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What Is a Good Theory? A Perspective from Theoretical Psychology

Article  in  Acta Psychologica Sinica · January 2013

DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1041.2012.00133

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心理学报 2012, Vol. 44, No.1, 133−137
Acta Psychologica Sinica DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1041.2012.00133

What Is a Good Theory? A Perspective from Theoretical Psychology

YE Hao-Sheng1; Henderikus J. Stam2
(1 Center for Psychology and Brain Science, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006)
(2 Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada)

Abstract: We discuss the status of theories in psychology by addressing ourselves to a recent paper published in
this journal by Hong, Chao, Yang & Rosner (2010). We argue that Hong et al. provided a restrictive version of
theory in psychology that is limited by the implicit adoption of logical empiricism as the basis for their views of
theory. In addressing the limitations of logical empiricism we address the broader question of just what
constitutes theory and how theory might be more usefully and widely applied in the discipline.
Key words: theory; theoretical psychology; post-empiricism

With examples from their research on hierarchical positivism in philosophy, Fisher’s experimental designs
identity, identity hegemony, and bridging identity, Hong, and inferential statistics in the field of mathematics and the
Chao, Yang & Rosner (2010) illustrated a four-step development of behaviorism in psychology (e.g., Danziger,
approach to building and testing psychological theories 1990; Mills, 1998). Each of these has been influential in
(selecting phenomena, finding critical commonalities, turn in creating the methodological and theoretical
abstracting and hypothesis testing). We agree with the orientation so well described by Hong et al. (2010). We
authors that “it is never too excessive to emphasize the have no comment on the research program that Hong et al.
value and importance of theories in social psychology” (p. describe since we think it should be judged on its own
22) and consider the proposed four-step approach to be of merits. However, the version of theory espoused by the
use for psychological researchers to build and test theories logical empiricist project has limitations. Its limitations are
as a first step in the research enterprise. The place of theory such that they restrict the nature and uses of theory and
in psychology however is contested still and in our hence we wish to (a) discuss why we believe this concept
comments on their paper we wish to consider various ways of theory is limited and (b) consider a number of
in which we can understand theory in research and practice. alternatives to the description of theory that Hong et al.
The proposed four-step approach by Hong et al. (2010) have presented.
represents one such perspective but one based upon Hong et al.’s (2010) define theory in the following
traditional logical empiricism, sometimes referred to as just manner, “theory is defined in science ‘as a comprehensive
logical positivism. This perspective, while long open to explanation of an important feature of nature supported by
debate within the philosophy of science, is still more or facts gathered over time’” (p. 23). Furthermore, theories
less widely accepted in the psychological community and make it possible to predict “yet unobserved phenomena” (p.
constitutes normal practice for many psychologists. We say 23). This simplified (but not simplistic) definition is useful
“more or less” since it is often adopted implicitly rather but perhaps makes a host of complexities about theory
than explicitly. It is implied in many of the methodologies invisible. These complexities concern just what counts as
propounded by psychologists and taught to our students. theory in the first place, and avoids the question of how we
There are important historical reasons for this, the are to treat theory in science (are theories representations
discussion of which is far beyond this short commentary. of reality, instrumental tools, models that we don’t expect
However, we can sum these up by noting that the adoption to be correct, and so on). Unfortunately the authors’
of a neo-positivist viewpoint in psychology coincided in approach is one that relies heavily on one tradition only, as
the early 20 th
century with the development of logical we have noted, the logical empiricist tradition. Although
we should add that the authors do not commit themselves
收稿日期: 2011-03-14 explicitly to any particular understanding of theory, they
* 羊城学者首席科学家资助项目(10A030S)。 appear to implicitly adopt what is often referred to as the
通讯作者: 叶浩生, E-mail: [email protected] ‘received view’ in the philosophy of science (Suppe, 1989).
133
 134 心 理 学 报 44 卷

On the received view, a good theory is one that is psychologists carry out an experiment, which is then taken
based on empiricism (hence observation) and logic (the as a trial to attest to the value of the hypothesis. We assume
generalization and induction of empirical observations). this is what Hong et al. (2010) refer to when they argue that
This perspective has the following characteristics: First, they engage in four steps, “(1) selecting phenomena, (2)
theory comes from the induction and abstraction of finding critical commonalities, (3) abstracting (theorizing),
empirical facts. It is built upon facts and is an induction and (4) hypothesis testing” (p. 42). A hypothesis will take
and generalization after (psychologists’ in this case) on some truth value, after having being verified by
arduous gathering of empirical observations over time, as experimental testing, while if not verified, it will be cast
is stated by the authors: “for us, social psychological away. Finally, on this view the development of theory is a
theories are best grounded in social phenomena” (Hong et cumulative process. Theory is tentative, not a finished
al., p. 24). From the analysis and induction of the empirical product. But with the ever-continuing development and
facts thus gathered, psychologists generalize some basic perfection of a theory, and also the constant growth of
principles like concepts, theories and, eventually it is related theories, the empirically based theory will by
hoped, laws, which may combine systematically to form definition come close to the truth.
some preliminary theories. This inductivist view however
is itself an idealized view of science and the history of the 1 Alternative Views of Theory
sciences informs us otherwise. It was Karl Popper (1963)
who noted the problem of induction by showing that it is Unfortunately, this neat picture of the relationship
far too simple to verify a theory by searching for between theory and data was long ago shattered not only by
confirmatory evidence. What is crucial for the purposes of historians and philosophers of science but by scientists
science is the falsifiability or refutability of a theory. themselves. This picture of theorizing, like the logical
Knowledge argued Popper is the outcome of conjecture and empiricist view on which it is based, restricts theorizing to
criticism, not induction. Even if one disagrees with the a few well-defined activities in which few scientists ever
falsifiability criterion, induction is no sure way from ‘data’ engage. As Quine (1953/1980), and Duhem (1906/1954)
to ‘theory’. before him argued, scientists are very reluctant to give up a
Second, in this tradition, theory is fundamentally treasured hypothesis because their data do not confirm the
concerned with the explanation and collection of ‘facts.’ theory at hand. Instead, it is much more likely that
What constitutes a fact however is not clear. From the time adjustments will be made elsewhere in the theory so that
of Norwood Hanson’s (1958) important work, we have the work of confirmation can continue. As Duhem had
come to understand that data are at least to some extent already noted in the early 20th century, scientists never base
‘theory-laden.’ Although we may disagree precisely to their predictions on a single hypothesis but on an entire set
what degree any data gathering episode is theory-laden, it of assumptions and rules of inference. Quine furthered the
is more or less given that we cannot collect data in the first case by noting that we cannot separate out a linguistic
instance without some strong theoretical guidance for component and a factual component in determining the
telling us just what we deem is important. This does not truth of any given statement; “science has its double
mean that the data are determined beforehand. It does dependence upon language and experience; but this duality
mean that the data-gathering enterprise, the search for is not significantly traceable into the statements of science
‘facts,’ is constrained and enabled by our conceptual taken one by one” (Quine, 1953/1980, p. 42). In other
scaffolding. words, we do not speak of the empirical content of
Furthermore, according to the ‘received view’ what individual statements but theories as a whole. And theories
theoretical psychologists embark on is largely mediational as a whole are always open to revision in the face of
work that requires them to establish some relationship conflicting evidence (see Stam, 1992).
among various empirical facts to explain contradictions This of course does not mean that scientific progress
and conflicts. That is, theory is a kind of supplementary cannot occur or that we cannot evaluate the claims of the
work conducted after the arduous labor of data gathering scientist. What it does mean however is that such
has been completed. And of course, on this view theory is evaluations simply do not follow the simple prescriptive
in turn generative of experimental hypotheses. A guidelines found in our textbooks or in descriptions such as
hypothesis presumably exists at the very outset before those in Hong et al. (2010).
 1期 What Is a Good Theory? A Perspective from Theoretical Psychology 135

2 What is a theory? Hacking, kinds of people, action, behavior, and so on.

Their most important feature is that they have an effect on
We should note that there is no canonical standard to people since people are capable of self-knowledge and they
which we can turn to explain theory to us. In the 20th are moral agents who will respond to the ‘kinds’ they are
century scholars have presented a number of important taken to be. Hence human kinds are subject to what
proposals as alternatives to the dominant version of logical Hacking (1995) called “looping effects”, later he called this
empiricism. As the difficulties with logical empiricism “interactive kinds”, namely we respond to the knowledge
became clearer, for example following the acceptance that of what we are by possibly becoming something different.
the theory-observation distinction is much more complex Unlike quartz, we respond to the theories that are posited
than logical empiricists believed, some have argued that we about us (see also Gergen, 2010).
need to return to theories as realistic claims about the The uniqueness of psychology among the family of
world, rather than seeing them as sentences that are sciences then is already reflected in the varieties of theory
verifiable. Realists often use what Hilary Putnam once taken up in the post-empiricist era. These include such
referred to as the ‘no miracles’ argument, namely, that radical departures from empiricism as phenomenology,
‘realism is the only philosophy that does not make the hermeneutics and social constructionism. First, theory is
success of science a miracle’ (Putnam, 1975, p. 73). What not only the generalization and induction of empirical facts,
this seeks to recover is the intuition that the success of but in addressing practical problems psychologists have
science has something to do with the way the world generated numerous alternatives to a sterile empiricism.
actually is. However, realism remains controversial within Second, theory is capable not only of explanation and
the philosophy of science because of the problem posed by prediction, but more importantly, can serve the function of
Laudan (1981) and others, now referred to as the criticism and reflection. On the empiricist view, theory is
‘pessimistic induction’ or ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ regarded either as a kind of tool capable of providing
problem. It argues that science has been wrong in the past hypotheses that can be validated, or as consequences of
and what we hold to be true today will likely turn out to be logical reasoning after systematic observations. Today we
false. Indeed, on Laudan’s account realism cannot account accept that in the variety of the human sciences, the role of
for the fact that theories which contain theoretical terms theory can also be to evaluate and criticize, and to reflect
that are non-referential can nonetheless turn out to be upon the kinds of categories that have come to exist in
successful (such as the vibratory theory of heat). This does empirical work more generally. There is in fact a venerable
not mean that realism is wrong merely that it is tradition of this in psychology. Watson’s (1913) critique of
unwarranted. the structuralism of the early 20th century was based on a
Another alternative to logical empiricism is conception of behaviorism that did not have an empirical
constructive empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980). According program nor a viable research methodology until much
to this account a theory can still be understood to refer to later. Freud’s (1895/1977) early development of
literal entities, however it is more concerned with empirical psychoanalysis was done in the absence of both patient
adequacy. This is a subtle distinction meaning that it is not cases and the neurological evidence Freud might have
theories or hypotheses but models of reality that are tested hoped for. Early attempts to produce a cognitive
in science and these models must have some relationship to psychology were also more of a hope than a reality and
a broader theory. The theory is empirically adequate were based on conceptual work done on computers by such
according to van Fraassen if appearances “are isomorphic early cognitive theorists such as Newell and Simon.
to the empirical substructures of some model of the theory” Third, theory is not just a resource for experimental
(Monton & Mohler, 2008). hypotheses - it could be an “invention” rather than a
The social sciences in general and psychology in “discovery” derived from empirical facts. Empirical data
particular however suffer from an additional problem. The are not independent of theory as we have noted, on the
phenomena that we investigate are accessible to us contrary, theory lays restriction on what facts can be
precisely because we are apt participants in the world that observed and different data may be acquired in different
entails them. Sometimes this is referred to as the theoretical frames. Experimenters are inclined to verify
distinction between human kinds and natural kinds while they might not notice or just intentionally neglect
(Hacking, 1995; 2002). Human kinds are distinguished by other inconsistent evidence, thus always enabling opposing
the fact that they are not inevitable – they are, according to parties to find their own supporting data. Fourth, theory’s
 136 心 理 学 报 44 卷

development is not a cumulative process. A theory is not an important part of social construction, the application of this
empirical model, but is based upon a host of assumptions method also holds the status of epistemology and lays a
and presumptions, what Kuhn (1962) called a paradigm and solid foundation for choosing and comparing theories.
later called a ‘disciplinary matrix.’ Science moves, on this Rhetorical and narrative analysis thus becomes another
view, from “normal” through “revolutionary periods.” important criterion in evaluating theory.
After a so-called ‘scientific revolution’ however Kuhn Finally, social practice and application may function
famously (and controversially) argued that scientific as another standard. Empiricists believe that theory comes
paradigms were largely incommensurable. Science is from practice while, in the meantime, practice is guided by
generally conservative in its approach to theory change theory, which lost its foundation in the post-empiricist era.
argued Kuhn in so far as most ‘normal’ science proceeds by Here, theory is no longer considered to be a generalization
solving puzzles within a disciplinary matrix. Although and abstraction of experience, but a kind of discursive
Kuhn has been roundly criticized, his work began a practice; theory usually reflects a specific form of life and
systematic evaluation of the importance of historical, social the changes in this discourse would potentially bring about
and psychological influences on the sciences, including the changes to traditional models of action. In this sense,
human sciences (e.g., Smith, 1997). theory is closely related to other human activities (Gergen
We hope it is now clear that from the perspective of & Zielke, 2006). Theoretical discourse is a coherent part of
the many different ways of approaching theory that, effective actions, and a theory can be evaluated by its
depending on one’s views of the place of theory in science, coherence with practice, that is, whether the theory has
there are at least several different standards for validating promoted social practice to be more effective, more
and evaluating a good theory. In the view of logical meaningful and more theoretical.
empiricism, theory is supported only after being validated Of course, we do not intend to deny the contributions
by experience for its compatibility with empirical facts. of empirical perspectives. In fact, there are often two
Theory is restrained by empirical methods, as stated by the categories of theory in theoretical psychology: substantive
authors: “the derived hypotheses would constrain the choice theory in specific areas and metatheory, which concerns
of method because some methods are better able to test the itself with foundational question and is hence more general.
hypotheses than are other methods” (Hong et al., 2010, p.26). The theory illustrated by Hong et al. (2010) is a substantive
As we hope we have demonstrated, this version of theory was theory, which is also necessary for the development of
long ago discarded for a host of alternatives. theoretical psychology. But what we have tried to
For post-empiricism, coherence with empirical emphasize is that substantive theory should keep pace with
evidences is not any longer the only and critical criterion progress in metatheory, and that on the basis of experience
while the evaluation of a theory can be carried out at we should carry out a metatheoretical reflection on
different levels and standards. The first is the standard of substantive theory. To answer the question, “what is a good
conceptual logic, with which it is analyzed, to wit, whether theory”, a kind of open and tolerant attitude is suggested
the inner factors of a theory are logically consistent with and we should integrate those specific and relatively
each other, whether a theory is compatible with other scattered substantive theories to create more meaningful
background theories, and whether a theory is compatible theories, thus finally realizing Lewin’s adage (incidentally,
with the proposer’s epistemology and methodology. The not original to Lewin) quoted by Hong et al. (2010) that
second standard that can be used is value and ideology. All “there is nothing as practical as a good theory” (p.22).
psychological theories are ideologically embedded in some
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什么是好的理论？基于理论心理学的视角
叶浩生 1 汉克・斯塔姆 2
( 广州大学心理与脑科学研究中心, 广州 510006) (2 卡尔加里大学心理学系, 卡尔加里, 加拿大)
1

摘 要 文章在 Hong, Chao, Yang & Rosner (2010)的基础上, 从理论心理学的视角继续探讨了“什么是好的理论”。文章

认为, 在传统经验主义的视野中, 好的理论必须根源于经验, 从经验观察中进行提炼和抽象, 并最终由经验事实来进行证实
或证伪。它认为：(1)理论是对事实的归纳和抽象; (2)理论是对事实的解释; (3)理论是实验假设的来源; (4)理论的发展是一个
知识可累加的过程。但是, 随着哲学、心理学的发展, 当代人们关于理论的看法正在逐渐进入后经验主义时代。它主要持以
下观点：(1)理论不只是经验事实的归纳与概括, 非经验的理论思辨本身也可能提出创新性的理论; (2)理论具有解释、预测
的功能, 但更重要的是具有批判与反思的功能; (3)理论不一定是经验事实中的“发现”, 还可能是心理学家联盟的一种“发
明”或“共识”; (4)理论的发展不一定是知识累积式的, 还可能是不可通约的不同范式之间的转换。在这种理论观下, 与经
验证据的相符不再是判断“好的理论”的唯一或关键的标准, 人们可以在概念与逻辑、价值观与意识形态、修辞与叙事、
应用与实践等不同的层次和水平上对理论展开评价。
关键词 理论; 理论心理学; 后经验主义
分类号 B84-09

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