CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGEST PART 1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS GLENN DE GUZMAN y DELOS SANTOS

FACTS:
This is a case wherein the accussed appellant was convicted of violation of Sec. 5 and
11 of RA 9165. On this case, the he Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Unit of Olongapo City, in
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), conducted an
entrapment operation against appellant prior surveillance had confirmed numerous
reports that appellant was indiscriminately selling marijuana within the neighborhood.
During the pre-operation briefing, P/Insp. Julius Javier designated PO1 Lawrence
Reyes (PO1 Reyes) as poseur buyer, SPO1 Allan Delos Reyes (SPO1 Delos Reyes) as
case investigator and back-up, PO2 David Domingo as spotter, and three other
policemen as perimeter security. At the target area, appellant approached PO1 Reyes
and asked if he wanted to buy marijuana. PO1 Reyes accepted the offer and handed
the P100.00 marked money to appellant who, in turn, gave him a sachet of marijuana
fruiting tops. Once the exchange was completed, PO1 Reyes grabbed appellant's right
hand which served as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been
consummated. SPO1 Delos Reyes rushed to the scene and assisted PO1 Reyes in
conducting a body search on appellant. They introduced themselves as police officers,
informed appellant of his constitutional rights and placed him under arrest. After the
body search, SPO1 Delos Reyes recovered the P100.00 marked money, four sachets
of marijuana and one plastic pack containing a small brick of marijuana fruiting tops.
The entrapment team immediately brought appellant to the police station after his
relatives created a commotion and tried to interfere in appellant's arrest.
Following Section 21 of RA 9165, at the police station, PO1 Reyes marked the sachet
that was the subject of the buy-bust operation with his initials "LR" and turned it over to
SPO1 Delos Reyes who also put his initials "ADR" thereon. SPO1 Delos Reyes
separately marked the other four sachets and the plastic pack that he had confiscated
from appellant during the body search with his initials "ADR." SPO1 Delos Reyes then
prepared the Inventory Receipt, the Letter Request for Laboratory Examination, and the
Request for Drug Test. Photographs of the confiscated items were also taken. Notably,
only two barangay officials were present during the conduct of a physical inventory of
the seized items there were no representatives from both the Department of Justice
(DOJ) and the media. Later, SPO1 Delos Reyes personally turned over the seized items
to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Olongapo City. On November 13, 2009, Forensic
Chemist Arlyn Dascil (Forensic Chemist Dascil) conducted a qualitative examination on
the subject specimens to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After the
examination, the seized items tested positive for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug.
SEC 21, Paragraph 1 RA 9165: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous
drugs, x x x shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and frame-up and insisted that the evidence
against him was planted. He narrated that, while on his way home from a party, some
armed men alighted from a van and asked for the whereabouts of a certain "Bunso."
After failing to provide an answer, he was frisked and brought to the police station
where he was incarcerated and forced to point to the drugs on the table as pictures
were taken.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165. Not satisfied to the ruling of the court, the accused appeal to CA
which affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that Sec 21 of RA 9165 was complied,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sec 21 of RA was complied.

RULING:
NO. In this case, the records show that the buy-bust team had failed to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedure under Section 21, par. 1. Although the seized items were
marked at the police station, there is nothing on record to show that the marking had
been done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. Clearly, this constitutes a
major lapse that, when left unexplained, is fatal to the prosecution's case. But failure to
complied with the procedure will not result to the acquittal of the accused because of the
proviso of the provision. However, this saving mechanism operates only "under
justifiable grounds, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team." Thus, it is incumbent
upon the prosecution to: a) recognize and explain the lapse or lapses committed by the
apprehending team; and b) demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized had been preserved, despite the failure to follow the procedural
safeguards under RA 9165.

Unfortunately, the prosecution failed not only to recognize and explain the procedural
lapses committed by the buy-bust team, but also to adduce evidence establishing the
chain of custody of the seized items that would demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of said items had been preserved.
In Derilo v. People, the Court laid down the guidelines in order to show an unbroken
chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs, “the following links must be established in
order to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized items had not been
compromised: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the il1egal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.”

-The first crucial link in the chain of custody pertains to the time the marijuana was
seized from appellant up to its delivery at the police station. failed to disclose the identity
of the person/s who had custody and possession of the confiscated items after their
seizure, or that they themselves had retained custody of the same from the place of
arrest until they reached the police station. The police officers failed to disclose the
identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the confiscated items after
their seizure, or that they themselves had retained custody of the same from the place
of arrest until they reached the police station.
-The turnover of the seized items from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist,
the prosecution failed to disclose the identity of the person who had custody of the
seized items after its turnover by SPO1 Delos Reyes; the identity of the person who
turned over the items to Forensic Chemist Dascil, and the identity of the person who
had custody thereof after they were examined by the forensic chemist and before they
were presented in court.

All told, the totality of these circumstances leads the Court to inevitably conclude that
the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The failure of
the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the seized marijuana
is fatal to its cause. Accused-appellant was acquitted.
ESTIPONA VS LOBRIGO
G.R. NO. 226679, August 15, 2015

FACTS:

This is a case wherein the petitioner was charged of violation Art. II, Sec 11 of RA 9165
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs), on where he pleaded not guilty. Estipona filed
a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-Bargaining Agreement, praying to
withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section
12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs). However, the prosecutor objected the
motion on the ground that Section 23 expressly prohibits plea-bargaining which reads:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.
Petitioner argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law
expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the
principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.
The court denied the motion. Estipona filed motion for reconsideration but it was
likewise denied. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

YES.  Plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence
of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

At the case at bar, the Congress by not allowing plea-bargaining suspend the operation
of the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. As stated in Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of
the 1987 Constitution: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Therefore, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA

FACTS:
This is a case wherein the petitioner and his co-accused (Gorres) was apprehended by
virtue of a valid buy-bust operation conducted by police-officers of Cagayan de Oro City
and PDEA agent. The PDEA agent made a body searched on where they found inside
the pocket of Lim were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box
about 3x4 inches in size. They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white
substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was seized. IO1 Orellan took into
custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and
a disposable lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from
Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite exerting
efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media
and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking. Upon arrival,
they "booked" the two accused and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory
examination on the drug evidence and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well
as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory
Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was
no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence
seized were taken. The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused
and the drug specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in
possession of the sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. The
forensic chemist, found that the plastic sachet was contaminated with the presence of
shabu, and Lim turned positive for having substance of illegal drugs on his urine. They
were charged of alleged violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.

After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale
of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a
conspirator. On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty
that the PDEA operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative value of the
seized items. Not satisfied with the ruling of the trial court, Lim appeal to CA which
affirmed the ruling of the RTC, hence this present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not chain of custody of evidence was successfully complied.
RULING:
NO. The Court cited Mallillin v. People, where the Court also discussed how, ideally, the
chain of custody of seized items should be established the links in the chain of custody
that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the
seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the
turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the
forensic chemist to the court. Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the
plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1
Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the
house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he
immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.
To ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim
to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as
BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his
initial/signature. Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and
representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the physical inventory and
photograph of the seized items. In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory
Receipt. The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro: The prosecution
bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid
down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Earnest effort to secure the
attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos requires: It is
well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the
confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate with and secure
presence of the required witnesses. Hence, accused-appellant Lim shall be acquitted.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) GR NO. 157870 November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR. vs DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD GR. NO. 158633
November 3, 2008
PHILIPPINE DRUG Boards, vs AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. G.R. No. 161658 November 3,
2008
FACTS:

This is a three consolidated case seeks to nullify Section 36 (c), (d), (f), (g) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9165 for being unconstitutional insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged provision is unconstitutional.
RULING:
For Pimentel case: the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

For Laserna case: the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In
the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicion
less drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of
their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random,
and suspicion less drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.
For SJS case: the drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicion less arrangement. The objective is to stamp out
illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well-being of the citizen, particularly the
youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the
policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x
x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti -
drug abuse policies, programs and projects." The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this
random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals.
Hence, Sections 36 (f) and (g) of RA 9165 are unconstitutional, and Sections 36 (c) and
(d) of the same law are constitutional.

AMATAN VS. AUJERIO

FACTS:
The issue on this arises when criminal complaint filed against one Umpad who are
facing a charge of homicide for killing one Tagsip. Upon arraignment of he entered into
a plea-bargain agreement, on where he plead guilty to a lesser offense of attempted
homicide. The trial judge who is the respondent on this case rendered a decision finding
the accused guilty of the crime of lesser offense of attempted homicide. The brother of
the victim filed a complainant on where he contends that the sentence of respondent
judge finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of
Attempted Homicide and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative, on its face, of
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct. Responding to
the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual
— with the consent of the offended party — to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged,
or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge erred in making his decision finding the accused
Umpad guilty of the crime of lesser offense of attempted homicide.
RULING:
YES. Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense
regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of
death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable, cannot
by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the
lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.
Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a
misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. In instances where a
literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in
opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be
unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice
at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat
coelum. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated
or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly
inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so
cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent
judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties. The death
of an identified individual, the gravamen of the charge against the defendant in the
criminal case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a more expedient plea of
either attempted or frustrated homicide. We have held before that if the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs WILLINGTON RODRIGUEZ y HERMOSA

FACTS:
This case a wherein the accused-appellant was apprehended by virtue of an
entrapment operation for alleged violation of RA 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003. She allegedly recruits, transport, harbor, provide,
introduce or match for money for the purpose of prostitution, pornography or sexual
exploitation, the following trafficked persons, of three young girls to PO1 Escober and
his companion. She denies the allegation that he had offered a girl for sexual purposes
to PO1 Escober. He said that he was only selling cigarettes on Quezon Avenue when
he was arrested by the police officers. He only found out that he was being accused of
human trafficking after he was brought to the City Hall. The trial court rendered
Rodriguez of the crime charged. The trial court held that Rodriguez's acts of offering sex
to PO1 Escober, calling the three (3) pickup girls for him to choose from, and receiving
money are clearly acts of human trafficking. It gave more weight to the positive
testimony of PO1 Escober over Rodriguez's unsubstantiated denial. Likewise, the trial
court noted that PO1 Escober had no improper motive to falsely testify against the
accused. Finally, it held that absent ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty must prevail. She appealed the case to CA which affirmed the RTC
ruling. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court.
RULING:
YES. It is a basic rule that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness
of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution. This is premised on the
constitutional presumption that the accused is innocent unless his guilt is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of trafficking in persons: (1) the act of
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipts of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (2)
the means used which include threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another; and (3) the purpose of trafficking
is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs." A careful review of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove the
presence of these elements beyond reasonable doubt, nor did we find the second and
third elements proven by the prosecution.

The exchanges between PO1 Escober and Rodriguez would suggest that PO1 Escober
already knew what Rodriguez meant when he said "Sir, sir, babae, sir," and thus
assumed that Rodriguez was offering women for sex. However, his testimony is bare as
to the fact that the offer of women was explicitly for sexual purposes. It also lacked the
necessary details on how Rodriguez allegedly called on the pickup girls to display them
for PO1 Escober to choose from. We must remember that suspicion, no matter how
strong, must never sway judgment. It is pivotal in criminal cases that we evaluate the
evidence for the prosecution against the required quantum of evidence in criminal
cases. When there is reasonable doubt, the evidence must be interpreted in favor of the
accused. Under the equipoise rule, if the evidence admits two interpretations, one of
which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given
the benefit of the doubt and should be acquitted. The gravamen of the crime of human
trafficking is not so much the offer of a woman or child; it is the act of recruiting or using,
with or without consent, a fellow human being for sexual exploitation. In this case, the
prosecution miserably failed to prove this.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JEFFREY HIRANG y RODRIGUEZ

FACTS:
This is a case wherein accused-appellant Hirang was arrested by virtue of valid
entrapment operation for allegedly using the innocent mind of four young girls and
introduced them to entertain sexual desires of Korean Nationals. He was charge before
the RTC of Pasig with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons, as defined and
penalized under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and Section 3(a), (b)
and (c) of R.A. No. 9208. The young girls testified against Hirang. The entrapment was
conducted with proper coordination with local authorities. A social worker from the
Deartment of Social Welfare and Development and members of the media for the
segment XXX of ABS-CBN Channel 2 joined the operation. Villagracia secretly recorded
his conversation with Hirang. Hirang denies the allegation. The trial court rendered a
decision finding him guilty of the crime charged. Not satisfied with the conviction, he
appealed the case to CA contending that he was apprehended by the police not
informing him of his Miranda rights. The CA rendered a decision affirming trial courts
finding. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of Hirang beyond
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
YES. In People v. Casio, the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as
derived from the aforequoted Section 3(a), to wit: (1) The act of "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders"; (2) The means used which
include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another"; and (3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
"exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The information
filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the minor
victims for sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain.
Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified
trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years
of age. The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution
witnesses who testified during the trial.The young victims themselves testified on their
respective ages, and how they were lured by Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex
trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation.
Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him on
June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police
authorities personally, witnessed Hirang's unlawful activity, as they conducted the
entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with the supposed
customers and received payment therefor.
As to the issue of Miranda Rights, there is no sufficient ground for the Court to acquit
him. The CA correctly explained that any defect in the arrest of the accused was cured
by his voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising the
issue. In People v. Vasquez, the Court held: The Court rules that the appellant can no
longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary
submission to the trial court's jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LUDIVICO PATRIMONIO BANDOJO, JR. and

FACTS:
This is a case wherein the two accused were apprehended by virtue of a valid
entrapment operation conducted by the police officers who receives tip from a reliable
source that the accused offering and using child to engage in prostitution through social
media. The police officers alleged that the accused used the innocent mind of the
accused and promise to her that they will give her a racket (to enter into sexual
intercourse in certain man) on where he will gain money for consideration. The police
officers recovered the marked money from the accused and they were arrested and
charged for alleged violation of violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of
R.A. No. 9208. The accused denies the allegation. The trial court rendered a decision
finding both the accused guilty of the crime charged. Not satisfy to the ruling of the trial
court the accused elevated the case to CA which affirmed the decision of the trial court
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, whether or not there is a conspiracy, and the trial court erred
in not accepting the defense of denial of the accused.
RULING:
YES. In People v. Casio, the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as
derived from Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit: 1. The act of "recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders." 2. The means used which
include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another; 3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
"exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."
The crime is further qualified under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208 when the trafficked
person is a child. In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish the presence
of all the elements of the crime by testimonial and documentary evidence. As to the first
element and third elements, the testimony of AAA established that it was Kenny Joy
who recruited her to engage in prostitution by offering her rakets where she could earn
money by having sexual relations with clients the latter had found. AAA further averred
that Kenny Joy accompanied her to meet such clients, waited for her, and received
money after her relations with the clients concluded. Meanwhile, the testimony of NBI
Agent Señora established that Ludivico (under the name Jhanne David), provides the
sexual services of women through a Facebook account. It was Ludivico, together with
Kenny Joy, who brought AAA to meet Agent Señora during the entrapment operation.
The down payment, consisting of four Php 500.00 bills dusted with fluorescent powder,
was paid by Agent Señora to Ludivico. During the latter's arrest, the said entrapment
money was recovered from him as evidenced by the results of the Fluorescent Powder
Examination where Ludivico and the bills were found positive for the presence of
fluorescent powder. As to the second element, while AAA did not immediately accede to
the proposition initially made by Kenny Joy, she eventually yielded and asked for
a raket because she needed the money. It is, thus, apparent that the accused-
appellants took advantage of AAA's and her family's abject poverty in recruiting her to
engage in prostitution.
The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an
agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the
execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based
on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties' conduct indicating a
common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime.
Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into
an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be
carried out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the
crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a
joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
A categorical and consistent positive identification which is not accompanied by ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness prevails over mere denial. Such denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. It cannot be given a greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN, vs PEOPLE

FACTS:
This is a case wherein the accused were arrested without warrant, Villamor was
convicted as a collector of bets in the illegal numbers game of "lotteng" under Section
3(c) of RA 9287, while petitioner (Bonaobra) was convicted as a coordinator, controller,
or supervisor under Section 3(d) of the said law. The arresting officers go the house
Bonaobra upon received a call from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers
game. The police leader alleged that he saw the accused in flagrante delicto in the act
of counting bets, described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and
examining numbers placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet
numbers, and counting money bets. The accused denied the allegation. Bonaobra state
that he was at the door, a man later identified as PD Peñaflor kicked the fence of
Bonaobra's house, grabbed Bonaobra's right arm, and said, "Caught in the act ka!"
Florencio went outside and asked PD Peñaflor if he had a search warrant. Two more
men entered the house and took the money from the table. The trial court convicted the
two accused of the crime charged. The RTC held that petitioners were seen by the
arresting officers in the act of counting bets before the arrest was made inside
Bonaobra's compound. The petitioners were also caught holding "papelitos," which
contained the three rows of two-number combinations. Not satisfied, the accused
appealed the case to CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC hence this instant
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners' conviction for violation of RA 9287 as collector or
agent under Section 3(c) for Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor under
Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.
RULING:
NO. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on
the existence of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law
enforcement agents. Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes
unreasonable within the context of the Constitution and any evidence obtained on the
occasion of such unreasonable search and seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding. "Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree." While there are exceptions to the rule
requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar.
Under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a lawful arrest may be effected even
without a warrant of arrest in the following instances: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Upon cross-examination, the arresting officers state that they were positioned some 15
to 20 meters away from petitioners. Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant
distance between the police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that
the police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was ongoing to allow
them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and a search incidental to
a warrantless arrest thereafter.
In this case, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the acts that constitute the
offense of illegal gambling as a collector or an agent under Section 3(c), and as a
coordinator, controller, or supervisor under Section 3(d), of RA 9287. Under the said
law, a collector or agent is "any person who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf
of his/her principal for any illegal numbers game who is usually in possession of
gambling paraphernalia." On the other hand, a coordinator, controller, or supervisor is
defined as, "any person who exercises control and supervision over the collector or
agent." The prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia
found and confiscated inside the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt acts
that constitute the offense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRENEO JUGUETA

FACTS:
This is a case wherein the respondent with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation shoot a firearm to the daughters of Noberto Divina on where he
was charged of double murder. He was also charged together with one Gorres and San
Miguel of a crime of multiple attempted murder for the accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength attack, assault, and shoot with the said
firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the
acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident
other than the spontaneous desistance. Upon their request for re-investigation the other
accused Gorres and San Miguel was free of charge for having no prima facie evidence
against them. On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as
his defense. Finding appellant's defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to
the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that
appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of
Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder and Multiple Attempted
Murder. Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. The CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts finding which later affirmed by CA was correct.
RULING:
YES. The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed
by the CA, that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them
carrying firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two
young daughters. Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the
unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence of any one of
the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing
as murder. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because
treachery attended the killing of Norberto's two children. In this case, the victims were
defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned
down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly
as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in
concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their
house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina
refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming
their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of
the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary
Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Noberto’s other
family member.
As to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify the crimes for which appellant
was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the terms
"Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet
imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize
appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted
Murder.

The facts, as alleged in the Information, and as proven during trial, show that appellant
is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the
victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts.
In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder
and not Multiple Attempted Murder. It bears stressing that the Information in this case
failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court that an information must charge only one offense. As a general rule, a complaint
or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to
move for the quash of the Information, he is deemed to have waived his right to
question the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORATO C. BELTRAN, JR.

FACTS:
This is a case wherein accused appellant was charged of crime of murder. While armed
with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, attack, assault and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without warning
one Norman Concepcion y Habla while the latter was unarmed and completely
defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused
the victim's death. The accused and the victim had a quarrel but it was settled in the
barangay at the early morning of the before the incident happened. The accused
wanted to surrender but he was apprehended by the barangay police. The prosecution
presented who strongly testify on the case. The accused denies the allegation and
invoke self-defense. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Accused appealed to SC, the SC reprimanded the case to
CA following jurisprudence. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this
present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution successfully proved the guilt of the accused.
Whether or not the defense of the accused was acceptable.

RULING:

YES. It was strongly proven by the witness of the prosecution. Although it occurred late
in the evening, the light coming from the moon and the electric post therein provided
him with good visibility to identify appellant and Norman, and to witness how the
heinous act was executed. This testimony was corroborated by another prosecution
eyewitness, Rolando. Thus, the positive identification and categorical declarations of
Ever on the witness stand under solemn oath deserves full faith and credence. More
importantly, the RTC had observed that Ever was candid, straightforward and credible
in giving his testimony on the witness stand. It found Ever to be unbiased since he was
neither a friend nor an enemy of appellant and Norman but just a mere neighbor. It also
found that there was no ulterior motive for him to testify against appellant. It is a well-
settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.

For the defense of self-defense:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
In the instant case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Norman that
justified the act of appellant in hacking him to death. There was no actual or imminent
danger on the life of appellant when he came face to face with Norman. As narrated by
Ever, Norman was just walking on the road and was not provoking appellant into a fight.
It was the appellant who approached and suddenly hacked Norman repeatedly even
when the latter was already fallen on the ground. In short, appellant was the unlawful
aggressor. It is an essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete self-
defense.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by the person
defending himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may take into
account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other circumstances
showing that there is a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the
defense. The act of appellant in repeatedly hacking Norman on his head and neck was
not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by
the latter.
Treachery:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances:
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.
The suddenness and unexpectedness of the appellant's attack rendered Norman
defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. Appellant's use of nighttime and
a deadly bolo, as well as the sudden attack and repeated hackings on the vital portions
of Norman's body, were especially adopted by him to immediately cripple Norman and
prevent him from retaliating or escaping.
Sufficient Provocation on the part of the offended party/Voluntary Surrender:
Article 13 paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person's criminal
liability may be mitigated if there was a sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party which immediately preceded the crime. Before the same can be
appreciated, the following elements must concur: (1) That the provocation or threat
must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime committed and adequate to arouse one
to its commission; (2) That the provocation or threat must originate from the offended
party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime
by the person provoked.
Norman did not in any way provoke appellant into a fight on that fateful night. There was
no argument or physical struggle that ensued between them shortly before appellant
hacked Norman with a bolo. Norman was innocently walking along the road when, all of
a sudden, appellant surfaced and hacked him in rapid succession.
Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code states that the offender's criminal
liability may be mitigated if he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his
agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) that the
offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was
voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agent.
Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials of
Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police by a certain Tomas Dimacuha.
Moreover, the flight of appellant and his act of hiding until he was apprehended by the
barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that
characterizes the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO

FACTS:
This is a case wherein the accused was charged allegedly conspired for violation of
article 248 of the RPC defining and penalizing the crime of murder. The appellant herein
in the performance of their duty as security personnel of PNR tasked to investigate a
commotion in the canteen of PNR compound on where Dagani approached Javier who
had been striking a bottle of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber
revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly,
while outside the canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw
Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier. During the
course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a warning shot. He
heard Javier's gun fire again, so he decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano then shot
Javier from a distance of less than four meters. Appellants invoked the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR security
officers. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. They appealed to CA
but it was likewise denied. Hence this instant petition for review.
ISSUE: THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN
OFFICIAL DUTY. WON THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.
RULING:
They also argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability.
Two requisites must concur before this defense can prosper: 1) the accused must have
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the
injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence
of such lawful exercise. These requisites are absent in the instant case.
As found by the CA:
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty at the time
they were at the canteen. The trial court gave weight to the fact that the appellants were
unable to submit their daily time records to show that they were on duty at the time.
Appellants' assertion that they were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR
Security Investigator Rolando Marinay's testimony that PNR security officers work in two
12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury inflicted upon
him cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of appellants' due performance of
an official duty.
On the issue of conspiracy, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant Santiano
as he was being subdued by appellant Dagani. The trial court held that the manner of
the attack was indicative of a joint purpose and design by the appellants. Other than the
plain fact that the victim had been shot by one of the accused, while being held by a co-
accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were animated by the same
purpose or were moved by a previous common accord. It follows that the liability of the
accused must be determined on an individual basis. While no formal agreement is
necessary to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, yet, conspiracy must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARNEL KALIPAYAN Y ANIANO

G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018

FACTS:

This is a case wherein the accused-appellant and the victim Glaiza Molina were lovers
and had child. This case arose when the accused Kalipayan go to the victim house
without permission, approached Glaiza, stabbed her in the back and held her hair.
Accused-appellant then made Glaiza face him and continued stabbing her in the
abdomen, which resulted to the immediate death of the latter. Accused-appellant
claimed that he confronted Glaiza because he believes that the latter was having an
affair with another man. Glaiza was angry at him, and thereafter went to the kitchen,
and he followed her. Accused-appellant took a knife from the sink and threatened
Glaiza, causing the latter to slap him and when the latter lost control, he started
stabbing Glaiza, and he could not remember the number of times he stabbed her.
 Issue: Whether or not the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
 Ruling: Yes, treachery is present in this case. Treachery constitutes two (2) elements:
(1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) that said means of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted.
First, the accused-appellant unexpectedly entered the house, went straight for Glaiza,
and immediately, without warning and through an almost stealthy manner, stabbed the
latter numerous times. There was no heated discussion immediately prior to the
incident. Glaiza was attacked in the back, with accused-appellant holding her hair to
prevent her from moving. Second, the mode of attack, of suddenly entering the house
and going straight to where Glaiza was while the latter was preparing food, is also
clearly indicative of his nefarious plan to attack when Glaiza was not in a position to
defend herself.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs OSCAR MAT-AN Y ESCAD

G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018

FACTS: