The Gallic Disaster

Author(s): Veit Rosenberger

Source: The Classical World, Vol. 96, No. 4 (Summer, 2003), pp. 365-373
Published by: Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of the Classical Association of the
Atlantic States
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 THE GALLIC DISASTER
Not much is known about the Gallic disaster. Attempts to date
the battle at the Allia range from 390 to 385 B.C. According to
Livy, the story goes as follows. During an argument with the Gauls
at Clusium, Roman envoys broke the law of nations and took up
arms. Since the Gauls did not get reparation from the Romans, they
decided to take revenge: they won at the Allia because they were
fighting a just war. A few days later the Gauls invaded the deserted
city and sacked it. Only a small garrison on the Capitoline held
out and was eventually forced to hand over a large payment of gold.
Just when the Romans and Gauls were discussing the amount, Marcus
Furius Camillus turned up with an army and defeated the Gauls.'
Taking into account Polybius and other authors, it is obvious that
much of this version is constructed. The Camillus legend, e.g., serves
to replace the role of Caere; the whole story is full of anti-plebe-
ian elements. Thus, it is difficult to assess what actually happened.
It is most likely that Rome was attacked by a wave of Gallic raid-
ers interested only in movable booty. Reports about Roman casualties
are largely exaggerated. Rome was not destroyed: the burnt-layer
once attributed to the Gauls has to be dated back to the sixth cen-
tury B.C. In sum, there is good reason to believe that the patriotic
annalistic tradition exaggerated the extent of the Gallic raid.2
Within our general theme, "Roman military disasters and their
consequences," I should like to investigate the effects of the Gal-
lic disaster. In 1985 the German historian Heinz Bellen published
a seminal book on the metus Gallicus. According to Bellen, the
metus Gallicus, fear of the Gauls, was the driving force in Roman
foreign politics during the republican age; it might have been con-
structed shortly before or during the Gallic war from 225 to 222
B.C.3 Bellen was not the first to note this fear of the Gauls, which
was subsequently transferred to all peoples living north of the Alps.
Alfred Heuss, author of one of the most influential German hand-
books on Roman history in the second half of the twentieth century,
described the defeat at the Allia as a trauma which caused mur-
derous fear among the Romans whenever Northerners invaded Italy.4

Liv. 5.35-55.
2 M. Torelli, "I Galli a Roma," in P. Santoro, ed., I Galli e l'Italia, 2nd ed.
(Rome 1979) 226-28; F. Coarelli, "La stratigrafia del Comizio e l'incendio gallico,"
in Santoro (above) 229-30; T. J. Cornell, "Rome and Latium to 390 B.C.," CAH VII,
2nd ed. (Cambridge 1989) 305-9; R. R. Holloway, The Archaeology of Early Rome
and Latium (London and New York, 1994), esp. 91-102; F. Kolb, Rom: Die Geschichte
der Stadt in der Antike (Munich 1995) 140-41; W. Kuhoff, La Grande Roma dei Tarquini:
Die fruheste Expansion des romischen Staates im Widerstreit zwischen literarischer
Uberlieferung und historischer Wahrscheinlichkeit (Augsburg 1995) 21, 41-42; and
T. J. Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome (London and New York, 1995) 313-18.
3 H. Bellen, Metus Gallicus-Metus Punicus: Zum Furchtmotiv in der romischen
Republik (Mainz 1985).
4 A. Heuss, Romische Geschichte (Braunschweig 1960) 23: "jenes Trauma, welches
die Romer hinfort in eine morderische Angst vor jedem nordldndischen Angriff versetzte."

365

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366 VEIT ROSENBERGER

Since 1985, Bellen's thesis has been widely accepted, especially

by German researchers. Jorg Rupke called the Allia a historical
psychosis of the Romans.' Bernhard Kremer regarded the Gallic
Wars as a continuing struggle for survival of the Romans with the
following results: absolutely uncontrolled, paniclike, and irrational
fear, a fear so strong that it was able to paralyze public life.6
Herbert Heftner postulated that the shock of this near catastrophe
was present in the collective memory of the Romans for centu-
ries.7 In the opinion of J. H. C. Williams, the sack of Rome gave
the Romans "nightmares which lasted for centuries, long after the
conquest of the Gauls themselves."8 This short survey should be
sufficient to demonstrate the acceptance of Bellen's thesis.9
I will not try to play down the meaning of the sack of Rome
entirely; too much was at stake for the Romans. But I should like
to bring forward a more balanced assessment. Fear cannot be the
only force behind decisions in Roman politics.'0 Accepting a con-
tinuous metus Gallicus as a motif behind Roman politics would
sustain the thesis of defensive imperialism, as advanced by Theodor
Mommsen in the nineteenth century. Although this is not the place
to reopen the debate about Roman imperialism, there were doubt-
less also other motivations for Roman expansion, e.g., economic
benefits, a desire for territorial annexation, and the competition
for glory within the ruling elite." We shall now examine Bellen's
arguments.
His first point is the tumultus Gallicus. He stresses the aspect
of fear in tumultus by referring to Servius, who explains tumultus

J. Riipke, Domi militiae: Die religiose Konstruktion des Kriegs in Rom (Stuttgart
1990) 74.
6 B. Kremer, Das Bild der Kelten bis in augusteische Zeit (Stuttgart 1994) 64-
65.
H. Heftner, Der Aufstieg Roms (Regensburg 1997) 16.
8 J. H. C. Williams, Beyond the Rubicon: Romans and Gauls in Republican
Italy (Oxford 2001) 221-22.
9 Among others see H. Sonnabend ("Pyrrhos und die Furcht der R6mer vor
dem Osten," Chiron 19 [1989] 319-45), who argues that contrary to the Gallic wars,
the wars against Pyrrhus did not produce metus; M. Kostial, Kriegerisches Rom? Zur
Frage von Unvermeidbarkeit und Normalitit militdrischer Konflikte in der romischen
Politik (Stuttgart 1995) 109-15; P. B. Ellis (Celt and Roman [New York 1998] 128),
who speaks of a "neurotic fear"; and R. Urban, Gallia rebellis: Erhebungen in Gallien
im Spiegel antiker Zeugnisse (Stuttgart 1999) 43, 130. See also A. M. Eckstein, "Hu-
man Sacrifice and Fear of Military Disaster in Republican Rome," AJAH 7 (1982) 69-92.
'? K.-W. Welwei ("Zum metus Punicus in Rom um 150 v.Chr.," Hermes 117 [1989]
315-20) does not regard metus Punicus as a motivation for Roman politics.
" W. V. Harris (War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.c. (Oxford
19791 176) regards statements of fear, anxiety, and terror in Livy as valueless; see
also 127 and 266-67; J. Linderski, Si Vis Pacem Para Bellum: Concepts of Defensive
Imperialism, in W. V. Harris, ed., The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome (Rome
1984) 143 = J. Linderski, Roman Questions (Stuttgart 1995) 11: "Most Roman wars,
if not all, were undertakenfrom a position of strengthwhen Rome was secure in its
military superiority. Hence no fear of the enemy."

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 THE GALLIC DISASTER 367

as timor multus, strong fear.'2 We should not give too much credit
to customary Latin etymology. According to the OLD, tumultus should
be translated as: "1. Commotion, fuss; 2. Hostile incursion; 3. A
confused state due to fear, panic, alarm." Contrary to bellum with
its formal declaration of war, tumultus was decreed when the Ro-
mans were threatened by a sudden attack and did not have the
time to go through all the rituals.'3 When a tumultus was pronounced
there was a suspension of normal state business, military leave was
cancelled, and all citizens were levied. The Romans knew of sev-
eral tumultus, e.g. tumultus Gallicus, tumultus Italicus, and-less
common-tumultus Etruscus.'4 Based on a passage in Appian men-
tioning that the usual exemptions from military service for priests
and old men were not valid during a tumultus Gallicus, this tu-
multus is sometimes regarded as more serious than a tumultus Italicus.'5
But there are other sources. The lex Ursonensis of 44 B.C. stipu-
lates that nobody shall be drafted against his will unless there is
a tumultus Gallicus or a tumultus Italicus. 16 In judicial matters,
the inscription of a city law should carry more weight than a lit-
erary source. Thus, we have clear evidence that both sorts of tumultus
were of the same level of urgency in the late Republic. Nobody
would claim that the Romans suffered from a strong and irratio-
nal fear of the Italians. This stipulation is not a proof for uncontrolled
fear of the Gauls: tumultus Gallicus is a pragmatic instrument to
deal with sudden attacks allowing colonies to react without first
contacting the distant authorities in Rome. Furthermore, we should
not forget that tumultus Gallicus and tumultus Italicus could be
used in a simply geographic meaning in the late Republic, thus
naming military emergencies in Italy and in Gallia Cisalpina. 17
Secondly, Bellen stresses the preparations during the tumultus
Gallicus in 225 B.C., when the Romans sent an army of 148,000
men, the largest army so far, to northern Italy to fight the Gauls.
Additionally, there was a reserve of another 53,500 fighters. How
can we interpret these exceptionally high numbers? If we follow
Polybius, who explicitly states that an army of such numbers had
never yet been raised,ls they cannot prove permanent neurotic fear,
but only the urgency of that Gallic war and the determination of
the Romans to end it. Otherwise we would expect similarly high

12 Serv. Aen. 2.486: tumultus dictus quasi timor multus.

3 Rupke (above, n.5) 74-75.
V. Rosenberger, Bella et expeditiones: Die antike Terminologie der Kriege Roms
(Stuttgart 1992) 142-45.
15
Bellen (above, n.3) II; Williams (above, n.8) 171, based on App. BC 2.150.
16 CIL II 5439 1 3.31 ILS 6087 LXII: invitum militem facito neve fieri iubeto
neve eum cogito neve ius iurandum adigito neve adigi iubeto neve sacramento rogato
neve rogari iubeto, nisi tumultus Italici Gallicive causa.
'7 Cic. Phil. 8.3: Itaque maiores nostri tumultum Italicum, quod erat domesticus,
tumultum Gallicum, quod erat Italiae finitimus, praeterea nullum nominabant.
18 Polyb. 2.23.11.

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368 VEIT ROSENBERGER

numbers in all conflicts with Gauls. Taking into account that such
high numbers are mentioned only for 225 B.C., one might gener-
ally be tempted to doubt them-even if a historian of the rank of
Polybius is our witness.'9 Furthermore, it can be argued that the
war resulted at least as much from Roman as from Gallic pres-
sure: C. Flaminius' attempt to distribute the ager Gallicus among
Roman citizens in 232 can be interpreted as an aggressive act.20
Bellen's third point focuses upon three cases of human sacri-
fice in 228, 216, and 114 B.C. Livy described the circumstances
of the human sacrifice in 216, immediately after the battle at Cannae:
Interim ex fatalibus libris sacrificia aliquot extra-
ordinaria facta, inter quae Gallus et Galla, Graecus
et Graeca in foro bovario sub terram vivi demissi
sunt in locum saxo consaeptum, iam ante hostiis
humanis, minime Romano sacro, imbutum.2'
In the meantime, by the direction of the Books of
Fate, some unusual sacrifices were offered; amongst
others a Gaulish man and woman and a Greek man
and woman were buried alive in the Cattle Market,
in a place walled in with stone, which even before
this time had been defiled with human victims, a
sacrifice wholly alien to the Roman spirit.
According to Bellen, the human sacrifice was the result of panic
at Rome caused by fear of the Gauls. Even though the Romans
were not yet fighting against Greeks-the treaty between Hannibal
and Philip V of Macedonia was to be sealed in the following year-
the pairs of Gauls and of Greeks were an integral part of the rite.
Not to bury the Greek man and woman alive would have meant
that the Romans endangered the effectiveness of the entire rite.22
Yet one is tempted to ask: if the intention was to symbolically
kill and destroy the enemies, the Gauls make sense, but not the
Greeks. One wonders why the Romans did not bury a couple of
Carthaginians.
Much has been published about the burial of the pairs of Greeks
and Gauls. In each of the following three years there was a war
with Celts and in all three cases an unchaste Vestal was buried
alive. There is a consensus that burying the two couples symbol-
izes the destruction of the enemy and averts the possibility of a
real occupation of Rome by hostile forces. The fact that Greeks
and Gauls were buried is traced back to Etruscan origins, because

19 P. Bender, "Rom, Karthago, und die Kelten," Klio 79 (1997) 91-94.

20 Harris, War (above, n.l 1) 197; see also A. M. Eckstein, Senate and General:
Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, and London, 1987) 13.
21 Liv. 22.57.6. This translation is by B. 0. Foster, Livy in Fourteen Volumes,
vol. 5 (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929).
22 Bellen (above, n.3) 14.

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 THE GALLIC DISASTER 369

Etruscan hegemony in Italy fell after conflicts with Greeks and

Celts.23 Briggs L. Twyman regarded the ritual of 228 as concocted
by the decemvirs in order "to incite rather than assuage metus Gal-
licus." They did this to diminish the influence of C. Flaminius,
who had challenged the senate's control of policy on the Celtic
frontier by proposing a plebiscite for distribution of land in the
north.24
For further clues, we need to interpret the burials within the
Roman prodigy system. First, a sign was reported to a magistrate,
usually a consul or a praetor (nuntiatio). Then the magistrate car-
ried the sign to the senate (relatio), in some cases using witnesses.
If the senate accepted the sign, it became a prodigium and was
noted on the whitened board of the pontifex maximus. The state
thus publicly accepted the sign, and the new pair of consuls at
the beginning of the year would see to its expiation. In the mean-
time, the senate ordered religious specialists-pontifices, decemviri,
or haruspices-to find the correct expiatory rite for the prodigium.
Usually only one group of priests was asked to find the rite; they
did this by inspecting their secret books. Again the senate was
free to accept or to refuse the proposed rite. The senate was the
decisive institution in the prodigy system. During wars more prodigies
were accepted and expiated than in times of peace. Nevertheless,
the senate held the system in its hands even during the most night-
marish crises. Thus, we should not make the mistake of comparing
the expiation of prodigies with early modern witch-hunts. Prodi-
gies were not seen by superstitious and hysterical masses or expiated
by spontaneous rites invented by an uncontrollable crowd. Instead
the system used in Rome was intended to produce calm-the sen-
ate would do something about the prodigy.
If we understand prodigies as a disruption of a symbolic bor-
der, and the expiatory rite as a way to restore the border, we can
interpret the strange sacrifice as follows. Gauls and Greeks settled
outside the Roman sphere of influence in the north and south of
the Italian peninsula. By burying members of the neighboring peoples,
the Romans ritually reinforced their own borders and the bonds
between Rome and her allies. This was needed in the time after
Cannae, when Hannibal had managed most successfully to trans-
gress the borders of the sphere of Roman hegemony.25 If we still

23 C. Cichorius, Romische Studien (Berlin and Leipzig, 1922) 17-20; K. Latte,

Romische Religionsgeschichte (Munich 1960) 256-57; A. Fraschetti, "Le sepolture rituali

del Foro Boario," in M. Torelli, ed., Le defit religieux dans la cite antique (Rome
1981) 59-66; Eckstein (above, n.9) 69-92; R. Muth, Einfiuhrung in die griechische
und romische Religion (Darmstadt 1988) 306; J. Seibert, Hannibal (Darmstadt 1993)
206-7; and M. Beard, J. North, and S. Price, Religions of Rome, vol. I (Cambridge
1998) 81-82.
24 B. L. Twyman, "Metus Gallicus, the Celts, and Roman Human Sacrifice," AHB
11 (1997) 1-11, esp. 4.
2S V. Rosenberger, Gezahmte Gotter: Das Prodigienwesen der r6mischen Republik
(Stuttgart 1998) 135-39.

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370 VEIT ROSENBERGER

explain the burial of Greeks and Gauls as a proof of the extraordi-

nary fear of the Gauls, we must also postulate an extraordinary fear
of the Greeks, which never existed: in terms of culture, most of
the Romans adored the Greeks; in military terms Greeks, were de-
rided as Graeculi, useless fighters living on a great past.26
In his fourth point, Bellen refers to the fact that the Romans
remembered the day of the defeat at the Allia, the dies Alliensis.
The fasti Amiternini comment on July 18: DIES ALLIENSIS. In
the fasti Antiaties we find for the same day: DIES ALLIA[E ET]
FAB(IORVM), a hint on the battle at the Cremera, when the three
hundred Fabii were defeated by Veii in 477 B.c.27 Two defeats from
a distant past were dated on the same day.28 This calendric anal-
ogy connected the two worst defeats of the early Republic and
mutually explained them-analogies of this sort were not uncom-
mon in antiquity.29 Ovid offers a different date for the battle at
Cremera: February 13.30 This variant should make us cautious. The
Roman calendars are products of the Augustan age, as are most
of the literary sources on early Rome. If some fasti give July 18
as the date of the battle at the Allia, it does not prove that this
date was transferred from the early fourth century to the age of
Augustus. Most probably the date goes back to the early second
century B.C.3" In any case, this is no proof of fear of the Gauls.
One might even turn around the argument: defeats such as Lake
Trasimene (217), Cannae (216), Arausio (105), Carrhae (53), or
Teutoburg (9 A.D.) are not mentioned in the calendars. Moreover,
with the exception of Lake Trasimene, we do not even know the
day and the month of these battles from literary sources.32 It is
not possible to explain this silence as a vagary of classical trans-
mission. Too many calendars are preserved, but too many dates
are not known. The reason for this silence is to be sought in the
temporal distance to those battles. Only defeats from a distant past
were remembered-they did not hurt any more. Apart from the Allia
and Cremera the calendars mention only one date from Rome's
early history: the foundation of the city on April 21.33 Historians

26 Harris, War (above, n.ll) 198.

27 CIL 1.1, 2nd ed., p.244 and 248 =Inscr. It. XIII 2, p.188-89 and 208.
28 Liv. 6.1.11; Tac. Hist. 2.91. Cic. Att. 9.5.2.

29 According to Her. 7.166, the battles of Himera and Salamis (480 B.c.) were
fought on the same day; according to Ael. 2.25, Alexander was born, won the battle
at Issos, and died on a Thargelion 6; Ov. Fast. 6.563-568 mentions two defeats on
June 11; see also A. T. Grafton and N. M. Swerdlow, "Calendar Dates and Omi-
nous Days in Ancient Historiography," JWI 51 (1988) 14-42; J. v. Ungern-Sternberg,
"Eine Katastrophe wird verarbeitet: Die Gallier in Rom," in C. Bruun, ed., The Ro-
man Middle Republic: Politics, Religion, and Historiography c. 400-133 B.c. (Rome
2000) 210.
30 Ov. Fast. 2.193-196.
'1 J. Riipke, Kalender und 6ffentlichkeit (Berlin and New York, 1995) 359, 567-
70.
32 Ov. Fast. 6.763 (June 21/23).

33 Rupke (above, n.31) 569.

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 THE GALLIC DISASTER 371

have pointed out the calendric analogy between the Neronic fire
of Rome on July 19, A.D. 64, and the fire of Rome which Livy
places one day after the battle at the Allia.34 Livy mentions that
the city was destroyed by the Gauls 365 years after the founda-
tion by Romulus.35 Another 365 years later, if we reckon inclusively,
is the year 27 B.C., when Augustus proclaimed the res publica re-
stored. Thus, the reconstruction of Rome after the Gallic fire is
exactly in the middle between Romulus and Augustus.36 Every 365
years Rome is founded anew.37 If we follow this line of argument,
the extent to which the date of the Allia must have been con-
structed becomes evident. Thus, the dies Alliensis obtains a meaning
far beyond the metus Gallicus.
Bellen's fifth argument is the designation of July 18 as dies
ater. Gellius, quoting Verrius Flaccus' De VerborumSignificatu, explains
the defeat at the Allia on religious grounds: Q. Sulpicius, the Ro-
man general, had sacrificed before the battle on the day after the
Ides. Other Romans also remembered that whenever a Roman magis-
trate had sacrificed on the day after the Kalends, Nones, or Ides,
the following battle was lost. So the pontiffs decreed that there
should be no more sacrifices on such days.38 Although this expla-
nation is highly artificial, it demonstrates two points: first, not only
was July 18 a dies ater, there were several dies atri every month;
second, the Allia was not the only reason to introduce dies atri in
the calendar-other defeats were also blamed on sacrificing on the
wrong day.39
Let us examine two further alleged proofs for the existence
of extreme metus Gallicus. Twenty years after the Allia, the Ro-
mans fought another battle with the Gauls in 367. This time the
Romans won. Livy comments: Nec dubia nec difficilis Romanis,
quamquam ingentem Galli terrorem memoria pristinae cladis attu-
lerant, victoria fuit ("Notwithstanding the great terror occasioned
by the invasion of the Gauls and the recollection of their old de-
feat, the Romans gained a victory that was neither difficult nor
uncertain").40 Is this passage, as Kremer postulates, an indubitable
proof of metus Gallicus?4 First, we need to be cautious about ac-
cepting Livy's psychological interpretation; Livy has no witness

34 G. Baudy, Die Brande Roms (Hildesheim 1991) 17; Williams (above, n.8) 177.
3 Liv. 5.54.5.
36 G. B. Miles, Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome (Ithaca and London, 1995) 95.
37 This is not the place to discuss the meaning of this number. Is 365 years a
great year or is it, as Baudy (above, n.34) 17 speculates, understandable as a quarter
of the life span of the Phoenix, who lives for 1,460 (= 4 x 365) years? According to
Tac. Ann. 6.28, the Phoenix dies every 1,461 years.
38 Gell. 5.17.2.
39 There was always a religious explanation if the Romans lost a battle; see also
N. Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the
Middle and Late Republic (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990).
40 Liv. 6.42.7. Translation by Foster (above, n.21) vol. 3.

4' Kremer (above, n.6) 63.

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372 VEIT ROSENBERGER

from that time. Second, an analysis of the construction of this sentence

is helpful. The fear of the Gauls is literally framed by the em-
phasis on how easy the victory was: nec dubia nec difficilis . . .
victoria fuit. Livy's style leaves no doubt about the victory. Now
to the second example: when Gaius Sulpicius Peticus and Marcus
Valerius Publicola entered their consulate in 354 B.C., four hun-
dred years after the founding of Rome, Livy dated it as follows:
Quadringentesimo anno, quam urbs Romana condita erat, quinto
tricesimo (sc. anno) quam a Gallis reciperata ("The four hundredth
year from the founding of Rome and the thirty-fifth from its re-
covery from the Gauls").42 For Kremer it is obvious that Livy used
the Allia to date an event because the defeat was one of the worst
landmarks in Roman history.43 A closer look at Livy's text is once
again revealing. Livy does not take the defeat at the Allia as the
event from which to date, but the conquest of the city by the Ro-
mans and the founding of Rome. The text is about the first and
the second foundation of Rome, not about the metus Gallicus. Fur-
ther so-called proofs of the metus Gallicus turn out to be as weak
at close examination."

Conclusion
When Cicero delivered his speech De Provinciis Consularibus
in 56 B.C., he characterized Gaul as follows: Nemo sapienter de
re publica nostra cogitavit, iam inde a principio huius imperii,
quin Galliam maxime timendam huic imperio putaret ("From the
very beginning of our Empire we have had no wise statesman who
did not regard Gaul as the greatest danger to our Empire").45 Even
though it was Cicero's aim in this speech to underline Caesar's
success in Gaul by enhancing the Gallic threat, there is a grain of
truth in his statement. Why were the Gauls so important? First,
there were many Gauls and Celts. Galli, Celti (not to mention that
Greeks were often talking of Germans when they spoke about Keltoi)
dwelt not only in northern Italy, but in a region north of the Medi-
terranean from Galicia to Galatia. Second, there were many wars
from the Gallic raid until Caesar conquered Gaul. It is justified
to include in this series also wars with Germanic tribes, e.g., the
Cimbri and Teutones invading northern Italy. Third, unlike other
Italian enemies like the Latins, Etruscans, Samnites, or the Greeks,
the Gauls came from an entirely different cultural background. They
were the first barbarians the Romans had to fight, and they were

Liv. 7.18.1. Translation by Foster (above, n.21) vol. 3.

42

Kremer (above, n.6) 63: Livy regarded the Allia as "einen der schlimmsten
43

Marksteine romischer Geschichte . . ., zeigt sich schon allein darin, dass er den Fall
Roms als Mittel der Zeitrechnung verwendet."
44 App. BC 2.150; and Plut. Cam. 41.7.

4S CiC. Prov. Cons. 33. This translation is by R. Gardner, Cicero in Twenty-Eight

Volumes, vol. 13 (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1958).

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 THE GALLIC DISASTER 373

impressively different.46 Yet, there were no major defeats in the

Gallic wars-when the Romans were defeated by the Senones in
an insignificant skirmish more than a century after the Allia, they
retaliated with the utmost determination.47
The quintessence of Livy's description of the Gallic raid is
not that from that time on the Romans were terribly afraid when-
ever the Gauls attacked. The Gauls might be tall, loud, and horrible,
but the Romans fought back with their virtues: piety, self-devo-
tion, bravery, planning ability, and discipline.48 Only Rome can be
the home of the Romans, only this place makes them masters of
the world. In a nutshell, the story of the loss and retaking of the
city can be interpreted as a parable for Livy's readers who wit-
nessed civil war entering the gates of Rome: Rome will recover
when the Romans remember their own virtues.
We cannot trace the influence of the Allia in the decades or
even centuries immediately after the battle, since our sources are
mostly from the late Republic and early Empire. But there is no
proof of an uncontrolled fear of the Gauls or of panic. It was not
the intention of this paper to deny entirely the existence of metus
Gallicus. Doubtless the Gauls, a people once having successfully
attacked Rome and an enemy for many centuries, were regarded
as formidable enemies. Our sources mention many instances of fear
in Rome, fear of the Gauls, but also fear of other peoples. Jerzy
Linderski wrote in 1984: "We tend to use terms denoting emo-
tions loosely and imprecisely. This is unfortunate for it distorts
history."49 This paper has attempted to examine carefully the emo-
tional life of persons and peoples of an epoch of more than two
thousand years ago.

Emory University/ UniversitdtAugsburg VEIT ROSENBERGER

Classical World (96.4) 2003 veit.rosenbergerggmx.de

46 See also M. Jantz, Das Fremdenbild in der Literatur der Romischen Republik

und der augusteischen Zeit: Vorstellungen und Sichtweisen am Beispiel von Hispanien
und Gallien (Frankfurt 1995) esp. 140-51.
4' Flor. 1.8.21; S. Mattem, Rome and the Enemy (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and
London, 1999) 220.
48 On Roman virtues see T. J. Moore, Artistry and Ideology: Livy's Vocabulary

of Virtue (Frankfurt 1989).

49 Linderski (above, n.ll) 143 = 11.

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