CANON 7

CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO (A.C. No. 4921, March 6,
2003)
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013Labels: Disbarment, Lawyers, Legal Ethics
FACTS:

Complainant and respondent had their illicit relationship while the latter was
preparing to take the bar examinations. After the admission of the respondent to the
Philippine Bar, complainant learned that he was already married. Respondent, who by
now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant
and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. After the birth of the baby,
however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form
of support. After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo
guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

HELD:
YES. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the same Code.
The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to
renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by
Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification.
 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

A.C. No. 244             March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A.
Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in
his application for such bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who
caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending
that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the
allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A.
diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in
support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of
successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered
the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian
life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and
4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure
to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A.
from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months
before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but
due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular
manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo
A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So
ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

CANON 8

PAULINO VALENCIA v. ATTY. ARSENIO FER. CABANTING, Adm. Cases Nos. 1302,
1991-04-26
Facts:
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo.
Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
workable solution concerning his house.
While the petition was pending, the trial court, on
March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has
already become final and executory
On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos
and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April
25, 1973.
Issues:
Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491
of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another:
(5)  xxx this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved.  It is
intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client.  Greed may get the
better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness.  Any violation of... this
prohibition would constitute malpractice
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation
is pending.
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after
finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding.  A thing is said to be
in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in... court, but also from
the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.  (Gan Tingco vs.
Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81).
Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may either grant or
dismiss the petition.
Principles:
Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has
terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari
connected therewith is still in progress.  Thus, purchase of the property by Atty.
Cabanting in... This case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
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A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.

Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.

Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking
the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.

The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:

Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a

certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a
deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from
the United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed
of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid.
Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get,
demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City.
The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the
aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City
post office that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence,
Geesnell Yap filed a complaint for injunction with damages against complainant.
Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting
and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on

23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the
Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant
in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing
her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated
21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post
offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.

On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw
the pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel
of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney
Alexander H. Lim.

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again
without the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00.
It was likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would
be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per
annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by
the trial court on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment,
based on the following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking

assistance, advise and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy
thereof was furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself
despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the same;

8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary

for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only
jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous
expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her
anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon
her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
 9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by
means of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on
her by respondent;

10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to

represent complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,

Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other
counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon
the request of complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he
(respondent) made the compromise agreement.

Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was
informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.

Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers.
Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the
compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by
Yap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed
grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4
October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect
to any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on
the promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was
hired by him to collect the loan.

In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985,

complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the
lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five
percent (75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the
P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest
of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is
required to see that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to
complainant.

With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise

agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys.
Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from
informing her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier
quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial
court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.

Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel,
respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was
the execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly
and patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.

Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

9. Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the

subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel;
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It
is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented
by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to
the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by

written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.

Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this
Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they
likewise prevent justice from being attained.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of

SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled
mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar.

 The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on
the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

 Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.

 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses

respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does
not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar
Ruling:

 the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing
the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.

 True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LADAGA 350 SCRA 326 [2001]
Wednesday, January 21, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Legal Ethics

FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a

relative in a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court as required by the Administrative Code. An administrative complaint
was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the Department
Head (CJ) as required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he
merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative and that he was on an approved leave
of absence during his appearances as such counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of
the court to which he is assigned knew his appearances as such counsel.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative

constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the statute should be

customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in this
case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the
Department (CJ) as required by law, respondent was reprimanded.