U Studies53No4 Book Web 17dec09

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4
Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)
Military Intelligence in WW I
“The Intelligence Section, A.E.F”

Operation IFEKTION:
The Soviet Bloc AIDS
Disinformation Campaign
Reviewed: Solving Real World Intelligence

The Accidental Guerrilla Problems on the College Campus
Vietnam Declassified
OSS Training in National Parks
The Secret War in El Paso
The James Angleton Phenomenon
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf
Books Reviewed in 2009
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Cover: Painting by US combat artist S.J. Woolf. (Image from

Library of Congress American Memories Collection, Newspaper
Pictorials, World War I Rotogravures at http://memory.loc.gov/)
CSI’s Mission The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to
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Studies in Intelligence
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Awards The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most signifi-
cant contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in
Studies. The prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of
equal merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstand-
ing. An additional amount is available for other prizes, including the Walter L.
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Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the
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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) i

C O N T E N T S
CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
be written on any historical, opera-
tional, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect Operation INFEKTION
of intelligence.
Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS
The final responsibility for accepting
or rejecting an article rests with the
Disinformation Campaign 1
Editorial Board. Thomas Boghardt
The criterion for publication is
whether, in the opinion of the Board, The Origins of Modern Intelligence,
the article makes a contribution to the Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
literature of intelligence. Military Intelligence at the Front, 1914–18 25
Terrence J. Finnegan, Col., USAFR (Ret.)
EDITORIAL BOARD
Carmen A. Medina, Chairperson
Pamela S. Barry
INTELLIGENCE TODAY AND TOMORROW
Nicholas Dujmovic
Eric N. Heller An Experiment in Collaboration on an
Robert A. Kandra Intelligence Problem
William C. Liles
John McLaughlin
Developing STORM, a Methodology for Evaluat-
Matthew J. Ouimet ing Transit Routes of Transnational Terrorists
Valerie P and Criminals 41
Cyril E. Sartor Mark T. Clark and Brian Janiskee
Michael Richter
Michael L. Rosenthal
Barry G. Royden INTELLIGENCE IN PUBLIC MEDIA
Ursula M. Wilder
Members of the Board are drawn from the The James Angleton Phenomenon
Central Intelligence Agency and other
Intelligence Community components. “Cunning Passages, Contrived Corridors”:
Wandering in the Angletonian Wilderness 49
EDITORIAL STAFF David Robarge
Andres Vaart, Editor On the Web:

Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angle-
ton and CIA Counterintelligence (Posted with the
permission of the Journal of Intelligence History)
David Robarge
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars

in the Midst of a Big One 63
Reviewed by Matthew P.
Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) iii

Vietnam Declassified: CIA and
Counterinsurgency in Vietnam 65
Hayden Peake
OSS Training in the National Parks and Service

Abroad in World War II 69
Reviewed by Clayton D. Laurie
The Secret War in El Paso: Mexico

Revolutionary Intrigue, 1906–1920 73
Reviewed by Mark Benbow
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 75

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
Comment
In Defense of John Honeyman
(and George Washington) 89
Kenneth A. Daigler, aka P.K. Rose
Books, Film, and Television Reviewed

in Studies in Intelligence, 2009 93
iv Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Contributors
Mark Benbow worked as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence. He now

teaches American history at Marymount University in Virginia. His book, LEAD-
ING THEM TO THE PROMISED LAND: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant Theology,
and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1915 will be published by Kent State Press.
Thomas Boghardt is historian of the Spy Museum in Washington, DC. His article
won a Studies in Intelligence Award for 2009.
Mark T. Clark is Professor of Political Science and Director of the National Secu-
rity Studies program at California State University, San Bernardino. He directs
the CSU Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence and was the
STORM project coordinator.
Ken Daigler is a retired CIA officer. As P.K. Rose, he is the author of Founding
Fathers of Intelligence and Black Dispatches: Black American Contributions to
Union Intelligence During the Civil War, both available on cia.gov.
Terrence Finnegan is a retired US Air Force Reserve colonel. He is the author of

Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Reconnaissance and Photographic Interpretation
on the Western Front—World War I.
Brian Janiskee is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Political Science
Department at CSU, San Bernardino. Janiskee teaches the Politics of National Se-
curity, Research Methodology, and other courses in the National Security Studies
Program. He was the STORM project’s principal analyst.
Dr. Clayton Laurie is a CIA historian. He has served tours at the US Army Cen-
ter of Military History, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the History Staff
of the Director of National Intelligence. Dr. Laurie also teaches military and intel-
ligence history at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County.
Brad P. is a clandestine service officer assigned to the CIA History Staff.
Hayden Peake is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served

in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.
David Robarge is the chief of the CIA History Staff. He is a frequent contributor
and winner of Studies in Intelligence Annual Awards.
Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) vi

Operation INFEKTION
Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS

Disinformation Campaign
Thomas Boghardt
The practice of intelligence dif- weaken the USSR’s opponents—

fered considerably between East first and foremost the “main
and West during the Cold War. enemy” (glavny protivnik), the
Western intelligence services were United States—and to create a
most commonly tasked with gath- favorable environment for
ering information, but their advancing Moscow’s views and
international objectives
“
Soviet bloc counterparts placed
much greater emphasis on decep- worldwide.
tion operations to influence
Our friends in Moscow opinions or actions of individu- This is the story of one such mea-
call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ als and governments. 2 sure—a campaign to implicate
Our enemies in America the United States in the emer-
call it ‘active measures,’ These “active measures” (aktiv- gence of the AIDS pandemic that
inyye meropriatia, as the Soviets appeared in the early 1980s. The
and I, dear friends, call it
called them) included manipula- story both illustrates the nature of
‘my favorite pastime.’ Soviet and communist bloc disin-
tion and media control, written
and oral disinformation, use of formation programs and
”
—Col. Rolf Wagenbreth,
director of Department X (dis-
information) of East German
foreign communist parties and
front organizations, clandestine
radio broadcasting, manipula-
tion of the economy, kidnappings,
paramilitary operations, and sup-
demonstrates the potential long-
term consequences.
Editor’s Note: This article was the

recipient of an Annual Studies in
foreign intelligence 1 port of guerrilla groups and Intelligence Award in 2009. The
terrorist organizations. Under references to end notes seen in
Joseph Stalin, active measures this text are included only in the
also included political article’s .PDF versions posted in
assassinations. 3 The basic goal of the Studies in Intelligence collec-
Soviet active measures was to tion in www.cia.gov.
Organizational Basics Directorate (foreign intelli-

gence) was expected to spend 25
The KGB’s Service A was the percent of his time conceiving
unit tasked with conducting and implementing them. 4 But
active measures, and numerous active measures were well inte-
KGB residencies abroad were grated into Soviet policy and
assigned officers dealing exclu- involved virtually every ele-
sively with them. Moreover, ment of the Soviet party and
each officer of the First Chief
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov-
ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 1

The Creation and Perpetuation of a Myth
Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Mos-

cow’s decision to embark on an aggressive active measures of Germany was merely an
campaign. incarnation of the Third Reich. 8
In conducting disinformation
state structure, not only the Moscow’s “total” approach to campaigns, Soviet bloc intelli-
KGB. influence and deception opera- gence had to be mindful of the
tions contrasted starkly with concerns, fears, and expecta-
Active measures specialists the American concept of covert tions of their target audience.
used newspapers, radio sta- action, which was carried out As Ladislav Bittman, deputy
tions, embassies, and other offi- by a single agency—the CIA— chief of the Czechoslovak intel-
cial institutions for whose budget for such opera- ligence service’s disinformation
implementation and diffusion. tions made up a fraction of its department from 1964 to 1966,
Services allied to the Soviets, overall expenditure and paled pointed out: in order to succeed
such as East Germany’s Minis- in comparison to what the Sovi- “every disinformation message
try for State Security (MfS), ets spent on active measures. 7 must at least partially corre-
were frequently enlisted as spond to reality or generally
well. In 1980, a conservative Disinformation (dezinfor- accepted views.” 9
CIA estimate put the annual matsiya) was a particularly
cost of Soviet active measures effective weapon in the armory
at $3 billion. 6 of Soviet bloc active measures. The AIDS Campaign’s
The term dezinformatsiya Backdrop and Origins
denoted a variety of techniques
A Note about Intelligence and activities to purvey false or Deteriorating East-West rela-
Sources misleading information that tions formed the backdrop to
Soviet bloc active measures spe- Moscow’s decision to embark on
With the end of the Cold War, an aggressive active measures
cialists sought to leak into the
former Soviet and East German campaign in the 1980s. The
intelligence officers confirmed
foreign media. From the West-
ern perspective, disinformation Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
their services’ sponsorship of the
was a politically motivated lie, in 1979 ended what was left of
AIDS disinformation campaign.
In 1990, the German TV news but Soviet bloc propagandists détente, and the newly elected
magazine Panorama featured an believed their disinformation US president, Ronald Reagan,
anonymous former intelligence campaigns merely highlighted adopted a hard line against the
officer—probably Günter greater truths by exposing the USSR. At his first press confer-
Bohnsack—who revealed his ence, Reagan declared: “They
department’s participation in the
real nature of capitalism.
[the Soviets] reserve unto them-
campaign. Later that year,
For example, the KGB began selves the right to commit any
Bohnsack and a fellow retired
intelligence officer published more spreading rumors about FBI crime, to lie, to cheat in order to
details of their department’s activ- and CIA involvement in the attain [world revolution].”
ities against the West, including assassination of President John
the AIDS disinformation F. Kennedy because the Soviets In short order, the new presi-
campaign. 5 And in 1992, SVR earnestly believed the US mili- dent increased the defense bud-
(Russian foreign intelligence)
tary-industrial complex was get by 10 percent, suspended
director Yevgeny Primakov con- arms reduction talks, and rein-
firmed the KGB’s participation.
involved in Kennedy’s murder.
Likewise, East German intelli- stated work on MX missiles and
Over the next years, the European
gence routinely floated disinfor- B-1 bombers. The Reagan
and the North American media
repeatedly reported on Soviet bloc mation depicting West German administration’s hawkish
intelligence sponsorship of the politicians as former Nazis, stance, in turn, stoked Soviet
AIDS conspiracy theory. Archival because, from East Berlin’s per- paranoia, especially after Yuri
sources, interviews, and other spective, the Federal Republic Andropov’s election as general
material were used in this article secretary of the Communist
as well.
2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Party of the Soviet Union in

The Soviet Active Measures Process
1982. A former KGB chairman,
Andropov was intelligent and Center gives strategic go-ahead for a disinformation campaign.
well-versed in foreign affairs, Ideas would be generated by residency officers assigned to read local press,
but he was also a hardliner books, and magazines for material that could be used for disinformation
with a proclivity for conspiracy purposes. 12
theories, a trait perhaps exacer- Center would evaluate the ideas. According to a senior East European intel-
bated by his terminal illness. ligence officer who defected in 1968,
During his short reign, Individual suggestions for special operations [active measures] which
came from stations abroad were submitted for preliminary assess-
Andropov became convinced ment.…the majority of the suggestions were discarded in the first stage
that the United States planned of the selection process, leaving only those whose conception corre-
sponded with our long-range plans and whose projected consequences
for nuclear war, and KGB resi- suggested positive results. The suggestions were then transmitted to a
dencies in Western capitals panel…where the author of the proposal faced many questions and
were instructed to look for signs much criticism in an attempt to uncover any weakness. The composition
of the critical board varied from case to case although several Depart-
of a first strike. In keeping with ment D employees and experts on particular regions were permanent
Andropov’s hostility toward the members. Further supplemented and polished, the proposal was then
submitted to the intelligence chief for approval. 13
Reagan administration, the
KGB’s First Chief Directorate Still at the Center, preparation involved disinformation specialists writing
on 30 September 1982 in their native language, approvals by managers, and translation.
instructed its residencies in the Targeting followed. The Center typically sought to launch a story outside
United States to counterattack the Soviet bloc-controlled press to conceal Moscow’s hand. This was done
Washington’s aggressive stance frequently through anonymous letters and newspaper articles in the
with active measures. 10 Third World. 14
Once published abroad, the Soviet media might pick up and further prop-
Soviet active measures agate the item by referring to its non-Soviet source.
worked best when pre-existing
plans fit neatly into political- Types of Active Measures
cultural environments and spe- According to the defector, two types of active measures existed:
cific events. 11 In this case, Mos-
The first category includes operations initiated and designed within
cow had long realized that KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation tech-
chemical and biological war- niques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds
of these categories every year even though their impact is rather
fare was of great concern to limited. 15
Western publics and could be
exploited for disinformation Such single pieces of disinformation were not reinforced by additional prop-
agation efforts.
purposes. During the Korean
War, the Chinese and North The second type was the result of a strategic decision at the top of the Soviet
Koreans had broadcast “confes- active measures pyramid and directly approved by the Politburo. Campaigns
sions” of captured American were usually planned to last several years and encompassed many elements
pilots about the alleged US use of the Soviet state, including the International Information Department
(IID), which directed official press organs, such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio
of germ warfare. 17 During the Moscow; and the International Department (ID), responsible for liaison with
Vietnam War, the KGB circu- foreign communist parties, international communist front organizations,
lated a forged letter purporting and clandestine radios.
to come from Gordon Goldstein
The KGB, ID, and IID would cooperate closely in executing a particular cam-
of the US Office of Naval paign with the means available to each—the KGB’s Service A, responsible
Research. First published in the for forgeries and spreading rumors (“black propaganda”), the IID’s press
Bombay Free Press Journal in organs for official stories (“white propaganda”), the ID for clandestine radio
1968, the letter “revealed” the broadcasts and the use of international front organizations (“gray
existence of American bacterio- propaganda”). 16

In their conspiracy-driven world view, it was plausible to as-

sume that AIDS was indeed the result of US biological warfare was indeed the result of US bio-
experiments. logical warfare experiments.
But ultimately, the true origins
of AIDS were of secondary
logical warfare weapons in Viet- response to the discoveries importance. 23 According to
nam and Thailand. 18 opened the door to rumors. 20 Yevgeny Primakov, at the time
The emergence of the mysteri- the first deputy chairman of the
Moreover, Americans had ous illness so soon after revela- Soviet Peace Committee, a for-
shown themselves politically tions about US biological eign propaganda front organi-
sensitive to the behavior of warfare experiments therefore zation, the KGB conducted the
their own government. In the provided Soviet active mea- AIDS disinformation campaign
1970s, a spate of press and con- sures specialists an opening to to expose the “perfidious” work
gressional investigations publi- exploit. of US military scientists. 24
cized several actual instances of
US biological warfare research In addition, the Soviets were
early in the Cold War. One extremely sensitive to charges The Campaign Opens
example was the secret Special against them concerning biolog-
Operations Division (SOD) at ical weapons. A US State The opening salvo of the AIDS
the premier US chemical and Department report released on disinformation campaign was
biological warfare research 22 March 1982 accused Mos- fired on 17 July 1983, when an
facility at Fort Detrick, Mary- cow of using chemical toxin obscure newspaper in India, the
land, which had created a num- weapons (“yellow rain”) in Patriot, printed an anonymous
ber of germ weapons for the Southeast Asia. This allegation letter headlined “AIDS may
CIA (codename MKNAOMI). may have provided an impetus invade India: Mystery disease
Later, an SOD report surfaced, for the KGB to respond in caused by US experiments.”
detailing a simulated biological kind. 21 The letter, allegedly written by
warfare attack in New York in a “well-known American scien-
the summer of 1966—Army All Moscow had to do was add tist and anthropologist” in New
personnel had released aerosol a twist to its time-tested biolog- York, claimed that “AIDS…is
clouds of a “harmless simulant ical warfare disinformation believed to be the result of the
agent” into subway stations theme by introducing the idea Pentagon’s experiments to
along the 7th and 8th Avenue that US government scientists develop new and dangerous bio-
lines to assess the vulnerabil- had created the AIDS virus. In logical weapons.” It went on to
ity of subway systems to covert the words of two former Soviet state that the United States
biological attacks and to explore bloc disinformation officers, the was about to transfer these
“methods of delivery that could AIDS disinformation campaign experiments to sites in Paki-
be used offensively.” 19 “virtually conceptualized stan, where they would pose a
itself.” 22 grave threat to neighboring
In this environment, the key India.
event was the emergence in the As in earlier disinformation
early 1980s of the Acquired campaigns, the propagandists • Citing a number of publicly
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, sought to expose what they con- available sources, the article
AIDS, as a national health cri- sidered a greater truth about recounted a series of well-
sis. Scientists had named the the “main enemy”—i.e., that established facts about
disease in 1982, and the follow- the United States was an impe- AIDS—that there was great
ing year a causative virus (HIV) rialistic, reactionary power con- concern about contaminated
was identified. However, the trolled by a war-mongering blood donations; that AIDS
origins of HIV/AIDS were still arms industry. In their conspir- was probably caused by a
obscure. The lack of verifiable acy-driven world view, it was virus; and that AIDS regis-
facts and the strong emotional plausible to assume that AIDS

The idea for the AIDS disinformation campaign would have

tered its first major outbreak been approved and polished at KGB headquarters.
in the United States.
• The author then listed ele- charges made in 1982 in the of Army Labs in RDA” and spe-
ments of the US biological Soviet media to the effect that a cifically referred to “the U.S.
warfare program known to research laboratory sponsored Army Medical Research Insti-
the public: government by the University of Maryland tute of Infectious Diseases
records obtained through the in Lahore, Pakistan, was in fact (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,
Freedom of Information Act a bacteriological warfare Md,” which had—the journal
by the Church of Scientology, facility. 26 AIDS itself was not of asserted—placed particular
which had documented biolog- much concern to the average emphasis “on problems associ-
ical agent experiments in the Indian in 1983, but any men- ated with medical defense
1950s; CIA-sponsored testing tion of schemes involving against potential biological war-
of drugs on humans during India’s arch-foe Pakistan could fare agents, or naturally occur-
the same time period; and the be expected to draw attention ring diseases of particular
development of biological on the subcontinent. military importance and on the
weapons until the late 1960s highly virulent pathogenic
at Fort Detrick. The 17 July letter’s extensive microorganisms which require
quoting of US sources—e.g., special containment facilities.” 28
• Even though President Rich- U.S. News & World Report,
ard Nixon had banned US Associated Press, and Army Once conceived, the idea for
offensive bacteriological weap- Research, Development & the AIDS disinformation cam-
ons research by executive Acquisition magazine—sug- paign would have been
order in 1969, the letter in the gests that US-based KGB offic- approved and polished at KGB
Patriot stated that the Penta- ers initiated the AIDS headquarters (the Center) in
gon had “never abandoned campaign, or at least collected the Moscow suburb of Yasen-
these weapons” and claimed the material that triggered the ovo. (See box on Soviet active
that Fort Detrick had discov- idea. The KGB had large resi- measures process.) The task of
ered AIDS by analyzing sam- dencies in New York City and pulling pertinent material
ples of “highly pathogenic Washington, DC, both of which together and generating the let-
viruses” collected by Ameri- were assigned officers who ter would have fallen to the
can scientists in Africa and worked solely on active KGB’s disinformation special-
Latin America. measures. 27 ists of Service A, under Gen-
eral Ivan Ivanovich Agayants.
• It concluded by quoting statis- One especially clear indicator By 1985, the service employed
tics and publications on the of the US origins of the effort is roughly 80 officers at Yasenovo
spread and lethality of AIDS, the Patriot letter’s reference to and another 30 to 40 in the
and its particular threat to Army Research, Development & Novosti Press offices at Push-
developing nations. 25 Acquisition,which was not kin Square. 29
widely available and would
make unusual reading for a Although they had no particu-
Indicators of Soviet
“well-known American scien- lar training in psychology, these
Inspiration
tist” who also described himself specialists had honed their
as an “anthropologist.” The skills over several decades and
There can be little doubt
journal would be a typical understood the dynamics of
about the KGB’s authorship of
source for a KGB officer seek- rumor campaigns intuitively.
the letter. The letter’s argu-
ing material for a disinforma- The responsible officer(s) would
ments built on earlier disinfor-
tion campaign, however. In fact, have composed the text first in
mation campaigns involving US
the magazine’s July/August Russian and then commis-
bacteriological warfare and spe-
1982 issue focused on “The Role sioned a translation into
cifically picked up on false

As an opening salvo, the letter was a dud.

eventually lead to the dissolu-
tion of the USSR, but at the
English by KGB-translators. Indian journalists and politi- time he refrained from interfer-
Some translators were native- cians willing to take money. 31 ing with the KGB active mea-
speakers, but most were Rus- sures program and generally
sian speakers schooled in With respect to the left-wing supported its agenda. 34) Sec-
English for this purpose. Patriot, the KGB had been ond, the spread of AIDS had
involved in setting it up in 1967 become a much greater global
The use of non-native speak- for the very purpose of circulat- concern and made it a poten-
ers who may not have had ing Soviet-inspired articles. tially more powerful disinfor-
much exposure to spoken With a circulation of about mation weapon than two years
English, occasionally resulted 35,000, the Patriot was small by earlier.
in stilted and syntactically Indian standards, but it quickly
incorrect translations, as gained a reputation in intelli- Three events in 1985 might
appeared in the Patriot letter. gence circles as Moscow’s have contributed to a Soviet
The text included several gram- mouthpiece. 32 decision to reactivate the AIDS
matical errors, including a ref- campaign.
erence to the “virus flu,” rather As an opening salvo, the let-
than “flu virus.” Such linguistic ter was a dud. Though care- • A US government report
slip-ups were typical give- fully prepared and planted, no released in February 1985
aways of Soviet bloc disinforma- media outlet picked it up at the claimed that the Soviets had
tion stories. 30 time. Even though the letter broken the Geneva Conven-
mentioned Pakistan, the Indian tion by producing biological
press probably ignored it sim- weapons. 35
Placement ply because AIDS was not then
an issue on the subcontinent. 33 • An article in Lyndon H.
Composed, approved, and That the Soviet media failed to LaRouche Jr.’s Executive Intel-
translated, the letter needed to follow up, on the other hand, ligence Review accused the
be inserted covertly into the may have been because the let- USSR of blocking the battle
media. India, as a large, non- ter had fallen into that second- against AIDS. 36
aligned country with a diverse ary category of disinformation,
English-language press, was an a single, if clever, piece con- • Concern about the spread of
ideal staging ground. The ceived at the bottom of the AIDS within the USSR may
Indian government put few Soviet active measures’ pyra- have prompted the leader-
restrictions on the influx of mid and not reinforced by addi- ship to attempt to redirect
Soviet officials, and in the tional support measures. domestic concerns abroad. 37
1980s more than 150 KGB and
GRU (military intelligence) The campaign reopened with
officers served on the subconti- Reemergence of the an article in the newspaper Lit-
nent. Many of them were busy Campaign. eraturnaya Gazeta, the KGB’s
planting biased or false stories “prime conduit in the Soviet
in Indian papers. According to The Patriot letter lay largely press for propaganda and
KGB archivist and defector unnoticed for nearly three disinformation.” 38 On
Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB years. By 1985, a lot had 30 October 1985, the paper pub-
planted 5,510 stories in this changed. First, a new, dynamic lished an article by Valentin
way in 1975 alone and con- general secretary of the CPSU, Zapevalov, titled “Panic in the
trolled 10 Indian newspapers Mikhail Gorbachev, had, with West or What Is Hiding behind
and one news agency. KGB KGB support, taken over and the Sensation Surrounding
officers boasted to one another ended the USSR’s period of AIDS.” 39
that there was no shortage of leadership disarray. (Gor-
bachev’s reform agenda would

Zapevalov began his lengthy Fort Detrick. As a result of tests

piece by reminding readers that on unsuspecting victims—peo- East Germany’s Ministry for
State Security
AIDS was apparently spread- ple from the US “satellite coun-
ing from the United States to try” Haiti, drug addicts, Modeled on the KGB, East Ger-
the rest of the world (in fact, homosexuals and homeless peo- many’s MfS was a massive secu-
rity and espionage agency that
most early AIDS cases were ple—the virus was then alleg-
included secret police and foreign
reported among US homosex- edly unleashed. Zapevalov intelligence components. The for-
ual men). He went on to accu- concluded by suggesting that eign intelligence branch (HVA, or
rately describe the disease, US military personnel were Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung—
quoting well-known publica- potential carriers of the virus chief reconnaissance division) was
tions such as U.S. News & and expressed the hope that headed for many years by the
World Report for statistical evi- “one of the victims” would sue urbane Markus Wolf. In the early
1960s, the HVA set up its own dis-
dence. He then veered back to the CIA or the Pentagon to
information section, Department
his initial contention about the show the world that “all vic- X (or HVA X). By the 1980s, the
provenance of AIDS, chroni- tims of AIDS are the result of a department had grown to include
cling in some detail the early monstrous experiment.” roughly 60 officers, based at MfS
spread of the disease, and ask- headquarters in the Normannen-
ing rhetorically: “Why [did] The structure of the Literatur- strasse in East Berlin.
AIDS…appear in the USA and naya Gazeta article bears a
Headed throughout its history by
start spreading above all in striking resemblance to the Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, HVA X
towns along the East Coast?” Patriot letter. While both publi- focused primarily on West Ger-
This leading question was fol- cations claimed that AIDS was many, but it was also active in the
lowed by a laundry list of covert made in the USA, most of the Third World. (By the late 1970s it
US biological warfare pro- information given in the text had expanded its overseas activi-
was accurate—an essential ties to include China and the
grams of the 1950s and 1960s United States.) In the mid-1960s,
already noted in the Patriot let- ingredient of a successful disin-
the KGB introduced structural
ter; CIA-authorized testing of formation campaign. Much of reforms in the Soviet bloc intelli-
drugs for mind-control pur- the data was taken from pub- gence network, permitting indi-
poses; the case of Frank Olson, lished sources. As had the vidual KGB departments to work
a Special Operations Division authors of the Patriot letter, directly with their territorial,
(SOD) bio weapons expert who Zapevalov used verifiable facts counterintelligence and disinfor-
about early Cold War US exper- mation counterparts in Eastern
committed suicide after he was
Europe. Henceforth, HVA X
administered LSD without his iments as circumstantial evi-
informed the KGB directly of
knowledge; and the delivery of dence for his claim that AIDS active measures planned by East
a toxic substance by CIA officer was the result of similar tests. Berlin, and HVA and KGB held
Sidney Gottlieb to the Agency’s annual bilateral meetings, alter-
station chief in Congo for use in nating between Berlin and Mos-
Enter East Germany and cow, to discuss operations against
assassinating President Patrice
Dr. Jakob Segal the United States and other
Lumumba. 40
nations. 44
The Soviets frequently
In the last third of the article,
involved allied intelligence ser-
the author reminded readers of
vices and their disinformation The rest of this story is largely
the biological warfare pro-
departments in their disinfor- about the role played by a dedi-
grams at Fort Detrick and
mation campaigns. In this case, cated East German scientist
stated that these experiments
in turning to East Germany known to the KGB and East
continued notwithstanding
and to a particular East Ger- Germany’s Ministry for State
President Nixon’s 1969 ban.
man, the Soviets injected their Security, the MfS (colloquially
The Patriot letter from 1983
campaign with an energy even known as the Stasi) and the
was referenced as a source for
they may not have expected. Soviet and East German prac-
the alleged creation of AIDS at

tice of exploiting unwitting ser-

The Segal Arguments in AIDS—its nature and origins
vants of seemingly good causes
for their own ends. Segal and his coauthors mixed truth, to establish professional credentials,
and fiction—the heart of their story. At the outset, the three detailed well
While most of the KGB’s jun- established facts about the illness, including that it was caused by the HIV
ior partner services conducted virus and disabled a body’s immune system.
active measures to some extent,
by the 1980s, East German Rejecting theories about the simian origins of the virus, the three asserted
that Fort Detrick was “for a long time…the central laboratory of the Pentagon
intelligence had emerged as the
for the development of biological agents of war” and operated a “P-4 type” high
KGB’s most valuable partner in security laboratory for gene manipulation in “building 550” since 1977. 49
loyalty, professionalism, and There, voluntary human test subjects were probably infected with the AIDS
technical expertise. Having virus, which they alleged was the product of two natural, artificially synthe-
decided to revive the AIDS cam- sized (“recombined”) viruses, VISNA and HTLV-I. When the test subjects
paign, the KGB informed its showed no symptoms for six to 12 months, due to AIDS’ long incubation
East German counterpart period, the Pentagon concluded its virus was ineffective, and the infected vol-
unambiguously that Moscow unteers were released.
expected it to participate. 41 Since the test subjects were criminals who had spent a long time in jail
deprived of female companionship, the three argued, most of them had
The East Germans were told become homosexuals. Many of the infected volunteers headed for New York,
specifically to employ a “scien- mixing with the local gay population, thus initiating the epidemic whose first
tific approach” 42 and produce victims were registered among homosexuals in that city in 1979—two years
disinformation contending the after the alleged Fort Detrick experiments. Displaying a wobbly grasp of US
AIDS virus had been developed urban reality, they added that it “was logical for the released prisoners to seek
at Fort Detrick, from where it out a major city close by, but not Washington, where the political climate is
rather unsuitable for criminals [in fact, Washington, D.C. had one of the high-
spread to the general popula-
est crime rates of the nation in the 1980s]. New York with its developed
tion through human testing. underworld was more promising.” 50
Beyond those obligatory details,
the East Germans were given a views who were not openly pro- gence probably originated in
free hand in devising their own Soviet. Bloc intelligence those years. After the war, Segal
strategy and spreading the referred to them as “agents of settled in East Berlin, where he
story. The HVA code named the influence,” “subconscious multi- became head of the Institute for
operation INFEKTION and plicators,” or simply as “useful Applied Bacteriology at East
VORWÄRTS II [Forward II] idiots.” 45 Berlin’s Humboldt University in
and henceforth was the KGB’s 1953 46 After his retirement, he
junior partner and main ally The agent of choice in this case and his wife Lilli—also a scien-
regarding AIDS. 43 was the retired East German tist—developed an interest in
biophysicist Professor Jakob AIDS, although neither of them
The KGB was particularly Segal. Born in St. Petersburg in was an expert on the subject. 47
keen on employing another of 1911, Segal grew up in interwar Both Segals were unwavering
its standard active-measure Germany, where he studied biol- believers in international com-
practices, the use of unwitting ogy, but as a Jew and commu- munism and staunch support-
agents who were held in high nist he was forced to flee to ers of the GDR. As an
esteem in their home countries. France when the Nazis assumed established KGB contact and an
Such individuals did Moscow’s power. According to Segal, he MfS informer (Inoffizieller
or East Berlin’s bidding completed his PhD at Sorbonne Mitarbeiter, or IM), 48 Segal was
through their speeches, publica- University in Paris, just before a known quantity, and Soviet
tions, and personal networks. the German invasion in 1940 bloc intelligence had enough
Often, these individuals were and joined the French resis- information to judge him politi-
journalists, scientists, or other tance during the occupation. His cally reliable.
public figures with left-wing connection with Soviet intelli-

Segal became genuinely and passionately devoted to his

How Segal was actually cause, and many people found him winsome and convincing.
brought into the process is not
known with certainty, but in all
likelihood “evidence” of the US have met him, the theory’s conceded that the theory was
origins of AIDS would have appeal [about the origins of based on circumstantial evi-
been given to him in personal AIDS] may lie in the man him- dence, they concluded that the
meetings, perhaps with a pro- self. Engaging and well-read, he “assumption that AIDS is a
fessional colleague previously is sympathetic to AIDS suffer- product of the preparation of
briefed by the MfS. In this first ers and wants to help out in the biological warfare can there-
meeting, Segal would not have fight against the disease.” 52 fore be quite plainly expressed.”
been told explicitly that the According to press reports,
material came from Soviet bloc Segal subsequently claimed the
The Segal Contributions project was code-named “MK-
intelligence or that it was part
of a disinformation campaign. Naomi.” 54
Segal’s first major contribu-
Rather, he simply would have tion to the AIDS disinforma-
been encouraged to look into HVA X had provided Segal
tion campaign was a 47-page with much of the material for
the matter. Given Segal’s back- pamphlet titled AIDS—its
ground, he would have been his pamphlet, 55 which began
nature and origin, co-authored circulating in Harare, Zimba-
expected to reach the intended by his wife Lilli and Ronald
conclusion. While Segal may bwe, on the eve of the Eighth
Dehmlow, a fellow retired Hum- Conference of NonAligned
have suspected the real source boldt University professor. 53 In
of the AIDS material, it was Nations (1–6 September 1986).
it, the authors went to great The conference was attended by
common practice in the GDR lengths to refute the more and
for authorities to share “back- representatives of more than
more widely accepted theory 100 Third World countries—as
ground information” quasi-con- about the African origins of
spiratorially in one-on-one well as four HVA and 20 KGB
AIDS, inter alia by pointing to officers, who were busily dis-
conversations. Its validity was the fact that the epidemic’s first
typically not questioned. 51 tributing Segal’s paper to the
cases were reported among the press and delegates. 56 Segal’s
gay populations of New York explicit repudiation of the the-
Segal’s selection as the cam-
and San Francisco, not in sis that AIDS originated in
paign’s frontman was a master-
Africa. Like the Patriot letter Africa was tailor-made for an
stroke. As a German, he could
and Zapevalov’s article in Liter- African audience, and his
speak unfiltered to the popula-
aturnaya Gazeta, Segal’s pam- claims subsequently appeared
tion of a major member of the
phlet tediously detailed several in the press of 25 African coun-
Western alliance, and as an
well-established facts about tries. The East German commu-
established scientist, he pos-
AIDS, and he described accu- nist party leadership was
sessed professional authority. By
rately how Western scientists delighted to see Segal’s theses
concealing their hand, the intel-
had identified HIV. Having included in the conference’s
ligence services ensured that
demonstrated his professional final report and heaped praise
Segal would speak convincingly,
expertise on the subject matter, on the HVA for the operation. 57
with the voice of a true believer
Segal then detailed his theory
not that of a paid informant.
about US government experi-
In the event, Segal became mentation, specifically among Disappointment at the
genuinely and passionately homosexual prisoners who went Politburo
devoted to his cause, and many on to infect gay populations in
people found him winsome and New York City and San Fran- Meanwhile, Segal began
convincing. A Montreal Gazette cisco. (See text box on facing aggressively pushing his the-
reporter, who interviewed him page: Segal Arguments.) Even ory at home. In late summer of
in 1992, wrote: “For those who though Segal and his coauthors 1986, he asked for a meeting

for having agreed that the HIV

Segal Memorandums to the Ministry of Health virus had originated in Africa.
After detailing what was wrong
1. If AIDS spread at the current rate, Segal predicted, American hospitals
with the Soviet scientist—the
would soon be overwhelmed, as every AIDS patient “is on average being hos-
pitalized for 82 days until death and costs on average $49,348.” By 1990, the USSR’s top AIDS expert had in
cost of care for patients would “ruin the country economically.” If one could 1986 pinpointed a case of HIV
persuade Americans that AIDS was the result of war preparations, Segal infection in the USSR that pre-
argued, the epidemic could become “an important political factor.” And since ceded the virus’s supposed birth
a majority of AIDS victims were young men eligible for military service, the at Fort Detrick—Segal accused
disease would lead to “a military and economic weakening…. Overall, the him of lying.
United States is facing a decade of gravest economic problems.” Since AIDS
spread exponentially, countries currently less affected—such as the Warsaw It is evident from the second
Pact states—would be much better off for many years. “This optimistic prog-
memorandum that Segal was
nosis, however, has a reverse side,” Segal cautioned. Due to the expected
rapid spread of AIDS in the West, the Americans would lose their capability solely interested in bringing
to wage war against Moscow in the next 10 years. When the American pres- political pressure to bear upon
ident became aware of this decline, “would he not contemplate the idea of a colleagues from bloc countries
preemptive strike in the next years? With [President Ronald] Reagan and with opinions that differed from
[Vice President George H.W.] Bush, such a reaction cannot be ruled out.” 58 his own, rather than engage
2. In the second memo, Segal took swipes at his critics. One of these, Profes- them in a professional dia-
sor Niels Sönnichsen, representing the GDR at an AIDS summit of the World logue. Indeed, as a political
Health Organization in Graz, Austria, in April 1986, had concluded his lec- activist, Segal had reason to be
ture by saying that AIDS originated—“as we know”—in Africa. “This state- upset with Zhdanov. The Soviet
ment is, as a matter of fact, false,” Segal commented and added: scientist’s comments threat-
“[Sönnichsen’s] remarks can only be viewed as a formal kowtow to the US-
ened to pull the rug from
supported thesis.” Then Segal took on Professor Viktor Zhdanov, director of
the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, the Soviet Union’s top AIDS expert, at
underneath Segal’s own theory.
the second international conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986. Zhdanov When asked by a reporter
had reported on the case of a 14-year-old girl who had contracted lymphade- whether the United States had
nopathy, an early indicator of infection with HIV. Soviet scientists had traced developed the AIDS virus,
the girl’s infection to a series of blood transfusions in 1974 and concluded the Zhdanov replied bluntly: “That
AIDS virus must already have existed at that time—a blow to Segal’s theory is a ridiculous question. Per-
of its 1979 origins in the United States. Segal indignantly pointed out, “One
haps it was the Martians.” 60
could infer [from Zhdanov’s statement] that AIDS did not spread from New
York to the rest of the world but was imported to America from the Soviet
Axen referred Segal to Karl
Union.” He then accused Zhdanov of lying. 59
Seidel, head of the health
department of the central com-
with Hermann Axen, the East disaster, the US political situa- mittee of the SED (East Ger-
German Politburo member tion would change drastically. many’s ruling communist
responsible for foreign affairs, At the same time, he warned, party), and the two met on
and offered two memorandums the economic consequences 17 September 1986. In this
for consideration. The first would lead US leaders into des- meeting, Segal reiterated his
memorandum demonstrated perate and warlike acts. (See “assumption” (underlined in the
that Segal deemed AIDS to be Segal Memorandums in text minutes of the meeting) that
both a medical problem and a box.) AIDS was the result of biologi-
political weapon. As a medical cal warfare experiments at Fort
problem for the United States, In the other memorandum, Detrick. Segal conceded that
he predicted, AIDS would even- Segal took on East German and this assertion was merely “a
tually overwhelm the nation’s Soviet scientists who contra- hypothesis, albeit a probable
economy, and, if Americans dicted him. Segal charged the one.” Since the Soviet bloc was
could be made to believe their East German with being sub- only minimally affected by
government had caused the servient to the United States AIDS, Segal argued the GDR

West German media reported a mysterious visit of two “US dip-

should abandon its “defensive lomats” to Jakob and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.
publishing practice” and begin
denouncing the “true culprit” of
the AIDS epidemic, i.e., the mentioned anti-imperialist construed as an official
United States. goal.” 61 endorsement? In fact, Hager’s
decision to keep Segal at arm’s
Segal solicited guidance from Hager may not have been length was a clever move from a
the SED central committee as aware of the details of the disinformation operation per-
to how he should proceed and AIDS disinformation cam- spective. By keeping Segal at a
expressed interest in working paign, but he probably knew distance, Hager maintained at
with the Ministry of Health about it in general. 62 In any least a semblance of scientific
AIDS task force under Profes- event, he rejected most of independence for the AIDS
sor Sönnichsen—even though Seidel’s recommendations, campaign’s front man and
one of Segal’s memorandums although he authorized the denied Western observers the
disparaged Sönnichsen. Segal Segals’ participation in the opportunity to quickly dismiss
also expressed disappointment AIDS task force. Hager con- Segal’s utterances as state-con-
that officials had not paid suffi- cluded that the GDR should trolled propaganda. Another
cient attention to his own work. maintain its restrictive AIDS reason for Hager’s reluctance to
information policy, and “since endorse Segal was probably
Seidel briefed Kurt Hager, a Comrade Segal himself speaks East German leader Erich
hard-line Politburo member of a hypothesis, reproduction Honecker’s angling for an offi-
and the SED’s chief ideologue, [of his theses] in official GDR cial state visit to Washington,
on the meeting and suggested publications must be avoided. I DC. The last thing Honecker
how to deal with Segal and the do not know to what extent his needed was to have an anti-
AIDS issue. Seidel pointed out assumptions can be published American active measure of his
that Segal’s theses, even if only in relevant foreign journals. Of own secret service blow up and
partially substantiated, would course, he alone would be derail his cherished project. 64
portend the “unmasking of answerable for them.” 63
steps for biological war prepa-
rations of US imperialism, For Segal, support from the A Mysterious Visit
which is politically highly SED leadership would have car-
explosive. Especially the well- ried obvious advantages. His Shortly after Segal’s corre-
founded polemics against the AIDS hypothesis offered him spondence with the SED leader-
long-tailed-monkey theory of the chance of a lifetime— ship, West German media
the origins of AIDS [in Africa], advancing the cause of commu- reported a mysterious visit of
should reinforce anti-imperial- nism while increasing his own two “US diplomats” to Jakob
ist sentiments and activities of name recognition far beyond and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.
numerous political forces in the scientific community and According to a report in the
Africa who must perceive this East Germany. Segal doubt- weekly Der Spiegel—appar-
theory as an insult and dispar- lessly also realized that his ently based on an interview
agement by the schemes of US work would endear him to the with Segal—the two showed up
imperialism.” He recommended SED leadership, which would at his doorstep in mid-October
that Segal be allowed to pursue have supported his research 1986, flashed their credentials,
his work without restrictions efforts and sponsored trips politely asked for permission to
and that he and his wife abroad, a major perk for a GDR enter, and began to “cross-
become consultants to the AIDS citizen. examine” Segal for two hours
task force. He also suggested about his hypothesis. Segal was
that the GDR publish more But why did Hager turn down “certain they were from the
material on AIDS, which “also most of Segal’s proposals and CIA.” 65 He later elaborated that
takes into account the above- avoid anything that could be the two visitors “wanted to

Heym’s words carried significant moral weight … and his enlist-

ment in the AIDS campaign was a major coup. operation must be rated a suc-
cess.
know where we got our infor- had no incentive to have him

mation. They were interested to “cross-examined,” in Berlin or Another Dupe
know whether the information elsewhere.
was correct or not. They were On 18 February 1987, the
merely looking for the traitor In all likelihood Segal’s visi- major West German daily news-
[who had revealed the secrets tors were HVA officers intent paper tageszeitung published a
to Segal]. In turn, they offered on building up Segal’s resolve lengthy interview by the
us wonderful working condi- by posing as CIA men visiting famous East German author
tions, which we did not accept, in diplomatic guise and raising Stefan Heym with Jakob Segal
though.” 66 questions that allowed Segal to on AIDS. 69 Segal and Heym had
conclude that his theory had much in common. Like Segal,
Segal appears not to have struck a nerve in Washington. Heym was a German of Jewish
questioned the credentials of descent with communist sym-
his visitors. With his conspira- Segal was unlikely to have pathies, and like Segal he left
torial mindset, the incident invented the story. By this time Germany when the Nazis came
must have confirmed his worst he was a sincere believer in the to power in 1933. Heym emi-
suspicions; the appearance of veracity of his theory, and the grated to the United States in
the two “CIA men” showed US invention of such a fairy tale 1935, became a US citizen, and
authorities to be totally uncon- does not correspond with his served in a psychological war-
cerned about the consequences missionary zeal for spreading fare unit of the US Army in
of their “actions” and merely the “truth.” Moreover, a yarn World War II. In 1952, he
interested in tracking and pre- about CIA operations in East returned all his American mili-
sumably punishing those Berlin, published in the West- tary commendations in protest
responsible for leaking the ern media, would have gotten of the Korean War, moved to
secret. him into serious trouble with Prague, and in the following
the GDR security apparatus. year to East Germany, where he
However, the story can hardly Yet there were no repercus- quickly became a literary and
be taken at face value. For one sions for Segal. political icon.
thing, it is virtually inconceiv-
able that CIA officers would Only one organization in East Heym’s words carried signifi-
have “cross-examined” a well- Germany, the MfS, had the cant moral weight in East Ger-
known East German scientist authority and wherewithal to many and beyond, and his
with connections to MfS and carry out a deception opera- enlistment in the AIDS cam-
KGB in one of the best moni- tion—if that is what it was. paign was a major coup for
tored cities of the Soviet bloc. Günter Bohnsack, a former Segal and the HVA. Heym
As one former CIA station chief HVA X officer deeply involved looked favorably on Segal’s the-
in Germany wrote, “East Ger- in the East German AIDS dis- ses, but like his interviewee, he
many’s ubiquitous security ser- information campaign, has lit- was probably unaware of HVA
vice had such an iron grip on its tle doubt that the two visitors involvement. The tageszeitung
people that almost no one dared were from the HVA, and he was an anti-status-quo, left-of-
spy for the Americans.” 67 Had recalls “overhearing comments center newspaper, independent
the CIA really wished to con- from M. Wolf to the effect that of Moscow but critical of the
tact Segal, it could have done so the dear professor needed to be United States. As such, it repre-
easily on one of his trips ‘propped up.’…This ‘CIA visit’ sented the perfect vehicle for
abroad. But why would it? US was certainly staged.” 68 Given Segal and the HVA, and the
intelligence knew Segal’s the- that Segal repeatedly referred interview had the intended
ory was humbug and therefore to the “CIA visit,” the HVA

The naive conclusion by a Western academic would have

effect. As a contemporary pleased intelligence headquarters in East Berlin.
reader observed:
Consider the peculiarity tronic surveillance) recorded a case long-term inmates of

of the situation: Two well- phone conversation referencing a prison for men!—back to
known, respected East Simmel’s project and for- their cells. 72
Germans publish a the-
ory propounding the warded a copy to Department The book quickly became a
notion that AIDS is X. The disinformation special- bestseller and spawned a popu-
caused by a man-made ists spotted an opportunity and lar three-part TV program.
virus produced by Ameri- decided to anonymously send
can biological warfare Raving about his agency’s coup,
Simmel material pertaining to Markus Wolf proudly piled 10
researchers—but they do
so in West Berlin. They Segal’s AIDS theory. 71 copies of Simmel’s novel on his
are not permitted to pub- desk. Bohnsack and his col-
lish their theory in The result was, from the East
leagues were both happy and
newspapers in their own German perspective, phenome-
country, which is offi- surprised that Simmel accepted
nal. Released in mid-1987, Sim-
cially anti-American and the HVA material as genuine
mel’s 500-page novel, Doch mit
especially vituperative and made such extensive use of
about the CIA. It is impos- den Clowns kamen die Tränen
it. 73
sible to give a verifiable [Along with the clowns came
explanation for this reti- the tears] revolved around a Simmel’s uncritical accep-
cence, but one may biological arms race between tance of the HVA’s disinforma-
surmise that in the GDR the United States and the
the politics of AIDS has tion package most likely was
Soviet Union. The two super- the product of naivety, moralis-
remained the province of
medical personnel rather powers were portrayed as tic zeal, and eagerness to tell a
than political equally cynical, ruthless, and good story. Shortly after the
propagandists. 70 unethical in their pursuit of a book was released, Simmel said
super germ. In the foreword, about himself more insightfully
This naive conclusion by a Simmel insisted that “The mon-
Western academic would have than he would have realized at
strous experiments I report on the time: “Simmel is in a fatal
pleased intelligence headquar- have already been successfully
ters in East Berlin. way naive and starry-eyed. He
conducted by some scientists.” may come across as cunning
One protagonist cites Heym’s and clever, but he steps into
Still Another Dupe interview with Segal in the ta- every trap that’s out there.” 74
geszeitung as evidence for the
The HVA’s biggest coup was monstrosity of the superpow-
yet to come. In the mid-1980s, ers’ goals: Back to the USSR
the Austrian-born best-selling
author Johannes Mario Sim- He [Segal] is convinced Meanwhile, the Soviets’ own
that genetic scientists at propaganda machine went into
mel mulled over a book project Fort Detrick have experi-
on the perils of genetic manipu- high gear. Moscow understood
mentally generated the
lation and biological warfare. AIDS virus HTLV III that repetition of a particular
By that time, Simmel had [sic]. However, since the theme over an extended period
already authored 20 novels, infection’s initial effect is of time was key to a successful
numerous screenplays, and var- minor and the incubation disinformation campaign, 75 and
period lasts two to five the Soviets promoted the AIDS
ious short stories and chil- years, they didn’t con-
dren’s books. His works had sider the virus viable in story’s worldwide dissemina-
been translated into 25 lan- humans and sent the tion through radio broadcasts,
guages and sold over 65 million infected test persons—yes, rumors, posters, handbills, forg-
copies. By sheer coincidence, yes, yes, they work with eries, and leaflets (some of
test persons there, in this which displayed pornographic
HVA Department III (elec-

The merger of the ethnic weapons and AIDS campaigns creat-

ed a powerful narrative in Africa. greater extent than the popula-
tion of friendly forces.” 82
caricatures of US soldiers). Turkey, the Soviets sought to In June 1987, Novosti news
Soviet propagandists even lifted stir concern among the local agency editor Valentin Falin
some stories about the US gov- population, create pressure on told a USIA official slyly: “And
ernment’s alleged creation of US allies to send American given the US treatment of
AIDS verbatim from a New troops packing, and generally American Indians, putting
York gay magazine, the New discourage contact with Ameri- smallpox blankets on them, and
York Native, which in Novem- can citizens. 80 the placement of Japanese-
ber 1986 called for a US con- Americans in detention during
gressional investigation into The Soviets also began to the Second World War, the
the origins of AIDS. 76 broaden the campaign’s focus, development of an ethnic
merging it with other disinfor- weapon by the US sounds
Soviet efforts promptly paid mation campaigns. A particu- pretty logical.” 83
off. Third World media reported larly effective twist was the
the AIDS falsehood widely, and claim that the US government
even the established British had designed AIDS as an eth- The Impact in Africa
newspapers Sunday Express nic weapon against black peo-
and Daily Telegraph recounted ple. The “ethnic weapon” theme The merger of the ethnic
Segal’s “findings” uncritically. had first appeared around 1980 weapons and AIDS campaigns
By late 1987, the story had cir- in the Soviet active measures created a powerful narrative
culated in the media of 80 coun- repertoire. In an effort to hitch that threatened to undermine
tries, appearing in over 200 the United States to the widely America’s reputation in Africa.
periodicals in 25 languages. 77 detested South African apart- Allegations that Washington
“If media replay is an indica- heid regime, Moscow spread the was using AIDS as a racial
tion of success,” noted a US offi- rumor that Washington was weapon against Africans began
cial, “then this campaign has aiding Pretoria in the develop- circulating across the continent
been very successful.” 78 ment of weapons to eliminate in the wake of the nonaligned
nonwhites. 81 nations summit in Harare in
The Soviets paid special 1986, where HVA and KGB had
attention to countries with US Since these claims were base- promoted Segal’s paper so
military bases on their soil. In less, the Soviets employed the diligently. 84 On 7 June 1987,
late 1985, North Korea began well-established technique of the Patriot rejoined the fray
its own AIDS propaganda oper- propping up their conspiracy with an article accusing the US
ation, portraying US troops in theories with circumstantial Department of Defense of con-
South Korea as carriers of the evidence. For example, an ducting experiments in Africa
epidemic. Turkish broadcasts American military manual had to determine the “depopulating
emanating from the USSR indeed noted in 1975 that “it is effect” of AIDS in strategically
urged the closure of US bases theoretically possible to develop important areas of the conti-
because they were allegedly so-called ‘ethnic chemical weap- nent like Zaire.
breeding grounds for AIDS. And ons,’ which would be designed
an English-language, Soviet- to exploit naturally occurring In early 1988, a Nigerian
inspired broadcast in Asia differences in vulnerability newspaper varied the theme
alleged that outbreaks of AIDS among specific population somewhat by claiming that the
“are as a rule registered in the groups. Thus, such a weapon spread of AIDS in central and
areas near American war would be capable of incapacitat- western Africa was the result of
bases.” 79 By targeting nations ing or killing a selected enemy rich Americans testing contami-
where American troops were population to a significantly nated polio vaccine on poor
based, such as South Korea and blacks during the 1960s. 85 The
tale was told and retold in a

Because the AIDS disinformation campaign jeopardized coop-

number of variations in media eration with US scientists, Moscow began to listen to Washing-
reports across the continent. ton’s complaints.
The US Watch over the ter. Zapevalov had not men- AIDS virus—VISNA and HTLV-
Story tioned the date of the item, and I—were too distinct from one
USIA only searched back to another to be cut and spliced
In 1981, the US government 1 January 1984. State Depart- together. The State Depart-
created the Active Measures ment spokesman Charles E. ment also pointed to recent
Working Group (AMWG), an Redman responded in early findings that suggested AIDS
interagency committee chaired November 1986 that no such had existed in human popula-
by the Department of State, article had ever appeared in the tions since at least 1959—long
and including representatives Patriot. 89 before the AIDS virus, per
of the CIA, USIA, the US Arms Segal’s contention, had been
Control and Disarmament The Soviets took advantage of created at Fort Detrick.
Agency (ACDA), and the the mistake with gusto. On
Departments of Defense and 19 November, Literaturnaya In addition, AMWG collected
Justice. 86 AMWG officials moni- Gazeta printed a lengthy arti- opinions from reputable AIDS
tored Soviet disinformation cle titled, “It Existed, It experts who contradicted Segal.
campaigns, issued regularly Existed, Boy” that trium- The Americans were especially
updated reports, talked to the phantly reproduced the first keen on airing the comments of
Western press, personally page of the Patriot letter. Turn- scientists from the Soviet bloc,
called editors of newspapers ing the US effort to pillory the such as Segal’s nemeses Dr.
that ran Soviet-sponsored disin- Soviets’ disinformation cam- Zhdanov, who stated categori-
formation stories, and occasion- paign on its head, the paper cally that “an AIDS virus has
ally confronted Soviet officials referred to AMWG as a bureau not been obtained artificially,”
directly about particular active for “disinformation, analysis and Dr. Sönnichsen, who told
measures. Herbert Romerstein, and retaliatory measures” and Der Spiegel that “Segal’s com-
who joined USIA in 1982, and lambasted Redman for his erro- ment is nothing but a hypothe-
his assistant Todd Leventhal, neous claim: “We don’t know sis, and not a very original one
played a critical role in moni- whether Redman is part of the at that. Others before him have
toring and countering the AIDS personnel of the bureau of dis- claimed the same. If you open
campaign for AMWG. 87 information, but one could Meyer’s Dictionary under the
boldly recommend him. He has term ‘hypothesis’ you can read:
The disinformation campaign mastered the methods of hypothesis is an opinion
first appeared on AMWG’s disinformation.” 90 unproven by facts. That is my
radar with its resumption in comment.” 92
the pages of the Literaturnaya Undeterred, US officials con-
Gazeta in October 1985. Zape- tinued their counter-campaign.
valov’s reference to the Patriot USIA officers repeatedly dis- The Environment Shifts
as source of his allegations, led cussed the techniques and goals
USIA to take a closer look at of Soviet disinformation with In the late 1980s, AIDS began
the Indian newspaper. The the media. 91 And AMWG spent spreading through the Soviet
agency was aware that the time and effort dissecting Union, and Moscow developed a
Patriot was being financed by Segal’s theses and highlighting greater interest in exchanging
the KGB and that its editor was their inconsistencies and con- medical research on the subject
the recipient of the Stalin peace tradictions to lawmakers and than it had a few years before.
prize. 88 However, the Ameri- the public. For one, they Because the AIDS disinforma-
cans were initially unable to argued, the two viruses Segal tion campaign jeopardized coop-
locate the original Patriot let- claimed were used to create the eration with US scientists,

As Moscow shifted its focus to subjects other than AIDS, the

East Germans became the campaign’s primary sponsor. Concurrently, the Soviets con-
ceived other, no less vicious dis-
information themes. In January
Moscow began to listen to gandists to stop saying the 1987, Moscow launched a cam-
Washington’s complaints. In a opposite. Soviet media cover- paign to assign responsibility
23 October 1987, meeting with age of Segal’s theses did decline for the mass-suicide of over 900
Mikhail Gorbachev, US Secre- markedly in late 1987, but it members of the People’s Tem-
tary of State George Shultz did not disappear altogether. ple in Guyana in 1978 to the
charged that the USSR had On the same day that Izvestia CIA. Its centerpiece was the
peddled “bum dope” on the published the Academy’s dis- book The Death of Jonestown:
AIDS subject. avowal, Sovetskaya Rossiya Crime of the CIA by three
repeated the AIDS disinforma- Soviet journalists who con-
Shortly thereafter, the Soviet tion claims and defended the tended that CIA hirelings had
Academy of Sciences, through Soviet media’s right to “report killed the cult members “for
the government’s official news- different views.” 95 And on 13 their intent to gain asylum in
paper Izvestia, disavowed the February 1988, Radio Moscow the USSR.”
thesis that AIDS was artifi- broadcast an uncritical inter-
cially created. 93 In the summer view with Segal who reiterated Another heinous disinforma-
of 1988, the Academy’s presi- his theses. 96 tion campaign was initiated in
dent, Dr. Vadim I. Pokrovskiy April 1987 when the Soviet
followed up in an interview Even though Soviet bloc media began reporting false
with the Russian federation’s media broadcasting of the AIDS allegations to the effect that
official newspaper Sovetskaya disinformation campaign had wealthy Americans were
Rossiya, by stating that “not a largely ceased by summer 1988, importing children from Latin
single Soviet scientist, not a the story continued to appear in America and had them butch-
single medical or scientific Third World papers with ered in order to use their body
institution, shares this reputed Soviet links. On 3 July parts for organ transplants. 99
position.” 94 1988, the Ghanaian weekly Like the AIDS disinformation
Echo reiterated a Novosti arti- campaign, these disinforma-
cle about the alleged link tion themes were designed to
The End of the Campaign? between AIDS and US biologi- tarnish America’s image in the
cal research, as did the Indian world, and particularly to alien-
But did the Soviets genuinely
Maharashtra Herald on ate developing countries from
believe in the wisdom of discon-
26 August 1988. When con- Washington.
tinuing their AIDS disinforma-
fronted by US officials two
tion campaign and did they
months later, Novosti chief
really tell their active mea- HVA X and Segal Still at It
Falin issued a standard defense
sures apparatus to stand down?
by quoting alleged “foreign
For one, Moscow had never pub- As Moscow shifted its active
sources” and freedom of the
licly acknowledged authorship measures focus to subjects
Soviet press under glasnost. 97
of the campaign. The Soviet other than AIDS, the East Ger-
As late as 1989, AIDS disinfor-
Academy of Sciences merely mans became the AIDS cam-
mation appeared in over a
confirmed what many respect- paign’s primary sponsor.
dozen media reports through-
able Soviet and East European Around 1987, HVA X gave
out the world, including in the
scientists believed anyway and Segal material “from secret ser-
Soviet Union, India, Pakistan,
had uttered before—that AIDS vice circles” on the 1969 con-
West Germany, Brazil, Pan-
was not artificially created. gressional testimony of Donald
ama, Yugoslavia, Peru, Turkey,
Great Britain, and Zambia. 98 MacArthur, then deputy direc-
But the Academy’s statement tor of research and engineering
could not and did not commit in the Office of the Secretary of
Soviet intelligence and propa-

An HVA X influence agent in West Germany did the East Ger-

Defense. In his testimony, Mac- mans’ bidding with loyalty and little regard for the historic
Arthur stated that “within a changes sweeping through Europe.
period of five to 10 years it
would be possible to produce a
synthetic biological agent, an The reference to NCI led West German and British TV
agent that does not naturally Segal straight to another “vil- picked up Segal’s story. The
exist and for which no natural lain.” It so happened that Rob- West German TV production
immunity could have been ert Gallo, one of the pioneer “AIDS: The African Legend”
acquired.” He elaborated fur- scientists involved in the identi- uncritically featured Segal’s
ther that “A research program fication of HIV, was appointed disinformation claims. The
to explore the feasibility of this head of the NCI’s Laboratory of “documentary” was broadcast
could be completed in approxi- Tumor Cell Biology in 1971. In by Westdeutscher and Hessi-
mately five years at a total cost his earlier publications and scher Rundfunk in the first half
of $10 million.” 100 utterances, Segal had dispas- of 1989, and by Britain’s Chan-
sionately and largely accu- nel Four in January 1990. 105
For Segal, the MacArthur tes- rately described Gallo’s There is no evidence of direct
timony was near-certain evi- contribution to the identifica- HVA X involvement in this pro-
dence that the Pentagon had tion of HIV, but he sharply duction, but East Berlin cer-
not only contemplated an HIV- changed his tack in the late tainly rated the broadcasting of
type virus since 1969 but also 1980s, when Gallo became the their disinformation by gullible
had gone through with the key figure in Segal’s theory. In Western journalists—the “use-
project within the 10-year time his final years, Segal developed ful idiots” of Soviet bloc intelli-
frame MacArthur had sug- an apparent pathological gence—a major success.
gested. Henceforth, Mac- hatred of Gallo as the man per-
Arthur’s testimony became a sonally responsible for creating HVA X also used a tested
cornerstone of Segal’s conspir- AIDS, and he seized every vehicle to spread Segal’s thesis
acy theory. Segal ignored the opportunity to lambast the directly in the West German
fact that MacArthur left the American scientist. media. One of the department’s
Pentagon one year after his tes- influence agents in West Ger-
timony to go into private In 1989, just one year before many was Michael Opperskal-
business. 101 East Germany’s demise, Segal ski, listed under the code name
went on a lecture tour across “Abraham” in HVA X records. 106
Segal also continued to brush West Germany. Even though Opperskalski’s Cologne-based
aside President Richard Nixon’s the SED leadership had magazine Geheim and its
1969 ban of offensive biological avoided endorsing Segal and he English-language edition Top
research by contending that did not travel as an official Secret published crude Soviet
such programs continued GDR representative, his trip bloc disinformation stories
unabated under the guise of the was inconceivable without the throughout the late 1980s.
National Cancer Institute Politburo’s knowledge and “Abraham” did the East Ger-
(NCI). Part of the Bethesda- approval. In his presentations, mans’ bidding with loyalty and
based National Institutes of Segal touted his latest piece of little regard for the historic
Health, NCI opened a branch at evidence—the MacArthur hear- changes sweeping through
Fort Detrick in 1971, which ing of 1969—and pilloried Europe. The summer/autumn
focused on identifying the Gallo. 103 According to the recol- 1990 issue of Top Secret, pub-
causes of cancer, AIDS, and lections of one of his listeners, lished on the eve of German
related diseases—more than Segal referred to Gallo as “a reunification, carried an article
enough circumstantial evi- huge gangster” [ein ganz by Jakob and Lilli Segal, titled
dence to earn the institute a grosser Gangster] who was “AIDS—Its Nature and
prominent place in Segal’s con- responsible for creating the Origins.” 107
spiracy theory. 102 virus. 104

Segal died in 1995, completely unrepentant and utterly con-

vinced of the American origins of AIDS. Still Kicking, but Why?
Neither the end of the KGB

Segal’s last major accomplish- Post–Cold War HVA campaign, nor Jakob
ment during the Cold War was Segal’s death, or the “confes-
the publication in 1990 of his The end of the Cold War sions” of those responsible for
book AIDS—die Spur führt ins threw the KGB into disarray, the AIDS disinformation cam-
Pentagon [AIDS—the trail and the MfS disappeared alto- paign stopped the further diffu-
leads to the Pentagon], which gether. Yet Segal continued his sion of the theory. Whence its
incorporated the bits on Gallo crusade as vigorously as ever. longevity?
and the MacArthur hearing In May 1991, he gave a lengthy
into his original thesis. The interview to the left-of-center A few individuals involved in
book was published by Neuer Berlin weekly Freitag. He reit- the original campaign carried
Weg, a publishing house closely erated many of his earlier theo- on after the end of the Cold
associated with the far-left, ries and claimed that “in War. 111 More importantly, how-
Maoist Marxist Leninist Party Germany, only a single publica- ever, the conspiracy theory
of Germany (MLPD). tion has contradicted us.” In assumed a life of its own. In
August 1991, the Swedish sub-Saharan Africa, where
By then, the HVA was already channel TV-2 featured an KGB and HVA had directed
dissolving, and its employees uncritical news program with much of their firepower, media
spent much of their time shred- Segal. In a February 1992 inter- and word of mouth spread and
ding files. In the book’s appendix view with the Montreal Gazette, developed the legend of AIDS
is an anonymous letter Segal, echoing past arguments, as a biological weapon, often
addressed to Segal and his wife, focused on the economic ramifi- adding bizarre twists to the
dated 8 October 1989 (one month cations of his thesis: “If the story. In March 1991, for exam-
before the fall of the Berlin Wall). United States were recognized ple, a letter to the Zimbabwean
The letter’s author relays infor- as the producer of the AIDS daily Bulawayo Chronicle
mation allegedly obtained from virus, it would destroy the econ- charged not only that the
someone linked to the US “mili- omy. Think of the compensa- United States had invented
tary intelligence establishment.” tion claims! This is why they AIDS, but that the CIA had
This person confirmed “every- will never admit it.” exported “AIDS-oiled condoms”
thing you [Segal] have said—the to other countries in 1986. 112
Pentagon grant, the work at Ft. When confronted by critics,
Detrick, the experiment on pris- Segal stood his ground. A As AIDS took a progressively
oners who first brought the virus former USIA consultant, who greater toll on Africans, the
to the streets of New York.” The interviewed Segal in 1991, notion of a conspiracy became
writer insinuated that it would recalled that the retired profes- more deeply entrenched on the
be too risky to reveal his consor “presented himself as a die- continent. Zimbabwean Presi-
tact’s name because “he truly hard Marxist, totally incapable dent Robert Mugabe once
recounts so many amazing of accepting the demise of com- described AIDS as a “white
things.…My God, it’s easy to munist East Germany. Segal, man’s plot.” And in 2004, Ken-
become paranoid when looking then 80 years old, insisted that yan biologist and Nobel peace
into these matters. These shit- his information on the origin of prize winner Wangari Maathai
heads [Diese Scheisskerle]!” 108 the HIV virus was solid, and he reportedly ascribed AIDS to the
Whether the letter constituted a denied having any contact with machinations of “evil-minded
final active measure of HVA X the Stasi.” 110 Segal died in scientists” and contended that
disinformation or not, it was cer- 1995, completely unrepentant the disease was meant to “wipe
tainly the kind of material that and utterly convinced of the out the black race.” 113 Even
had been fed to Segal through- American origins of AIDS. though reliable statistics are
out the late 1980s. 109 hard to come by, it seems rea-

Soviet bloc intelligence had created a monster that has outlived

sonable to conclude that many its creators.
Africans believe the claims. 114
The AIDS conspiracy theory observe the natural progression psyche, Soviet and East German
has a firm hold in other places. of the disease—not surprisingly disinformation specialists
In 1992, 15 percent of ran- leave African Americans predis- applied the techniques that stim-
domly selected Americans con- posed to believe the AIDS con- ulate the growth and spread of
sidered definitely or probably spiracy theory. 116 rumors and conspiracy theo-
true the statement “the AIDS ries—simplistic scapegoating,
virus was created deliberately In addition, since the scien- endless repetition, and the clever
in a government laboratory.” tific community was initially mixing of lies and half-truths
African Americans were partic- unable to explain the outbreak with undeniable facts. Once the
ularly prone to subscribe to the and spread of AIDS, groups dis- AIDS conspiracy theory was
AIDS conspiracy theory. A 1997 proportionately affected—such lodged in the global subcon-
survey found that 29 percent of as homosexuals and blacks— science, it became a pandemic in
African Americans considered predictably sought a communal its own right. Like any good
the statement “AIDS was delib- interpretation of the mysteri- story, it traveled mostly by word
erately created in a laboratory ous disease. Indeed, conspiracy of mouth, especially within the
to infect black people” true or theories about the US govern- most affected sub-groups. Hav-
possibly true. And a 2005 study ment’s responsibility for creating effectively harnessed the
by the RAND Corporation and ing AIDS cropped up dynamics of rumors and conspir-
Oregon State University independently of KGB and HVA acy theories, Soviet bloc intelli-
revealed that nearly 50 percent manipulation in gay communi- gence had created a monster that
of African Americans thought ties in the early 1980s. 117 has outlived its creators.120
AIDS was man-made, with over
a quarter considering AIDS the ❖ ❖ ❖
In Sum
product of a government lab.
Twelve percent believed it was Yet it would be mistaken to dis- Acknowledgements
created and spread by the CIA, miss the Soviet bloc disinforma- The author gratefully acknowledges
and 15 percent opined AIDS tion campaign as irrelevant or as the advice, comments, and support
was a form of genocide against provided by Klaus Behling, formerly
the US government’s knee-jerk
black people. 115 of the East German Foreign Ministry;
reflex to “blame the Russians.” 118 Laura M. Bogart, Harvard Medical
Studies have shown that who- School; Lt.-Col (ret.) Günter
Certainly, beliefs in a govern-
ever makes the first assertion Bohnsack, HVA X; Peter Earnest and
ment conspiracy to create and/or
about an event or occurrence has Burton Gerber, both formerly CIA;
spread AIDS cannot be ascribed Oleg Gordievsky, formerly KGB; Tif-
a large advantage over those who
solely to the Soviet bloc disinfor- fany T. Hamelin, US Department of
deny it later. 119 When AIDS
mation campaign. The marginal- State; Victoria Harden, formerly
emerged in the early 1980s,
ization of homosexuals and the National Institutes of Health; Maj.-
Soviet bloc disinformation spe-
long history of oppression and Gen. (ret.) Oleg Kalugin, KGB; Todd
cialists quickly recognized the Leventhal, formerly USIA and cur-
discrimination of blacks made
opportunity the mysterious epi- rently US Department of State;
these groups inherently suspi-
demic offered, acted with alac- Lawrence Martin-Bittman (Ladislav
cious of government institutions.
rity, and planted disinformation Bittman), formerly Czechoslovak
And some disclosures—e.g. the intelligence (disinformation); Peter
only months after the scientific
infamous Tuskegee experiment Martland, University of Cambridge;
community had coined the term
sponsored by the US Public Herbert Romerstein, formerly USIA;
“AIDS” and established the exist-
Health Service, which deliber- and Kristina N. Terzieva, Woodrow
ence of a causative virus. Wilson International Center for
ately left several hundred Afri-
Equipped with an intuitive Scholars.
can Americans suffering from
understanding of the human
syphilis untreated in order to ❖ ❖ ❖

Endnotes tions possibly involved in preparations for nuclear

war and to report immediately any deviations from
the norm. See Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 589.
11. House Intelligence Committee, Soviet Covert
1. In a lecture to Department X recruits in 1986,
Action, 30.
cited in: Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer,
Auftrag: Irreführung: Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen 12. Bittman, Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelli-
machte (Hamburg: Carlsen, 1992), 19. gence in Soviet Political Warfare (Syracuse, NY: Syr-
acuse University Research Corp., 1972), 125.
2. Michael Herman, Intelligence and Power in Peace
and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 13. Bittman, Deception Game, 125.
1996), 55f.
14. The West German security service publication
3. House Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Innere Sicherheit, 1 (20 March 1985), 2, noted that
Measures, (Washington, DC: Government Printing such letters were typically provided not as originals
Office, 1982), 31. but as photographs of alleged originals, so as to
make it more difficult to detect the forgery.
4. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky,
Instructions from the Center: Top Secret Files on 15. Bittman, KGB and Soviet Disinformation, 44.
KGB Foreign Operations 1975–1985 (London: Hod-
16. Innere Sicherheit 1, (3 March 1985), 2; US
der & Stoughton, 1991), 3.
Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A
5. For the Panorama broadcast of 28 January 1991, Report on Active Measures and Propaganda 1986–87
see Rote Fahne, 30 December 2004, and Bohnsack (Washington, DC: Department of State Publications,
letter to author, 22 September 2008; Bohnsack and 1987), ix, 4; US Department of State, Soviet Influ-
Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung. ence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Pro-
paganda, 1987–1988 (Washington, DC: Department
6. Statement by CIA Deputy Director of Operations
of State Publications, 1989), 23.
John McMahon, House Committee on Intelligence,
Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive, (Wash- 17. US Department of State, Soviet Influence Activi-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 6. ties…1986–87, 34f. The “confessions” had no basis in
fact.
7. According to Michael Herman, in 1987, only 3 per-
cent of the CIA’s staff was involved in covert action, 18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 503f. Again, the
and only 5 percent of the agency’s budget went into Soviet claim was spurious.
it. (Hermann, Intelligence Power, 56.)
19. Washington Post, 22 April 1980.
8. For information on the KGB’s planting of the
20. Lee Richards, “Whispers of War: The British
Kennedy conspiracy theory, see Aleksandr Fursenko
World War II Rumor Campaign,” The Intelligencer
and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrush-
16, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 54.
chev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964: The Secret
History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. 21. Jonathan B. Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Contro-
Norton, 1998), 343–50; for East German Nazi disin- versy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The
formation campaigns against West Germany, see Nonproliferation Review 8 (Spring 2001): 31.
Hubertus Knabe, Die unterwanderte Republik. Stasi
22. Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung,
im Westen (Berlin: Propyläen, 1999), 121–52.
219.
9. Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinfor-
23. Bohnsack letter to author, 6 March 2009.
mation: An Insider’s View (Washington, DC: Perga-
mon-Brassey’s, 1985), 49. In the same vein, see Ilya 24. Primakov, then SVR (Russian foreign intelli-
Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant: My Life with the KGB gence) director, made his remarks to graduate stu-
and the Soviet Elite (New York: Harper & Row, dents in Moscow during an SVR recruitment drive in
1987), 304f. 1992; Boston Globe, 19 March 1992; Izvestiya, 19
March 1992.
10. Operation RYAN (the KGB codename) had KGB
officers in Western capitals carry out a regular cen- 25. Patriot, 17 July 1983.
sus of the number of cars and lighted windows at all
26. “Interagency Intelligence Study,” cited in House
hours at government buildings and military installa-
Intelligence Committee, Soviet Active Measures, 55.

These charges were intended to undermine the 39. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 30 October 1985. Zape-
regime of the Pakistani president, General Muham- valov’s name was not a pseudonym. After the col-
mad Zia-ul-Haq, a pivotal ally in Washington’s lapse of the Soviet Union, he became a successful
efforts to assist anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen. businessman, author, and spokesman for Russia’s
arms-export agency Rosvooruzhenie.
27. Interviews with KGB Major-General (ret.) Oleg
Kalugin, 1 October and 22 December 2008. 40. The station chief, Larry Devlin, decided not to
carry out the assignment. Lumumba was later killed
28. Army Research, Development & Acquisition 23, no.
by local rivals. See Larry Devlin, Chief of Station,
4 (July–August 1982): 48f.
Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67 (New York: Public
29. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 628. Affairs, 2007), 94–97, 113–14.
30. Bittman, Deception Game, 227; Todd Leventhal, 41. Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung,
“The origins of AIDS disinformation,” January 9, 219.
2009, available online at http://blogs.amer-
42. Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
ica.gov/rumors/2009/01/09/the-origins-of-aids-disin-
formation/. Additional comments on the KGB’s use 43. Bohnsack and Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung,
of non-native speakers as translators were provided 219f; Bohnsack letters to author, 25 July and 14
to the author by Todd Leventhal, 25 February 2009. August 2008.
31. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The 44. Bittman, Deception Game, 141; Bohnsack and
World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle Brehmer, Auftrag: Irreführung, 40f, 218; Oleg Gordi-
for the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), evsky e-mail to author, 20 September 2008; Oleg
324; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 507. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography
of Oleg Gordievsky (London: Macmillan, 1995), 183.
32. The Patriot was established under the auspices
of the KGB resident in New Delhi, Radomir Ale- 45. Innere Sicherheit, 1 (March 20, 1985), 3;
ksandrovich Bogdanov, with the assistance of KGB Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
officer Ilya Dzhirkvelov, see Andrew and Gordievsky,
46. Segal provided his biographical data to edition
KGB, 503, and Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant, 303f. For
monochrom in 1993, http://www.mono-
a US assessment of the Patriot, see State Depart-
chrom.at/segal. See also John O. Koehler, Stasi: The
ment, Soviet Influence Activities… 1986–87, 44.
Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Boul-
33. David A. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” Stud- der, Col.: Westview Press, 2000), 260f.
ies in Intelligence 32, no. 4 (1988): 10.
47. Aktennotiz (note for the record) by Kurt Seidel
34. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 608, 628. on conversation with Jakob Segal, 17 September
1986, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/vorl.SED 36832 [hence-
35. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activi-
forth SAPMO].
ties…1986–87, 34f.
48. Bohnsack letter to author, 25 July 2008.
36. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 30 October 1985. I am
Bohnsack describes Segal as “partly a convinced sci-
grateful to Kristina N. Terzieva for an English trans-
entist, partly an operative assistant [operativer
lation of this and a later article.
Helfer], probably a colorful mix.”
49. According to Todd Leventhal, who visited Fort
ties…1986–87, 40.
Detrick and saw building 550, it was an ordinary
38. Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years looking bungalow with a front porch; interview with
in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (New Todd Leventhal and Oleg Kalugin, 22 December
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 158. See a statement 2008. Segal may have thought of building 470,
to the same effect by Martin C. Portman of the CIA’s locally referred to as “anthrax tower,” a pilot plant
Directorate of Operations in House Intelligence for testing optimal fermentor and bacterial purifica-
Committee, Soviet Active Measures, 21. tion technologies. It was torn down in 2003. Also, he
evidently meant “BSL-4” or “Level-4” rather than “P-
4” laboratories. BSL-4 or Level-4 laboratories handle

deadly diseases that have no cure; see House Com- 60. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activi-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, Germs, Viruses ties…1986–87, 37.
and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Labora-
61. Kurt Seidel, note for the record, 17 September
tories in the United States (Washington, DC: Govern-
1986, SAPMO.
ment Printing Office, 2007), 1, 54.
62. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008.
50. Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal, AIDS-Die Spur führt
Bohnsack writes that MfS director Erich Mielke did
ins Pentagon, second edition (Essen: Verlag Neuer
not necessarily inform his Politburo colleagues about
Weg, 1990), 138.
ongoing active measures but that Hager was proba-
51. Behling e-mails to author, 30 and 31 March 2009. bly aware of the AIDS campaign.
52. Michael D. Morrissey letter to Noam Chomsky, 63. Hager to Seidel, 26 September 1986, with copy to
14 September 1989, http://educate-your- General Axen, SAPMO.
self.org/cn/morrisseycorrespondencewithnoamchom-
64. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008.
sky.shtml; Gazette, 16 February 1992. However,
others considered Segal a “pompous ass” (pene- 65. Der Spiegel, 10 November 1986.
tranter Wichtigtuer), Behling e-mail to author, 18
66. Jakob Segal interview, Freitag, 17 May 1991.
November 2008.
67. Milt Bearden and James Risen, The Main
53. Jakob Segal, Lilli Segal, and Ronald Dehmlow,
Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Show-
AIDS-its nature and origin (no place, no date
down with the KGB (New York: Random House,
[1986]). I am grateful to US Department of State
2003), 385.
Anti-Misinformation Officer Todd Leventhal for a
copy of the pamphlet. 68. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008.
Between 1970 and 1989, Bohnsack was HVA X liai-
54. Stefan Nickels, “Geheimprojekt ‘Naomi’: Um den
son with the KGB and was thus informed about joint
Ursprung von Aids ranken sich seit langem obskure
East German/Soviet disinformation campaigns.
Hypothesen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszei-
Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
tung, 17 October 2004. As mentioned earlier,
MKNAOMI was the CIA codename for an early Cold 69. The interview was subsequently published in
War bacteriological weapons research program at book form in Kuno Kruse (ed.), Aids-Erreger aus dem
Fort Detrick. Genlabor? Die Diskussion der rätselhaften
Krankheit, die die Welt bedroht (Berlin: Simon &
55. Behling e-mail to author, 15 July 2008, based on
Leutner, 1987), 15–27.
an interview with Bohnsack. In his 1986 pamphlet,
Segal quotes an East German publication for his 70. John Borneman, “AIDS in the Two Berlins,” in
allegations about Fort Detrick: Reinhard Pieckocki, Douglas Crimp (ed.), AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cul-
Genmanipulation: Frevel oder Fortschritt (Leipzig, tural Activism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988),
Jena, Berlin: Urania Verlag, 1983). 234.
56. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activi- 71. Klaus Behling, Kundschafter a.D.: Das Ende der
ties…1986–87, 35; Bohnsack letters to author, 25 DDR-Spionage (Stuttgart, Leipzig: Hohenheim Ver-
July and 14 August 2008. According to Bohnsack, lag, 2003), 252f.
the HVA deployed Capt. Hans Pfeiffer and “officer on
72. Johannes Mario Simmel, Doch mit den Clowns
special assignment” [Offizier im besonderen Einsatz
kamen die Tränen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1987),
or OibE] Horst Schoetzki, officially a journalist rep-
9, 110f.
resenting the GDR magazine Horizont, to the confer-
ence. See also Christhard Läpple, Verrat verjährt 73. Wolf resigned his directorship in 1986 but,
nicht: Lebensgeschichten aus einem einst geteilten according to Bohnsack, retained his secret service ID
Land (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 2008), 299f. card, personal driver, and assistant and remained as
consultant and “guiding spirit” at HVA headquar-
57. Bohnsack letter to author, 25 July 2008; Spet-
ters; Bohnsack letter, 25 July 2008.
rino, “Aids Disinformation,” 11.
74. Der Spiegel, 7 September 1987.
58. Segal to Axen, 8 September 1986, memorandum
regarding economic aspects of AIDS, SAPMO. 75. Department of State, Soviet Influence Activi-
ties…1986–1987, 29; Shankar Vedantam, “Persis-
59. Segal to Axen, 27 August 1986, SAPMO.

tence of Myths Could Alter Public Policy Approach,” 89. Murray Feshbach, “The Early Days of HIV/AIDS
Washington Post, 4 September 2007. Epidemic in the Former Soviet Union” (paper pre-
pared for the conference “Health and Demography in
76. Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation:
the Former Soviet Union,” Harvard University, April
American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning
2005), 9, argues that the 1983 Patriot letter was a
of the Cold War. An Insider's Account (New York:
“ghost source” generated by Service A specialists to
Arcade, 1995), 113f; Ladislav Bittman, The New
enable Soviet propagandist to quote a non-Soviet
Image-Makers: Soviet Propaganda & Disinformation
source. Even though the technique of using “ghost
Today (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988),
sources” was not unknown to Soviet bloc intelli-
25.
gence, it was not employed in this instance. The
77. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” 9, 11; Sunday Indian National Library at Kolkata holds a copy of
Express, 26 October 1986; Daily Telegraph, 27 Octo- the Patriot, dated 17 July 1983, which carries the
ber 1986. On the other hand, the London Times, AIDS letter.
31 October 1986, lambasted the Express for giving
90. Literaturnaya Gazeta, 19 November 1986.
Segal a platform.
(Translation by Kristina N. Terzieva.)
78. USIA official Herbert Romerstein, quoted in Tor-
91. See, for instance, Christian Science Monitor, 11
onto Star, 28 April 1987.
December 1986, and New York Times, 8 April 1987.
79. Times, 31 October 1986. See also Der Spiegel, 10
November 1986.
ties…1987–88, 33-36; Der Spiegel, 9 March 1987.
93. New York Times, 5 November 1987.
ties…1986–87, 33.
94. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 182f.
81. United States Information Agency (USIA), Soviet
Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A Report to 95. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glas-
Congress (March 1988), 12; Department of State, nost, 11.
Soviet Influence Activities…1986–87, 35.
82. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher ties...1987–1988, 2f.
Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and
Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982),
ties…1987–1988, 4.
240.
98. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold
83. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 116.
War” Era 1988–1991: A Report Prepared at the
84. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” 11. Request of the United States House of Representa-
tives Committee on Appropriations (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, June 1992), 71–75.
ties…1986–87, 40; Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,”
Pagination according to online edition.
14.
99. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glas-
86. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glas-
nost, 12–49.
nost, 82, 86; Department of State, Soviet Influence
Activities…1986-87, iii. The West Germans estab- 100. Behling, Kundschafter a.D., 253; House Com-
lished a similar group, Innere Sicherheit [internal mittee on Appropriations, Department of Defense
security], which included representatives from for- Appropriations for 1970 (Washington, DC: Govern-
eign intelligence (BND) and counterintelligence ment Printing Office, 1969), 129. The text of Mac-
(BfV) agencies; Bohnsack letter, 25 July 2008. Arthur’s testimony was made available to the public
long before Segal “discovered” it. Paxman and Har-
87. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 93, 113.
ris, A Higher Form of Killing, 241, also quote from it.
88. Koehler, Stasi, 260. Koehler was then working as
101. Obituary, Donald Malcolm MacArthur, Wash-
a consultant to USIA director Charles Z. Wick.
ington Post, 29 November 1988. After leaving gov-
ernment, MacArthur founded Dynamac, which

helped conduct anthrax sampling after the anony- of the Patriot. See also the MLPD newspaper Rote
mous attacks in 2001 and performed cleanup at two Fahne, 30 December 2004.
anthrax-contaminated federal buildings in Washing-
112. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold
ton, DC.
War” Era, 66.
102. Segal mentioned the MacArthur testimony first
113. Peta Thornycroft, “Mugabe Highlights
in a reply to his critics in 1987, see Kruse, Aids, 51,
HIV/AIDS Crisis in Zimbabwe,” Voice of America
55. Disinformation on the NCI’s alleged role was pro-
News, 5 December 2006; New York Times, 10 Decem-
vided by HVA X, see Behling, Kundschafter a.D.,
ber 2004. Maathai subsequently said her words were
253.
taken out of context, but the African journalist who
103. Raimund Geene, AIDS-Politik: Ein neues first reported her remarks stood by his original
Krankheitsbild zwischen Medizin, Politik und report.
Gesundheitsförderung (Frankfurt a.M.: Mabuse,
114. Laura M. Bogart, Seth C. Kalichman, Leikness
2000), 294.
C. Simbayi, letter to the editor, “Endorsement of a
104. Michael D. Morrissey letter to Noam Chomsky, Genocidal HIV Conspiracy as a Barrier to HIV Test-
14 September 1989; Chomsky replied that the Mac- ing in South Africa,” Journal of Acquired Immune
Arthur testimony “sends a chill up the spine,” Chom- Deficiencies 49, no. 1 (1 September 2008): 115f.
sky letter to Morrissey, 28 December 1989;
115. Ted Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories,”
http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrisseycorrespon-
Political Psychology 15, no. 4 (December 1994): 731–
dencewithnoamchomsky.shtml.
33; Anita M. Waters, “Conspiracy Theories as Eth-
105. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold nosociologies: Explanation and Intention in African
War” Era, 70, 73, 75. The producer, Malte Rauch, did American Political Culture,” Journal of Black Stud-
not respond to an inquiry from this author regarding ies 28, no. 1 (September 1997): 117; Laura M. Bogart
the making of his documentary. and Sheryl Thorburn, “Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy
Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention Among African
106. Knabe, Der diskrete Charme, 170.
Americans?” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency
107. USIA, Soviet Active Measures in the “Post-Cold Syndromes 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2005): 215.
War” Era, 62.
116. Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories,” 740.
108. Segal and Segal, AIDS-die Spur führt ins Penta-
117. Kruse, Aids, 3.
gon, 243. The book also contains a censorious essay
on U.S. biological warfare research, titled “Biokrieg.” 118. Cf. Patricia A. Turner, I Heard It through the
The author, Manuel Kiper, subsequently served as a Grapevine: Rumor in African-American Culture
Green Party member of the German parliament (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 156,
from 1994 to 1998. dismissing a statement by the CIA’s Coordinator for
Academic Affairs Arthur S. Hulnick, who wrote her
109. Bohnsack comments: “Maybe he [Segal] wrote it
on 23 August 1988 that his agency believed rumors
himself, maybe the HVA did. Heaven knows, I don't
linking the CIA to AIDS were the result of Soviet
have a clue.” Bohnsack letter to author, 19 January
disinformation.
2009.
119. Vedantam, “Persistence of Myths,” Washington
110. Freitag, 17 May 1991; USIA, Soviet Active Mea-
Post, 4 September 2007.
sures in the “Post-Cold War” Era, 64; Gazette, 16 Feb-
ruary 1992; Koehler, Stasi, 261. 120. For an analysis of rumor dynamics, see Robert
H. Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor,” The Public
111. Gordon Schaffer, Baby in the Bathwater: Memo-
Opinion Quarterly 8, no. 1 (Spring 1944): especially
ries of a Political Journalist (Sussex: Book Guild,
26f on the importance of sub-groups.
1996), 240, 244; Schaffer was London correspondent
❖ ❖ ❖

The Origins of Modern Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Military Intelligence at the Front, 1914–18

Terrence J. Finnegan, Col., USAFR (Ret.)
Introduction familiar to Europeans of the day

but which had not yet been
Military intelligence at the effectively employed in warfare.
front advanced remarkably dur-
ing the Great War, adopting At the front, the conservative
methods and technologies that military culture was forced to
“
Military leaders learned
that approaching battle
through in-depth study
would remain in place through
the 20th century. Before the
modern era, national and strate-
gic intelligence (renseignement
grapple with its tradition and
make sense of combat in the
new stationary environment. In
the face of catastrophic casual-
ties, military leaders soon
and Nachricht, French and Ger-
and analysis would prove man, respectively) came mainly learned that approaching battle
far more effective than from espionage. With the intro- through in-depth study and
reliance on élan. duction of aerial reconnaissance analysis would prove far more
deep behind enemy lines, the effective than reliance on the
” tools of a modern era would con- élan that spurred the first
tribute to shaping strategy and waves of soldiers to rush for-
assessing enemy intentions. ward into walls of lead from
machine guns.
On the World War I battle-
field, as traditional sources— They learned that access to
including the military com- accurate and timely informa-
mander’s favorite force arm for tion was essential to gain
intelligence, mobile cavalry— advantage in battle. Their com-
were rendered impotent, armies mand and control came to
became entrenched along hun- depend on constantly collected
dreds of miles of front. With intelligence from a rapidly
each passing day of 1914, as expanding list of sources to sup-
opposing forces commenced a port decisions from the plan-
strategy of positional war, ning stages to their execution.
demand mounted for a constant Leading exponents of military
stream of accurate and timely intelligence reinforced this
information to target field artil- thinking. Within the first year, a
lery, the most important weapon French intelligence visionary
in the contemporary arsenal. portrayed intelligence informa-
This demand created new tion’s contribution in simple
sources of intelligence derived terms—to follow the destructive
from technologies that were work of our artillery and to reg-
(Copyright: Terrence J. Finnegan, 2009)

Origins of Modern Military Intelligence
By late 1915, intelligence information, especially that acquired

from airplanes, had demonstrated that it was credible. Major advances in camou-
flage and deception appeared,
offering fascinating glimpses
ister the victorious advance of and a host of new technologies. into the cognitive processes of
our infantry. 1 Continuous, timely, and accu- modern war. With the stereo-
rate information made military scope serving as the instru-
By late 1915, intelligence intelligence at the front a lethal ment of choice in the war of
information, especially that weapon beyond the contempo- perceptions, imagery trans-
acquired from airplanes, had rary arsenal—a major force formed the battlefield. In the
demonstrated that it was credi- multiplier, in today’s parlance— trenches, deception was
ble and contributed effectively increasing lethality with an employed wherever possible
to the conduct of battle. Tradi- array of new technologies that and reinforced by cover of dark-
tionalists, who had been skepti- made use of the light spectrum, ness and activities below
cal of new intelligence sources photogrammetry, and sound ground. Above ground, master
at the beginning of the conflict, and radio waves. artists perpetuated illusion
became firm disciples for the through a vast array of camou-
remainder of the war. The Along with exploitation of flage netting.
words of two British intelli- intelligence came improve-
gence officers reflect the shift. ments in communicating data Radio deception was also
The first was offered in 1915; to decisionmakers and combat- employed. Techniques like the
the second after the war. ants, which in turn led intelli- generation of intense radio traf-
gence collectors and analysts to fic in quiet sectors and the
Intelligence is very frequently focus on communication net- reduction of wireless activity in
looked upon as an affair that works throughout the trenches the area of a planned attack
has nothing to do with regi- and rear echelons. Electronic were common practices. In the
mental officers and men. A
technology, then in its infancy, forward areas, construction of
very general opinion seems to
be that information about the was rapidly assimilated in the dummy trenches and artillery
enemy is obtained in some front lines and became a com- batteries, along with feints
mysterious way from spies or mon fixture for all combatants. from raids and maneuvering
other persons of doubtful Radio transmitters achieved a artillery, contributed to the war
character, but of surprising role above the battlefield of illusion.
intelligence.” 2 through airplanes.
…[The] results [of intelli- The most lethal force arm, Eleven Primary Sources at
gence] are produced by hard artillery, received three-dimen- the Front
work, great diligence and sional, near-real-time updates
untiring watchfulness, and of its accuracy. All conceivable Radio Intercept and
the painstaking collection and ways of transmitting messages Radiogoniometry
collation of every possible within the trenches were tried, Radio intercept and radiogoni-
form of information. Nothing ometry (direction finding) was
including telephones, runners,
is too small to be unworthy of the first of the modern sources
the attention of I. D. [Intelli- carrier pigeons, messenger dogs
and small rockets. In the to have a decisive impact on
gence Department] and no
problem too big for it. 3 absence of radio, airplanes battle during a period of
operated from landing grounds intense mobile warfare. Radio
By 1918, sector surveillance of and directly supported head- intercept had been evolving as
the positional battlefield had quarters by dropping contain- an intelligence discipline before
become a refined art, employ- ers with message updates. the war started, but its value
ing both traditional methods was clearly demonstrated with

the interception of open radio

transmissions at the battles at
Tannenberg in eastern Poland
and the First Marne, northeast
of Paris. Tannenberg became
the first battle in history in
which interception of enemy
radio traffic played the decisive
role. 4 Success came to the Ger-
mans when they intercepted
Russian radio transmissions
containing exact force disposi-
tions. French cryptological
experts were never able to con-
vince the Russians that their
codes were easy to read and
required better protection with The Eiffel Tower, served as a French collection site for enemy radio transmis-
frequent code and cipher sions. The chief of staff to the French military commander of the Paris sector
recognized its service in his description of events during the first Marne bat-
changes. 5 tle. He cited Gen. Johannes Georg von der Marwitz, the German cavalry
commander of the First Army, violating radio discipline on 9 September by
Aerial reconnaissance rein- transmitting, “Tell me exactly where you are and what you are doing. Hurry
forced German command deci- up, I am going to bolt.” French intelligence triangulated the transmission
site and later found abandoned stacks of munitions, vehicles, and a field
sions at Tannenberg, but did kitchen with a great store of flour and dough half-kneaded. 7 (Photo, 1910 ©
not play as critical a role. Ironi- Bettman Corbis)
cally for the Germans, Allied
radio intercepts of transmis- The successes at Tannenberg allowing combatants to posi-
sions a few days later at the and the Marne clearly illus- tion their own forces in
First Marne undermined the trated the value of radio inter- response. Traffic analysis
German offensive near Paris. cept and radiogoniometric focused on enemy radio proce-
French intelligence intercepts methods to the combatants. dures and call signs. 8
led to successful analysis of Positional war refined their role
German intentions. Partial and value and created a pro- By 1915, incessant artillery
credit went to the German lack cessing cycle for evolving sig- fire had obliterated most com-
of discipline in radio operation. nals intelligence. Message munication networks at the
By 4 September 1914, French interception, analysis to deter- front. As a result ground teleg-
intelligence had confirmed that mine the originator, cryptanaly- raphy was used within the
the German First Army was not sis, and event reporting all trenches. However, electromag-
moving toward Paris. It also matured the discipline. Moni- netic currents of comparatively
discovered the extent of Ger- toring of units in fixed loca- low frequency could still be
man fatigue and logistical tions at the front allowed detected directly by the tele-
shortfalls. Finally, the French cryptanalysts to group emitters phone receiver. Wire-tapping
monitored German General within a particular echelon— units intercepted ground tele-
Alexander von Kluck’s order to division, corps, or army. This graph lines (French term for
withdraw and knew that the analysis became a highly this ground telegraphy opera-
German retreat had favored method for confirming tion was télégraphie par le sol
commenced. 6 enemy order of battle (OOB) [T.P.S.]). 9 Three kilometers was
and determining the depth of the normal range for transmis-
echelons in a given sector, sions, enough to support the

average front line sector. In forces arrived in late 1917, the GNEISENAU offensive at
turn, intercept stations work- French army provided the Montdidier and Compiègne. 17
ing from the most forward equipment and technical sup-
trenches tapped the lines to lis- port the newcomers needed. In Front line security called for
ten in to enemy telephone con- mid-1917 senior American offic- the most stringent enforcement
versations in the opposite ers were discreetly informed by of radio discipline. Soldiers
trenches. Their reporting pro- General Philippe Pétain’s staff were warned that the enemy
vided indication of enemy relief that the Germans were not overheard all telephone conver-
and warning of imminent aware of the success the French sations. Radio intercept opera-
attacks. 10 By war’s end a large cipher section was having in tors not only listened for enemy
part of the interceptions were of breaking German codes—an conversations but also kept
signals in Morse code. 11 insight not shared with the rest track of communication viola-
of the French army for fear of tions by friendly forces. One
Codes and ciphers for secure leaks. 14 friendly operator was able to
communications were devel- deduce the entire US OOB for
oped to unprecedented levels The culture of sharing intelli- the St. Mihiel assault by listen-
during the war. At first, this gence within a limited circle of ing to the complaints of a US
was primarily the domain of the experts proved beneficial. switchboard operator that his
French, who had established American radio intercepts dis- communication lines were being
radio intercept stations against covered that German battle broken by tanks and heavy
Germany before the war. Brit- preparations included imple- artillery moving up for the
ish advances in the discipline mentation of a new code, known attack. 18
focused on naval intelligence. 12 as the ADFGVX cipher, on
11 March 1918. The Americans
Conversely, the Germans immediately for-
lagged in the field. They did not warded the infor- CONFIDENTIAL ORDER No. 1.
emphasize cryptanalysis for the mation to French [classified SECRET]
first two years of the war. The and British cryp- Published by Headquarters, 26th Division,
Germans, forced to operate on tanalysis staffs. American Expeditionary Force, in France,
captured French territory with The brilliant February 16, 1918.
radios, were more vulnerable to French cryptana- 1. It is safe to assume that all telephone conversa-
intercepts. The French, on the lyst, Captain tions within one thousand yards of the front line will
other hand, had at their dis- Georges Jean Pain- be heard by the enemy. This necessitates great care
posal a well-established system vin broke the code in the use of the telephone. To prevent, as far as pos-
of less vulnerable wire net- on 6 April. In the
15 sible, the enemy gaining information through indis-
works adjacent to their front on subsequent weeks creet use of our telephone, the following rules will be
home territory. In addition, strictly observed:
Painvin’s analysis (a) REFERENCE TO LOCATION will never be tele-
with French and British experi- was combined with phoned.
ence in analyzing German intelligence reports (b) From regimental P.C. forward, the telephone will
phraseology and idiosyncra- from aerial recon- be used for tactical purposes only; administrative
sies, the Allies had an advan- naissance and pris- matters will be transacted other than by telephone.
tage they never lost. 13 oner (c) Messages referring to movements or operations of
interrogations. The whatever size must be in cipher (except in attack,
By the last year of the war, resulting analysis
when secrecy will give way to urgency).
interception and decoding had (d) The designations of stations as used by the
led to an effective French will continue to be used; in all cases this rep-
become fully integrated compo- French counter to resents a location and not an organization and does
nents of the Allied intelligence Gen. Erich Luden- not change when new organizations occupy the
discipline. As novice American dorff ’s 9 June 1918 locations. 16

The newly established third defensive works on his own they are the most experienced,
dimension of warfare, aerial, immediate front. To extract questioners.” 24
also took on signal intelligence this information from him
collection. Triangulated inter- requires time. It is sometimes Interrogators used data from
cepts of radio transmissions necessary to take the prisoner detailed photographic mosaics
from enemy artillery observers back in the front line trenches of his sector to trace with
or to Observation Posts and sources (prisoner or deserter)
in airplanes provided intercept
almost always necessary to their itineraries from the rear
location data for pursuit esca- examine him with the assis-
drilles and squadrons. to the front line trench net-
tance of aeroplane
photographs. 20 work, confirming statements
Intercepted radio transmis- with specific details from photo-
sions from goniometric stations Ludendorff ’s chief intelli- graphs to include an isolated
also helped counter strategic gence manager at the front, tree, house, or any other visible
aerial bombardment by Zeppe- Oberstleutnant Walter Nicolai, feature. 25
lins, Gotha bombers, and Zep- testified to the value of pris-
pelin-Staaken (Riesenflugzeug) oner interrogations, saying, Personal letters, documents,
giants. Radio transmissions “Our greatest and most valu- and correspondence taken from
from German ground stations able source of news in the west- prisoners helped in identifying
providing bearings to aerial ern theatre of war—and at the opposing units and provided
navigators were intercepted, front line the only one—was information for tactical and
location determined, and data furnished by prisoners of war.” 21 strategic analysis. 26 A good
passed to British defense example with German prison-
squadrons. 19 Interrogation became a sci- ers was the Soldbuch or pay-
ence of human emotion and book. It served not only to
Prisoner Interrogations psychology. German military identify the prisoner, but the
The most voluminous source intelligence was aware that the military record it contained pro-
of intelligence information in British had been told to expect vided discussion material for
positional war came from the beatings and other ordeals, and the first interrogation. 27
interrogation of prisoners. so “prisoners who, still feeling
(According to popular esti- the violent emotions of battle, Interrogated prisoners of both
mates, some 8 million men on found themselves humanely sides provided stereotypical
all sides were captured during treated … spoke more willingly responses. Officers regretted
the war.) The capture and even than the deserters.” 22 being captured. Privates were
retention of prisoners took glad to be out of the hell of the
place during all levels of opera- Interrogation centers took trenches. German prisoners
tions on both sides of No Man’s great care in separating prison- were confident in the success of
Land. Not only was a captive ers by ethnic origins. Polish and German arms, at least early on.
one less threat, prisoners were Alsace-Lorraine prisoners were One Bavarian summed up the
often treasure troves of infor- kept in separate locations to Allies in his interrogation by
mation on critical issues that promulgate their anger toward saying,
other forms of collection threw Germans, reinforced by better
treatment and food, “which The French have done won-
no light on. One senior British
derfully. They are the enemies
intelligence officer described nearly always loosens their
that we like the best. We hate
the process: tongues.” 23 At one French inter- the English. We have regret
rogation center, most of the for the French. 28
Most of the information which staff were professors and law-
a prisoner has is information yers, “who obviously make the The first Americans became
in detail regarding the enemy best [interrogators], because prisoners on 17 November

officer. 30 Concern about spying

created a culture of distrust
and uncertainty throughout the
front. British warnings
reflected a somewhat chaotic,
even paranoid, culture:
Because a man is dressed in

British, French or Belgian
uniform, do not necessarily
assume that he is what he
appears to be. Such a dis-
guise is by far the most
effective and safe one for a
German spy, and there is lit-
tle doubt that it has been
“Treachery was in the air day and night. This sector was full of German agents frequently made use of. No
and spies. Special orders were issued to us and all were placed on guard, chal- matter who the man is, if he
lenging everyone at night, both on cross-roads and at points entering our acts suspiciously—wants to
lines.”–from a WW I memoir. 29 A German agent about to be executed by a British know too much about the
unit. (Photo: ©Corbis/Bettman) (Photo, 1915 © Bettman Corbis)
troops—detain him.
1917. Initially, during the their required a disciplined, self-con- Moreover, French and Bel-
first six months in combat, trolled existence, in the gian citizens near the front
American soldiers were not trenches and the rear. Keeping were also suspect.
asked about their combat arms. noise to a minimum was a
Barbers, cafe proprietors,
Rather, discussions focused on requirement. Personal letters
waiters and waitresses may
the numbers of Americans in were potential intelligence doc- all be looked upon as poten-
theater and en route across the uments detailing morale, loca- tial spies, and it is most
Atlantic. Concerned about sus- tions, personal observations, important that they should
taining combat in the face of and other relevant data. Cen- have no opportunity of pick-
the arrival of new and fresh sorship was imposed to curtail ing up odd scraps of
forces, the Germans were after any chance of an enemy acquir- information. 31
everything they could get about ing a critical snippet of infor-
the American reinforcements mation. Information from Refugees—
that would help shape their Repatriated Agents
battle strategies for the remain- A British intelligence officer Human intelligence also came
der of 1918. commented on this environ- from the interrogation of repa-
ment: “The enemy has many triated civilians who crossed
Spies soldiers who speak English per- through Allied lines from Ger-
Spies in the Great War pro- fectly, and they recognize by our man-held territory. Interviews
vided intrigue, both in the accent what part of the country were normally conducted by
minds of the combatants and of we come from.” The trench cul- intelligence personnel in the
the practitioners of the art. The ture thus mandated that every sector in which they crossed for
intelligence officer was respon- combatant play a role in gath- whatever information the refu-
sible for preventing these ering information. “Every man gees had on nearby German
agents of espionage from find- should, therefore, look upon activity and intentions. 32 After
ing out anything about “our- himself as a collecting agent of local French authorities con-
selves.” Contre-Espionage information,” wrote a British firmed that the repatriated

Everyday combat operations at every echelon, especially by in-

were authentic, follow-on inter- fantry and artillery elements, led to intelligence collection oppor-
views sought to gather more tunities.
information on German activ-
ity seen in aerial photography
or reported by other sources. including locations of saps nean microphone, the
The intelligence was applied to (trench construction into No perpendicular and horizontal
artillery target lists and docu- Man’s Land), mine locations, range finder, and the elongated
ments. One example follows: and forward listening posts. 34 three-power French binocular. 37
Panorama photographs, pasted
The two French civilians who When information was needed together to form mosaics along
came into our lines near Pont- to refine operations, trench the horizon were generated to
a-Mousson on Sept 2, have raids were mounted to capture provide photographic detail for
described in detail a water prisoners for interrogation or to infantry analysis. The pan-
supply system by which water gather material from enemy oramic mosaics were annotated
from the Fontaine du Soiron, trenches. Raiding parties were to show compass bearings to
66.8-48.3, is pumped to reser- given prioritized requirements.
voirs at 3 points…. This recognized permanent points as
Objectives might have included, reference points for all observa-
system is partly visible on
for example, taking note of tions.
photos, where it has the
appearance of buried cable trench and revetment configu-
trenches, and it has been so rations. Any article of equip- Ground observers, usually
represented on maps. The ment was potentially valuable. highly experienced infantry-
civilian’s statement is entirely Captured helmets, caps, rifles, men, were required to main-
consistent with the photo- shoulder straps, and identity tain total concentration. With
graphic evidence and discs complemented analysis of the experience of combat, these
indicates that the further other sources. Patrols also had observers could piece together
strengthening of the Hinden- a counterintelligence compo- an evolving situation and
burg line is to be looked for at nent when they were instructed report back quickly with artil-
the points indicated. 33 to look for the antennae of lery targeting data or other
enemy listening devices. 35 information. 38 Additional tasks
Patrol Reports
included keeping the lines of
Everyday combat operations
Ground Observation— communication in working
at every echelon, especially by
Reporting from Infantry and order at all times and under
infantry and artillery ele-
Artillery any and all conditions. 39
ments, led to intelligence collec-
Positional war meant contin-
tion opportunities. Each combat An American observer trained
ual observation of the enemy
unit had its own patrol proce- and deployed to an SROT
through a network of stations
dures requiring collection and observation post before the St.
along both sides of the front
dissemination of information Mihiel offensive provided
line. The French referred to this
within its sector. Reports gener- insight into the French observa-
as the service des renseigne-
ated by daily operations supple- tion process:
ments de l’observation du ter-
mented other material,
rain (SROT). 36 Incessant focus
including aerial photography, They showed us how to locate
on one enemy sector day after
and contributed to three intelli- German batteries, machine
day led to fleeting opportuni-
gence objectives: understand- gun nests, railroads, troop
ties that became intelligence for
ing of the layout of one’s own movements, supply trains,
artillery unit and local ground aerial activity, observation
front line; detailed knowledge
commanders. Among the tools balloons, etc. We paid particu-
of the configuration of No Man’s
observers used were the scis- lar attention to watching how
Land up to enemy wire; and
sors telescope, the subterra- often Hun airplanes arose,
exact analysis of enemy lines,

collection because of the techno-

logical sophistication of their
networks. According to Allied
intelligence the Schall-
messtrupp inventory included a
stopwatch, telephone, anemom-
eter (wind-gauge), weather
vane, and thermometer. As each
post heard a definitive report
from an artillery piece, opera-
tors started their watches.
When the warning post linked
to the section started vibrating,
the watches were stopped.
Their calculations took into con-
sideration measurements of
atmospheric conditions, temper-
The Salmson 2A2 was one of the finest airplanes of the Great War. The aerial cam- ature, and the direction and
era is a French, 26 cm “Grand Champ.” This airplane was assigned to the US Air velocity of the wind. The results
Service’s 1st Aero Squadron. Today, the US Air Force’s 1st Reconnaissance Squad-
ron operates the Lockheed U-2 and the RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance aircraft. were sent to the central post for
(Original image at USAF Academy Library, Davis Collection, SMS 54) final calculations with the tar-
geting data forwarded to the
heavy artillery unit com-
where they crossed our lines, along a 9,000-yard sector— mander for counterbattery
whether or not they were fired recorded the sounds of artillery salvos. 43
on by our anti-aircraft guns, rounds as they traveled from
the number of Hun planes in their guns. With the rounds Flash-Spotting
the air, the purpose of their travelling at 1,100 feet per sec- Flash-spotting (Licht-Messs-
flights, etc. It was particu- ond, the sounds created mea- tellen) applied optical measure-
larly important to get the ments to locate enemy artillery.
surable arcs that were plotted
point where the German avia- The essential equipment for
tors crossed the Allied lines. 40 on sector maps. The signals
from the microphones were flash-spotting control at head-
Sound-ranging tracked and superimposed on a quarters was the Flash and
Target acquisition of enemy regional map. The data were Buzzer Board and the plotting
artillery evolved as a science in synthesized using a mechani- board—generally a 1/10,000
the Great War using principles cal device called a “computer.” map for tracing and synchroniz-
of sound and light. The process The resulting information was ing responses from posts. A
became so refined on both sides sent to friendly artillery units telephone switchboard pro-
that by the time of the armi- over telephones. Sound-rang- vided connectivity. All calcula-
stice once an enemy artillery ing equipment was also used to tions on identified artillery
battery commenced fire it was track and correct friendly fire. 42 batteries were forwarded to
quickly registered to a pre- artillery for counterbattery
cisely known location and The German sound-ranging operations. 44 The combination
became a target for counterbat- section (Schallmesstrupp) posts of sound-ranging and flash-
tery fire. 41 Sound-ranging did not possess automated spotting proved to be a vital
microphones—usually com- capabilities. Interrogated part of front-line intelligence
posed of six-microphones set up Schallmesstrupp prisoners networks supporting artillery
credited the Allies with better targeting. Aerial reconnais-

An example of a Plan Directeur targeting

map that intelligence specialists updated
daily. This one shows a portion of the Somme
Sector. (Original in Library of Congress.)
sance complemented these col- a chronometer, and telephone. dummy complexes, and other
lection systems. Like sound-ranging, the cen- projects of interest were found.
tral station reported observa- By correlating aerial photo-
The German flash-spotting tions to the heavy artillery unit graphs with captured docu-
Section [Lichtmesstrupp] com- commander for counterbattery ments, analysts identified more
prised a central station and targeting. 45 features. Photo interpreters
eight observation stations over required detailed knowledge of
a 20-km front. Each post had Captured Documents trench organization, such as
eight men, with four providing Captured documents were could be found in published
relief every two days. Observa- gold mines for intelligence anal- German regulations and other
tion was accomplished by one ysis on both sides of the lines. captured documents. Their tac-
individual at a time. Each post The French described enemy tical approaches often found the
had a pair of periscopic field documents as “perfect interpre- keys to enemy intentions. Anal-
glasses, a device called an tation,” particularly when ysis of strategic aspects would
alidade that allowed one to aerial photographs matched be done by the intelligence
sight a distant object and use dates and items noted in docu- staff.
the line of sight to perform the ments. Sometimes sketches
required computational task, with notes about machine guns, French manuals included
an ordinary pair of field glasses, trench mortars (Minenwerfer), reminders about the impor-

Balloons with forward aerial observers were the prized resource

of artillery. artillery, and aeronautical
activity; movements on road
and rail; and sightings of explo-
tance of handling documents tion seriously. Priority was sions—all within the limits
properly, noting, for example, given to maintaining proper imposed by terrain, weather,
that a commander’s responsibil- camouflage and deception, and and countering enemy
ities included reviewing cap- officers were assigned to activity. 50 Balloons with for-
tured documents for indications arrange for aerial photography ward aerial observers were the
concerning every possible phase of emplacement sites before con- prized resource of artillery. Bal-
of attack or defense, including struction was begun and dur- loons had one advantage over
lines of approach and lines of ing and after construction to airplanes: instant telephone
defense. 46 test camouflage. 48 connections to those in need of
the information. Notably, the
On the German side, cap- Toward the end of the conflict Germans extensively employed
tured documents were no less during the Meuse-Argonne aerial cameras from captive
important. In 1918, for exam- campaign, captured German balloons to provide coverage of
ple, General Ludendorff documents provided American the front.
referred to a captured British intelligence analysts (in a unit
guide to photo interpretation, known as the Enemy Works Balloons were assigned to
Notes on the Interpretation of Subdivision) with information, support army- to division-level
Aeroplane Photographs (SS including orders, weapon sys- requirements. A German bal-
550), which was one of the most tem manuals, tactics for defeat- loon detachment was tactically
important documents on the ing tanks, intelligence under the command of every
subject prepared during the summaries, and reports on the division on the front. Since
war. In his directive to forces interrogations of prisoners. The these tasks also belonged to the
engaged in an operation against data provided a concise view of aviators, the commander of the
British forces in the Cambrai the German estimate of the balloons had to keep in con-
Salient, Ludendorff quoted strength of Allied forces and stant contact with the Army
from the document’s descrip- demonstrated that late in the Aviation Commander (Kom-
tion of German practices: war German leaders had come mandeur der Fliegertruppen) to
to fear the effects of Allied pro- allocate work among aircraft
It is evident that increasing paganda and had issued and balloons. 51
care is taken to conceal repeated orders to soldiers to
emplacements and to defeat turn in papers dropped by German long-range artillery
the camera. As, however, the groups (Fernkämpfartiller-
Allied airplanes. 49
Germans usually start to con-
iegruppen) firing on key strate-
struct camouflage after a
Aerial Observation from gic targets such as command
battery emplacement has been
completed, their attempts are Balloons centers, lines of communica-
rendered abortive, owing to A natural extension of the tion, and ammunition dumps
the fact that the emplacement ground observation reporting had their own dedicated aerial
will probably have been pho- system was the captive balloon observers and balloon
tographed several times or kite balloon (Drachenbal- sections. 52 French and British
during the various stages of lon), which allowed observers aligned their balloons units to
construction. 47 from both sides to spy on more the army echelon requiring sup-
distant enemy locations than port. American balloons
German actions before the could be seen from ground sites. assigned at the army echelon
operation demonstrated that Reports from balloon observa- were attached to a “Balloon
they took Ludendorf ’s admoni- tion covered enemy infantry, Group,” which reallocated

Aerial photographic interpretation was a team effort.

observation to the lower eche-
lons. Balloons supporting divi-
sions helped regulate divisional
artillery fire as well as provide mobile campaigns on both East- coverage to detect new works or
surveillance and liaison for the ern and Western Fronts; the defenses. 56 The exploitation pro-
infantry divisions. 53 evolution and extensive use of cess was accomplished by plac-
aerial cameras and photogra- ing tracing paper over
Observation from Airplanes phy proved to be decisive in photographs and tracing objects
The primary and most lucra- shaping the battlefield through- requiring further attention.
tive military intelligence out the war; and in subordi- Sketches of important items
resource in the Great War was nate roles, such as infantry were then completed and deliv-
aerial photography. From 1915 contact (Infanterie-Flieger), air- ered along with photographic
to 1918, aerial photography was crew observations added to a prints to command staffs.
the cornerstone of military battlefield commander’s timely
intelligence at the front. In update of forces in contact. Draftsmen sketched the fea-
cases of conflicting data, the tures of new positions and points
photograph was acknowledged Notwithstanding its enor- of interest in coordination with
by the French as the one source mous importance, the aerial the aerial observers who flew the
for settling discrepancies. 54 As reconnaissance inventory on missions. Short notes attached to
one American instructor both sides of the front has been the maps included impressions
summed up intelligence: ignored or forgotten. Airplanes of the enemy’s organization
such as the Maurice Farman gained from the study of photo-
Under the conditions of mod- (MF) 11, Farman Experimental graphs and of the ground. By
ern warfare, no army can long (FE) 2b, Albatros C.I, Recon- war’s end, US military leaders,
exist without using every pos- naissance Experimental (RE) 8, like the French, had concluded
sible means of gathering Breguet 14 A2, Halberstadt C.V that photographs taken from air-
information; and of all these and Salmson 2 A2, to name a planes could be considered the
means aerial photographs few, delivered the information final intelligence on enemy
present probably the best
necessary to make critical bat- works, regardless of other infor-
medium. 55
tlefield decisions. Indeed, many mation acquired.57
It not only provided the airplanes of this era, in particu-
lar those of the French and Ger- Strategic analysis at the front
viewer with a concise portrayal
mans, were specifically focused on the enemy’s ability to
of the threat that existed at a
designed to house cameras sustain major operations. In
particular moment in time; the
within their fuselages. For most 1918 Supreme Allied Com-
interpreted information could
of the war the British relied on mander Marshall Ferdinand
be effectively and accurately
smaller cameras attached to the Foch tasked his best reconnais-
applied to the most important
outside of their airframes. sance pilot, Capt. Paul-Louis
medium of the Great War, the
Americans generally flew aerial Weiller, to command a group of
targeting map. Photographs
reconnaissance missions in three escadrilles to monitor key
provided all combatants with
French aircraft. targets in a given sector for
the ability to wage positional
changes related to operations at
war in the most effective and
Aerial photographic interpreta- the front. Weiller was supported
devastating manner.
tion was a team effort. An intelli- by an elite team of strategic
Aerial observations (observa- gence officer usually identified aerial photographic interpreter/
tion aérienne and Fliegerbeo- sets of photographs for exploita- analysts based in Paris. When
bachtung) played key roles tion; draftsmen compared dupli- his Weiller Grouping converted
during the first months of the cate sets with the history of to aerial reconnaissance of tar-

The complexity of the World War I intelligence enterprise is evident in the contemporary schematic above, which shows Ameri-
can Expeditionary Force division-level intelligence supported by corps architecture in 1918. (Original at NARA, RG 120; also
accessed through Footnote.com, NARA M923 The Supreme War Council.)
The skills of the people needed in this enterprise were neatly described after the war by British General Macdonogh.
Intelligence personnel may be divided into two main groups, a very large one which collects information and whose main
characteristic is acquisitiveness, and a very small one which extracts the substance from that mass of facts and fiction.
The mental requisites of this last class are: (1) clearness of thought, (2) grasp of detail, (3) a retentive memory, (4) knowledge of
the enemy, (5) the power of projection into his mind, (6) imagination tempered by the strongest common sense, (7) indefatigabil-
ity, (8) good health, including the absence of nerves, and (9) above all others, absolute impartiality.
A high intelligence officer who allows himself to have any preconceived notions or prejudices is useless. He must look at friend,
foe and neutral alike—that is, merely as pieces on the chessboard. 64
gets well beyond the front, they Analysis side of No Man’s Land. Ulti-
institutionalized an intelligence mately, intelligence officers
collection and analysis process Analysis was aimed at deep- were called on to validate all
that remains to the present day. ening understanding of tacti- military activity planned
In turn, Foch developed an oper- cal and strategic situations— against the enemy.
ational strategy of determining including events in progress,
offensive operations based on the value of planned friendly Analysts had to remain
what the strategical assessment operations, and details of abreast of the status quo on the
portrayed. 58 enemy forces on the opposite front lines to recognize changes

The persistent emphasis on order of battle led to frustration be-

that would permit timely dis- cause such detailed knowledge of the enemy never led to deci-
covery of enemy plans. 59 Thus, sive breakthroughs and victory.
the search for signatures asso-
ciated with an enemy offensive
operation was a top priority. the subject—especially on the of enemy intentions and shar-
Signatures included construc- part of the British—plagued ing trends in analysis. Confer-
tion of roads and railroads, intelligence analysis. A senior ences enabled intelligence and
increased presence of supply UK analyst justified the pro- photographic specialists to
depots, new artillery battery tracted attention by saying: share ideas and techniques for
positions, and new trench work collection and analysis, a phe-
into No Man’s Land. Con- As everyone knows, the basis nomenon that led to closer coop-
[of intelligence work] is the eration between the infantry
fronted with deception, ana-
building up of the enemy’s combatant and the affiliated
lysts depended on aerial order of battle, for when this
reconnaissance and photo- arms, including artillery and
has been done the identifica-
graphic interpretation as the tion of one unit is prima facie aviation. 65
ultimate arbiters of uncer- evidence of the presence of the
tainty. Whether on the defen- division to which it belongs Production and
sive or on the offensive, and possibly also of the corps Dissemination
planning required currency of or even army.” 62 Military intelligence gener-
analysis at all times, and expe- ally was packaged into two
rience demonstrated that time One of the most brilliant senior mediums. Cartography was the
spent on proper surveillance intelligence officers in the war, primary form, with written
and intelligence was essential Lt. Gen. Sir George Macdonogh, reports providing greater detail.
to ensure that “the enemy can- the British War Office’s Director The core Allied targeting map
not pass by unperceived.” 60 of Military Intelligence, would comprised either the French
echo this after the war in the Plan Directeur or the British
French analysts went further, Infantry Journal. firing map (also known as the
based on the belief that the trench map). Both provided
German adversary was method- If you were to ask me which is commanders with updates of
ical, and closely followed senior the most important function the situation they faced. The
of the offensive intelligence Plan Directeur was the focal
headquarters [Grosses Haupt-
[intelligence on the enemy], I
quartier] policies. 61 Thus, Deux- point for French battle
should probably surprise you
ième Bureau colleagues role- by saying that it is the build- planning. 66 Maps ranged in
played German leaders in ing up and constant scale from 1/5,000 to 1/50,000. 67
attempts to better understand verification of the enemy's
German decisionmaking as order of battle. 63 British GHQ’s intelligence
lines changed hands, troops was disseminated in two prod-
moved among sectors, and artil- In the final analysis, the persis- ucts, the Daily Intelligence
lery targets shifted. They tent emphasis on order of bat- Summary and the Daily Sum-
applied logic to defensive strat- tle led to frustration because mary of Information. Both were
egies in attempts to allow maxi- such detailed knowledge of the geared to serve the commander-
mum resistance with minimum enemy never led to decisive in-chief on developments in the
personnel at hand. breakthroughs and victory. war in the British theater. The
content of the Summary was
As understanding of the sta- Collaboration established by General Mac-
tus quo was also achieved by Interaction among the Allied donogh, who dictated that it
having clear knowledge of Ger- experts became an important contain only information on
man OOB, a singular focus on part of reaching understanding

Thanks in part to the expansion of military intelligence and its ex-

ploitation of science, the Great War became the harvest of death tion, became critical facets of all
for which it is remembered to this day. operations. Finally, the ability
of the new tools to see beyond
the front lines began to affect
adversaries and nothing about years later. Traditional intelli- strategy and the deployment of
Allied forces. 68 gence methods quickly gave forces on a strategic scale.
way to a juggernaut of techno-
The Germans developed a logical innovation involving a In all probability few in 1918
comprehensive array of battle spectrum of scientific princi- would have seen the long- term
maps at the headquarters for ples applied to the rigorous implications of their experi-
each army through their sur- demand for battlefield knowl- ence, least of all those who
vey detachments (Vermessungs- edge. Most significantly, avia- might have thought there
Abteilungen) and subordinate tion defined the role of would be no second world war.
map-printing section (Karten- intelligence in industrial age For most, intelligence was
Felddruckerei). The Germans warfare. In addition, the mira- about winning or losing that
created topographical sections cles of mass production made particular conflict. As General
(Kartenstelle) to complete obser- available the tools of intelli- Macdonogh wrote in 1922:
vations of the artillery survey gence—aircraft, cameras, radio
sections and evaluate the topo- intercept equipment, sensors, I will venture to say that the
graphical implications of recon- printing presses, and much chief reason why the Ger-
naissance information from more—across the battlefront mans lost the war was
aircraft and balloons. Their because they had a bad intel-
and provided the most effective
equivalent of the French Plan ligence system … and it failed
means of acquiring timely, from the very outset of the
Directeur was called the Mess- detailed, and readily under- campaign. 70
plan. The Germans worked stood intelligence.
with 1/80,000 maps for general Thanks in part to the expan-
purposes and the 1/25,000 as With each advanced source sion of military intelligence and
the normal trench map. Trench and method, the institution of its exploitation of science, the
maps as detailed as 1/5,000 intelligence assumed greater Great War became the harvest
were also issued. When the stature, and commanders real- of death for which it is remem-
Germans acquired captured ized that the intelligence com- bered to this day. Today’s intel-
Plan Directeurs, the maps were ponent of warfare had ligence challenges, however, go
copied and sometimes com- progressed far beyond their well beyond a narrow strip of
bined with enlargements from early imagining. Further testa- devastation separating ene-
smaller scale maps. 69 ment to the expanding intelli- mies. Instead, military intelli-
gence art was the fact that gence at the 21st century front
advances made known in the covers every facet of human
Conclusion field were quickly copied by all existence. It remains to be seen
the combatants, and camou- how such knowledge and abil-
Military intelligence evolved
flage and deception aimed at ity will shape the future.
as a significant force arm from
overcoming these advances,
the first shots of August 1914 to
especially in aerial observa- ❖ ❖ ❖
the Armistice more than four

Endnotes trine Developed in the French Army, 1914–1921. Pre-

pared by Col. Le Vert Coleman. Box 819. NARA.
1. Captain J. de Lennoy de Bissy quoted in Terrence
12. David Kahn, The Codebreakers, The Story of
J. Finnegan, Shooting the Front: Allied Aerial Recon-
Secret Writing (New York: The MacMillan Company,
naissance and Photographic Interpretation on the
1967), 300.
Western Front—World War I (Washington, DC:
National Defense Intelligence College, 2006), 5. 13. Ibid., 313–14.
2. Lieut.-Colonel B. Walcot, “Lecture on Intelligence 14. Nolan, Intelligence Draft, 14.
for Regimental Officers and Non-commissioned
15. Origination and Evolution, 26.
Officers” July 24th, 1916, in Arthur L. Conger
Papers, US Army Military History Institute, Carl- 16. Confidential Order No. 1. France, February 16,
isle, PA (USAMHI), Box 2 1918. Box 5, Headquarters 26th Division, RG 120,
NARA.
3. Lt. Gen. Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh, K. C. B., K. C.
M. G., “The Intelligence Service,” in Infantry Jour- 17. Origination and Evolution, 26; David T.
nal, 1922, 260. Zabrecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A case study
in the operational level of war, (London: Routledge,
4. Wilhelm F. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether
2006), 240.
(Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1977) I, 3.
See also Gregory Elder, “Intelligence in War: It Can 18. Kahn, Codebreakers, 334.
Be Decisive,” Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (June
19. Organization and Functioning of the Radio Intel-
2006): 15–17.
ligence Subsection, Drum Papers, XIV, USAMHI;
5. Dennis E. Nolan, Intelligence Draft, Chapter III, Origination and Evolution, 26.
USAMHI, 14.
20. John Charteris quoted in Michael Occleshaw,
6. Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services, From Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in
the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, the First World War (London: Columbus Books,
Straus and Giroux, 1995), 75. 1989), 100–101.
7. General Clergerie in “The Battle of the Ourcq,” 21. Walter Nicholai quoted in Christopher Duffy,
Edited by Charles F. Horne and Walter Austin, The Through German Eyes, The British & The Somme
Great Events of the Great War (The National 1916 (Phoenix, London, 2006), 38.
Alumni, 1920), II, 221–22.
22. Duffy, Through Germany Eyes, 41.
8. The Origination and Evolution of Radio Traffic
23. First Lt. Colman D. Frank, Report of a Visit to
Analysis, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info
VIIIth. Army Headquarters to attend the Interroga-
/_files/cryptologic_quarterly/trafficanalysis.pdf,
tory of Prisoners Taken in the Coup de Main on the
accessed on 20 July 2009, 22. (Hereafter Origin and
Lorraine Sector, February 20, 1918, USAMHI.
Evolution)
24. Ibid.
9. William A. Morgan, “Invasion on the Ether: Radio
Intelligence at the Battle of St. Mihiel, September 25. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 173–76.
1918,” Military Affairs, 51, Issue 2 (April 1987), 57–
26. Lieutenant Biddle, Report on the collection, anal-
61.
ysis and distribution of German documents captured
10. Hermann Cron, translated by C.F. Colton, Impe- at the front. Conger Papers, USAMHI.
rial German Army 1914–18, Organisation, Structure,
27. Lieutenant McKay, Report on a mission to the
Orders-of-Battle, (Solihull, West Midlands, UK:
French Second Bureau. Soldbuchen. February 24th
Helion & Company Ltd, 2002), 201.
1918. Conger Files, Box 2. USA MHI, Carlisle, PA.
11. Part XXXIX, Transmissions. “American Mission
28. Frank, Visit to VIIth Army Headquarters.
with the Commanding General, Allied Forces of
Occupation, Mainz, Germany.” A Study of the Orga- 29. Edward D. Sirois, Lieutenant, and William
nization of the French Army Showing its Develop- McGinnis, Corporal, Smashing Through “The World
ment as a Result of the Lessons of the World War and War” With Fighting Battery C. 102nd F.A. “Yankee
Comprising Notes on Equipment and Tactical Doc- Division” 1917–1918–1919 (Salem, MA: The Meek
Press, 1919), 47–48.

30. Walcot, “Lecture on Intelligence.” 49. Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st Army, A.E.F., Report.
November 18, 1918. Drum Papers, Vol 14. USAMHI,
31. Ibid.
28.
32. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 176.
50. Maj. Georg Paul Neumann, translated by J. E.
33. Summary of Intelligence, 1st Army Corps, U.S. Gurdon, The German Air Force in the Great War
Second Section, G.S. in Finnegan, 176. (Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, ca. 1920, later published
by Cedric Chivers Ltd, Portway, Bath, 1969), 6.
34. Patrol and Control of No Man’s Land. Conger
Papers, Box 2, USAMHI. 51. Cron, Imperial German Army, 180.
35. Walcot, “Lecture on Intelligence.” 52. Zabecki, Steel Wind, 42.
36. Maj. J.E. Hahn, The Intelligence Service within 53. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 335.
the Canadian Corps (Toronto: The Macmillan Com-
54. Captain Eugene Pépin quoted in Finnegan,
pany of Canada, 1930), 188.
Shooting the Front, 177.
37. Private Edward Alva Trueblood, In the Flash-
55. Thomas Hibben quoted in Finnegan, Shooting
spotting Service, 38, http://www.guten-
the Front, 459.
berg.org/files/26138/26138-h/26138-h.htm, accessed
25 October 2009. 56. Hahn, Intelligence Service within Canadian
Corps, 260.
38. Walcot, “Lecture on Intelligence.”
57. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 179, and Asst.
39. Trueblood, “Flash-Spotting,” 38.
Chief of Staff, G-2, 1st Army, A.E.F. Report. Novem-
40. Ibid, 39. ber 18, 1918. Drum Papers, Vol 14. USAMHI, Carl-
isle, PA.
41. David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994), 13. 58. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 261.
42. John R. Innes, Flash Spotters and Sound Rang- 59. Ibid., 172.
ers: How They Lived, Worked and Fought in the
Great War (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 60. Ibid.
1935), 129–32. Joseph Goldstein in Bernard Edel- 61. Ibid.
man, Centenarians, The Story of the 20th Century by
the Americans Who Lived It (New York: Farrar, 62. Kirke, senior GHQ intelligence officer, quoted in
Straus and Giroux, 1999), 246. David French, “Failures of Intelligence: The Retreat to
the Hindenburg Line and the March 1918 Offensive,”
43. Summary of Information for Divisional Head- Strategy and Intelligence, British Policy during the
quarters, No 153, GHQAEF, Second Section, General First World War, edited by Michael Dockrill and David
Staff March 14, 1918. Box 16N 1090, Service His- French (London: The Hambledon Press, 1996), 76.
torique de la Défense (SHD).
63. Macdonogh, “Intelligence Services,” 261.
44. Innes, Flash Spotters, 99–100.
64. Ibid., 260.
45. Summary of Information for Divisional Head-
quarters, No 154, GHQ AEF, Second Section, Gen- 65. Hahn, Intelligence Service within Canadian
eral Staff March 15, 1918. Box 16N 1090, Service Corps, 263.
Historique de la Défense (SHD). 66. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 157.
46. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 177. 67. Hahn, Intelligence Service within Canadian
47. David T. Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Corps, 96.
Case Study in the Operational Level of War (London: 68. Intelligence Services of the British Army in the
Routledge, 2006), 118; General Ludendorff quoted in Field, February 16th, 1915. George O. Squiers
Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 106. Papers. USAMHI.
48. Finnegan, Shooting the Front, 106–108. 69. German Army Handbook, April 1918 (New York:
Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1977), 124.
70. Macdonogh, 256.
❖ ❖ ❖

An Experiment in Collaboration on an Intelligence Problem
Developing STORM, a Methodology for

Evaluating Transit Routes of Transnational
Terrorists and Criminals
Mark T. Clark and Brian Janiskee
Introduction private firms. However, the IFA

recently opened the process to
In July 2008, a California universities identified by the
State University (CSU) consor- Office of the Director of National
tium became the first academic Intelligence (ODNI) as “Intelli-
“
organization to accept a “chal- gence Community Centers of
lenge project” from the NSA’s Academic Excellence” (IC
The IFA asked the Institute for Analysis (IFA). A CAE). a The CSU consortium is
challenge project consists of a one of these centers and
group to assess why question for which the IFA seeks accepted the first such chal-
terrorist groups or a fresh answer from outside the lenge offered to a university
criminal transnational Intelligence Community (IC). group.
organizations select The challenge process begins
certain transit with individual NSA analysts
who approach the IFA with par- The Problem
countries for their
purposes. ticularly vexing questions. IFA
The project CSU took on was
then evaluates these for their
labeled the “Transit Country
”
importance, timeliness, and
Problem.” In a nutshell, the IFA
suitability to outside research.
asked the group to assess why
Once the IFA approves a ques-
terrorist groups or criminal
tion for a challenge project, the
transnational organizations
question is reframed to make it
select certain transit countries
suitable for open-source
for their purposes. The report
research by whatever group is
was due in the spring of 2009.
assigned the challenge project.
Challenge projects vary in a Through its ICCAE program office, the

complexity. Some involve a ODNI awards grants competitively to uni-
direct, one-time answer to a versities nationwide to develop and diver-
highly specialized question. Oth- sify the pool of potential applicants for
careers in intelligence. As of this writing,
ers, however, are more exten-
31 universities participate in the program.
sive and require the group The California State University IC CAE
taking the challenge not only to program is unique in that it is a consor-
answer the question but also to tium of seven California state universities
in southern California. For more informa-
provide a reproducible method-
tion in the ODNI’s Intelligence Community
ology. Customarily, these chal- Centers of Academic Excellence program,
lenges are contracted out to please see: http://www.dni.gov/cae

An Experiment in Collaboration
Our approach from the beginning was to incorporate the chal-

lenge project into classrooms. Organization
Our initial organizational

Our initial goal in CSU was to consortium with the CSU structure for the project was in
focus on the terrorist compo- Chancellor’s Office and the place by September 2008. (Our
nent of the problem and only ODNI. Second, we have a report was due to the IFA in
later develop a methodology to diverse talent pool of faculty January 2009.) The director of
include criminal organizations. and students—in graduate and the CSU consortium served as
undergraduate programs—who the overall coordinator. The
specialize in the following key three course instructors were
The Approach subject areas: terrorism, intelli- team leaders responsible for
gence studies, research meth- supervising the research pro-
In thinking about how we
ods, the sociology of terrorism, cess in each class. These
would meet the challenge, we
and geographic information sys- instructors divided their classes
decided to answer the question
tems. into research subteams to fur-
collaboratively by exploiting
ther analyze specific elements
what we believe in the CSU IC Given the academic mission of of the research question. A
CAE is a comparative advan- the CSU consortium, our graduate student provided
tage in collaborative work. approach from the beginning assistance to the director. Later,
First, we had experience in was to incorporate the chal- another faculty member was
working collaboratively as a lenge project into classrooms. brought in as a principal ana-
consortium of seven universi- The faculty members who par- lyst.
ties in the CSU system on the ticipated in the project ensured
goals and objectives of the IC that the project would add sig-
CAE grant received from the nificant academic value to the Getting Started
ODNI in September 2006. a This student experience.
relationship requires the coor- Representatives of the IFA
dination of faculty, staff, and Three courses seemed to fit came to Southern California to
students across seven cam- best the scope and subject mat- brief the faculty and students
puses, in different disciplines, ter in the challenge. Two were on the transit country project
and in very different academic in the graduate program in and the contribution the consor-
cultures. b As importantly, the national security studies at tium could make to solve the
director of the program must CSU San Bernardino. One was puzzle. For one class—the grad-
coordinate the efforts of the in the undergraduate sociology uate course on American For-
program at CSU Northridge. eign Policy—the IFA
The two graduate courses representatives were present
a The seven universities include the fol-
selected at CSU San Bernar- for the first class meeting. The
lowing California State University system
campuses: Bakersfield, Cal Poly Pomona, dino were Tracking Terrorism professor introduced the consor-
Dominguez Hills, Fullerton, Long Beach, and American Foreign Policy. tium director, who told the stu-
Northridge, and San Bernardino. The pro- The undergraduate course dents about the challenge
gram is directed out of CSU San Bernar-
selected at CSU Northridge was project and the role they would
dino’s national security studies (MA)
program, which is housed in the Depart- Sociology of Terrorism. On play in it. After the director’s
ment of Political Science. Please see: standby at CSU Long Beach, background discussion of the
www.csu-ace.org. we had faculty and graduate project, the IFA representa-
b The disciplines include computer sci-
assistants available for any geo- tives addressed the class. They
ence, criminal justice, geographic informa-
tion systems, political science and graphic information systems made it clear that this was an
sociology at the undergraduate level, and (GIS) work we may have opportunity for the students
national security studies at the graduate needed. and faculty to work on a real
(MA) level.

Faculty who had access to Intellipedia and proprietary sources

question in need of fresh of information rigorously avoided using that data or steering stu-
answers. To put it mildly, the dents toward it.
students were surprised and a
little intimidated by the pros-
pect of researching the chal- tives reiterated several times then organized teams of stu-
lenge. Once they got into it, that even a “failure” to find an dents to conduct research. The
however, the students were acceptable answer to the chal- professor thought that the term
energized by working on the lenge would be a useful answer transit country was not particu-
question in the classroom, in itself. larly well defined. He devel-
knowing that there would be a oped a new term: “terrorist node
final report to the IFA and, if of operation (TNOP).” He
One Question, Three defined a TNOP as “a physical
the quality was good enough,
Research Teams: Diversity area possessing certain geo-
that it would contribute to the
of Viewpoint and graphic, structural, and socio-
overall mission of the IC. We
Redundant Systems political characteristics making
made clear to the students that
each professor would be free to it useful for a terrorist organi-
The research approaches the zation to operate.” The profes-
approach the challenge in his or
faculty took were unique. For sor thought the term transit
her own way and that the stu-
the American Foreign Policy country implied a subset of
dents were allowed, indeed
class, the faculty decided to countries that was too small
encouraged, to explore novel
have students research eight and the term itself was too nar-
approaches.
different countries as potential row to answer the question
On the second day of the IFA transit points and three major fully.
visit, we held a video teleconfer- pathologies that could be asso-
ence (VTC) from the San Ber- ciated with potential transit The professor then divided the
nardino campus to brief the countries. Some students students into three teams. The
faculty researchers on the other approached the question with first, the Terrorist Threat
campuses about the challenge the nation as the object of anal- Group Team, looked at the
project. We conducted two more ysis, while others made a spe- question from the point of view
VTCs that fall involving the cific pathology the object of of the terrorist group. This
same teams to ensure we were analysis, following the trouble resembled the focus of the
on track and to discuss issues wherever the research led. The pathology team in the Ameri-
or answer questions that arose eight countries were: the Baha- can Foreign Policy class. The
during the students’ research. mas, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, students on the Terrorist
At no time, however, did any- Georgia, Romania, Serbia, and Threat Group Team followed
one from the IFA ask for or inti- Turkey. The three pathologies the research results to wher-
mate an “acceptable” outcome were weapons smuggling, ever they led, without having in
for the project. Representatives nuclear materials smuggling, mind a particular set of TNOPs.
repeatedly indicated they and human trafficking. Stu- The second group, the TNOP
wanted our research to be genu- dents were divided into coun- Focus Group, looked at specific
inely free of influence from an try study teams and pathology countries in particular
“IC” perspective. To that end, teams. The teams were regions—such as the Middle
faculty who had access to Intel- expected to provide weekly East, Europe, North and Trans-
lipedia and proprietary sources reports to their professors. Saharan Africa—to determine
of information rigorously what qualities they had that
For the Tracking Terrorism would make them useful to ter-
avoided using that data or
class, the professor changed the rorists. The third group, the
steering students toward it.
definition of a key term, and Exploitation Team, had access
Furthermore, IFA representa-

We decided on multiple approaches … to cast the net widely to

capture as many good ideas as possible. ferences to flourish. We seek to
benefit from different disciplin-
ary approaches and different
to the ongoing research of the We decided on multiple ave- educational cultures on our
first two teams. Its job was to nues of research for two rea- campuses and leave plenty of
synthesize the results into a sons. First, we wanted to cast room for local innovations. Not-
coherent report. the net widely to capture as withstanding our experience in
many good ideas as possible. collaboration, we had never
The third class to participate The multiple approaches taken attempted to collaborate on
in the challenge project was the to this problem would help such a large project before and,
Sociology of Terrorism course. ensure thoroughness in frankly, did not really know
As was the case with the other research and avoid some of the whether one or more approach
two classes, the professor took inherent biases that may come would actually produce some-
yet another approach. He orga- from a single approach. Sec- thing of value or whether one or
nized the research project so ond, we wanted to ensure the more faculty members would
students would develop some- delivery of a product. With shepherd their projects to
thing resembling a transit three separate groups working timely conclusions.
countries indicators and warn- on the project, a research road-
ings (I&W) model. He then used block faced by one class would As the fall term came to an
four measures by which the stu- not, accordingly, jeopardize the end and the three teams were
dents could evaluate chains of whole endeavor. in the process of delivering
transit countries for the move- their final results, the overall
ment of terrorist groups. The We took our responsibility to coordinator of the project faced
measures were guns (arms deliver a product with the the task of getting a single
smuggling and dealing), drugs utmost seriousness. Redun- product to the IFA. We would
(traditional routes for the move- dancy would allow us to carry not be satisfied with a straight-
ment of illegal drugs), human on if one part of the project, for forward compilation of several
trafficking, and corruption. whatever reason, was inter- reports for the IFA. We sought
rupted. a to integrate the classroom
The professor also recom- research products into a single
mended that students engage As a multicampus consor- approach with a reproducible
in two novel approaches. The tium, though we collaborate on methodology. The director of the
first was “internet treble hook- the overall goals of the ODNI CSU program feared that this
ing.” A single student or group grant, we allow individual dif- would expose the biggest poten-
of students would monitor open tial weakness in our collabora-
source information from a spe- tion—a lack of cohesion. We
cific country for activities once a The need for redundancy was very needed to forge the answers
that country was deemed to be nearly realized. One of the participating achieved in the three
a potential conduit for illegal professors, a military reservist, was unex-
approaches into a single answer
transit activities. The second pectedly recalled to active duty. He
received news of this just a few weeks with a robust methodology that
approach was “spark plugging.” before the project deadline. Fortunately, could be useful to intelligence
This involves a targeted dia- he insisted on seeing the project through analysts in their day-to-day
logue—on message boards, for to completion and his final class report
work.
example—with specific experts was turned in two days before he shipped
out. In this instance, we did not suffer a
familiar with a particular coun- failure in one of our systems, but we had
try or activity under consider- confirmed the wisdom, in projects of this
ation. scope, to expect the unexpected and to
take organizational steps to ensure that a
product is delivered.

The need for a principal analyst for a multi-team project like this
Three Research Teams, One became evident early in the process.
Product: The Role of the
Principal Analyst
involved in the sex trade was are a limited number of coun-
Fortuitously, however, one fac- counted as part of the overall tries that can act as conduits
ulty member who was aware of human trafficking pattern. In for terrorist or criminal activ-
the process but uninvolved in others, anyone who ever ity. Instead, we thought that
classroom research for it offered accepted “pay” for sex acts were any country in the world could
his services at the right time to not counted as victims of serve as a transit country,
help integrate the reports. He human trafficking, even if they depending on a number of con-
also brought to the table consid- were first forced into sex sla- ditions. In the STORM process,
erable methodological skills. We very. Moreover, only a few we first had the analyst ask
had promised to have some- nations try to track it and those questions about the group, its
thing by late January, so this that do—like the United States, goals, its objectives, and its
individual had to work over- which has spent over $371 mil- resource needs before asking
time during his winter break to lion since 2001 on this issue— which countries might become
develop our final approach. In have no assessment on whether transit countries, or nodes of
collaboration with the coordina- such efforts have prevented any operation.
tor, usually by phone, but also human trafficking. The same
over lunch, our principal ana- was true for databases on politi- The different approaches to
lyst read, analyzed, and synthe- cal corruption, arms smug- the problem paid off here as
sized faculty and student gling, and drug smuggling. So, well. After having developed
reports—well over 400 pages— when the principal analyst the term terrorist node of opera-
into a creative, and useful began evaluating all the data, it tion in one class, the principal
methodology we called STORM became clear to us that we analyst determined that it
(Security threat, Target, Opera- needed to substitute qualita- suited the purposes of the over-
tion, Resources, Movement pat- tive proxies for poor, incom- all report better simply to use
tern). plete, or unreliable quantitative node of operation to include ter-
measures. But the proxies he rorist groups and criminal tran-
The need for a principal ana- identified had to be able to snational organizations.
lyst for a multiteam project like accommodate quantitative data
this became evident early in the of high quality, once they could Second, we also determined
process. Students across all be identified. that because open-source data
groups quickly discovered that can be corrupted, we used qual-
a significant number of open itative proxies for various
source metrics were bad, cor- STORM pathologies. For example, if the
rupted, or simply unreliable. data for arms trafficking are
The methodology’s name, bad, qualitative proxies such as
For example, the subject of
STORM, served as a mnemonic the presence of civil wars or
human trafficking is fraught
device to help analysts method- insurgencies could be used. (A
with difficulties. Some coun-
ically identify potential “nodes
tries try to combat it, others
of operation.” a In coming up
ignore it, and still others hide
with the acronym, we, in a See the unclassified Intellipedia article
it. Yet every student group
essence, determined that ask- on transit country and the report,
reported finding metrics for it. "STORM: A Methodology for Evaluating
ing questions about transit
More troubling, the definition of Transit Routes for Terrorist Groups and
countries was not the preferred
human trafficking was found to Criminal Transnational Organizations" at
first step. The concept of a tran- https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Transit_
be different across databases.
sit country implies that there Country. The IFA has authorized its dis-
In some databases, anyone tribution on the public Intellipedia.

The methodology was sensitive to potential changes in a group’s

condition, goals, membership, or planned operations. the results as highly as they
did.
qualitative proxy is one that is During our VTCs, our geogra- In April 2009, the project coor-
highly correlated to bad or sus- phers told us that if the coun- dinator and principal analyst
pect behavior.) We also pro- try is the unit of analysis, then delivered a briefing on STORM
vided a methodology, or a spreadsheet approach would at NSA headquarters in Fort
template, by which analysts can be sufficient; that GIS can help Meade to a packed room of ana-
assess the relative importance when the analysis focuses on lysts. The briefing was also
of certain countries to various sub- or transnational activities. recorded for future training.
groups, depending upon a num- Our selection of the country as The methodology received high
ber of conditions discovered by the unit of analysis from the praise from that group as well.
first working through the beginning, however, was in part The following was all we
STORM process. a direct response to the needed to hear about the mood
assumptions behind the chal- of the analysts as they left the
The methodology was sensi- lenge question itself: that there briefing: we were told that the
tive to potential changes in a is a distinct subset of all states analysts came in skeptics but
group’s condition, goals, mem- in the international system that went out believers. (See IFA
bership, or planned operation. can be classified as transit director’s letter on facing page.)
As each component of the pro- countries. The question itself
cess changed, the potential biased our approach in answer-
nodes of operation for that Lessons Learned
ing the challenge.
group could change as well. In
addition, the methodology could The three reports became one. The lessons we learned in this
be used to plot potential nodes We sent the IFA our final prod- collaborative effort could be
of operation for all terrorist and uct on time and briefed it to helpful to those working on sim-
criminal groups: past, present, them by VTC in January 2009. ilar projects. For the project
or future under varying condi- Involved were representatives itself—and we imagine for intel-
tions. Furthermore, the from the IFA, several senior ligence analysts in general—the
STORM methodology is scal- intelligence professionals from question drives the research.
able, so that future iterations the ODNI, coparticipants at the How a question is posed can
could involve not only national various campuses, and a group lead to biases in how to answer
units of analysis but regional of students and faculty at the it. As mentioned above, the
and local ones as well. CSU San Bernardino campus, research strategies in all three
where the VTC was broadcast. classes were designed specifi-
Our one major disappoint- While the researchers answered cally around countries as the
ment was our inability to use pointed questions from the IFA, units of analysis and the
our GIS Team. We simply ran it became clear to the partici- assumption that there were
out of time. We were unable to pants that the project was well- likely to be clear indicators of
complete the project early received and had been a suc- what makes a country a “tran-
enough to give our geographers cess. The students in atten- sit country.” Realizing that the
time to work with the results. dance, many of whom had been concept of a transit country was
Part of this was due to the intimidated at the first briefing too limited, we followed our
unfamiliarity that most of our in September, were excited to instincts and recast our
researchers have with the capa- witness the project’s successful approach to better capture the
bilities of GIS. Another ele- completion, but beyond that, phenomenon under question.
ment was our selection of the they were elated that intelli- This reassessment of a key term
country as the unit of analysis. gence professionals evaluated in the question itself was, in and

Letter from the Director of the Institute for Analysis at

NSA, Donn L. Treese.
Having different faculty mem-
To the faculty and students of the California State University Intelli- bers apply different ways to get
gence Community Center of Academic Excellence: at our challenge revealed the
depth of the problem associ-
Very well done. What I see in this project is a very good microcosm of
ated with relying on the open-
what we actually do and, even better, an insight into the way it should be
done. source data. Across all classes,
students found problems with
For the former, like us, your students and faculty were somewhat the data that faculty members
daunted by the task and the lack of specificity right up front. They were had believed would be neces-
asking themselves exactly what was expected and where do they get sary for solving the challenge.
started. What kind of data is available? Where might it lead me? Sounds
Having multiple approaches
familiar to an analyst. Does the question make sense? Also familiar to an
analyst. What happens if I get this wrong? Not enough analysts ask
also helped us avoid problems
themselves this question. associated with the potential
bias of a single approach. We
For the latter, what you described is a near perfect union of disciplines also had an added feature to
and collaboration. It was very smart, in my opinion, to involve others ensure the integrity of the pro-
(even though time ran out, you had them on the hook) and not present cess. By permission of the two
any predisposed ideas or biases. Even more so, instilling this behavior as
CSUSB instructors, the project
the best way to achieve a task such as this, to me, is the best outcome of
this whole project.
coordinator solicited weekly
reports on the research
I must add that your presentation at NSA was very well received. I heard progress from two students who
comments to the effect that this tradecraft would indeed be incorporated were not aware of each other's
into the daily analysis activities of a number of attending analysts. One efforts, keeping the process
discussion even focused on automation of this methodology. In short, this honest.
work was very well received.
An overall coordinator, a shep-
What I hope your students bring to my agency when they get here is sim-
ple enough, I think: I need them to understand that egos are not helpful; herd for the whole project, was
that even though we typically are tasked individually, we must find and useful as well. In fact, it is hard
work with others to get the best intel product on the street; we often have to see how the project could
incomplete data sets and no time to complete them; open and creative have come together without the
thinking is a staple of the job; and to ask for a better question if the one unobtrusive, guiding hand of
received lacks sensibility. One more thing: The job is to understand the one person with a vested inter-
past, work the present, and suggest the future. Some analysts get 24
est in completing it. The coordi-
hours to do that. Some get 24 months. What you all accomplished during
a semester is indeed pretty remarkable. Thanks for your role in ushering
nator organized the VTCs,
this along to its great outcome. checked up on the process
through his two classroom con-
tacts, offered help and encour-
of itself, a contribution to the even if they compel one to alter a agement to the professors, and
dialogue. By encouraging our key premise of the question itself. maintained communication
teams to be creative, we were with IFA representatives. Fur-
able to come to this important Building in redundancy in a
thermore, he was able to bring
result. Since we were asked to research design can be useful
in a principal analyst, who
provide a perspective outside of for a variety of reasons. Doing
stood outside the three in-class
the IC, we were not afraid to so helped us avoid reliance on
projects. When the principal
seek an unconventional only one person or class, with
analyst was brought in to eval-
approach. This is a key lesson. its higher potential for failure.
uate the research and inte-
Follow the data where they lead, But redundancy also gave us
grate it into a coherent whole,
multiple angles on our subject.
the coordinator worked with

It was important for the students to realize that, despite [the un-
certainties], the faculty and students would be expected to pro- writing his or her own paper,
duce a result—just as any working analyst must. with the final team product
being a compilation of the
the analyst to discuss the ideas faculty and student research- papers. This year, we intend to
and strategies the analyst ers, to the coordinator, to the collaborate through the use of a
would bring to the product. In geographers who waited for an Wiki, to simulate the type of col-
addition, the coordinator opportunity to help, to the prin- laboration that Intellipedia
advised the principal analyst on cipal analyst—wanted the offers to analysts in the IC.
how best to present this infor- project to succeed. All were As a test, the coauthors of this
mation to the eventual consum- willing to admit where they article worked on this manu-
ers of the product. believed their efforts or their script using Wiki technology.
research or research design was Each entry by a coauthor was
In retrospect, after the chal- weak in the supporting reports.
lenge was completed and tracked and was immediately
In an environment where egos available to all who had access
briefed to the IFA, the faculty sometimes get in the way of
agreed that it was good for stu- to the site. Through this we
success, this was a huge factor. hoped to find out what works
dents to see the research process
in its entirety because the pro- and what does not and why.
cess resembles the way in which Conclusion Our ultimate goal is to have
faculty members conduct their more students who can bring
research and, we imagine, how Where will we go from here? the new tools of Web 2.0 to
intelligence analysts conduct Our efforts to collaborate are potential careers in the IC. In
theirs as well. It was impor- only beginning. We envision the process, we are also learn-
tant, pedagogically, for the stu- more opportunities to bring more ing new and better ways to col-
dents to grasp fully the faculty and students into future laborate.
uncertainties, and anxieties, of challenge projects. We are also
testing how to make Wikis— ❖ ❖ ❖
a research process in which
there is no predetermined out- with their capacity to accommo-
come and there is a high level date multiple authors and abil-
of uncertainty about whether ity to show changes over time—
the research will be academi- available for collaborative
cally useful or accepted by their efforts. At the CSUSB campus,
peers. Yet it was also impor- we annually produce a mock,
tant for the students to realize competitive National Intelli- a Our PSCI 621: Strategic Intelligence
gence Estimate in our graduate course requires students to learn photo-

that, despite this, the faculty graphic interpretation, the writing of the
and students would be expected program. We use a two-team for- President’s Daily Brief, and the team
to produce a result—just as any mat—Teams A and B—in which research approach in a competitive NIE.
working analyst must. students represent different IC Each year, the instructor selects a new
agencies on their team. We have topic based on reasonable approximations
of real-world problems. For example, over
Finally, it helps to have people been doing these NIE exercises the past several years, our NIEs have
who bring their “A-game” to the for more than a dozen years. a In included The Prospects for China’s Domes-
project. No one person’s ego the past, the students have tic Stability over the Next Five, Ten and
worked on the NIE in the tradi- Fifteen Years, Russia After the Election,
stood in the way of the project
and this year, North Korea After Kim
as a whole. Everyone—from the tional fashion, each individual Jong-Il.

The James Angleton Phenomenon
“Cunning Passages, Contrived Corridors”:

Wandering in the Angletonian Wilderness
David Robarge
Angleton was CIA’s answer to the Del-

phic Oracle: seldom seen but with an
awesome reputation nurtured over the
years by word of mouth and interme-
diaries padding out of his office with
pronouncements which we seldom
professed to understand fully but
accepted on faith anyway.
—David Atlee Phillips 1
There’s no doubt you are easily the

most interesting and fascinating fig-
ure the intelligence world has
produced, and a living legend.
—Clair Booth Luce 2
Mr. A. is an institution.
——William Colby 3
Whatever genre they work in—history, journalism, literature, or film—observ-

ers of the intelligence scene find James Angleton endlessly fascinating. 4 The
longtime head of counterintelligence (CI) at the Central Intelligence Agency has
been the subject, in whole or substantial part, of dozens of books, articles, and
films, including five in the past three years. Beyond the vicarious appeal of look-
ing at the shadowy world of moles, double agents, traitors, and deceptions, the
enduring interest in Angleton is understandable, for he was one of the most influ-
ential and divisive intelligence officers in US history. He shaped CIA counterin-
telligence for better or worse for 20 years from 1954 to 1974—nearly half of the
1 David Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 189.
2 Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1991), 30.
3 Ibid., 307. At the time Colby was head of CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO).
4 The title of this article is derived from one of Angleton’s favorite poems, “Gerontion” by T.S. Eliot: “After
such knowledge, what forgiveness? Think Now/History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors/
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions/Guides us by vanities. Think now.” Angleton took his signa-
ture phrase “wilderness of mirrors” from this poem.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in
the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual
statements and interpretations.

Angleton in Literature and Film
Agency’s Cold War existence—and his eccentricities and excesses have been
widely portrayed as paradigmatic of how not to conduct counterintelligence.
Angleton’s career ended abruptly amid controversy over damaging disclosures

about Agency domestic operations that forever changed the place of intelligence
in the American political system. Angleton’s real and perceived legacy still influ-
ences counterintelligence practices in the US government and public perceptions
of CIA.
Yet the lore about Angleton is more familiar than his ideas, accomplishments,
and true shortcomings because much of the publicly available information about
him is highly partisan, generated by a range of intelligence veterans, scholars,
journalists, and fiction and film writers who have maligned or embellished his
career to the point that much of what is supposedly known of him is a mix of fact
and fiction.
Delving into the Angletonian library is a Rashomon-like experience. As one

scholar of Angleton has written with only mild exaggeration, “One could ask a
hundred people about [him] and receive a hundred lightly shaded different
replies that ranged from utter denunciation to unadulterated hero worship. That
the positions could occupy these extremes spoke of the significance and the ambi-
guity of the role he had played.” 5
What do we know, and what do we think we know, about perhaps the Agency’s
most compelling and caricatured figure, and what else can we reliably say until
still unrevealed information about him becomes available?
Biographical Backdrop
Before venturing into an analysis of how others have depicted Angleton, the
salient facts of his biography should be presented. 6 Angleton was born in Boise,
Idaho, in 1917 and grew up mostly in Italy, where his father owned the National
Cash Register subsidiary. He attended an English preparatory school before
entering Yale in 1937. He majored in English Literature and edited a poetry
review called Furioso that published the works of T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and oth-
ers. He entered Harvard Law School and then joined the Army in 1943.
Angleton was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services and first worked in
the super-secret X-2 counterintelligence branch in London. It was here that
Angleton learned to be so hyperconscious about security. X-2 was the only OSS
component cleared to receive raw ULTRA material, intercepted German military
communications sent via the Enigma encryption machine. He also knew about
the DOUBLE CROSS and FORTITUDE deception operations that were paving
5 Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New York: William Morrow,
1987), 437.
6 One persistent misunderstanding about Angleton to dispense with straight away involves his middle
name, Jesus. Practically everyone who writes or talks about Angleton uses it—to what end is unclear—but
he never did, and as an Anglophile, he avoided calling attention to that prominent reminder of his half-
Mexican parentage. He always signed documents just with “James Angleton,” in a crabbed, slightly shaky
script that would fascinate graphologists.

the way for the Normandy invasion. The success of these operations was one rea-
son for his later belief in Soviet “strategic deception.”
Angleton next served in the X-2 unit in Rome, where he was codenamed ARTI-
FICE. 7 He was an innovative field operative and rose to be chief of all X-2 opera-
tions in Italy by the end of the war. When the OSS disbanded in 1945, Angleton
stayed in Italy to run operations for the successor organizations to OSS. After he
moved into CIA’s espionage and counterintelligence component in 1947, he
became the Agency’s liaison to Western counterpart services. In 1954, he became
the head of the new Counterintelligence Staff. He would remain in that job for
the rest of his career.
Separating Fable and Fact
From this biography, Angleton’s portrayers have drawn frequently contradic-

tory and unverifiable information and assertions that almost seem too great for
one person to embody. Angleton, some of them say, was a paranoid who effec-
tively shut down Agency operations against the Soviet Union for years during his
Ahab-like quest for the mole in CIA. He received copies of all operational cables
so he could veto recruitments and squelch reports from sources he delusively
thought were bad. He had a “no knock” privilege to enter the DCI’s office unan-
nounced any time he pleased. He ordered the incarceration and hostile interroga-
tion of KGB defector Yuri Nosenko. And he had a bevy of nicknames that
included “Mother,” “Virginia Slim,” “Skinny Jim,” “the Gray Ghost,” “the Black
Knight,” “the Fisherman,” and “Scarecrow.” None of these claims is completely
true or demonstrable. 8
What is known for sure about Angleton is more complicated and captivating. He
looked like a character in a spy novel and had unconventional work habits and
mannerisms. A magazine profile of him aptly stated that “If John le Carré and
Graham Greene had collaborated on a superspy, the result might have been
James Jesus Angleton.” 9
Angleton possessed a brilliant intellect and extensive knowledge of current and

historical Soviet operations, although his sometimes convoluted descriptions of
case histories affected people differently. While his colleague William Hood said
that he “would sometimes add a full dimension” to an operational discussion,
former DCI James Schlesinger recalled that listening to him was “like looking at
an Impressionist painting.” 10 Angleton was fervently anti-communist, continu-
ally discoursing on “the nature of the [Soviet] threat,” and ardently supported
Israel; his control of that country’s account at CIA, an administrative anomaly,
7 See Timothy J. Naftali, “ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy,” in The Secrets War: The
Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington, DC: National Archives and
Records Administration, 1992), 218–45.
8 The only nickname that others are reliably said to have used for Angleton was “the Cadaver,” by some men
in his unit just after World War II ended, referring to his gaunt appearance. Winks, “Artifice” 372.
9 David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 216.
10 Working Group on Intelligence Reform, Myths Surrounding James Angleton (Washington, DC: Consor-
tium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 15; Mangold, 153.

was one of the foundations of his influence. The two qualities were interrelated
operationally, as he saw Israel as a bastion against the Soviet Union.
Secretive and suspicious, Angleton had a compulsive approach to anything he

took on—whether hunting spies, raising orchids, or catching trout—and sur-
rounded himself and his staff with an aura of mystery, hinting at dark secrets
and intrigues too sensitive to share. Some of that mystique carried over from his
OSS days, and some of it he cultivated as a tactic to advance his interests at CIA.
He ran vest pocket operations and compiled extensive files that he kept out of the
regular Agency records system. He believed the values of Western democracies
left them vulnerable to intelligence attack—especially deception—and so he sat
on some actionable information if he thought it was unverifiable or counterfeit.
Angleton often was arrogant, tactless, dismissive, and even threatening toward
professional colleagues who disagreed with him. Outside the bounds of Agency
business, which for him were expansive and caused his family life to suffer,
Angleton could be charming and had many close and loyal friends and a wide
assortment of interests. One way or another, he always left a lasting impression
on those who met him.
An even-handed assessment of Angleton’s career would discern two distinct

phases to it, although most of his detractors concentrate on the second. From the
late 1940s to the early 1960s, he and his staff provided a useful voice of caution
in an Agency seized with piercing the Iron Curtain to learn about Soviet inten-
tions and capabilities. For roughly the next 10 years, distracted by unsubstanti-
ated theories of Soviet “strategic deception,” Angleton and his staff embarked on
counterproductive and sometimes harmful efforts to find moles and prove Mos-
cow’s malevolent designs.
What makes Angleton such a conundrum for the historian and biographer is that
he was losing his sense of proportion and his ability to live with uncertainty right
around the time, 1959–63, when it became startlingly evident—agents compro-
mised, operations blown, spies uncovered—that something was seriously amiss
with Western intelligence and more aggressive CI and security were needed. 11
Given the Soviets’ record of success at penetration and deception operations going
back to the 1920s, and with no current evidence to the contrary, Angleton was jus-
tified in presuming CIA also was victimized. However, there was no other source,
human or technical, that he could use to guide him on the molehunt—only his
favored source, KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn, and their symbiotic relationship
soon became professionally unbalanced as the manipulative and self-promoting
defector’s allegations of international treachery grew more fantastical.
Overall, Angleton’s negatives outweighed his positives. First, among the latter:
While he was running CIA counterintelligence, there were no known Soviet pene-
trations of the Agency besides “Sasha” (the extent to which Angleton deserves
credit for that is arguable). Information from, or assistance by, him and the CI
11 The defection to the Soviet Union of Angleton’s erstwhile friend, MI6 officer “Kim” Philby, in 1963 con-
firmed years of suspicion that he was a KGB agent and certainly reinforced Angleton’s sense that Western
intelligence had been pervasively betrayed to Moscow.

Staff helped uncover, or prepared the way for later discovery of, Soviet espionage
operations in several Western countries. He maintained good relations with the
FBI at the working level, helping mitigate longstanding interagency hostility fos-
tered mostly by J. Edgar Hoover. And he contributed to the establishment of
counterintelligence as an independent discipline of the intelligence profession
with resources and influence at CIA.
The negatives preponderate, however. By fixating on the Soviets, Angleton

largely ignored the threat that other hostile services posed—notably the East
Germans, Czechs, Chinese, and Cubans. His operational officers were so deeply
involved with defensive CI (molehunting) that they did not contribute nearly
enough to offensive (counterespionage) operations. He became far too dependent
on Golitsyn and consequently mishandled some cases (although in two of them,
in Norway and Canada, the real spies were found eventually). He held to his dis-
information-based interpretations of certain world events—the Sino-Soviet split,
Tito’s estrangement from Moscow—long after they were discredited. His skill at
bureaucratic infighting belied his administrative sloppiness. Lastly, he grew too
isolated later in his career, and his security consciousness became self-consum-
ing and stultifying for his staff.
Even without the sensational New York Times front-page story by Seymour
Hersh in December 1974 about CIA domestic operations that prompted Angle-
ton’s dismissal, it was more than time for him to go, as even his longtime
defender Richard Helms came to admit. 12 Many people will remember Angleton
only for two of his last publicized appearances: drunk, disheveled, and disori-
ented when a media mob confronted him at his home the morning after he was
fired; and cagey, elusive, and defiant while testifying before the Church Commit-
tee several months later. 13 Very quickly after he left Langley, an anti-Angleton
orthodoxy set in at the Agency and coincided with the intelligence scandals of the
mid-1970s and a public backlash against CIA that profoundly influenced subse-
quent interpretations of Angleton.
The “Real” Angleton
Historians and journalists have produced what seems in overview to be a work-

able bibliography on Angleton, 14 but it has gaps in coverage and flaws in scholar-
ship and lacks focus. This nonfiction corpus began appearing after Angleton’s
12 Seymour Hersh, “Huge CIA Operation Reported in US Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in
Nixon Years,” New York Times, 22 December 1974: A1; Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look Over My
Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), 284.
13 It was in the latter circumstance that Angleton confirmed that in a deposition he had asserted “It is
inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the
government,” and then backpedaled from it, saying, “If it is accurate, it should not have been said…I had
been imprudent in making those remarks…I withdraw that statement…the entire speculation should not
have been engaged in.” Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, First Session, Volume 2, Huston
Plan (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 72, 73.
14 This writer’s previous foray into the subject was “Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and
CIA Counterintelligence,” Journal of Intelligence History 3:2 (Winter 2003): 21–49, posted on cia.gov, along
with this issue, with the journal’s permission.

high-profile firing generated extensive interest in the mysteries of counterintelli-

gence, and pro- and anti-Angleton voices made themselves heard. Because most
of the documentation for the cases Angleton worked on remains classified, these
accounts rely heavily on interviews—many of them unattributed—and unsourced
information from former US intelligence officers who generally agree with the
authors’ perspectives. There are at least several dozen nonfiction works that deal
with Angleton in some detail, so only those that are about him principally or
exclusively will be described here. 15
Edward Jay Epstein, Legend and Deception. 16

Epstein, a journalist and currently a columnist for Slate, became Angleton’s
most prolific ally in his post-dismissal, behind-the-scenes campaign for vindica-
tion. In Legend, Epstein first publicized the clashes inside CIA over the bona
fides of Yuri Nosenko and drew attention to the deception and penetration theo-
ries of Angleton and his prize source, Anatoli Golitsyn. Angleton and like-minded
former Agency and FBI officers provided Epstein with much unsourced, still-clas-
sified information for Legend. He acknowledged their assistance in Deception,
published two years after Angleton died in 1987. In later articles, Epstein contin-
ued with most of the same apologetic themes but did become more skeptical of
the Angleton-Golitsyn interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. Most recently, he
noted that the observation of Aldrich Ames’s KGB handler that Angleton’s suspi-
cions about a mole inside CIA “has the exquisite irony of a stalker following his
victim in order to tell him he is not being followed.”
David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors. 17

Martin has been a national security reporter for CBS News since 1993 and had
covered intelligence affairs for the Associated Press and Newsweek when this
seminal book was published nearly 30 years ago. Despite its age, Wilderness of
Mirrors remains the most balanced treatment of Angleton and CIA counterintel-
ligence. It helped deflate the emerging Angleton mythology and established a
more objective frame of reference within which to evaluate the merits of the duel-
ing defectors Golitsyn and Nosenko. The book is not solely about Angleton, how-
ever—it examines in parallel, and sometimes disjointedly, CIA covert actions
against Castro and the career of FBI agent and CIA officer William Harvey—and
it lacks sourcing—there are no footnotes or bibliography, and Martin does not
identify where he got much of his specific information. Angleton initially cooper-
ated with Martin but cut off contact when he learned that the author also was in
touch with some of his critics. One of them was Clare Petty, an ex-CI Staff officer
who had come to believe that Angleton was either a fraud or a KGB asset.
15 Turn to the end of this article for a list of other books, articles, and a Web site for materials on Angleton
that are worth noting for their facts and often starkly varying perspectives.
16 Edward Jay Epstein, Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978) and
Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). See also
Epstein’s articles “The War Within the CIA,” Commentary, August 1978; “Who Killed the CIA?,” ibid., Octo-
ber 1985; “Was Angleton Right?,” Wall Street Journal, 30 December 2004; and “Through the Looking Glass”
(undated), all posted on his Web site, www.edwardjayepstein.com. The quote that follows comes from the
Wall Street Journal piece.
17 New York: Harper and Row, 1980. The 2003 paperback reprint adds the overwrought subtitle Intrigue, De-
ception, and the Secrets That Destroyed Two of the Cold War’s Most Important Agents.

Yuri Nosenko, KGB. 18

An unusual early entrant into the nonfiction (with an asterisk) category was a
made-for-television movie that appeared on BBC-TV in the United Kingdom and
HBO in the United States in 1986. It tells the Nosenko story through the eyes of
the CIA case officer who initially ran him but, when confronted with Angleton’s
Golitsyn-inspired suspicions, turns on the defector and tries to “break” him
through hostile interrogation and solitary confinement. The well-staged docu-
drama avoids emotionalism, gets most of the atmospherics and personalities
right, and features remarkable look-alikes for Angleton and Helms. Some minor
historical and tradecraft errors will be apparent to knowledgeable viewers.
Epstein served as a “program consultant,” which explains the film’s pro-Angle-
ton slant. 19
Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown. 20

In a chapter titled “The Theorist,” the late Yale history professor presented the
most insightful biographical sketch of Angleton yet written (in part derived from
conversations with its subject). Winks avoided the sinister allusions and arm-
chair psychology that mar other accounts. His detailed examination of Angleton
in the OSS captured the formative effect that fighting World War II from the
cloister of X-2 had on the fledgling operations officer’s conceptions of CI theory
and practice.
Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior. 21

A BBC correspondent at the time, Mangold produced what still is the most fac-
tually detailed, thoroughly researched study of Angleton. Cold Warrior is not,
however, a cradle-to-grave biography and does not cover all aspects of Angleton’s
CIA career. Rather, it is the “prosecution’s brief ” against him for the molehunt.
Mangold is unsparingly critical, rendering all either/or judgments in the nega-
tive. He concludes that counterintelligence in several Western services suffered
at Angleton’s hands—notably during his later years—when its practitioners most
needed to exhibit intellectual honesty and operational discernment. Journalistic
flourishes, such as clipped prose and catchy “sign-off lines” that more properly
belong on a newscast, and a derogatory designation of Angleton and his kindred
spirits as “fundamentalists” detract from an otherwise readable book. More over-
drawn but still worth watching is the spin-off documentary Spyhunter that aired
on the Public Broadcasting Service’s “Frontline” series in May 1991.
David Wise, Molehunt. 22

The doyen of intelligence journalists, Wise started a biography of Angleton, but
when Mangold beat him to it, he salvaged his project by focusing on the search
for “Sasha”—the alleged Soviet mole inside the CIA. Wise drew on many of Mar-
tin’s and Mangold’s sources but also turned up new information from previously
18 Directed by Mick Jackson; screenplay by Stephen Davis; US release 7 September 1986.

19 The movie set off a spirited exchange among some Agency veterans—Mark Wyatt, Leonard McCoy, “Steve
Daley” (the screen name for Nosenko’s handler, Tennent H. Bagley), and Joseph Evans—in the pages of the
Central Intelligence Retirees Association newsletter during 1986–87.
20 See note 5.
21 See note 2.
22 Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA (New York: Random House, 1992).

silent Agency officers and in formerly classified records, including about compen-
sation provided to victims of the molehunt. Wise also revealed details about the
penetration agent, who did not damage CIA nearly as much as Angleton feared
or as the molehunt itself did—although he goes well beyond the facts to claim
that the search “shattered” the Agency.
Cleveland Cram, Of Moles and Molehunters. 23

Cram was a career CIA operations officer who returned to the Agency after
Angleton was gone to write a lengthy, still-classified history of the CI Staff. In
public remarks and writings based on his research, Cram strongly disparaged
Angleton. That attitude sometimes is displayed in Of Moles and Molehunters, a
unique and valuable historiographical survey of counterintelligence publications
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.
Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith,

Richard Helms as DCI. 24
In this formerly classified publication of the CIA History Staff, then-Agency his-
torian Hathaway wrote a highly unfavorable chapter on Angleton based not on
in-depth archival research but mainly on critical internal surveys prepared in the
years soon after his dismissal and on interviews mostly with CIA retirees unfa-
vorably disposed to him. Another limitation of Hathaway’s treatment as a contri-
bution to Angleton scholarship is that, in keeping with the focus of the book,
Helms’s attitudes toward the CI chief and the practice of counterintelligence get
as much attention as Angleton and the prominent cases he was associated with
at the time. The MHCHAOS domestic espionage program, for example, is han-
dled in that matter, so Angleton’s limited role in it—overstated in Hersh’s
exposé—does not get emphasized.
Working Group on Intelligence Reform,

Myths Surrounding James Angleton. 25
Underscoring the bipolar nature of perceptions about Angleton, two former CIA
officers and an FBI senior manager who knew and worked with him—William
Hood, Samuel Halpern, and James Nolan—offered mainly sympathetic observa-
tions of him at a symposium held the same year that Hathaway’s critique was
published. In the discussion afterward, their undocumented recollections and
assessments got a mixed reception from the intelligence professionals in atten-
dance—many of whom likewise knew and worked with Angleton.
23 Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977–92 (Washington, DC: CIA
Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993). The monograph is available on cia.gov at https://www.cia.gov/li-
brary/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/index.html.
24 Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966–1973 (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1993);
declassified in July 2006 and available on CIA’s public Web site at www.foia.cia.gov. The book carries the dis-
claimer that “while this is an official publication of the CIA History Staff, the views expressed…are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CIA” (ix).
25 Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.

Gérald Arboit, James Angleton, le Contre-espion de la CIA. 26

Arboit, a historian at the University of Strasbourg, has written the only book
about Angleton in French. Beyond that and some thoughts on portrayals of
Angleton in popular culture, its stereotyped depiction of him and CIA counterin-
telligence as deranged—Arboit uses “paranoid” and “madness” liberally—adds
little to an understanding of a complex story.
Tennent H. Bagley, Spy Wars. 27

The CIA operations officer who had the dubious fortune of handling Nosenko
has written a combative and sometimes confusing rebuttal to the criticisms of
how Angleton and others approached that case—the presumption that Nosenko
was a false defector dispatched to discredit Golitsyn and assert that the KGB had
nothing to do with the JFK assassination. Bagley denies the oft-repeated charge
that he initially believed Nosenko was bona fide but then fell under Angleton’s
and Golitsyn’s sway and embraced their conspiratorial world view that would
later be called “sick think.”
Instead, in a detailed and often hard-to-follow case review, Bagley insists that
Nosenko’s first contact with CIA in 1962 was designed to conceal the presence of
Soviet penetration agents who had been operating in US intelligence since at
least the late 1950s and that his reappearance barely two months after the JFK
murder was a risky change in the operation. Bagley unsparingly attacks the
defector’s defenders, who he believes have besmirched his own reputation, and he
has challenged them to answer 20 questions about the case, claiming that a “no”
to any one of them would be enough to discredit Nosenko and substantiate Angle-
ton’s view that the defector was dispatched. Critics of Spy Wars have noted Bag-
ley’s reliance on unnamed former KGB officers as sources for essential (some
would say convenient) information.
Michael Holzman, James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of
Intelligence. 28
Holzman is an independent scholar with a doctorate in literature who, he says,
set out to write a study of an interpretive school of literary thought called the
New Criticism that was prominent at Yale when Angleton attended, and then
decided to use it as a way to divine the meaning of Angleton’s approach to coun-
terintelligence. In essence, Holzman contends that only people trained in the
New Criticism, which emphasized ambiguity and multiple simultaneous levels of
meaning, could think they really understood all the nuances and intricacies of CI.
Whatever the intellectual cause and effect the school had on Angleton, Winks
deals with it more economically and less esoterically.
Holzman offers some new information on Angleton’s personal life and poetic inter-
ests, but his recounting of Angleton’s intelligence career follows the usual well-worn
26 Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2007. Translated, the title reads “James Angleton: CIA Counterspy.” Arboit has
distilled most of the book’s discussion of Angleton’s notorious molehunt in an article, “In His Defector He
Trusted: How the CIA Counterintelligence Staff Broke the Western Intelligence Community for Ten Years,”
posted on the Web site of the Centre Français de Recherché sur le Renseignment, www.cf2r.org/fr.
27 Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007).
28 Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008.

tracks. He does, however, give the earlier years their due instead of hurtling into the
1960s like most other writers. Holzman’s research is reasonably thorough,29 but for
a literary critic he uses secondary sources with a surprisingly unquestioning atti-
tude, and he makes many careless mistakes with dates, organizations, and people.
The narrative is cluttered with several pedantic or politically loaded asides and
digressions into CIA and FBI activities that Angleton was aware of but not directly
involved in, such as anti-Castro plots and COINTELPRO. The extensive treatment
of MHCHAOS repeats much of what has been known since the Church Committee
report of 1976 and serves as a set piece for Holzman to express his moral outrage at
the “STASI-like mentality” (44) behind the US government’s post-9/11 counterter-
rorism and internal security measures.
The Fictional Angleton
Angleton looms so large in modern American intelligence that he has tran-

scended mere history and entered the realm of book and film fiction. One reason
why the conventional wisdom about him is so tenaciously held is that the clichéd
image of him purveyed in several novels and films has reached a wider audience
than nonfiction works. Literary license has obscured historical reality and made
achieving an understanding of him all the harder. Characters in some novels,
such as Norman Mailer’s Harlot’s Ghost and David Morrell’s The Brotherhood of
the Rose, are loosely based on Angleton, and he appears postmortem in Chris
Petit’s The Passenger. 30 This discussion will look only at novels and movies in
which Angleton clearly is portrayed as a major character, whether in fictional or
true name, in a realistic setting.
Aaron Latham, Orchids for Mother. 31

One reviewer’s blurb on the paperback edition of this roman à clef declares that
“some things can only be said in fiction, but that doesn’t mean they are not true.”
The problem with that statement is that little the book says about its main char-
acter is true. Latham’s often outrageous novel about the bureaucratic feud
between counterintelligence chief “Francis Xavier Kimball” and DCI “Ernest
O’Hara” (William Colby) is the source of more misconceptions about Angleton
than any other work—starting with the title containing his supposed nickname,
which nobody ever used for him. 32
Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, The Spike. 33

The writers—friends and admirers of Angleton—place him in this conspiracist
tale in the role of a counterintelligence sage, dismissed from service, who uses
29 Although he cites some, Holzman appears unfamiliar with the publications of the Center for the Study of
Intelligence, which he claims “can be relied upon as accurate depictions of what the Agency wishes to be
known and thought about its activities” (337 n. 92). Regular users of CSI products know that they often are
critical of CIA’s performance in many areas.
30 Winks, an aficionado of spy fiction, identified many others in Cloak and Gown, 539 n. 14.
31 Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.
32 Some Web sites, including until recently Wikipedia, say that Angleton’s CIA cryptonym was KUMOTHER,
but no such term existed. The pseudonym used for him in Agency cable traffic was Hugh N. Ashmead. Wise,
32.
33 New York: Crown Publishers, 1980.

revelations from a high-level KGB defector to save the United States from an evil
Kremlin plot that employs Soviet agents infiltrated throughout the US govern-
ment. The book is as far-fetched and misguided about Angleton from its right-
wing perspective as Orchids for Mother is from Latham’s leftist viewpoint.
William F. Buckley, Jr., Spytime. 34

Buckley—oddly, given his conservative views—appropriates most of Latham’s
motifs and perpetuates some of their inaccuracies in this clumsy and contrived
work that is far inferior to the entertaining Blackford Oakes tales. Whereas some
of Latham’s off-the-wall statements can be attributed to parody, Buckley’s
approach is too sober to allow that excuse. His Angleton is dull and unappealing,
and he resuscitates the unoriginal idea that Colby, who fired Angleton, is the
long-sought Soviet mole in CIA (and, more imaginatively, the “Fifth Man” in the
Cambridge spy ring). As one reviewer wrote, “Both deserve better treatment than
their reputations receive in this book.” 35
Robert Littell, The Company. 36

Reviewers have touted Littell as “the American le Carré,” and although his
prose is far inferior to that of George Smiley’s creator, he generally displays a
sophisticated sense of tradecraft in his usually stark plots. However, in this
bloated saga of the Cold War CIA, Littell propagates much folklore and misinfor-
mation about Angleton, who appears in true name along with other Agency lumi-
naries such as Frank Wisner, Allen Dulles, and Colby. Littell’s portrayals of
Angleton’s idiosyncrasies occasionally border on the (unintentionally) comical,
and the idea that the CI Staff chief could order the imprisonment and torture of
an Agency officer suspected of being a Soviet mole is preposterous. The TNT tele-
vision network’s film version of the book by the same name that appeared in
2007 is much better. 37 Some suspension of disbelief is required to watch Michael
Keaton in a trench coat and homburg instead of a Batman costume, but he cap-
tures Angleton’s quirky habits and often obsessive personality just about right.
The Good Shepherd. 38

This 2006 film was marketed as the “untold story” and “hidden history” of CIA,
unlike other movies that used the Agency as a vehicle to present a transparently
fictional plot or as part of a historical backdrop for made-up characters acting in
real-life settings. However, as the CIA History Staff has indicated in this publica-
tion, 39 The Good Shepherd is a “propagandamentary” similar to Oliver Stone’s
JFK that mangles and fabricates history for political purposes. Its lifeless main
character, “Edward Wilson,” purportedly is based on Angleton—when the plot
requires he also stands in for other Agency operatives—but to borrow from the
standard movie disclaimer, any resemblance between Wilson and persons living
or dead is mostly coincidental. 40
34 Spytime: The Undoing of James Jesus Angleton (New York: Harcourt, 2000).
35 Benjamin B. Fischer, review of Spytime in CIRA Newsletter 26 (Spring 2001), 55.
36 Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002.
37 Directed by Mikael Salomon; teleplay by Ken Nolan; released 5 August 2007.
38 Directed by Robert DeNiro; screenplay by Eric Roth; released 22 December 2006.
39 Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 1 (2007): 47–54.

What’s Left to Say?
Michael Holzman has perceptively pointed out that the open literature on
Angleton
is narrowly focused on the Great Molehunt, which is an indication, among other

things, of the interests of his former colleagues, the ultimate source of much of that
literature. It is, in its way, insiders’ history, concerned with the internal history of
the Central Intelligence Agency, concerned with continuing bureaucratic battles
among the file cabinets and between the covers of books, some scholarly, some not.
It is, ultimately, not the history of the winners, but simply that of the survivors.”41
His comment addresses the perennial challenge for those who approach any his-
torical topic: the inadequacies of the available evidence. Documentation is incom-
plete and not fully trustworthy, and memories are fallible and subject to bias.
Coming to a reasonable degree of historical closure is more difficult in a case like

Angleton’s, where emotions are involved and reputations are at stake; where people
and institutions have established unwavering positions on controversial subjects;
and where evidence is sparse or no longer available,42 and what does exist is open to
different interpretations. Declassification of the primary case files is essential to
fully understand the Angleton era and its impact; synopses and analyses derived
from file research are useful only up to a point. How, for example, can the Golitsyn-
Nosenko dispute be resolved when scholars are limited to weighing Tennent Bag-
ley’s “Evaluation of the Bona Fides of Yuri Nosenko” against John Hart’s “Monster
Plot”?43 They are incompatible versions of the same information and events and
cannot be compounded into a synthesis. Like chemistry, the historical imagination
has its limits.
But the raw details of CI operations are among any service’s most closely guarded
secrets, and properly so. Angleton reportedly once said that “if you control counter-
intelligence, you control the intelligence service.”44 The same may well apply to a
historical understanding of CIA counterintelligence. Necessary restrictions on infor-
mation about the enterprise that he considered the foundation of all other intelli-
gence work probably will prevent us from seeing the reality of him and instead
consign us to continue looking at shadows and reflections. Angleton may remain to
history, as he fancied himself in life, an enigma.
❖ ❖ ❖
40 Most recently on film (2009), an Angleton-like character (tall, thin, trench coat, brimmed hat) appears as a
senior CIA executive in An American Affair, which is loosely based on the real-life relationship between Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy and Mary Pinchot Meyer, ex-wife of Agency covert action chief Cord Meyer. Mary Meyer
was killed in 1964 under strange circumstances, and Angleton had an odd role afterward in keeping the pres-
idential affair quiet. See Nina Burleigh, A Very Private Woman: The Life and Unsolved Murder of Presidential
Mistress Mary Meyer (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), 245–49. Presumably in the same vein, Angleton is list-
ed as appearing in a forthcoming (2010) documentary, Murder on Fifth Helena Drive, about the death of the
Kennedy brothers’ alleged paramour, Marilyn Monroe. See the Internet Movie Database at www.imdb.com/ti-
tle/tt1083463.
41 Holzman, 224.
42 Many records on Angleton’s freelance activities and the CI Staff ’s domestic operations were destroyed after
his dismissal.
43 Both documents are posted on the Agency’s FOIA Web site. John Hart was a former Agency operations of-
ficer who DCI Stansfield Turner brought out of retirement to review CIA’s handling of Nosenko.
44 Mangold, 47.

Also Worth Reading
• Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors (London:

Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988)
• William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978)
• Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelli-
gence (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995)
• John Hart, The CIA’s Russians (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003)
• Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the
Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003)
• Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992)
• Seymour Hersh, “The Angleton Story,” New York Times Magazine, 25 June
1978: 13–18ff.
• Angus MacKenzie, Secrets: The CIA’s War at Home (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1997)
• Ted Morgan, A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, and

Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1997)
• Thomas Powers, “Spook of Spooks,” New York Review of Books, 17 August 1989:
40–43, reprinted as “The Riddle Inside the Enigma” in Powers, Intelligence
Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda (New York: New York
Review Books, 2002), 109–25
• Mark Reibling, Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1994)
• Nigel West, A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945–1972 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol-
son, 1982) and The Circus: MI5 Operations, 1945–1972 (New York: Stein and
Day, 1983)
• Peter Wright with Paul Greenglass, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a

Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987)
• The Web site of the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies
(www.cicentre.org), which provides CI training to the federal government, con-
tains a large variety of materials on Angleton—declassified documents,
interviews, speeches, quotes, articles, book reviews, and reading lists—that is
exclusively critical of him.
❖ ❖ ❖

Intelligence in Public Literature
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small

Wars in the Midst of a Big One
By David Kilcullen. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 340 pp., index.
Reviewed by Matthew P.
David Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerrilla is at once an intellectual memoir of the

author’s field research, a contribution to the academic discourse on counterinsur-
gency and counterterrorism, and a prescription for the Western establishment to
manage more smartly the many smaller conflicts included in the so-called war on
terror. Kilcullen—a former Australian army officer who has served as a civilian
adviser to the US government on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism,
including during the 2007 surge of US forces in Iraq—argues that the vast major-
ity of persons the West faces in these conflicts had no initial intention of fighting
but instead were moved to action by an extremist minority. Therefore the West
should pursue courses that counteract the conditions that allow extremists to
manipulate segments of populations into becoming “accidental” guerrillas rather
than targeting certain individuals or groups. Engaging conflicts in the way Kil-
cullen suggests would have profound implications for intelligence.
Kilcullen examines recent activity in several theaters, primarily Afghanistan

(2006–2008) and Iraq (2006–2007), and to lesser extents East Timor (1999–2000),
southern Thailand (2004–2007), the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA) of Pakistan (2006–2008), and immigrant communities in Europe. Though
not all of Kilcullen’s case studies are in Muslim areas, Islam figures prominently
because of the frequency with which insurgent or terrorist activity is a function
of takfiri Islam, which professes conversion to Islam by force and death for the
unwilling—as a recurring script for violent resistance.
In looking at these cases the author uses a medical analogy suggesting phases
of an infectious disease: “infection”—the entry of extremists into a vulnerable
area; “contagion”—the spread of extremist influence; “intervention”—the engage-
ment of establishment, often Western-partnered, security services; “rejection”—
the hoped-for elimination of the insurgent or terrorist group by the population.
What does Kilcullen suggest? Western intervention—if done at all— should be

low-profile and should demonstrate that the West is advocating the well-being of
populations and not imposing outside systems—no matter how altruistic or ratio-
nal in Western eyes. Strategies should emphasize the population: building trust,
creating good governance, establishing credible security services, maintaining
relationships with local officials, and marketing the success of all of the above to
those in the population who are wavering. Overwhelming use of force and search-
and-destroy techniques that risk high collateral damage and rally locals in oppo-

Book Review: The Accidental Guerrilla
sition should be avoided—though he does not dismiss selective operations against

terrorist or insurgent leaders.
Kilcullen’s case study of the construction of the road through Afghanistan’s

Kunar Province during 2007–2008 illustrates how these practices can be carried
out and demonstrated that the engagement of the local population in the plan-
ning, construction, and security of the operation mattered more than the road
itself. Similarly, he points out, success in Iraq involved bringing tribes and insur-
gent groups into sanctioned security arrangements and gave locals alternatives
to the extremist option.
The success of Kilcullen’s approach would seem to require intense partnering of

intervening forces with the governments, especially the security and intelligence
services, of the host countries, a subject that would benefit from further study.
Local governments themselves must consider the repercussions of moves against
violent Islamist movements in their borders. In some cases, a host government or
security service might actually want to perpetuate traditional Western counterter-
rorist practices and lexicon—for example, by getting its internal oppositionists on
certain terrorist lists or military classifications (foreign terrorist, common enemy,
etc.) a host government may acquire new Western funding, legal authorities, and
more powerful tools with which the host government can suppress its internal
opposition. Kilcullen’s thesis would have applications here, and it would be profit-
able to inquire further into how to manage these host interests.
Given the profound role intelligence would have to play, Kilcullen says surpris-
ingly little of specific intelligence entities, though at one point he lauds the World
War II–era US Office of Strategic Services as a model for civilian-military inter-
action with a strategic purpose. As he stresses, counteracting conditions that
extremists exploit requires intimacy with the local environments. Collecting,
analyzing, and articulating objective ground truth to decisionmakers are essen-
tial. Also important are covert, unconventional warfare options—an “indirect
approach that ruthlessly minimizes American presence” (285). These might
include propaganda and counterpropaganda; increased liaison relationships with
(and presumably, penetrations of) host-country intelligence services; assistance to
selected local leaders or groups to increase their patronage and authority to serve
as vessels of influence; support to community programs, e.g. civic centers; health
care; moderate (in the case of religious-based) educational institutions; and, more
broadly, elevation of expertise in the Western intelligence community.
Overall, Kilcullen’s thesis is convincing, and the book is a notable addition to

the literature of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in providing another
antidote to the “enemy-centric” doctrines that have often failed and to the over-
simplification of the lexicon of the war on terror. Both have tended to obscure the
complex realities of local conditions and prevented adoption of the best solutions.
Even if concepts Kilcullen has raised are familiar to recent Western military and
intelligence practitioners and students of guerrilla conflict, The Accidental Guer-
rilla presents a systematic way of looking, based on smart analysis and research,
at the complexities of global strategy in this age.
❖ ❖ ❖

Vietnam Declassified: CIA and

Counterinsurgency in Vietnam
Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 480 pp., index.
Hayden Peake
In his preface to Vietnam Declassified, Thomas Ahern writes that when he left
Vietnam in 1965, “I knew we were losing, but I had no idea why the Saigon gov-
ernment was in retreat in the countryside, and the VC ascendant.”(12) In this
book, originally published internally in 2001 as a classified history entitled CIA
and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam, Ahern provides many answers, formed
with the benefit of hindsight, deep research into classified documents, candid and
revealing interviews, and his own experience as a clandestine service officer. 1
Vietnam Declassified is narrowly focused on operations related to “the strug-

gle to suppress the Viet Cong and win the loyalty of the peasantry”(9), although
major military and political events are mentioned for context. The story is told
from the perspective of the CIA officers involved—many of whom are named—the
insurgents they battled, and the peasants they labored to empower. The narra-
tive covers six chronological periods. In the first, from 1954 to 1956, the Agency,
as a temporary expedient to get things going, dismissed orthodoxy and operated
with two distinct stations. One, labeled the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), was
headed by Col. Edward Lansdale, who reported to Allen Dulles. Its mission was
to establish military and civic action programs in the countryside where none
existed. The conventional station, subordinate to the Far East Division of the
Directorate of Plans (since renamed the Directorate of Operations and then the
National Clandestine Service), focused on rural political mobilization. While the
two stations cooperated on some projects, for the most part they operated in par-
allel, often with the reluctant toleration of the Diem government, which was
struggling to consolidate power on its terms. By the end of 1956 the SMM, hav-
ing laid some groundwork with the Diem government, left Vietnam, while the
conventional station continued the work in the provinces.
1 Ahern was an operations officer in the CIA for 35 years. He served five tours in Asia, including three in
Indochina. Since retirement, he has served as a CIA contract historian. A slightly redacted version of Rural
Pacification was released in 2006. Five other Ahern histories of CIA efforts in the region were declassified
with varying degrees of redaction in 2009. All six can be found at http://today.ttu.edu/2009/03/cia-releases-
documents-of-vietnam-war-era-intelligence/. Published in-house by the CIA History Staff of the Center for
the Study of Intelligence between 2001 and 2006, Ahern’s works have been widely used in the Intelligence
Community for education and training purposes. The last of the series, Undercover Armies: CIA and Surro-
gate Warfare in Laos, 1961–1973, is the most frequently accessed history book CSI has produced.

Book Review: Vietnam Declassified
Agency activity diminished during the second period (1956–61) as Diem

attempted to destroy communist elements in the countryside, alienating peas-
ants in the process. The station reasserted itself in the third period (1961–63) by
“launching a series of programs designed either to stimulate village self-defense
or attack the insurgent organization at the village level.”(17) Internal Vietnam-
ese conflicts persisted and Diem was overthrown in November 1963.
During the fourth period (1963–65) the Vietnamese generals competed for
power while station officers worked at the provincial level trying to find a suc-
cessful pacification formula. The fifth period (1966–69) was characterized by an
expansion of the pacification effort and the massive military buildup of US
troops, which eventually led to the unification of intelligence and countryside
action programs under the Military Assistance Command (Vietnam) or MACV.
The final period (1969–75) brought the Nixon policy of Vietnamization, which
sought to turn over CIA-sponsored programs to the Vietnamese. A major ele-
ment of this period was the Phoenix program—called Phung Hoang by the Viet-
namese. Its objective was to integrate “all government of Vietnam activities
against the VC” aimed at penetration of the VC and the collection of intelli-
gence.(295) The CIA provided advisory support. Ahern devotes considerable
space to the bureaucratic machinations from which this program evolved, its
operations in the field, and details of CIA support.
In the end, of course, CIA efforts to help the South Vietnamese in the country-
side failed. The reasons are evident in the pages of Vietnam Declassified. Ahern
quotes exchanges with Headquarters, cites conflicts with MACV, and documents
the complex political terrain. From the CIA standpoint, it battled for success with
two constituencies, one American, the other Vietnamese, and yet it never con-
ducted a comprehensive analysis of the insurgency’s political dynamics. The
Americans, under MACV’s rigid bureaucracy, first resisted involvement in and
then demanded control of all intelligence and counterinsurgency operations,
often with methods the CIA station considered counterproductive. The Vietnam-
ese insisted on the final say on all programs—it was, after all, their country. But
they could never control their own bureaucracies, whose competing equities led
them to interfere with agreed-upon CIA operations that were seen as challenges
to power.
The story is not one of unremitting failure, however. The success of the People’s
Action Teams (PATs), described in chapter 10, is an example of what could be
achieved. Informants were recruited to identify communist cadres and a civic action
program trained security teams and strengthened provincial administration. Roads
were repaired, haircuts given, security provided, and the villagers responded by
informing on VC forces. For a while it appeared that a workable formula had been
found for replacing the VC infrastructure and expanding “the government’s popular
base in the countryside.”(169) But attempts to sustain and expand the program and
others like it—the Rural Development (RD) operations conducted by the Marines,
for example—failed in battles of competing bureaucracies.
Ahern identifies many reasons for the collapse of the pacification efforts. Some
South Vietnamese recognized them as well. One general noted that commanders in
the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) were actively “sabotaging pacification,” charg-
ing the government itself with “preferring to let the US bear the burden of the

Book Review: Vietnam Declassified
war.”(313) Others cited “indifference and lack of empathy at all levels among Viet-
namese officials”(328), and there was corruption like the phantom platoons that
existed only on payrolls. It wasn’t until after the Tet Offensive of 1968 that
national mobilization was decreed, but it was never vigorously enforced. Despite all
the programs designed to disrupt VC infrastructure, it remained virtually intact.
One complicating factor was the decision of the Vietnamese government to treat
captured VC as criminals, not prisoners of war, with the result that after short sen-
tences they were free to return to the fight. (339) The Provincial Interrogation Cen-
ters posed additional difficulties. Cases of brutality resulted when old traditions
among the Vietnamese prevailed, a problem aggravated by the lack of trained
interrogators. The CIA regarded the practices “as not only inhumane but counter-
productive.”(367) In the end, Ahern concludes, “Whatever the theoretical merits of
democracy, the GVN version could not compete with the communists’ discipline
and cohesiveness, which the democratic forces lack.” (337)
Experiments conducted under flawed assumptions are likely to provide unsat-

isfactory outcomes. In the final chapter Ahern discusses what he believes to have
been the fatally flawed assumptions of the war in Southeast Asia, for example,
conflict in Vietnam was between communism and democracy rather than a bat-
tle for national liberation—this prejudiced policy and operations. Likewise, the
tenacity of the North Vietnamese was consistently misjudged, and operations
based on the assumption that resistance could be overcome by winning “hearts
and minds” had little chance of success, especially absent government efforts to
“mobilize the countryside.”(426) The assumption that the peasants abhorred VC-
style communism and longed for democracy also proved unjustified.
In this edition, Ahern includes a preface that reflects on the Vietnam prece-
dents and the lessons they suggest for battling insurgencies. The circumstances
are not identical, but the similarities are significant, though complicated by the
magnitude and complexities of an insurgency incorporating fanatical religious
beliefs. Still, the United States again faces the problems of foreign forces trying
to protect populations that do not fully participate in their own defense and the
alienation brought on by the destruction inherent in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorist operations. Ahern does not provide answers for today’s dilem-
mas, but he makes vividly clear what did not work when one nation tried to fight
another nation’s war. He also provides the foundation for a greater understand-
ing of the CIA’s potential roles in counterinsurgencies.
❖ ❖ ❖

OSS Training in the National Parks and

Service Abroad in World War II
By John Whiteclay Chambers, II. (Washington, DC: US National Park Service, 2008), 616 pages, with maps
and illustrations. Online at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/oss/index.htm
Reviewed by Clayton D. Laurie
Ostensibly a history of OSS interaction with the National Park Service (NPS),
specifically the use of parks as training grounds, OSS Training in the National
Parks and Service Abroad in World War II, by Rutgers University history profes-
sor John Whiteclay Chambers, II, is a much more comprehensive and detailed
account of the OSS than the title implies. Indeed, it is one of the more extensive
and well-researched histories to have appeared in several years, and it stands to
become one of the seminal books on the OSS when published by Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, as currently planned. Commissioned in 2004 to write just a NPS-OSS
study, Chambers convinced the park service of the need for a much broader his-
tory that placed OSS training activities in the overall context of OSS activities
during World War II and its importance as the first centralized intelligence orga-
nization in US history. The original concept expanded into the 600-plus-page
manuscript available on the NPS Web site. Given this online availability, Cham-
ber’s history may well become one of the more popular and widely read works on
the OSS.
The first two chapters retell the familiar story of OSS origins. Chambers
recounts the background of founder William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan; the connec-
tions between those interested in intelligence, “fifth column” activities, and psy-
chological or “political warfare” in Great Britain and the United States; and the
fitful start for such endeavors with the formation of the Office of the Coordinator
of Information (COI) in July 1941. All this, of course, took place amid monumen-
tal bureaucratic turf wars between Donovan and the military intelligence offices
and the FBI, which claimed responsibility for the nation’s intelligence missions
but performed them badly. Six months after US entry into World War II, as
Chambers details, the much larger and more sophisticated OSS replaced the COI
and began organizing and training for global operations. While there is not much
new in this traditional interpretation, Chambers covers the terrain well, citing a
tremendous number of published and archival sources in a clear writing style
that always keeps the reader’s attention.
The next five chapters on training are the strongest part of the study and a
significant contribution to the existing scholarly literature—filling a gap in OSS
history that has existed for far too long and which could form a stand alone schol-
arly publication. Chambers fully describes OSS-NPS agreements that culmi-
nated in the establishment of two large training facilities on park service

Book Review: OSS Training
property in the Catoctin Mountains near Thurmont, Maryland (near the presi-
dential retreat then called Shangri-La, now Camp David), and in Northern Vir-
ginia’s Prince William Forest Park near Quantico (on Chopawamsic and Quantico
Creeks). Although many existing histories mention OSS training areas in pass-
ing, Chambers covers the topic in great depth—from physical descriptions of the
parks, to the hiring of instructors for the OSS Schools and Training Branch and
subsequent course development, to the construction of barracks, mess halls, fir-
ing ranges, and classrooms.
This history focuses exclusively on the specialized training provided those des-
tined for the OSS operational arms—the Special Operations and Communica-
tions Branches and Operational Groups. The work deals less with those slated
for service in Morale Operations, Secret Intelligence, or Counterintelligence
Branches, or the Maritime Units, who received most of their training elsewhere
in the United States or abroad (Research and Analysis Branch members from
academic backgrounds generally had the necessary background to perform their
duties without additional training). Chambers discusses other OSS training loca-
tions, such as Congressional Country Club, and smaller facilities in the Washing-
ton suburbs or in Baltimore but keeps the focus on the bigger bases. While
covering OSS training on the macro level, these chapters also represent fine
examples of local history, relying heavily on many new oral history interviews of
veterans who were there.
The final two chapters describe the results of OSS training, as intelligence and
paramilitary teams fanned out to the operational theaters in Europe, the Medi-
terranean, and the Far East. Although Chambers includes mostly standard fare,
he does describe new operations, based on oral history interviews, and draws a
direct connection between the realistic training recruits received and OSS opera-
tional success abroad. He notes that the methods developed during World War II
proved so realistic and practical that they reappeared in postwar training pro-
grams of the Central Intelligence Agency and military special operations com-
mands. Chamber’s summary and conclusion, wide-ranging and beyond just the
OSS-NPS connection, is sober and accurate. He notes failures, as well as accom-
plishments of the 13,000-member OSS, whose contributions to the Allied war
effort, and to the future of American intelligence, far exceeded what proponents
and critics alike would have expected from a wartime agency only slightly
smaller than a typical US army infantry division.
Of particular note are the many excellent oral history interviews Chambers
conducted of OSS veterans who trained in the areas he describes. They personal-
ize the history in ways that archival sources cannot and become especially impor-
tant as the decades pass and surviving veterans become ever fewer in number.
Chambers notes that OSS members, so successful during the war, went on to
lives and careers that were equally successful—many of the veterans inter-
viewed for this study are now in their 80s and 90s and remain as active as they
were in decades past.
In addition to these rich new oral histories, Chambers has compiled perhaps
the most comprehensive bibliography of published and archival material avail-
able anywhere on the OSS. Only a few pertinent works are missing from this
otherwise exhaustive list. One hopes that revised online and print versions will
include these few omissions. Nonetheless, Chambers has thoroughly mined the

Book Review: OSS Training
records at the National Archives, the Roosevelt and Truman Presidential

Libraries, the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, and personal papers
held at Princeton University, the US Army Military History Institute, and the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. The online version of the his-
tory contains an intriguing portfolio of maps of the training areas, as well as
several score photographs obtained from OSS veterans. (Warning: Readers will
need broadband service to download the nearly 7 MB file of illustrations.)
In spite of the rather understated title, OSS Training in the National Parks is
highly recommended for general audiences interested in a detailed one-volume
history describing the origins, people, and operations of the OSS during World
War II. Having the searchable manuscript online at the National Park Service
Web site is an added bonus. Scholars will find the chapters on training a wel-
come and long overdue addition to the existing historiography of intelligence and
to our understanding of the OSS, while the comprehensive bibliography will
prove invaluable to researchers. Although many historians may find much of the
early and later chapters in this large manuscript a familiar retelling of oft-told
OSS tales that could have profited from judicious editing, these portions do sur-
round some wonderful new and original research on OSS training that is well
worth examining.
❖ ❖ ❖

The Secret War in El Paso: Mexico

Revolutionary Intrigue, 1906–1920
Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 488 pages,
photos, bibliography, index.
Reviewed by Mark Benbow
Professors emeritus from New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, Charles
Harris and Louis Sadler are (or should be) familiar names to anyone studying
pre-1940s intelligence history. They have published several excellent studies,
including The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of
Naval Intelligence (2003) and The Border and the Revolution: Clandestine Activi-
ties of the Mexican Revolution 1910-1920 (1988). The two began work on Secret
War several decades ago as a history of gunrunning in El Paso during the Mexi-
can Revolution. However, as such studies often do, this one expanded as they dis-
covered that gunrunning was only part of a much larger picture—an intelligence
battle between US agencies and a kaleidoscope of contending Mexican factions.
Harris and Sadler’s work breaks interesting new ground because they have
carefully sifted through records not previously explored in great depth. They
combed declassified records from the FBI, Naval Intelligence, the Department of
Justice, the United States Secret Service, and the Mexican archives—not always
an easy task. Together they form an elaborate intelligence puzzle. Their work
shows how a careful reconstruction from such disparate records can illuminate a
long-forgotten piece of US intelligence history.
Like good historians, or intelligence officers, Harris and Sadler let the evi-
dence lead them to the story. An example is the frequently ignored meeting of
President William Howard Taft and Mexican President Porfirio Díaz in El Paso
in 1910, when primitive intelligence-sharing prevented a major diplomatic crisis.
At the time of the meeting, Díaz was facing growing opposition, and informants
had reported assassination plots against him. Despite the dubious provenance of
many of the reports, a heavier presence of Mexican and US troops at the meeting
than had been originally planned as well as a “private, ‘off-the-books’ security
force” recruited by one of Taft’s friends prevented an attempt on Díaz’s life.(15)
Had Díaz been assassinated on US soil, the ensuing crisis could have propelled
the United States into much more involvement in Mexican affairs.
The intelligence sharing established a precedent that would be repeated

throughout the decade. After Mexican reformer Francisco Madero replaced Díaz
in 1911, US officials took an even more active role in cooperating with the Mexi-
can government to obstruct revolutionary activity on US soil. The “most striking
aspect,” the authors note, “was the degree to which US and Mexican intelligence
agencies cooperated.”(377) While liaison cooperation never entirely stopped ille-
73
Book Review:
gal arms shipments across the border, even the partially effective embargo made
it more difficult—and more expensive—to buy arms in the United States for use
in Mexico.
Because neither country had experienced intelligence officers in today’s sense

of the word, the role of intelligence was largely a contest between amateurs. Har-
ris and Sadler cite the example of the Thiel Detective Service, an American com-
pany operating in El Paso. Hired by Madero’s government to report on counter-
revolutionaries based in the city, Thiel’s agents passed copies of their reports to
US officials without the knowledge of Madero's government. (82) Such multiple
allegiances were common, as neither country had established protocols to vet
sources. In addition, double agents were often uncovered by accident or were
betrayed by other double agents trying to earn a reward.
A notable amateur was Felix Sommerfeld, an agent who worked for several
Mexican factions, switching loyalties as conditions changed. A German who had
been decorated by the Kaiser’s government for his actions during the Chinese
Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Sommerfeld had by 1912 become a mining engineer
with experience in Mexico and the United States—he also served as a reporter
for the Associated Press. The authors observe that “Sommerfeld would move
through the Mexican Revolution like a wraith…,” (76) attaching himself to Mad-
ero, then to anti-Huerta Constitutionalists, then to revolutionary Venustiano
Carranza, and, finally, Pancho Villa. All the while he cooperated with the United
States when it served the interests of the faction he was backing.
What we would call HUMINT dominated the type of information gathered by

agents on each side, although there were a few attempts at using emerging tech-
nologies to acquire COMINT. Harris and Sadler note that US officials tried to plant
recording devices such as Dictaphones in hotel rooms. The information received
was unreliable and sometimes deliberately intended for Washington’s ears by fac-
tions hoping to win official favor. The only topic Harris and Sadler failed to discuss
in sufficient detail, in my judgment, is the role of third-party actors, in particular
the Europeans. They mention German actions in the border area after the United
States entered the Great War in April 1917, but they could have covered what the
Germans (and British) were doing in the border region during the rest of the
decade. Maybe there wasn’t much, but the accounts of activity elsewhere as cov-
ered by Frederick Katz in The Secret War in Mexico (1983) and Barbara Tuchman
in The Zimmerman Telegram, (1958) suggest otherwise.
Covering their topic in largely chronological order, Harris and Sadler intro-
duce an enormous roster of actors. A who’s who would have been helpful, as I
occasionally found myself referring to the index to refresh my memory—though I
think the index is too short and probably inadequate to meet the needs of follow-
on researchers. The story flows smoothly, however, and the authors write with
wit and humor. Their bibliography is impressive, including the major works on
the United States and the Mexican Revolution. The illustrations include numer-
ous unique photos. In sum, the book is well-done and should be read by anyone
interested in the Mexican Revolution or in American intelligence operations in
the years before the development of formal intelligence processes.
❖ ❖ ❖
74
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake
Current
Intelligence for an Age of Terror, Gregory F. Treverton

Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities Of National Intelligence, Robert
Kennedy
Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence, Jennifer E.
Sims and Burton Gerber (eds.)
General Intelligence
The Real Spy’s Guide to Becoming A Spy, Peter Earnest with Suzanne Harper
Historical
The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel’s Deadly 1967 Assault on
a U.S. Spy Ship, James Scott
My Life As A Spy: One of America’s Most Notorious Spies Finally Tells His
Story, John A. Walker, Jr.
Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America’s First Spy, M. William Phelps
The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War: Katharine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanc-
tion the Iraq Invasion, Marcia and Thomas Mitchell
Intelligence Abroad
Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence, Ephraim Kahana & Muham-

mad Suwaed
Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of
Hamas, Paul McGeough
Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904–05: Secret Opera-
tions on Land and at Sea, Evgeny Sergeev
SPOOKS: The Unofficial History of MI5, Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas
Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups—Six Decades of Espionage
Against America and Great Britain, Chapman Pincher
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing
in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its fac-
tual statements and interpretations.

Bookshelf—December 2009
Current
Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (New York: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2009), 306 pp., endnotes, index.
In his 2001 book—completed before 9/11—Reshaping National Intelligence

for an Age of Information, Gregory Treverton suggested changes needed in an
era of globalization. He then prophesied that only two events might alter his
recommendations: “a major terrorist attack on the United States…a global
economic collapse.” (vii) This book extends his previous recommendations in
light of the events since 9/11. He argues from a perspective formed by service
on the Church Committee—right out of college in 1975—the National Securi-
ty Council, and as vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council when it
reported to the director of central intelligence. His experience also includes
service as a Rand consultant to the FBI on the Hanssen case and to congres-
sional committees regarding the advisability of establishing a separate do-
mestic intelligence service, and his current position as director of the Rand
Corporation’s Center for Global Risk and Security.
A basic premise of the book is that US intelligence agencies generally

were not ready for 9/11, after which “the task of intelligence changed dra-
matically.” From this it follows that the reshaping begun by reforms enact-
ed in 2004 was only “the bare beginning” of what is needed. (1) The nine
chapters of the book examine a series of changes needed in the intelligence
landscape to meet the challenges presented by Islamic terrorism. These
include dealing with the “tyranny of the ‘stovepipes’”—a Cold War legacy
that prevented necessary cooperation among agencies— an enhanced DNI
role, modifications in organization—a separate domestic intelligence
agency is not recommended—and the challenges to analysts when dealing
with masses of information coupled with the problem of conflating security
and sharing of data. With regard to the latter point, Treverton suggests
that “fresh analytic insights are likely to arise precisely from those…with
a fresh perspective who have no need to know.” (12) There is also a chapter
dealing with an expanded customer base—what Treverton calls the “poli-
cy tribes”—and the security issues involved. The issue of security and civil
liberties in a democracy surfaces throughout the book but is dealt with in
depth in the final chapter, “Rebuilding the Social Contract.” Here Trever-
ton invokes experiences of other nations—mainly Great Britain—to argue
for more transparency, accountability, and oversight. The final sentence in
the book is less than optimistic on this point: “I do not fear the terrorist, I
do sometimes fear us.” (261)
Intelligence for an Age of Terror is a top-down examination of the topic in

the current environment, with an agenda for the future. Intelligence officers,
however, while agreeing with many of the issues raised, may well conclude
that proposed changes must first be tempered with a view from the bottom up.

Robert Kennedy, Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National

Intelligence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), 261 pp., endnotes, appendices, index.
In his 35 years of government service, Robert Kennedy has taught at the

Army War College, served as a foreign affairs officer at the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, was civilian deputy of the NATO Defense College,
Rome, and is currently a professor at the Sam Nunn School of International
Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. In Of Knowledge and Power he has
applied this experience to the intelligence profession in the post 9/11 era, es-
sentially providing a primer for management or people new to the problems
of intelligence.
Kennedy recognizes the new threats of our age, but he does not examine
the mechanics of dealing with them or offer any solutions. Similarly, he iden-
tifies the difficulties posed by today’s increased volume of data, the impact of
budget cuts, the criticality of training and creative thinking, the risks of cog-
nitive bias with historical examples, and the problem of politicizing—intelli-
gence to please—but leaves solutions to others. The final chapter, “The
Struggle for Congressional Oversight,” is particularly interesting in this re-
gard. He notes the problems of workload, lack of time to “probe the quality of
intelligence,” the tendency to infuse political demands where they don’t be-
long, and the “willingness to take intelligence at face value.” (203) How con-
gressional staffs can overcome these problems with their limited resources is
not discussed.
With one exception, Of Knowledge and Power clearly identifies the prob-
lems facing the Intelligence Community today. The exception, is counterintel-
ligence, a topic he doesn’t mention. Nevertheless, for an overview of what
intelligence management faces, it is a good start.
Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (eds.), Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Redis-
covering U.S. Counterintelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2009), 310 pp., end of chapter notes, index.
The title of this book raises a question author Jennifer Sims answers in the
first paragraph. Counterintelligence (CI) functions by “exploiting, disrupting,
denying, or manipulating the intelligence activities of others.” The tools em-
ployed “include security systems, deception, and disguise: vaults, mirrors, and
masks.” This unusual conceptualization is indicative of the book overall. It is
not about CI cases or operations but rather considers questions of CI policy,
organizational relationships and strategy, the connection between CI, civil lib-
erties and culture, and the need for greater congressional oversight. Each of
the 13 chapters takes into account these issues to some degree from various
points of view—academia, law enforcement, the military, judiciary, Congress,
and the professional intelligence officer.
The quality of the contributions varies. At the outset, the need for a new
“national counterintelligence strategy” is assumed—but not demonstrated—
nor is the difference with the current national CI strategy made clear. Subse-
quent chapters offer solutions to “the thorniest problems…confronting coun-

terintelligence in democracies.” Five identified are: the “dominance of

defensive CI…and the disconnect between policy makers and CI community,”
the lack of a common approach to CI among various agencies, “the absence of
homes for strategic CI planning and operations…in broader service to nation-
al security policy,” the lack of CI understanding and training among agencies,
and the absence of oversight. (10–11)
Unfortunately, the authors have identified problems, but they have neither
fully substantiated their existence nor proffered solutions for them. For exam-
ple, the chapter on the theoretical basis for reform stresses the “mission-
based” approach to CI. While those words may stimulate vigorous debate, the
elements and value of the theory are not made clear, nor does the narrative
indicate how a new mission-based approach differs from the existing mission-
based approach. The chapter “Defense Counterintelligence, Reconceptual-
ized” also invokes theory without adding clarity and discusses putative orga-
nizational CI problems without providing solutions or establishing that
problems really exist. It then offers such illuminating conclusions as “counter-
intelligence is an inseparable subset of intelligence.”
The contribution by Judge Richard Posner, “Counterintelligence, Counter-

terrorism, Civil Liberties, and the Domestic Intelligence Controversy,” offers
clear articulation of the issues, suggestions for resolution, and a direct chal-
lenge to the view that “any curtailment of liberty operates as a rachet, or more
dramatically as placing us on a sharp downward slope, at the bottom of which
is tyranny.” (278)
The final chapter offers six recommendations for improving CI in the fu-
ture. The first, “do no harm,” suggests limiting the federal footprint at the lo-
cal level while focusing on networking rather than creating new
organizations. The second, “at the federal level, reconnect CI with national se-
curity strategy and decisionmaking,” is more ambiguous, suggesting that this
can be accomplished by reducing “the influence of law enforcement directives
over the role and agenda of the NCIX [National Counterintelligence Execu-
tive].” The third argues for greater diversity in the workforce. The fourth deals
with the need to redesign declassification policies. The final two are concerned
with improving congressional oversight.
It is not self-evident that the ultimate conclusion of the book, “reform of the
US counterintelligence effort is urgent,” has been demonstrated, however.
Vaults, Mirrors and Masks has raised many issues worthy of discussion, but
nothing about counterintelligence has been “rediscovered.”

Peter Earnest with Suzanne Harper, The Real Spy’s Guide to Becoming a
Spy (New York: Abrams Books, 2009), 144 pp., bibliography, appendices, pho-
tos, index.
In his preface to The Craft of Intelligence, Allen Dulles, tells of listening to

his family discuss the Boer War and then writing his own pro-Boer views on
the matter. Discovered by his elders, the views were published as a booklet,
misspellings and all. At the age of eight, he was fond of telling young officer
trainees, he was taken seriously; it was a lesson he said he never forgot. Re-
tired CIA case officer, Peter Earnest has not forgotten it either. The Real Spy’s
Guide is a serious book aimed at those who may at some point in their forma-
tive years consider becoming an intelligence officer—a spy in popular par-
lance.
The seven chapters explain why spying is necessary, what spies do and
do not do, the qualifications required, the terminology used, and how to ap-
ply to the intelligence agency of your choice—the internet, of course—Web
addresses are included. Several chapters end with short multiple-choice
quizzes to help readers decide if they have the “right stuff ” and what ca-
reer options—espionage, analysis, technical, support—fit best. For those
considering an overseas career in the CIA, the chapter on training discuss-
es tradecraft—surveillance, recruitment techniques, working under cover,
bugs, dead drops, codes and the like. There is also a chapter that answers
the question: what do I do until I am old enough to apply? The importance
of foreign language and writing skills are stressed. In each chapter are
short stories of actual espionage cases that emphasize the risks and excite-
ment one may expect.
The Real Spy’s Guide answers questions often asked but seldom answered
in one place. Students, teachers and parents will find it useful.
Historical
James Scott, The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel’s Deadly
1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 374 pp.
On 8 June 1967, in the middle of the Six-Day War between Israel and
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attacked the USS
Liberty while her crew was collecting SIGINT in international waters off the
Gaza Strip. It was a clear day, the 350-foot Liberty was sailing at 10 knots and
flying a large US flag. The ship’s name was on the stern, and its number was
on the bow. Except for several small caliber machine guns, the Liberty was un-
armed. Israeli aircraft fired rockets and cannons and dropped napalm bombs.
The torpedo boats launched at least five torpedoes, one of which tore a 34-foot
hole in the bulkhead and decimated the cryptologic center staffed mainly by

NSA linguists. The attack lasted about an hour. Thirty four were killed, 171
were wounded. These basic facts are no longer disputed.
Shortly after the attack, the survivors were sworn to secrecy, told to stay
away from the press, and then decorated—in secret. The Liberty’s captain, Wil-
liam L. McGonagle, was awarded the Medal of Honor, but the president refused
to follow tradition and make the presentation. The security restrictions not-
withstanding, books questioning the official position that the attack was an ac-
cident began appearing in 1968 and have reappeared periodically since then.
Some were written by survivors. The Attack on the Liberty is by the son of a sur-
vivor. 1
James Scott’s account is an expanded version of events based on inter-

views with crew, letters, and recently released government documents. He
makes clear that the survivors all thought the attack was intentional, though
the reason was obscure. The Israeli government insisted it was an unfortu-
nate accident. Initially, some officials in the US government accepted this ex-
planation. But eventually, many—CIA Director Richard Helms, CIA Deputy
Director Admiral Rufus Taylor, Admiral Thomas Moorer, presidential adviser
Clark Clifford, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk—to name a few, concluded
it could not have been accidental. Many members of Congress agreed but
would not take a public position and declined to conduct hearings or an inves-
tigation. The short Navy hearing was conducted before some of the wounded
could testify. The panel initially tended to blame the crew. The only person
who really mattered, President Johnson, accepted the Israeli account and
that became the official result.
The sad impact of the attack on the lives of the survivors is evident. The
situation was aggravated when Israelis at first blamed the attack on the Lib-
erty, then reversed themselves and agreed to pay reparations to survivors and
families. But they delayed payment for more than 10 years. In the end, Scott
speculates on two important points. First, he looks at the strategic impact of
lessons not learned by keeping details of the attack secret. For example, he
asks whether a Navy-wide review of the facts might have prevented the cap-
ture by North Korea of the USS Pueblo seven months later. Second, and more
important, he considers possible reasons the president behaved as he did—
the stresses of the Vietnam War, the need for Jewish support in America, and
support in Congress are just three possibilities.
As with all incidents, there are at least two sides. Scott makes all the po-
sitions clear, though there is little doubt he agrees with the crew. The Attack
on the Liberty is skillfully written and admirably documented, but it leaves
little hope that the complete truth will be known any time soon.
1 Anthony Pearson, Conspiracy of Silence (London: Quartet Books, 1968).

John A. Walker, Jr., My Life As A Spy: One of America’s Most Notorious

Spies Finally Tells His Story (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008), 340 pp.,
no index.
In his foreword, prisoner # 22449-037 explains that he began this book in

1994 as an apology to his children, as an acknowledgement of regret to the na-
tion, and as a means of making public “in exhaustive detail” the real reasons for
his traitorous behavior. For those uninterested in the detail, the disingenuous
Walker asks readers to believe these reasons: (1) his exposure to vast amounts
of government secrets, (2) President Kennedy’s assassination by “powerful gov-
ernment officials,” and (3) the failure of the US Navy to defend the USS Liberty.
But he goes on to argue that in spite of these factors, he never would have spied
had it not been for the “the fraudulent cold war” and his unsuccessful marriage,
for which he assigns blame to his wife’s “blatant infidelity.”
There is very little new in the two stories he tells in this book. The first sto-
ry concerns his decision to give secrets to the Soviets in the late 1960s, how he
did it for so long, the roles of those he recruited to help him, how he got caught,
and why his actions actually contributed to peace. The second story concerns
his family life, which he pictures as rather normal except for his wife’s behav-
ior. Both are covered in more detail by Pete Earley in Family of Spies, which
is based on interviews with Walker and some of the KGB officers involved—
by far the best treatment of the case. Earley’s depiction of Walker’s family life
is one of constant conflict and abuse by Walker, an aspect absent from Walk-
er’s account. The one new detail Walker adds occurs in a short chapter titled
“A CIA Mole.” In it he claims that he had told the KGB he was thinking of ap-
plying to the CIA after he left the Navy. Worried about the polygraph, he says
the KGB gave him the name of a KGB mole in the CIA who would help him
avoid the ordeal. Walker offers no evidence for this apocrypha. John Walker is
eligible for parole in 2015 if he survives the diabetes that has cost him his eye-
sight.
M. William Phelps, Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America’s First Spy
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 306 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.
Nathan Hale was America’s first spy. On 22 September 1776, age 21, he
was hanged by the British in Artillery Park, New York City. Forts, parks, and
schools, have been named in his honor. In 1925 a stamp (1/2 cent) was issued
with his likeness. Three statues were sculpted in his memory, one stands at
Tulane University Law School, another at New York City Hall, and the most
famous, by Bela Lyon Pratt, at Yale University, from which Hale graduated in
1773. Six copies of the Pratt likeness have been made, one stands in front of
CIA headquarters. At least 100 books have told Hale’s story; what, one might
ask, can another add to the tale?
The simple answer is a lot. Phelps has formed a more complete account
in one book than any other of Hale’s life, from his early days on the family
farm, to his life at Yale, his short career as a teacher begun at age 18, and
his equally brief service in the revolutionary army. Phelps draws on letters
to and from family and friends, diaries, the Yale archives, and contempo-

rary accounts. The portrait that emerges is one of a young man who decid-
ed that life as a farmer was not for him and for whom teaching became a
passion. At Yale he joined the Linonia Society, a group of scholars that met
to discuss “slavery, astronomy, literature, women’s rights, and other im-
portant social and academic issues.” (17) His later correspondence with
Yale classmates provides much detail about his life as a young man and
his decision to serve his country in time of war.
Three episodes are of particular interest in this account. Hale’s meeting

with Washington and his decision to volunteer to go behind British lines to
collect tactical intelligence, the mission itself, and his last words before being
hanged. There are several versions of Hale’s meeting with Washington, and
Phelps evaluates each. His treatment of the espionage mission dismisses
claims that Hale was captured in New York City and presents a well-docu-
mented account of the circumstances that led to his capture just before he was
due to return to his unit after having acquired the intelligence he set out to
collect. The most controversial element of the Hale story continues to be the
words he spoke before giving his life. Phelps recounts the various versions
that have appeared in the literature. Acknowledging that there is no first-
hand account, he concludes that the line most often attributed to him—“I only
regret that I have but one life to lose for my country”—is probably only a
“paraphrase of what Nathan actually said.” (192)
Hale’s hanging was meant as an example to all those considering espi-

onage against Britain. But the greater result was the creation of a martyr,
hero-patriot who set a standard by risking his life for intelligence service
to his country.
Marcia and Thomas Mitchell, The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War: Katharine
Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion (Sausalito, CA: Poli-
Point Press, 2008), 210 pp., endnotes, photos, index.
On 31 January 2003, British GCHQ employee and Chinese Mandarin lin-

guist, Katharine Gun, read an e-mail from NSA that she decided described “il-
legal intelligence operations against UN Security Council members that
would have an impact on the upcoming invasion of Iraq.” (7) “I must admit
that the decision to leak the e-mail was instantly in my mind” Gun told the
authors; she never invoked the internal security procedures established for
such a situation. (9) Instead, she leaked the e-mail to a friend, and its prompt
publication caused a furor in Britain. When first questioned in the inevitable
investigation, she denied responsibility, but after her conscience got the better
of her she confessed. Dismissed from GCHQ, she was taken to court, but the
government withdrew the case, arguing it could not reveal the secrets neces-
sary to prosecute.
The Mitchells, in an admittedly pro-whistle-blower account, fill in the

details and assail the media in the United States for the less-than-exten-
sive coverage of the case received here. They relate Ms. Gun’s life from her
birth in Taiwan to her GCHQ career and the trying ordeal to which she

subjected herself. The underlying theme of the book is that a whistle-blow-

er’s “conscience tells us we must reveal what we know,” especially when it
is judged to be misleading or false. (171) It then goes on to advise the gov-
ernments involved on Middle East policy.
The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War is an apologia for Katharine Gun that
explicitly encourages others to decide on their own that they know best when
it comes to security.
Intelligence Abroad
Ephraim Kahana & Muhammad Suwaed, Historical Dictionary of Middle

Eastern Intelligence (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 359 pp., bibliogra-
phy, no index.
The authors of this latest contribution to the Scarecrow Press Historical

Dictionary of Intelligence and Counterintelligence series are Israeli academ-
ics specializing in national security issues. In their preface, they identify the
geographic area they consider and set out their objectives: discuss the impor-
tant intelligence events, organizations, and principal players that have influ-
enced the current situation in the region. An overview of the events covered
can be quickly assessed by scanning the chronology and the introduction,
which outline the use of intelligence from ancient times until the present.
The 325-page dictionary is arranged alphabetically and mixes personal-

ities and organizations. In most cases the national intelligence organiza-
tions are listed by country and described in their incarnations from their
origins until the present. There are separate entries for the nuclear weapon
programs of Iraq, Iran, and, surprisingly, Israel, but not for Pakistan—there
is no entry for India, or Afghanistan for that matter. The CIA is mentioned
frequently but it does not have a separate entry, though some of the officers
who played roles in various events do. Similarly, the Israeli Security Agency
(ISA), also known as the Shin Bet, is included but does not have its own en-
try, though the Mossad does. There are also entries covering the numerous
terrorist organizations that threaten regional stability and non-Muslim na-
tions—al Qaeda is found under ‘Q.’ There is an entry for the Yemen Civil
War, but it does not discuss its intelligence organizations or terrorist activi-
ties. A good index would have been helpful in locating the many players and
organizations.
As with the previous volumes in this series, no sources are cited in the en-
tries, and errors have crept in. For example: Dudley Clarke was not a briga-
dier and did not “replace General Wavell;” 2 (1) and William Buckley was the
CIA chief of station, not a “US Army colonel.” (205) There is an extensive bib-
2See Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2004).

liography that includes mostly English sources—books, articles, and Web

sites—though some Israeli and Arabic citations are included.
Overall this is a valuable contribution for those concerned with intelli-

gence in the Middle Eastern countries.
Paul McGeough, Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid

Mishal and the Rise of Hamas (New York: The New Press, 2009), 477 pp., end-
notes, chronology, photos, index.
In October 1997, Sheik Ahmad Yassin, the 61-year-old quadriplegic leader

of Hamas in the Gaza strip, arrived home after serving nearly eight years of
a life sentence in an Israeli prison. The early release of the terrorist leader
was not an Israeli government gesture of goodwill; the Israelis were pressured
by King Hussein of Jordan with the support of President Bill Clinton. The
triggering event was a failed attempt to assassinate Hamas leader, Khalid
Mishal, in Amman, Jordan, on 25 September 1997. Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu had approved the mission, and Mossad, given the task,
bungled it badly.
Australian Middle East specialist, Paul McGeough, tells how the assassins
went about “methodically rehearsing” the operation, with one exception: the
delivery appliance—the liquid poison “bullet” hidden in a camera-like de-
vice—had not been used in such a mission before. The operational concept was
to pass Khalid in the street and hold the “camera” near his ear and release the
poison that was supposed to kill him several days later—after the assassins,
dressed as tourists, had returned to Israel. But the delivery was off target.
Khalid’s bodyguards caught two of the team with their fake Canadian pass-
ports. They were exposed as Israelis and detained. Two others took refuge in
the Israeli embassy. As Khalid became sick, he was taken to a hospital, but
the doctors could not determine what was wrong. Informed of the Israeli at-
tempt, King Hussein, furious that the attack had taken place in Jordan,
phoned Netanyahu and demanded an antidote or the captives would be tried.
Then, for good measure, he called President Clinton and asked for his help—
which he got. In the negotiations that followed, Yassin’s release was arranged,
the antidote was reluctantly provided, Khalid survived, and Hamas achieved
greater status than it had ever enjoyed.
The final part of the book tells how Khalid took advantage of these cir-
cumstances to eliminate his competition within Hamas and eventually be-
come its leader. Khalid did not achieve this objective without a battle with
Arafat and Fatah and terrorist attacks on Israel. McGeough describes in
considerable detail the complex infighting and the roles played by the
United States, the Arab nations in the area, and Iran. In the process he
provides biographic background on the principal players on both the Ha-
mas and Israeli sides. The story is fascinating and well told. Kill Khalid
exposes the intricacies of dealing with Middle East nations and factions, is
well documented, and a most valuable contribution.

Evgeny Sergeev, Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan,

1904-05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea (New York: Routledge,
2008), 252 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.
The second episode of the 1983 TV series, Reilly, Ace of Spies, starring Sam
Neill as Sidney Reilly, dramatized the story of Reilly’s role as a British secret
agent in Port Arthur prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904.
Reilly is shown warning the British and the Russians of the upcoming Japa-
nese attack—they ignored him—while at the same time giving crucial secrets
to Japan that made the surprise attack a success. It was splendid entertain-
ment but sorry history. In his thoroughly documented Russian Military Intel-
ligence in the War with Japan, historian Evgeny Sergeev sets the record
straight from the Russian point of view and at the same time tells the story of
the development of Russian military intelligence.
While acknowledging a role for secret agents—Reilly is mentioned in

passing—Sergeev’s account first describes Russian military intelligence pri-
or to the war. He goes on to show what Russia knew about Japan’s military
and political intentions and why the surprise attack succeeded—a success
due in part to Japan’s many secret agents in Port Arthur. He then depicts
the role of Russian military intelligence (tactical and strategic) in the naval
and land battles that followed—all won by Japan. At the same time, he ex-
plains, specially trained military and naval attachés—conducted operations
in most countries in Europe and Asia to keep abreast of and influence dip-
lomatic developments and weapon purchases headed for Japan. The at-
tachés were supported by “shoulder–strapped” diplomats—co-opted in
today’s terminology—who were very successful in breaking Japanese codes.
For political reasons, the Japanese made the initial overtures for peace at
a point when Russian losses were so costly militarily and financially that the
tsar was forced to accept President Theodore Roosevelt’s offer to mediate.
While Sergeev addresses the political factors involved in this first clash of
Western and oriental empires, his emphasis is on the impact of the war on
Russian military intelligence and the reforms—tactical and strategic—that
the Bolsheviks would institute and capitalize on when they came to power.
Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan uses Russian pri-
mary sources that became available after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and Japanese sources that have not appeared in English. In exploiting
these sources, Sergeev makes evident why Soviet military intelligence had
the upper hand in foreign intelligence in the early years of the Soviet
Union. Sergeev has produced a fine history of the intelligence war and the
lessons the Soviets learned.

Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas, SPOOKS: The Unofficial History of

MI5 (Gloucestershire, UK: Amberley Publishing, 2009), 662 pp. endnotes, bibliog-
raphy, photos, index.
For Americans, the term spooks suggests Halloween, horror movies, and
perhaps spies. In Britain, the BBC drama series of the same name about MI5
is what jumps to mind. SPOOKS, the book, is also about MI5 but from a non-
fiction, historical perspective. It is not the first book on the subject, John Bul-
loch and Nigel West made previous contributions. 3 Its reign as the most recent
was shortlived, with the publication this fall of Christopher Andrew’s “autho-
rized” history, Defend The Realm. 4 Given that MI5 and MI6 both have marked
100th anniversaries this year, it is odd that there is no preface to explain why
SPOOKS was published at this time. A glance at the endnotes suggests the
authors capitalized on the recent release of MI5 files to the National Ar-
chives— most of the extensive notes cite specific Security Service documents.
The book’s introduction recalls the terrorist attacks in London in July

2005, the failure of MI5 to prevent them, and the important “life and death”
role of the Security Service. The 37 chapters that follow cover in great detail
the origins of the service and the many espionage and counterterrorism cas-
es—mainly “The Troubles” in Ireland—with which it has been involved.
Chapter 37, “A New World Disorder: 9/11 to 7/7 and Beyond,” draws more on
parliamentary reports and other open sources, as no MI5 documents have
been released covering these events. The short final chapter, “Reflections,”
summarizes MI5 achievements, its continuing respect for individual liberties,
and emphasizes that its successes will only be revealed by future historians.
Perhaps inevitably in a work of this magnitude, a few errors have crept

in. For example, the VENONA project was not the consequence of Finnish
intelligence discovering NKVD codebooks in 1939. (519) Likewise, Guy
Burgess did not join the Communist Party while at university or any other
time (550), Kim Philby defected in 1963, not 1967 (552), and Oleg Gordi-
evsky was not a double agent. Other shortcomings are its very small print
and narrow margins—which are not conducive to easy reading—and a grossly
inadequate index.
SPOOKS offers a comprehensive view of MI5’s early years. There is plenty

of material here to stimulate the scholarly research necessary to judge its ac-
curacy.
3 John Bulloch, The Origins and History of the British Counterespionage Service MI5 (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd,
1963); Nigel West, MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909–1945 (London: The Bodley Head, 1981) and A
Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945-72 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982).
4 Andrew’s book was released too late for review in this issue of Studies.

Chapman Pincher, Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups—Six

Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain (New York: Ran-
dom House, 2009), note on sources, bibliography, appendix, index.
In his 1981 book, Their Trade Is Treachery, British journalist Chapman

Pincher claimed that Soviet intelligence had penetrated the British govern-
ment to an extent greater than previously thought. The most sensational
charge levied was that former MI5 Director-General Sir Roger Hollis was sus-
pected of being a Soviet mole while on active duty. Pincher expanded his case
in 1984 in another book, Too Secret Too Long. His source, not revealed at the
time, turned out to be Peter Wright, a disgruntled MI5 retiree who published
his own book with amplifying details, Spycatcher, in 1987, after winning a
long court battle with the government. That same year, in his book Molehunt,
intelligence historian Nigel West took an opposing view on Hollis. In 1990,
Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky argued that Hollis had been “mis-
takenly accused.” 5 There the matter has rested until its resurrection in this
book by the 94-year-old Pincher. Treachery is a 600-page speculative treatise
devoted to the conclusion that Hollis may have been a GRU agent throughout
his MI5 career, or, at the very least, concealed his relationship with the Com-
munist Party before he joined the service.
Treachery is a chronological account of Roger Hollis’s life and career in

MI5. Pincher discusses many of the cases in which Hollis was actively in-
volved or declined to play a role and points out what he suggests are numer-
ous incidents in which Hollis protected GRU agents in Britain, all the while
very likely passing counterintelligence data to the GRU. He admits there is no
“smoking gun evidence” of Hollis’s guilt and relies on a succession of coinci-
dences that, if true, could make his case. But it is not until the final four chap-
ters that Pincher really strengthens his case. In those chapters he reveals
information in a 1996 book by an Estonian émigré in the UK, Einar Sanden, 6
that reports a debriefing of a GRU agent who claimed Hollis was recruited as
an agent while he was in China in the 1930s. That is not conclusive evidence,
but it does raise doubts and deserves scholarly followup. There the matter
now rests.
Treachery has no endnotes, but Pincher does provide a 13-page “Note on

Sources” that explains how he went about his work. He states that most of
his allegations are based on MI5 documents recently released by the Brit-
ish National Archives and those wishing to check his data should consult
the primary sources he lists in the bibliography. Despite its length and his
detailed analysis, Treachery does not close the case on the Hollis saga. But
it is a fascinating book and illustrates the challenges faced by counteres-
pionage officers in every service.
❖ ❖ ❖
5 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), p. 27.
6 Einar Sanden, An Estonian Saga (Cardiff, UK: Boreas, 1996).

Comment
In Defense of John Honeyman (and George

Washington)
Kenneth A. Daigler, aka P.K. Rose
In the June 2008 issue of Studies in Intelligence Alexander Rose, author of Gen-
eral Washington’s Spies, made the case that John Honeyman—widely held to be a
key agent of George Washington in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1776—was “no spy.”1
From a purely academic perspective, I can understand his thinking, but I do not
believe he has made his case. Since neither of us can produce documentation to
support—or conclusively refute—the story written by Honeyman’s grandson nearly
100 years after the events of Trenton, we must both rely on indirect evidence and
understanding of George Washington’s conduct of intelligence late in 1776.
Mr. Rose recognized my perspective as author of a monograph on Washington

and his role in intelligence by noting, “Intelligence historians, perhaps paradoxi-
cally, tend to give more credence to Honeyman’s achievements.” He mentions the
work of George O’Toole, a former CIA analyst, and me, a retired CIA case officer, as
examples. While Mr. Rose has raised interesting questions, my career experiences
and research in the field of early American intelligence history have convinced me
that even in the case of Revolutionary War spies, Honeyman included, seldom will
the public, including academic researchers, find documentation regarding success-
ful intelligence activities. Obviously, a key aspect of conducting intelligence activi-
ties is to keep them secret. All intelligence professionals know only too well that the
failures become public while the successes remain secret. Thus, if Honeyman pro-
vided intelligence of value regarding the Hessian positions and activities around
Trenton, his mission would have been a success and his involvement worth keeping
from the public.
Guarded treatment of such information would have been Washington’s approach.

We know Washington was very security conscious, and formal records identifying
“sources and methods” information were not routinely kept, particularly during this
phase of the war, when Washington was being chased about the middle colonies by
the British. Researchers studying Washington’s official records and those of other
1 Alexander Rose, “The Strange Case of John Honeyman and Revolutionary War Espionage” in Studies 52,
no. 2 https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/
vol52no2/the-spy-who-never-was.html). Rose’s book (published, 2000) focuses on details of the Culper Ring
and mentions other intelligence related activities during the Revolutionary War. P.K. Rose is the pen name
I used in my pamphlet about George Washington’s intelligence activity published for CIA,The Founding Fa-
ther of American Intelligence.https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publica-
tions/books-and-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html

army commanders and the Continental Congress find few specifics of intelligence
activities other than scouting and reconnaissance at this time.
I believe the real weaknesses behind Mr. Rose’s argument are his beliefs that
Washington was not capable in December 1776 of conducting an intelligence
operation like the Honeyman operation and that Washington would undertake
an attack on Trenton without intelligence of the enemy’s situation. On the first
point, it appears that Mr. Rose does not believe it was possible to run an agent
like Honeyman behind enemy lines without a developed network and “case offic-
ers,” which Washington would not have until later. While it is true that running
agent networks requires more organizational skills and resources than those
required to handle a singleton agent—and I agree with Mr. Rose that at this
point in the war such capabilities were not as developed as they would be by the
time of the Culper Ring in New York City—Honeyman was a singleton agent,
and given the time that he served Washington, about two months, he need not
have been part of a network to serve successfully.
Secondly, by November 1776, Washington had already demonstrated skill as a

manager of assets like Honeyman. He had already implemented singleton collec-
tion activities against the British in several areas and had carried out intelli-
gence tasks like Honeyman’s some 20 years earlier, both personally through
observation and elicitation and with “agents” sent behind enemy lines. Washing-
ton’s first experience in intelligence collection related to French activities before
the start of the French and Indian War. In 1753, while delivering official corre-
spondence to the French in the Ohio Valley and awaiting a reply, he obtained,
through observation and elicitation, details of French plans and intentions in the
area. His use of Indian “agents” to collect intelligence on French facilities, capa-
bilities, and plans and intentions during this period is well documented in his
diary. For example, his entry of 21 June 1754 discusses dispatch of agents not
only to collect intelligence but also to try to stimulate a mass desertion by French
troops. 2
During the French and Indian War, Washington continued to collect tactical
intelligence from Indian allies and French deserters regarding French move-
ments and fortifications. Arguably the most influential intelligence teaching
point in Washington’s early military career related to an intelligence failure at
the battle of Fort Duquesne, where he served under British General Edward
Braddock. Braddock failed to collect adequate intelligence on the French and
Indian forces in the area, was ambushed, and his forces mauled. Washington is
given credit for reorganizing the troops after Braddock was wounded and saving
the force from disaster. His experiences during this period led to his well known
quote: “There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a
designing enemy, and nothing that requires greater pains to obtain.” 3
The documentary record suggests that Washington applied the lessons of these
experiences as the commander of the colonial army. Less than two weeks after tak-
ing command he recorded his first payment for intelligence collection. On 15 July
2 John C. Fitzpatrick, A.M. (ed.), The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799, Vol. I (Cranbury, NJ: The
Scholar’s Bookshelf, 2005), 54–55 and 97–101.
3 Washington to Robert Hunter Morris, 5 January 1766 in The Writings of George Washington, Vol I. (Wash-
ington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1931–44), 268.

1775 he provided $333 to an unidentified officer to go to Boston to establish secret

correspondence for the purpose of providing intelligence on British movements and
intentions. In a note to this entry Washington stated, “The Names of Persons who
are employed within the Enemy’s Lines or who may fall within their power cannot
be inserted”—and thus he established the pattern of generally not revealing the
identity of his sources. 4 By April 1776 he had expended $5,232 on intelligence. This
same determination to collect on the British was evident around Trenton. Mr. Rose
cites one letter, of 14 December 1776, demonstrating Washington’s interest in
acquiring intelligence on British plans and locations, but there was a greater effort.
Col. Joseph Reed, Washington’s adjutant, was also active collecting information on
the military situation in New Jersey. 5 All of this hardly suggests, as Mr. Rose
implies, that Washington depended on luck to take Trenton.
What of the story’s origins? Mr. Rose theorizes that “Aunt Jane,” the sole
source of the Honeyman story, was inspired by James Fenimore Cooper’s The Spy
and its hero, Harvey Birch. While this is possible, at the time of the novel’s publi-
cation, the speculation, widely publicized and debated, was that the Birch char-
acter was based on Enoch Crosby, a counterintelligence agent working for John
Jay’s New York State Committee for Detecting Conspiracies in the “neutral
ground.” Aunt Jane could have believed anything she wanted, but the novel’s plot
and Birch’s activities bear only faint resemblance to the collection activities
described in the Honeyman story.
Finally, one small, to me personal, point: Mr. Rose opined that Nathaniel Sack-
ett, another one of Jay’s counterintelligence agents, who ran collection agents in
New York City, deserved to be designated as the “founding father” of intelligence
collection. Here, I must strongly disagree. Sackett was not the first individual to
run an agent collection network against the British—the leaders of the “Mechan-
ics” in Boston during 1774–75 clearly hold this distinction. 6 Sackett certainly was
not as experienced or as skilled a “case officer” or intelligence manager as Ben-
jamin Tallmadge, the officer in charge of the Culper Ring, who also played a vital if
serendipitous role in the capture of Major André, Benedict Arnold’s British contact.
As the individual in charge of creating new liaison meeting facilities at CIA

Headquarters, I had to name the suites. I took this responsibility seriously and
believed that in the Agency’s dealings with older intelligence services it was
important to demonstrate that even as a relatively “young” nation we had a solid
history of intelligence activities. The Founding Father of American Intelligence
was written with this in mind. My selection of George Washington as the Found-
ing Father of intelligence collection was based upon his creation of an American
intelligence collection capability that he managed and directed throughout the
war. I believed then, and still do today, that no officer of the period had the
breadth of experience in intelligence operations that George Washington did.
❖ ❖ ❖
4 Marvin Kitman, George Washington’s Expense Account (New York: Grove Press, 2001), 119.
5 David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 201.
6 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution
into The New Millennium, Vol. I, 2–3.

Books, Film, and Television Reviewed in
Studies in Intelligence
2009
Current Topics and Issues
The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of
Midst of a Big One by David Kilcullen (53 4 National Intelligence by Robert Kennedy (53 4
[December], Matthew P.) [December], Bookshelf)
The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelli-
gence from the End of the Cold War to the Inva- Secret Intelligence: A Reader, Christopher Andrew,
sion of Iraq by John M. Diamond (53 1 [March], Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark (eds.)
Roger Z. George) (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)
The Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Terrorism 2005–2007: A Chronology by Edward F.
Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Mickolus (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)
Afghanistan by Doug Stanton. (53 3 [Septem-
ber], J.R. Seeger) Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S.
Intelligence for an Age of Terror by Gregory F. Tre- Counterintelligence, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton
verton (53 4 [December], Bookshelf) Gerber (eds.) (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)
Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: The Real Spy’s Guide to Becoming A Spy by Peter
National Approaches, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, Earnest with Suzanne Harper (53 4 [December],
Stuart Farson, and Shlomo Shpiro, eds. (53 2 Bookshelf
[June], Michael Warner)
Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners,
Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National
Managers and Users by Don McDowell (53 3
Leadership: A Practical Guide by Gary Berntsen,
[September], Peter C. Oleson)
(53 2 [June], Bookshelf)
Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to
Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, Be A Counterintelligence Officer by William R.
eds. (53 2 [June], J.M. Webb) Johnson, (53 2 [June], Bookshelf)
Following book titles and author names are the Studies in Intelligence issue in which the review appeared and the name of the
reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

Reviewed in 2009
Historical
The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of My Life As A Spy: One of America’s Most Notorious
Israel’s Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship Spies Finally Tells His Story by John A. Walker,
by James Scott (53 4 [December], Bookshelf) Jr. (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)
The Central Intelligence Agency: A Documentary Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America’s First
History by Scott C. Monje (53 3 [September], Spy by M. William Phelps (53 4 [December],
Bookshelf) Bookshelf)
Churchill’s Wizards: The British Genius for Decep-
Operation Kronstadt: The Greatest True Tale of
tion 1914-1945 by Nicholas Rankin (53 3 [Sep-
Espionage to Come Out of the Early Years of MI6
tember], Bookshelf)
by Harry Ferguson (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)
Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and
Secret Operations by Richard C. S. Trahair and OSS Training in the National Parks and Service
Robert C. Miller (53 3 [September], Bookshelf) Abroad in World War II by John Whiteclay Cham-
bers, II (53 4 [December], Clayton D. Laurie)
L’espionne: Virginia Hall, une Americaine dans la
guerre by Vincent Nouzille. (In French) (53 1 The Secret War in El Paso: Mexico Revolutionary
[March], M.R.D. Foot) Intrigue, 1906–1920 by Charles H. Harris III and
Historical Dictionary of Air Intelligence by Glenmore Louis R. Sadler. (53 4 [December], Mark Ben-
S. Trenear-Harvey (53 3 [September], Bookshelf) bow)
Historical Dictionary of Sexspionage by Nigel West, Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service
(53 2 [June], Bookshelf) by Frederic Wakeman, Jr. (53 1 [March], Bob
Bergin)
Hunting Eichmann: How a Band of Survivors and a
Young Spy Agency Chased Down the World’s SPYMASTER: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence
Most Notorious Nazi by Neal Bascomb (53 3 and Espionage Against the West by Oleg Kalu-
[September], Bookshelf) gin (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)
The Irregulars: Roald Dahl and the British Spy Ring
The Spy Who Came in from the Co-op: Melita Nor-
in Wartime Washington by Jennet Conant (53 1
wood and the Ending of Cold War Espionage by
[March], Bookshelf)
David Burke (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)
James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, & the Craft of
Counterintelligence by Michael Holzman (53 3 The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War: Katharine Gun
[September], Bookshelf) See also David and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion
Robarge’s review of James Angleton’s appear- by Marcia and Thomas Mitchell (53 4 [Decem-
ances in literatures and film in Studies 53 4 ber], Bookshelf)
(December)
Vietnam Declassified: CIA and Counterinsurgency
The Lost Spy: An American in Stalin’s Secret Ser- in Vietnam by Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (53 4
vice by Andrew Meier (53 2 [June], Bookshelf) [December], Hayden Peake)
Intelligence Around the World
British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources by Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence,
Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire, and Gra- by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed (53
ham Macklin(53 1 [March], Bookshelf) 4 [December], Bookshelf)
Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of
CIA’s Eye on South Asia by Anuj Dhar (53 2 [June], Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas by Paul
Bookshelf) McGeough (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Reviewed in 2009
Intelligence Around the World (continued)
Memorias de un Soldado Cubano: Vida y Muerte de SPOOKS: The Unofficial History of MI5 by Thomas
la Revolucion [Memories of a Cuban Soldier: Life Hennessey and Claire Thomas (53 4 [Decem-
and Death of the Revolution], by Dariel Alarcon ber], Bookshelf)
Ramirez aka “Benigno” (53 3 [September], Juan) Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups—
Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, Six Decades of Espionage Against America and
1904–05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea, Great Britain by Chapman Pincher (53 4 [Decem-
Evgeny Sergeev (53 4 [December], Bookshelf) ber], Bookshelf)
Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelli-

gence Inside MI5 and MI6 by Gordon Thomas
(53 3 [September], Bookshelf)
Fiction
North from Calcutta by Duane Evans (53 3 [September] Bookshelf)
Special Review Issue
See also Studies in Intelligence Special Review Supplement, Summer 2009, in which the following fictional
works in literature, film, and television are discussed by numerous reviewers (not listed here).
Master and Commander et al. by Patrick O’Brian
The Spy Who Came in from the Cold by John le Carré
Crescent Moon Rising by Kerry Collison
Stormbreaker by Anthony Horowitz
Rogue’s March by W. T. Tyler
The Hunt for Red October by Tom Clancy
The Kite Runner by Khaled Hosseini
One Day in September (movie)
Munich (movie)
The Siege (movie)
9/11 Documentary (movie)
Hamburg Cell (movie)
Baghdad ER—The 86th Combat Support
Hospital in Iraq (HBO documentary)
Body of Lies (movie)
The Bourne Identity (movie)
Burn Notice (television)
The Recruit (movie)
Taken (movie)
❖ ❖ ❖

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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4

Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

“The Intelligence Section, A.E.F”

Reviewed: Solving Real World Intelligence

Studies in Intelligence is available on the Internet at: https://

Requests for subscriptions should be sent to:

Center for the Study of Intelligence

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis

Cover: Painting by US combat artist S.J. Woolf. (Image from

To carry out this mission, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence, as well as

The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) i

Andres Vaart, Editor On the Web:

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars

Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) iii

OSS Training in the National Parks and Service

The Secret War in El Paso: Mexico

The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 75

Books, Film, and Television Reviewed

iv Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Mark Benbow worked as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence. He now

Terrence Finnegan is a retired US Air Force Reserve colonel. He is the author of

Brad P. is a clandestine service officer assigned to the CIA History Staff.

Hayden Peake is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served

Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) vi

Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS

The practice of intelligence dif- weaken the USSR’s opponents—

Editor’s Note: This article was the

Organizational Basics Directorate (foreign intelli-

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 1

Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Mos-

2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Party of the Soviet Union in

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 3

In their conspiracy-driven world view, it was plausible to as-

4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

The idea for the AIDS disinformation campaign would have

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 5

As an opening salvo, the letter was a dud.

6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Zapevalov began his lengthy Fort Detrick. As a result of tests

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 7

tice of exploiting unwitting ser-

8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Segal became genuinely and passionately devoted to his

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 9

for having agreed that the HIV

10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

West German media reported a mysterious visit of two “US dip-

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 11

Heym’s words carried significant moral weight … and his enlist-

know where we got our infor- had no incentive to have him

12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

The naive conclusion by a Western academic would have

Consider the peculiarity tronic surveillance) recorded a case long-term inmates of

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 13

The merger of the ethnic weapons and AIDS campaigns creat-

14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)