1. cruz vs pandacan 3.    How may a private individual abate a public nuisance?

Petitioner Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay or

Chairperson of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of Manila. 2 On Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance
November 10, 2006, around five o'clock in the afternoon, and which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
along Central Street, Pandacan, Manila, within the vicinity of necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same,
her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
basketball with the following statements: unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball) court? Wala kayong a)    That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the
karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to, barangay namin ito! xxx property to abate the nuisance;
xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa. Ako ang chairman dito. Mga
walanghiya kayo, patay gutom! Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya b)    That such demand has been rejected;
kong panagutan lahat!
c)    That the abatement be approved by the district health officer
Then, she allegedly gave an order to the other and executed with the assistance of the local police; and
petitioner, Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz (Dela Cruz),
to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw d)    That the value of the destruction does not exceed three
which Dela Cruz promptly complied with, thus, rendering the thousand pesos.
said basketball court unusable.

Petitioners maintain that they acted merely with the intention 4.    Assuming that the basketball ring was a nuisance per se, but
to regain free passage of people and vehicles over the street without posing any immediate harm or threat that required
and restore the peace, health and sanitation of those affected instantaneous action, may the petitioners summarily destroy
by the basketball court. Cruz, in particular, asserts that she the basketball ring?
merely abated a public nuisance which she claimed was within
her power as barangay chief executive to perform and was part
of her duty to maintain peace and order. No.

1.    May the Petitioners summarily destroy the basketball ring? Under Article 700 of the Civil Code, the abatement, including
one without judicial proceedings, of a public nuisance is the
responsibility of the district health officer. Under Article 702
No. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a of the Code, the district health officer is also the official who
nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated. shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance. The
In the case at bar, the basketball ring can be held, at most, as a two articles do not mention that the chief executive of the
mere nuisance per accidens, for it does not pose an immediate local government, like the Punong Barangay, is authorized as
effect upon the safety of persons and property. A basketball the official who can determine the propriety of a summary
ring, by itself, poses no immediate harm or danger to anyone abatement.
but is merely an object of recreation. Neither is it, by its
nature, injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort 2. rana v wong
of the community and, thus, it may not be abated as a nuisance
without the benefit of a judicial hearing. 3. aquin v malay, aklan

FACTS
2.    Explain the police power of the local government units under
the general welfare clause to abate nuisance.
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
The general welfare clause provides for the exercise of police (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company
power for the attainment or maintenance of the general applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
welfare of the community. The power, however, is exercised government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was
by the government through its legislative branch by the already operating a resort in the area, and the application
enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional sought the issuance of a building permit covering the
and civil rights. construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land
measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay
Flowing from this delegated police power of local Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a
governments, a local government unit exercises police power Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT)
through its legislative body, in this case, its Sangguniang issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Barangay Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s accidens, however, we still find in this case that the LGU may
application on the ground that the proposed construction site nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is
was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal because, in the exercise of police power and the general
Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance). welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the welfare.
respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by
the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay,
Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned,
demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of due notice
and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for

injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order was One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes
issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion. city and municipal governments, acting through their local
chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing
laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative
to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property
be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi)
And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure
secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition. and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing
to secure the necessary permits.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no
court order because the municipal mayor has the express Before the Court is a petition for review
power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated December 18,
removal of illegally constructed buildings. 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated March 21, 2016 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699, which directed
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch
51 to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the
ISSUE Cease and Desist Order[4] (CDO) and the Closure Order[5] of
petitioner Mayor Mylyn P. Cayabyab (Mayor Cayabyab) upon
posting of a bond to be determined by the RTC.

Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first

The Facts
before the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the
property in question.
Respondent Jaime C. Dimson (Dimson) is the owner of a
poultry farm located in Barangay Prado Siongco, Lubao,
Pampanga (subject poultry farm) which had been operating for
more than 30 years. In January 2014, he applied for a
RULING barangay clearance with the office of petitioner Prado Siongco
Barangay Chairman Angelita L. David (Chairman David),
preparatory to his application for a business permit, and was
informed that the issuance thereof is conditioned on a prior
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing ocular inspection of the subject poultry farm by the Office of
as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. the Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, Mayor Cayabyab. However,
despite the conduct of an ocular inspection, Chairman David
refused to issue the clearance; hence, no business permit was
issued in favor of Dimson.[6]
On April 29, 2014, Dimson received[7] a CDO[8] dated April purpose as the act sought to be restrained was already fait
28, 2014 from the Office of Mayor Cayabyab, directing him to accompli, since a notice of closure was already posted on the
desist from further conducting any poultry farming on the concrete wall of the subject poultry farm effective September
grounds of: (a) lack of a Barangay Business Permit and a 29, 2014.[23]
Mayor's Permit; (b) lack of a pollution control officer; (c) foul
odor being emitted by the subject poultry farm that offended Due to the Presiding Judge's voluntary inhibition in the case,
passing motorists, and for which complaints were filed by the same was re-raffied to Branch 51 of the same RTC.[24]
those affected; and (d) the said poultry farm being situated
only five (5) meters away from the national road, in violation Dimson filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
of the 500-meter minimum distance requirement under the however, denied in an Order[25] dated December 22, 2014.
Code of Sanitation of the Philippines (Sanitation Code).[9] Unperturbed, Dimson filed a petition for certiorari[26] before
the CA, seeking to set aside the Orders dated October 2, 2014
In his motion for reconsideration,[10] Dimson denied that there and December 22, 2014, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138699.
[27]
was foul odor coming from his poultry farm, at the same time,
manifesting that he had already employed a pollution control
officer.[11] Said motion was denied by Lubao Acting Mayor
Robertito V. Diaz in a letter[12] dated May 20, 2014. The CA Ruling
Dissatisfied, Dimson filed another motion for reconsideration,
[13]
 contending that the subject poultry farm is not a In a Decision[28] dated December 18, 2015, the CA granted the
nuisance per se that can be abated by the local government petition, and directed the RTC to issue a TRO against the
without the intervention of the courts.[14] The motion was implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor
denied by Mayor Cayabyab in a letter[15] dated June 13, 2014, Cayabyab.[29]
which clarified that the CDO was primarily issued on the lack
of the requisite Barangay Business Permit and Mayor's Permit. The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
Thereafter, a Closure Order[16] dated June 20, 2014 was issued denying Dimson's application for a TRO which was
by Mayor Cayabyab effectively shutting down the subject essentially rooted on a determination of whether the subject
poultry farm.[17] poultry farm is a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens.
Considering that poultry farming is a legitimate business, by
its nature alone, the same can only be a nuisance per
The RTC Proceedings accidens if in the course of its operations, it should become
objectionable to such extent that it offends some laws, public
Aggrieved, Dimson filed a Petition for Certiorari, policy, or should become a danger to public health and
Mandamus, Prohibition (With Application for Preliminary welfare. It may only be abated on the strength of judicial fiat.
Mandatory Injunction)[18] and prayed for the issuance of a [30]

TRO against Mayor Cayabyab and Chairman David

(petitioners) before the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, docketed Consequently, the CA held that Dimson was able to establish
as Sp. Civil Case No. G-14-685, which was raffled to Branch the concurrence of the requisites for the issuance of injunctive
52. He maintained that his poultry farm is not a nuisance per relief, to wit: (a) he has the right to engage in poultry farming;
se that can be summarily abated; hence, respondents grossly (b) the issuance of the CDO and the closure order would work
abused their discretion when they withheld his permits, and injustice to him; and (c) the issuance of the said orders which
issued the CDO and Closure Order.[19] amounted to an abatement of his poultry enterprise without the
required judicial intervention violates his rights, which cannot
In their defense,[20] respondents averred that: (a) the non- be justified under the general welfare clause.[31]
issuance of the Barangay Business Permit was based on valid
grounds as there were written complaints against the operation The CA likewise held that the issuance of a TRO cannot be
of the poultry farm, and a public hearing was conducted denied on the ground of fait accompli since the acts
thereon; (b) the non-issuance of the Mayor's Permit was complained of is a continuing prohibition on an otherwise
justified considering the lack of a Barangay Business Permit; legitimate business. Hence, Dimson could still resume his
(c) the issuance of the CDO and Closure Order was justified operations in the meantime, or until a final decision on the
and in accordance with due process; and (d) the poultry farm merits of the main case is rendered by the RTC, and the
violated not only the Sanitation Code but also the status quo ante may still be attained, and, thereafter,
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance preserved.[32]
requiring poultry farms to be 500 meters away from the major
roads and/or highways.[21] Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
[33]
 which was, however, denied in a Resolution[34] dated March
In an Order[22] dated October 2, 2014, the RTC denied 21, 2016; hence, the instant petition.
Dimson's application for TRO for failure to establish a clear
and unmistakable right to the said issuance and to show that he
will suffer irreparable injury. Moreover, the RTC opined that The Issue Before the Court
the issue of whether or not petitioners have the right to order
the closure of the subject farm is best threshed out in the main The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not
case. It likewise ruled that the TRO can no longer serve its the CA committed reversible error in directing the issuance of
a TRO against the implementation of the CDO and the Closure be otherwise.[44] In this case, Dimson was unable to refute the
Order of Mayor Cayabyab. finding that foul odor is being emitted by his farm, having
failed to present the inspection report of the sanitary officer
who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in the fann.
[45]
The Court's Ruling  Not having passed the necessary sanitation standard, there
was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason for the withholding
The Court grants the petition. of the required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to
the renewal of Dimson's business permit to operate.
"A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive
reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary business
substantive rights and interests."[35] To be entitled to the pennit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to obtain
injunctive writ, the applicant must show that: (a) there exists a the required barangay clearance due to non-compliance with a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) this right is requirement standard,[46] Dimson may not legally operate in
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (c) the the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (d) there issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent Order. Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of
serious and irreparable damage. The grant or denial of an discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying Dimson's
injunctive relief in a pending case rests on the sound discretion application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders.
of the court since the assessment and evaluation of evidence In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear legal
towards that end involve findings of fact left for the conclusive right to resume his operations pending final determination by
determination of the said court.[36] "Hence, the exercise of the RTC of the merits of the main case
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A clear legal right
interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
discretion."[37] The burden is, thus, on the applicant to show enforceable as a matter of law, which is not extant in the
that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable
his favor,[38] since an application for injunctive relief is damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a
construed strictly against him.[39] Here, Dimson failed to ground for the issuance of an injunctive relief.[47]
sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the
issuance of a TRO against the CDO and the Closure Order of In fine, it was grave error for the CA to order the issuance of a
Mayor Cayabyab. TRO against the implementation of the CDO and the Closure
Order of Mayor Cayabyab. A court may issue injunctive relief
Preliminarily, it must be clarified that contrary to the CA's against acts of public officers only when the applicant has
ruling,[40] the grant or denial of Dimson's application for TRO made out a case of invalidity or irregularity strong enough to
was not essentially rooted on a determination of whether the overcome the presumption of validity or regularity, and has
subject poultry farm is a nuisance per se or a nuisance per established a clear legal right to the remedy sought,[48] which
accidens, but rather on whether or not there was an ostensible was not shown here.
showing of a sufficient justification for the issuance of the
CDO and the Closure Order. Corollary is the issue of whether WHEREFORE, the petltlon is GRANTED. The Decision
or not there were prima facie valid reasons for the withholding dated December 18, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 21,
of the barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699 are
renewal of Dimson's business permit to operate. hereby SET ASIDE.

A business permit must be secured from the municipal SO ORDERED.

business permits and licensing office in order for the business
to legally operate in the locality.[41] While poultry farming is
admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate without a
business permit, which expires on the 31st of December of 5. smart v aldecoa
every year and must be renewed before the end of January of
the following year.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any
telecommunications business. On March 9, 2000, petitioner
application for renewal of his business permit to operate the
entered into a contract of lease with Florentino Sebastian in
subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to
which the latter agreed to lease to the former a piece of vacant
secure the necessary barangay clearance which was not issued
lot, measuring around 300 square meters, located in Barangay
based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said
Vira, Roxas, Isabela (leased property). Petitioner immediately
farm. Records show that complaints from neighboring
constructed and installed a cellular base station on the leased
barangays were received by the office of Mayor Cayabyab
property. Inside the cellular base station is a communications
bewailing the foul odor coming from the said farm,[42] which
tower, rising as high as150 feet, with antennas and
was confirmed upon ocular inspection conducted by the
transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides
Health and Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao,
containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and
Pampanga.[43] Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are
close to the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics,
presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently shown to
and establishments, including the properties of respondents ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less
Arsenio Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be
Mansano, Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta. said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree, and
Respondents filed before the RTC on May 23, 2000 a reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
Complaint against petitioner for abatement of nuisance and circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.
of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-
632-2000. The respondents opposition of the Smart’s The courts have made it clear that in every case the question is
construction of their cellsite is anchored on the supposition one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of one’s
that the operation of said cellsite tower would pose a great property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable
hazard to the health of the alleged cluster of residents nearby invasion of another’s use and enjoyment of his property so as
and the perceived danger that the said tower might also to constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules,
collapse in case of a strong typhoon that fell the Mobiline but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each
Cellsite tower of Mobiline. case, such as locality and the character of the surroundings, the
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint as the nature, utility and social value of the use, the extent and nature
allegations therein are purely speculative and hence no basis in of the harm involved, the nature, utility and social value of the
fact to warrant further proceedings of this case. On appeal, the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like.
appellate court declared the cellular base station of petitioner a
nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents Persons who live or work in thickly populated business
of Barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela because: (1) the locational districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances and of
clearance granted to petitioner was a nullity due to the lack of those trades and businesses which are properly located and
approval by majority of the actual residents of the barangay carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But
and a barangay resolution endorsing the construction of the these annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those
cellular base station; and (2) the sound emission of the ordinarily to be expected in the community or district, and
generator at the cellular base station exceeded the Department which are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) standards. businesses. If they exceed what might be reasonably expected
and cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant relief.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s communications tower is a
nuisance per se/per accidens and together with its standby A finding by the LGU that the noise quality standards under
generator maybe abated for posing danger to the property the law have not been complied with is not a prerequisite nor
and life and limb of the residents of Vira, Roxas, Isabela constitutes indispensable evidence to prove that the defendant
more particularly the respondents and those whose houses is or is not liable for a nuisance and for damages. Such finding
are clustered around or in the periphery of the cell site. is merely corroborative to the testimonial and/or other
evidence to be presented by the parties. The exercise of due
HELD: NO. care by the owner of a business in its operation does not
There was no presentation by the parties of evidence on the constitute a defense where, notwithstanding the same, the
contested or disputed facts, thus, there was no factual basis for business as conducted, seriously affects the rights of those in
declaring petitioner's cellular base station a nuisance and its vicinity.
ordering petitioner to cease and desist from operating the
same. A reading of the RTC Order dated January 16, 2001 readily
shows that the trial court did not take into account any of the
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort foregoing considerations or tests before summarily dismissing
are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000. The reasoning of the RTC
sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the that similar cellular base stations are scattered in heavily
reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, populated areas nationwide and are not declared nuisances is
or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted unacceptable. As to whether or not this specific cellular base
to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary station of petitioner is a nuisance to respondents is largely
care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the dependent on the particular factual circumstances involved in
vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a the instant case, which is exactly why a trial for threshing out
noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those disputed or contested factual issues is indispensable.
affected by it. Evidently, it was the RTC which engaged in speculations and
unsubstantiated conclusions.
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to For the same reasons cited above, without presentation by the
the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property parties of evidence on the contested or disputed facts, there
uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base
be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that station a nuisance and ordering petitioner to cease and desist
to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or from operating the same.
excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when
noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or 6. James Perez vs Spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda
volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce Pante
actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of
 accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention
Facts: is unwarranted.

Spouses are registered owners of a residential property in (3) Petitioner argues that he was just performing his duties and
Green Heights Subdivision, Marikina City. In 1989, spouses as public officer, he is entitled to the presumption of regularity
built their house thereon and enclosed it with concrete fence in the performance of his official functions.  Unless there is
and steel gate. clear proof that he acted beyond his authority or in evident
malice or bad faith, he contends that he cannot be held liable
1999, James Perez as Chief Demolition Officer sent a letter to for attorney’s fees and costs of suit. As respondents were
the spouses ordering them to remove the fence encroaching forced to file a case against petitioner to enjoin the impending
the public drainage. As response, Madrona sent a response demolition of their property, the award of attorney’s fees and
letter to Perez condemning the order of demolition with the costs of suit is justified.  Clearly, respondents wanted to settle
following contention: (1) contained an accusation libellous in the problem on their alleged encroachment without resorting
nature as it is condemning him and his property without due to court processes when they replied by letter after receiving
process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court petitioner’s first notice.  
order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited
legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner authority to
demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their 7. knights of rizal v dmci homes
fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk.
FACTS:
Respondents likewise sought the issuance of TRO to enjoin
petitioner and all persons acting under him doing any act of DMCI Project Developers, Inc. acquired a lot in the City of
demolition on the property. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the Manila.  The said lot was earmarked for the construction of
order of default, but the RTC denied the motion. Perez filed a Torre de Manila Condominium project.  After having acquired
petition for certiorari before CA assailing the default order, all the necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI was
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. ready to commence the intended project.  However, the City of
Manila Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the
The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the Building Permit until such time that issues had been cleared. 
subject property, are entitled to the peaceful and open Consultations after consultations had he been initiated both by
possession of every inch of their property and petitioner’s the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI.  Finally, On Jan. 2014, the
threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is City Council of Manila, issued another resolution ratifying and
tantamount to a violation of their rights as property owners confirming all previously issued permits, licenses and
who are entitled to protection under the Constitution and approvals issued by the City for Torre de Manila.
laws.  The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that
respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se and presents an Knights of Rizal, on the other hand, filed a petition for
immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is there injunction seeking TRO, and later a permanent injunction,
basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on against the construction of the project.  The KOR argued that
the sidewalk as to justify its summary demolition. the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the
monument, an endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage,
Issues: (1) Did the trial court err in reinstating the complaint of and a construction borne out of bad faith.
respondents? (2) Are the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
injunction present? and (3) Is petitioner liable to pay ISSUE:
attorney’s fees and costs of suit?
Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus
(1) For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, against the City Officials to stop the construction of Torre de
there must be a right to be protected and second, the acts Manila.
against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of
said right. Here, the two requisites are clearly present: there is RULING:
a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over their
concrete fence which cannot be removed without due process; No, The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the
and the act, the summary demolition of the concrete fence, construction of the project.  It was not even considered as
against which the injunction is directed, would violate said contrary to morals, customs and public order.  The project was
right. way well from the Park where the monument was located. 
(2) Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se.  By its nature, The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the
it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community.  It City of Manila. It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is
was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and issued when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office
prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and
by respondents, the sidewalk still exists.  If petitioner believes the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the
that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it performance of such act.”  In the case at bar, such factors were
may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.  wanting. Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any
Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per Law or rule that the construction of such building outside the
Rizal Park was prohibited if the building was within the
background sightline or vision of the Rizal Monument.  Thus, due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its
the petition was lacking of merit and, thus dismissed. effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
6. lucena v jac liner happen to be effective.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner,

vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent. 9. city of manila v laguio
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
FACTS:
Facts:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development
 The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides,
Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business
inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town
passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built
and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a
for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all motel although duly accredited with the Department of
temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared Tourism as a hotel.
inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It
also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an
the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed
ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter
alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to
constitutional prohibition against monopolies. disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
Issue:  Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be
 Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid
closed and padlocked permanently.
exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.

Held: June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court,
praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and
 The local government may be considered as having properly inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly
met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful to the Supreme Court.
method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the ISSUES:
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena,
they involve public interest warranting the interference of the
W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power
State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police
power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law
of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably HELD:
necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the
They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the
requisites for a valid exercise of police power are not met. The
traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se
to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills
should have been done was to determine exactly where the fo prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
problem lies and then to stop it right there. spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns.
These are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the
moral welfare of the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in

the most innocent places.... Every house, building, park, curb,
street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from
the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places
where there are impure men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address

the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape
morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a
moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a
building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.

The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is

repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local
Government Code merely empowers local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 thereof.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal

and property rights adn impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it
is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
Council unde the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance
and is therefore ultra vires null and void.