PA On Disaster Management in India Railways

PREFACE
The Report for the year ended 31 March 2007 has been prepared in three
volumes (PA 8 of Performance Audit, CA 6 of Compliance Audit and PA 18
of Information Technology Audit) for submission to the President under
Article 151 (1) of the Constitution of India.
This volume (PA 8 of Performance Audit) contains results of the following
reviews:
(i) Disaster Management in Indian Railways (Chapter 1)
(ii) Land Management in Indian Railways (Chapter 2)
(iii) Scrap Management in Indian Railways (Chapter 3)
(iv) Construction, Operation and Maintenance of (Chapter 4)

'Project Railway'
(v) Working of Matunga Workshop (Chapter 5)
The observations included in this Report have been based on the findings of
the test-audit conducted during 2006-07 as well as the results of audit
conducted in earlier years, which could not be included in the previous
Reports.
iv
Abbreviations used in the Report
CR Central Railway
ER Eastern Railway
ECR East Central Railway
ECoR East Coast Railway
NR Northern Railway
NCR North Central Railway
NER North Eastern Railway
NFR Northeast Frontier Railway
NWR North Western Railway
SR Southern Railway
SCR South Central Railway
SER South Eastern Railway
SECR South East Central Railway
SWR South Western Railway
WR Western Railway
WCR West Central Railway
PRCL Pipavav Railway Corporation Private Limited
v
Chapter 1 Disaster Management in Indian Railways
Chapter 1
Disaster Management in Indian Railways
1.1 Highlights
• Disaster management plans of the zonal railways and the divisions
were not comprehensive, lacked uniformity and did not adhere to the
provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the
recommendations of the High Level Committee constituted by
Ministry of Railways.
(Para 1.10.1)
• Provision of rescue and relief equipments – Self Propelled Accident
Relief Trains (SPARTs), Accident Relief Trains (ARTs), Accident
Relief Medical Vans (ARMVs), Breakdown Cranes etc was inadequate
and maintenance was deficient. Speed restrictions and non-placement
of relief equipments strategically in the divisions curtailed speedy
response to disasters. The state of preparedness was not geared up to
envisaged levels.
(Paras 1.10.2.1 to 1.10.2.3)
• Facilities in hospitals for the deceased and in trains were inadequate
and the communication facilities from trains and disaster sites were
weak.
(Paras 1.10.2.4 to 1.10.2.6)
• Coordination arrangements with State Governments/District
authorities as well as other agencies were weak and Railways were
unable to harness their infrastructure while responding to disasters.
(Para 1.10.3)
• Training - a vital tool to hone the skills of staff- did not receive
requisite importance. Even basic training in First Aid and disaster
management were not imparted to most of the frontline staff.
Specialised training programmes were cancelled due to poor
participation. Setting up of a Railway Disaster Management Institute
at Bangalore was in a nascent stage and crack team of rail rescue
experts has not been formed.
(Para 1.10.4)
• Railways were neither able to rapidly access the disaster sites nor
provide organised rescue and relief during the ‘Golden hour’- the first
hour after the accident. Delayed arrival of relief equipments at the
disaster sites also led to delayed restoration of rail traffic causing
diversions and cancellation of trains. Railways also lacked the
expertise to deal with water related disasters.
(Para 1.11.1 to 1.11.3)
• Assets were not renewed or rehabilitated in a timely manner. Safety
aids were not provided and the safety measures initiated for
prevention and mitigation of disasters were inadequate.
(Para 1.12.1)
1
Report No. PA 8 of 2008 (Railways)
• Surveillance mechanisms in railway stations were inadequate and the

RPF was ineffective in preventing unauthorised entry into station
premises.
(Para 1.12.2)
1.2 Gist of recommendations
• Railways need to formulate an integrated disaster management plan to
facilitate a cohesive approach to comprehensively address all aspects of
disaster management. The zonal and the divisional disaster management
plans need to be revised on priority basis to eliminate existing
shortcomings.
• Railways should augment its infrastructure of relief equipments, facilities
in hospitals and in trains to the envisaged scale and initiate effective
measures to maintain the relief equipments fully equipped and in a state of
operational readiness.
• Railways should on priority, address the issues of operational constraints
imposing speed restrictions, positioning the relief trains/medical vans,
cranes etc in a manner that optimises the response time, which is the
essence of any response mechanism.
• Railways should quickly provide communication system in trains and in
relief trains for transmission of real time information from the disaster site,
which is essential in assessing the gravity of the disaster and in organising
rescue and relief.
• Railways should enter into formal coordination arrangements with the
State Governments/District authorities, civil/private hospitals and other
agencies so as to effectively leverage their infrastructure while responding
to disasters.
• Railways need to constitute dedicated teams and initiate tangible measures
to quicken the pace of providing specialised training in order to develop a
trained team to handle any disaster. Railways should also effectively
harness the services of private contractors on board the trains to augment
its preparedness
• Railways need to improve the response time in order to provide effective
post incidence response to disasters. Railways also need to effectively
monitor the movement of relief equipments so as to ensure their timely
availability at the disaster sites. Railways need to enhance their state of
preparedness in handling disasters involving water bodies.
• Railways need to ensure that assets are promptly replaced and
rehabilitated, safety aids are adequately provided and manpower and other
infrastructure are effectively monitored to enhance safety of trains.
• Railways need to enhance the surveillance mechanism in the railway
stations and institute an effective mechanism to prevent unauthorised entry
into station premises.
2
1.3 Introduction
In India, the railways are the most preferred mode of transport both for the
movement of people and goods consignments in bulk. Indian Railways is
spread over a vast geographical area over 63000 route kilometers. Unlike in
other countries where the role of Railways, in the event of a disaster, is
restricted to clearing and restoring the traffic, in our country Indian Railways
handles the rescue and relief operations. The ‘Citizen Charter’ of the Indian
Railways also spells out the railways’ commitment in providing safe and
dependable train services to passengers.
The Indian Railways were managing disasters relating to train accidents in
accordance with the rules and procedures contained in the Accident Manual
1992. Increasing traffic density, longer length of trains with a large number of
passengers on board, higher operational speeds of trains, emerging
technologies etc., called for a paradigm shift from the existing level of
preparedness and readiness to combat any disastrous situation to a much
higher level of an
effective ‘Disaster Major recommendations of HLC
Management System’. • Detailed disaster management plans should be devised
at the zonal and divisional levels.
Consequently,
• Relief trains and medical vans should be adequately
Ministry of Railways provided, strategically located, upgraded to operate at
constituted higher speed and equipped with modern equipments.
(September 2002) a • Rescue ambulances and other infrastructure should be
High Level provided including facilities in hospitals.
Committee (HLC) to Communication facilities should be upgraded.
• MoUs should be entered into with State Governments,
review the disaster public/private agencies, Armed forces etc to improve
management system the response time during disasters.
over the Indian • Crack rescue teams should be formulated. Specialised
Railways related to training in rescue, extrication, relief and restoration
train accidents and techniques should be provided to staff.
natural calamities and to identify additional technological and managerial
inputs required to quicken the pace of rescue, relief and restoration of
operations. The Committee recommended additional inputs to be in place
within a period ranging from three to 36 months and all of its 111
recommendations were accepted (April 2003) by the Railway Board. Since the
HLC did not address disasters such as earthquakes, floods, cyclones, fires,
industrial accidents, Salient features of the Corporate Safety Plan
accidents involving • Extensive use of Anti Collision Device (ACD) to
trains carrying prevent collisions.
explosives/ • Replacement of overaged tracks bridges, Signal &
inflammable/ Telecommunication gears and rolling stock to reduce
derailments.
hazardous material,
• Manning of unmanned level crossings and use of Train
Ministry of Railways Actuated Warning Device and ACD to reduce level
constituted (January crossing accidents.
2004) another • Introduction of modern bridge inspection and
Committee to address management system.
these disasters. This • Filling up of safety category posts.
Committee is yet to
3
finalise its recommendations.

The Ministry of Railways also formulated (August 2003) a Corporate Safety
Plan as a means to realise the vision of an accident free and casualty free
Indian Railway system. Apart from addressing the safety concerns, in its
Corporate Safety Plan, Ministry of Railways reiterated its focus on
modernisation of Disaster Management. While the Corporate Safety Plan
addressed the causes that lead to disasters and was preventive in nature,
HLC’s focus was on effective management of disasters.
Further, the Central Government promulgated (December 2005) a Disaster
Management Act Disaster Management Act 2005
2005. Prior to formal The Disaster Management Act, 2005 stipulates that
promulgation of the Ministries of Government of India shall be responsible for
Act, Ministry of taking measures necessary for prevention, mitigation,
Railways had capacity building and to respond effectively to any
threatening disaster situation or a disaster in accordance
nominated (January with the guidelines of the National Disaster Management
2003) Additional
Member (Mechanical) as a member of the National Disaster Management
Authority (NDMA) to represent Ministry of Railways. Since the HLC was
already constituted to review and upgrade the disaster management system in
Indian Railways, Ministry of Railways issued instructions from time to time to
zonal railways to ensure compliance on specific issues.
1.4 Organisational structure
A number of Directorates in the Railway Board are involved in addressing
disaster management and related safety concerns of which the main ones
responsible for issue of policy guidelines are the Safety, Mechanical, Health,
Traffic, Commercial and Security directorates. The overall implementation
rests with the respective departments of zonal railways, with the Safety
Department being the nodal department to handle all disaster management
related issues.
1.5 Audit objectives
The Performance Audit on Disaster Management in the Indian Railways was
carried out with a view to assess whether the:
• emergency preparedness of the Railways for handling disasters was
adequate;
• post incidence (post disaster) response of the Railways was adequate and
effective; and
• safety and security issues, which contribute to prevention of accidents and
disasters, were adequately addressed.
1.6 Audit scope, criteria and methodology
Disasters on the railway network are a consequence of human and equipment
failures, natural calamities and acts of sabotage and comprise collisions and
derailments of trains, accidents at level crossings, fires on trains; floods,
cyclones, earthquakes, bomb blasts, terror attacks and other
destructive/disruptive activities. This report is confined to management of
4
disasters as a consequence of train accidents, natural calamities and acts of

sabotage that impact train operations on the rail network.
The Disaster Management Act 2005, the report of the High Level Committee,
Corporate Safety Plan of Railways and the instructions issued by Railway
Board from time to time were used as audit criteria.
The policy decisions taken by Railway Board in respect of disaster
management were studied and records relating to their implementation in
various zonal railways during the past four years i.e., 2003-04 to 2006-07 were
reviewed. Joint inspections with railway authorities were also carried out on a
selected sample of trains, divisional hospitals, relief trains, medical vans and
stations to capture the prevailing ground condition.
1.7 Sample selection
A sample of 31 divisions over the sixteen zonal railways and Metro Railway
Kolkata were selected for review of the implementation of certain specific
directives on disaster management, while provision of major infrastructure
was analysed over all the 67 divisions and Metro Railway Kolkata over Indian
Railways. Further, a sample of 95 trains, 50 divisional hospitals, 90 relief
trains and 67 medical vans were selected for conducting joint inspections.
Indian Railways categorise stations on the basis of earnings, which broadly
reflects the number of passengers using a station. A sample of 138 stations
from various categories was also selected to review the safety and security
measures in place. Details of the selected sample are given in Annexure –I.
1.8 Acknowledgement
The audit objectives, scope and methodology were discussed by the Principal
Directors of Audit in the zones with the respective General Managers and
concerned departmental heads in entry and exit conferences. The input
provided on various aspects including suggestions for sample selection and
support provided by railway officials while conducting joint inspections in the
field is acknowledged with thanks. The co-operation extended by Railway
Board during the course of audit is also appreciated.
1.9 Audit findings
Performance Audit of disaster management in the Indian Railways was
undertaken against the above background and the results of audit are given in
the following three sections:
• Emergency preparedness
• Post incidence response and
• Safety and security issues
1.10 Emergency preparedness
Disaster management is ‘a continuous and integrated process of planning,
organising, coordinating and implementing measures necessary for prevention
of danger or threat of any disaster, mitigation or reducing the risk of any
disaster or its severity or consequences, capacity building, preparedness to
deal with any disaster, prompt response to any threatening disaster situation or
5
disaster, assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster,

evacuation, rescue and relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction’1. Capacity
building for emergency preparedness was therefore an integral part of disaster
management.
Audit observations in respect of emergency preparedness are as follows:
• The Committee formed in January 2004 was to provide recommendations
for Railways’ response in all types of disasters such as earthquake, floods,
cyclones, fires, industrial accidents, accidents involving trains carrying
explosives/ inflammable/ hazardous materials and the training needs for
keeping the system in a state of alertness and to evolve a professional
crisis management all over Indian Railways (IR). The Committee’s
recommendations were to be dovetailed with the National Disaster
Management Authority’s Global Disaster Management Plan for the
country. Even after a lapse of three years, the Committee was yet to submit
its report and in the absence of any other specific plan of action to deal
with these issues, the emergency preparedness of the Indian Railways was
certainly compromised to that extent.
• A review of emergency preparedness across IR revealed inadequacies in
the disaster management plans, inadequate provision and maintenance of
infrastructure – Self Propelled Accident Relief Trains, Accident Relief
Trains and Accident Relief Medical Vans, other rescue and relief
equipments, facilities in hospitals, facilities in trains and communication
facilities, poor coordination arrangements, inadequacy of trained
manpower and inadequate monitoring mechanism as brought out in
paragraphs 1.10.1 to 1.10.5.
1.10.1 Inadequacies in disaster management plans
The Disaster Management Act 2005, stipulates that every Ministry should
prepare a disaster management plan specifying among others (i) the measures
to be taken for prevention and mitigation of disasters, (ii) its roles and
responsibilities in relation to preparedness and capacity building, promptly and
effectively responding to disasters (iii) present status of preparedness and the
measures required to be taken to perform its roles and responsibilities. The
plans so drawn are to be reviewed and updated annually. The HLC also
recommended that all zonal railways and divisions must devise their disaster
management plan taking into account the details of the local resources
available with them, their neighbouring divisions/ zonal railways, civil
authorities and armed force bases and dovetail the same with the District/State
disaster management plans respectively. Scrutiny of the various disaster
management plans prepared by zonal railways and divisions revealed the
following deficiencies:
• While accidents were defined as ‘any occurrence which does or may affect
the safety of the Railways, its engines, rolling stock, permanent way,
works, passengers, railway servants, others or which does or may cause
delays to trains or loss to the railway’, IR did not adopt a comprehensive
1
As per the Disaster Management Act, 2005
6
definition of disaster for uniform applicability over the entire IR network.

The definition of “disaster” adopted by the various zonal railways varied
widely. Most of the definitions did not incorporate any quantifiable and
objective parameter to assess disasters. While WR and CR reckoned an
accident involving injuries to more than 50 persons and a long duration of
interruption of traffic as disaster, NER considered an accident as a disaster
only when the number of casualties exceeded 75 and ECR reckoned an
accident involving more than 100 injuries as a disaster. Even in these four
zonal railways, the duration of interruption of traffic was not expressed in
terms of number of hours.
Further, while a majority of the zonal railways considered various cases of
human/equipment failures, natural calamities and acts of sabotage that
could cause disasters, the disaster management plans of four zonal
railways (ER, NR, NFR and NWR) were restricted only to train accidents
such as derailments, collisions, fires and explosions in trains and level
crossing accidents. Acts of sabotage were not considered by SER as
disasters.
Under the existing mechanism, the gravity of a disaster would, therefore,
be comprehended differently by the various zonal railways and the entire
approach thereby lacked cohesiveness.
• Lack of a concerted effort from Railway Board to ensure cohesiveness
contributed to the various deficiencies in the zonal and divisional disaster
management plans. The zonal disaster management plans of 10 (WR, SR,
CR, ER, NR, SCR, NER, ECR, ECoR and NCR) of the 16 zonal railways
and Metro Railway Kolkata were deficient since they did not provide for
the measures taken either for prevention or for mitigation of disasters as
required by the Disaster Management Act 2005.
• While the roles and responsibilities were provided for in all the zonal
plans, the present status of preparedness was not mentioned in two zonal
plans (SR and SCR).
• In spite of the Railway Board’s detailed instructions of July 2004, 13 zonal
railways (except SECR, NWR and WCR and Metro Railway Kolkata) did
not dovetail its zonal plans with the plans of the respective State
Governments. In SR SCR and SWR, the zonal railways were not even in
possession of the State plan and in WR dovetailing could not be completed
since the zonal railway was yet to identify the areas where assistance from
the State/District authorities was required. In SCR, action was not even
initiated to finalise the standing arrangements with State/District
Authorities, Armed Forces etc., to ensure proper coordination and mutual
cooperation in the hour of need and the Railway Board’s instructions
largely remained ineffective.
• The zonal disaster management plans of eight zonal railways (SR, CR,
SCR, SWR, SER, SECR, NWR and ECR) and Metro Kolkata did not
provide for the details of the organisations having infrastructural facilities
7
useful in disaster management and the resources available with civil

authorities as recommended by the HLC.
• While seven zonal railways (SR, NR, SER, NER, NWR, SECR and NCR)
did not update the zonal plans since their preparation, the zonal plan of
WCR was not updated annually and was last updated in March 2005.
• Railway Board advised (December 2004) that electronic forms of all zonal
and divisional disaster management plans be loaded on the Railnet server/
website of zonal railways so that all railway authorities concerned could
make use of such information. The disaster management plans of seven
zonal railways (ER, NR, SCR, SWR, NFR, SECR and ECR) and Metro
Kolkata were not available on the website of the respective zonal railway.
In SR, even though electronic forms of the disaster management plans
were put on the website, expeditious search of required information was
not facilitated, defeating the very purpose of making the plans available on
the website.
• Two zonal railways (ECR and NCR) did not issue the pocket booklet of
Do’s and Dont’s to all officials. In SECR, the provision of issue of booklet
was not incorporated in the divisional plans of two (Nagpur and Bilaspur)
out of the three divisions.
• Similar deficiencies existed in a number of the divisional disaster
management plans. Twenty two2 out of the 67 divisions had not updated
the disaster management plans since their preparation. Sixteen3 divisional
plans did not lay down the methodology of seeking coordination from the
State Governments.
• Nanded Division of SCR was yet to formulate a disaster management plan.
• Further, the divisional plans of SR, SCR, SWR, ECR, Rangiya Division of
NFR, Nagpur and Bilaspur Divisions of SECR were not even dovetailed
with their respective zonal plans.
• Even though IR had sections in its network, which had a lot of tunnels, the
divisional plans did not have any action plan to tackle disasters in tunnels
as provided in the disaster management plan of Konkan Railway
Corporation Limited.
• Railway Board directed (December 2004) that to ensure uniformity, the
divisional plans should contain a detailed inventory of railway and non-
railway resources as envisaged by HLC and that information common to
all divisions should be provided in the zonal plan and replicated in all the
divisional plans. The detailed inventory of resources was not provided for
in the plans of eight4 divisions and the common infrastructure of the
2
Chennai, Palghat, Tiruchchirapalli, Trivandrum, Bhusawal, Delhi, Ferozepur, Lucknow, Izatnagar,
Varanasi, Ranchi, Ajmer, Bikaner, Nagpur, Sambalpur, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Kota, Hubli, Jhansi, Allahabad
and Agra.
3
Bhavnagar, Chennai, Palghat, Madurai, Tiruchchirapalli, Trivandrum, Ferozepur, Secunderabad,
Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Guntur, Guntakal, Bangalore, Mysore, Hubli and Lumding.
4
Secunderabad, Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Guntur, Guntakal, Mysore, Bangalore and Lumding.
8
respective zonal railway was not replicated in the disaster management

plans of 225 divisions.
• None of the disaster management systems were ISO certified.
Thus, most of the zonal and the divisional plans were not comprehensive,
lacked uniformity and also did not adhere to the provisions of the Disaster
Management Act 2005 and the recommendations of HLC.
Recommendations
IR needs to formulate an integrated disaster management plan to facilitate a
cohesive approach to comprehensively address all aspects of disaster
management. The zonal and the divisional disaster management plans need to
be revised on priority basis to eliminate existing shortcomings.
1.10.2 Inadequate provision and maintenance of infrastructure
The HLC recognised that the strategy for setting up of an effective disaster
management system in the Indian Railways had to be based on stronger and
appropriate infrastructure, backed by a well trained team of disciplined and
dedicated staff. The HLC recommended provision of infrastructure in terms of
rescue and relief equipments such as relief trains, medical vans, breakdown
cranes, rescue ambulances etc to reach the site quickly and to carry out rescue
and relief operations, adequate facilities in railway hospitals to take care of the
victims and facilities in coaches of trains to assist rescue and relief. Review of
the infrastructure provided in all the 67 divisions and in a sample of 50
divisional hospitals and 95 trains across IR disclosed the following:
1.10.2.1 Self Propelled Accident Relief Trains
The HLC recommended, in April 2003, provision of a three coach Self
Propelled Accident Relief Train (SPART) in each division within a period of
three years. The SPARTs were also to be upgraded to run at a speed of 140
kilometers per hour. The HLC had recommended provision of various tools
equipments relevant for rescue and relief operations. A review, however,
revealed the following deficiencies:
• Even after a lapse of four years, as against the target of provision of 67
three coach SPARTs only six SPARTs were provided (Chennai and
Palghat in SR, Chakradharpur in SER, Khurda Road, Sambalpur and
Waltair in ECoR) in the entire railway network. The two coach SPARTs
available in 12 other divisions across nine zonal railways6.have not been
converted into three coach SPARTs.
• None of the existing SPARTs were fit to run at the designated speed of
140 kilometers per hour.
5
Ratlam, Chennai, Palghat, Madurai, Tiruchchirapalli, Trivandrum, Ferozepur, Secunderabad,
Hyderabad, Vijayawada, Guntur, Guntakal, Bangalore, Mysore, Hubli, Lumding, Rangiya, Nagpur,
Sonepur, Jhansi, Allahabad and Agra.
6
Mumbai Central, Vadodara, Howrah, Sealdah, Ambala, Secunderabad, Vijayawada, Varanasi,
Lumding, Bikaner, Bhopal and Jhansi.
9
• A joint inspection of 12 SPARTs across nine zonal railways further

revealed that:
o Some of the vital tools and equipments required for rescue and relief
operations such as self contained breathing apparatus and inflatable
tents were not available in most of the SPARTs. Only one SPART
(placed in Vijayawada) was provided with the prescribed number of
four sets of self contained breathing apparatus.
o Equipment useful in maintaining communications such as WLL
exchange and PC with high speed satellite modem were provided only
in four and one SPARTs respectively. Even out of these, the WLL
exchange was not commissioned in two SPARTs. Similarly, four
SPARTs were found to have lesser number of walkie talkie sets than
the prescribed scale of 30 sets.
o In five SPARTs, the prescribed number of emergency inflatable
lighting towers for effective general illumination was not provided.
Further, the staff of the SPART at Khurda Division was neither trained
nor was any demonstration organised to familiarise the staff with the
operations of the device. Thus, the staff could not operate the device.
o The stock register of SPART at Chennai Division of SR revealed
disposal of various items as 'rat damaged'. Rusty surgical equipments
requiring replacement were available and the expiry dates of medicines
were incorrectly exhibited.
o The medical van of the SPART of Chakradharpur Division of SER did
not have any item other than some injections and basic medicines like
Analgin, Paracetamol and pre-sterilised disposable dressings.
• Further, on two occasions of
major accidents, the SPART
located at Chennai Division of
SR, which was self propelled,
had to be hauled with the
assistance of a locomotive.
Similarly, during a trial run,
the SPART at Palghat
Division of SR could not be
moved due to an error in its
engine, indicating that the
SPARTs were not maintained The SPART at Chennai Division
in good fettle.
• The SPART at Jharsuguda in Chakradharpur Division of SER was placed
at a crippled siding and was being hauled from its base to the railway
station with the service of one shunting engine as there was no earmarked
driver at the siding to get the SPART to Jharsuguda station, where the
driver and other accident relief staff boarded the SPART. It usually took
10 to 30 minutes to get the SPART to the station on each occasion, which
increased the response time and defeated the very purpose of having a
10
specialised self propelled vehicle to quickly respond to an emergency

situation.
1.10.2.2 Accident Relief Trains and Accident Relief Medical Vans
The HLC recommended provision of Accident Relief Trains (ARTs) and
Accident Relief Medical Vans (ARMVs) with various tools and equipments
required for aiding rescue and relief operations. A review, however, revealed
the following deficiencies.
• To improve the response time, HLC recommended that ARMVs could be
stationed at intervals not exceeding 100 kilometers each. ARMVs in 26 out
of 60 divisions across IR were less than the assessed requirements. The
assessed requirements of the remaining seven divisions and Metro Railway
Kolkata were not available. The provision of ARMVs was, therefore,
inadequate and inevitably curtailed speedy response to emergency
situations.
• HLC did not prescribe any scale for provision of ARTs. However, it
recommended that the speed of the ARTs be upgraded to 100 kilometers
per hour. Audit observed that 61 ARTs out of a total of 168 ARTs
available across IR were not upgraded to run at the speed of 100
kilometers per hour.
• Some cases were noticed where even though the ARTs were upgraded,
various operational restrictions effectively limited the speed of the ARTs
and the up gradation of the ARTs did not serve the intended purpose. In
ER, the loop lines served by the ARTs /ARMVs located at Rampurhat
station had a track speed capacity of 90 kilometers per hour, which was
limiting the running capacity of the ART. Further, the ART at Asansol in
ER consisted of three coaches and two wagons. While the coaches were
upgraded to operate at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour, the wagons
could only operate at a speed of 65 kilometers per hour, which effectively
restricted the overall running speed of the ART. Similar position prevailed
in SCR, where all the wagons of the ART were only fit to run at a speed of
75 kilometers per hour. In WCR, the operational speed of the two ARTs in
Kota Division was restricted by the break down cranes, which were kept
separately in another line, and the crane composition had a speed of only
75 and 60 kilometers per hour.
• Though HLC recommended that the location of the ARTs and ARMVs
should be reviewed, rationalised and relocated wherever necessary after
addressing the unreasonable clusters or long gaps in the existing placement
of ARTs, the ARTs were either not strategically located or conveniently
placed in all the divisions, which delayed the availability of ARTs at the
disaster sites as shown below.
11
Zonal Division Number Location of SPARTs Observation

Railway of and ARTs
SPARTs
and ARTs
SR Chennai 1 SPART SPART- Chennai SPART and two ARTs
and three Two ARTs at located at a distance of 8
ARTs Tondiarpet and Basin kms of each other
Bridge
ER Sealdah 1 SPART SPART and one ART- SPART and the two ARTs
and two Beleghata near Sealdah placed at a distance of 74
ARTs One ART- Ranaghat kms of each other
CR Mumbai 3 ARTs One ART at Kurla and Two of the three ARTs were
one ART at Kalyan located at a distance of 16
Kms and 54 kms from
Mumbai.
• Further, in SCR, the ARTs in Vijayawada and Hyderabad Divisions were

located at Rajahmundry and Nizamabad respectively, where availability of
diesel locos to haul the ARTs was a constraint, while the SPARTs, which
do not require a locomotive, were placed at Vijayawada and Secunderabad
respectively which had diesel locomotives within their vicinity.
In ECoR, the ART placed
at Talcher siding could
move only in the forward
direction and had to take a
route, which was invariably
occupied by goods trains
blocking the exit point of
the ART. In ECR, an
ARMV was placed at
Jhanjharpur and all the staff
deployed on this ARMV
was stationed at Railway Pathway of ART blocked by a goods train at Talcher Station
Hospital, Darbhanga. In
the event of an emergency, the staff had to travel a distance of 39
kilometers, which included 19 kilometers to be covered by road with the
ongoing gauge conversion, to take charge of the ARMV. While HLC had
mentioned that feasibility of entering into a tie up with private/ civil
hospitals could be explored so that additional ARMVs could be located
even in places where railway medical infrastructure was not available, no
tie up was entered into with any private or civil hospital to handle the
ARMV at Jhanjharpur, while responding to a disaster.
• The Workshops, which received the ART/ARMV coaches for periodical
overhaul, were not returning the same coaches to the divisions after
overhaul and the divisions, on many occasions, received another coach in
place of the one sent for periodical overhaul. Due to this systemic
weakness, apart from the details of the previous overhauls, recorded
evidence of the persistent problems of the coaches were not traceable for a
substantial number of coaches, thereby preventing specific attention to
coaches in subsequent overhauls.
12
• In Samastipur Division of ECR, 24 out of the 31 coaches available were

long over due (due dates were from 2002-03 to 2006-07) for periodical
overhaul. Of these, 23 coaches are overaged for periods ranging from one
year to 15 years. Even in NFR, 10 out of the 74 coaches available in
Katihar and Lumding Divisions were over due for periodical overhaul,
indicating that the ART coaches were poorly maintained and raised
questions on their reliability during an emergency.
• A joint inspection of 78 ARTs and 67 ARMVs across IR further revealed
that:
o Equipment such as self contained breathing apparatus, inflatable tents,
oxy fuel cutting equipment and inflatable air bags were not available in
39, 61, 44 and 55 ARTs Extent of deficiency
respectively. 78
o Equipment facilitating 65
maintenance of 52
communications such as 39
WLL exchange and PC
26
with high speed satellite
modem was not available 13
in 61 and 67 ARTs 0
Breathing Inflatable Oxy fuel Inflatable WLL PC w ith
respectively. Further, the apparatus tents cutting eqpt air bags exchange modem
WLL exchange was not

commissioned in four ARTs and the PC was without the modem in two
ARTs.
o Automatic spring loaded measuring gauges used for measurement of
track and rolling stock parameters were not provided in 25 ARTs.
o In 18 ARTs, the emergency inflatable lighting towers available were
fewer than the prescribed scale of four sets
o Out of the six oxygen cylinders available in one ART in ECoR, three
were found empty and no refilling was done.
o Augmented First Aid boxes, wrist bands to identify the injured and the
dead, emergency inflatable lighting towers were not available in 15, 12
and 13 ARMVs. Similarly, digital video/still cameras were not
available in 27 ARMVs and luminous jackets to be worn by the rescue
workers were found to be less than the prescribed scale of 30 jackets in
15 ARMVs. Even basic facilities such as coffins and body bags were
not available in six ARMVs.
o Most of the medicines and injections prescribed were not available in
the ARMVs in Secunderabad and Vijayawada Divisions in SCR.
Further, the physical verification of items in ARTs/ARMVs was also
not being carried out regularly by SCR and SR.
• Further, delays were noticed in conversion of coaching stock into ARTs,
which affected the availability of ARTs for managing disasters. As per the
Rolling Stock Programme for the year 2006-07, Parel Workshop of CR
had to convert 20 coaches into ARTs /ARMVs. Out of these, one coach
was still lying in Dadar yard. NR had also provided eight coaches in
13
November 2002 to Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Jammu (DME/JAT)

and these were not yet converted into ART. In the absence of an ART at
Jammu, the disasters/emergency situations had to be managed with Lukas
Jacks available with DME/JAT. In NWR, two coaches converted into an
ART were lying idle for two years since the zonal railway was unable to
decide on the location to place the ART.
1.10.2.3 Other rescue and relief equipments
The other rescue and relief equipments required to be provided for
management of disasters comprised 140 tonnes break down cranes, rescue
ambulances, emergency rail cum road vehicles and diesel locomotives. A
review of the provision of these rescue and relief equipments across IR
revealed the following deficiencies.
• The HLC suggested that there should be at least one 140 tonnes break
down crane in each broad gauge division. Even though four years had
lapsed since the recommendations of the HLC were accepted by the
Railway Board, only 56 break down cranes of 140 tonne capacity were
provided so far in all the zonal railways as against an initially planned
requirement of 73 break down cranes. Additional locations for locating the
cranes were identified and the requirement was revised to 84 cranes.
Considering that the manufacture of 12 cranes was in progress in Jamalpur
Workshop, there was still a shortage of 16 cranes. The shortage was more
striking when cranes were taken off for scheduled periodical overhaul,
since the area of coverage of the nearest available crane was enhanced to
cover the area serviced by the crane sent for periodical overhaul.
• Instances of cranes placed at inconvenient locations leading to delays in
dispatch on rescue operations also came to notice. The crane in Chennai
Division was placed at Tondiarpet Diesel Shed, which had a one way exit,
while the ART was placed at Tondiarpet Marshalling yard. This inevitably
delayed dispatch of the ART with the crane to the accident site. A proposal
to construct a platform cum roof to locate the crane along with the ART
was mooted in September 2006 but there has been no progress since then.
Similarly, movement of the breakdown crane at Ludhiana in Ferozepur
Division of NR was restricted to one side only since the other end was
used as a cycle stand. Further a covered shed constructed, in September
2006, for housing the crane was not yet operational (August 2007).
• The 140 tonne Gotwald crane was not very versatile and suffered from
various operational constraints. The Chief Mechanical and Planning
Engineer, CR pointed out that the crane was not suitable for use in
electrified sections and that diagonal pulling, which was invariably
required for removing entangled wagons/coaches, was not possible.
• Even though the steam cranes were to be phased out and replaced with 75
tonne MG cranes convertible to BG cranes of equal capacity with least
inputs, the four ARTs of Samastipur Division of ECR were mounted with
a steam crane of 35 tonne capacity and no action was initiated to upgrade
the cranes.
14
• A platform that could be hooked to the crane was to be provided to assist

the rescuers in their effort to extricate victims from the coaches. Hookable
platforms were not provided in the cranes available in 17 divisions.7
• Nylon slings of 70 ton capacity were to be provided for the break down
cranes for speeding up rescue operations. Although, the technical
specifications for the nylon slings was finalised by RDSO in October 2003
itself and NR was advised by Railway Board (November 2003) to procure
a sample set of nylon slings as per specifications to gain actual user
experience, the exercise was still not complete and the nylon slings were
not provided, thereby hampering preparedness for rescue operations.
• HLC had also recommended synthetic packing to be provided in ARTs for
the cranes in lieu of the wooden packing. However, synthetic packing was
not provided in 72 out of the 78 ARTs that were jointly verified.
• Divisions, where the road network was good, were required to procure a
rescue ambulance and base it at the divisional hospitals, though initially
one such ambulance was planned to be introduced in each zone. Feasibility
of introducing an emergency rail cum road vehicle was also to be
explored. Neither rescue ambulances nor emergency rail cum road vehicles
were provided in any zonal railway. In its bid to minimise the cost and to
incorporate rescue features in the rescue ambulance, the Ministry of
Railways took two years to finalise its design. Even after the specifications
for a rescue ambulance with rescue capabilities were finalised in
September 2005, Central Organisation for Modernisation of Workshops
(COFMOW) was yet to procure a rescue ambulance according to these
specifications. As regards the rail cum road vehicle, the Ministry of
Railways was still contemplating the design and the features that need to
be provided in the vehicle.
• Diesel locomotives were to be provided in electrified routes, within a
vicinity of 25 to 75 kilometers, to haul the relief trains in case of damage
to the overhead electricity or failure of power supply. Six (CR, SCR, SER,
SECR, ECR and NCR) out of the 14 zonal railways (except NWR and
NFR) having electrified routes did not have a plan to locate diesel
locomotives within a vicinity of 25 to 75 kilometers of each other. In
ECoR, a plan was available only for Khurda Road Division only. Similarly
in NR, the plan was not available for Delhi Division and in WR, the power
plan was yet to be finalised for Mumbai Division to ensure availability of
diesel locomotives. As such, the preparedness for haulage of relief trains in
case of damage to overhead electricity or failure of power was restricted.
1.10.2.4 Facilities in hospitals for the deceased
Facilities in terms of collapsible coffins, air conditioned mortuaries and
embalming gums and chemicals for preservation of the dead bodies for a
reasonable time were to be provided in all the railway divisional hospitals. A
7
Ratlam, Mumbai, Chennai, Dhanbad, Danapur, Mughalsarai, Sonepur, Samastipur, Tinsukia,
Alipurduar, Lumding, Katihar, Rangiya, Chakradharpur, Kharagpur, Adra and Ranchi.
15
review of the facilities available at the divisional hospitals revealed the

following deficiencies.
• Nineteen out of the 50 divisional hospitals across IR did not have
collapsible coffins while the number of collapsible coffins in nine hospitals
was less than the prescribed scale of 20 coffins.
• Embalming gums and chemicals were not available in 19 out of the 50
hospitals, while only the chemicals were available in three other hospitals.
In the hospitals at Chennai and Palghat in SR, Varanasi in NER and
Kharagapur in SER though the embalming gums were available there was
no trained staff to operate the mechanism. Traditional gravitation methods
and injections were used in the absence of embalming gums.
• Eighteen out of 50 hospitals across IR did not have Air Conditioned (AC)
mortuaries to preserve the dead bodies and the overall preparedness for
taking care of the deceased was primitive. Further, the Air Conditioned
mortuaries purchased by NWR for the divisional hospitals at Jaipur and
Jodhpur were not installed and were lying idle. Similarly the AC mortuary
purchased by SR for divisional hospital at Arakkonam in Chennai Division
was also not installed.
1.10.2.5 Facilities in trains
The HLC suggested display of guidelines in every coach to educate the
passengers about the precautionary measures to be taken at the time of
accidents. Further, modifications in the coach design were suggested with two
roof hatches and one under floor hatch to be provided in each coach for
evacuating and extricating the trapped passengers. Provisions for emergency
lights were to be made in every coach. A joint inspection of trains revealed the
following deficiencies.
• Roof and under floor hatches provided in two rakes of Prayagraj express
were not useful as the roof exits had leakage problem while the floor exits
had security and theft problems. Railway Board had since abandoned the
idea of providing hatches in coaches and instead decided to have four
emergency exits in coaches as against the existing two.
• Emergency automatic Customer Safety facilities in AMTRAK, USA
lights were not Customer Safety facilities during emergencies in trains
provided in any coach run by AMTRAK, USA include:
of the 87 trains out of • In the event of power failure battery power
illuminates floor markings
the 95 trains checked.
• Chemical ‘snaplights’ are provided at the end of
Even out of the eight each car with instructions for operation.
trains, which had • Emergency communication station is provided in
coaches provided the vestibule with instructions for operation.
with emergency • Instructions for using emergency provisions and
automatic lights, in exiting the trains are displayed.
five trains the
emergency automatic lights were provided only in nine out of the
29 coaches checked.
16
• The guidelines to educate the passengers about the precautionary measures

to be taken at the time of accidents were not displayed in any of the
coaches in 34 trains out of the 95 trains, while in 28 trains the guidelines
were displayed only in some coaches. Further in SWR, the guidelines to
passengers were made out as posters, which were prone to
damages/peeling off. Moreover, these were placed in inconspicuous
locations in trains.
1.10.2.6 Communication facilities
The HLC recommended provision of video conferencing facility from the
disaster site to Railway Board and zonal railway headquarters to assist in
assessment of damage, relief and assistance required at the site.
Communication facility in the trains is also essential in effective real time
transmission of information. A review of the communication facilities
revealed the following deficiencies:
• Video conferencing mechanism was not established in any zonal railway.
The Department of Telecommunications did not accord permission to use
the RBGAN satellite modem to the Railways. A video conferencing
facility was procured in February 2005 and commissioned in November
2005, in Mumbai Division of WR, without fully comprehending the
requisite formalities and as such the system was not operational in the
absence of clearance from Department of Telecommunications. As an
alternative, the Ministry of Railways decided (September 2006) to provide
internet facility and data communication from the site through Railways’
own V-SAT hub and small V-SAT terminals in all the divisional ARTs.
This facility was, however, not provided in any divisional ART
(November 2007).
• The HLC also
recommended a gradual Communication systems- French Railways
Centre National Des Operations – a railway traffic
upgradation of control management center monitors passenger, freight,
rooms to become multi operations and infrastructure over the entire country
disaster resistant and and coordinates with French Railway (SNCF).
fully equipped with back The center communicates with customers through
up systems for the national media. It controls the role of operations
and responds to emergencies.
communication, power,
drinking water etc. sustain for a week. An upgraded multi resistant disaster
control room was not available in any zonal railway. Further, in 138 out of
the 31 control rooms checked in the divisions the back up facilities of
communication, water or power were either not available or at least one of
these facilities could only last up to two days. Further, various other
deficiencies were observed in the zonal disaster control room of SCR. The
satellite phone, whose antenna had to be out in the open sky for signal
reception, was actually kept in a closed room. The satellite phone was fully
discharged and was not being checked weekly. The zonal control room did
8
Mumbai, Nagpur, Howrah, Sealdah, Asansol, Malda, Bangalore, Chakradharpur, Ranchi, Khurda
Road, Bilaspur, Danapur and Samastipur.
17
not have vital inputs of the resources available in the adjacent zonal
railways, civil authorities and other organisations, drawings of approach
roads to stations etc. indicating that the preparedness was deficient.
• Radio communication in the trains was not provided in 86 out of the 95
trains checked. In some of the other trains it was seen that VHF sets were
provided to communicate with the nearest station. Therefore, first hand
and real time information of a disaster, which was vital in assessing the
gravity of the disaster as well as to organise rescue and relief operations,
could not be transmitted from the trains.
Thus, even after four years of acceptance of the recommendations of the HLC,
the infrastructure provided in terms of rescue and relief equipments on the
railway network, facilities in hospitals for the deceased and in trains were
inadequate and the communication facilities were weak. Maintenance of the
rescue and relief equipments was also deficient. The relief equipments were
not strategically placed in all the divisions impeding speedy response and the
entire mechanism reflecting the state of preparedness of IR was not geared up
to envisaged levels.
Recommendations
• IR should augment its infrastructure of relief equipments- SPARTs, ARTs,
ARMVs, break down cranes and rescue ambulances etc, facilities in
hospitals and in trains to the envisaged scale.
• IR should initiate effective measures in maintaining the relief equipments,
especially the SPARTs, ARTs and ARMVs, fully equipped and in a state of
operational readiness at all times.
• IR should quickly provide communication system in trains and in relief
trains for transmission of real time information from the disaster site,
which is essential in assessing the gravity of the disaster and in organising
rescue and relief. The facilities in the control rooms need to be enhanced.
• IR should on priority, address the issues of operational constraints
imposing speed restrictions, positioning the relief trains/medical vans,
cranes etc in a manner that optimises the response time, which is the
essence of any response mechanism.
1.10.3 Poor coordination arrangements

The HLC recommended entering into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with the state governments so that the Railway administration could
join hands for mutual assistance in case of railway or non-railway disasters.
The HLC also suggested entering into MoUs with the civil and private
hospitals to improve the response time, with the Armed Forces and private air
operators for air support to access the disaster sites. Review, however,
revealed the following deficiencies.
18
• Railway Board advised (August 2004) zonal railways that verbal MoUs
with State Governments/ Private hospitals etc. would be adequate and that
written MoUs need not be insisted upon. Consequently, divisions were not
effectively pursuing the matter of entering into MoUs with the various
agencies as recommended by the HLC as shown in the succeeding
paragraphs. The absence of written MoUs hampered the post incidence
response of IR, which has been brought out separately in para 1.11.1.2.
The rationale behind Railway Board’s instructions was not clear, since a
written framework always has better enforceability than a loose verbal
arrangement. A proper framework of eliciting co-ordination from the State
Governments/Private hospitals etc is essential since IR’s vast network of
63,000 route kilometers makes it impossible for IR to reach a disaster site
anywhere on its network in a reasonable time without external assistance.
• Only 109 out of the 67 divisions entered into a MoU with their respective
State Governments/District Authorities and the zonal headquarters of SWR
had entered into a MoU for the zone as a whole. In Mumbai Division of
CR, the state government officials assured (August 2003) that it would
provide all assistance in case of a disaster.
• Similarly only SWR and 1510 divisions of other zones entered into MoUs
with civil and private hospitals.
• Only 511 out of the 67 divisions finalised an MoU with the Armed Forces/
Airport Authority or private air operators for air support.
• Further, only six out of the 67 divisions entered into a written arrangement
with St. John Ambulance /Red Cross for providing the ambulance services
and only three divisions (Rajkot of WR, Jabalpur of WCR and Jhansi of
NCR) concluded an MoU with NGOs.
Thus, by and large, IR was unable to harness the infrastructure of the State
Governments/District authorities as well as other agencies in responding to
disasters and preferred to have loose co-ordination arrangements.
Recommendation
IR should enter into formal coordination arrangements with the State

Governments/District authorities, civil/private hospitals and other agencies so
as to effectively leverage their infrastructure while responding to disasters.
1.10.4 Inadequacy of trained manpower
The HLC recognised that the strategy for setting up of an effective Disaster
Management System depended on a well trained team of disciplined and
dedicated staff. The HLC recommended periodic training for frontline staff,
basic training in search and rescue for Group A officers and training ART staff
to handle fire related accidents apart from the training in First Aid, which was
9
Ratlam, Rajkot, Firozpur, Ajmer, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bhopal, Jabalpur and Kota.
10
Ratlam, Rajkot, Nagpur, Solapur, Izatnagar, Ajmer, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bilaspur, Nagpur, Kota,
Jhansi, Allahabad and Agra.
11
Ratlam, Rajkot, Katihar, Bikaner and Jodhpur.
19
mandatory. A manual on post accident rescue and relief operations was also
to be prepared. Review revealed that:
• Crack teams of rail rescue experts who can be rushed to any site of
accident at short notice to assist the divisional efforts at the site,
recommended by the HLC were not constituted. Even after four years,
process of formation of crack teams had only commenced and a tender for
engaging a consultant to harness global expertise was under evaluation in
the Ministry of Railways.
• Similarly, the setting up of a Railway Disaster Management Institute with
special focus on rescue, extrication, medical relief and restoration
techniques and ‘Disaster Management’ modules at Bangalore in SWR,
were also in the nascent stage, since a tender for engaging consultants was
under evaluation.
• In most of the divisions less than 25 per cent of the frontline staff12- the
first to respond in case of a disaster were trained in disaster management
during the period 2004-05 to 2006-07. In NR, training programmes on
disaster management were not conducted at all. While no person was
trained in Bilaspur Division of SECR, in SWR, less than one per cent of
the frontline staff was trained in disaster management. Moreover, the
frontline staff was not properly identified in Rajkot Division of WR, while
in Bhusawal Division of CR only staff of the security department was
identified as frontline staff. In Pune Division of CR, frontline staff yet to
be trained was not identified. Divisional hospitals of Izatnagar and
Varanasi Divisions of NER could not organise training courses for front
line staff of various departments as trainees were not spared for training.
• The training programmes were poorly attended. In NFR, 21 programmes
on Disaster Management were cancelled due to poor participation. Three
out of the eight programmes organised by the Supervisors Training Center,
Bangalore in SWR, during the two years 2005-06 and 2006-07 were
similarly cancelled. Two programmes were cancelled during 2004 in SCR
and no one participated in the only programme organised by ECR in
2006-07. In SR, 158 out of the 600 RPF personnel nominated to undergo
training at Training College, Kimber Garden, Tiruchchirapalli during
2003-04 did not attend the training.
• Even basic training in First Aid was imparted to less than 25 per cent of
the frontline staff in most of the divisions. In SER, training in First Aid
was given to only six persons during the three years 2004-05 to 2006-07.
• Refresher courses were also not monitored properly. In SER, the staff
nominated to refresher courses were not imparted the initial training itself.
• Training of the ART staff in fire related disasters was not very
comprehensive. The ART staff in some divisions was not trained in
handling fire related disasters.
12
Front line staff include the Travelling Ticket Examiner, TXR, staff of Railway Protection Force (RPF),
AC attendants, Permanent Way Inspectors, Safaiwalas, Guards, Drivers / Asst.Drivers, Gangmen,
gatemen etc.
20
• Films on disaster management covering various types of

accidents/disasters were not prepared and given to all the divisions.
• Basic training in search and rescue to the specialised teams of Group A
officers in consultation with NDMA did not commence since the teams
were yet to be constituted by the NDMA.
• Joint inspection of running trains across IR revealed that:
o Only 150 out of the 1349 frontline staff were found to have the booklet
containing Dos and Don’ts in case of a disaster.
o The pantry car staff and AC coach attendants of the private contractors
in the trains inspected on WR, CR and SR were not trained in first-aid
and were not aware of the procedure of handling disasters. Even
though HLC had recommended that private operators connected with
frontline services should certify that their onboard staff is trained in
First aid and is conversant with other medical techniques, no such
condition was incorporated in the contracts entered into by SWR.
o The First Aid boxes in 2622 Tamilnadu express did not contain
medicines and those verified in the trains over SCR did not contain the
adhesive bandages. Similarly, in SCR augmented First Aid boxes were
not available in the long distance trains (Venkatadri, Rajkot and
Hussain Sagar express trains).
Thus, training- a vital tool to hone the skills of staff- did not receive requisite
importance in IR. The pace at which the frontline staff was trained and poor
participation in specialised training programmes suggested that IR were not
serious about developing the skills of staff to deal with medical and other
emergencies that arise in disasters.
Recommendations
IR needs to constitute dedicated teams and initiate tangible measures to
quicken the pace of providing specialised training in order to develop a
trained team to handle any disaster. IR should also effectively harness the
services of private contractors on board the trains to augment its
preparedness.
1.10.5 Inadequate monitoring mechanism
Monitoring the system is a vital mechanism for ascertaining the actual
functioning of the system and to rectify the aberrations if any. The HLC
recommended that each division should conduct one full scale disaster
management exercise in a year. A review of records regarding the full scale
disaster management exercise and mock drills for the previous two years
2005-06 and 2006-07 revealed the following deficiencies.
• Only Metro Railway Kolkata and 1713 out of the 67 divisions across IR
carried out the full scale disaster management exercise in both the years,
13
Bhavnagar, Chennai, Palghat, Tiruchchirapalli, Madurai, Trivandrum, Solapur, Bangalore, Lucknow,
Izatnagar, Adra, Bikaner, Raipur, Nagpur, Bhopal, Jhansi, Allahabad and Metro Railway Kolkata.
21
while another 11 divisions carried out the exercise once in the two year
period.
• The deficiencies observed were mainly related to delayed departure of the
ART/ARMV and SPART. In some cases, the response of staff was sloppy.
The lack of seriousness was evident when one full scale drill carried out on
24th June 2006 with ART Madurai between Tirupparamkundram and
Tirumangalam sections of SR, was not treated as a mock drill by the Chief
Safety Officer commenting that the exercise was not sufficient to check
the alertness of all staff involved in disaster management.
• In WR, the manual operation of point at Udhana led to regular delays
ranging from 5 minutes to 45 minutes in departure of ART for site of
accident. This deficiency was brought out in trail runs but no remedial
action was taken. In SCR also the various deficiencies observed in the
mock drills conducted earlier in Vijayawada, Kazipet, Rajahmundry and
Bitragunta such as non provision of double entry for the ART/ARMV
siding, breakdown staff not allotted residential quarters at one place etc.,
were not yet rectified.
Thus, IR was lax in not ensuring that the full scale disaster management
exercise was scrupulously conducted and deficiencies noticed in the mock drill
rectified by all divisions.
Recommendation
IR needs to actively promote the practice of conducting the full scale disaster
management exercise periodically as a means of obtaining a realistic
appraisal of its preparedness to counter any disaster.
1.11 Post incidence response
Post incidence response encompasses provision of immediate relief and
rescue, minimising dislocation and early restoration of rail traffic. The
effectiveness of capacity building and emergency preparedness is, therefore,
borne out by the quality of the post incidence response.
The HLC termed the first hour after an accident as the ‘Golden Hour’
recognising that (i) most of the trauma patients could be saved if bleeding was
effectively stopped and blood pressure restored within one hour (ii) victims
remaining in a state of shock for long duration would die and therefore
surgical intervention in the first hour was crucial for increasing the patients’
chances of survival. The HLC laid down five basic steps for quick and
effective rescue and relief operations
(i) Rapid access to the site of the accident
(ii) Quick extrication of victims and effective on-site medical management
(iii) Stabilisation of condition
(iv) Expeditious extraction and shifting of rescue vehicles and
(v) Speedy transportation to hospital.
IR handles all disasters affecting trains as per the Accident Manual, which,
among others, laid down the norms for departure of the relief trains to the
22
disaster sites. Review of 205 accidents that occurred over the previous five
years across IR revealed that response to disasters within the golden hour was
ineffective, preparedness and expertise was lacking apart from other
deficiencies as brought out in paragraphs 1.11.1 to 1.11.3.
1.11.1 Ineffective response within golden hour
Rapid access to the accident site was the fundamental step in providing quick
and effective rescue and relief operations within the golden hour. IR was not
only unable to rapidly access the disaster sites for providing effective rescue
and relief, but the coordination arrangements with the civic authorities/ private
hospitals etc., also were very weak as shown below:
1.11.1.1 Delayed arrival of rescue and relief equipments
The Accident Manual stipulates that ARMVs and ARTs should depart for the
accident site within 30 minutes and 45 minutes of ordering (60 minutes during
night time) respectively. A review revealed that:
• The time required for
Extent of delay in arrival of Relief Trains
ordering and 50
movement of the
40
ARTs/ARMVs
together with the
No of cases
30
requisite time to
travel the distance to 20
the disaster site

10
invariably took the
response time 0
beyond the golden 30 minutes or 30 minutes to Betw een one More than three
less one hour and three hours hours
hour. Out of the 138
No of cases (ART) No of cases (ARMV)
incidents that
warranted either an ART or an ARMV for rescue and relief, in 124 cases
the ART/ARMV the site after the golden hour. The assistance provided by
IR during the golden hour was thus more by default than by design. For
instance, in an accident involving a truck and train no 9304 Bhopal–Indore
Intercity express at Ujjain station in Ratlam Division of WR on 27 June
2004, the ART ordered at 20:30 hours, departed only at 21:54 hours and
took 48 minutes to reach the site, which was only six and a half kilometers
away. Even during the bomb blasts in seven local trains that took place on
11 July 2006, in Mumbai suburban section of Mumbai Central Division of
WR the ARMVs located at Mumbai Central, Valsad and Udhana were
ordered but before arrival of the ARMVs, the victims at all the locations
had already been shifted to nearby hospitals by the volunteers from
amongst the passengers and medical relief was not required to be done by
the ARMVs. Due to non-availability of diesel locomotive in the vicinity of
75 Kilometers on Mumbai Division, ARMV capable of running at a speed
of 100 Kilometers per hour had to be hauled with WDS 4 locomotive with
a speed capacity of 45 Kilometers per hour only.
23
• In 14 out of the 138 incidents, the ordering of the ART/ARMV itself was
delayed. In ECR, when the train no 619 collided with a goods train on
9 November 2005, the Accident Relief Medical Equipment (ARME) was
called for almost an hour after the collision. The Commissioner of Railway
Safety (CRS) observed that ARME should be immediately ordered in case
of passenger train accidents. Similarly in NR, ART/ARMV was not called
in an accident involving train no 5273, Satyagraha express, which collided
with loader of JCV machine at Jahanighera halt station on 10 April 2006.
• Delay in arrival of relief trains and equipments also delayed restoration
work in 78 out of the 109 incidents that required restoration. For instance,
after a mob wrecked the
2124 Deccan Queen
express and two other
suburban trains on 30
November 2006 in CR, the
diesel light engine, that
was requisitioned, took one
hour and ten minutes to
reach the site, while a slow
local train would have
taken 12 minutes to travel
the distance. As a result the ART Kurla carrying hydraulic rerailing equipment
rescue work was delayed
and in the meantime 133 suburban trains and two mail trains were
cancelled. In another case of derailment of Marusagar express on
8 November 2003 in CR, an ARMV was sent back as no injuries were
incurred, without realising that the ARMV was carrying the rerailing
equipment required for restoration work. A separate ART was
subsequently called for and the rerailing work that could have commenced
by 11:00 hours, actually commenced at 16:00 hours leading to cancellation
of nine trains, diversion of six trains and rescheduling of four trains.
1.11.1.2 Poor coordination arrangements
Lack of proper co-ordination was evident in the post incidence response to
various disasters as Railways could not harness the infrastructure and support
of the civic/ private agencies in 46 out of the 94 incidents that required
external support. Some of the instances are detailed below.
• In the absence of an MoU, the private hospitals refused medical help in the
bomb blasts that took place on 11 July 2006 in the Mumbai suburban
section and consequently WR was left to face court cases, claims and
criticism.
• In a major accident where 2301 Rajdhani express derailed and fell on river
bank on 9 September 2002 in ER, the injured were taken to Howrah by
train. Enquiring into the incident the CRS observed that the Railways
could have hired helicopters/planes to move them to hospitals.
• In SCR, when the Delta Fast Passenger derailed on 29 October 2005 and
fell into a water body flowing underneath the bridge, the assistance of an
24
Air Force helicopter, naval divers, army battalion, boats and trained
personnel were sought for. While the Air Force helicopter reached the site
six hours after it was requisitioned, the boats and trained personnel reached
after five hours by which time all the victims were extricated and those
surviving were sent to nearby hospitals. The naval divers from
Visakhapatnam arrived at 14:30 hours the next day (34 hours after the
disaster).
• Even when train no 2124 Deccan Queen express and two other suburban
trains were wrecked by a violent mob on 30 November 2006 at 10:22
hours in CR, fire extinguishers were called at 11:30 hours and two fire
tenders reached only by 13:00 hours, by which time most of the coaches
were gutted by the fire. Even though the damages to railway property were
Rs.2.29 crore, the CRS did not conduct an enquiry even though a statutory
enquiry was obligatory in all cases where the loss exceeded Rs.25 lakh.
Thus, IR was neither able to rapidly access the disaster sites nor could they
provide organised rescue and relief through effective co-ordinated
arrangements with civil /other agencies. Providing rescue and relief during the
‘Golden hour’ was the exception rather than the rule. Delayed arrival of relief
equipments at the disaster sites also led to delayed restoration of rail traffic,
causing diversions and cancellation of trains.
Recommendations
IR needs to improve their response time in order to provide effective post
incidence response to disasters. Co-ordination with private agencies/NGOs
and harnessing the infrastructure of the district authorities are vital in
promptly responding to disasters. IR also needs to effectively monitor the
movement of relief equipments so as to ensure their timely availability at the
disaster sites.
1.11.2 Lack of preparedness and expertise
Preparedness to handle any type of disaster is essential for providing an
effective post incidence response. Railways’ lack of preparedness and
expertise in handling water related disasters was apparent in the IRs post
incidence response. Out of the four disasters where trains were either stranded
in floods or capsized in water bodies, IR was unable to provide timely rescue
and relief. Some of the instances as detailed below:
• During the floods that hit Vadodara Division of WR in June 2005 air/ boat
support was not provided. The passengers of Shanti Express train were
stranded and the train was detained for 48 hours leading to complaints of
inadequate arrangements for eatables, water, medicines and
communication facilities to stranded passengers at stations and in trains.
• During the floods that engulfed Mumbai and its suburban areas on 26 July
2005, passengers were marooned in trains in the suburban section of CR.
No relief was provided to the passengers until the next day when the first
train service started between Mumbai CST station and Dadar at 12.45 hrs.
Additionally, the floods damaged railway property worth Rs.72.92 crore.
The CRS did not conduct the mandatory enquiry. As such, there was no
25
scope for addressing the weaknesses in the system in handling such

disasters.
• In the derailment of train no 415 Delta Fast Passenger at 04:22 hours on 29
October 2005 between
block stations
Ramannapet -Valigonda
at a bridge on SCR,
where the train fell into a
water flowing underneath
the bridge, the rescue
team could not maneuver
the velocity of the
flowing water and though
the ARMV from
Secunderabad reached
The capsized Delta fast passenger train in Valigonda
the site by 6:50 hours, the
rescue work could commence only at 09:30 hours, after the water level
receded, with the assistance of the local villagers. The passengers from
other coaches helped those in the affected coaches to come out.
Thus, IR lacked the preparedness and the expertise in dealing with water
related disasters.
Recommendation
IR needs to enhance their state of preparedness in handling disasters
involving water bodies.
1.11.3 Other deficiencies
Various other deficiencies in the rescue and relief operations came to the fore,
which are as follows:
• Neither diesel nor electric locomotives were kept on call for ARMVs or
ARTs and in the event of an accident; ART/ARMVs were hauled using the
nearest running train.
• The performance of SPARTs, while responding to accidents was not very
encouraging. In two accidents (i) collision of a tipper lorry with train no
3351 Dhanbad/Tata –Alleppey express on 27 April 2007 between Attipattu
Pudunagar – Ennore stations in SR and (ii) Unmanned level crossing
accident on 16 April 2007 between Kanchipuram and Thirumalpur in SR,
the SPART located at Chennai was hauled with a locomotive since the self
propelling mechanism was not functioning, defeating the very purpose of
providing such specialised equipments.
• Poor communication system and faulty communication equipment
hampered rescue work and effective transmission of information. The
information about an accident was communicated by the Guard of the train
to the nearest station master using the mobile phone of a passenger.
Similarly, the Guard of train no 5273 Satyagraha express could not use the
portable communication phone provided to him, when the train collided
with a loader of a JCV machine on 10 April 2006 at Jahanighera station
on NR.
26
• Timely recovery of the affected coaches/wagons from the disaster site is

essential for considering possible reuse of these coaches/wagons after
carrying out necessary repairs. A test check revealed that on ECR alone
there were 85 wagons and one passenger coach lying at the accident sites
as at the end of the year 2006-07, out of which 47 wagons and one
passenger coach were lying for more than six months.
• As many as 233 compensation claims were pending in three zonal railways
(ER, NR and ECR) out of which 219 cases pertained to NR. All these
cases were pending in the Railway Claims Tribunals at Delhi, Ghaziabad,
Chandigarh and Lucknow due to non completion of departmental
enquiries/investigations. The pending claims even related to accidents that
occurred as far back as December 1999.
• Railway Board was yet to prepare a comprehensive accident claim
compensation booklet, which was recommended by the HLC to be given
on complimentary basis to the victims. Zonal publications were available
in only six (ER, NR, SR, SWR, ECR and NCR) out of 16 zonal railways.
Thus, poor and inadequate infrastructure coupled with delays in the various
facets of post incidence response restricted the IR’s capability to effectively
handle disasters.
Recommendations
IR should ensure that appropriate infrastructure was available and
maintained in good fettle. Recovery of the coaches/wagons affected by
disasters and settling compensation claims of victims should be carried out in
a specified time frame.
1.12 Safety and security issues
Safety and security measures are all pervasive in the functioning of IR.
Increasing traffic density, large number of passengers on board and the higher
operational speeds of trains pose an attendant risk of accidents/disasters to its
customers. Prevention and mitigation of disasters depend to a large extent on
the safety and security measures in place. It is thus imperative that Railways
accord importance to the safety and security issues. Audit assessed the safety
and security initiatives of IR and the findings are given in the following two
sections.
• Safety issues
• Security issues
1.12.1 Safety issues
In its Corporate Railway Strategic Safety Plan in Britain
Safety plan The Railway Strategic Safety Plan (2007-2009) for Britain’s
formulated in mainline rail network is based on a Safety Risk Model that
August 2003 IR predicts the risk of total fatalities per year. Key risk areas to the
passengers, workforce and the public – road users at level
identified that most crossings are accordingly identified based on which
of the accidents commitments are made and targets are projected.
with disastrous The aim is to move towards developing a Strategic Safety Plan
consequences occur that would project percentage reduction in risk that is expected
due to collisions, from each set of actions in each key risk area.
27
derailments, fire accidents, accidents at level crossings and distressed bridges.

Corporate Safety plan envisaged renewal and replacement of overaged assets-
tracks, rolling stock and bridges, modernisation of signal and
telecommunication and monitoring the human element to enhance safety.
Audit, however, observed that timely renewals and replacements of assets
were not carried out, provision of safety aids and monitoring of other
infrastructure was inadequate compromising on safety as brought out below:
1.12.1.1 Delayed renewal and replacement of assets
Assets comprise railway tracks (Permanent Way), rolling stock (coaches,
wagons, diesel and electric locomotives) and bridges. Audit observed that
track renewals, replacement of rolling stock and rehabilitation of distressed
bridges were not carried out in a timely manner.
• Special Railway Safety Fund (SRSF) was set up in 2001-02 with a corpus
of Rs.17,000 crore to wipe out the arrears of replacements and renewals of
overaged railway assets within a fixed time frame of six years. Inspite of
Railways utilising Rs.14,920.88 crore as at the end of March 2007 and
planning works of Rs.1,882 crore out of this fund during 2007-08 arrears
of track renewal works, rehabilitation of bridges and overaged locomotives
continued to exist as shown in the succeeding paragraphs.
• While in service, the track is subjected to fatigue, wear and tear. For
continued ability of the track to withstand the expected traffic, it is
required to be renewed periodically. Track renewals involve replacement
of existing rails and/or the sleepers. However, as pointed out previously in
Chapter 3 of the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India
(Union Government Railways) 2007 (Report No. 6-Performance Audit),
while only 56 per cent of track renewal works projected by the zonal
railways were finally sanctioned by Railway Board, even the works
sanctioned were not completed within the stipulated time. As many as
1,416 works, comprising 556 works under SRSF,14 were outstanding out
of which 569 works, comprising 258 works under SRSF, 15 were taken up
more than five years ago.
• One of the aims of the Corporate Safety Plan was to replace the existing
system of assessment of bridges with a modernised inspection and
assessment system for evaluation of the strength and residual life of the
bridges. As on date, out of 1,27,768 bridges, while 42 per cent of the
bridges were stated to be more than 100 years old and 62 per cent of the
bridges were more than 80 years old. However, even after a lapse of four
years of formulation of the Corporate Safety plan, Railways have only
awarded contracts for pilot projects to carry out (i) Under Water Inspection
of bridges (ii) Capacity assessment and condition monitoring of bridges
(iii) Fatigue testing and residual life analyses (iv) Non destructive testing
of bridges etc. In the meantime, freight loading in excess of the carrying
14
556 works under SRSF (Green book 2006-07) and 860 works under DRF (Pink Book 2005-06)
15
258 works under SRSF and 311 works under DRF.
28
capacity was permitted on some selected routes, which meant that the
capacities of the bridges need to be strengthened on priority.
• Twenty four bridges out of the 136 bridges that were declared as distressed
by Railways up to 2004-05 were not even planned for repair/rehabilitation.
Out of the 110 bridges that were planned for rehabilitation during 2005-06
and 2006-07, works on as many as 39 bridges were not completed
(November 2007).
• Modern bridge testing laboratories with some non-destructive testing
equipment, which were to be provided in all the zonal railways have not
been provided in any zonal railway.
• The rolling stock comprising of coaches, diesel and electric locomotives
was overaged. As many as 321 out of the 4,500 diesel locomotives, 61 out
of the 3,197 electric locomotives and 1,229 of 42,160 coaches had outlived
their stipulated lives requiring replacement. Diesel and electric
locomotives and coaches were overaged to the tune of 216 months, 108
months and 588 months respectively.
1.12.1.2 Inadequate provision of safety aids
Safety aids play a crucial role in prevention of disasters such as collisions and
accidents at level crossings. Corporate Safety Plan envisaged installation of
modern devices and warning systems to prevent collisions, modernisation of
signalling system and maintenance of signalling equipment. Audit observed
that safety aids were yet to be comprehensively provided as brought out
below:
• The Corporate Safety Plan envisaged provision of Anti Collision Device
(ACD) for comprehensive safety coverage to eliminate collisions and
consequent fatalities. This device provided in the trains, stations and level
crossing gates assists in detecting train partings and provides audible and
visual warnings at level crossing gates when trains approach them. Even
after four years of finalisation of the Corporate Safety Plan, IR was yet to
implement the ACD. The pilot project is still in progress in NFR
(November 2007).
• Track circuiting is one of the most important safety aids to be provided at
all stations to reduce collisions in station area. Track circuiting eliminates
the chance of reception of trains on the occupied lines at stations. Full
track circuiting was not implemented in as many as 1,784 out of 6,211
signalling stations in 67 divisions across IR.
• Axle counters are electronic devices employed for detecting the presence
of a vehicle on a block section i.e., the section of a track between two
adjacent stations. This is a critical device that detects presence of parted
load (bogies and wagons) that get disconnected from the running trains
and remain dangerously on the track. Tracks used even for ‘A’ class
routes, on which super fast trains are operated, did not have the facility of
block proving (process of proving that there are no vehicles in the entire
block section) by axle counters.
29
• Train Actuated Warning Devices (TAWDs) are provided at unmanned

level crossings to warn about an approaching train and to prevent accidents
at unmanned level crossings. There were as many as 18,976 unmanned
level crossings in all the 67 divisions; and even though accidents at level
crossings were identified as a serious concern, only 43 unmanned level
crossings in seven divisions16 were provided with TAWDs.
• Modernisation of points and signals through Panel Interlocking (PI), Route
Relay Interlocking (RRI), and Solid State Interlocking (SSI) were not
completed. Out of 6,211 signalling stations only 2,959, 288 and 164
stations respectively were provided with PI, RRI and SSI.
• Numerous instances of signal gear failures were noticed across all zonal
railways. For the year 2006-07 alone 2,08,966 failures in signal gears were
reported across IR, with Bilaspur Division of SECR, Howrah Division of
ER, Lucknow, Delhi and Moradabad Divisions of NR accounting for the
maximum with 19,357, 12,705, 12,051, 10,778 and 10,003 failures
respectively.
• Auxiliary Warning System (AWS) eliminates human error in passing
signals at danger. Even though AWS was working satisfactorily in the
Mumbai suburban sections of CR and WR, the system was not
implemented in any route across IR.
1.12.1.3 Inadequate monitoring of other infrastructure
Railways were not monitoring the other infrastructure directly related to safety
as brought out below:
• Excessive use of line capacity of the track has its adverse impact on safe
operation of trains. A test check on some zonal railways indicated that in
91 sections over five zonal railways (WR, ER, SCR, SWR and NFR) the
line utilization was far beyond its chartered capacity and the sections were
oversaturated. In SCR, 49 sections over five divisions were oversaturated
with the actual line utilisation up to 173 per cent of the chartered capacity.
Over utilisation results in non-availability of time for effective
maintenance and thus constitutes a safety hazard.
• Monitoring of human element was also deficient. A large number of
vacancies existed in the cadre of drivers/motormen in most of the
divisions. Except for three divisions (Bhavnagar of WR, Guntur of SCR
and Rangiya of NFR) which had manpower slightly in excess of the
sanctioned strength, as many as 8,493 vacancies existed in the
driver/motormen cadre in 62 out of the 67 divisions across IR as at the end
of March 2007. This inevitably led to a situation where the drivers
increasingly performed overtime duties beyond their prescribed duty of ten
hours and were prone to fatigue and neglect, which is not in the interest of
safety.
16
Vadodara (1), Tiruchchirapalli (4), Delhi (14), Hyderabad (10), Bangalore (4), Bikaner (8) and
Jodhpur (2).
30
• The Corporate Safety Plan envisaged induction of fire proof coaches and
introduction of technological inputs to prevent and minimise fire accidents
and its fatalities. The fire proof coaches have not yet been manufactured
by the Integral Coach Factory, Perambur. Even though the use of fire
retardant materials was planned for coach flooring, roof ceiling, seats and
berths, seat upholstery and curtains in the coaches, fire retardant materials
such as compreg boards and asbestos free limpet sheets were used only for
coach flooring and roof ceiling, which was inadequate in mitigating the
consequences of fire.
• The Disaster Management Act, 2005 stipulates that every ministry and
department should allocate funds for measures for prevention of disaster,
capacity building and preparedness. However, Railways did not allocate a
separate head of account for booking the expenditure incurred on disaster
management. Zonal railways allotted funds through regular budget plan
and booked the expenditure to concerned revenue / capital heads. Several
departments were incurring expenditure on various aspects of disaster
management and all the zonal railways differed in their approach of
booking the expenditure on disaster management. Consequently, the total
expenditure on disaster management was a diffused entity, which could
not be tracked.
• After a serious accident in CR and based on recommendation of CRS the
facility of artificial ventilation with exhaust/jet fans was installed in tunnel
number 25C in Karjat-Lonavla section at a cost of Rs.1.79 crore. The
system remained non- functional for long periods of time from January
2004 and May 2005 and from August 2006 till date (November 2007),
indicating that the infrastructure specifically provided for prevention and
mitigation of disasters was not properly maintained.
Thus, assets were not renewed or rehabilitated in a timely manner. Safety aids
were not provided and safety related infrastructure including manpower was
not effectively monitored. The safety measures initiated for prevention and
mitigation of disasters were inadequate.
Recommendation
IR needs to ensure that assets are promptly replaced and rehabilitated, safety
aids are adequately provided and manpower and other infrastructure are
effectively monitored to enhance safety of trains.
1.12.2 Security issues
Protection of railway assets and property was the responsibility of the
personnel of the Railway Protection Force. The Commercial staff also man the
entry points in stations to prevent unauthorised entry into the station premises.
As already pointed out in Chapter-II of the Report of the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (Union Government Railways) Report no 6
(Performance Audit) of 2007, overcrowding in station premises was an aspect
of major concern and it is imperative that IR assess the threat perception at all
stations and initiate measures towards enhancing security at stations. A joint
inspection of the security mechanism at 138 stations across IR revealed that
31
the infrastructure was inadequate and the surveillance at stations was not very
effective as brought out below:
• CCTVs were not available in 87 out of the 128 stations belonging to the
‘A’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ category stations, which handle the maximum amount of
the passenger traffic.
• In 10 out of the 24 ‘A’ category stations, some units of the CCTV
mechanism were not functioning, which included major ‘A’ category
stations such as Chennai Central, Kalyan, Secunderabad, Guwahati and
Patna Junction. In Patna, only 10 out of the 53 CCTV units were
functional. In addition, in Mumbai CST station - an important ‘A’ category
station, the RPF personnel were unaware of the CCTV operations. In
Nagpur, even though walkie talkie instruments were provided to facilitate
communication between the RPF personnel monitoring the CCTV and
other RPF staff deployed in the station premises, none of the 16 walkie
talkie instruments provided were functioning, limiting the utility of
CCTVs. In Vijayawada, no RPF personnel were posted to monitor the
CCTVs, defeating the very purpose of their provision.
• Only four stations (Jammu Tawi, Samastipur, Darbhanga and Patna) out of
the 62 ‘A’ category stations were equipped with scanning machines. Even
out of these, the scanning machines provided at Samastipur, Darbhanga
and Patna were not functional. Similarly only two stations (Moradabad and
Bareily) out of the 50 ‘B’ category stations inspected were provided with
scanning machines and the scanning machine provided in Bareily was not
in working order.
• Hand held metal detectors or door frame metal detectors were provided in
only 47 out of the 62 ‘A’ category stations and in 25 out the 50 ‘B’
category stations. Even out of these, some of the hand held metal detectors
or door frame metal detectors provided in 15 ‘A’ category and seven ‘B’
category stations were non-functional.
• The security mechanism in smaller stations was inadequate. None of the
five ‘D’ category stations
jointly were equipped with
any surveillance mechanism.
• Bomb detection and disposal
squad was available only in
Chennai. In Secunderabad a
bomb detection set was
available but none of the
staff was trained to operate
the equipment.
• A majority of the stations had An unmonitored entry/exit point at Bangarapet station
multi entry/exit points, which

were either not manned or monitored regularly. The RPF was therefore not
effective in preventing unauthorized entry into station premises.
32
Thus, surveillance mechanisms were inadequate and the RPF was ineffective
in preventing unauthorized entry into station premises.
Recommendation
IR needs to enhance the surveillance mechanism in the stations and institute
an effective mechanism to prevent unauthorised entry into station premises.
1.13 Conclusion
Indian Railways had recognised that the state of preparedness required an
upgradation to that of a Disaster Management System to effectively deal with
disasters. Indian Railways were however, not prepared to deal with all kinds of
disasters, the zonal and divisional disaster management plans lacked
cohesiveness and were not comprehensive. The infrastructure was not only
insufficient but was also poorly located and not maintained adequately at
many places. This was borne out by the post incidence response of the Indian
Railways to various disasters. Indian Railways were neither able to rapidly
access the disaster sites with its rescue and relief equipments nor leverage the
infrastructure of the civic/ private agencies through effective co-ordination
agreements. Organised assistance provided within the golden hour was the
exception than the rule. The response time of Indian Railways warranted
significant improvement. The provision of safety aids and maintenance of
infrastructure to enhance safety of the travelling passengers was inadequate
and the measures adopted to enhance security at stations for prevention and
mitigation of disasters were not commensurate with the number of passengers
handled.
33

PA On Disaster Management in India Railways

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PA On Disaster Management in India Railways

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PA On Disaster Management in India Railways

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What are the key issues highlighted in disaster management of Indian Railways?

What are the key issues highlighted in disaster management of Indian Railways?

What are the deficiencies in provision of rescue and relief equipment according to the report?

What are the deficiencies in provision of rescue and relief equipment according to the report?

PREFACE

(i) Disaster Management in Indian Railways (Chapter 1)

(ii) Land Management in Indian Railways (Chapter 2)

(iii) Scrap Management in Indian Railways (Chapter 3)

(iv) Construction, Operation and Maintenance of (Chapter 4)

(v) Working of Matunga Workshop (Chapter 5)

ECR East Central Railway

ECoR East Coast Railway

NCR North Central Railway

NER North Eastern Railway

NFR Northeast Frontier Railway

NWR North Western Railway

SCR South Central Railway

SER South Eastern Railway

SECR South East Central Railway

SWR South Western Railway

WCR West Central Railway

PRCL Pipavav Railway Corporation Private Limited

• Surveillance mechanisms in railway stations were inadequate and the

finalise its recommendations.

disasters as a consequence of train accidents, natural calamities and acts of

disaster, assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster,

definition of disaster for uniform applicability over the entire IR network.

useful in disaster management and the resources available with civil

respective zonal railway was not replicated in the disaster management

• A joint inspection of 12 SPARTs across nine zonal railways further

specialised self propelled vehicle to quickly respond to an emergency

Zonal Division Number Location of SPARTs Observation

• Further, in SCR, the ARTs in Vijayawada and Hyderabad Divisions were

• In Samastipur Division of ECR, 24 out of the 31 coaches available were

WLL exchange was not

November 2002 to Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Jammu (DME/JAT)

• A platform that could be hooked to the crane was to be provided to assist

review of the facilities available at the divisional hospitals revealed the

• The guidelines to educate the passengers about the precautionary measures

1.10.3 Poor coordination arrangements

IR should enter into formal coordination arrangements with the State

• Films on disaster management covering various types of

the disaster site

scope for addressing the weaknesses in the system in handling such

• Timely recovery of the affected coaches/wagons from the disaster site is

derailments, fire accidents, accidents at level crossings and distressed bridges.

• Train Actuated Warning Devices (TAWDs) are provided at unmanned

multi entry/exit points, which

You might also like