76.1 Brownell Vs Sunlife

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BROWNELL v.

SUNLIFE 95 PHIL 228


FACTS: This is a petition instituted in the Court of the First Instance of Manila under the
provisions of the Philippine Property Act of the United States against the Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada, to compel the latter to comply with the demand of the former to pay
him the sum of P310.10, which represents one-half of the proceeds of an endowment policy
(No. 757199) which matured on August 20, 1946, and which is payable to one Naogiro
Aihara, a Japanese national.
The defenses set up in the court of origin are: (1) that the immunities provided in section 5
(b) (2) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of the United States are of doubtful application
in the Philippines, and have never been adopted by any law of the Philippines as applicable
here or obligatory on the local courts; (2) that the defendant is a trustee of the funds and is
under a legal obligation to see it to that it is paid to the person or persons entitled thereto,
and unless the petitioner executes a suitable discharge and an adequate guarantee to
indemnify and keep it free and harmless from any further liability under the policy, it may
not be compelled to make the payment demanded.
The Court of First Instance of Manila having approved and granted the petition, the
respondent has appealed to this Court, contending that the Court of origin erred in holding
that the Trading With the Enemy Act of the United States is binding upon the inhabitants of
this country, notwithstanding the attainment of complete independence on July 4, 1946, and
in ordering the payment prayed for.
ISSUE: Whether the United States can acquire jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. There is no question that a foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a
country other than the country of origin, provided the latter, in which it is sought to be
made operative, gives its consent thereto. This principle is supported by the unquestioned
authority.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity
from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the
restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power in which
would impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They
can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied.
(Philippine Political Law by Sinco, pp. 27-28, citing Chief Justice Marshall's statement in the
Exchange, 7 Cranch 116).
In the course of his dissenting opinion in the case of S. S. Lotus, decided by the Permanent
Court of International Justice, John Bassett Moore said:
It is an admitted principle of International Law that a nation possesses and exercises
within its own territory an absolute and exclusive jurisdiction, and that any exception
to this right must be traced to the consent of the nation, either express or implied
(Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden [812], 7 Cranch 116, 136). The benefit of this
principle equally enures to all independent and sovereign States, and is attended with
a corresponding responsibility for what takes place within the national territory.
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of
the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the
Philippines and of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic
Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.

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