G.R. No. L-21438             September 28, 1966 1.

The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review

"all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner
AIR FRANCE, petitioner, charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings
vs. of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the
APPEALS, respondents. appellate court's decision.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner. Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso. decision shall be rendered by any court of record without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand
that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state
"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall
SANCHEZ, J.: contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it". 7
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to
pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is
moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 open to direct attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a
representing the difference in fare between first class and decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the
tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of to write in its decision every bit and piece of
the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit. issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation
"to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered
as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision
of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of
respects", with costs against petitioner. Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its
conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom
The case is now before us for review on certiorari. "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for
the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify
by the evidence of record", are: (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was
48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on held that the mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on
March 30, 1958. the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the
issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official
vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager upon by it. 15
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked
to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to
be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate
that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16 They consist of
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts
in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his
seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of
May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first 2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an
class" seat in the plane.3 appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not
appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to Q. Confirmed for first class?
review the questions of fact. 20
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals support its xxx     xxx     xxx
judgment.
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims? Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for,
and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give
and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot
asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l",
complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said witnesses,
respondent knew that he did not have confirmed and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own
would have a first class ride, but that such would depend witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for a
upon the availability of first class seats. "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was
confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with
and discussed in its brief before the Court of Appeals under its plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by defendant
third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right
to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21 difference of a few pesos in the amount refunded on
Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We
thus: hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged
the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a
determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and
the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all
that the passenger to whom the same had been questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as
issued, would be accommodated in the first-class finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the
compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all
to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing
the necessary first-class reservation. We are not in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would
impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those
understand how a reputable firm like defendant of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of
airplane company could have the indiscretion to Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which
give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
received the corresponding amount in payment of
first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to
be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not
with the ordinary course of business that the company entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that
should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed,
be honored or not.22 then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands
of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will
always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees,
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that
similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus: there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that,
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that
ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case
plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows: here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence
intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what
you know, what does this OK mean? The foregoing are the considerations which point to the
conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of
A. That the space is confirmed. Appeals predicated the finding that respondent
Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was xxx     xxx     xxx
entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok , which
is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That
perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by class passage covering, amongst others, the
petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that
respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said
provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, contract was breached when petitioner failed to
Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
"to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again and Third, that there was bad faith when
to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to
first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if
another had a better right to the seat? leave his first class accommodation berth "after
he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's inconvenience, embarrassments and
action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an humiliations, thereby causing him mental
award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
or bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails
to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
complaint bearing on this issue are: It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad
faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it
may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air
therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation
carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for
wrongful expulsion.
and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed
to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the
plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard on what
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in
plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... . Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's manager who
gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in
the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from
on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to
Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in
accommodation but only after protestations,
the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An
arguments and/or insistence were made by the
amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even
plaintiff with defendant's employees.
required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals
declared:
5. That finally, defendant  failed to provide  First Class
passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first
only Tourist  Class accommodations from Bangkok to
class compartment of the plane belonging to the
Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
been compelled  by defendant's employees to leave
transferred to the tourist class not only without his
the First Class accommodation berths at
consent but against his will, has been sufficiently
Bangkok after he was already seated.
established by plaintiff in his testimony before the
court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no by the purser of the plane in his notebook which
repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments notation reads as follows:
brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced
to take a Pan American World Airways plane on his
"First-class passenger was forced to go to
return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene",
xxx     xxx     xxx
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G.
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of the
First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered plane who was asked by the manager of defendant
inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do
causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant
feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in ever contradicted or denied this evidence for the
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33 plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of
 the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but accommodate, using the words of the
defendant did neither. 37 witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white
man".38
The Court of appeals further stated —
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior the quoted portion first transcribed did not use the
reservation was made by the white man. Hence, if the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital
employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first- of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not
class ticket to him when all the seats had already only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will;
picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer
to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. compartment - just to give way to another passenger
Instead of explaining to the white man the whose right thereto has not been established.
improvidence committed by defendant's employees, Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad
the manager adopted the more drastic step of faith has assumed a meaning different from what
ousting the plaintiff who was then safely is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
strengthened in our belief that this probably was operating with furtive design or with some motive
what happened there, by the testimony of of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when
asked to explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is
appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of the
space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Court of First Instance, thus:
Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who
was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, The evidence shows that the defendant
testified as follows: violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing circumstances that defendant's Manager in
office know what reservation the passenger Bangkok went to the extent of threatening
has arranged with you? the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the
A They call us up by phone and ask for the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he
confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959) was occupying to, again using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white
man" whom he (defendant's Manager)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the wished to accommodate, and the defendant
trial Judge has said on this point: has not proven that this "white man" had any
"better right" to occupy the "first class" seat
Why did the, using the words of witness that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for,
Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a and for which the corresponding "first class"
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40
Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", 5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
nay, any right on the part of the "white man" employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For
to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
occupying and for which he paid and was employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
If there was a justified reason for the action injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the morals, good customs or public policy shall
defendant could have easily proven it by compensate the latter for the damage.
having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did
not do so; the presumption is that evidence In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal
willfully suppressed would be adverse if precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219
produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
and, under the circumstances, the Court is
constrained to find, as it does find, that 6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in
the Manager of the defendant airline in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. 43 And
Bangkok not merely asked but threatened this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains
the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
if he did not give up his "first class" seat public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
because the said Manager wanted to advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Q About that purser?

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel
have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of translated it to me — because it was recorded in
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for French — "First class passenger was forced to go to
damages against the carrier. 44 the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene."
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had
accepted a passenger's check, it was a Mr. VALTE —
breach of contract and a tort, giving a right
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of
of action for its agent in the presence of the witness because the best evidence would be the
third persons to falsely notify her that the notes. Your Honor.
check was worthless and demand payment
under threat of ejection, though the COURT —
language used was not insulting and she
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
was not ejected." 46 And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that
carrier is "contractual both in origin and the purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First class
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will,
and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon
the contract may be also a tort".   And in another47
evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is
case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not
conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does
to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay Such testimony is admissible. 49a
the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing
in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in
using insulting language to him, as by calling him a Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the
lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was
the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger. 1awphîl.nèt
still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as
yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of
public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his
said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has
case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's
testimony, thus — At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And,
by an employee of petitioner. It would have been an easy
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's
attendant and purser? testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made,
the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
A When we left already — that was already in the trip
— I could not help it. So one of the flight attendants We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of
approached me and requested from me my ticket and Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
I said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you
transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that
kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." 8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The
And I also said, "You are not going to note anything Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
there because I am protesting to this transfer". exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi-
contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have
Q Was she able to note it? "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
And this, in addition to moral damages.54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of

exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys'
fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that
it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We
do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well
exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.

10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both

the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as
moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages,
and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals
did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense
suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts
and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals

does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to
affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,

Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.
1. JOSE CANGCO, vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO., G.R. No. light located some distance away, objects on the platform
L-12191 October 14, 1918 where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially
to a person emerging from a lighted car.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the
Manila platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it
was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a
EN BANC large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the
market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has
G.R. No. L-12191             October 14, 1918 been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The
testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,  melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of
vs. the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee. of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform.
His statement that he failed to see these objects in the
darkness is readily to be credited.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious
condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had
FISHER, J.:
received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once
to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this
the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried
Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly to another hospital where a second operation was performed
wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the and the member was again amputated higher up near the
province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and
company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he for other expenses in connection with the process of his
used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to curation.
ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the
occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the
his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and,
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages
making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the
of the defendant company, founding his action upon the
steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in
hand for support.
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court
Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to rise of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
with a moderate gradient some distance away from the substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his
company's office and extends along in front of said office for a conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers
Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself
same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and
begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the
also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of plaintiff appealed.
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him
and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad
from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where
company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the
his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that
platform in the manner above stated; that their presence
after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward
caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that
possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own master would be liable in every case and unconditionally — but
contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
primary responsibility of the defendant company and the negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in
examined. the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the
method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences
the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage
to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting
at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The
of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master
say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection
legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the
negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a
care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil breach of the contract between the master and the person
Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but injured.
only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical
form of expression, that article relates only to culpa  aquiliana It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the
and not to culpa contractual. selection and control of the servant relieves the master from
liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary, that proof shows
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol.
and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care
out the difference between "culpa, substantive and in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the
obligation between persons not formerly connected by any duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs
legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third
performance of an obligation already existing . . . ." persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he
incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third
to rest squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the
Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been
constitute the breach of a contract. negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and
diligence in this respect.
Upon this point the Court said:

The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical

The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the
provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that
Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be those
these articles are applicable to cases of extra-
not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to
contractual culpa  exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto
one another. But where relations already formed give
Rico Reports, 215.)
rise to duties, whether springing from contract or
quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its
code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil.
Rep., 359 at 365.) rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the
extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the
damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which,
acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after
under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon
citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
employers with respect to damages occasioned by the
negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not
bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common From this article two things are apparent: (1) That
Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior —  if it were, the when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
 servant or employee there instantly arises a fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful
presumption of law that there was negligence on the or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum
part of the master or employer either in selection of juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum  exists
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by
after the selection, or both; and (2) that that the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure,
and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
necessarily that if the employer shows to the negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected —
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on
of a good father of a family, the presumption is the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability,
overcome and he is relieved from liability. without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or
This theory bases the responsibility of the master mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.
his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to
Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be
with strangers, the negligence of the servant in directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
conclusively the negligence of the master. responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care
in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a
case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is position of dependency with respect to the person made liable
necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to for their conduct.
the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article
1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in The position of a natural or juridical person who has
complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly
says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action
special relations of authority or superiority existing between the depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof
person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if he does not his
his act or omission, was the cause of it. action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the
the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful
the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his
of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard nonperformance is sufficient  prima facie  to warrant a recovery.
does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his
contract. As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-
contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon
contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized case of negligence which presupposes the existence
society imposes upon it members, or which arise from these of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary
to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure [1907 ed., p. 76]).
of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach
members of society. The breach of these general duties of a contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent
whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be
of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on
party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his
character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not
constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court
or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the held that the owner of a carriage was not liable for the
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case
that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the court commented on the fact that no evidence had been
the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been
than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania
liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for
exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff
that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of
such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a
practically complete immunity from damages arising from the contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp.
breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think
servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to
reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of the case."
such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking
corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374),
negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages for the
just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's
liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which
upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the
been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk? damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the
automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an he was present at the time, saying:
obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the
performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by . . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are
the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; continued for a length of time as to give the owner a
November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct
of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained
arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. such length of time that the owner by his
The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
saying:

In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach

These are not cases of injury caused, without any Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court
pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon
those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury
but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him
carry out the undertakings imposed by the arising out of the contract of transportation. The express
contracts . . . . ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in
dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the servants "makes the distinction between private individuals and
liability of employers for damage done by the negligent acts of public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a
their servants will show that in no case has the court ever rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or
decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has direction of servants; and that in the particular case the
been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for presumption of negligence had not been overcome. 
breach of contract.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the
court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather
than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and
an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that
the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory.
Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result
must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop
beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was
plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed
had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It
therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact
breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa guilty of negligence.
aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8,
pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had
course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury
itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends,
its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is
act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving
inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its
the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is
failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of
exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was
servants, the practical result is identical in either case. barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the meters from the place where he stepped from it.
damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to Thousands of person alight from trains under these
whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury
that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of where the company has kept its platform free from
its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that
it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's
defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
selection and control of the servant. alighting place.

The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this
the attention to the relative spheres of contractual and extra- subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence
contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
is much more broader than that of contractual obligations,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human The test by which to determine whether the
relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting
that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered
to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the and condition of the passenger, would have acted as
same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual the passenger acted under the circumstances
obligation had no contract existed between the parties. disclosed by the evidence. This care has been
defined to be, not the care which may or should be
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with used by the prudent man generally, but the care
it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson,
code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not
be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this
to defendant's servants. court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that
the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train
even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in which would have admonished a person of average prudence
placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was
contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence
alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory capable than men of alighting with safety under such
negligence.1awph!l.net conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff
which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this
guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
without being able to discern clearly the condition of the mind with regard either to the length of the step which he
platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In was required to take or the character of the platform where
considering the situation thus presented, it should not be he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the
overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence
melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to negligence.
afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its
trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the
some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him
was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure from continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown
upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a
alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his
their presence would be revealed. permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental
part of the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a
level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is
ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the
where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the costs of both instances. So ordered.
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident
to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it Separate Opinions
was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff MALCOLM, J.,  dissenting:
was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood,
and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been
accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited
in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of
until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
contributory negligence in performing such act — that is
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With
to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory
recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the
negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the
to alight from a moving train is negligence  per se." Adding
safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
these two points together, should be absolved from the
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
complaint, and judgment affirmed.