IP Case 2
IP Case 2
IP Case 2
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court questioning the Decision 1 dated June 30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 33731, which a rmed in toto the Decision dated November 28, 1990
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 (Baguio City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the
CA Resolution dated December 15, 2000 which denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern
half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City,
consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identi ed as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan
SWO-37115. 2
The antecedent facts are clear:
The subject land, at the turn of the 20th century, had been part of the land claim
of Mateo Cariño. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed by
H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold
the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo Cariño and grandfather of private
respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco Cariño then took possession of the buildings and the
land on which the buildings were situated.
Ting-el Dicman, 3 predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, namely, Ernesto
Dicman, Paul Dicman, Florence Dicman, Babing Cosil, Feliciano Torres, Cristina Alawas,
Emily Torres and Tomasito Torres, and resident of Atab, a sitio within the City of Baguio
but located at some distance from the land in controversy, had been employed by
Sioco Cariño as his cattle herder. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were
already many parcels of land recorded in his name, 4 Sioco Cariño caused the survey of
the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.
On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed
of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cariño. The
deed reads:
DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND.
That to-date I have not as yet received the plan for said survey;
That Mr. Sioco Cariño has advanced all expenses for said survey for me
and in my name, and also all other expenses for the improvement of said land, to
date;
After I have received my title to said parcel of land I bind myself, my heirs
and assigns, to execute the nal papers and forward same for approval of the
competent authorities at Mr. Sioco Cariño's expense.
WITNESS MY HAND in the City of Baguio, P.I., this, the 22nd day of
October, 1928, A.D.
his right
TING-EL DIAC-MAN
thumbmark 5
After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cariño, who had been in
possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.
On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño executed, as seller, a public instrument
entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with
his son, Guzman Cariño, as buyer. The contract states in part:
. . . for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P1.00) Philippine Currency
and other valuable considerations which I had received from my son, Guzman A.
Cariño . . . have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents do hereby
cede, convey and transfer unto the [sic] said Guzman A. Cariño, his heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns, all my rights, title, interests in and
participation to that parcel of land (public) covered by an application for free
patent with a surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land
O ce of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman, and who ceded, conveyed and
transferred one half of his title, rights and interests to me under an instrument
executed by the said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on the 22nd day of
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October, 1928 A.D. and duly rati ed before Notary Public . . . together with all
improvements therein, consisting of oranges, mangoes, and other fruit trees and a
building of strong materials (half nished) . . ., which building was purchased by
me from H.C. Heald on March 14, 1916, free from all liens and encumbrances,
with full rights and authority to the said Guzman A. Cariño to perfect his claim
with any government agency the proper issuance of such patent or title as may be
permitted to him under existing laws.
In a letter dated January 15, 1938, Sioco Cariño asked his son, Guzman Cariño,
who had been doing business in Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to take possession of
the subject land and building. 7 Guzman Cariño moved to Baguio as requested and
occupied the property. Evidence was adduced in the RTC to the effect that Guzman
Cariño took possession of the property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of
owner: the directory of Baguio Telephones published in October 1940 lists the
residence of Guzman A. Cariño at Camp 7, Baguio City, along with his telephone
number; pictures were taken of him and his family, including the private respondent
who was then an infant, depicting the property in the background; U.S. Army authorities
obtained permission from Guzman Cariño to use a part of the land in question after the
war; he introduced various improvements on the property over the years and exercised
acts of ownership over them; he permitted the use of portions of the land to Governor
Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. and the Boy Scouts of Rizal Province; he leased out portions of
the land to Bayani Pictures, Inc.; and his neighbors con rmed the possession and
occupation over the property of Guzman Cariño and, after him, his son, herein private
respondent Jose Cariño. These ndings of fact were either con rmed or
uncontroverted by the CA. 8
On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cariño had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so as to
indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the
petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and purportedly
indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square meters, belonged to the
petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly pertained
to Sioco Cariño and, later, to Guzman Cariño. Additionally, the resurvey indicated the
house where private respondent Jose Cariño resided and, before him, where his
predecessors-in-interest, Sioco and Guzman Cariño, also resided.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cariño led a Free Patent Application over the land in
question. The application was given due course, but Guzman later withdrew it when he
decided to le his opposition to the petition later led by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman.
This petition, entitled "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211," was led by Felipe Dicman, Bobing Dicman and Cating Dicman, in
their capacity as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman on April 24, 1959 with the Court of
First Instance of Baguio. The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and
Lot 76-B which, taken together, covered an area of 10.1006 hectares. Guzman Cariño
opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in
controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cariño likewise filed an opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and con rmed that
the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman, there having been no
adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold further
hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the
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trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the
operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as
'Igorot Claims' situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." The
Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims" enumerated therein shall be
"subject to the condition that except in favor of the government or any of its branches,
units, or institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be
encumbered or alienated within a period of fteen years from and after the date of
issuance of patent." One such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman," to wit:
Name Lot No. Survey Plan Residence Section Area (Sq.m.)
12. That after the dismissal of the abovementioned petition and before the
dispute between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the eastern half portion of
the above-described property, defendant unlawfully and illegally continue to
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occupy portion [sic] of the above-described property to the clear damage and
prejudice of herein plaintiffs;
13. That the defendant has no valid claim of ownership and possession
over any of the portions of the above-described property;
14. That plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have been religiously
paying the realty taxes covering the above-described property . . . 1 1
Private respondent Jose Cariño led his answer and prayed for dismissal. He
alleged that his predecessors-in-interest had acquired the land by onerous title through
the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by his grandfather, Sioco
Cariño, as seller, and his father, Guzman Cariño, as buyer; that the property was earlier
acquired by Sioco Cariño by virtue of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cariño
and Ting-el Dicman; and that he has been in possession of the subject property for 55
years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title
over the same through acquisitive prescription. EcTCAD
On June 13, 1983, the administratrix of the Estate of Sioco Cariño led a motion
to intervene with the RTC. On July 1, 1983, the RTC granted said motion. On July 11,
1983, the Estate of Sioco Cariño led its Complaint-in-Intervention, praying for quieting
of title among the adverse claimants.
The RTC, through an ocular inspection on February 15, 1984, found that the larger
building still stands on the land in controversy and, together with the surrounding area,
constituted the residence and was in the possession of private respondent and his
family.
On November 28, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
To support its ruling, the RTC found that the tax declarations and their revisions
submitted as evidence by the petitioners made no reference to the land in question; 1 3
that no tax declaration over the land declared in the name of the Estate of Sioco Cariño
had been submitted as evidence, and that the intervenor-estate presented tax
declarations over the building only; that it was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for
taxation purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name; 1 4 that
there is no evidence to the effect that petitioners ever led any action to challenge the
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validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land"
dated October 22, 1928; that even assuming that this instrument may be invalid for
whatever reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cariño and his successors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject property publicly, adversely, continuously and in
concept of owner for at least 55 years before the ling of the action; 1 5 that Sioco's
successor, Guzman Cariño, had been in open and continuous possession of the
property in good faith and in the concept of owner from 1938 until his death in 1982
and, hence, the Estate of Sioco Cariño has lost all rights to recover possession from
Guzman Cariño or his heirs and assigns; and that although the Estate of Sioco Cariño
attempted to assail the genuineness and due execution of the "Deed of Absolute Sale"
dated January 10, 1938 executed by Sioco Cariño in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño,
the challenge failed since no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation of
forgery. 1 6
On January 23, 1991, petitioners seasonably led their notice of appeal. The RTC,
however, denied the motion for reconsideration and motion to admit appeal led by the
Estate of Sioco Cariño on July 3, 1991 for being filed out of time.
Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court of Appeals:
1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND THE
STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF THEIR WITNESS.
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF
CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.
3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE TO HAVE A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR THEREIN.
On June 30, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and a rmed in toto the ruling of
the RTC. On December 15, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
The CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners raised for
the rst time on appeal the issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights
and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections 145 and 146 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu 1 7 (which was made applicable later to the
Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya by Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and then
to all other cultural minorities found within the national territory by virtue of Section 120
of the Public Land Act 1 8 ) and, hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court; 1 9
that, even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show that Ting-el Dicman,
though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and, hence, the foregoing laws are not applicable; 2 0
that there was sufficient proof of consideration for the said deed; 2 1 and that even if the
deed were a mere contract to sell and not an absolute sale, under Borromeo v. Franco
2 2 the obligation on the part of the purchaser to perfect the title papers within a certain
time is not a condition subsequent nor essential to the obligation to sell, but rather the
same is an incidental undertaking the failure to comply therewith not being a bar to the
sale agreed upon. 2 3
On February 12, 2001, petitioners, through newly retained counsel, led their
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petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO.
2798 ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE "DEED OF CONVEYANCE" EXECUTED BY
PING-EL DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT HE WAS
A NON-CHRISTIAN AND THAT BAGUIO CITY IS NOT COVERED BY THE SAID ACT.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN
BORROMEO V. FRANCO (5 PHIL 49 [1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE PART
OF THE PARTY TO A CONTRACT TO PERFECT THE TITLE PAPERS TO A
CERTAIN PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME IS NOT A CONDITION
SUBSEQUENT OR ESSENTIAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO SELL [sic].
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF
LITIGATION AND OVER WHICH RESPONDENT'S IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT
BELONGS TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS' PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN
HAD APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA AND HAD BEEN
ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954
AND HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH
WHEN HIS GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, THE PETITIONERS,
TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER,
PING-EL DICMAN.
The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the
petitioners during the proceedings before the RTC. Su ce it to say that issues raised
for the rst time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court
are barred by estoppel. 3 5 Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the
original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised
for the rst time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would
amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process. 3 6
4. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely
a contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private
respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through
acquisitive prescription. 3 7
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the
possession of Guzman Cariño, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
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continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just title, to
the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the
period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case,
is 10 years. 3 8 The ndings of fact of the lower courts, and which this Court has no
reason to disturb, inescapably point to this conclusion: immediately after the "Deed of
Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by
Sioco Cariño in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño (the father of private respondent), the
latter immediately occupied the property; the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones
lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone number; his
permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his introduction
of improvements over the land in controversy; the testimonial accounts of his
neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for tax purposes both
the land and the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax declarations of the
other claimants made no reference to the subject property. 3 9 Although arguably Sioco
Cariño may not have been the owner of the subject property when he executed the
"Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is
nonetheless satis ed, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should
ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner. 4 0 By the time the
successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in
controversy by ling their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman timely
opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for
acquisitive prescription is deemed satis ed well before Guzman's possession can be
said to be civilly interrupted by the ling of the foregoing petition to reopen. 4 1 After the
dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his
possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are
buried on the land in question. Thereafter, Guzman's widow and son, herein private
respondent, continued possession of the subject property in the same manner. When
petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive the case on April 20, 1983, they had,
far before that time, lost all rights to recover possession or ownership.
5. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches.
Laches has been de ned as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. 4 2 It is a delay in the assertion of a right
which works disadvantage to another 4 3 because of the inequity founded on some
change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. 4 4 It is based on public
policy which, for the peace of society, 4 5 ordains that relief will be denied to a stale
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. 4 6 It is different from and applies
independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity
being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a xed time, laches is not. 4 7
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. 4 8 It has been held that even a registered owner of property under the Torrens
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Title system may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
49
Given the foregoing ndings of fact, all the four (4) elements of laches, as
prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are present in the case, to wit:
a. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; SIDTCa
As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el
Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever led any action to question the validity of the
"Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its
execution on October 22, 1928 5 1 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was
any action to recover possession of the property from Guzman Cariño instituted
anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive prescription,
reckoned from Guzman's occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in
his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cariño or his Estate
ever led any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January
10, 1938. 5 2 Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cariño tried to assail the deed as a
forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal was lodged therefrom. It will
be di cult for this Court to assume that the petitioners and their predecessors were all
the while ignorant of the adverse possession of private respondent and his
predecessors given the publicity of their conduct and the nature of their acts. Private
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that
no action would be led against them by such passivity. There is no justi able reason
for petitioners' delay in asserting their rights — the facts in their entirety show that they
have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned
from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take
positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the exception of
forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two instruments abovementioned,
as well as the averment that the former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were
issues raised only for the rst time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this
late a stage. The features of this case are not new. The Court has on several occasions
held in particular that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property
by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of approval of competent
authorities, the right to recover possession has nonetheless been barred through the
operation of the equitable doctrine of laches. 5 3
6. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then President Carlos
P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of "segregating" and "reserving" certain
Igorot claims identi ed therein, including one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of
Dicman," and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of
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15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued,
all rights over the property in question had already been vested in private respondent.
The executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be
construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered
or deprived by executive at alone without contravening the due process guarantees 5 4
of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to be
redistributed for public use without just compensation. 5 5
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions are vital concerns of the
State and constitute important public policies which bear upon this case. To give life
and meaning unto these policies the legislature saw it t to enact Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating
measure to a rm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities
on matters that affect their life and culture. 5 6 The provisions of that law unify an
otherwise fragmented account of constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory doctrine
which enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for the protection of indigenous
cultural communities as a marginalized sector, 5 7 to protect their ancestral domain and
ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being, 5 8 and to
guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility. 5 9
As the nal arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has
always been mindful of the highest edicts of social justice especially where doubts
arise in the interpretation and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the
loftiest ends ordained by the Constitution this Court nds that the law is clear and
leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of right and justice
as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation of the rights of all persons
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali (now retired), with Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. (now retired), concurring.
4. The RTC took judicial notice of the historical fact "that much of Baguio City, including the
Camp John Hay reservation which adjoins the property in question, used to belong to the
Cariño family, particularly their patriarch Mateo Cariño. In fact, a whole district of the
city, Campo Sioco, is named after Sioco Cariño himself." RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p.
103.
9. 140 Phil. 241 (1969), reiterated in Republic v. Marcos, 152 Phil. 204 (1973).
10. RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.
12. This should read "R.A. 6940" which is entitled "AN ACT GRANTING A PERIOD ENDING ON
DECEMBER 31, 2000 FOR FILING APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENT AND JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE TO ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER CHAPTERS VII AND VIII OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA
141, AS AMENDED)."
SEC. 145. Contracts with non-Christians: requisites. — Save and except contracts of sale or
barter of personal property and contracts of personal service comprehended in chapter
seventeen hereof no contract or agreement shall be made in the Department by any
person with any Moro or other non-Christian tribe or portion thereof the Department or
with any individual Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant of the same for the payment
or delivery of money or other thing of value in present or in prospective, or in any manner
affecting or relating to any real property, unless such contract or agreement be executed
and approved as follows:
(b) It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record, justice or auxiliary justice of the
peace, or notary public, and shall bear the approval of the provincial governor wherein
the same was executed or his representative duly authorized in writing for such purpose,
indorsed upon it.
24. RULES OF COURT, Rule 46, Sec. 3, par. 5. (1997); Great Southern Maritime Services Co. v.
Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 435; Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 141973, June 28, 2005, 461
SCRA 369, 382; Chan v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog City, Br.
9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796, 806.
25. Loquias v. Ombudsman, 392 Phil. 596 (2000).
26. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 141973,
June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 369, 382; Chan v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte
in Dipolog City, Br. 9 , G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796, 806; Mendigorin v.
Cabantog, 436 Phil. 483 (2002); Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals , G.R.
No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286, 290.
27. Estares v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604, 616-17;
Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi, Inc ., G.R. No. 150859, March 28,
2005, 454 SCRA 111, 115-16.
30. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 141973,
June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 369, 383-84; Vicar International Construction, Inc. v. FEB
Leasing and Finance Co., G.R. No. 157195, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 588, 596-99; Great
Southern Maritime Services Co. v. Acuña , G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA
422, 435-37; Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile , 448 Phil. 302 (2003); Chan v. Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog City, Br. 9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA
796, 808; General Milling Corporation v. NLRC , 442 Phil. 424 (2002); Active Realty &
Development Corporation v. Daroya , 431 Phil. 753, 758-59 (2002); Shipside Incorporated
v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 345-47; Uy v.
LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419, 427-29; Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 121488, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 696, 700-01;
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Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 105819, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 108, 117; Loyola v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 117186, June 29, 1995, 245 SCRA 477, 482-84.
31. See, e.g., Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo , G.R. No. 160455, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA
325, 336-37; Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634,
July 6 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 465.
32. See San Miguel Co. v. Aballa , G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392; Heirs of
Olarte v. NHA , G.R. No. 165821, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 561; Estares v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604; Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, G.R. No.
148635, 1 April 2003, 400 SCRA 255, 261-262; Docena v. Lapesura , G.R. No. 140153,
March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 658; Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, 393 Phil. 734 (2000).
33. Rivera v. Roman , G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 276; The Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA
79, 86; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310,
319; C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279 (2002).
34. Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Lacamen
v. Laruan , G.R. No. L-27088, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 605, 608; Miguel v. Catalino , 135
Phil. 229, 234 (1968).
35. Cruz v. Fernando , G.R. No. 145470, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 173, 182; Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA
487, 503-04; Caltex (Phils), Inc. v. CA , G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 448,
461.
36. Cruz v. Fernando, supra ; Department of Agrarian Reform v. Franco , G.R. No. 147479,
September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 74, 92-93; Gualberto v. Go , G.R. No. 139843, July 21,
2005, 463 SCRA 671, 678; De Rama v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 131136, February 28,
2001, 353 SCRA 94.
37. Section 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) provides:
Sec. 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten years actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly
continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way
such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant
or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the person under
disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by
prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person
under or through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all claimants . . .
The relevant provisions under the present Civil Code provide:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title
for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.
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Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and
529 of this Code are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the
prescription of ownership and other real rights.
Art. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
38. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Act 190, Section 41. Article 1116 of the 1950 Civil Code states:
Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws
previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein
required for prescription should lapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though
by the former laws a longer period might be required.
This is a case where Article 1116 may be said to apply, such that if the period began and
ended under the old law, then the period under the old law applies which, in this case, is
only 10 years regardless of good faith or bad faith. Section 41 of Act 190, otherwise
known as the Code of Civil Procedure, allows adverse possession in any character,
whether good faith or bad faith, to ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten years. See
Rigonan v. Derecho , G.R. No. 159571, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 627, 643-44; Ramos v.
CA, 198 Phil. 263; Alvero v. Reas , 146 Phil. 221 (1970); Ongsiaco v. Dallo , 136 Phil. 596
(1969); Arboso v. Andrade , 87 Phil. 782, 785-786 (1950); Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo ,
41 Phil. 342 (1921); Locsin Rama v. Montelibano Ramos , 36 Phil. 136 (1917); Altman v.
Commanding Officer, 11 Phil. 516 (1908). Prescription lies under the said section even in
the absence of good faith and just title. Rigonan v. Derecho , G.R. No. 159571, July 15,
2005, 463 SCRA 627, 643-44, citing Alvero v. Reas , 146 Phil. 221 (1970). The new Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950.
39. CA Decision, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 65-7; RTC Decision, pp. 3, 5; Rollo, pp. 104, 106.
40. See CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Act 190, Section 41. See also CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, R.A. 386, arts. 1117, 1129 & 1130 (1950); IV ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 26
(1991); IV EDGARDO L. PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 31-2
(2000), citing Doliendo v. Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232 (1906) & 2 Castan 240.
41. See CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, R.A. 386, Art. 1123 (1950).
42. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel , G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518; Lacamen v.
Laruan, supra note 34, citing 27 AM. JUR. 2d 687; Re O'Donnel's Estate, 8 Ill. App. 2d 348,
132 N.E. 2d 74; 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 171-72 (5th ed.).
43. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Hall v. Mortgage Secur . Co.
192 S.E. 145, 393, 11 A.L.R. 118.
44. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY
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JURISPRUDENCE 171-72 (5th ed.).
45. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy , L-
21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29.
46. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Vda. de Lima v. Tio , 143
Phil. 401 (1970).
47. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Nielson & Company, Inc. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 125 Phil. 204 (1966).
48. Id. citing Eduarte v. Court of Appeals , 370 Phil. 18 (1999); Catholic Bishop of Balanga v.
Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206 (1996).
49. Panganiban v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 151235, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 370, 381; Vda. De Cabrera,
et al. v. CA, et al., 335 Phil. 19 (1997).
50. Panganiban v. Dayrit, supra , note 49, at 382; Claverias v. Quingco , G.R. No. 77744, March 6,
1992, 207 SCRA 66, 83; Miguel v. Catalino , 135 Phil. 229, 235 (1968); Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, 280 (1956); Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho , 96 Phil. 622, 637 (1954),
citing 19 Am. Jur., 343-344.
51. RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.
53. See Lucenta v. CFI , G.R. No. L-39789, June 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 197; Lacamen v. Laruan,
supra; Miguel v. Catalino, supra, note 34.
54. See Ayog v. Cusi, 204 Phil. 126 (1982).
55. See Manotok v. NHA, G.R. No. L-55166-7, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
56. See Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Introducing the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 47 ATENEO L.J.
571 (2002) (introducing the Colloquium on Indigenous Peoples and discussing the
framework of IPRA); Werner Blenk, ILO Partnership with Indigenous Peoples, 47 ATENEO
L.J. 556 (2002) (de ning the historical involvement of the International Labor
Organization in the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples); Terence D. Jones, The
United Nations Development Programme and the Indigenous Peoples, 47 ATENEO L.J
562 (2002) (discussing the situation of indigenous peoples in light of internal con ict
and sustainable development).
59. Amarante v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Madale
v. Sa Raya , 92 Phil. 558 (1953); Porkan v. Navarro , 73 Phil. 698 (1942); De Porkan v.
Yatco, 70 Phil. 161 (1940).