Case No. 11
Case No. 11
Case No. 11
11
I. SHORT TITLE: TRANSFIELD VS. LUZON HYDRO
On 5 November 2000, petitioner as plaintiff filed a Complaint for Injunction, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, against herein respondents as
defendants before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.Petitioner sought to restrain
respondent LHC from calling on the Securities and respondent banks from transferring,
paying on, or in any manner disposing of the Securities or any renewals or substitutes
thereof. The RTC issued a seventy-two (72)-hour temporary restraining order on the same
day and it was also extended later on.
The RTC denied petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. It ruled that
petitioner had no legal right and suffered no irreparable injury to justify the issuance of the writ.
Employing the principle of "independent contract" in letters of credit, the trial court ruled that
LHC should be allowed to draw on the Securities for liquidated damages. Dissatisfied with the
trial court's denial of its application for a writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The appellate court
dismissed the petition for certiorari expressing conformity with the trial court's decision that
LHC could call on the Securities pursuant to the first principle in credit law that the credit itself
is independent of the underlying transaction and that as long as the beneficiary complied with the
credit, it was of no moment that he had not complied with the underlying contract.
Subject of this case is the letter of credit which has evolved as the ubiquitous and most important
device in international trade. A creation of commerce and businessmen, the letter of credit is also
unique in the number of parties involved and its supranational character.
Petitioner has appealed from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61901
entitled "Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Oscar Pimentel, et al.," promulgated on 31 January
2001.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not the "independence principle" on letters of credit may be invoked by a beneficiary
thereof where the beneficiary's call thereon is wrongful or fraudulent
VII. RULING:
In a letter of credit transaction, such as in this case, where the credit is stipulated as irrevocable,
there is a definite undertaking by the issuing bank to pay the beneficiary provided that the
stipulated documents are presented and the conditions of the credit are complied with. Precisely,
the independence principle liberates the issuing bank from the duty of ascertaining compliance
by the parties in the main contract. As the principle's nomenclature clearly suggests, the
obligation under the letter of credit is independent of the related and originating contract. In
brief, the letter of credit is separate and distinct from the underlying transaction. To say that the
independence principle may only be invoked by the issuing banks would render nugatory the
purpose for which the letters of credit are used in commercial transactions. As it is, the
independence doctrine works to the benefit of both the issuing bank and the beneficiary.
Letters of credit are employed by the parties desiring to enter into commercial transactions, not
for the benefit of the issuing bank but mainly for the benefit of the parties to the original
transactions. With the letter of credit from the issuing bank, the party who applied for and
obtained it may confidently present the letter of credit to the beneficiary as a security to convince
the beneficiary to enter into the business transaction. On the other hand, the other party to the
business transaction, can be rest assured of being empowered to call on the letter of credit as a
security in case the commercial transaction does not push through, or the applicant fails to
perform his part of the transaction.
Jurisprudence has laid down a clear distinction between a letter of credit and a guarantee in that
the settlement of a dispute between the parties is not a pre-requisite for the release of funds under
a letter of credit. In other words, the argument is incompatible with the very nature of the letter
of credit. If a letter of credit is drawable only after settlement of the dispute on the contract
entered into by the applicant and the beneficiary, there would be no practical and beneficial use
for letters of credit in commercial transactions.
Respondent banks had squarely raised the independence principle to justify their releases of the
amounts due under the Securities. Owing to the nature and purpose of the standby letters of
credit, this Court rules that the respondent banks were left with little or no alternative but to
honor the credit and both of them in fact submitted that it was "ministerial" for them to honor the
call for payment.
Of course, prudence should have impelled LHC to await resolution of the pending issues before
the arbitral tribunals prior to taking action to enforce the Securities. But, as earlier stated, the
Turnkey Contract did not require LHC to do so and, therefore, it was merely enforcing its rights
in accordance with the tenor thereof. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Petitioner is hereby required to answer the charge of forum-shopping within fifteen (15) days
from notice.