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Globalisation and global justice

Article  in  Studia Theologica · April 2005

DOI: 10.1080/00393380510032319

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 Economic Globalisation and Global Justice
Göran Collste
Centre for Applied Ethics, Linköping University
Address: Centre for Applied Ethics, Linköping University, SE-583 31
Linköping, Sweden,
tel +46 13281826, E-mail [email protected]

Introduction
When I spoke with one of our Nigerian master students in applied
ethics the other day, he told me the story about when SAP came to
Nigeria. SAP was the acronym used for Structural Adjustment
Programmes which were enforced by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the military dictatorship in
the 90th. He was a boy at the time but he still remembered the fear and
resentment it caused; because of privatisation of the health care sector,
poor people no longer had any chance to get health care, because of
economic liberalisation, poor farmers had to sell their farms,
unemployment grew and the number of poor people increased.

This happened in Nigeria in the 1990th. Quite recently, in May 2005,

the British organisation Christian Aid presented a report on the
consequences of the strategies for economic liberalisation in the Third
world designed by the World Bank and the IMF. They had, Christian
Aid reported, led to devastation of poor countries and decreased the

1
standard of living for many farmers. Due to pressure from the World
Bank and the IMF, in India the Rupie was devalued in 1991 in order to
increase export. The farmers were accordingly advised to grow
commercial crops like cotton and sugar instead of staple crops like rice
and wheat. To be able to do this the farmers had to get loans from the
newly privatised banks. The interest rate raise, the farmers could no
longer pay the interests and many of them lost their small farms. The
policy led to a domestic decrease in food supply and subsequently to
starvation. Now, one can notice a suicidal epidemic among Indian
farmers. In Andhra Pradesh the suicide rate grew from 200 1999 to
2000 last year, Christian Aid reports. Furthermore, according to the
report, the SAP has had similar consequences in other parts of the
globe. Two other Christian Aid-studies report that the liberalisation of
the market has crushed the poultry production in Ghana and led to a
decrease of sugar-cane production in Jamaica with unemployment,
drug-dealing and prostitution as results.1

My Nigerian master student and Christian Aid present two gloomy

pictures of economic globalisation. Of course there are also other,
more rosy pictures. However, these pictures connect economic
globalisation to the issue of justice; the policy outlined in Washington
has had grave consequences for poor people living far away in another
part of the globe.

2
One aim of this article is to show that many decisions behind
economic globalisation are basically ethical. Hence, economic
globalisation touches upon questions of well-being and of justice. I
will discuss two versions of global justice: global rectificatory justice
and global distributive justice and I shall argue that both versions have
a moral force and relevance in the present discussion about global
justice.

The ethics of SAP

Two of the main actors behind economic globalisation are the World
Bank and the IMF. The commission of the World Bank is to provide
loans for economical development and IMF intervenes when nations
face a financial crises. In order to provide loans, both the World Bank
and the IMF demand that borrowers should reform their economical,
financial and social sectors. These demands include a decrease of state
expenditures, liberalisation of trade implying deregulations and
removal of all tariffs, a stiff financial policy and privatisation of health
care and education. These structural adjustment programmes go under
the label “the Washington consensus”. In spite of the label, the policy
is not based on a consensus among affected nations. Instead it is a
result of an economic strategy designed by a number of World Bank
and IMF economists.

The structural adjustment programmes are justified by the assumption

that reforms that in the short run imply a lower standard of living due

3
to for example fees on education and health care in the long run will
bring about economic development. This argument is weakened by
our pictures from the Nigerian master student and Christian Aid and it
has been questioned by former chief economist of the World Bank and
Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz in his book Globalization and its
discontents. He writes: “The history of the past fifty years has not
supported these theories and hypotheses”2.

However, let us for a moment assume that the justification hold good.
Still it presupposes premises that can be scrutinised from a moral point
of view. When analysing the arguments for structural adjustment
programmes one should take a closer look at concepts like “lower
standard of living”, “in short and long run” and “development”.

What does a “lower standard of living” mean? It can mean different

things. It can mean – to just mention two interpretations - general
lowering of living standard but still a decent standard for everyone.
But it can also mean poverty for certain social strata, implying no
schooling and limited access to health care due to fees, leading to
illiteracy, diseases, prostitution, trafficking and early deaths.

“In short and long run” can also be interpreted in different ways. For
how long will the lowering of the living standard last? When will the
economic development begin – in 5 years, 10 years or 50 years? And
what does “development” mean? A higher standard of living for

4
everyone? Or perhaps a higher standard only for those who already
have a high standard? Or does it mean a higher standard particularly
for those who where hit by the previous lowering?

Hence, depending on how these concepts are defined, the justification

for structural adjustment programmes can be interpreted in different
ways. In fact, my interpretations so far of the concepts “lower standard
of living”, “in short and long run” and “development” leaves us with
18 possible interpretations! But let me mention only two. The
proposition: “reforms that in the short run imply a lower standard of
living will in the long run bring about economic development “ can,
for example, mean that although there is a lowering of the living
standard for everyone – but still a decent standard – in, say, 10 years
the standard of living for everyone will increase and in particular for
those who suffered most from the former lowering. But it can also
mean widespread poverty implying early deaths for many, and that
other population strata in a number of years will enjoy a high standard
of living.

A decision to introduce a structural adjustment programme is not only

an economic but also a moral decision. It has implications for peoples’
welfare and for how welfare is distributed. A programme can, as we
noticed, imply a great sacrifice in terms of poverty, lack of education
and health care for particular population groups while other social
groups will gain from the development. A decision to introduce a

5
programme implies then that the interests of certain individuals can be
sacrificed for the welfare of others, i.e. a moral – and indeed a very
controversial – decision. It comes for example in conflict with Kant’s
second formulation of the Categorical imperative: “Act in such a way
that you treat humanity…always at the same time as an end and never
simply as a means”3 . This imperative implies that a human being may
never be used as a means for others, but this is exactly what structural
adjustments programmes in certain cases imply. Some individuals are
hit by poverty and illness, for the sake of an increased welfare for
others.

A structural adjustment programme can be seen as a kind of social

experiment. One acts under conditions of uncertainty, the outcome is
difficult to predict and the programme will give new information
about the effects of economic reforms.

The principle of informed consent is highly regarded for medical

experiments involving patients. A patient has the right to choose to
participate or to abstain and this right is justified by a principle of
autonomy, and ultimately by a principle of human dignity. And it is
from an ethical perspective blameworthy to force a patient to
participate. The decision should be the patient’s.

When the World Bank or IMF decides to introduce a structural

adjustment programme no principle of informed consent is applied.

6
The message to nations in crises is: accept the conditions or abstain
from loans! Furthermore, which makes the question from a moral
point of view even more demanding, elites that care less about the
welfare of the population often govern the receiving nations.

Thus, SAP can not be reduced to economic calculus but presupposes

moral reasoning and moral decisions. Then, how come that
globalisation so often is discussed in economic terms and, reversed,
that the ethical discussion so seldom deals with global issues?

I will suggest two complementary answers to this question. One is that

the economic sphere – to use Michael Walzer’s concept - has become
“exiled” from the rest of the society and that economic development is
often considered as predetermined. There is a prevalent view, not least
among neo-classical economists, that the economy is in some way
living its own life apart from the rest of the society. A related view is
that the economy follows its own path but through “the invisible
hand” everyone will benefit in the end. As a consequence, in contrast
to for example medicine, economic decision making is seldom
scrutinised from a moral point of view.

The view that economic development follows a predetermined path is

not least prevalent in the discussion about economic globalisation.
Globalisation is then interpreted as a natural force that is impossible to
direct or control. For example, the Japanese economist Kenichi Ohmae

7
writes: “No more than Canute’s soldiers can we oppose the tides of the
borderless world’s ebb and flow of economic activity”4. As a
consequence, the room for political initiatives is limited and the only
option for politics is to adjust to globalisation in order to benefit from
it.

Another explanation of the fact that the ethical discussion so far

largely disregards global issues is that political theory and political
philosophy have suffered from “methodological territorialism”, to use
Jan Aart Scholte’s term5. Modern theories in political theory and
political philosophy have to a large extent been adherents of the 17th
and 18th - century philosophical ideas of a social contract. For those
philosophers the nation was the natural political community. As a
consequence, up till this day the discussion about justice has often
been limited to a specific territory, i.e. a nation. However, due to
globalisation, it has become crucial to question both these restrictions.
It has become urgent to find ways to influence economic decisions
with a global reach and to work out a theory of global justice.

2. Globalisation as a challenge to social ethics

Globalisation has become an all-pervasive catchword in the public
debate. What then is the meaning and implication of globalisation?
Globalisation is used with reference to such phenomena as global
banking, global tourism, global environmental pollution, global

8
terrorism, global media and global implementation of human rights,
just to mention some examples. Hence, globalisation refers to different
social processes that have a global reach.

To demarcate the concept I propose the following defining criteria:

Globalisation refers to
(1) processes and relations (social, economic, political, cultural
etc) that are
(2) transcending national borders, that
(3) link distant places and peoples and that
(4) are spontaneous rather than the result of political decisions.

In the age of globalisation, what happens in one place may influence

another place at a far distance. But are the global processes really
spontaneous rather than the result of political decisions? Of course,
political decisions contribute to globalisation. Examples are political
decisions to deregulate currency flows in the 1980th. However, these
political decisions are rather a response to, than an anticipation of,
globalisation.

Economic globalisation is probably the most important single

globalisation force and it is, as I will argue, a most important process
from a moral point of view. Economic globalisation, i. e. the
intensification of world-wide economic relations, has different
characteristics. Global trade has increased not less than 17 times from

9
1982 to 1999. Total volumes of foreign investments grew from $15
billions to $240 billions from 1970 to 1990. The yearly sales volume
of the world’s 50 largest companies increased from $540 billion1975
to $2100 in 1990. Today 50 of the world’s 100 largest economies, are
companies, the rest are nations! Finally, the global financial market,
i.e. the global trading of currencies, securities, bonds etc, increased
from $20 billion per day 1973 to $1800 billion per day 1998! 6 Taken
together, the rapid increase of global trade, foreign investments, the
number and volume of transnational companies (TNC) and the global
financial market, form a more or less integrated global economy. As
the economists Francis Adams and Satya dev Gupta writes:

As the twentieth century comes to a close, the modern

system of independent states is being transformed.
National governments are gradually losing control over
domestic economic and political affairs. Separate
national economies are being replaced by a single,
integrated global economy and basic political functions,
which traditionally have been the province of national
authorities, are being delegated to international
institutions including transnational corporations. The
twin processes of economic and political integration
have fundamentally altered our world order7

10
How, then, is globalisation a question for ethics? Globalisation is a
challenge for ethics in at least two ways. First, one aspect of
globalisation is that we are linked to people at a distance. The impact
of our collective actions, for instance in the form of consumption,
production, banking, travelling etc transcends national borders and
this means that the scope of our moral responsibility is becoming
wider. As a consequence it is arbitrary to let national borders delimit
social ethical reasoning and discussions about justice. Thus,
globalisation makes it obvious that methodological territorialism does
not work in social ethics any longer. Secondly, one aspect of
globalisation is that national sovereignty is hollowing and the states
are losing control.8 Important economic and political decisions
shaping the future of societies are taken less and less at a domestic
level and more and more at a global level within global institutions.
My examples of the implications of the imposed structural adjustment
programmes (SAP) are here illustrative. Hence, while economic
globalisation affects how wealth and power is globally distributed, it
has become necessary to discuss social ethics in a global context and
to develop principles of global justice.

How, then, is wealth and power today globally distributed? Although

there are some positive global trends indicating decrease in child
mortality, increase in life expectancy and literacy, there is still a sharp
global border between rich and poor. Some figures can illustrate this.
The 582 million poorest people in the world living in the south have

11
an income of $146 billion. The richest 200 persons have an income of
$1042 billion. More than 1 billion people lack access to clean water
and 2.4 billion have insufficient sanitary equipment. 1.2 billion people
are very poor and earn less than $1/day. Behind these figures is a
reality of misery, humiliation and hopelessness!

Equally divided is the access to productive resources. 97% of all

patents belong to the industrialised West and 90% of them are in the
hands of transnational companies. And the global divide does not
seem to decrease. The poorest fifth of the world’s population had in
1960 2.3% of the total wealth and in 1990 only 1.4%.9

The following chart shows how Gross National Product ($

GNP/Capita) has developed between 1975-1995, i.e. the period of the
present age of globalisation, for groups of countries: the poorest third,
the middle third and the richest third.

25000

20000
Rich
15000
Middle
10000
Poor
5000

0
1975 1985 1995

(Source: The World Bank)

12
In face of globalisation and the global divide, ethical theory must
become globally sensitive. The implications of globalisation for
ethical theory are thus twofold. It questions a traditional view of moral
responsibility that limits responsibility to our fellow national citizens
and it questions a methodological and normative ethical
“territorialism” in favour of ideas of global justice.

3. Theories of global justice

How, then could a theory of global justice be outlined? In his
discussion on justice, Aristotle distinguishes between distributive and
rectificatory justice.10 Distributive justice focuses on distribution of
scarce resources and goods. Rectificatory justice, on the other hand, is
backward looking and focuses on retribution, punishment or
compensation for past acts. I will discuss global justice both from a
rectificatory and from a distributive perspective. Hence, I will
distinguish between Global Rectificatory Justice (GRJ) and Global
Distributive Justice (GDJ).

Global Rectificatory Justice

First, I will discuss GRJ. When focusing on GRJ, the historical
inequality and suffering connected to colonial an imperial dependence
becomes important. The territorial borders, as well as the economies of
the colonies in Asia, Africa and Latin America were adjusted in the
interests of the colonial powers. Through the Spanish and Portuguese
exploitation of Latin America, the British, Belgian and French of

13
Africa, British, Portuguese and Dutch of Asia, the slave trade etc,
Europe and North America prospered while many colonies sank in
despair. What happened during this period in history is well captured
in the title of Brazilian author Eduardo Galeano’s book Venas abiertas
de América Latina (Open Veins of Latin America).

How, then can we relate this to ethical theory. Referring once again to
Aristotle’s view:

“…for in the case also in which one has received and

the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the
other been slain, the suffering and the action has been
unequally distributed: but the judge tries to equalize
things by means of the penalty, taking away from the
gain of the assailant…therefore corrective justice will be
the intermediate between the loss and gain” (Aristotle,
V:4)

If Aristotle’s description of injustice captures the relation

between colonial powers and colonies, one can according to
Aristotle’s theory of justice argue for corrective justice.

According to John Locke, one of the founding fathers of modern

political philosophy, the earth “is given to mankind in common” and
every individual is by God given equal rights to employ the creation.

14
Locke’s intention was to justify property rights. However, according
to Locke, property rights are justified as long as “there is enough, and
as good left in common for others”.11 This condition has become
known as Locke’s proviso. In accordance with Locke’s proviso one
could argue that the present global distribution of possessions is not
morally justified because it does not leave enough for the others. This
argument presupposes then that the underdevelopment of the poorest
1/3 of the world’s population, or the 1/5 who live on only 1$/day, is
one side of the coin and the possessions by the ancestors of the
colonial powers is another side of the coin. Global wealth and poverty
is interrelated. Hence, if this presupposition holds true, redistribution
in favour of the poor is mandatory. It is in line with this argument that
philosopher Hillel Steiner in An Essay on Rights argues for a global
fund that would secure that every individual gets his or her fair share
of resources.12

A related line of argument for rectificatory justice could be developed

from philosopher Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory. According to
Nozick, a person is entitled to his or her property provided that it is
acquired in a just way. Hence, property rights depend on justice in
acquisition and justice in transfer. (Nozick 1974, p.150f) Nozick’s
theory is a philosophical justification of libertarianism. However, with
some factual assumptions, the theory can justify a theory of global
rectificatory justice. If we can assume that the present concentration of
property and wealth in the rich part of the world at least partly is the

15
result of unjust historical acquisitions, i.e. plunder, theft and war, one
could, also in line with Nozick’s entitlement theory, argue for a global
redistribution of property. Historical injustices thus beg for rectifying
actions.

It seems to me that GRJ has some moral force. Let me illustrate the
argument: Assume that I live a life in prosperity and welfare. My next
door neighbour, on the other hand, lives in poverty and misery. Let us
also assume that many years ago my grandparents stole the land from
my present neighbour’s grandparents and our present difference in
welfare is the result of this historical fact. Then, it seems that my
neighbour with good reasons could demand to get a part of my land or
income, and thus, that I have some moral obligations to my neighbour.
And these obligations are generated by the acts of my forefather.

Even if the GRJ has some moral force, it is not without problems. It
presupposes the possibility of historical and collective responsibility.
Is it reasonable that the fact that some of our forefathers acted wrongly
towards the forefathers of say Africans, Asians or Latin-Americans
implies that we who lives today have a responsibility towards, and are
obliged to compensate, present Africans, Asians and Latin-
Americans? From the point of view of moral individualism this seems
doubtful. One could argue that the oppressor owe something to the
oppressed at the time of colonialism, but not that individuals living
later, i e the grandsons and granddaughters, who themselves neither

16
acted as oppressor nor oppressed owe anything to each other. On the
other hand, if there is a causal relation between the welfare and
positions of the grandchildren of the oppressor and the oppressed
respectively, i.e., if they have benefited and lost because of the former
exploitation, it seems fair that the grandchildren of the oppressor
compensate the grandchildren of the oppressed.

However, there are some constraints to the application of GRJ. First,

there must be some time-related restrictions. It is bizarre if, for
example, the Scandinavian countries according to the GRJ should
compensate England and France for what the Vikings did towards
their ancestors in the 9th and 10th centuries. Hence, we must add a
time-related discount to the GRJ-theory. Or, maybe it is more
reasonable to add a principle of constraint saying that its application
depends on whether the colonial or imperial power still gain and the
subject of colonialism and imperialism still suffer from former
injustices.

The application of rectificatory justice is not new in political ethics. It

has been practised in other historical instances of oppression and
exploitation. One example is the compensation given by Germany to
Israel because of the Holocaust and another is the policy of
preferential treatment in favour of the black people and former slaves
in the US.

17
As I have interpreted GRJ, global justice depends on some historical
facts. Hence, if the history of colonialism and imperialism can be
described in another and for the colonial powers more favourable way,
the cause of rectification is undermined. However, irrespective of
historical course of events, the question of social justice is relevant
and important, both domestic and global, and not least in the light of
the present poverty in the third world. This means that we also must
look for a theory of global distributive justice (GDJ).

A forward-looking theory of GDJ can be applied to the present global

situation in at least two ways. First, one can identify some unjustified
differences in social welfare and argue for redistribution in accordance
to some principles of global distributive justice. Second, global
organisations, like the World Bank and the IMF, make decisions that
will have effects on people’s welfare. Then, principles of justice
deduced from a GDJ will be helpful as guidance for the decisions.

Global Distributive Justice

The contemporary discussion about justice takes the publication of
John Rawls´s work A Theory of Justice (1971) as its starting point and
I will take Rawls’s theory as a point of departure for an argument for
GDJ. Rawls’s theory has been a source of inspiration for liberal
egalitarianism in questioning social injustice. In one of his last
contributions to political philosophy, Rawls at least partly transcends

18
methodological territorialism and extends the idea of a social contract
to – what he calls - a Society of Peoples. However, this theory is rather
a theory of just international relations- than a theory of global justice.
(See my critique of The Law of Peoples in Collste 200513)

Given that Rawls’s theory of justice from 1971 is basically sound;

how would a theory of global distributive justice based on Rawls’s
contract theory look like? The hypothetical device of a social contract
is then transferred from a nation to the world as a whole.
Representatives of the world’s population deliberate on the
appropriate principles of justice behind a “veil of ignorance”. The
responsibility to comply with these principles lies both on national
governments and on global and international institutions.14 I further
assume that in the absence of an institutionalised world-wide political
community and a world government the principles of global justice are
formulated in a slightly different way than the ones in A Theory of
Justice even though the moral content is similar.

What principles of global justice would then the representatives agree

on? I assume that at least the following three principles would be
included in a theory of global justice:
1) A principle of respect for universal basic human rights
2) A principle of democratic legitimacy of global governance15, and
3) A principle of equal distribution of social goods unless an unequal
distribution is to the benefit of the least advantaged.

19
The first principle corresponds to Rawls’s sixth principle in his Law of
Peoples16. It suggests that there are some crucial moral concerns, or
from the right-holders point of view, some crucial moral claims that
applies equally to each human being. These moral concerns and claims
imply obligations on the part of governments and other institutions,
including global ones. Thomas Pogge uses in connection to the UN
Charter §2817 the concept “global institutional order” for the subject of
these rights and he writes: “…our global institutional order is to be
assessed and reformed principally by reference to its relative impact
on human rights fulfilment.”18

What, then, is the substance of this principle? That is to say, what

rights should we have in mind? Among the human rights that Rawls
mentions are the rights to life, including subsistence and security,
liberty, property and formal equality. However, the realisation of these
rights presupposes rights to food, health care and education.19 The
rights will protect people’s agency, i. e. the capacity of individuals to
their rational intentions as Michael Ignatieff writes.20 As a
consequence of the economic and political globalisation the
responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights is also globalised. It is
not only states but also global institutions and global organisations
that have duties to respect human rights.

20
The second principle takes into account the need for a democratic
global order. It is warranted by a principle of autonomy, e.g. that each
person has a right to influence those decisions that affect his/her life
and by a principle of democratic equality. In the present global
(dis)order, poorer nations have much less influence on international
organisations like the World Bank or the IMF than the wealthier
nations have. The global order suffers from a democratic deficit that
according to the second principle of global justice should be altered.21

The third principle is a global application of Rawls’s difference

principle and is justified for the same reasons as Rawls advances in A
Theory of Justice. This implies that we can imagine an alternative
more morally sound scheme for the global economic order then the
prevalent one. As Rawls’s principle, it leaves open for the possibility
of a free market as long as the least advantaged groups are benefiting
from it.

In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues that it is “…circumstances,

institutions, and historical traditions…” that decide which economic
system and which social institutions best serve the realisation of
justice.22 This also applies to global justice. However, global justice is
probably not compatible with a totally unregulated economic
globalisation. The first principle presupposes some kind of global
juridical institutions, the second democratisation of global governance
institutions and the third socially institutionalised mechanisms for

21
redistribution. Hence, in the absence of a global government the
principles will demand more of institutional and political regulation of
the global interactions and processes than is presently the case. This
development is however in accordance with recent globalisation
processes concerning human rights enforcement, environmental
protection and other forms of regional and global co-operation and
institutionalisation.23

Opponents of a global application of the difference principle, argue

that there are significant political and economic differences between a
nation and the world as a whole. A nation can be looked upon as a
network of co-operating citizens. They all contribute to the common
good. This fact makes it also legitimate to make redistribution among
those who belong to a particular society. This, the argument goes, is a
reality for a nation but it is not a global reality. However, the argument
presupposes that nations are autonomous economic units. But through
economic globalisation the economies of different nations are
becoming more and more integrated and inter-dependent. Thus, when
the extensive global economic integration is taken into account, the
force of the argument weakens.

For Rawls the subject of justice is a society’s basic structure. Perhaps

it is not possible to apply the difference principle on a global level due
to a lack of a global basic structure, i.e. a set of economic and political
institutions that affects the distributions of burdens and benefits

22
among peoples and individuals around the world? However, even this
objection is successively weakened by globalisation. One aspect of
globalisation is precisely the increasing importance of governing
social institutions and financial agreements on a global level. Besides
the United Nations with its sub-institutions, one can notice a growing
influence of international economic institutions like the IMF, the
World Bank and the WTO as well as a global scheme of property
rights, multilateral agreements of investments etc. Even regional
communities like the EU and NAFTA can be included in a global
basic structure. Financial and economic organisations direct and
redirect economic resources on a global level and many nations are
economically and politically dependent on their policies. Hence, the
global basic structure requires principles of justice as much as the
basic structure of individual societies. The new emerging global basic
structure is the subject of global justice.24

Conclusion
Globalisation has an economic as well as a moral aspect. This fact was
illustrated by a decision to implement Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAP) in poor countries. Further, I argued that
globalisation has at least two implications that are important for a
discussion about justice. First, globalisation implies that there are new
powerful actors besides nations on the global scene. These actors often
elude political control and accountability. Secondly, globalisation

23
implies global interdependence, which challenges the “methodological
territorialism” of many theories of justice.

I have distinguished between two theories of global justice; global

rectificatory justice and global distributive justice. Further, I have
argued that both GRJ and GDJ have argumentative and moral force. A
theory of GRJ finds its support in different classical theories of
rectificatory justice and a theory of GDJ takes its point of departure in
Rawls’s theory of distributive justice. I have proposed three principles
of global distributive justice based on Rawls’s theory of justice and I
have argued that these principles should guide political decision
making in the age of globalisation.

Let us now for a moment turn back to the reality of present-day

globalisation. It seems that in practice the GRJ is reversed. Take for
example the rules for global trade. When the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) met in Cancun 2003, four of the world’s poorest
nations – and former colonies - Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali
demanded a fair trade in cotton. Without any particular success, they
questioned the fact that US government gives subsidies to its own
cotton production that equals the value of the total global trade in
cotton! Another, appalling example of reversed justice is the European
Union’ s subsidies to its own farmers, European companies export
cheap milk powder to Latin America, and as a consequence poor Latin

24
American farmers are outstripped from the market. Who owes
something to whom?

On the other hand global leaders also make decisions in accordance

with what both GRJ and GDJ demands. One example is the recent
follow up of the G8-meeting in August 2005. The ministers of finance
of the richest nations decided together with IMF and the World Bank
that the depths of 18 of the world’s poorest nations will be written off.
This decision may have different raison d'être. One could be justice.

Acknowledgements
I have benefited from comments by Martin Andersson, Nigel Dower
and Carl- Henric Grenholm on earlier versions of this article. It is
written within a project financed by the Bank of Sweden's
Tercentenary Foundation.

Notes
1
Dagens Nyheter, 2005-05-16
2
Stiglitz, J, Globalization and its Discontents, London: The Penguin Press, 2002, p.79
3
Kant, I, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in Ethical Philosophy, Indianapolis, Hacket 1994 (1785),
p.35
4
Ohmae, K, Putting Global Logic First, in The Evolving Global Economy, ed. Ohmae, K, Boston, Harvard
Business Review Book, 1995
5
Scholte, J A, Globalization, a critical introduction, New York, Palgrave, 2000, p.56
6
Scholte, J A, Globalization, a critical introduction , p. 125, Ostry, S, Technological Change and International
Economic Institutions, i Dev Gupta, S, The Political Economy of Globalisation, Boston: Kluwer, 1997, p.
242, Eatwell, J , The Liberalisation of International Capital Movements: The Impact on Europe, West and East
in Understanding Globalisation, Stockholm: A&W, 1988.
7
Adama, F, Dev Gupta, S, The Political economy of Globalisation: An Introduction, in Dev Gupta, S. The
Political Economy of Globalization, Boston, Kluwer, 1997.
8
Sassen, S, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization, New York: Polity, 1996
9
UNDP, Human Development Report, 2000, New York, Oxford University press, 2000, World Development
Report 2003. Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World. The World Bank and Oxford University Press,
Washington 2002.

25
 10
Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, Book V:2, Oxford, oxford University press, 1980
11
Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, § 27,London, Dent, 1977 (1690) p.130
12
Steiner, H, An Essay on Rights, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994
13
Collste, G, Globalisation and Global Justice, Studia Theologica, Vol 59, No 1, 2005, pp 55-73
14
With global institutions I mean global organisations like TNCs and with international institutions I mean
international organisations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, United Nations, the European
Union etc.
15
According to the UN Commission on Global Governance, “At the global level, governance has been viewed
primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), citizens’ movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market.”
(www.egg.ch/chap1.html, 2002-02-28)
16
Rawls, J, The Law of Peoples, 1999, p.37
17
“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized” (UN Declaration of Human Rights, §28)
18
Pogge, T., The International Significance of Human Rights, i The Journal of Ethics, 4, 2000, p.55
19
Pogge, T., 1999, p 64 See also Nussbaum, M, Women and Human Development, The Capabilities Approach,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, for a discussion about basic human rights in a global context.
20
Ignatieff, M., Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p.57
21
See Held, D, Democracy and the Global Order, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995
22
Rawls, J, A Theory of Justice,p.280
23
In Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) political scientist David Held
sketches a conception of democracy and political institutions in an age of globalisation. The so called “Tobin-
tax” is one proposal to introduce a tax on global financial transactions with the aims to slow down global
speculation and to get resources for development projects in the third world. (Tobin, J, A Currency Transaction
Tax, Why and How, Open economics review, 7:493-499, 1996)
24
Buchanan, Allen, Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World, Ethics Vol. 110, (2000),
pp 697-721

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