IP Case 2

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146459. June 8, 2006.]

HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN,


FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY TORRES, TOMASITO
TORRES and HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALAWAS and BABING COSIL ,
petitioners, vs . JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF APPEALS , respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p

This refers to the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court questioning the Decision 1 dated June 30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 33731, which a rmed in toto the Decision dated November 28, 1990
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 (Baguio City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the
CA Resolution dated December 15, 2000 which denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The petition originated from an action for recovery of possession of the eastern
half of a parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J", Camp Seven, Baguio City,
consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and identi ed as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan
SWO-37115. 2
The antecedent facts are clear:
The subject land, at the turn of the 20th century, had been part of the land claim
of Mateo Cariño. Within this site, a sawmill and other buildings had been constructed by
H.C. Heald in connection with his lumber business. On March 14, 1916, H.C. Heald sold
the buildings to Sioco Cariño, son of Mateo Cariño and grandfather of private
respondent Jose Cariño. Sioco Cariño then took possession of the buildings and the
land on which the buildings were situated.
Ting-el Dicman, 3 predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, namely, Ernesto
Dicman, Paul Dicman, Florence Dicman, Babing Cosil, Feliciano Torres, Cristina Alawas,
Emily Torres and Tomasito Torres, and resident of Atab, a sitio within the City of Baguio
but located at some distance from the land in controversy, had been employed by
Sioco Cariño as his cattle herder. On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were
already many parcels of land recorded in his name, 4 Sioco Cariño caused the survey of
the land in controversy in the name of Ting-el Dicman.
On October 22, 1928, Ting-el Dicman executed a public instrument entitled "Deed
of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" with Sioco Cariño. The
deed reads:
DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND.

KNOW ALL PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS:


That I, Ting-el Diac-man, of legal age, widower, and resident of the sitio
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known as "Atab", near Camp Seven, City of Baguio, Philippine Islands, DO
HEREBY STATE, viz: —
That I am the applicant for a free-patent of a parcel of land (public), having
a surface of over ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land O ce of Baguio
for me, and located in the place known as Camp Seven, Baguio;

That to-date I have not as yet received the plan for said survey;
That Mr. Sioco Cariño has advanced all expenses for said survey for me
and in my name, and also all other expenses for the improvement of said land, to
date;

That for and in consideration of said advance expenses, to me made and


delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cariño, I hereby pledge and promise to convey, deliver
and transfer unto said Sioco Cariño, of legal age, married to Guilata Acop, and
resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half (1/2) of my title, rights, and
interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land; same to be delivered, conveyed and
transferred in a nal form, according to law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me,
my heirs, and assigns, as soon as title for the same is issued to me by proper
authorities. IaEACT

That this conveyance, transfer, or assignment, notwithstanding its


temporary nature, shall have legal force and effect; once it is approved by the
approving authorities all the nal papers and documents, this instrument shall be
considered superseded.

After I have received my title to said parcel of land I bind myself, my heirs
and assigns, to execute the nal papers and forward same for approval of the
competent authorities at Mr. Sioco Cariño's expense.

WITNESS MY HAND in the City of Baguio, P.I., this, the 22nd day of
October, 1928, A.D.

his right

TING-EL DIAC-MAN

thumbmark 5

After the execution of the foregoing deed, Sioco Cariño, who had been in
possession of the land in controversy since 1916, continued to stay thereon.
On January 10, 1938, Sioco Cariño executed, as seller, a public instrument
entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale" covering the subject land and its improvements with
his son, Guzman Cariño, as buyer. The contract states in part:
. . . for and in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P1.00) Philippine Currency
and other valuable considerations which I had received from my son, Guzman A.
Cariño . . . have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents do hereby
cede, convey and transfer unto the [sic] said Guzman A. Cariño, his heirs,
executors, administrators and assigns, all my rights, title, interests in and
participation to that parcel of land (public) covered by an application for free
patent with a surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District Land
O ce of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman, and who ceded, conveyed and
transferred one half of his title, rights and interests to me under an instrument
executed by the said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on the 22nd day of
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October, 1928 A.D. and duly rati ed before Notary Public . . . together with all
improvements therein, consisting of oranges, mangoes, and other fruit trees and a
building of strong materials (half nished) . . ., which building was purchased by
me from H.C. Heald on March 14, 1916, free from all liens and encumbrances,
with full rights and authority to the said Guzman A. Cariño to perfect his claim
with any government agency the proper issuance of such patent or title as may be
permitted to him under existing laws.

xxx xxx xxx 6

In a letter dated January 15, 1938, Sioco Cariño asked his son, Guzman Cariño,
who had been doing business in Damortis, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to take possession of
the subject land and building. 7 Guzman Cariño moved to Baguio as requested and
occupied the property. Evidence was adduced in the RTC to the effect that Guzman
Cariño took possession of the property publicly, peacefully, and in the concept of
owner: the directory of Baguio Telephones published in October 1940 lists the
residence of Guzman A. Cariño at Camp 7, Baguio City, along with his telephone
number; pictures were taken of him and his family, including the private respondent
who was then an infant, depicting the property in the background; U.S. Army authorities
obtained permission from Guzman Cariño to use a part of the land in question after the
war; he introduced various improvements on the property over the years and exercised
acts of ownership over them; he permitted the use of portions of the land to Governor
Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. and the Boy Scouts of Rizal Province; he leased out portions of
the land to Bayani Pictures, Inc.; and his neighbors con rmed the possession and
occupation over the property of Guzman Cariño and, after him, his son, herein private
respondent Jose Cariño. These ndings of fact were either con rmed or
uncontroverted by the CA. 8
On July 27, 1954, Guzman Cariño had the entire Lot 46 resurveyed so as to
indicate the half portion that belonged to him and the other half that belonged to the
petitioners. The resurvey evenly divided the lot into Lot 76-A and 76-B, and purportedly
indicated that Lot 76-A, consisting of 50,953 square meters, belonged to the
petitioners, while Lot 76-B, also consisting of 50,953 square meters, formerly pertained
to Sioco Cariño and, later, to Guzman Cariño. Additionally, the resurvey indicated the
house where private respondent Jose Cariño resided and, before him, where his
predecessors-in-interest, Sioco and Guzman Cariño, also resided.
On May 23, 1955, Guzman Cariño led a Free Patent Application over the land in
question. The application was given due course, but Guzman later withdrew it when he
decided to le his opposition to the petition later led by the heirs of Ting-el Dicman.
This petition, entitled "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211," was led by Felipe Dicman, Bobing Dicman and Cating Dicman, in
their capacity as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman on April 24, 1959 with the Court of
First Instance of Baguio. The petition sought to establish ownership over Lot 76-A and
Lot 76-B which, taken together, covered an area of 10.1006 hectares. Guzman Cariño
opposed the petition insofar as he insisted ownership over Lot 76-B, the land in
controversy. The Estate of Sioco Cariño likewise filed an opposition.
On March 6, 1963, the trial court rendered a partial judgment and con rmed that
the title over Lot 76-A belonged to the heirs of Ting-el Dicman, there having been no
adverse claim. But as to Lot 76-B, the trial court found it necessary to hold further
hearing in order to decide on the adverse claims of the parties.
Meanwhile, on January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the
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trial court, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 "excluding from the
operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land known as
'Igorot Claims' situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same open to
disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land Act." The
Proclamation further provided that the "Igorot Claims" enumerated therein shall be
"subject to the condition that except in favor of the government or any of its branches,
units, or institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be
encumbered or alienated within a period of fteen years from and after the date of
issuance of patent." One such claim pertained to the "Heirs of Dicman," to wit:
Name Lot No. Survey Plan Residence Section Area (Sq.m.)

Heirs of 46 Swo-37115 "J" 101,006


Dicman
Before the trial court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated
Republic v. Marcos 9 which held that Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no
jurisdiction to reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a
consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the
certi cate of title issued pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was
invalidated. The trial court stated that the remedy for those who were issued titles was
to le a petition for revalidation under Presidential Decree No. 1271, as amended by
Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and 2034.
After the dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his
possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are
buried on the land in question, next to the large house purchased in 1916 by his father,
Sioco Cariño (the grandfather of private respondent), from H.C. Heald. Guzman's widow
and son, private respondent Jose Sioco C. Cariño, continued possession of the subject
property. 1 0
On April 20, 1983, petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman,
revived the foregoing case by ling a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages involving the subject property with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R.
As earlier stated, petitioners, then complainants, originally sought to recover
possession of the eastern half of the parcel of land situated in Residence Section "J",
Camp Seven, Baguio City, consisting of 101,006 square meters, more or less, and
identified as Lot 46, Ts-39, Plan SWO-37115.
Petitioners, then plaintiffs, averred in their complaint:
10. That however, this Honorable Court was not able to decide the [ ]
petition for reopening as far as the remaining eastern half portion of the above-
described property is concerned due to the fact that the said petition was
dismissed for alleged lack of jurisdiction; . . .
11. That because of the above-mentioned dismissal, the con ict between
herein plaintiffs and defendant over the half eastern portion of the above-
described property which was one of the issues supposed to be decided in the
said judicial reopening case remains undecided;

12. That after the dismissal of the abovementioned petition and before the
dispute between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the eastern half portion of
the above-described property, defendant unlawfully and illegally continue to
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occupy portion [sic] of the above-described property to the clear damage and
prejudice of herein plaintiffs;
13. That the defendant has no valid claim of ownership and possession
over any of the portions of the above-described property;
14. That plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have been religiously
paying the realty taxes covering the above-described property . . . 1 1

Private respondent Jose Cariño led his answer and prayed for dismissal. He
alleged that his predecessors-in-interest had acquired the land by onerous title through
the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938 executed by his grandfather, Sioco
Cariño, as seller, and his father, Guzman Cariño, as buyer; that the property was earlier
acquired by Sioco Cariño by virtue of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cariño
and Ting-el Dicman; and that he has been in possession of the subject property for 55
years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and therefore perfected title
over the same through acquisitive prescription. EcTCAD

On June 13, 1983, the administratrix of the Estate of Sioco Cariño led a motion
to intervene with the RTC. On July 1, 1983, the RTC granted said motion. On July 11,
1983, the Estate of Sioco Cariño led its Complaint-in-Intervention, praying for quieting
of title among the adverse claimants.
The RTC, through an ocular inspection on February 15, 1984, found that the larger
building still stands on the land in controversy and, together with the surrounding area,
constituted the residence and was in the possession of private respondent and his
family.
On November 28, 1990, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of private
respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Plaintiffs' complaint is hereby DISMISSED;


2. Plaintiffs'-Intervenors complaint-in-intervention is hereby
dismissed;
3. Defendant is hereby declared the lawful possessor and as the party
who has the better right over the land subject matter [sic] of
this action and as such he may apply for the con rmation of his
title thereto in accordance with law (R.A. No. 8940 1 2 )[.]
Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed;
4. Costs is [sic] adjudged against the plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor.
SO ORDERED.

To support its ruling, the RTC found that the tax declarations and their revisions
submitted as evidence by the petitioners made no reference to the land in question; 1 3
that no tax declaration over the land declared in the name of the Estate of Sioco Cariño
had been submitted as evidence, and that the intervenor-estate presented tax
declarations over the building only; that it was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for
taxation purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name; 1 4 that
there is no evidence to the effect that petitioners ever led any action to challenge the
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validity of the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land"
dated October 22, 1928; that even assuming that this instrument may be invalid for
whatever reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cariño and his successors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject property publicly, adversely, continuously and in
concept of owner for at least 55 years before the ling of the action; 1 5 that Sioco's
successor, Guzman Cariño, had been in open and continuous possession of the
property in good faith and in the concept of owner from 1938 until his death in 1982
and, hence, the Estate of Sioco Cariño has lost all rights to recover possession from
Guzman Cariño or his heirs and assigns; and that although the Estate of Sioco Cariño
attempted to assail the genuineness and due execution of the "Deed of Absolute Sale"
dated January 10, 1938 executed by Sioco Cariño in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño,
the challenge failed since no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation of
forgery. 1 6
On January 23, 1991, petitioners seasonably led their notice of appeal. The RTC,
however, denied the motion for reconsideration and motion to admit appeal led by the
Estate of Sioco Cariño on July 3, 1991 for being filed out of time.
Petitioners raised the following issues before the Court of Appeals:
1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND THE
STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF THEIR WITNESS.
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF
CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.
3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE TO HAVE A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR THEREIN.

On June 30, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and a rmed in toto the ruling of
the RTC. On December 15, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
The CA based its ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners raised for
the rst time on appeal the issue on whether the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights
and Interests in Agricultural Land" is void ab initio under Sections 145 and 146 of the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu 1 7 (which was made applicable later to the
Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya by Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and then
to all other cultural minorities found within the national territory by virtue of Section 120
of the Public Land Act 1 8 ) and, hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court; 1 9
that, even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show that Ting-el Dicman,
though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and, hence, the foregoing laws are not applicable; 2 0
that there was sufficient proof of consideration for the said deed; 2 1 and that even if the
deed were a mere contract to sell and not an absolute sale, under Borromeo v. Franco
2 2 the obligation on the part of the purchaser to perfect the title papers within a certain
time is not a condition subsequent nor essential to the obligation to sell, but rather the
same is an incidental undertaking the failure to comply therewith not being a bar to the
sale agreed upon. 2 3
On February 12, 2001, petitioners, through newly retained counsel, led their
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petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioners raise the following grounds for the petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO.
2798 ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE "DEED OF CONVEYANCE" EXECUTED BY
PING-EL DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF THAT HE WAS
A NON-CHRISTIAN AND THAT BAGUIO CITY IS NOT COVERED BY THE SAID ACT.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN
BORROMEO V. FRANCO (5 PHIL 49 [1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE PART
OF THE PARTY TO A CONTRACT TO PERFECT THE TITLE PAPERS TO A
CERTAIN PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME IS NOT A CONDITION
SUBSEQUENT OR ESSENTIAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO SELL [sic].

C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF
LITIGATION AND OVER WHICH RESPONDENT'S IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT
BELONGS TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS' PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN
HAD APPLIED FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA AND HAD BEEN
ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954
AND HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL HIS DEATH
WHEN HIS GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, THE PETITIONERS,
TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER,
PING-EL DICMAN.

On March 2, 2001, petitioners led their Manifestation and Motion to Substitute


Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs stating, among others,
that Julio F. Dicman, son of petitioner Ernesto Dicman, had been appointed by the
petitioners to sign the petition for and in their behalf, but due to distance and time
constraints between Makati City and Baguio, he was not able to submit the same in
time for the deadline for the petition on February 12, 2001. Petitioners attached the
Special Power of Attorney seeking to formalize the appointment of Julio F. Dicman as
their attorney-in-fact and to ratify his execution of the veri cation and certi cation of
non-forum shopping for and on behalf of the petitioners.
On March 15, 2001, private respondent led with this Court a Motion for Leave of
Court to File Motion to Dismiss and/or Deny Due Course, arguing that the petition failed
to comply with the requirements for veri cation and certi cation of non-forum
shopping. The a ant of the petition, according to private respondent, is not a principal
party in the case; rather, he is merely the son of Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners.
The verification and certification reads:
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I , JULIO F. DICMAN , of legal age, Filipino, with residence address at
Camp 7, Montecillo Road, Baguio City, after being rst duly sworn in accordance
with law, do hereby depose and state:
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1. I am one of the petitioners in the above-entitled case; HDTCSI

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

To private respondent, since Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners, appears to


be alive, he excludes his son as the successor-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman. The
veri cation, therefore, is false in view of the statement under oath that Julio F. Dicman
is a petitioner when in fact he is not, and should be cause for the dismissal of the case
and indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to administrative and criminal action.
On May 2, 2001, in their Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File the Attached
Reply and Reply, petitioners argued that while it may be true that the veri cation and
certi cation to the petition were signed by Julio F. Dicman, the son of one of the
petitioners, they subsequently con rmed his authority to sign on behalf of all the
petitioners through the Special Power of Attorney submitted to the Court in a
Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina Alawas With Their
Respective Heirs led on March 2, 2001. Petitioners invoked substantial compliance
and prayed that the Court overlook the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial
justice. The parties thereafter submitted their respective memoranda.
The petition must be dismissed on the following grounds:
1. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires the
pleader to submit a certi cate of non-forum shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or
principal party, is mandatory, and non-compliance therewith is a su cient ground for
the dismissal of the petition. 2 4 The forum shopping certi cation must be signed by the
party himself as he has personal knowledge of the facts therein stated. 2 5 Obviously, it
is the plaintiff or principal party who is in the best position to know whether he actually
led or caused the ling of a petition in the case. 2 6 Where there are two or more
plaintiffs or petitioners, all of them must sign the veri cation and non-forum
certi cation, and the signature of only one of them is insu cient, 2 7 unless the one who
signs the veri cation and certi cation has been authorized to execute the same by, and
on behalf of, the co-plaintiff or co-petitioner. 2 8 But it must be stressed that the
requirement the principal party himself should sign the certi cation applies only to a
natural person and not to a juridical person which can only act through its officer or duly
authorized agent. 2 9
However, the Court has also held that the rules on forum shopping were
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect
to the contents of the certi cation. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the certi cation of non-forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certi cation cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. 3 0 Thus, under justi able
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 3 1
But a perusal of the relevant decisions handed down by this Court consistently
shows that substantial compliance may be invoked and the procedural lapse
overlooked provided that, where the petitioner is a natural person as in the case at bar,
the authorized signatory must also be a principal party or co-petitioner. 3 2 Petitioners,
as natural persons, cannot therefore appoint a non-party to sign for them, especially
since only the petitioners occupy the best position to know whether they actually led
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or caused the ling of a petition in this case and who personally know the facts stated
in the petition. On this point alone the petition should be dismissed.
2. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the ndings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.
While jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be
resolved by this Court, namely: (1) when the ndings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
con icting; (6) when in making its ndings the CA went beyond the issues of the case,
or its ndings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the ndings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the ndings are conclusions
without citation of speci c evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; (10) when the ndings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, could justify a different conclusion, 3 3 none of these exceptions
has been shown to apply in the present case and, hence, this Court may not review the
findings of fact made by the lower courts.
3. Petitioners argue on appeal that the "Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco Cariño
and Ting-el Dicman is void ab initio for lack of approval of competent authorities as
required under Section 145 in relation to Section 146 of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, the application of which was later extended to the Mountain
Province and Nueva Viscaya and, thereafter, throughout the entire national territory; 3 4
that the sale was without valid consideration; and that the said deed is not an absolute
sale but merely a contract to sell subject to the suspensive condition that the papers
evidencing the title must rst be perfected. These arguments were lumped under the
following issue in their appeal to the CA:
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE DEED OF
CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO DESPITE ITS NULLITY.

The foregoing issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the
petitioners during the proceedings before the RTC. Su ce it to say that issues raised
for the rst time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court
are barred by estoppel. 3 5 Matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the
original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where they are raised
for the rst time. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would
amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process. 3 6
4. Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely
a contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private
respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through
acquisitive prescription. 3 7
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the
possession of Guzman Cariño, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
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continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just title, to
the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the
period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case,
is 10 years. 3 8 The ndings of fact of the lower courts, and which this Court has no
reason to disturb, inescapably point to this conclusion: immediately after the "Deed of
Absolute Sale," a public instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by
Sioco Cariño in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño (the father of private respondent), the
latter immediately occupied the property; the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones
lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone number; his
permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his introduction
of improvements over the land in controversy; the testimonial accounts of his
neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for tax purposes both
the land and the improvements thereon in his name, while the tax declarations of the
other claimants made no reference to the subject property. 3 9 Although arguably Sioco
Cariño may not have been the owner of the subject property when he executed the
"Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is
nonetheless satis ed, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should
ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner. 4 0 By the time the
successors-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in
controversy by ling their "Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211" on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman timely
opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for
acquisitive prescription is deemed satis ed well before Guzman's possession can be
said to be civilly interrupted by the ling of the foregoing petition to reopen. 4 1 After the
dismissal of that case on July 28, 1978, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his
possession of the subject property until his death on August 19, 1982. His remains are
buried on the land in question. Thereafter, Guzman's widow and son, herein private
respondent, continued possession of the subject property in the same manner. When
petitioners, heirs of Ting-el Dicman, tried to revive the case on April 20, 1983, they had,
far before that time, lost all rights to recover possession or ownership.
5. Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches.
Laches has been de ned as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. 4 2 It is a delay in the assertion of a right
which works disadvantage to another 4 3 because of the inequity founded on some
change in the condition or relations of the property or parties. 4 4 It is based on public
policy which, for the peace of society, 4 5 ordains that relief will be denied to a stale
demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. 4 6 It is different from and applies
independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay,
laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity
being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas
prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a xed time, laches is not. 4 7
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. 4 8 It has been held that even a registered owner of property under the Torrens
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Title system may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.
49

Given the foregoing ndings of fact, all the four (4) elements of laches, as
prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are present in the case, to wit:
a. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; SIDTCa

b. Delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had


knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit;
c. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
d. Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. 5 0

As correctly held by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el
Dicman or his successors-in-interest ever led any action to question the validity of the
"Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" after its
execution on October 22, 1928 5 1 despite having every opportunity to do so. Nor was
any action to recover possession of the property from Guzman Cariño instituted
anytime prior to April 24, 1959, a time when the period for acquisitive prescription,
reckoned from Guzman's occupation of the property in 1938, had already transpired in
his favor. No evidence likewise appears on the record that Sioco Cariño or his Estate
ever led any action to contest the validity of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January
10, 1938. 5 2 Though counsel for the Estate of Sioco Cariño tried to assail the deed as a
forgery in the trial court, the attempt failed and no appeal was lodged therefrom. It will
be di cult for this Court to assume that the petitioners and their predecessors were all
the while ignorant of the adverse possession of private respondent and his
predecessors given the publicity of their conduct and the nature of their acts. Private
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were made to feel secure in the belief that
no action would be led against them by such passivity. There is no justi able reason
for petitioners' delay in asserting their rights — the facts in their entirety show that they
have slept on them. For over 30 years reckoned from the "Deed of Conveyance of Part
Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land" dated October 22, 1928, or 20 years reckoned
from the "Deed of Absolute Sale" dated January 10, 1938, they neglected to take
positive steps to assert their dominical claim over the property. With the exception of
forgery, all other issues concerning the validity of the two instruments abovementioned,
as well as the averment that the former was in the nature of a contract to sell, were
issues raised only for the rst time on appeal and cannot therefore be taken up at this
late a stage. The features of this case are not new. The Court has on several occasions
held in particular that despite the judicial pronouncement that the sale of real property
by illiterate ethnic minorities is null and void for lack of approval of competent
authorities, the right to recover possession has nonetheless been barred through the
operation of the equitable doctrine of laches. 5 3
6. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628 issued by then President Carlos
P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of "segregating" and "reserving" certain
Igorot claims identi ed therein, including one purportedly belonging to the "Heirs of
Dicman," and prohibiting any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of
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15 years from acquisition of patent. But by the time the Proclamation had been issued,
all rights over the property in question had already been vested in private respondent.
The executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be
construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered
or deprived by executive at alone without contravening the due process guarantees 5 4
of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to be
redistributed for public use without just compensation. 5 5
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions are vital concerns of the
State and constitute important public policies which bear upon this case. To give life
and meaning unto these policies the legislature saw it t to enact Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, as a culminating
measure to a rm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities
on matters that affect their life and culture. 5 6 The provisions of that law unify an
otherwise fragmented account of constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory doctrine
which enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for the protection of indigenous
cultural communities as a marginalized sector, 5 7 to protect their ancestral domain and
ancestral lands and ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being, 5 8 and to
guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ductility. 5 9
As the nal arbiter of disputes and the last bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has
always been mindful of the highest edicts of social justice especially where doubts
arise in the interpretation and application of the law. But when in the pursuit of the
loftiest ends ordained by the Constitution this Court nds that the law is clear and
leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according to the principles of right and justice
as all people conceive them to be, and with due appreciation of the rights of all persons
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali (now retired), with Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. (now retired), concurring.

2. The eastern portion was denominated as Lot 76-B of Plan RS-463-D.


3. Also known as "Ping-el" or "Diac-man" in the records.

4. The RTC took judicial notice of the historical fact "that much of Baguio City, including the
Camp John Hay reservation which adjoins the property in question, used to belong to the
Cariño family, particularly their patriarch Mateo Cariño. In fact, a whole district of the
city, Campo Sioco, is named after Sioco Cariño himself." RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p.
103.

5. Exhibit "6"; Exhibit "H" of Estate of Sioco Cariño.

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6. Exhibit "8"; Exhibit "O" of Estate of Sioco Cariño.
7. Sioco Cariño's letter asked Guzman Cariño" to come up here at Camp 7 because I am here
waiting for you inasmuch as I like to hand over to you this building here in Camp 7 and
also the land which came from Isis, in order that you and your wife have a gift which will
serve as the remembrance of your children from me, your father." RTC Decision, pp. 2-3;
Rollo, pp. 103-4.
8. CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 63; RTC Decision, at 3; Rollo, p. 104.

9. 140 Phil. 241 (1969), reiterated in Republic v. Marcos, 152 Phil. 204 (1973).
10. RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.

11. Rollo, p. 83.

12. This should read "R.A. 6940" which is entitled "AN ACT GRANTING A PERIOD ENDING ON
DECEMBER 31, 2000 FOR FILING APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENT AND JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE TO ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER CHAPTERS VII AND VIII OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA
141, AS AMENDED)."

13. RTC Decision, pp. 4-5;


14. Id. at 5; Rollo, p. 106; CA Decision, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 65-7.

15. RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.

16. RTC Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 108.


17. Sections 145 and 146 provide as follows:

SEC. 145. Contracts with non-Christians: requisites. — Save and except contracts of sale or
barter of personal property and contracts of personal service comprehended in chapter
seventeen hereof no contract or agreement shall be made in the Department by any
person with any Moro or other non-Christian tribe or portion thereof the Department or
with any individual Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant of the same for the payment
or delivery of money or other thing of value in present or in prospective, or in any manner
affecting or relating to any real property, unless such contract or agreement be executed
and approved as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record, justice or auxiliary justice of the
peace, or notary public, and shall bear the approval of the provincial governor wherein
the same was executed or his representative duly authorized in writing for such purpose,
indorsed upon it.

xxx xxx xxx


(f) The judge, justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public before whom such
contract or agreement is executed shall certify o cially thereon the time when and the
place where such contract or agreement was executed, and that it was in his presence,
and who are the interested parties thereto, as stated to him at the time; the parties
making the same; the source and extent of authority claimed at the time by the
contracting parties to make the contract or agreement, and whether made in person or by
agent or attorney of any party or parties thereto.
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SEC. 146. Void contracts. — Every contract or agreement made in violation of the next
preceding section shall be null and void; and all money or other thing of value paid to
any person by any aforesaid Moro or non-Christian inhabitant or tribe or portion thereof,
or any other person, for or on his or their behalf, thereunder or pursuant thereto may be
recovered by suit in the name of the province wherein the contract was executed in any
court of competent jurisdiction; and one-half thereof shall be paid to the person suing for
the same, and the other half shall be paid into the treasury of the province wherein the
contract was executed for the use of the aforesaid Moro or non-Christian inhabitant or
tribe or portion thereof by or for whom it was so paid.
18. Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Lacamen
v. Laruan , G.R. No. L-27088, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 605, 608; Miguel v. Catalino , 135
Phil. 229, 234 (1968).

19. CA Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 70.


20. CA Decision, pp. 11-13; Rollo, pp. 71-3.

21. CA Decision, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 73-4.

22. 5 Phil 49 (1905).


23. CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 74

24. RULES OF COURT, Rule 46, Sec. 3, par. 5. (1997); Great Southern Maritime Services Co. v.
Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 435; Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 141973, June 28, 2005, 461
SCRA 369, 382; Chan v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog City, Br.
9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796, 806.
25. Loquias v. Ombudsman, 392 Phil. 596 (2000).
26. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 141973,
June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 369, 382; Chan v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte
in Dipolog City, Br. 9 , G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796, 806; Mendigorin v.
Cabantog, 436 Phil. 483 (2002); Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals , G.R.
No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286, 290.

27. Estares v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604, 616-17;
Gonzales v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi, Inc ., G.R. No. 150859, March 28,
2005, 454 SCRA 111, 115-16.

28. Loquias v. Ombudsman, supra note 25, at 67-8.


29. BA Savings Bank v. Sia, 391 Phil. 370 (2000).

30. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 141973,
June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 369, 383-84; Vicar International Construction, Inc. v. FEB
Leasing and Finance Co., G.R. No. 157195, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 588, 596-99; Great
Southern Maritime Services Co. v. Acuña , G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA
422, 435-37; Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile , 448 Phil. 302 (2003); Chan v. Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog City, Br. 9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA
796, 808; General Milling Corporation v. NLRC , 442 Phil. 424 (2002); Active Realty &
Development Corporation v. Daroya , 431 Phil. 753, 758-59 (2002); Shipside Incorporated
v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 345-47; Uy v.
LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419, 427-29; Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 121488, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 696, 700-01;
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Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 105819, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 108, 117; Loyola v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 117186, June 29, 1995, 245 SCRA 477, 482-84.
31. See, e.g., Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo , G.R. No. 160455, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA
325, 336-37; Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634,
July 6 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 465.
32. See San Miguel Co. v. Aballa , G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392; Heirs of
Olarte v. NHA , G.R. No. 165821, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 561; Estares v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604; Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, G.R. No.
148635, 1 April 2003, 400 SCRA 255, 261-262; Docena v. Lapesura , G.R. No. 140153,
March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 658; Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, 393 Phil. 734 (2000).
33. Rivera v. Roman , G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 276; The Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA
79, 86; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310,
319; C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279 (2002).
34. Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Lacamen
v. Laruan , G.R. No. L-27088, July 31, 1975, 65 SCRA 605, 608; Miguel v. Catalino , 135
Phil. 229, 234 (1968).

35. Cruz v. Fernando , G.R. No. 145470, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 173, 182; Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA
487, 503-04; Caltex (Phils), Inc. v. CA , G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 448,
461.

36. Cruz v. Fernando, supra ; Department of Agrarian Reform v. Franco , G.R. No. 147479,
September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 74, 92-93; Gualberto v. Go , G.R. No. 139843, July 21,
2005, 463 SCRA 671, 678; De Rama v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 131136, February 28,
2001, 353 SCRA 94.
37. Section 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) provides:

Sec. 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten years actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly
continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way
such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant
or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the person under
disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by
prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person
under or through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a
claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all claimants . . .
The relevant provisions under the present Civil Code provide:

Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title
for the time fixed by law.

Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership.
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Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith required for possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and
529 of this Code are likewise necessary for the determination of good faith in the
prescription of ownership and other real rights.

Art. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years.

Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.

38. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Act 190, Section 41. Article 1116 of the 1950 Civil Code states:

Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws
previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire period herein
required for prescription should lapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though
by the former laws a longer period might be required.

This is a case where Article 1116 may be said to apply, such that if the period began and
ended under the old law, then the period under the old law applies which, in this case, is
only 10 years regardless of good faith or bad faith. Section 41 of Act 190, otherwise
known as the Code of Civil Procedure, allows adverse possession in any character,
whether good faith or bad faith, to ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten years. See
Rigonan v. Derecho , G.R. No. 159571, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 627, 643-44; Ramos v.
CA, 198 Phil. 263; Alvero v. Reas , 146 Phil. 221 (1970); Ongsiaco v. Dallo , 136 Phil. 596
(1969); Arboso v. Andrade , 87 Phil. 782, 785-786 (1950); Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo ,
41 Phil. 342 (1921); Locsin Rama v. Montelibano Ramos , 36 Phil. 136 (1917); Altman v.
Commanding Officer, 11 Phil. 516 (1908). Prescription lies under the said section even in
the absence of good faith and just title. Rigonan v. Derecho , G.R. No. 159571, July 15,
2005, 463 SCRA 627, 643-44, citing Alvero v. Reas , 146 Phil. 221 (1970). The new Civil
Code took effect on August 30, 1950.

39. CA Decision, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 65-7; RTC Decision, pp. 3, 5; Rollo, pp. 104, 106.
40. See CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Act 190, Section 41. See also CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, R.A. 386, arts. 1117, 1129 & 1130 (1950); IV ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 26
(1991); IV EDGARDO L. PARAS, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 31-2
(2000), citing Doliendo v. Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232 (1906) & 2 Castan 240.

41. See CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, R.A. 386, Art. 1123 (1950).

42. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel , G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518; Lacamen v.
Laruan, supra note 34, citing 27 AM. JUR. 2d 687; Re O'Donnel's Estate, 8 Ill. App. 2d 348,
132 N.E. 2d 74; 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 171-72 (5th ed.).

43. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Hall v. Mortgage Secur . Co.
192 S.E. 145, 393, 11 A.L.R. 118.
44. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing 2 POMEROY'S EQUITY
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JURISPRUDENCE 171-72 (5th ed.).

45. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy , L-
21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29.
46. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Vda. de Lima v. Tio , 143
Phil. 401 (1970).

47. De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra , citing Nielson & Company, Inc. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 125 Phil. 204 (1966).
48. Id. citing Eduarte v. Court of Appeals , 370 Phil. 18 (1999); Catholic Bishop of Balanga v.
Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206 (1996).
49. Panganiban v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 151235, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 370, 381; Vda. De Cabrera,
et al. v. CA, et al., 335 Phil. 19 (1997).
50. Panganiban v. Dayrit, supra , note 49, at 382; Claverias v. Quingco , G.R. No. 77744, March 6,
1992, 207 SCRA 66, 83; Miguel v. Catalino , 135 Phil. 229, 235 (1968); Mejia de Lucas v.
Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, 280 (1956); Go Chi Gun v. Co Cho , 96 Phil. 622, 637 (1954),
citing 19 Am. Jur., 343-344.
51. RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.

52. RTC Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 107-08.

53. See Lucenta v. CFI , G.R. No. L-39789, June 20, 1988, 162 SCRA 197; Lacamen v. Laruan,
supra; Miguel v. Catalino, supra, note 34.
54. See Ayog v. Cusi, 204 Phil. 126 (1982).

55. See Manotok v. NHA, G.R. No. L-55166-7, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
56. See Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Introducing the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 47 ATENEO L.J.
571 (2002) (introducing the Colloquium on Indigenous Peoples and discussing the
framework of IPRA); Werner Blenk, ILO Partnership with Indigenous Peoples, 47 ATENEO
L.J. 556 (2002) (de ning the historical involvement of the International Labor
Organization in the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples); Terence D. Jones, The
United Nations Development Programme and the Indigenous Peoples, 47 ATENEO L.J
562 (2002) (discussing the situation of indigenous peoples in light of internal con ict
and sustainable development).

57. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, R.A. 386, Art. 24 (1950).


58. See PHILIPPINE CONST. Art. XII, Sec. 5.

59. Amarante v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Madale
v. Sa Raya , 92 Phil. 558 (1953); Porkan v. Navarro , 73 Phil. 698 (1942); De Porkan v.
Yatco, 70 Phil. 161 (1940).

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