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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

*
No. L-51263. February 28, 1983.

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and
RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC., respondents.

Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Findings of fact of Court of

Appeals generally final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court;
Exceptions, not present in case at bar.—Petitioner takes issue with the
appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since, the
present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be
raised. It is a well-established rule laid down by this Court in numerous
cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and
conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both
appellant and appellee. None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the
case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Factual finding of the Court of Appeals will not be
disturbed absent a clear showing that the finding is not supported by
substantial evidence.—That is likewise a factual finding which may not be
disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that
said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact.
Same; Same; Succession; Right of representation; An alleged
grandchild born outside wedlock cannot, by right of representation, claim a
share of an estate left by an alleged deceased great grandparent; Reason;
Case at bar.—Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born
outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September

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13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and
what is more,

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 120, FEBRUARY 28, 1983 891

Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

his alleged father’s first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit an intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased
Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Porfirio C. David for petitioner.
     Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R, promulgated on February 21,
1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in favor of petitioner:

“(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great

grandson and heir of deceased FRANCISCA REYES,
entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased,
jointly with defendant Maria Cailles;
“(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the
properties of the deceased FRANCISCA REYES and not of
defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell;
“(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by
defendant Maria Cailles in so far as the share of
Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;
“(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of
this decision, of the properties subject of this litigation,
between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano
Leonardo, share and share alike;

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Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell,

“(e)
within 30 days from the finality of this decision, to render
an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days
thereafter to pay to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-
half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;
“(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell to
pay jointly and severally plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo the
amount

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

“(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and
1
“(h) Dismissing defendants’ counterclaim.”

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate
on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and
Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her
daughter, Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo
died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any issue.
On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming
to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for
ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of
the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half
share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by
said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint, partitioned
between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an
accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall
have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal
interest.
Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles
asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged
that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent
James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue
of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly
mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. sometime in
September 1963.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which was earlier
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quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to

prove ownership of the properties in suit.

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1 pp. 134-135, Record on Appeal.

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of

Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial
court, thereby dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Reconsideration
having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review
was filed on the following assignment of errors:

“RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

II

“RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER

HAS NOT ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.

III

“RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER,

AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO
LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.”

To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to

be the exclusive properties of the private respondents.

“There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as
each has its own distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by
Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh. ‘60’), which describes it as follows:

‘. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites y

linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la
izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea
del Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio’

“After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes
starting from 1918 up to 1948. Thereafter as she and her son Narciso
Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained
reasons, she paid and declared the same in her own name. Because of this,
plaintiff decided to run after this property, erroneously thinking that as the
great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right over the
same.
“The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in
1917 under a deed of sale (Exh. ‘3’) which describes the property as
follows:

. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte con la
linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y
Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste
con el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea, de una extension superficial de 1229.00
metros cuadrados.’

“After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax
in 1917 and continued paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and
her son, Narciso Bracewell, established their residence in Nueva Ecija,
Francisca Reyes administered the property and like in the first case, declared
in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the
property of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a
portion thereof as the same allegedly represents the share of his father.
“As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the
plaintiff principally because defendants’ evidence do not sufficiently show
that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908 and 1917, are the same as
the properties sought by the plaintiff.
“Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge
misinterpreted the evidence as to the identification of the lands in question.
“To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. ‘60’) of 1908 clearly states that
the land sold to Maria Cailles is ‘en la calle Desposorio’ in Las Piñas, Rizal
which was bounded by adjoining lands owned by persons living at the time,
including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. (‘la via ferrea del
Railroad Co.’).
“With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the
description fits the land now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is
also located in Desposorio St. and is bounded by the M.R.R. Co.
“With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the
property described in the deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same
property.

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

“The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several

decades have already passed between the deed and the declaration and
‘during that period, many changes of abode would likely have occurred.’
“Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in
Desposorio St. and they have paid the realty taxes of this property from May
29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason to doubt that this
property is the same, if not identical to the property in Desposorio St. which
is now being sought after by the plaintiff.
“With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from
Tranquilino Mateo in 1917, it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be
relied upon. It is however undeniable that after declaring it in her name,
Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917 until
2
1948.” (Reference to Exhibits omitted.)

Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings
of fact, forgetting that since the present petition is one for review on
certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-
established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final and
conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and
3
appellee. None of the above exceptions, however, exists in the case
at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made
the following findings:

“Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero
Leonardo, the son of one of the daughters (Pascuala) of

_____________

2 pp. 22-24, Rollo.

3 Vargas v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195; Vda. de Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 88
SCRA 695.

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

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Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala predeceased

Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944,
survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of
Francisca Reyes by right of representation.
“In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth
certificate showing that his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro
Timbol, his alleged mother.
“Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation
of this vital evidence, We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for
that vital link connecting him to the family tree of the deceased Francisca
Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend credence
to his tale.
“This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is
not that of the plaintiff but a certain ‘Alfredo Leonardo’ who was born on
September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his
bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that
the ‘Alfredo Leonardo’ mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he
himself. Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details,
We may safely conclude that plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a
fundamental requisite in this action where he is claiming to be an heir in the
4
inheritance in question.”

That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this

petition for review in the absence of a clear showing that said
finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court making the finding
of fact.
Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that
when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative
father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his
alleged father’s first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like
the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)

____________

4 p. 24, Rollo.

897

VOL. 120, FEBRUARY 28, 1983 897

Heirs of Enrique Zambales vs. Court of Appeals

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WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be

reviewed in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and

Escolin, JJ., concur.
     Aquino, J., on leave.
     Abad Santos, J., I concur with the observation but I would
have dismissed the petition by minute resolution for lack of merit.

Decision affirmed.

——o0o——

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