Kraidy
Kraidy
Kraidy
scholar Jennifer Daryl Slack (1996) when she wrote that “context is not
something out there, within which practices occur or which influences the
development of practices. Rather, identities, practices, and effects generally,
constitute the very context with which they are practices, identities or effects’’
(p. 125, emphasis in original). Using the notion of intercontextuality, we
can maintain that hybridity is always already permeated with power,
without, however, arguing in favor of a generalized hegemonic out-
come. In other words, while most hybridities tend to be structured in
dominance, the resulting hybrid forms and identities are not always
and not necessarily reflective of total dominance. Critical transcultural-
ism views the relationship between structure and agency in terms of a
lopsided articulation. Articulation, according to Stuart Hall (1986), “is
both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under
certain conditions, to cohere together in a discourse, and a way of ask-
ing how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures,
to certain political subjects’’ (p. 53).5 Our attention, then, needs to be
redirected from debating the political and theoretical usefulness of hy-
bridity, to analyzing how structures and discourses operate in a variety
of contexts to shape different hybridities, and how, in turn, hybrid cul-
tural forms—as we have seen, for example, with Tele Chobis in Chapter
Five—reflect at once the presence of hegemony and its limitations.
While some, perhaps the most powerful, politico-economic structures
are global, it may be helpful to pay more attention to the role of the
state as a regulator of communication processes that shape hybridity.
Critical transculturalism, as mentioned earlier, considers social practice
as the site of agency whose scope is both translocal and intercontextual.
The state, even as its economic prerogatives have been frittered away
under globalization, retains most of its political, legal, regulatory, and
military power. In these domains, the national state mediates between
not only the global and the local, but also the local and other locals. It
is therefore helpful to reappraise the role of the state in international
communication, and to explore the implications of this role for the issue
of cultural hybridity.
This content downloaded from 128.151.150.1 on Thu, 18 Oct 2018 01:05:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Hybridity without Guarantees 157
This content downloaded from 128.151.150.1 on Thu, 18 Oct 2018 01:05:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
158 Chapter 7
This content downloaded from 128.151.150.1 on Thu, 18 Oct 2018 01:05:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Hybridity without Guarantees 159
broadcasting is clear, and this logic permeates both how the system
works and how it is engaged by social movements. Negative media
representations of minorities, for instance, are not monitored or sanc-
tioned by the state; rather, activist groups address stereotypical media
depictions by organizing commercial boycotts. Because media corpora-
tions recognize the rising purchasing power of certain groups, they often
accommodate their demands, whether these are ethnic groups, such as
African Americans and Hispanics, or more recently the gay community.
The situation is different in less commercial media environments.
In Latin America, states tend to follow a preservationist approach to
culture, and cultural policy thus concentrates on traditional folk art
and crafts and elite plastic arts. In the past, media and popular culture
were neglected by policy, and when included, they were treated ac-
cording to the same “preservation of culture’’ logic, an approach now
giving way to market considerations in the wake of economic liberaliza-
tion (Garcı́a-Canclini, 1995/2001). In western Europe and Canada, on
the other hand, commercial considerations have overshadowed public
broadcasting ideals, but well-enshrined social democratic values and
the laws these values have inspired have arguably worked against too
rapid a change and mitigated the impact of liberalization.
In the Arab world, the media are caught between the exacting de-
mands of markets and the repressive tendency of states. Lebanon, its
freewheeling economy and relatively free civil society notwithstand-
ing, is no exception to this combination of laisser-faire media economics
combined with authoritarian state control over content. This tension is
mediated by a system of political patronage and partitioning of media
and other resources perhaps best captured by the phrase “oligarchical
capitalism,’’ in which media resources are distributed along sectarian
lines and controlled by the elite of each confession. This system, as ex-
plained in Chapter Six, devolves power and control to the confessional
level, so that leading politicians in each group have a monopoly over
public expression. Instead of enhancing the prospects of constructive
dialogue between communities, this rigid structure concentrates the
ability to communicate in the hands of unaccountable political leaders.
Therefore, oligarchical media capitalism hardens pluralism into enclav-
ism where recognition and redistribution are perfectly (at least in the-
ory) aligned under elite control, and it preempts hybrid identities from
developing into progressive political energy.
An alternative policy must be imagined, at least from a normative,
if not yet practicable, point of view. In the United States, where public
This content downloaded from 128.151.150.1 on Thu, 18 Oct 2018 01:05:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms