. Geschicbtstbeo/ogisches De"ke1l bei Thomas VOII Aquin. Munich
1964.
24. Thomas Aquinas, STI-II, 106 and 108.
25. H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck, Kommelltar zum Neueu Testamellt aus
Talmlld ulld Midrasch 2, Munich 1924, 134-8.
26. CI. below, German 243((.
 Notes to pages 211- 213 361
27. On the history 01 pneumatology: H. B. Swete, The Holy Spirit ill the Allcielll
Church, London 1912; T. Ruesch, Die Enlsle/JUlIg deT Lehre l'om Heiltgeu GeIst
be; Ig1latius VOIl Amioc/Jia. Thcop/JI/us VOII AlIliochia mId trCI1QUS von LYOII,
Studien Zll Dogmcngeschichte und systematischen Theologie 2, Zurich 1952; G.
Kretschmar, Studien ZII' fri;hchristlicbell Trinitiitstheologte, Beitrage zur hisrori-
5chen Theologie 21, Tubinge" 1956; id" 'Le developpemenr de 13 doctrine du
Saint-Esprit du Nouveau Testament 3. Nicee', VCaro 88, 1962,5-55; id" 'Oer
Heilige Geist in dec Geschichrc. Grundzuge frilhchristlicher Pneumatologic', in W.
Ka.sper (cd.), Gegemuart des Geistes. Aspek~p der Pllellmatoiogjc, QD 85, Frdburg
- Basic - Vienna 1970, 92- 130; H. Oplrz, Urspriinge {riihcbrist/icher Pllellmatol·
ogie. Eill Beitrag zlIr Entstel"mg der Lehre vom Heiligell Geist ill der romischen
Geme;'lde lmter ZlIrgrtmdelegwrg des I. C/emens·Brie{es rard des 'Hirten' des
Hermas, Theologische Arbeiren 15, Berlin 1960j A. Orbe, 'La teologia del Espiritu
Santo', in his £Studios Va/enti"iar1Os 4, Rome 1960j W. D. Hauschild. Gottes
Geist wId deT Mensch. St"diell lur {rii,hristlichen Pllelmratologie, BEvT 63,
Munich 1972; H. J. J:lschke, Der Heilige Geist i111 Bekemrtms deT Kirche. Eine
Studie lltr P"eumato/ogie des Ire"iills VOIl LYall ;m Amga1lg VOIII altchristlicben
Giallbellsbekenntn;s, Munsterische Bcitrage zur Theologie 20, Munster 1976;
Congar, op. cit., I: 17311.
28. Gregory 01 Nazianzus, Oratio 31, 26 (SC 250, 326-9).
29. Shepherd of Henllas 41; 58; 59 (SC 53, 188-91,24-37,238-41); Justin,
Apologia I, 39 (COrpIlS Apo/.l, ed. von Otto, 110-13 ).
30. Didache 7,1 (SC 248, 232).
31. Justin, Apologia I, 61 (op. cit., 162-91.
32. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. III, 17, 1 (SC 211, 328-31 ); Demollstratio 3; 61. (SC
62,32,391.).
33. Tertullian, De baptismo (CCl 1,2881.1.
34.lrenaeus, Adv. haer. I, 10, 1 (SC 264, 154-9).
35. Tertullian, De praescript. haer. 12 (CCl I, 1971); Adv. Praxeall 2 (CCl 2,
11601.); De virgo vel. 1 (CCLl, 12091.).
36. Irenaeus, Demollstratio 5 (SC 62, 391.).
37. Ibid., 99 (SC 62, 1681.).
38. Echoes in Irenaeus, Demollstratio 1 (SC 62, 46-8); Origen. De principiis I,
3,4 (SC 252,148-53).
39. Tertullian, Adv. Praxeall 2; 8 (CCl2, 11601., 11671.).
40. Origen, De principiis I, 3,1-8 (SC 252,142-65).
41. Athanasius, Epist. ad Serap. I, 19-25 (PG 26, 573-90); d. Gregory 01
Nazianzus, Oratio 31, 6 (SC 250, 285-7).
42. On Constantinople d. A. M. Riner, Das K01lzil vOIl.. Konstalli"opel Jmd seill
Symbol. Stlldien lllr Gescbicbte .md The%gie des 2. Okumemtscbell KOIlZils,
Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Oogmengeschichte 15, Gottingen 1965; I. Ortiz de
Urbina, Nicee et Constatttillople, Histoire des conciles oecumeniques, ed. G.
Dumeige, I, Paris 1963; W. D. Hauschild, 'Oas trinirarische Dogma von 381 .tls
Ergebnis verbindlicher Konsensusbildung', in K. Lehmann and W. Pannenberg
(ed.), GJallbensbekemllnis mId Ki"bengemeinscha{t, Dialog der Kirchen I, Frei·
burg and Gettingen 1982, 13-48.
43. CI. COD, 28.
44. DS 151; ND 13.
45. DS 168-77; ND306/16-24.
362 Notes to pages 213-221
46. Epiphanius, AllcoralUs 119 (GCS 25,147-9).
47. DS 150; ND 12.
48. Cf. below, 214ff.
49. On what follows d. especially Congar, op. cit., 3: 174ff.
50. M. J. 5cheeben, The Mysteries of Christiallity, ET C. J. Vollert, 5t louis
1946,99.
51. Augustine, De Trinitate V, 11 (CCl 50, 218ff.).
52. Ibid., VI, 10 (CCL50, 24lff.); d.IX 4f. (CCL50, 297-301).
53. Anselm of Canterbury, MOllologioll, 49ff.
54. Thomas Aquin3s~ ST 1, 27, 3f. ; 36, 1; Summa cOlltra Gentiles IV, 19.
55. Augustine, De Trinitate IV, 20 (CCl 50, 195-202); V, 11 and 14 (CCL50,
218ff., 222f.).
56. Ibid., XV, 17 and 26 (CCl 50A, 501-7, 524-9).
57. Thomas Aquinas, 1111 Sent., d. 28, q. 1,3. 1i IlIlll Sent., d. 25, q. 1,3. 2 .
58. Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII, \0 (CCl 50, 290f.); IX, 2 (CCl50, 2941.).
59. Congar, op. cit., 3: 103-6,108-14.
60. Richard of 5t Victor, De Trillitate III, 22ff. (ed. J. Ribaillier, 136ff., 202ff.).
61. John Damascene, De fide orth. I, 7 (Die Schriften des Johallnes vall
Damasklls, ed. B. Kotter, I, Berlin and New York 1973, 16£.), who is quoting
Gregory of NYSSil, Oratio catechetica magna 2 (PG 45, 17-18c),
62. De fide orth. I, 8 (Korter, 18-31).
63. Ibid., I, 7 (Karter, 161.l; Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica magna 2 (PG
45,17-18c).
64 . De fide orth. 1, 8 (Karter, 18-3 1).
65. Congar, op. cit. 3: 401., 49 n. 1.
66. DS 850;.ND 321.
67. Congar, op. cit., 3: 25f, 30ff, 35f.
68 . Ibid., 3: 32, 39.
69. Tertullian, Adv. Praxeall4 (CCl 2, 11621.).
70. Epiphanius, AncaralUs 6 (GCS 25,12£.).
71. Maximus Confessor, Opuscula theo/ogica et polemica (PG 91, 136).
72. DS 188 (?), 284, 470, 485, 490, 527; ND 310.
73. Congar, op. cit., 3, 49ff.
74. DS 805, 850, 853; ND 319, 321, 24. Forthe contemporary appraisal of this
council d. A. Ganoczy, 'Formale und inhaltliche Aspekte der miuelalterlichen
Konzilien OIls Zeichen kirchlichen Ringc:ns urn ein universales Glaubensbekeontnis',
in Lehmann and Pannenberg (eds.), op. cit. (n. 42), 49-79.
75. COD 65 .
76. Congar, op. cit., 3: 57ff.
77. Ibid., 3: 61 if; D. Wenden bourg, Geist oder Energid Zur Frage der innergol/-
lichen Verankertmg des christ/ichen Lebens ill der byzalltinischen Theo/ogle,
Munich 1980.
78 . V. lossky, Th. Mystical Theology of tIl. Eastem Clm,,", london 1957;
'The Procession of the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox Triadology', ESQ 7, 1948,
31-52. Similarly S. Bulg.kov, Le paraclet, Paris 1946. For. different view: P.
Evdokimov, L'Esprit-Saint dans la traditIon orthodoxe, Paris 1969.
79. V. Bulatov, 'Th~ses uber das Fllioque. Von unseren russischen Theologen',
ReVile internationale de t"eo/ogie 6, 1898,681- 712.
80. Cf. Congar, op. cit., 3: 103ff., 174ff.
 Notes to pages 221-226 363
81. On the Council of Florence: J. Gill, COllStalJce 1..'1 HJlc·Florcnce.
Histone
des conciles occumcniqucs, cd. G. Dumcigc, 9, Paris 1965, 2I3ff.; Congar, op. cit.,
3: 1841f.
82. OS 850, d. 1300; NO 321, d. 322.
83. K. Barth, Chllrch Dogmatics III, 546-67; d.I/2, 250.
84. for cont,cmporary ccu~enical discussion: L. Vischcr (ed, ), GeIst Gottes -
Geist ChristI. Okumemsche Uberlegtmgell zur FiJioquc·Kcmtroverse, BClheftc zur
Okumcmschcn Rundschau 39, Frankfurt 1981; R. Slenczka, 'Das Fihoque In der
6kumemschen DlskusslOn', in Lehmann and Panncnbcrg (cds.), op. (n. (n. 42),
80-99; Congar, op. CIt., 3: 19211.
85. On recent pneumatology: H. Mlihlen, Der Heilige Geist als Person. BeItrag
zur Frage naeh der de", Heiligell Geist eigclw';mlichen Fwrktion in deT Trmitiit,
be; der Inkanratioll ulld 1m Gnadenb,,,,d. Munstcrischc Bcitragc zur TheologJc 26,
Mlin!>tcr 1963; id., Una mystica persona. Die Kirche als das Mysterium der
hetlsgeschichtltchen [delltitat drs Heiligen Ge;sts ill Christus tmd den Christen:
Em Persall m vlelen Personen, Munich - Paderborn - Vienna, .11968; Id., Dte
Emeuerlmg des elmstlichen Glaubens, Charisma - Geist - Befreitmg, l\:lunich
1974; H. Urs von Balthasar, Spiritus Creator, Skizzen zur Theologie 3, Emsicdeln
1967 ; H. Berkhol, The Doctr;lIe of the Ho.l)' Spirit, Richmond 1964; W. Dantine,
Der Hetllge GeIst und dertmheilige Geist. Uberdie Ernellerung der Urteils(dIJlgkelt,
Stuttgart 1973; C. Heitmann and H. Miihlen (eds.), Erfalmlllg lind Theologle des
Heiligen Geistes, Hamburg and Munich 1974; E. D. O'Connor, The Pentecostal
Movement in the Catholic Church, Notre Dame 1971; J. Moltmann, The Church
in the Power of the SPlrtt: A Contribwi011 to Messianic Ecclesiology, ET M. Kohl.
London and Ncw York 1977; \VI. Kasper and G. Sauter, Kirche- art des Geistes,
Kleine okumeOische Schriften 8, Freiburg - BasIc - Vienna 1976; K. Blaser.
Vorstosszur Pneumato/ogie, ThcologischeStudit;n 121, Zurich 1977;J. V. Taylor.
The Go-between God: The Holy Spirit and the ChTlstian Mission, London
and PhIladelphia 1973; O. A. Dillschneider, Ge;st als Vollellder des Glallbells,
Gutersloh 1978; E. Schweizer, Heiliger Geist, Themen der Thcologic. Erg.-Band,
Stuttgart 1978; \VI. Strolz (cd.), Vom Geist, dell wir brauchell, Freiburg - Baslc-
Vienna, 1978; \VI. Kasper (cd.), Gegemvartdes Geistes. Aspekteder PlIellmatologie,
QD 85, Freiburg - Basic - Vienna, 1979; M. Thurian, Feuer f,ir d,e Erde. Vom
W"ken des Geistes in der Gemeinschaft der Christen, Frclburg - Basle - Vienna
1979; Y. Congar, [ Believe ill the Holy Spirit. ET David Smith, 3 vols. London and
New York 1983; P.]. Rosato, The Spirit as Lord. The Pllelllllatolog)' of Karl Barth,
Edmburgh 1981.
86. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 37, 1.
87. Congar, op. cit., 3: 6.
88. H. Urs von Balthasar, 'Der Ubekannte jcnseits des Wanes', in Spiritus
Creator (n. 85), 95-105.
89. HIlary, De Tr;lIitate 11,1 (CCl 62, 38).
90. Augustine, De Trillitate V, II and 141. (CCl 50, 21811., 22211. ); VI, 101
(CCLSO, 241-9); XV, 17-21 (CCLSOA,501- 191.
91. Peter lombard, I Sent., d. 18.
92. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 38.
93. Congar, op. cit., 3: 31, 1471., 1501.
94. K. Barth, Chllrch Dogmatics 1/2, 24211.
95. Augustine, De Tr;n;tate XV, 17 (CCl 50A, 501- 7).
364 Notes to pages 226-233
96. Ibid., V, 11 (CCl 50, 218ff.); II, joalmis Evallgelillm tractatlls 105,3 (CCl
36,604f.).
97. Augustine, De Trinitate V, 14 (CCl50, 224).
98. Ibid., V, 15 (CCL50, 224).
99. Augustine, Ellchiridion XII, 40 (CCl 46, 72).
100. Cf. H. Urs von Balthasar, 'Der Heilige Geist als Licht', in his Spiritlls
Creator (no 85 ), 106-22; W. Kasper, 'Die Kirche :lIs Sakrament des Geistes ', in
Kasper and Sauter, op. cit. (n. 85 ), 33f.; Congar, op. cit., 3: 145ff.
101. M.]. Scheeben, The Mysteries orC/lristionity (n. 50), IlOff.
102. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, 10 (CCl 50, 24lff.).
103. Cf. H. Schauf, Die Ebrwohmmg des Hemgen Ceistes. Die Lehre von deT
nicht appropri;erten £inwohmmg des Heiligen Geistes als Beitrag ZlfT Theologiege·
s,hichte des 19. Jal"lmndcrts linter beso"derer Benlcks;cht;gung deT beiden
Thea/age" earl Passaglia und Cleme,rs Schrader, Freiburger theologische StudieD
59; Freiburg 1941.
104. Thomas Aquinas, Summa camra Ge"tiles IV, 20-2.
lOS. Vatican II, GOlldillm et spes, 26, 28, 38, 41, 44.
106. K. Rahner, 'Thoughts on the Possibility of Faith Today', in Theological
Investigations 5, ETK.-H. Kruger, London and Baltimore 1966, 3-22; 'Christianity
and the Non-Chriscian Religions" ibid., 115- 34; 'Anonymous Christians" ibid.,
6, ET K.-H. and B. Kruger, london and Baltimore 1969,390-98; 'Atheism and
Implicit Christianity" ibid., 9, ET G. Harrison, london and New York 1972,
145-64i 'Anonymous Christianity and the Missionary Task of the Church', ibid"
12, ET D. Bourke, london and New York 1974,161-78; 'Observations on the
Problem of the "Anonymous Christian" " ibid .• 14, ET D. Bourke, New York
1976,280-94; 'Anonymous and Explicit Faith', ibid., 16, ET D. Morland, london
and New York 1979,52-59; 'Jesus Christ in the Non-christian Religions', ibid.,
17, ET M. Kohl london and New York, 1981,39-50; 'Missions II: Salvation of
the Non-Evangelized', SacMtmdi 4, 79-81.
107. Thomas Aquinas, Summa cOlltra Gentiles IV, 21 f.
108. Thomas Aquinas,STI·II, 106, If.; 108, If.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., III, 8, 3; d. M. Seckler, 'Das Haupt aller Menschen. Zur Auslegung
eines Thomastextes', in Virtus politica (FS A. Hufnagel), Stuttgart and Bed Canstatt
1974,104-25.
111. Augustine, Scrm. 267, 4, PL 38,1231; Leo XIII, Encyclical Divinll1n iIIud,
in C. Carlen (ed.), T/re Papal Encyclicals 2, Wilmington, NC 1981,409-17; Pius
XII, Encyclical Mystici corporis, in C. Carlen (cd.), The Papal EllClyclicals 4,
37-63.
112. Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. Ill, 17, 1 (SC 211, 328-31).

PART THREE

Chapter J Establishment of the Doctrine of the Trinity

1. Recent fitature on the doctrine of the Trinity (encyclopedia articles are not
listed here, nor arc: the well-known manuals of dogmatic theology): K. Rahner,
'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate lU , in Theo/ogicallnvestigatiolls
4, ET K. Smyth, london and Baltimore 1966,77-102; id., The Trinity, ET j.
 Notes to pages 233- 236 365
Donceel, New York 1970; B. Lonergan, De Dea Trino, Rome 21964;J. Danielou,
La Tr;n;te et Ie mystere de I'existence, Paris 21968j H. Geisser, 'Oer Beitrag def
Trinitiitslere zur Problematik des Redens von Gott', ZTK 65,1968,231-55; L.
Scheffcl.yk, Der eitle r",d dreifaltigl Gott, Mainz 1968, F. Bourassa, Questions de
theo/ogie trinitaire, Rome 1970; E. Fortmann, The Triune God, London 1972; M.
Durrant, Theology and IlIIel/igibility: An Examillation of the Doctrine that God
Is the Last End of Rational Creatllres and the Doctrille that God Is Three Persolls
ill aile Substance: 'The Doctrille of the Holy Trinity', Boston 1975; R, Panikkar,
The Trillityand the Religious Experie"ceofMan,lcotJ. Person, Mystery, Maryknoll
NY 1973; H. Brunner, Dreifaltigkeit. Personale Zugiinge .. um Mysterium, Ein-
sieddn 1976; E. JUnge!, God as the Mystery of the World, ET Grand Rapids
1982; H. Wipner, Grlll/dfragen der Trinitatsspekulation. Die Analogiefrage in dcr
Trinitatstheo/ogie, Regensburg 1977; j. Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom:
The Doctrllle of God, ET M. Kohl, london and New York 1981; W. Pannenberg,
'Die Subjektivitat Gones und die Trinitarslehre', in his Grundfragen systcmatischer
Tbe%gie. Gesamllle/te Allfsatl.e 2, Gettingen 1980, 96-111.
2. Cf. K. Rahner, Tbe Trillity (n. I), 10.
3. On the theme of unity: E. Pererson, Heis Theos. Epigraphische, formgeschicht.
liehe rmd religionsgeschichtUche Untersuc!nmgen, Goningen 1920; L. Oeing-
Hanhoff, EllS et "'tum convertwrtur. Stellmlg WId Cehalt des Grm,dsatzes in der
Pbilosophie des HI Tholllas VOI/ Aquill, BGPTM, 37/3, Munster 1953; M.
Heidegger,ldelltityal/d Differellce, ET j. Stambaugh, New York 1969; K. Rahner,
'Einheit', lTK 3, 749-50; H. Volk, 'Oie Einheit als theologisches Problem', MTZ
12,1961,1- 13; E. Coreth, 'Einheit und Oifferen,', in H. Vorgrimler (ed.), Gott
ill W/elt (FS Karl Raimer), 2 vols., Freiburg - Basle-Ylenna 1964, I, 158-87; W.
Kern, 'Einheit-in ·mannigfaltigkeit. Fragmentarische Uberlegungen zur Metaphysik
des Geistes', ibid. 1,207-39; E. Stauffer, 'Heis', TDNT2, 434-42; H, R. Schlette,
Dos Eineund das A"dere. St"die1l zur Problematik des Negative" in der Metaphysik
Plotins, Munich 1966; W. Heisenberg, Der Teil und dos Gauze. Cespriiche im
Umkreis der Atomphysik, Munich 1969; C. F. von Weizsacker, Die Ei"heit hI der
Natllr, Munich 21971; 'Oas Eine" H\'(fP 2, 361-7; M. Zahn, 'Einheit', HPG 1,
320-37.
4.ThomasAquina5,Deverl,lj2, t5;STI, II, 1.
5, Aristotle, Metapbysica IV, 6, 1016b,
6.Cf. ibid.
7. Heraclitus, Fragm. 24, in H. Oiels and W. Kranz (eds.), Die Fragme1lte der
Vorsokratiker I, Berlin 61951,178, ET K. Freeman, Alrcilla to the Pre-Socratic
Philosophers, Cambridge, Mass. 1962,33.
8. On rhe problem of monotheism in the history of religions: R. Panikkar, The
Trillityond \'(forld Religions, Madras t 970; H. LeSaux, Sagesse Hindoue, Mystique
Chretienne: Du Vedama aIII Tri"ite, Paris 1965.
9. Xenophilnes, Fragm. 23, in Oiels ilnd Kranz (n. 7), 135j ET in Freeman (n.
7),231.
10. Aristotle, Metaphysica XI, 10, 1076il. Cf. E. Peterson, 'Monocheismus als
politisches Problem', in Thco/ogische Traktate, Munich 1951,45-147.
II. Cf. H. Kleinknecht, 'logos', TDNT 4, 84f.
12. Aristotle, Ethica NicomaclJea 1,4, 1096b.
13. Plotinus, EmlCllds VI, 9,4.
14. Augustine, Confessiones XI, 29, 39 (CCl 27, 214f.).
366 Notes to pages 236-245
15. On what follows d. R. Merhlein, 'Drei', RAC 4, 269-310.
16. Cf. R. Roques, 'Dionysius Arepagita', RAC 3, 1090f.
17. Cf. A. Stuiber, 'Dreieck', RAC 4,310-13.
18. Mehrlein, art. cit., 298-309; C. Delling, 'Treis', TDNT8, 216-25.
19. Mchrlein, art. cit., 280£.
20. On biblical faith in one God d. E. Stauffer, 'Heis', TDNT 2,434-42; T. C.
Vriezen, An Outlil" of Old Testammt Theology, ET S. Neuijen, Oxford 1958,
175ff.; A. Deissler, Die Grllndbotschaft des Alten Testamellls. Eill theologischer
Durchblick, Freiburg - Basic - Vienna '1972, 25-31; K. Schelkle, Theology of the
New Testament 2, ET W. A. Jurgens, Collegeville 1976,257-61; B. lang (ed.),
Der eit1zige Gott. Die Geburt des biblischen Monotheisffms, Munich 1981.
21. Cf. below, 241.
22. Tertullian, Adv. Marcionem I, 3 (CCl I, 443f.).
23. Cf. W. Pannenbcrg, 'The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of
God 3S 3 Dogmatic Problem of Early Christian Theology', in his Basic Questions
in Theology, ET G. H. Kehm, 2 vols., Philadelphia and london 1970-71, 2,
119-83.
24.Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 1,3 (Corpus Apo/.,l, 10-17); Tati:ln, Oratio
adversus Graecos 14 (PG 6, 8361.); Theophilus of Antioch, Ad AutolYCllm 11,4;
8,28 (SC 20, 102f., 114-19, 166-9).
25. Cyril of Jerusalem, Cateeheses 6, 36; 4, 6; 7, If.; 17,2 (PG 33, 60 Iff., 459ff.,
605fl.,969ff.).
26. OS 112; NO 301.
27. OS 2ff., 125, 150; ND 1,7,305. Among later magisterial pronouncements
that of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215): 'Unus so/us est verus Deus - There IS
only one true God' (OS 800; NO 19), and that of the First Vatican Council: 'Vllum
esse Deum verum et vivum - There is one God, true and living' (DS 3001; ND
327), are especially important.
28. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I, 10, 1 (SC 264, 154-9); II, 1, 1-5 (SC 294, 26-35);
Tenullian, Adv Mardonem II, tE. (CCl 1, 475f.); Origen, Colltra eels"", I, 23
(SC 136, 132-5).
29. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 11,3.
30. Cf. below, 393ff.
31. On what follows d. R. Schulte, 'Die Vorbereicungcler Trinitats-offenbarung',
Mysa/2,49-84.
32. C. Westermann, Genesis I, Biblischer Kommentar, Aires Testament, Ill,
Neukirchen·Vluyn 1974, 199-201.
33. P. Evdokimov, L'art de l'icone. Theologie de 10 beaute, Paris 1971.
34, Cf. below, 249ff.
35. W. Eichrodt, Theology of the Old TestamCllt, ET). A. Baker, 2 vols., london
and Philadelphia 1961-67,2,23, 27f.
36. Deissler, op. cit. (n. 20), 31.
37. Cf. G. Delling, 'Treis', TDNT 8,216-25; R. Mehrlein, 'Drei', RAC 4,
300-10; F. ]. Schierse, 'Die neutestamentliche Trinitatsoffenbarung" Mysal 2,
85-131; G. Wainwright, The Trinity in the New Testament, London 1962; K. H.
Schelkl e, Theology of the New Testamem 2 (n. 20), 295-309.
38. Cf. above, 142f., 170ff.
39. F. Lentzen-Deis, Die TallIe Jem 1Iocb dell SYllop/ikem. Literarkr;/;s,he
 Notes to pages 245-250 367
Imd gattungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen, Frankfurter theologische Studien 4,
Frankfurt 1970.
40. A. Voglle, 'Ekklesiologische Auftragsworte des Auferstandenen', in his Das
Evangeliunr und die Evangelien. Beitriige zur Evangelienforschung, Dusseldorf
1971,243-52; id., 'Das christologische und ekklesiologische Anliegen von Mt 28,
18-20', ibid., 253-72.
41. No one before or since has produced anything superior to Augustine's In
Joha/mis Evallgelillm tractatlls 104-111 (CCl 36, 601-33). Recent literature: R.
Schnackenburg, The Gospel according to St.John 3, ET D. Smith and G. A. Kon,
New York and london 1982,167-202; E. Kiisemann, The Testament ofJesll$: A
S/JIdy of the Gospel ofJohn in the Light of Chapter 17, ET G. Krodel, london and
Philadelphia 1968.
42. R. Schnackenburg, Die Johannisbriefe, HTKNT 13/3, Freiburg - Basle -
Vienna, '1963, 37-9.
43. O. Cull mann, Die ersten ,h,;stli,hen Glaubensbekenntllisse, Theologische
Studien 15, Zollikon·Ziirich 1949,45. (There is an ETby J. K. S. Reid: The Earliest
Christian Confessions, London 1949, but it was not available to me. Tr.]
44. On the history of the theology and dogma of the Trinity (I limit myself to
comprehensive presentations and omit studies of details): L Schdfczyk, lLehramt-
liche Formulierung und Dogmengeschichte derTrinitiit', MySa/1, 146-217; T. de
Regnon, Etudes de the%gie positive sur la sainte Trinite, 3 vols., Paris 1892-8;
]. Lebreton, Histo;re du dogme de /a Trinite, 2 vols., Paris, 1927-8, ET or vol. 1
by A. Thorold, History of the Dogma of the Trinity, london 1939; G. L. Prestige,
God in Christian Thought, London 21952; M. Werner, The Format;onofChr;stian
Dogma: All Historical Stlldy of Its Problelll, ET S. G. F. Brandon, New York
1957; G. Kretschmar, Stlldie" zur friihchristlichen Tri"itatstheolog;e, Beitrage zur
historischen Theologie 21, Tiibingen 1956; C. Andresen, 'Zur Entstehung und
Goschich,e des rrinitarischen Personbegriffs', ZNW 52, 1961, 1-39, J. Ortiz de
Urbina, Nicee et Constattt,nople, His[Ore des conciles oecumeniquest cd. G.
Dumeige, 1, Paris 1963; A. Adam, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte I, Giitersloh
1965; B. lohse, Epoch." der Dogmcllgeschichte, Stuttgart·Berlin '1969; B. de
Margerie, La Trhrite chret;emre datls l'histo;rc, Theologie historique 31 , Paris
1975; A. Grillmeicr, Christ in Christian Tradition I, ET John Bowden, Oxford
and Arlanta, Ga'1975.
45. Ignatius of Antioch, Ad Ephesios 9, 1; 18, 2 (Patres apostolici, ed. Funk-
Diekamp, 1, 2441., 254-7); Ad Magllesianos 13, 1 (ibid., 289); cl. his Martyrium
Po/ycarpis (ibid., 420).
46. I Clem 42; 46, 6; 58, 2 (Dieapostolischen Yatcr, ed.J. A. Fischer, Darmstadt
1956, 76fl., 82, 98).
47. AthenagoC3s, SlIpplicatio pro Christianis 12 (TU 412, 13f.).
48. Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Allto/YCIIIII II, 15 (SC 20,138-41); Tertullian,
Adv. Praxean II, 4; VIII, 7 (CCl2, 1161, 1168).
49. Didache 7, 1 (SC 248, 1701.).
50. Justin, Apologia I, 61, 13 (Corpus Apo/. 1, 1661.).
51. For the his[Ory or the creed, in addition to the standard works of F.
Kattenbusch, H. Lierzm.nn, A. von Harnack and J. de Ghellinck, d. especially J.
N. D. Kelly, Early Christiall Creeds, london and New York '1960; K. H. Neufeld,
The Earliest Christian Confessions, Leiden 1963. A first introduction [0 the history
of scholarship is given by J. Quasten, 'Symbolforschung', LTK 1, 1210-12.
368 Notes to pages 250- 252
52. lrenaeus, DemollStratio 3; 7 (SC 62, 31- 33, 4lf.).
53. Ibid., 6 (62, 391.).
54. DS 10; ND 2.
55. Tercullian, De baptismo 6 (CCl 1,283 ).
56. Cyprian, De dominica oratione 23 (CSEl 311, 2841.).
57. V:uican II, Lumen gentium 4, ET Flannery, 353.
58. Hilary, De Trinitate II, 1 (CCl 62, 38).
59. Augustine, De Trinitate XV, 26, 46 (CCl 50A, 525-7).
60. Didache 9 (SC 248,174-9).
61. justin, Apologia 165; 67 (Corpus Apol. 1 178, 184).
62. Hippolytus, Traditio Apostolica 4-13, in G. Oix (cd.), The Treatise on the
Apostolic Tradition of St Hippolyrll' of Rome, london 1937, 7-9.
63. CI. justin, Apologia I 67 (Corpus Apol. 1, 184-9); Origen, De oratione 33
(GCS 2, 4011.); cf. C. Vagaggin;, Theological Dimetlsions of the Liturgy, ET L. J.
Doyle and W. A. jurgens, Collegeville 1976,2091.
64. CI. j . A. jungmann, The Place of Christ in Liturgical Prayer, ET A. j. Peeler,
Stalen Island, NY 1965; id., The Mass of the Roman Rite: Its OTlgin, and
Development (MissarumSolenm;a), ETF. A. Brunner,2 vols., New York 1951- 55,
2,25911.
65. On the original meaning of regula (idei cf. B. Hacggelund, 'Die Bedeutung
der regual (idei als Grundlage theologischer Aussagen', Studia Theo/ogica 12,
1958, 1-44; J. Quasten, 'Regula (idei, LTK 8, 11021.
66. Origen, De principiis, Prado 2 (SC, 252, 781.). After speaking 01 jesus Christ
3S the truth, Origen laments the bet that Christians, though confessing Christ, 3fC
at odds over many truths. It is important, therefore, he says, 'to lay down 3 definite
line of thought and unambiguous norms', Despite all the variations, 'the tC3ching
of the church as handed down in unbroken succession from the apostles is still
preserved and continues in the church to this very day; only that, therefore, is to
be believed as true which in no way departs from the ecclcsial and apostolic truth.'
CI. De principiis IV, 2, 2 (SC 268, 300-5).
67. CI. Augustine, De Trinitate 1,1 f. (CCl 50, 2711.), where Augustine explains
that for him the faith of the sacred scriptures is the foundation which he intends
to expound in agreement with all the available Catholic exegetes of the Old and
New Testaments; he then concludes: "This is likewise my faith, because ie is the
Catholic laith' (I, 4).
68. On jewish Christianity d. especially j. Danielou, The Theology of Jetvis',
Christianity, ET j. A. Baker, london and Chicago 1964; G. Kretschmar, Studien
lur friihchristliclml Trinitiitstheo/ogie (n. 44); j. Barbel, 'Christos Angelos',
Liturgie und Monchturn 21, 1957, 71-90; A. Adam, Lehrbuch der DogIIICII-
geschichte (n. 44),1, 127ff.
69. Scattered traces: Tertullian, De carne Christi 14 (eel 2, 899{,); Nov 3tian,
De Trinitate XVIII, 1022 (CCl 4,44); Origen, De principiis I, 3, 4 (SC 252,
148-53); Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelii VII, 141. (SC 215, 234-7).
70. CI. above, 1781.
71. This is the kernel of truth in the otherwise monomaniacal thesis of M.
Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma (n. 44), according to which Christian
dogma arose from an escha[Qlogization of the biblical message.
72. Cf. above, 1801.
73. Cf. n. 44 for literature on the history of the doctrine of the Trinity.
 Notes to pages 252-256 369
74. On gnosticism d. above, 180ff.
75. Cf. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I, 1 (SC 264, 28-35); Hippolytus, Reflltatio VI, 29
(GCS 26, 155-7).
76. Cf. the definition of emallatio or missio inlrenaeus. Adv.haer. lI. 13,6 (SC
294,118-21); and d. j. Ratzinger, 'Emanation', RAC 4,1219-28.
77.lrenaeus, Adv. haer.IV, 33, 8 (SC 100/2,818-21).
78. Ibid., I, 10 (SC 264,154-67).
79. Ibid., II, 28, 6 (SC 294, 282-5).
80. Ibid., 11,13.4; 28, 5 (SC 294,116-19,280-3).
81. On the theory of anakephalaiosis or recapitulation d. H. Schlier, 'Kephal.',
TDNT 3, 673-82; W. Staerk, 'Anakephalaiosis', RAC 1, 411-14; R. Haubst,
'Anakephalaiosis', LTK 1, 466f.; E. Schar!, Recapitlliatio IIIlIndi. Die Rekapitllla-
tionsbegriff des hi. Irelliills, Freiburg 1941.
82.lrenaeus, Adv. haer.lI, 28,1 (SC 294, 268-71); IV, 9.1; 20, 4 (SC 100/2,
476-81,634-7); and elsewhere.
83. Ibid., III, 19,2; d. 20, 2 (SC 211, 374-9, 388-93); IV, 20, 4 (SC 100/2,
634-7); V, 16,2 (SC 153, 216f.).
84. Ibid. III, 8, 3, (SC 211, 94-7); 6, 7; 20, 3; 38, 3 (SC 100/2,450-5, 632f.,
952-7).
85. Ibid., IV, 20,1 (SC 10012,624-7).
86. TertuHian, De praescriptione 13, 36; 37 (CCl 1, 197f., 216f., 217f.); Adv.
MarcionemlV,5 (CCl 1,550-52); Adv. Praxeallll, If. (CCl 2, 1160f.).
87. Adv. Praxean VIII, 9 (CCl 2, 1167-9).
88. Apo/ogeticlIlII XXI, 11 (CCl 1, 124).
89. Adv. Marciollemll, 27, 7 (CCl I, 507).
90. Adv. Praxean VIII, 7 (CCl 2, 1168).
91 Ibid., III, 2f. (CCl 2, 1161f.).
92. Ibid., X, 3 (CCL2, 1169).
93. Ibid., 11,4 (CCl 2, 1161), ET W. A. jurgens, The Faith of the Early Fathers
1, CoHegeville 1970, 154. Cf. De plldicitia XXI (CCl 2,1326-8).
94. Adv. Praxean XII, 6 (CCl 2,1173).
95. Ibid., XXV, I (CCL2, 1195).
96. Cf. above, 181.
97. DS 112-15; ND 301-3.
98. Cf above, 216f.
99. Hilary, De Trillitate II, 6ff. (CCl 62, 42ff.).
100. Origen, De principiis, Praef. 2 (SC 252, 70f.); IV, 2, 2 (SC 268, 300-5).
101 Ibid., I, 1, 1 and 6 (SC252, 90, 98-105).
102 Ibid., 1,2,6; 4, I (SC 252, 120-5, 166-9); Contra Celsllm VI, 34, 35 (SC
147,260-5).
103. De prillcipiis I, 6, 2; II, I, I (SC 252,196-201,234-7).
104. Ibid., I, I, 6 (SC 252, 98-105).
105. Ibid., II, 3,1 (SC 252, 248-51).
106. Ibid., II, 9, I; 9, 5f. (SC 252, 352-5, 360ff.).
107. Ibid., II, 9, 2; 9, 5f. (SC 252, 354-7, 360ff.).
108. Ibid., I, 6, I (SC 252,194-7).
109. Ibid., II, 10, I and 4ff.
110. H. jonas, Gnosis lind spiitantiker Geist 2/1, Gattingen 1954,207-10; j.
Rarzinger, 'Emanation' (n. 76), 1223.
370 Notes to pages 256-261
111. Origen, De prillcipiisl, 2, 10 (SC 252,133-9).
112. Ibid., I, 2, 6 and 9 (SC 252, 120-5, 128-31); IV, 4,1 (SC 268, 400-5 ).
113. Ibid., I, 2, 7 (SC 252,1241.).
114. Ibid., I, 2, 6 (SC 252, 120-5); d. above 1801.
115. Ibid., I, 2, 2 (SC 252,112- 15).
116. Ibid., I, 2,10 (SC 252, 132-9); d. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. V, 1, 1 (SC 153,
16-21).
117. Origen, De prillcipiisl, 2,6 (SC 252, \20-5).
118. Ibid., I, 2, 8 (SC 252,126-9).
119. Ibid., I, 3, 4; 3, 5; 3, 8 (SC 252,148- 53,152- 5,162- 5).
120. Ibid., I, 3, 5 (SC 252,152- 5); d . In Joall. II, 10,77 (SC 120,2561.).
121. OS 403- 11; NO 40111, 40118.
122. Cf. H. Crouzel, 'Die Origenesforschung im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert', in
H. Vorgrimlerand R. van derGucht, (cds. ), Bilau:derTheologie;m 20.Jahrhulldert
3, Freiburg- Basle - Vienna 1970,515- 21.
123. CI.• bove, 181.
124. CI.• bove, 1831.
125. C1. .bove, 18211.
126. I. Ortiz de Urbina, Nicee et Constantinople (n. 44).
127. Ibid., 82.
128. Ibid., 86-7.
129. Ibid., 75-6.
130. Ath.n"sius, Tomlls ad Alltiochellos 5 (PG 26, 8001.).
13 1. B.sil, Ep. 38 (PG 32, 325-40); Ep. 236, 6 (PG 32, 883-6).
132.ld., Ep. 38, 4 (PG 32, 329-34); Ep. 236, 6 (PG 32, 883-6).
133. Jerome, Ep. 15,4 (Pl 22, 3571.); Augustine, De Trinitate VII, 4 (CCl 50,
255-60).
134. Basil, Ep. 210,5 (PG 32, 773-8); d. Ep. 214, 4 (PG 32, 7891.); Ep. 236, 6
(PG 32, 883-6).
135. COD 28.
136. OS 150; NO 12.
137. OS 144.
138. OS 168, 173, 176; NO 306/16, 306/21, 306/24.
139. CI. W. Kasper,Jesll5the Christ, ETV. Green, london .nd New York 1976,
24011.
140. OS 421 ; ET in NO 620/1.
141. Ibid.
142.0S71, 73,441,451,470,485,490,501,525-32,542,566,568-70,680
etc.
143. OS 75; NO 16.
144. Tertullian, Adv. Praxeall, III, 21. (CCl 2, 116if.); Origen, De principiis I,
2,10 (SC 252, 132-9).
145. Origen, De principiis I, 3, 5 (SC 252, 152-5).
146. Basil, De spiritu sancto 16 (SC 17, 173-83).
147. Augustine, De Trillitate I, 4, 7; V, 14, 15 (CCl 50, 34-6, 2221.); Serm.
213, 6, 6 (Pl 33, 968); Basil, ibid.
t 48. Basil, ibid.: 'When we receive gifts we encounter first the one who distributes
them; then we recognize him who is sending them; finally we direct our thoughts
 Notes to pages 261-262 371
to the origin and source of all blessings ... For the sole source is what is works
through the Son and completes his action in the Holy Spirit.'
149. Cf. above, 250.
ISO. Cf.J. Liebaert, 'Eunomios', LTK 3, 1182f.
151. Basil, De spirit" sancto 18 (SC 17, 191-8); Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio 31,
8 (PG 36, 141 );john Damascene, De fide orth. I, 8 (Die Schriften des Johannes
von Damask"s, ed. B. Kotter II, Berlin and New York 1973, 18-31).
152. Cf. E. Muhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa,
Gottingen 1966.
153. D. Wendenbourg, Geist oder Energie? Zur Frage deT innergott/ichen
Verankerzmg des christlichen Lebens in deT byzantinischen Thea/ogie, Munich
1980, 24ff.
154. This is Wendenbourg's view; for a different opinion d. J. Meyendorff, St.
Gregoire Palamas ella mystique ortlJOdoxe, Paris 1959.
155. Already in Irenaeus, Adv. haer. 11,28,6 and 9 (SC 294, 282-5, 290-3);
Hilary, De Trinitate II, 9 (CCL 62 46f.); Augustine, De Trinitate V, 1 and 9; VII,
4 (CCL50, 206f., 217, 255-60).
156. Augustine, De Trinitate I, 2 and 6 (CCL 50, 3lf., 37-44); etc.
157. Ibid., VII, 6 (CCLSO, 261-7); XV, 4 (CCLSOA, 467f.).
158. Ibid., VII, 4 (CCL 50,255-60).
159. The doctrine of the Trinity as developed by Anselm in Monologion 38-65
proceeds entirely from the one spiritual essence of God which finds expression in
the essential operations of knowing and willing. As he explains in the Prologue, he
intends that 'nothing at all would be argued on scriptural authority', but 'rational
necessity would tersely prove' all assertions 'and truth's clarity would openly
manifest them' (Allselm of Canterbury, ET J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, 4 vols.,
New York 1974-76, I, 3).
160. DS 800,d. 1331;ND 19,326.
161. Thomas Aquinas, ST III, 3, 5.
162. Cf. below, 298.
163. The way had been prepared for this distinction from the time of Augustine.
I must agree with j. Auer's cautious judgment: 'God is seen less as the creator who
orders everything than as absolute Lord; and numerous specialized studies are still
needed before we can say for sure whether this 'absolute Lord' represents a God
of irrational arbitrariness or rather the biblical 'Lord of history' CNominalismus',
LTK 7,1022).
164. CA 1; Schmalkaldische Artikel, in BSLK 414f.
165. The basic formula of the World Council of Churches says: 'The World
Council of Churches is a fellowship of churches which confess the LordJesus Christ
as God and Saviour according to the Scriptures and therefore seek to fulfill together
their common calling [0 the glory of the one God; Father, Son and Holy Spirit'
(modified formula adop'ted at the New Delhi meeting, 1961); d. W. Theurer, Die
trinitarische Basis des Ok",nenischen Rates der Kirchen, Bergen-Enkheim 1976.
166. Kant's judgment is typical: 'The doctrine of the Trinity,taken literally, has
no practical relevance at aU', in The Conflict of the Faculties, ET M. J. Gregor,
New York 1979, 65.
167. F. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, no. 170, ET H. R. Mackintosh and
J. S. Stewart, Edinburgh 1928, reprinted Philadelphia 1976,741.
372 Notes to pages 264-268
Chapter 1/ Exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity
1. Still indispensable: F. C. Baur, Die christliche Leh,e von deT Dreieinigkeil ,md
MetlSchwerd,mg Gottes in ihrer geschiciltUchen Entwickillng J, Tubingen 1843,
D. F. Strauss, Die christliebe Glaubenslehre in ihrer geschichtUchen Entwicklrmg
und;m Kampfe mit der modemell Wisserrschaft 2, Tiibingen 1841, reprinted
Darmstadt 1973. For recent literature d. the previous chapter, n. 44.
2. Cf. W. Kasper, Das Absolute in der Geschichte. Philosophie lind Theologie
der Geschichte i/l der Spatphilosophie Schellings, Mainz 1965, especially 266-84.
3. Hegel, Vorlesullgell iiber die Philosophie der Religion (ed. G. Lasson) I, II.
Cf. J. splen, Die Trillitatslehre G. W. F. Hegels, Freiburg and Munich 1965; L.
Gcing-Hanhoff, 'Hegels Trinitatslehre', Theol. Phil. 52,1977,378-407.
4. Hegel , Vorleslfllgell I, 21.
5. Ibid., 36.
6. Ibid., 391.; d. 461.
7. Ibid., 41.
8. Ibid., 40.
9. Ibid., 411.; ere.
10.lbid., III, 57, 69, 74, etc.
II. Ibid., 621., 821.
12. Ibid., 75.
13. Ibid., 77.
14. OS 3001, 3041; NO 327,137. CI. the condemnalion 01 A. Gunther, OS
2828-31, and 01 A. Rosmini, OS 3225 .
IS. Hegel, Vories/lllgen III, 721.
16. Ibid., 641.; d. The Phellontellology of Milld, ET J. Baillie, rev. and cd.
London 1949, 81-2.
17. OS 3024, ET in NO 417.
18. Hegel, Vorlwlllgell III, 851.
19. Ibid., I, 148.
20. Ibid., III, 74.
21. Ibid., 651.
22. Ibid., 1731.
23. Ibid., 180, etc.
24. Ibid., 198.
25. L. Feuerbach, 'Principles 01 the Philosophy 01 the Future', in Z. Hanfi (cd.),
The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach, Garden City, NY 1972,
245; The Esse1lce o(Christia1lity, ET G. Elioc, London and New York 1957,65,
23211.
16. The Essel/ce of Christiollity, 247-69. 27. Ibid., 251.
28. Cf. E. Jungel, God as the Mystery of the World, Grand Rapids 1982.
29. Vatican II, Gaudi",,, et spes, 76 .
30. CI. M. J. scheeben, The Mysteries of Christiollity, ET C. Voller<, St. Louis
1946,25-48.
31. Cf. P. Wenzel, 'Semirationalismus', LTK 9, 625f.
32. CI. below, 2721.
33. Cf. W. Simonis, Trillitiit tmd Vermmft. Ulltcrsuclnmgcn 4'" Moglichkeit
eiller rationalen Trillitiitslehre bei Anselm, Abaelard. dell Vatikallcm, A. Gi;flther
,urd G. Froschammer, Frankfurter cheologische 5tudien 12, Frankfurt 1972.
 Notes to pages 268-273 373
34. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, 13, 12 ad 1.
35. CI. J. E. Kuhn, Katholische Dogmatik 2, Tubingen 1857,5021.
36. CI. above, 1261.
37. G. Ebeling, 'Profanit5.t und Geheimnis" in his \Vorl lind Glaube 2, Tiibingen
1969,1961.; d. G. Hasenhiittl, Kritische Dogmatik, Graz 1979,26,36.
38. CI. above, 1271.
39. CI. above, 1281.
40. CI. above, 2481.
41. Tertullian, De carne Christi V, 4 (CCL 2, 881); cf. Apologeticum 46, 18
(CCL I, 162).
42. J. E. Kuhn, op. cit., 513.
43. Ibid., 514.
44. Ibid., 520.
45. CI. above, 234.
46. Vatican II, Ullitatis redilliegratio, 1t j d. U. Va leske, Hierarchia veritatu11J.
Theo/ogiegesch[~htliche Hintergriinde mrd mogliche KonsequcnzclI cines
Himweises;m OkumclIismusdekret des 11. Vattkanischen Konzils zmn zwischen·
kirchlichell Gespriich, Munich 1963.
47. OS 3016; NO 132.
48. Ibid., ET in NO 132.
49. Justin, Diaioglts Clfm Tryph01Je 61, 2 (Corpus Apol. II, ed. von Ono, 212);
Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 5 (PG 6, 813c-818b); Hippolytus, Ad Noetllm (PG 10,
817c-820a); Tertullian, Apologeticum 21 (CCL I, 122-8).
50. Tatian, ibid.; Athenagoras, SlIpplicatio pro Christiallis 24 (TU 4/2, 3lfl.);
Justin, Dialoglls cum Trypholle 128 (Corplls Apol. II, 458-69); Hippolytus, Ad
Noet,m, 10 (PG 10, 817a-818c); Tertullian, Ad Praxeall 8 (CCL 2, 11671.).
51. Athanasius, Exposilio {idei 4 (PG 25, 205e-208a); De decretis 1IiCaCllae
sYllodi 25 (PG 25, 459c-462c); De synodis 52 (PG 26, 785c-788b); Adv. Aria/lOS
111,4 (PG 26, 327c-330b).
52. OS 125, 150; ET in ND 7, 12.
53. Tertullian, Ad Praxea/, 8 (CCL 2, 11671.).
54. CI. M. J. Schmaus, Die psychologische Trillitiitslehre des hi. AlIglIStillllS
Miinster 1967', 19011., 201f.
55. Hilary, De Trillitate XI, 11 (CCL 50, 355).
56. Schmaus, op. cit., 195ff.
57. Ibid., 220.
58. CI. above, 1801.
59. CI. Schmaus, op. cit., 2611.
60. Ibid., 195,230. Recent interpretations: C. Boyer, 'L'jrnage de la Trinite:
Synthese de la pense augustinienne', Greg 27, 1946, 173-99,333-52; M. Sciaca,
'Trinite et unite de "esprit" in Augusti,ms magister t, Paris 1954,521-33; U.
Duchrow, Sprachverstii"d"is tmd biblisches Horen bei Augustin, Hermeneutische
Untersuchungen zurTheologie 5, Tubingen 1965; A. Schindler, Wort I",d A1talogie
ill Augustills Trinitiitslehre, Hermeneudsche Untersuchungen zur Theologie 4,
Tiibingen 1965.
61. CI. above, 58, 971.
62. K. Barth, Chllrch Dogmatics III, 383-99.
63. OS 3016; NO 132.
64. K. Rahner, 'Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate" " in Theo-
 374 Notes to pages 273-279
logical Investigations 4, ET K. Smyth, London and Baltimore 1966, S7; The
Trinity, ET). Donceel, New York and London 1970,22.
65. K. Barth, Chureh Dogmatics Ill, 54S.
66.). Meyendorff, Introduction aI't!tude de Gregoire Palamas, Paris 1959,298.
67. F. Schleiermachcr, The Christian Faith, no. 172, ET H. R. Mackintosh and
). S. Stewart, Edinburgh 1928, reprinted Philadelphia 1976,748.
68. F. A. Staudenmaier, Die christliche Dogmatik 2, Fteibutg 1844, 475.
69. DS 74; ETin ND 16.
70. Cf. W. Kasper,jes." the Christ, ET V. Green, London and New Yotk 1976,
240ff.
71. Cf. H. Achauf? Die Einwo/mllng des HeiUgclI Geistes. Die Lehre von deT
nichtappropriierte" Einwohnultg des Hei!ige1t Geistes als Beitrag 1;'" Theologiege.
schichte des netlltzelmten JahrlJtmderts under besonderer Beriicksicht;gtwg deT
heiden Thea/ogen Carl Passaglia lind Clemens Schrader, Freiburger thcologische
Studien 59, Freiburg 1941.
72. Thus P. Schooncnberg, "Trinitat - dec vollendete Bund. Thesen zur Lehec
vom dreipcrsonlichen Gott', Orientie",ng 37. 1973, 115-17.
73. This tendency can be seen in H. Kung, Does God Exist? An Answer for
Today, ET E. Quinn, New York 1980, 699ft
74. Cf. Y. Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit 3. The River of Life Flatus in the
East alld ill the IVest, ET David Smith, London and New York 1983, 13ft Cf. H.
Urs von Balthasar, Theodramatik 3, Einsiedeln 1980, 297ft
75. D. Wendenbourg has given convincing proof of this for Arhanasius and the
Cappadocian theologians in his Geist oder Energid Z", Frage der ;,mergottlichen
Verankerllng des christlichen Lebells ill der byzantinischell Theologie. Munich
1980, 172-232.
76. Vatican II, De; Verbum, 2.
77. In what follows I shall be attempting a concise summary of the classical
doctrine of the Triniry; I shall be restricting myself principally (0 the concepts of
Thomas Aquinas. J 3m not aiming at 3 complete presentation of the sometimes
very subtle distinctions made hur cather at conveying the inner logic and meaning
of the doctrine. The most recent presentation of the Scholastic distinctions - 3
presentation that goes almost to extremes in its subtlety - is B. Lonergan, De Deo
trino II. Pars systematica, Rome 1964. I refer the reader to it, although I do not
have the impression that [he route of distinccion-making will lead us very much
funher to a deeper insight into the mystery. These distinctions do not seem to me
to take us materially beyond the monumental simplicity of Aquinas' Summa.
78. Cf. DS 527; ND 310.
79. Thomas Aquinas, STI, 43,1.
SO. Ibid., 43, 2 ad 5.
81. Thus M.). Scheeben, The Mysteries ofCbrisliallity (n. 30), 157.
82. DS 150,525-27, SOO, 1330; ND 12,308-10,19,325.
83. Thomas Aquinas, STI, 27,1.
84. Cf. M. Schmaus, Katbo/iscbe dogmalik I, Munich '1960, 462t
85. Cf. above, 184ft, 215ff.
86. ct above, 216ff.
87. Albert the Great, Smllma, tr. 7, q. 31, a. 4.
88. M.). Scheeben, op. cit., 104 n. 23.

1'--- - - ~ -== ....

 Notes to pages 279-281 375
89. Cf. H. Urs von Balthasar, 'Der Heilige Geist als liebe', in his Spiritus Creator,
Skizzen zur Theologie 3, Einsiedeln 1967, 106-22.
90. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1,28, 1 ad 3.
91. Athanasius, De synodis (PG 26, 707-12).
92. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 29,16 (SC 250, 210-13): 'Father' is a name
neither of the essence nor of an activityi it is the name of a relation (sehesis) and
shows how the Father is related to the Son and the Son to the Father.' Cf. Oratio
31,14 and 16 (SC 250, 302-5, 306-9); John Damascene, De fide orth. I, 8 (Die
Schriften des Johannes von Damaskus, ed. B. Kotter, II, Berlin and New York
1973,18-31).
93. Augustine, De Trinitate V, 5 (CCl SO, 210f.): 'Therefore while the Father
and the Son are distinct, there is no difference in substance. For the determinations
'Father' and 'Son' have to do not with the substance but with relations. This
relation, however, is not an accident because it is not changeable.' CE. VII, 6 (eel
50,261-7); VIII, prooem. (CCl 50, 268f.).
94. OS 528fl., 1330; NO 31 S, S325.
95. This principle is already recognized by Gregory of Nazianzus, Orati034 (PG
36, 257a-62d); Oratio 20 (SC 270, 37-85, espee. 70-3); Oratio 31 (SC 250,
276-343, espee. 282fl.); Oratio 41 (PG 36, 427a-52e, espec. 441e), and by
Augustine, De civitate Dei XI, 10 (CCl 48, 330fl.). It is given its definitive
formulation by Anselm of Canterbury, De processione spiritus sonet; 1, and
confirmed by the Council of Florence (OS 1330; NO 325).
96. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1,28,2.
97. On the history of the concept of person: E. Lohse, 'Prosopon', TDNT 6,
768-80; S. Schlossman", Persona lind Prosopon im Recht und im christlichen
Dogma (1906), Darmstadt 1968; H. Rheinfelder, Das Wort 'Persona', Halle 1928;
M. Nedoncelle, 'Prosopon et persona dans Pantiquite c1assique', RevSR 22, 1948,
277-99; A. Halder, A. Grillmeier and H. Erhart.., 'Person', LTK 8, 287-92
(bibliog.); C. Andresen, 'Zur Entstehung und Geschichte des trinitarischen Person·
begriffs', ZNW 52, 1961, 1-39;}. Rarzingef, 'Zum Pefsonverstandnis in def
Theologie', in his Dogma und Verkiindigung, Munich '1977, 205-23; H. Koster,
'Hypostasis', TDNT 8, 572-89; above all, H. Dorrie, Hypostasis. Wort· und
Bedeutungsgeschichte, Gottingen 1955; T. de Regnon, Etudes de thiologie positive
sur /a sainte Triniti I, Paris 1892, 129fl., 139fl., 152ff., 167fl., 216fl.; B. Studer,
'Der Person·Begriff in der friihen kirehenamtliehen Trinitatslehre', Theo/. Phil. 57,
1982,161-77.
98. Boethius, Liber de persona et duabus naturis 3 (Pl 64, 1343e-45b); on Ihis
definition d. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1,29, 1.
99. CI. Thomas Aquinas, ST!, 29, 1 ad 2; 3 ad 4.
100. Richard of St Vielor, De Trinitate IV, 22, 24 (ed. J. Ribaillier, 187-90).
Duns Scotus in particular adopted this definition and examined it more fully. Cf.
J. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. I, dist. 23, q. 1; d. H. MLihlen, Sein und Person
nach Johannes Duns Scotus. Beitriige tur Metaphysik der Person, Werl1954.
101. Thomas Aquinas, ST!, 29, 2.
102. Ibid., I, 29, 4: 'Therefore "divine person" signifies a relarion as subsisting.'
103. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 111, 417fl.
104. Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 43; d. A. Maler, Personne et amour
dans la theologie trinitaire de saint Thomas J'Aquin, Bibliotheque rhomisre 32,
Paris 1956, 55f.
376 Notes to pages 281-286
105. Thomas Aquinas, De pot. to, 3; d.ln I Sent., d. 23, q. I, a. 3; d. A. Malet,
op. cit., 7lff.; M. J. le Guillou, Das Mysterium des Vaters. Apostolischer Glaube
und modeme Gnosis, Einsieddn 1974, 1101.
106. John Damascene, De (ide orth. I, 8 (Die Schriften . . . II, 18-31); Thomas
Aquinas, STI, 40, 1-4;41, 1-6.
107. CI. T. de Regnon, op. cit. (n. 97), 311,18511.
108. Thomas Aquinas, De ver. 7, 3; STI, 39, 7.
109. Basil, Despiritu sancto 18 (SC 17, 191-8).
110. Augustine, De Trinitate VI, 71. (CCl 50, 237£.); d. DS 367.
111. DS 530; ND 314.
112. Thomas Aquinas, ST!, 30, 3.
113. Augustine, De Trinit~te VII, 4 and 6 (CCl50, 255-60, 261-7); Thomas
Aquinas, STI, 30, 4.
114. Hilary, De Trinitate IV (CCl 62,101-49).
115. T. de Regnon, op. cit. (n. 97), 1,40911: A. Denelle, 'Periehoresis, cireum-
incessio, circuminsessio. Eine rerminologische Untersuchung', ZKT 47, 1923,
497-532; G. L. Prestige, 'Perichoreo andperichoresis in the Fathers',ITS 29,1928,
242-52.
116. Athenagoras, Supplicatio pro Christianis 10, TV 4/2, 101.; Irenaeus 01
lyons, Adv. haer. III, 6, 2 (SC 211, 68-71); Dionysius 01 Rome, DS 145, ND 303;
Athanasius, De deeretis nicaenae synodi 26 (PG 25, 461-6).
117. Hilary, De Trinitae III, 4 (CCl 62, 751.), ET W. A. Jurgens, The Faith of
the Early Fathers I, Collegeville 1970,375.
118. Ibid., IV, 10 (CCl 62, 144£.); d. VII, 31-2 (CCl 62, 297-300).
119. Augustine, De Trinitate IX,S (CCl50, 3001.); d. VI, 10 (CCl 50, 2411£,).
120. Fulgentius 01 Ruspe, De (ide ad Petnlm seu de regula (idei I, 4 (CCl 91A,
7131.).
121. DS 1331; ND326.
122. Gregory 01 Nazianzus, Ep. 101,6 (SC 208, 38).
123. John Damascene, De (ideorth. I, 8 (DieSchriften . .. II, 18- 31 ); III,S (ibid.,
1181.).
124. Thomas Aquinas, STI, 42, 5.
125. CI. DS 302; ND 615. This principle is applied to the Trinity in Fulgentius
01 Ruspe, Ep. 14,9 (CCl 91, 3951.).
126. CI. DS 302; ND 615.
127. DS 421; NO 620/1.
128. DS 485, 495, SOl, 5281£., 542, 546, 805; 1330, etc.; ND 62711, 31111.,
325.
129. K. Rahner distinguishes betwcecn a logical explanation and an Dntic
explanation. The formcrsimply clarifies the st<ltcmcntor state of affairs in question,
i.e., makes it more precise and less liable to misunderstanding; an onticcxplanation,
however, takes into account a second, different content (e.g. the cause, concrete
circumstances, etc.) in order to explain the content which requires clarification.
According to Rahner the concept of person provides only a logical explanation of
what is originally a statement in revelation. Cf. The Trinity, 53.
130. Jerome, Ep. 15,4 (Pl 22, 3571.).
131. Augustine, De TTinitate V, 9 (CCl 50, 217).
132. Anselm 01 Canterbury, Mono/ogion 79.
133. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1,29,3.
 Notes to pages 286-289 377
134. Cited by K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Il l, 410.
135. J. Locke, Essay on Human Understanding II, ch. 27, S9, in The Works of
John Locke, London 1823, reprinted Aalen 1963,2,55.
136. I. Kant, General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals, ET W. Hastie,
in Kant, Great Books 01 the Western World 42, Chicago 1952,391.
137. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics III, 412. On this d. J. Brinktrine, Die Lehre
von Gatt 2, Paderborn 1954; C. Welch, The Trinity in Contemporary Thought,
London 1954, 190ff.; H. Volk, 'OieChristologie bei Karl Barth und Emil Brunner',
in A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (eds.), Dos KOI/Zil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und
Gegenwart 3, Wurzburg 1954,613-73, esp. 62511., 63411.; B. Lonergan, op. cit.
(n. 77), 2, 193-6; E. Jungel, The Doctrine of the Trinity: God's Being Is in
Becoming, Grand Rapids 1976, 2511. ; B. de Margerie, La Trinite chretienne dans
rhistoire, Paris 1975, 28911.
138. K. Rahner, The Trinity, 109fl. On this d. E. Gutwenger, 'Zur Trinitatslehre
von Mysterium Salutis II', ZKT90, 1968, 325-8; B. de Margerie,.op. cit., 29311.;
H. J. Lauter, 'Die doppelte Aporetik der Trinitatslehre und ihre Uberschreitung',
WWeis 361973, 6011.; F. X. Bantle, 'Person und Personbegriffin derTrinitatslehre
Karl Rahners', MTZ 30,1979,11-24;1. Molrmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom
of God, ET M. Kohl, London and New York 1981, 144-8.
139. Bonaventure, De Trinitate III, 2 and ad 13; Thomas Aquinas, In 1 Sent., d.
23, q. I, a. 3; De pot. 2, 5 ad 4; 9,4; 9, 5 ad 23; ST I, 30, 4 ad 2; Compendium
theologiae I, 46.
140. This point was made some time ago with regard to Barth by H. Urs von
Balthasar in his The Theology of Karl Barth, ET J. Drury, New York 1971. CI.
more recently, with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, W. Pannenbcrg, 'Die
subjektivitat Gottes und die Trinit3tslehre', in his Grundfragen systematischer
Theo/ogie. Gesammelte Aufsiit« 2, Gettingen 1980, 96-111. On Barth and
Rahner together (but without making a sufficient distinction between the two) d.
J. Moltmann, op. cit. (n. 138), 139-48. Over against the unsophisticated suspicion
of trithcism that is attached to Barth and Rahner Moltmann sets the contrasting
and equally unsophisticated suspicion of modalism that is attached to his own
conception of an open unity in the Trinity. On this point d. below, n. 183.
141. It is not without significance that K. Barth, Church Dogmatics Ill, 414,
appeals to the Neo-thomisitc dogmatic theology of F. Oiekamp. Cf. F. Oiekamp
and K. Jiissen, Katholische Dogmatik nach den Grundsiit«n des hi. Thomas I,
Munster 12-"1958, 329. On this point d . L. Oeing-H.nhoff, 'Hegels Trini,,;ts-
lehre', Theo/. Phil. 52, 1977, 399f.
142. B. Lonergan, op. cit., 186-931; d . Thomas Aquinas, ST 1, 34, I ad 3.
143. Ibid., 193.
144. H. Miihlen, Der Heilige Geist als Person. Beitrag zur Frage nach der dem
Heiligen Geiste eigentiimlichen Funktion in der Trinitiit, bei der lnkarnation und
im Gnadenbund, Munsterische Beitr3ge zur Theologie 26, Munster, 1963; in
addition d. M. N':doncelle, La reciprocite des consciences. Essai sur la nature de
la personne, Paris 1942; B. de Margerie, op. cit. (n. 137), 29511.; A. Brunner,
Dreifaltigkeit, Personale Zugiinge zum Mysterium, Einsiedeln 1976.
145. CI.J. G. Fichte, The Science of Rights, ET A. E. Kroeger, Philadelphia 1869,
reprinted London 1970, SS31. ; The Destination of Man, ET P. Sinnett, London
1846, Book 3; Guide to the Happy Life, ET W. Smith, in Fichte: Popular Works,
2 vols., London 1844-49, Lecture 10; Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ETT. M. Knox,
378 Notes to pages 289-294
Oxford 1942, SS35f., 48, 57, 71, where it is shown that 'person' concretely includes
self-recognition.
146. Cf. B. Langenmeier, Der dialogische Personalismus in deT evangelischen
und katholischen Theo/ogie der Gegenwart, Paderborn 1963; M. Theunissen, Der
Andere. Studien zur Sozia/onto/ogie deT Gegenwart, Berlin 1965i B. Casper, Dos
dialogische Denken. Eine Untersuchung deT religionshilosophischen Bedeutung
Franz Rosenzweigs, Ferdinand Ebners and Martin Bubers, Freiburg - Basle -
Vienna 1967; H. H. Schrey, Dialogisches Denken, Darmstadt 1970; J. Heinrichs,
'Scin und Intersubjektivitat', Theol. Phil. 45, 1970, 16lff.
147. Following Lonergan (op. cit., 193), Rahner (The Trinity, 107 n. 29)
interchanges these two.
148. J. Ratzinger, 'Zum Personverstandnis in der Theologie' (n. 97), 206.
149. Ibid., 206ff., 215ff.; d. his Introduction to Christianity, ET J. B. Foster,
New York 1970, 128-30.
ISO. Cf. above, 234ff; 239f.
lSI. B. Pascal, Pensees, fro 604 (Br 871), ET in A. Krailsheimer, Pascal's Pensees,
Baltimore 1966, 232.
152. Cf. above, 238ff.
153. Cf. above, 247f.
154. Cf. above, 240f.
ISS. TerruIlian, Ad Praxean 3 (CCl 2, 1161f.).
156. Ibid., III (CCl 2, 1169f.).
157. Cf. C. Huber, 'Monarchianismus', LTK 7, 533f.
158. Aristotle, Metaphysica XI, 10, 1076a. Cf. E. Pererson, 'Ocr Monotheismus
als politisches Problem', in Theo/ogische Traktate, Munich 1951,45,147.
159. Athanasius, Adv. Arianos IV, 13-15 (PG 26, 483-90) therefore sees
Sabellianism as deriving from Stoicism.
160. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 27, I (SC 250, 70-73).
161. This has been shown especially by J. A. Mohler, Athanasius der Grosse und
die Kirche seiner Zeit besonders im Kampf mit dem Arianismus, Mainz 1827,
304ff., where he refers to F. Schleiermacher. Cf. J. Moltmann, The Trinity and the
Kingdom (n. 140), 129ff.
162. Basil, Ep. 226, 4 (PG 32, 849ff.).
163. Basil, Ep. 210, 3 (PG 23, 771f.).
164. Basil, Ep. 210,4 (PG 32, 77lff.).
165. TerruIlian, Adv. Praxean 3, 3f. (CCl2, 1161f.).
166. Cf. above, 253ff.lt is to be noted here that under Stoic innuence TertuIlian
maintained a kind of corporeality in God. Cf. De carne Christi 11 (CCl2, 894f.);
Adv. Praxean 7 (CCl 2, 1165ff.).
167. Athanasius, De deeretis nicaenae synodi II; 22 (PG 25, 433ff, 453ff.).
168. Basil, De spiritu sancto 18 (SC 17, 191-8).
169. Basil, Ep. 8,2 (PG 32, 247ff.).
170. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 29, 16 (SC 250, 210-13); Oratio 31, 9 (SC
250,290-3).
171. John Damascene, De fide orth.l, 8 (Die Schriften . .. 11, 18-31).
172. ThusJ. E. Kuhn, op. cit. (n. 35), 498ff., 545ff.; similarly F. A. Staudenmaier,
Die christliche Dogmatik 2, Frciburg 1844, 470ff.
173. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics III, 400.
174. This idea is developed in J. E. Kuhn, op. cit., 558ff, especially in discussion
 Notes to pages 294-299 379
with Hegel. Cf. W. Pannenberg, 'Oie Subjektivitat Gottes und die Trinitiitslehre'
(n. 140), 96-111.
175. Hilary, De Trinitate VII, 3 (CCl 62, 26lf.), De synodis 37; 69 (PLIO,
455f., 526); Peter Chrysologus, Serm. 60 (Pl 162, 10081.).
176. OS 125, 150; NO 7, 12.
177. Cf. the condemnation of Roscellinus by the Council ofSoissons (1092) and
of Gilbert of Poitiers by the Council of Rheims (1148) (OS 745), although it has
now been established that the profession of faith directed against Gilbert was not
part of the original acts of the council.
178. OS 803; NO 317.
179. OS 528, ET in NO 311.
180 Catechismus Romanus II, 2,10.
181. OS 2697.
182. This theism was represented in philosophy by the late Idealists Weisse,
Fichte, Seogler and others.
183. Cf. J. Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation
and Criticism of Christian Theology, ET R. A. Wilson and John Bowden, london
and New York 1974, 249-52. There is a critical response to Moltmann in W.
Pannenberg, 'Oie Subjektivitat Gottes und die Trinitatslehre' (n. 140), 110 no. 34.
The danger of tritheism is even clearer in Moltmann's idea of a social or open
Triniry; d. his The Trinity and the Kingdom (n. 138).
184. On tritheistic tendencies in the history of theology d. M. Schmaus,
'Tritheismus', LTK 10, 365f.
185. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics 111, 402f.
186. It was the merit ofT. de Regnon, Etudes de tbeologie positive sur la sainte
Trinite (n. 97), esp. 1,335-40,428-35, to have shown the existence of the two
models.
187. Cf., e.g., V. lossky, The Mystical Theology ofthe Eastern Church, london
1957,52, 56fl.; S. Bulgakov, Le Paraciet Paris 1946, 118.
188. Cf. above, 215f.
189. OS 850; NO 321.
190. A. Malet has brought this out in his Personne et amour dans la theologie
trinitaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin (n. 104).
191. John Oamascene, De fide orth.l, 8 (Die Schriften . .. II, 18-31).
192. CI. Malet, op. cit., 141.
193. Ibid., 55££.
194. Cf. below, 300fl.
195. CI. M. J. le Guillou, Das Mysterium des Vaters (n. 105), 104fl.
196. Cf. Malet, op. cit., 37ff.
197. Cf. L. Scheffczyk, 'Oie heilsgeschichtliche Trinitatslehre des Rupert von
Dcutz uod ihre dogmatische Bedeutung', in 1. Bett and H. Fries (cds.), Kirche und
Uberlieferung (FS}. R. Geiselmann), Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1960,90--118.
198. Cf. Malet, op. cit., 7lff.
199. J. E. Kuhn, op. cit., 553, 572, rightly points this out. On the other hand,
Kuhn himself tries rather to carry the Latin and Western approach even further,
and he dismisses the Greek approach 35 insufficiently speculative. ]n this he is still
under the spell of idealism, however firmly he separates himself from Hegel and
Gunther materially and dogmatically. On this point it is clearer to us today that
we need a postidealist and personalist staning point.
380 Notes to pages 299-303
200. For what follows d. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111, 349-83: 'The Root
of the Doctrine of the Trinity', I cannot here discuss Barth's development. The
early version of Church Dogmatics 111 in Barth's Die christliche Dogmatik im
Entwurfl. Die Lehre vorn Worle Gottes. Prolegomena zurchristUchen Dogmatik,
Munich 1927, 126-40, is important.
20!. For what follows d. K. Rahner, The Trinity, 80ff.; also 'Remarks on the
Dogmatic Treatise "De Trinitate" " (n. 64), Foundations of Christian Faith: An
Introduction to the Idea of Christianity. ET W. V. Dych, New York and London
1978, 133-7; 'Trinity, Divine', SacMundi 6, 295-303; 'Trinity in Theology',
ibid., 6, 303-8; "Trinity', in K. Rahner and H. Vorgrimlcr, Concise Theological
Dictionary, ET R. Strachan, D. Smith, R. Nowell and S. o. Twohy, London and
New York 21981, 513-17; 'Dreifaltigkeitsmystik', LTK 3, 563-4. On Rahner's
approach d. G. Lafont, Peut-on cOImaitre Dieu en Jesus-Christ? Cogitatio fidei
44, Paris 1969, 172-228; B. van der Heijden, Karl Rahner. Darlegung und Kritik
seiner Grundposition, Eisiedeln 1973, 424-4~; K. Fischer, Der Mensch als
Geheimnis. Die Anthropo/ogie Karl Rahners, Okumenische Forschungen II, 5,
Freiburg - Basle - Vienna 1974,337-65; H. Urs von Balthasar, Theodramatik 3,
Einsiedeln 1980, 298ff.
202. K. Barth, Church Dogmatics III, 349.
203. Ibid., 351.
204. Ibid., 353.
205. Ibid., 362 and 367.
206. Ibid., 368.
207. Ibid., 381.
208. This is especially clear in his Die christliehe Dogmatik im Entwurf (n. 200),
140.
209. Thus W. Pannenberg, art cit., (n. 174), 96, in agreement with T. Rendtorff,
'Radikale Autonomie Gottes. Zum Verstandnis der Theologie Karl Barths and
ihrer Folgen', in Theorie des Christentums. Historisch-theo/ogische Sludien Sll
seiner neuzeitlichen Fasslmg, Gutersloh 1972, 161-81.
210. Cf. above, n. 139.
211. K. Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith (n. 201), 116 and elsewhere.
212. Id., The Trinity, 88 n. 10.
213. Ibid., 85 n. 7; 100 n. 18; 102 n. 21.
214. Ibid., 83-7.
215. Ibid., 91-8.
216. Ibid., 99-103; FOIllldations of Christian Faith, 136-7.
217. The Trinity, 59-60, 83-7.
218. Foul/dations of Christian Faith, 137.
219. Cf. above, 287f.
220. Worle ins Schweigen; ET J. Demske, Encounters with Sile"ce, Westminster,
Md. 1960.
221. Id.,'Current Problems in Christology', Theo/ogicall"vestigatio"s 1, ET C.
Ernst, London and Baltimore 1961, 157-63, 168-74; 'Dogmatic Reflections on
the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ', in Theological Investigations 5,
ET K.-H. Kruger, London and Baltimore 1966, 193-215.
222. 'The Position of Christology in the Church between Exegesis and
Dogmatics', Theological Investigations 11, ET D. Bourke, London and New York
1974, 198-9; for a clear statement, The Tri"ity, 61-3. For this reason the criticism
 Notes to pages 303-314 381
of B. van der Heijden, Karl Rahner, Darlegung und Kritik seiner Grllndposition
(n. 201), 399H, 435H, seems to point to a real problem but at the same time to
interpret Rahner's not entirely cleaf statement in a certain direction that is itself
open to criticism. .
233. K. Rahner, 'Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World',
Theological Investigations 5 (n. 221), 173-88.
224. This finds expression especially in the profound commentary on the prayer
which Augustine gives in his Injoa,mis Evangelium tractatus, tract. 107-11 (CCl
36,613-33). Recent exegesis: R. Bultmann, The Gospeloffohn: A Commentary,
ET G. R. Beasley-Murray, R. W. N. Hoare and J. K. Riches, Oxford and
Philadelphia 1971,486-522; W. Thusing, Herrlichkeit und Einheit. Eine Ausle-
gung des Hohenpriesterlichen Gebetes johannes 17, Die Welt der Bibel 14,
Dusseldorf 1972; E. Kasemann, The Testimony offesus: A Study of the Gospel of
john in the Light of Chapter 17, ET G. KrOdel, Philadelphia 1968; R. Schnacken-
burg, The Gospel according to St. john 3, ET D. Smith and G. A. Kon, New York
1972, 167-202; S. Schulz, Das Evangelimll nach johannes, NTD 4 Gattingen
1972,213-20.
225. This is the approach taken by J. E. Kuhn, Katho/icsch. Dogmatik 2. Di.
christlich. Lehre von der got/lich." Dreifaltigkeit, Tubingen 1857; d. A. Brunner,
Dreifaltigkeit. Personale Zugiillge zum Mysterium (n. 144),23.
226. Cf. above, 167f. This viewpoint is developed especially in J. Moltmann,
The Trinity and the Kingdom (n. 140).
227. Cf. above, 282f.
228. Augustine, De Trinitate, 1,4; etc. (eel so, 31); In Johannis Evangelium
tractatus 105,3; 107,6; 111,3 (CCl 36,604,615,631).
229. Cf. E. Peterson, 'Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem' (n. 158).
230. Ibid., 105.
231. K. Hemmerle, Thesen Ztl einer trinitarischen Ontologie, Einsicdeln 1976,
66ff.
232. Cf. above, 280f.
233. Cf. K. Hemmerle, op. cit., 38ff.
234. The kenotic character of the trinitarian persons as relations has been
brought out by H. Urs von Balthasar, 'Mysterium paschale', Mysallll13, 152f.,
following some modern Russian theologians (especially Soloviev, Turajev and
Bulgakov).
235. On this poin!cf. W. Breunins, 'StellungderTrinitatslehre', in H. Vorgrimler
and R. van der Guch! (eds.), 8ilanz der Theologi. im 20. jahrhu"dert 3, Freiburg
- Basic - Vienna 1970,26-8; K. Rahner, 'Trinity in Theology', SacM,,,,di 6,
304-5.
236. A New Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults, ET K. Smyth, london and
New York 1967,498-502.
237. K. Rahner, 'Trinity in Theology', SacMundi 6, 305.
238. M. Schmaus, Katholische Dogmatik I, Munich '1953.
239. Cf. W. Kasper, 'Christologie und Anthropologie', TQ 162,1982,202-21.
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Aachen, Synod of, 219 see God, incapable of suffering

Absolute, The, 53-5, 98, 105, 11lf., Apocalyptic, 119, 124f., 165, 1661.,
192, 252 173, 203, 212, 251
Acosmism, 24, 135 Apologetic, 26, 47, 63, 289,
Adoption, 139, 165,227 Appropriation, 275, 2821.
Aeon, 165, 166, 1721. Arianism, 179, 181£.,212, 218f., 256f.,
Aggiornamcnto, ISH. 261
Agnosticism, 52 Arminians, 285
Alexandria, Synod of, 258 Art, 200
Alienation, 29, 34, 38, 42, 48, 135, 199, Atheism, 7ff., 11, 12f., 15ff., 17, 20,
2641. 2311., 25ff., 28, 3lfl., 3511., 41,44,
ArnoT fati, 42 471.,4911., 52f., 54, 56, 571., 6211.,
Anakcphalaiosis, 2S 3 76, 86, 109, 159, 160, 196,292,
Analogy, 60, 68, 94-100, 155, 185, 296,312,31411.
187, 2161., 22311., 236, 261f., concept of, 49
27lfl., 2821., 290, 307, 310 forms of, 19 47
ana/agia entis, 58, 61, 96, 97, 99, of the masses, 7, 47
301 . phenomenon of, 53
analogia fidei, 61, 971., 99, 301 absolute, 49
ana/agia Iibertat;s, 98, 99 Christian, 17, 60
ana/agia nominum, 97 culpable, 53
ana/agia proportionalitatis, 98 Enlightenment, 11
ana/agia relat;on;s-operation;s, 98 humanistic, 11,27,54
Angel of Yahweh, 2421., 251f., 297 indifferent, 20, 47
Angst, 85, 103, 136, 199 Marxist, 11
Anima naturaliter christiana, 72 materialist, 19
Anthropology, 6, 51, 52, 94-100, methodical, 19,25
103-6, 113, 154, 180, 269, 300, naturalistic, 19
302, 316 postulatory, 30
Anthropomorphism, 185, 190 semantic, 87
Anthropotheism, 29 scientistic, 19, 25f.
Anthropoccntrism, 12 troubled, 20
Antichrist, 39, 44, 58, 98 Autonomy, 8ff., 11, 17ff., 21, 26f., 30,
Anticipation, 92, 94, 99, 105, 123, 157, 37, 38, 45, 72, 1351., 143, 160,290,
167, 200, 305 300
Antiquity, 16f., 95f., 103, 179, 185f., Authority, 1331., 137, 139
189f., 198, 201f., 235-8, 239fl.,
252, 260, 290 Baptism, 203, 205, 207, 233. 246,
Apathy-axiom, 18911., 194, 196 2501., 2761.
384 Index of Subjects
Baptismal command, 245£., 250, 276 Communism, 32-5, 26f., 38, 50, 107,
Baptismal confession, 181,212£., 276f. 307
Beautiful, the, 200, 228, 290 Concept, 82, 88, 99, 111, 149,265,287
Begening, 269, 279 Condescension, 129, 140, 165, 169,
Being, 15, 40, 42, 45, 52, 54£" 63, 93£., 191f.
98, !Olff., 104ff., 148-53, 154, 187, Confessional formula, 144, 260
235ff., 260, 283, 289, 299, 307 Conscience, 104
forgetfulness of, 54, 152 Consensus theory, .91f.
and history, 98 Consciousness, 28, 30, 187, 28 7,289
meaning of, 46, 54£., 93, t 14, lS5, Consfantinople, Council of, 145, 212ff.,
157,290 257ff., 263, 286, 295
question of, 46, 55, 64, 93 Constantinople, Second Council of,
thought .nd being, 185 259,295
underst;:mding of, 78, 156 Contemplation, 117
Biblical criticism, 163 Contingency, 101ff.
Biblicism, 212, 244 Contradiction, principle of, 44, 102,
Binitarian, 212 153,233
Biology, 95, 136, 160 Correlation, 62, 80
Brahmanism, 235f. Correspondence theory, 9lf.
Buddhism, 16, 235 Cosmology, 101-4, 113, 181,254,258
Cosmos, 39, 46, 98f., 101-4, US, 137,
Catechism, Roman, 295 161, 163, 177, 180f., 185,201,
Chalccdon, Council of, 194,212,214 237f., 252
Ch.rism., 204f., 208f., 246 Coveoont, 139, 204, 209ff., 228, 291
Christians for Socialism, 35 Creator, 48, 97, 116, 143,253, 265
Christianity, 17,35, 37ff., 39, 41, 44, Creation, 66-8, 72. 79. 136, 139, 145f.,
58,105,136, 145, 153, 159, 173, 149, 168, 173, 181, 186, 188,
182,237-42,249,252,266,295 200-2,223, 227, 252f., 262, 265,
religionless, 59 267,278
Christology, 51, 142, 157, 163, orders of, 67, 70, 254, 271, 272,
166-97, 244f., 249, 312 278
adoptionist. 178 Creaturc:liness, 61, 72
exaltation, 176 Creed, 3, 7, 45, 57, 80, 133, 158, 182,
functional, 171 198,210, 213ff., 249f., 251, 253,
indirect, 169-73 272,295,302,313,316
incamational, 185 Athanasian, 274
kenolic, 176, 189-97 christological, 166
of the cross, 176, 189 great, 213, 217, 219-2, 250, 261,
logos, 185-9, 195 263
pre·existence, 176 trinitarian, 210, 229, 233f., 238,
Son, 171, 173-8, 244f. 240ff., 244ff., 249-51, 261,
Transfiguration, 197 263ff., 272, 288, 294, 296,
Two·stage, 175,246 304f., 310, 314ff.
Christomonism, 220 Cross, 59, 60, 125, 17lf., 174ff., 177,
Christ, question of, 158-63 189, 191f., 194-7, 203, 191
Church, 44f., 205ff., 208ff., 214, 229f., Cross, Theology of the, 59, 60, 67, 125,
246f., 250f., 296 129, 163, 191
Circle, hc:rmeneucical, 81, 272 Culture, 31, 44, 60, 133,228
Communicatio idiomatum, 191{. Culture Protestantism, 75
Communication, 56, 91 f., 119 Cyclical thought, 39, 42
Communion (koinonia), 204, 285, 305,
306 Duth, 51, 85, 105,125,160,172,192
 Index of Stlbiects 385
D~mons, 203 174. 184. 195, 203f.• 206-10. 2B.
Davidism, 163-5, 175 225f.• 228. B3. 244, 247. 254,
De·apocalypticizing, 252 269f.• 224. 245f., 291. 303. 310.
De·divinization, 44f. 314ff.
IXfinirion, 148 Escha.ologizing. 164. 166
De-ideologizarion, 7S Eccmil)'. 42f.
Deism, 23fl., 50, 296 Ethics, 19f., 26, 30, 7S, 89, 90, 167,
Demythologization, 59, 103, 165 208
De-numiniz3rion, 17 EuchariSl. 171.207,233. 250ff., 277.
Depch psychology, 3 I, 1341. 310
Determinism, 25 Eunomians, 12S, 261
Devil, 159 Evil, 19,38.48. 158-63, 228
Dialectic, 30, 32, 57, 60, 93 Evolution, 141, 161, 199
Dialogue, 30, 53, 55, 58, 188, 279, 290 theory of, 21, 32
Difference, ontological, 54, 55 Exal.acion. 871.• 197,203. 245, 303f.
Dionysus, 40, 41, 42 Existence, Christian, 205f., 233, 246,
Disclosure situation, 85, 89, 117 249
Divinization, 183,212£. Exodus experience, 163f.
Docctism, 178f. Experience, 22, 30, Sl, 52, 55, 65,
Dogma, 182, 184, 188,220,251,265, 78-87. 991.• 117. 206
286,297 of connast, 84, 160
Dogmatics, 7, 65, 70, 215, 219ff., 265, Experience with experience, 84f.,
266,286,287,311-14 117
Doxology, 144f., 146,212,214, 242, historicity, 83
24611., 250, 261, 277, 288, 302, mysteriousness, 85
303, 3091f., 316 of suffering. 84f., 159-63
Dualism, 68, 161, 179, 186. 252f.• 270. religious, 81£., 84ff., 99, 117, 239
291 transcendental, 85
Experiential science, 79, 8J
uster, 166, 168, 171, 174 Extra calv;n;st;cum, 191
Ebionitism, 178, 251£.
Economy, 321.• 37f.• 78f.• 136, 160. 199
Ecstasy, 199, 208, 236 facticity, 107
Ecumenical. 214f.• 2181.. 221 Faith, 7, 11, 13, 45, SO, 78, 78Cf.. U8,
Election, 139, 165 122fl., 244f., 249. 251, 263, 272.
Emanation, 187,252-8 315
doctrine of. 183. 187.253-8,2961. act and content of, 79, US, 122
Emancipation, 9ff., 17.34, 134ff., 141 as a human act, 70
Empirical method, 81, 88, 90 communicability of, 70
Empiricism, 87 dimension oC, 65
Empl)'ing, sell. 187. 1951f.• 226 and experience, 79ff.
Energies, uncreated, 220, 261 formal object and material object,
Enlightenment, 12, 23f., 30, 32, 33f., 3
581.• 7311., 77, 124, 1261., 135, 160. and God. 56
262.264,269.285,315 and knowledge. 22. 74. 152, 268.
Ephesus, Council of, 219f. 271
Epiclesis, 248 as pattern of life, 121
Equivocal, 95, 99 questioning and searching, 7, 13
see Analogy credibilil)' of, I II
Erlangen school. 91 ground 01. 122
Eschatology, eschatological, 66, 119, implicit and explicit, 49
125, 139, 143. 159. 163, 167f.• 170. irrational and authoritarian, 61
386 Index of Subjects
presuppositions of understanding 1111t., 129, 133, 161, 191,240,
of, 65-75 265
rationality of, 47, 68, 71, 74, 78 Abba, 142f., 171, 174, 184, 206,
and repentance, 168 244,246
and thought. 9, 147 35 absolute Spirit, ISH., 192
Falsification, 88 Olbsoluleness, 26, 125, 240
Father, 133-44 actus p"ruS, ISO, 279
Abba, 142, 171, 175, 184,207, as omnipotence of love, 194ff.
244,246 ascity, 150f.
Trinitarian. 122£., 130, 133-59, being of, 45, 63, 111, 148ft., 194,
167f., 1711., 180-3, 187ff., 262, 2731., 306t.
192, 196-8,224,244,247,250, being in action, 152f.
259, 265, 274, 283, 303ft., causa 511;, 54, 150ff.
308f. compassion of, 163
origin and source of deity, 146, death of, 7, 10ff., 20, 24, 26, 27,
216ft., 278f., 296f., 299, 309t., 39,40-44,50, 59ft., 90, 134,
311,314 192-7,316
Fatherhood, 280-2 deity of, 17, 103f., 156, 167f., 225,
Fidcism, 69, 74, 91, 270 293,304,316
Filioque, 213ft., 217f., 219-22, 223, eternity of, 150
297 existence of, 4, 7, 25, 30, 46f., 49,
Filioquism, 220 63,82, 110ft., 315f.
Finirudc-in6nity, 30, 31,84,98, 104, experience of, 78-88
153,240,295 as freedom, 27, 46, 99, 105, 139,
Florence, Council of, 220, 284 144,152-7, I 94f., 211, 266,
Forgiveness, 141, 168 294
Form criticism, 90 as freedom in love, 128f., 139, 144,
Frankfurt, Synod of, 218 155, 161, 168, 1911., 195,223,
Frankfurt School, 33 225,256, 266, 268f., 299, 311,
Freedom, 7, 9, 10f., 15, 18, 26, 30, 42, 316
45,50,55,57, 77, 98-101, 103-6, goodness of, 45
115, 128f., 138, 151-7, 160, 162, as he who is, 148ff., 151, 154£.,
168,200, 206, 209, 256 289
s~e Man, God hiddenness of, 51, 54ff., 64,
Christian, 9,211 123-30, 155,265, 274, 300
of children of God, 177, 206, 223, in history, 48,140, 150, 179, 181,
228 184, 187, 190, 194f., 202, 243,
kingdom of, 154, 159, 166, 223f. 315
Friendship with God, 228, 285 holiness of, 156
Function, functional, 52. 156 of hope, 109, 194
Fundamental theology, 122 image of, 110, 119,256,272, 286,
Future, 36, 9J, 99, lOBf., 139, 144, 162 290
immanence of, 150
immutability of, 150,184,190,
Genre, literary. 90 194, 269
Goasis, Gnosticism, 14, 68, 136, 145, incilp3ble of suffering, 61, 184, 190
179,183, 185, 194,214,251-9, see Apathcia axiom
293,2% incomprehensibility of, 125ff., 223,
God 261
The word 'Goo', 3-6, 10, 12f., indivisibility of. 279, 294
90f., 93ff. of Jesus Christ, 59, 121, 158,224,
concept of, 4£., 40£., 52£., 101, 229,305,313,315
 Index of Subiects 387
as judge, 143 . God, belief in, 48, 55, 63, 99, 115, 139,
as he can be known, 49, 268 156, 158
as living God, 24lfl., 279 God-complex, 134
lordship 01, 140, 1721. God, doctrine of, 122, 146f., 158, 167,
as love, 271., 44, 46, 55, 891., 123, 313f.
129, 144, ISS, 147, 168, 172, philosophical, 147
194-7,216,2231.,2431.,248, theological, 147
265,271,2961.,2991., 3091., de Deo Trino, 1461.,311,314
314,316 de Deo Uno, 1461.,311,314
as mystery, 5, tI, 14,62£., 104, God, idea 01,1041., 110-14, 144, 147,
116,121, 122, 126-30, 185, 305
214,223,225,229,265, God, knowledge of, 51, 60, 67, 99-130,
268-71, 301f., 3151. 256, 268
nature of, 63, 103, 129, 147ff., anthropological, 103-6
239, 244, 258, 261f., 26911., by cosmology, 68
280, 2941., 296, 299fl., 304, historical, 106-10
308,314 natural, 48ff., 51, 63, 66, 68-71,
necessity of, 55 74,78
oneness, 29, 238-43, 305£. God, question of,S, 13,30, 44f., 52,
perfection of, 280 56,64, 78f., 107f., 158-164,315
personality of, 27, 142, 144, Godforsakenness, 172, 190, 192
151-7, 243, 285 Godlessness, 48, 59, 61, 67, 169
of philosophy, 54, lSI, 181 Gods, 43, 136,2351.,238-42,294,296
prool of, 4, 12,30, 78, 99-115 Good, the, 40, 54f., 200, 290
qllo nra;us cogitari neqllit, 4, 14£., and evil, 44, 54
1101., 122f., 195 Grace, 65, 73, 77, 130, 140, 168,2051.,
reality of, 5, 7, 9-12, 14£., 26, 30, 2081., 2241., 227fl., 302
60,92,104, lID, 111, 156, created·uncreated, 226, 274
179,256,274 as uncreated energy, 226
saving counsel of, 190, 125, 129
Ground, 1031.
self disclosure of, 66, 86, 99, 109,
Happmess, 27, 104
1131., 120f., 128, lSI, 177,
Heart, 52, 67, 71, 80, 82, 114
190, 1941.
Hellenism, 67, 135, 173, 184f., 250,
self communication of, 171, 226£.,
252
268, 275, 300fl., 314
Hellenization, 173, 181-4
sell·emptying of, 157, 195- 7 Heretics, 208ff.
silence of, 60 Hermeneutics, 182,312
simplicity of, 149£.,253, 268, 278, Heteronomy, 45
280, 2821., 293, 3061. Hierarchia veritatum, 251,271
as Spirit, 26511., 293 High·priestly prayer Uohn 17),2471.,
as substance, 23, 27, 46, 280, 288, 303-5,307, 309f., 316
295,296,300 Hinduism, 235
and subjectivity, 300ff., 304 Hippo, Council of, 144
and suflering, 190, 194, 195- 7 Historicity, 91, 99
transcendence of, 53, 60, 129, 137, History, 38, 58, 71, 73, 77, 106-9, 180
139,1491.,202,241,266,295, philosophy 01, 106-9, 113
299 Holy Spirit, 128, 130, 183f., 195-229,
unity of, 233f., 238-43, 245, 252f., 233, 243, 245, 247, 25011., 275,
256,261, 268f., 279, 28lfl., 278, 305
289- 300, 305- 7 community of Father, Son and,
see Trinity 216, 225, 279
388 Illdex of Subjects
divinity of, 212-14 Inter·pe:rsonality, 290£.
as ccstasis of God, 226 Interpretation, 182f., 184,286
freedom of, 211 Inter-subjectivity, 266, 290
function of, 211, 213f. lmuilion. 1 t 4
• s gift, 223-9, 275, 290, 308 Irrationalism, 270£.
as giver of life, 213 IsI.m, 238-41
indwelling of, 220, 226£., 275, 278
as love, 21.6, 223-7 jesus, 44, 66, 125f., 133, 140fl., 143f.,
as paracletc, 207, 210, 247, 225 163,166-71, 174, 194, 244f., 276,
as person, 210-4, 223, 225 302-5
as principle of the life of the church, Christ, 67, 69, 120, 122f., 125f.,
229 129, 134, 145, 158- 97, 203f.,
35 subjective possibility of 205, 209f., 213, 2271., 233,
revelation, 224f. 24311., 248f., 250, 255, 260,
work of, 214f., 223, 227f. 26if., 265, 269f., 284f., 302fl.,
Homoousios, 145£., 183-5,213,219, 315
254, 256, 258-60, 263 Abba relationship, 171, 174, 244
Hope, 13, 36, 38, 42, 68, 83, 93, 94, b.ptism of, 203fl., 245f.
107fl., 116, 140, 143, 158f., 160, the Christ, 163-84,256
162, 166£., 197, 198,305 cross of, 163, 174f., 184, 194-7,
Humanism, 9, 10, 32-5, 50, 60 206, 307
Human rights, 15, 70f. de.th of, Inf., 203, 206
Hybris, 130, 138 divinity of. 146, 178, 183, 190.
Hypost.ses, 173, 210, 243 2121., 253
Hypostatic union, 274f., 302£. humanity of, 253r., 274
Hypothesis, 22, 89, 109 Logos, 67, 145, 166
mess.ge of, 140f., 143, 166ff., 203,
I .nd thou, 30, 55, 56, 243, 266, 290 245f.
Iconoclasm, 125 messiah, 163f., 16M., 177
Iconography, 242 ministry of, 169, 174, 189.203
Idea, 39, 112, 149, 200 second coming of, 204, 207, 210,
Ide.l, 39, 40f., 199f. 305
Idealism, idealistic, 34, 106ff., Ill, self-3wareness of, 171, 194
192fl., 199,2231.,300 servant of God, 167
Ideological criticism, 114, 156, 158 Son of David, 165, 173
Ideology, 34, 37, 78, 86, 156, 158, 199, Son of God, 165, 167, 169,
229, 286, 307 171-85, 194,244-8, 279ff., 303
Idol. try, 125 Son of M.n, 166-8, 173, 203
Idols, 48, 53, 58, 74, 103f., 156, 224, .s Word of God, 173, 177
238f. Jewish Christianity, 252f.
Illative sense, 114 jud.ism, 159, 164, 169, 173, 178f.,
Illumination, 104, 11 H .• 123 210fl., 238-42, 260, 293f.
Illusion, 31, 341., 40 judgment, 130, 140, 168,256
Im.ge, 82, 87, 185, 214fl., 269, 271-4 justice, 38, 50, 55, 108, 256
prohibition of, 124 Justification, 76, 162
Incarnation, 177, 184f., 189, 194f.,
197,2531.,270,2741.,278 Kc:nosis (self-emptying). 60, 176, 184,
Individualism, 290, 302 189-97,276,310
Individu.lity, 154, 282 Kingdom of God, 44, 66, 92, 109,
Infinity see Finitude 125f., 133, 140fl., 156, 166fl., In,
Inspiration, 202f. 206, 305
Intellectualism, 71 Kingdoms, doctrine of two, 9
 Index of Subjects 389
Kingship, Davidic, 16411., 169 as person, 15f., 19, 38, 156,266,
Knowledge, 4, 30, 49, 52, 54, 69, 79£., 305
9911., 127, 186, 196,2771. Manticism, 201
order of, 74, 227 Martyr, 209
Marxism, Marxist, 30, 32, 35-37, 107,
138, 159
Language, 4, 60, 83-100, 188, 2881.
as communicative praxis, 92 Mary, 2061.
Materialism, 24ff., 34, 50, 78, 199,253,
existential statements, 45£.
functional, 93
2551.
dialectical, 32, 37
game, 89, 91
God and, 87, 921. mechanical, 26, 34
performative, 91 Mathematics, 95, 100
pragmatic, 93ff. Matter, 26, 29, 37,180
religious, 87, 88, 90-4, 99, 101, Meaning, 141.,42, 86, 1061., 1081.,
108 23611., 271
Lateran IV (1215), 96, 1261.,2191.,262 criterion of. 88
Law, 168, 209 question of, 38
of freedom, 228 Meaninglessness, 11, 20, 44, 86, 108
and gospel, 63, 209 Meditation, 117
Letter and spirit, 209 Messiah, 163-6, 172, 203
Liberalism, 58, 307 Messianic, messianism, 36£., 38, 163-6,
Liberation, 135, 143, 160, 163 175, 2031.
Lile, 3911., 43, 48, 54, 115, 133, 1371., Metaphor, 9311., 99, 113, 120
150, 1671., 20011., 2471. Metaphysics, 15. 22, 39ff., 43, 52-5,
form of, 89, 91 64,75,871.,98,100,109, III, 135,
Light, 256, 272 137, 147-57, 180, 184, 191,212,
Linguistic usage, 90 235, 2921.
Linguistic philosophy, 87-94, 117 Middle Platonism, 181, 257
Liturgy, liturgical, 143, 145, 146, lSlf., Miracle, 24, 141, 168
212, 242, 246, 261 Mission, 204, 229, 274, 27711., 291
Logos, 44, 72,1731., 17911., 185, 191, Modalism, 1661., 171f1., 195, 284,
252, 2561., 274, 292, 303 2871., 294, 29711.
Love, 45, 551.,85,123,1281.,141,143, Modern, modernity, 7, 10, 16ff., 21-4,
155, 157, 162, 168, 192, 19511., 2611., 33, 391., 561., 69, 104, 1351.,
2061.,21511.,22511.,243,249, 256, 151-7, 160, 198,264,268,273,
265,266, 279, 2841., 290, 296, 305, 28511.,288,2901.,295,300,302,
3081. 314
Lyons, Second Council of, 220 Modernism, 58, 80
Monarchianism, 291 ff.
Macedonians, 212 Monarchy 01 God, 221, 235, 2391.,
Man, 11, 12, 22, 28, 31, 33£., 37, 42, 2541., 291-300
49, 93, 115, 119, 135, 199, 235, Monism, 154, 161, 181. 185.
236,243,258,281,300,304 Monopatrism, 219
basic situation of, 6, 62, 108, 138, Monophysitism, 303
160, 172 Monotheism, 49. 178f., 188, 233ff..
35 being open to the world, 6, 305, 237-42,258,260,263,290-300,
314 305, 307, 314
and death, 11,20,26,316 Montanism, 208f.
dignity of, 15, 19, 51 Mother deities, 135
as mystery, 11, 14, 115, 118, 121£., Mysterium stricte dictum, 127,267.276
123, 1281., 185, 269-71 Mysterium tremendum fascinosum, 86
390 Index of Sub;ects
Mystery, 52T., 66, 80, 8511., 96, liS, Omology, 921., 109-15 171 285 287
117,2241.,26811.,274,29911.,3101. 310 ' , , ,
see God, Man, Trinity trinitarian, 310
concept 01, 1261.,268-71 Ontotheology, 64, 109 111 1501.
holy. 123 Origenism, 257 "
Mystery religions, 137. 173 Original sin, 134
Mysticism, 23, 55, 56, 58, 81, 87, 236 Onhodoxy. Protestant, 58, 75f., 274
256,285 '
Myth, 4311., 46, 66, 72, 83, 93, 136 Palamatism, 226
138, 201, 235, 237 ' Panencheism, 153
Mythology, 43, 13811., 173, 190,2371. Pantheism, 23ff., 27, 33, SO, 86, 102
lSI, 153, 2921. '
Parable, 66, 93, 98f., 113, 141, 168,
National socialism, 39, 59
170,215,269, 271fl., 290
Natural law, 19
Par.digm, 88, 93, 109
Natural philosophy, 61, 72 101
paradigm shilt, 88
Natural sciences, 20-26,
100, 102
76I
82 88
I ,
Paradox, 191
Participation, t 13, 174f., 201
Natural theology, see Theology
P.triarchal, 1341., 137
Naturalism, 34, SO
Paulu,-Gesell,chaft, 35
Nature, 22-4, 261., 3 If., 46' 58 , 70,
Peace, 166, 167
72 II.,771.,102, 171, 184,228
Peace Conference, Christian, 35
concept of, 77
Pentecost,205f.
and gracc, 69, 73
People 01 God, 204
law 01, 102, 107
Perichoresis, 283ff.
natura pura, 73
Natures, doctrine of two, 171, 190,
Person, IS, 120, 154-7, 201, 260, 282,
298, 305, 308, 310
19lfl., 212, 284
concept, 1521i., 156, 282 285-91
Nco-Kantianism, 7S
302,307 "
Nco-Marxism, 33, 107
worth. 38, 154
Neo-PaI3m.uism, 220£., 273
Personalism, 290
Nco-Platonism, 23, 114, 129, 144,
Peson3lity, 153f.
1491.,151, 187,223,2351.,261,
Philosophy, 15,30,331.,40,46 55 57
264-7, 290, 296
64,95,102,135,146, 147, i52~7 '
Neo-Positivism, 88f.
Nco-Protestantism, 75, 312
17311., 181, 185, 188, 190, 198,201,
233-8,252, 264, 291
Neurosis, 31, 134
Physics, 136
NextlS mysuriorrmt, 224 251 271 273
NicOle.. , Council of, 146,'149,'180-4,
Physiology, 160
Pietism, 10, 19
213, 25711., 263, 295
Nicaea, Second Council of 219
PI.tonism, 391., 44, 67, 102, 137, 2551.
Nihilism, t 1, 19,28,39,4'1,44,54,78,
Plur.llty, 233-8, 24011., 2901., 295,
2961., 305
86,102, 108, 109, 129, 136, 1991.
see Unity, Trinity
Nominalism, 9, 17, 129,270
Pneum3tology, 197-229,245
Nothingness (da, Nichts), 41, 43, 50,
Greek, 216-221, 223
1021., 137, 162
Latin, 216-221, 223
Number, 2341., 236, 282, 2931.
Pneumatamaebai, 212f., 250
Numinous, 16f.
Point of contact, 65 f.
Politics, 1411., 191.,30,34,56
Oedipus complex, 134 Polytheism, 49, 236, 238 2391. 292
Omnipotence, 133, 140f., 141. 143, Positivism, 82, 88, 199' ,
156-9,172, 177, 192, 1941.,245 Potentia oboedientialis, 61
 Index of Subjects 391
Poverty, 141 order 01, 68, 70, 253, 271, 2721.,
Praxis, 14, 33, 37, 56£., 70, 79f., 107, 292
130,238 Reformation, 9£., 21, 262, 270, 285
Pr.yer, 141, 143, 144, 150 Regula {idei, see Faith, rule of
Preambula {idei, 47 Rcims, Synod of, 295
Predestination, 163 ReI.tion, 63, 64, 156, 279, 290, 3 \0
Pre-existence, t 73- 8 ReI.tion.lity, ISS, 280, 290, 310
Pre-Socrarics, 201 Relativity, theory of, 25
Primal trust, 118 Religion, 4, 7, 9£., 19, 23, 28-31, 33ff.,
Priscillianism, 218 51,53,58,75,80,88,133, 136,
Private property, 34 138,201,228,235,237,26411.,290
Prob.bility, 1131. Asian high religions, 16, 23, 154
Process philosophy, 194 criticism of, 10,28, 30f., 33f., 37,
Process theology, 61, 240£. 76, 158,235,266,2851.
Progress, 40, 134, 199,209£.,212,228, history 01, 133, 1371., 174,233-8,
265 268, 285
Projection, projection theory, 29-31, hIStory of religions school, 173
33, 34, 37, 53, 62, 75, 82, 107, 266, natural, 24, 58
286 patriarchal, 134ff.
Promise, 148, 163, 16511., 194 philosophy 01, 26411.
Prool, 991., 103 as a private affair, to, 14, 19,56,
Prophecy, 68, 78, 119, 135, 140, 165, 71
2021.,204,213,238,291 Renaissance, 9, 23
Propr;um ,lJr;st;anum, 144, 166, 233, Represenr;nion, 160, 164
238,294 Resurrection, 125, 166, 174(., 203f.,
Protocol statements, 81 207, 245, 249, 2761.
Providence, 24, 256 Return, eternal, 42f.
Psychoanalysis, 30 Revelation, 12,58, 60f., 63, 68, 71,
Psychology, 31, 117, 1331., 160,285, 741., 77, 115-23, 1281., 138, 144,
287 155,1851., 188, 194, 238, 243-9,
268-72, 2721., 2761.,286, 30011.,
Quantum physics, 2S, 82, 88 308, 315
Question.bility,5, \02,3151. biblic.I, 118, 120, 138, 163
Qumr.n, 165, 1791. concept 01, 117-120, 129
eschalological, 121, 123, 174, 195,
Rationalism, 14, 50, 69, 71, 74, 107, 233, 2431., 3031.
127, 223, 267, 286, 309 lorms of, 2431.
Realism, 107 and the hiddenness of God, 124H.,
Reality, 10, 15,18,24,30£.,34,57,68, 177
77,78,81,86,891.,9211.,102, \03, and historicity, 120
113,1441., 1541., 177, 185, 199, and history, 118
2241., 235- 8, 256, 271 personal self-revelation, 118-22
Reason, 9,13£.,27,39£.,44,50,52. th<ology 01, 142
55,58,70,71,74,77,99, 102, trinitarian, 154, 243-9, 314
1851., 2351., 2711. in words and acrs, 120f., 223, 271
Recapitulation, see Anakephalalosis Revolution, 38, 141, 156, 159£., 177,
Reception, 183,212,214,219 183
Recollection, 57, 83, 186 Rome, Synod of, 212, 259
Reconciliation, 172, 200
Redeemer myth, gnostic, 17lf. S.beJli.nism, 2961.
Redemption, 38, 42, 65, 68, 143, Sacrament, 29, 208f., 228, 306
15911., 180, 196,253 Sacrifice, 134, 203
392 Index of Subjects
Sacrificium inteltectus, 68, 99 Sophistty, 186
Sadism, 162 Soteriology, 171, 173, 174, 176, 178,
Salvation, 48£., 58, 66£., 130, 168,223, 181,183, 212f., 247f., 253f., 256,
227,249,257,271,274,312 263,302,304,309,316
«onomy of, 217, 222, 261ff., Speculation, 174, 183ff., 201, 212f.,
268-71, 272, 275, 314 214, 223ff., 233, 235-8, 242, 246,
lack of, 48 249f., 251-3, 2SS, 257, 265f., 268,
mystery of, 233, 309, 311 270-4,284,297,302,304
need of, 49 Spinozism, 24
order of, 68, 254 Spir.tion, 268, 279f., 28Hf., 297
plan of, 253 Spirit, 37, 103ff., 107, 115, lSI, 153,
promise of, 163, 165 187, 192, 198ff., 245, 252f., 255,
question of, 158-63, 290 265, 268, 270
Salvation history, 70f., 98, 106-9, 118, see Holy Spirit, Trinity
1461.,184,202-10,214,223,253, concept of, 200-2, 210f.
261,262,266, 276ff., 298, 301, 312 experience of, 223
Schism, 9, 74, 214, 218-22 the word 'Spirit\ 201, 279
Science, 9, 13, 19,26,30,39,43,88, and institution, 208
136, 199, 305 and matter, 68, 107
Scientific theory, 7, 305 of God, 200ff., 204f., 208, 215,
Secularism, 8 240, 243, 267
Secularization, 7fl., 20f., 153, 159, 209, of God 3S power in crcadon, 2ooff.,
295 228
Self·awareness, 30, 34, 268, 286ff., 302 35 power of God's history, 203
Self-communication, 195, 303 3S power of new crcation, 203
Self-realization, 37, 134 of Jesus Christ, 209, 221, 228, 246
Self-redemption, 160 Spirit nature, 154
Semantics, 92((.
Spirit philosophy, 198f.
Semi-Arians, 258 Spirits, discerning the, 205£.
Semi-rationalism, 267 Spirituality, 236, 256, 307, 310
Sexism. 140
St03, 23f.. 67, 138, 142, 145, 180, 182,
Short formula of Christl:m belief, 246,
251,305,313f. 201, 235, 257, 292
Signs of the time, 7, II, 198ff., 202, Structuralism, 33
229 Subject, 18, 19,26,30, 33f., 56, 77, 82,
Simplicity, 240f. 1071., 123, 154, 285, 287, 288f.,
Sin, 38, 65, 168 290
Sinner, 163, 168ff. SubjectiVism, 18
Sil 4 im Leben, 90, 141,211,233,242, Subjectivity, 10, 18, 19, 3D, 34, 46, 57,
246, 250f., 261 61, 104, 123,285,290, 300ff., 304
Socialism, 32, 36 philosophy of, 46, 54, 76, 301
Early, 32 Suoordinationism, 180, 212, 250, 25 lE.,
Religious, 35 255ff.,291- 5
Socinians, 285 Subsistence, 281
Society, 9, 15,38, 46, 56, 74, 133f. Substance, 26, 64, 153, 155ff., 258,
criticism of, 169f. 280,281,290,310
Sociology, 117, 134f., 136ff., 160, 170 ontology of, 63f.
Soissons, Synod of, 295 Superman, 42
Son of God (trinitarian), 135, 136, U8, Superstition, 13
142, 144-7, 149, 157-98,224, 243, Supranaturalisrn, 24, 270
247, 250, 265, 2741., 279, 283, Symbol, 83, 93, 113, 117,237
303ff., 308f. System, 236
 Index of S"bjects 393
Taoism, 16 of revolution, 35
Teleology, 1011. scholastic, 47, 69, 97f., 107, 149,
Tern~ry, 236f., 272 1501.,191,223,275,288
see Threcness as science of faith, 7, 87
Theism, 16, 24, 28, 41, 44, 52, 60, 86, secularization, 8
1531.,197,2851.,288,299,315 speculative, 181
anonymous, 52£., 55 supernatural, 73
position beyond theism and theological, 15, 316
atheism, 59f. transcendental, 56, 70, 196,278,
Theodicy, 19, 106, 158-164, 196 301
Theogony, 265 01 the Word, 188, 196
Theology, 4, 6f., 8, 13, 20t., 26, 28, Theonomy, 8, 10, 17-19,26,30,37,
301., 441., 551., 64, 871., 90, 1471., 38,45
1601.,188,198,224,2631. • Theo·ontology see Ontotheology
baroque and Nco-scholastic, 73, Theop.schism, 1911.
236,289 Theoph.ny, 117, 124, 242
concept, 7. 73 Theory and praxis, 56f.
35 anthropology, 52, 266 Third Reich, 209
Catholic, 52, 57f., 59, 74, 104, Threeness, 233-8, 240, 283, 285, 290,
106, 194, 272, 312 2931., 2961., 298, 299-314
cognitio de; et hominis, 75 see Trinity
correlation, 61 Time,208f.
crisis of, 47 Toledo, Council aI, 146,283,295
'de.th 01 God', 601., 134, 194 Torah, 120
dialectical, 57, 60, 64f., 15f., 150, Tradition, 4, 6, 10, 13, 80, 86, 182,
270 21911.,2211.,264,286
dialogical, 56, 63 Traditionalism, 69, 74
dilemmas of, 9f. Transcendence, 24f., 30, 52,181
feminist, 135 see God
as (ides quaerens intellectJtm, 7, 13, human, 30, 38, 52f., 156,301
185 Transcendental, 6, 52f., 70f., 77f., 92f.,
formal/material, 312 94, 105
'from below' and 'from above" 12, Transfiguration, 197, 200
60 Trent, Council of, 50
Jewish, 159 Tri.d, 149
Iiber.l, 58, 751., 167, 173, 194,285 see Ternary, Threeness
of liberation, 35, 55f., 107 Trias, Trinitas, 250, 295
Lutheran, 62 Trinity, 128, 14511., 1871., 191, 195,
met.physic.l, 63, 2351. 2111.,215-23,229,233,241,
Modernist, 58 243-9, 250, 25611., 259, 2611.,
natural, 58ff., 60£., 63-79, 96, 99, 263-5, 26711., 27511., 282, 296, 297,
115, 161, 2141. 302,305,307
negative, 51, 96, 102, 220, 261, activity ad extra, 262f., 280
269 Christian monotheism, 290-300,
Nco-palamite, 220£., 273 306,315
Palamite, 226 economic, 217-223, 226, 254,
.nd philosophy, 64 2561., 264, 2661., 273-8,
political, 15,30,35, 55ft, 72, 107, 299-303,31211.,316
168, 235, 237 immanent, 60, 216-23, 225, 263,
rabbinic, 190, 251 26611., 273-7, 299-303, 312
Reformation, 74, 194,221 as mystery, 264-74, 277, 285,
of revelation, 64, 74, 78, 238-51 2991.,307-11,313
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

- - -

394 Index of Subjects

persons (hypostases), 212f£., Universality, 78f., 174, 177,240
256-60,274, 28 Iff., 284-91, Univocal, 95, 99, 236
296, 299, 302f., 309f. see Analogy
persons as distinct modes of Utopia, 37, 138, 159, 168, 199
subsistence, 287f., 296, 300
persons as modes of being, 288,
Values, 40, 41£., 199
297,300
Vatican I, 50, 69, 122, 127, 265, 271
processions, 217-23, 247,
Vatican II, 7, SOff., 70, 118, 228, 250
256,261,275,277-84,310
relations, 279-85, 289ff., 308f. Verification, 82, 89, 113
Via a{finnationis, 97
unity of being (nature, substance),
see Analogy
213, 254, 257ff., 28 Iff., 296ff.,
Via eminentiae, 97
300
see Analogy
unity of immanent and economic,
Via negationis, 97
271,274-7
see Analogy
vestigia Tr;nitat;s, 272ff.
Virgin, 166
Trinity, doctrine of, 180,210,218,
Virtue, 42, 44
233-316
Vision, Beatific, 270f.
angel trinity, 251
Vulgar materialism, 24
basic concepts, 277-93
content of, 305-8
context of, 311-14 Will to power, 39, 44
Greek, 251-63, 272f., 278f., 282f., Wisdom, Wisdom literature, 48, 120,
284, 296ff., 309, 314 166, 174, 1791., 185,210,243
Latin, 251-63, 272f., 278f., 2821., Wimess, 90, 125
284, 2961f., 299, 309, 312 to the truth, 91, 123
meaning of, 303-5 Women's movement, 135
problem 01, 307-11 Word, 891., 185, 186-9
psychological, 146, 261, 268, 01 God, 621., 751., 80, 121, 169,
2721.,275,2961.,301,314 184, 243, 250
Tritheism, 255, 258, 259, 281, 284, inward and outward, 186, 195,
2881., 29411. 217, 223, 272
Truth, 391f., 63, 88, 931f., 290 Work, 33, 44, 57, 107
Tiibingen School, 106, 113, 274 World, 6, 81., 101., 17, 191.,24,26,29,
Two·storey framework, 74 341.,381.,44,501., 55f., 591., 90,
93, 1071., 1491., 1611., 194,203,
Unbelief, 13, 238 256,265, 2921., 2941f.
Unity, 45, 233-42, 256, 281, 2821f., World Council of Churches, 262
285, 289, 290-300, 305 World view, 10, 2If., 25, 43, 54
as (ammunia, 307f£., 310 Worship, 1821., 205
 INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

Abelard, 298 187f., 189, 191, 196,216,218,223,

Achauf, H., 374 225f., 236, 249, 251, 255, 257, 261,
Adam, A., 367, 368 262,264,268,2711.,280,2821.,296,
Adorno, T. W., 32, 57, 336, 353 301,304,312,320,323,339,340,
Aeschylus, 84 343,345,347,351, 352, 354, 357,
Albert, H., 88, 341 358, 359, 362, 363, 364, 365, 367,
Albert lhe Greal, 17,268,279,374 368,371,375,376,381
Alexander of Hales, 111, 216, 298 Austin, J. L., 90, 341
Alfaro, j., 348 Ayer, A. j., 88
Althaus, P., 347, 358
Ahhusser, L., 32 Baehl, H. t 358, 377
Allizer, T. j. j., 60 Baius, M., 74
Altncr, G., 325 Balthasar, H. Urs v., 53, 55, 97. 193,
Amalric of Bena, 22 223,323, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339,
Ambrose of Milan, 218 340,343,344,345,348,358,363,
Amclung, E., 324 364,374,375,377,380,381
Anaximenes, 201, 360 Balz, H. R., 355
Andresen, c., 367, 375 Bantle, F. X" 377
Anselm of Canterbury, 4, 7, 73, 110(., Barbel, j., 368
112, 113, 126, 216, 223, 262, 265, Barth, H. M., 359
281,297,320, 332, 346, 347, 362, Barth, K., 35, 39, 51, 581., 60, 61, 621.,
371, 375 76,97,98,193,221,273,281,287,
Anselm of Havelberg, 298 288,298,300,304,312,327,336,
Apel, K. 0., 91, 341 339,343,344,346,347,349,359,
Aristotle, 83,95, 100, 107, 156,201, 363,372,375,377,379,380
235,236,292,323,340,342,344, Barrett, C. K., 360
345,346,360,365,278 Bartsch, H. W., 337
Acius, 126, 146, 180E., 182,212,252, Basil of Caesarea, 126, 146, 212, 218,
256,257 249,258, 261, 264, 282, 292, 293,
Assmann, H. t 335 351,370,371,378
Athanasiu5, 148, t8lE., 212, 259, 263, Bauer, B., 27, 28
271,272,280, 297, 352, 357, 358, Bauer, G., 335
361,370,372,375,378 Baumgartner, W" 3S 1
Alhenagoras, 145,249,367,376 Baur, F. C., 372
Aubert, R., 348 Bayle, P., 23, 270
Auer, J., 371 Beer, T., 358
Augustin, H. W., 337 Beierwahes, W., 340
Augustine, 7, 10,72, 73, 86, 104, 106, Benedict VIll, 219
115, 122, 126, 146, 147, 148, 149, Benedict XIV, 221
396 Index of Proper Names
Berkhof, H., 363 Brugger, W., 333, 344, 346, 353
Bcrtholet, A., 351 Brunner, A" 348, 377, 381
Bethge, E., 336 Brunner, E., 76, 150i., JS2
Benjamin, W., 92, 330 Brunner, H" 365
Benz, E., 330, 360 Bruno, G., 22, 153
Berdyaev, N., 193 Buber, M., 3, 7, II, 163, 289, 320, 321,
Berg, L., 343 322,327,351,354
Berger, P. L. t 321, 340 Bubner, R. t 336
Bernard of Clalrvaux, 270, 298 Buchner, G., 353
Bertsch, L., 336 Buchner1 L. t 25
Ben, J., 379 Biichscl, F., 360
Beumer, J., 348 Bula-rov, V., 362
Billerbcck, P., 354, 360 Bulgakov, S., 193,329,362,379,381
Billicsich, F., 353 Bulem.mo, R. t S, 59, 163, 173,320,
Bick, K., 327 354, 355, 356, 381
Birkner, H. J., 339 Buren, P. M. van, 60, 89
Bishop, J., 337, 352, 359
Biser, E., 39, 330, 333, 341 Cajetan, 97
Blank, J., 333 Calvin, J., 286, 358
Blaser, K., 363 Camus, A., 159, 353
Bloch, E., 32, 36, 199, 325, 329, 353 Camap, R., 87
Blumenberg, H., 8, 9,321,324,325 Casper, B., 333, 340, 341, 378
Blumhardt, C. F., 3S uSlelJi, E., 333
Bochenski, J. M., 328 Celsus, 180
Bodin, J., 18 Cer(aux, L., 354
Bohm, A" 324 Charlemagne, 219
Boehme, J., 193,264 Charles, R. H., 354
Boerhiu5 t 153,260,281,375 Cherbury, Herbert of, 23
Boff, L., 335 Cicero, 355
Bohr, N., 2S, 88 Clement of Alexandria, 180, 345. 351,
Bolotov, V., 220 358
Boman, T., 351 Cobb, J. B., 193, 337
Bonaventure, 73, 97, 111, 126, 146, Collins, A., 2J
209, 216, 284, 287, 298, 343, 377 Congar, Y., 351, 353, 359, 360, 361,
Bonhodfer, D., 7, 59, 321, 336 362,363, 364, 374
Bonino, J. M., 335 Conlelmann, H., 167, 355
Bornkamm, G., 136,348,350,355,356 Copernicus, 21, 23, 89
Bottomore, T. B., 327, 328, 353 Corcth, E., 105,333,342,345,365
Bossuet, J. -B., 106 Cramer, W., 344
Bourassa, F., 365 Crombie, A. C., 324
Boyer, c., 372 Ccouzel, H., 358, 370
nraithwaitc, R., 89 Conier, G. M. M., 328
Brasnett, R., 193 Cull mann, 0., 249, 355, 367
Braun, F. M., 356 Cyprian, 368
Braun, H., 59, 60, 337, 355 Cyril of Alexandria, 218
Braun, H. J., 326 Cyril of Jcrusalem, 366
Brechtken, J., 346
Breuning, W., 381 Daccke, S. M., 337, 359
Brinktrine, J., 377 Dalfenh, 1. U., 341
Brown, R. E., 356 Daly, M., 135, 350
Brox, N., 323 Damasus, 213, 259
Bruairc, C., 344 Daniclou, J., 365, 368
 Index of Proper Names 397
Dantinc, W., 363 Fabro, C., 323
Darwin, C., 21 Feil, E., 336
David of Dinant, 22 Feiner, J., 348
Dcisslcr, A" 348,351, 366 Fellermeier, J., 344
Delling, G., 366 Ferre, F., 340
Delp, A., 7, 321 Fessard, G., 35
Dcmocritus, 24 Fet5cher, I., 328
DeneCfe, A., 376 Fcucrbach, L., 28-30, 32, 33f., 37, 46,
Descartes, R., 17, 18, 24, 26,104, Ill, 58,60, 62, 76, 106,267,285,289,
323, 345 325,326,327,332,338,372
Dcssaucr, F., 324 Fichtc, J. G., 1I, 27, 45, 46, 142, 152,
Didcrot, D., 23, 24 153,264,289,326, 332, 352, 377,
Diekamp, F., 377 379
Dids, H., 360, 365 Figl, J., 333, 334, 335
Diem, H" 343 Fink, E., 39, 330
Dilischneider, 0., 363 Fischer, G. D., 335, 341
Dilthey, W., 106,321, 324, 325 Fischer, H" 341
Dionysius of Alexandria, 240, 255 Fischer, K., 334, 380
Dionysius of Rome, 240, 255, 376 Flew, A" 88
Dionysius the Pscudo-Arcopagitc, 96, Fortmann. E., 365
237,343 Francis of Assisi, 209
Dix, G., 368 Frank. F. H. R., 31, 193
Dodd, C. H., 355 Frank, V. E., 31
Doring, H., 333 Freud, S., 30f., 133, 134, 135, 327f.,
Dorrie, H., 375 349
Dostoievsky, F. M., 44, 162, 354 Fries, H., 326, 333, 343
Drey, J. S., 106,346 Frings, H., 105
Duchrow, U., 373 Fromm, E., 320
Dulles, A., 347 Fulgentius of Ruspe, 284, 376
Duns Scotus, 97, 111, 126,343,375 Fuller, R. H., 354
Durrant, M., 365
Gadamer, H. -G., 77, 93, 106, 340, 342
Gagern, M. v., 326
Easton, L. D., 327, 328 Galilei, G., 20f., 22
Ebeling, G., 5, 62, 76, 320, 323, 338, Galot, J., 193, 359
340,341,349,372 Ganoczy, A., 362
Ebner, F., 289 Garaudy, R., 32, 328, 333
Eckhan, Meister, 54, 335 Gardavski, V., 37, 328, 329
Eicher, P., 334, 347, 348 Garrigou-Lagrange, R., 347, 348
Eichrodt, W., 366 Gassendi, P., 24
Einstein, A., 23, 89, 102, 325 Gaunilo, 111
Eliade, M., 321 Gehlen, ., 53
Engelhard" P., 336 Geisser, H., 365
Engels, F., 32, 329 George, S., 39, 43
Engen, J. T., 325 Gerhoh of Reichersberg, 298
Epicurus, 24, 159 Genz, B" 343
Epiphanius of Salamis, 213, 218, 362 Gese, H., 164,354, 355
Erhaner, H., 375 Gestrich, c., 339
Eusebius of Caesarea, 360, 368 Gess, W. F., 193
Evagrius Ponticus, 256 Gewiess, J., 358
Evdokimov, P., 362, 366 Ghellinck, J. de., 367
Exeler, A., 336 Gide, A., 39
398 btdex of Proper Names
Gilbert of Poitiers, 379 Hasenhuttl, G., 327, 372
Gilg, A., 356 Haubst, R. t 369
Gilkey, L, 61, 337 Hegel, G. F. W., 8, la, 11,23,26,27,
Gill, J., 363 28,33,41,60,63,97,99, 106, III,
Girardi, G., 35 157, 192, 193, 199,264, 2651., 267,
Glucksmann, A., 33 274,289,321, 322, 324, 325, 326,
Gnilko, J., 355, 356 345,347,359,372,378
Garres, A., 43 Htidegger, M" 7, 39, 43, 46, 53-5, 77,
Gocrhe, J. W. v., 23, 153, 199, 350 93, 106, 151,321,325,330, 332,
Gogarten, F., 8, 321 345, 346, 352, 365
Goldman, L., 321 Heijden, B. van dec, 334, 380, 381
Gollwiner, H., 35, 333, 337 Heine, H" 32, 326
Gonzales-Ruiz, J. M., 332 Heinrichs, J., 378
Gore, c., 193 Hdntcl, E., 343
Grabner-Haider, A" 341 Heinz, H. P., 335
Gramsci, A" 32 Heisenberg, W., 25, 88, 102,324, 325,
Grass, G., 43 326,341,365
Grau, G. G., 330 Heitmann, c., 363
Gregory of Nazianzus, 126, 149,211, Helvcrius, G. A" 25
212,258,280,284,293,351,361, Hemmerle, K., 307, 381
375, 376, 378 Hengel, M., 326, 354, 355, 356
Gregory 01 Ny"a, 126, 191,212,258, Henrich, D., 346
293,352,358,362,371 Henry, P., 358
Gregory PaJamas, 220, 262 Heraclitus, 95, 186, 235, 365
Gregory Thaumaturgus. 191 Hermann, I., 360
Greifenhagen. M.• 350 Hess, M., 32
Grillmeier, A., 356, 357, 358, 375 Hichstalfl, J., 349
Groethuysen, B., 321 Hi8h, D. M., 341
Grotius, H., 9, 19, 321, 322 Hilary of Poitiers, 191,216,224,249,
Guardini, R., 53, 347 255,259,272, 283, 324, 352, 358,
Gucht, R. van der, 334, 370 363,368,369, 371, 379
Guddat, K. H., 327, 328 Hippolytu, 01 Rome, 180, 208, 249,
Gunther, A., 372 360,368,369, 372
Gutierrez, G., 335 Hirsch, E. c., 344
Gutwenger, E., 377 Hirschbergcr, J.t 39
Hirze, F., 37
Haas, A. M., 340 Hobbes, T., 23, 24
Habermas, J., 32, 77, 91, 92, 321, 328, Hochstalfl, J., 342
342 Holderiin, F., 7, 23, 43, 330
Haeckd, E., 25 Ho6us, c., 356
Haecker, T., 353 Holbach, P. H. D. v., 25
Hacggclund, B., 368 HolI, K., 321
Hahn, F., 354 Homer, 235
Halder, A., 375 Horkhcimcr, M" 32, 133, 160, 346,
Hamilton, W., 60 349,353
Hammer, K., 344 Hromadka, J. c., 35
Harc, R. M., 89 Huber, c., 378
Harent, 5., 348 Huncrmann, P., 335
Harnack, A. v., 167, 173,323,355,367 Huncnbiigel, J., 353
Hartmann, K., 328 Huonder, Q., 344
Hartmann, N., 30
Hartshorne, c., 193, 337. 346 lamblichus, 237
 Index of Proper Names 399
Ignatius of Antioch, 179, 183, 185, 190, Kern, W., 105, 323, 325, 329, 333, 337,
249, 357, 358, 367 344, 353, 365
Irenaeus of Lyons, 144, 180, 185, 191, Kessler, A" 340
208, 212, 240, 249,253,255,339, Keneler, W. E. (Bishop of Mainz), 36,
353,357, 358, 360, 361, 364, 366, 37
368, 369, 370, 371 Khrushchev, N., 25
Iwand, H. J., 35 Kicrkcpard, S., 106,270,359
Kirsch, E., 326
Jacobi, F. H., 11,325 Kitamori, K., 194, 359
Jamb.. , C., 33 Kittel, G., 342
Jaschke, H. J., 361 Kleinknecht, H., 350, 357, 360, 365
jaspers, K., 39, 153, 330, 352 Klostermann, F., 336
Javierre, J" 332 Kluxcn, W., 342, 343
Jeremias, J., 350, 355 Koch, G., 193
jerome, 256, 370, 376 Koster, H. t 375
joachim of Flora, 209, 294, 360 Kohlenberger, H. K., 346
john XXIII, 36, 50, 333 Kolakowski, L., 11, 32, 322, 323, 328
john Chrysostom, 126 Kolping, A., 37
John Damascene, 101, 126, 146, 149, Konrad, F., 347
284, 294, 298, 339, 344, 349, 364, Kopper, J., 346
371, 375, 376, 378, 379 Korsch, K., 32
john Paul II, 51 Kosellcck, R., 321
Jonas, E., 327 Kraft. H., 357
Jon35, H. t 136, 350, 369 Krailsheimer, A., 378
jordan, P., 326 Kranz, W., 360, 365
jungel, E., 62, 65, 76, 93, 193 335, 336, Kremer, K., 352
338,339,340,342,343,348,365 Kretschmar, G., 361, 367
JU55cn, K., 377 Krings, H., 345, 346, 352, 357
jung, C. G., 31 Kummel, W. G., 354
jungmann, j. A., 351, 368 Kung, H., 193,326,333,334,353,355,
just, W. D., 341 359, 374
Justin Martyr, 16, 144, 145, 180,212, Kuhn, j. E., 113, 151, 347, 352, 372,
249,323,339,345,350,356,357, 378, 379, 381
360, 361, 367, 368, 372 Kuhn, K. G., 350
Justinian, 256 Kuhn, P., 358
Kuhn, T. S., 89, 341
Kadenbach, j., 328 KUt5chki, N., 333
Kahler, M., 189 Kutter, H., 35
Kasemann, E., 354, 367, 381
Kambartel, F., 91 Lachenschmid, R., 358
Kant, I., 18, 19,22,26,27,52,77, Lacroix, J., 25, 333
10lf., 104, 110, 112, 142,209, 287, Lactantiu5, 353
323, 324, 340, 342, 344, 345, 346, Ladriere, P., 333
347, 348, 352, 353, 354, 355, 363, Lafont, G., 380
364,370,371,372,374,377,381 Lakner, F., 352
Kasper, W., 193,320,321,323,324, Lalande, A., 24
326, 333, 334 Lamenrie, J. A. de, 24
Kaucnbusch, F., 367 Lang, 8., 366
Kautzky, K., 36 Lang, H., 348
Kazanttakis, N., 39 Lange, F. A., 325
Kelly, j. N. D., 357 Langenmeier, B., 378
Kepler, j., 21 Laplace, P. S., 24
400 Index of Proper Names
Lardreau, G., 33 Malec, A., 375, 376, 379
Latourelle, R., 347 Malmberg, F., 348
Lau,er, H. j., 377 Malraux, A., 39
Lebreton, j., 367 Mann, T., 39, 43
Lefebvre, H., 32 Marcel, G., 39, 349
Le Guillou, j., 376, 379 Marchel, W., 350
Lehmann, K., 321, 324, 336, 340, 361, Marechal, j., 52, 104, lOS, 345
363 Margerie, B. dc, 367, 377
Leibniz, G. W., 22, 106, Ill, 161, 270, Marheineke, P. K., 27, 266
354 Maritain, ]., 353
Lenin, V. I., 34 Marquardt, 0., 353
Lennen-Deis, F., 360 Marx, K., 28, 32-9, 43, 46, 76, 77, 84,
Leo the Great, 218 106, 107,209,267, 285, 327, 328f.,
Leo III, 219 350
Leo XIII, 50, 364 Macxsen, W., 354
Leon-Dufour, X" 355 Mattes, W., 349
Leontius of Byzantium, 260 Matthiae, K., 354
le Saux, H., 365 Mauthner, F., 323
lessing, G. E., 23, 209, 264 Maximus the Confessor, 218, 362
Levy, B. H" 33 Mechels, E., 344
Ley, H., 323 Mehrlein, R., 366
Licbaert, j., 356, 371 Meier. A., 324
lienhard, M., 358 Meier zu Schlochtern, j.t 341
lienmann, H., 367 Melito of Sardis, 191,358
Lobkrowicz, N., 325 Merklein, H., 350, 355, 366
Loch, W., 327 Merleau·Ponty, M., 30, 32
Locke, j., 23, 287, 377 Mette, N., 336
Loewenich, W. v., 348, 358 Me,z, J. B., 8,321,328,333,335,336,
Lowi,h, K., 8, 39, 321, 326, 327, 329, 346,350
330, 345, 360 Meyendorfl, J., 274, 374
Lohmeyer. E., 356 Mieth, D., 321, 323, 340
Lohse, B., 367 Mill, J. 5., 32
lohse, E., 375 MilScherlich, A., 133, 134, 327, 349
Lonergan, S., 289, 365, 374, 377, 378 Mmc!strass, J.t 91
Lorenzen, P" 91 Mohler, j. A., 378
Loren, 0., 324 Moller, j., 105,333, 344
Lossky, V., 220, 262, 379 Molcschott, j., 25
Lon, j. B., 85, 105, 330, 333, 340 Mohmann, j., 60, 61,193,337,353,
Lubac, H. de., 39, 330, 360 359,363,365,377,378,379,381
Liibbe, H., 321, 326 Morris, C. W., 92, 342
Lucian of Antioch, 256 Moser, T., 134, 350
Liihrmann, D., 347 Miihlen, H., 193, 289, 363, 375, 377
Lihhi, K., 353 Miihlenberg, E., 349, 371
Luhmann, N., 342 Miiller, M., lOS, 342, 352
Lukacs, G., 32 Miiller, W., 321
Luther, M., 5, 62£., 75,191,338,339, Muller-Lauter, W., 39, 330
348, 358 Murray, j. c., 333

Maas, W., 358 Nas<, E., 327

M:lchovec, M., 32 Nedonccllc, M" 375, 377
Macquarric, j., 334, 341 Neuning, G., 35
Maicr, H., 335 Neufeld, K. H., 367
 Index of Proper Names 401
Newman, J. H., lOS, 114,345,347 Photius, 220
Newton, I., 22, 89 Pius VI, 294
Nicholas of Cusa, 126, 343, 349 Pius IX, SO
Nietzsche, F., 7, 20, 28, 39-46, 54, 76, Pius XI, 36, 50
77, 84, 136, 160, 324, 330f., 340, Pius XII, 36, 50
350, 353, 360 Plato, 40, 55, 72, 95, 146, 161, 186f.,
Nocrus, 292 196,237, 335, 342, 343, 345, 351,
Navalis, F., 11 354,357,359
Novatia", 368 PIc, A., 327
Niidlich, G., 326 Plotinus, 236, 237, 293, 343, 365
Pohier, J., 327
O'Connor, E. D., 363 Pohlmann, H. G., 344
Odng·Hanhoff, L., 338, 353, 358, 359, Pohlmann, R. t 323
365,372,377 Polybius, 345
Ogden, S., 193,337 Popkes, W., 356
Ogiermann, H" 344 Popper, K., 88, 89, 341
Opitz, H., 361 Post, W., 328
Orbe, A., 356, 361 Pottmeyer, H. J., 339
Crigen, 144, 145, 146, 149, ISOf., 191, Praxcas, 254, 292
196, 212, 240, 251, 252, 254, 256, Prestige, G. L., 356, 367, 376
257, 261, 293, 345, 351, 356, 357, Peodus, 237
358,361, 366, 368, 369, 370 Proudhon, P. -J., 32
Ortiz de Urbina, I., 356, 357, 361, 367, Prucha, M., 329
370 Przywara, E., 97, 337, 342, 343
Onmann, H" 325 Puntet, L. B., 342
Ono, R" 86, 340
Quasten, J., 367, 368
Panikkar, R. t 365 Quell, G., 350
Pannenberg, W., 61, 76, 106, 113, 321,
337,342,343,344,346,347,351, Rad, G. v., 349, 350, 354, 355
355, 361, 363, 365, 366, 377, 379, Ragaz, L. t 35
380 Rahner, K., 5, 20, 52, 53, 85, 105, 127,
Parmenides, 95, 235 234, 273, 274, 275f., 287ff., 298,
Pascal, B., 27, 41, 114, 161,291,345, 300f., 302f., 304, 320, 324, 328, 329,
347, 378 333, 334, 339, 340, 348, 349, 350,
Pater, W. A. dc, 90, 340, 341 351,355,364,365,374,376,377,
Paul, J., 11, 27, 41 378,380,381
Paul VI, 36, 50, 333 Ramsey, I. T., 90, 340, 341
Paul of Samos3ta, 179, 257, 292 Ratschow t C. H" 333
Perlitt, L. t 350 Ratzinger, J., 290, 343, 360, 369,375,
Perrin, N., 350 378
Pesch, R., 355 Reding, M., 35, 328
Peter Chrysologus, 379 Regnon, T. de, 367, 375, 379
Peter Damian, 270 Reimaru5 t H. 5., 23
Peter Lombard, 224, 363 Reinhardt, R., 326
Peters, E., 326 Rendtorff, T., 321
Peterson, E., 365, 378, 381 Rheinfclder, H" 375
Petuchowski, J. J.t 347 Ricardo, D., 32
Pcukcrt, H" 92, 330, 341, 342, 346 Richard of St Victor, 154, 196, 216,
Pfiirmer, 5., 325 268,281,309,314,352,359,362,
Philipp, W., 325 375
Philo of Alexandria, 148, 174, 185, 352 Richter, H. E., 134, 350
402 Index of Proper Names
Ricken, F., 357 Schlette, H. R., 333, 365
Ricoeur, P., 93, 327, 334, 347, 353 Schlick, M., 87
Riedel, M., 321 Schlier, H., 356, 360, 369
Riesenhuber, K., 338 Schlossmann, S., 375
Rilke, R. M., 43 Schmaus, M" 314, 343, 373, 374, 379.
Ristow, H. t 354 381
Ritschl, A" 7S Schmidt, A., 327
Robinson, J. A. T., 60, 337 Schmidt, K. L., 350
Rohrmoser, G., 350 Schmucker, J.t 344, 345
Rolfes, H., 328, 329 Schnackenburg, R., 350, 355, 356, 367,
Rolt, C. E., 193 381
Roques t R. t 366 Schneider, E., 326
Rosato, P. J., 363 Schneider, G., 355
R05ccllinus, 379 Schneider, Ro, 193
Rosenzweig, F., 289 Schnell, H., 352
Rosmini, A" 372 Schopf, A., 340
Rubenstein, R. L t 353 Scholem, Go, 353
Rublev, N., 297 Schoonenberg, Po, 374
Ruesch, T., 361 Schramm, Mo, 326
Ruether, R. R. t 135, 350 Schrenk, G., 350
Ruge, A" 28 Schrey, H. H., 378
Ruh, U., 321 Schurmann, Ho, 350, 355
Rupert of Deutz, 298 Schutte, Wo, 323
Russell, B., 87 Schutz, Co, 348
Schulte, Ho, 347
Sabellius, 255, 292 Schulte, R., 366
Saint·Simon, L. de, 32 Schultz, H. j., 333, 346
Santillana, G. de, 324 Schulz, So, 381
Sartre, J. -P., 30, 32, 327 Schulz, W., 323, 346
Sauter, G., 363 Schumacher, Eo, 324
Schaff, A., 32 Schweizer, Eo, 355, 356, 360, 363
SchaefOer, R., 333, 339, 340, 341 Sciaca, Mo, 373
Scharfenberg, j., 327 Searle, j. E., 90, 341
Scharben, J" 358 Seckler, Mo, 332, 338, 339, 348, 360,
Scharl, E., 369 364
Schauf, H., 364 Segundo, L., 335
Scheeben, M. j., 215, 279, 349, 362, Sengler, Jo, 379
364, 372, 374, 375 Scrtillanges, A. D., 353
Scheffczyk, L., 337, 350, 365, 367 Seybold, M., 347
Schelkle, K. H., 360, 366 Siewerth, G., 352
Schell, H., 152 Siller, P., 348
Schelling, F. W. j., 11, 23, 27, 43, 46, Simon, E., 353
77, 106, 112, 193,209,264,326, Simon, J., 92, 342
345,347 Simonis, W., 372
Schellong, D., 321 Skinner, B. F., 324
Schierse, F. j., 366 Slenczka, R., 363
Schiffers, N., 324 Smith, A., 32
Schillebeeckx, E., 337, 340, 350, 355 Smulders, Po, 356
Schiller, F. v,, 330 Socrates. 343
Schindler, A" 351, 373 Sohngen, G., 97, 338, 339, 343, 344
Schleiermacher, F., 23, 75, 199, 262, So\le, D., 60, 162,337,353,354
274,312,313,371,374 Soloviev, V. S., 39, 193, 381
 Index of Proper Names 403
Sass, H. M. t 326 Tillich, P., 5, 35, 61, 320
Spaemann, R. t 53, 346, 350 Tindal, M., 23
Spinoza, B., 23, 46, 111, 153,264 Toland, J., 23, 269
splett, J., 340, 341, 344, 353, 372 Track, J., 340, 341, 342
Spranger, E., 325 Tracy, D., 340
spiilbeck, V., 328 Trilling, W., 355
Staudenmeier, F. A., 274, 374, 378 Troeltsch, E., 8, 321, 324, 325
Stauffer, E., 365, 366 Triltsch, J., 348
Steenberghen, F. van, 344 Tucholsky, K., 3
steinbiichel, T., 35 Turajev, N., 381
Stirner, M., 32
Strack, H. L., 354, 360 Oberweg, F., 325
Strauss, D. F., 28, 372 Unamuno, M. de, 193
strolz, W., 347, 363
Studer1 B., 375 Vagaggini, c., 368
Stuiber, A" 366 Vahanian, G., 60
Swett:, H. B., 361 Valeske, U., 372
Varro, 72
Tarajcv, 193 Verweyen, H. J., 345
Tarian, 145, 366, 372 Vico, G., 106
Taylor, J. V., 363 Vischer, L., 363
Taylor, V., 354 Vogde, A., 367
Teolhard de Chardin, P., 21, 354 Volk, H., 365, 377
Tellenbach, H., 134, 349, 350, 351 Voltaire, F. M., 23
Temple, W., 193 Vorgrimler, H., 329, 333, 334, 350,
Terrullian, 68, 72, 194, 144, 180f., 191, 365,370,380
212, 218, 240, 249, 254, 255, 256, Vo"enkuhl, W., 352
257, 258, 261, 271, 292, 293, 339, Vries, J. de, 346, 379
345, 356, 357, 360, 361, 366, 368, Vriezen, T. c., 351
370, 372, 378
Theodotus the Moncy·Changcr, 179, Wagner, F., 324
292 Wainwright, G., 366
Theodotus the Tanner, 179,292 Waldenfels, H., 347
Theophilus of Antioch, 145,249, 256, Weber, H., 321, 323
356,366 Weber, M., 8, 37, 321, 329
Theunisscn, M. t 336, 378 Weger, K.·H., 333, 341, 344
Theurer, W., 371 Weidlich, W., 326
Thies, E., 327 Weischedel, W., 78, 320, 339
Thomas Aquinas, 4, 6, 17,49,52,53, Weisse, C. H., 324, 325, 326, 379
55, 63f., 73, 97, 101, 102, 104, 107, Weizsacker, C. F. v., 102, 365
122, 126, 146, 149, 150, 151, 154, Welch, c., 376
161, 1881.,209,216,218,223, Welker, M., 323
227f., 236, 240, 262, 263, 268, 28H., Welte, B., 39, 531., 105, 334, 335, 338,
284,286,287,298,311,320,323f., 344
332, 335, 338, 339, 340, 342, 343, Wendenbourg, D., 362, 371
344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 353, 354, Wenzel, P., 372
357,358,360,362,363,364, 365, Werner, M., 357, 367, 368
366,371,372,374,375,376,377 Wess, P., 348
Thomasiu5, G., 193 Westermann, c., 366
Thiising, W., 355, 381 Weston, F., 193
Thurian, M. t 363 Wetter, G. A., 328
Tilley, T. W., 341 Whitehead, A. N., 193, 337, 359
404 Index of Proper Names
Wiedenhofer, S., 335 Xenophanes, 235, 365
Wilckens, U" 356 Xhaufflairc, M" 326
Wild, c., 340
Wildiers, N. M., 324
William of St Thierry, 298 Zahn, M" 365
Windelband, W., 39 Zahrnt, H., 327, 333
WipOer, H., 365 Zenger, E., 354
Wisdom, J., 90 Zerfass, R., 336
Wittgenstein, L., 87, 88, 89, 91, 341 Zweig, S., 39
Wlosok, A., 350