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G.R. No. 148117             March 22, 2007

MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners,

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684.

The facts of the case as gleaned from the records are:

In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province
charged Mabini Epie, Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705,2 as amended. The Informtion reads:

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway at Acop,
Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without
any authority of law or without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and transport 870 bd. ft. of
Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY PESOS (₱24,360.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the
damage and prejudice of the GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet (presided by
respondent Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3138.

When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial then ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto
Ngina of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information from a confidential
agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine
lumber.
SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and SPO1 Domingo Pulig.
They then swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.

At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La
Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La
Trinidad where it finally halted.

The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted vegetables, like womboc3 and
chili.

When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and his
companions admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and
investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were
charged with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.

After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally
seized.

In a Resolution4 dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it was denied in a Resolution dated
September 27, 1999.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions of the trial court.

On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that
respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
that the search conducted without warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces
of lumber are admissible in evidence against the accused.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied in a
Resolution5 dated April 11, 2001.

Hence, the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether the police officers have a probable cause to
believe that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that, therefore, it can be stopped and
searched without a warrant.

In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the right of a person to
privacy against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the State. This right to undisturbed privacy is
guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the above provision
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise,
such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right. 6

The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions.

In People v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where search and seizure may be conducted without
warrant, thus:

(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable
cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place to be searched. 8 In People v. Aruta,9 we ruled that in warrantless
searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime
has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in
determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of each case.

Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search and seizure may be
conducted by peace officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there was probable cause
to justify such warrantless search and seizure.

We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2
Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine lumber was at Km. 96,
Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in
Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police
spotted the vehicle. They flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it
reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber.
Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the same.

In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a checkpoint and even
after having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to dissuade the police from
proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of
the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle
contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present
case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless
search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Felix Gabriel F. Balani

Epic v. Judge Marredo, GR 148117, March 22, 2007

FACTS:

On September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina received an information that a jeepney was loaded with
Benguet pine lumber. This led him and SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano to swiftly establish a checkpoint in Acop,
Tublay, Benguet. When the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They
flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it
finally halted.

When SPO4 Quitoriano searched the vehicle, he found some pieces of lumber under it. The driver and
his companions admitted they have no permit to transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested
and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos.

After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress
Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber were illegally
seized. This motion however was denied by the respondent judge in a resolution dated July 26, 1999.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Benguet pine lumber was illegally seized.

RULING:

No, In People v. Sarap it was listed that one of the exceptions where search and seizure may be
conducted without warrant was when searching a moving motor vehicle and that the only requirement
in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause.

Furthermore, in People v. Vinecarao the court ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a
checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to
dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable cause to justify a
reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of
the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense.

And finally, Section 13 of Rule 126 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Therefore, the police officers
were within their rights to search the subject vehicle which led to the legal seizure of the Benguet Pine
Lumber.