1.) CUENCA V.

PCGG
G.R. Nos. 159104-05
October 5, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent UHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Independent Realty
Corporation (IRC). UHC had an authorized capital stock of PhP 200,000,000 of
which 401,995 shares worth PhP 40,199,500 were subscribed and PhP
10,050,000 was paid up by IRC. Five stockholders of IRC held qualifying
shares in UHC and served in its Board of Directors. UHC became an inactive
holding company until the later months of 1978.
In 1978, petitioner Rodolfo M. Cuenca and his family’s holding company,
petitioner CIC, negotiated and reached an agreement with respondents IRC and
UHC, whereby petitioners Cuenca and CIC would purchase all the shares of
stock and subscription rights of IRC in UHC for PhP 10,000,000 and assume
IRC’s unpaid subscription of PhP 30,000,000. Petitioners Cuenca and CIC were
then the controlling stockholders of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), now the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation
(Sta. Ines), and Resort Hotels Corporation (Resort Hotels). In order to build up
UHC as his flagship company, petitioner Cuenca transferred to UHC the shares
of stocks in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels worth PhP 67,233,405, with
UHC assuming Cuenca’s various bank obligations, some or all of which were
secured by pledges or liens on the stocks.
On October 21, 1978, petitioner Cuenca was elected Chairperson and
President of UHC at a special stockholders’ meeting in accordance with the
acquisition plan, and through UHC, Cuenca continued to control and manage
CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels. Pursuant to the acquisition plan and
agreement with IRC, Cuenca and CIC transferred their shares of stock in
CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels to UHC, which in turn paid PhP
10,000,000 to IRC. In addition, petitioners assumed IRC’s unpaid subscription
of PhP 30,000,000 in UHC. The only remaining matter to be accomplished was
the transfer of the stocks and subscription rights of IRC in UHC to petitioners,
but despite demand, IRC did not comply.
In 1986, the instant controversy between petitioners and respondent IRC
was overtaken by dramatic political events. President Marcos was ousted in a
bloodless revolution and left behind an unbelievably large amount of funds and
assets that were sequestered by the new government of President Aquino
through PCGG. In July 1987, because of Marcos nominee Jose Yao Campos’
sworn statement, respondent PCGG directed Santos Luis Diego, President of
IRC, to dissolve all the boards of directors of IRC’s fully-owned subsidiaries. A
year later, it turned over IRC and its subsidiary, UHC, to the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) for rehabilitation, conservation, or disposition, enabling APT to
assign one share of stock in IRC and in each of its 25 subsidiaries, including
UHC, to Paterno Bacani, Jr.
Amidst this state of affairs, petitioners filed the October 2, 1991 Complaint6
against IRC, UHC, APT, and Bacani before the Makati City RTC, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2721, to compel IRC to transfer all its stock and
subscription rights in UHC to them or order IRC and UHC to return and re-
convey to them all the assets and shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and
Resort Hotels that they had transferred to UHC.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and as against defendants
IRC and UHC, who are hereby ordered to immediately return and reconvey to
plaintiffs all of the shares of stocks and stock subscriptions in Philippine
National Construction Corporation (formerly known as Construction and
Development [Corporation] of the Philippines), Resort Hotels Corporation and
Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation, including those transferred by
plaintiffs to UHC such as the 24,780,746 shares in CDCP/PNCC, the 468,062
shares in Resort Hotels Corporation and the 23,748,932 shares in Sta. Ines
Melale Forest Products Corporation plus all fruits thereof such as stock and
cash dividends and stock splits.
Through its assailed Decision, the appellate court reversed the Makati
City RTC’s Decision, granted the petition filed by PCGG, and dismissed the
instant case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court ratiocinated that the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the instant case involving
petitioners and the sequestered respondents corporations. It held that the
recourse of parties, petitioners in the instant case, who wish to challenge
respondent PCGG’s acts or orders, would be to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
Executive Order No. (EO) 14 issued on May, 7, 1986,27 which ordained that
this body alone had the original jurisdiction over all of respondent PCGG’s
cases, civil or criminal, citing PCGG v. Peña28 as authority. The appellate court
applied Republic v. Sandiganbayan29 on the issue of sequestration by
respondent PCGG of UHC, CIC, and CDCP (now PNCC) against petitioner
Cuenca, the Marcos spouses, their relatives, friends, and colleagues.
The CA applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment that any rule
which had already been authoritatively established in a previous litigation
should be deemed the law of the case between the same parties. As such, the
appellate court adopted the ruling in Republic on the continuing force of the
order of sequestration and concluded that, indeed, respondent UHC is a
sequestered company. The CA did not find merit in petitioners’ contention that
sequestration did not affect their transaction with respondents as it arose
before PCGG was created.
ISSUES:
WON jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners’ Complaint for
enforcement or rescission of contract between petitioners and respondents
belonged to the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
NO. Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case.
First, it is a fact that the shares of stock of UHC and CDCP, the subject
matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721 before the Makati City RTC, were also the
subject matter of an ill-gotten wealth case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016
before the Sandiganbayan. In Civil Case No. 91-2721 of the Makati City RTC,
petitioners prayed for a judgment either transferring the UHC shares or
restoring and reconveying the PNCC shares to them. In the event a final
judgment is rendered in said Makati City RTC case in favor of petitioners, then
such adjudication tends to render moot and academic the judgment to be
rendered in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0016 considering that the legal
ownership of either the UHC or PNCC shares would now be transferred to
petitioners Rodolfo Cuenca and CIC. Such adverse judgment would run
counter to the rights of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC
shares in question. It must be remembered that on March 21, 1986, a Sworn
Statement41 executed by Mr. Jose Y. Campos in Vancouver, Canada, whereby
Mr. Campos, a crony and close business associate of the deposed President
Marcos, named and identified IRC and UHC (a wholly-owned subsidiary of IRC)
as among the several corporations organized, established, and managed by him
and other business associates for and in behalf of the former President Marcos.
Subsequently, the UHC and IRC shares were surrendered and turned over by
Mr. Campos to PCGG, transferring, in effect, the ownership of the shares to the
Government.
Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by respondent
PCGG. Sequestration is a provisional remedy or freeze order issued by the
PCGG designed to prevent the disposal and dissipation of ill-gotten wealth.
Considering that the UHC shares were already sequestered, enabling the PCGG
to exercise the power of supervision, possession, and control over said shares,
then such power would collide with the legal custody of the Makati City RTC
over the UHC shares subject of Civil Case No. 91-2721. Whatever the outcome
of Civil Case No. 91-2721, whether from enforcement or rescission of the
contract, would directly militate on PCGG’s control and management of IRC
and UHC, and consequently hamper or interfere with its mandate to recover ill-
gotten wealth. As aptly pointed out by respondents, petitioners’ action is
inexorably entwined with the Government’s action for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth––the subject of the pending case before the Sandiganbayan. Verily, the
transfer of shares of stock of UHC to petitioners or the return of the shares of
stock of CDCP (now PNCC) will wreak havoc on the sequestration case as both
UHC and CDCP are subject of sequestration by PCGG.
Third, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Holiday Inn
(Phils.), Inc.47 are not analogous to the case at bar. The first dealt with
ownership of gaming and office equipment, which is distinct from and will not
impact on the sequestration issue of PCOC. The second dealt with an ordinary
civil case for performance of a contractual obligation which did not in any way
affect the sequestration proceeding of NRHDCI; thus, the complaint-in-
intervention of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. was properly denied for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In both cases cited by petitioners, there
was a substantial distinction between the sequestration proceedings and the
subject matter of the actions. This does not prevail in the instant case, as the
ownership of the shares of stock of the sequestered companies, UHC and
CDCP, is the subject matter of a pending case and thus addressed to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Fourth, while it is clear that the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan only encompasses cases where PCGG is impleaded, such
requirement is satisfied in the instant case. The appellate court clearly granted
PCGG’s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 49686, assailing the trial
court’s denial of its Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion to Dismiss. Thus,
the trial court’s April 20, 1998 Order was reversed and set aside by the
appellate court through its assailed Decision. Consequently, PCGG was
granted the right to intervene and thus became properly impleaded in the
instant case. Without doubt, the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide Civil Case No. 91-2721.

2.) ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999

FACTS
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the
imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said crime. He filed an MFR
and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The
Court denied both motions. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to
change the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH
BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal
injection against him under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or
unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a violation of the
Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of
the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a
ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already
upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly
declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177
and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most
modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than
electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent
Director; and that R.A. No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the
implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the
Bureau of Corrections. The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached
Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged similarly
with Echegaray’s arguments.
 The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave
due course to the petition. Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177
and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation
of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an
undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
ISSUE:
WON the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory,
still has jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
YES. The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential
aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for
the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel
courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.
It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have
been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them comform to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting
the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused who
has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict
who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the
execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.
 3.) HERRERA V. BARRETO
G.R. No. L-8692
December 20, 1913

FACTS:
A decision having been rendered in this case dismissing the application
for a writ of certiorari, the respondents or defendants in that application now
come asking for an assessment by this court of the damages occasioned by
reason of the issuance in that proceeding of an injunction by one of the
members of this court restraining the defendant from operating his cockpit
until this court should have passed finally upon the application for the writ.
It is provided by the Code of Civil Procedure that an injunction may be
granted upon the demonstration to the court of certain facts and the
presentation of an undertaking with sufficient sureties, conditioned "that the
plaintiff will pay to the party enjoined all such damages as such party may
sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court should finally decide that the
plaintiff was not entitled thereto."
Section 170 of the Code (Act No. 190) provide that: "Upon final trial the
amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff or to the defendant upon the
obligations provided in the last four preceding sections shall be ascertained by
the court trying the action, and judgment for the same shall be included in the
final judgment and the judgment shall be both against the plaintiff and against
the sureties upon any obligation given under the provisions of any of the last
four sections."
ISSUE:
WON the SC should take cognizance of the proceeding for damages as
proposed.
RULING:
NO. We do not believe that this court should take cognizance of the
proceeding for damages as proposed is not an action within the sense in which
that word is used in the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
injunctions. Certiorari being limited in its issuance to cases involving
jurisdictional defects can never be a proceeding in which the merits of a cause
are ventilated. If an application for the writ be made before the action or
proceeding in the inferior court is terminated, and such application is well
founded, the only result will be, in case where the court has exceeded its
jurisdiction, the correction of the error and the continuation of the cause in
trial court in accordance with law. If the action or proceeding in the inferior
court is terminated, this court in certiorari will either affirm, annul, or modify.
In either case, it will be presumed that the party interested will take or has
taken such proceedings in the court below as will protect him in the
prosecution of the proceeding to obtain the damages sustained by reason of the
injunction, if any. In certiorari this court touches no question but one law and
makes no adjudication which in any sense affects the merits of the action or
proceeding in the inferior court. In that sense, therefore, it is an action.
Under such circumstances, this court is not warranted in taking
cognizance of the proceeding presented to it. If we may assume for the moment
that the court could find any basis for such a proceeding before it, or there
could be presented any facts which would warrant its action, we can readily
see what embarrassment might arise. If this court should determine that the
party restrained by the injunction had suffered damages and should award
him a sum sufficient to compensate him, the Court of First Instance
subsequently, after a trial on the merits of the cause, might find that the party
restrained was not entitled to a judgment upon the merits and had no basis
whatever for his action. This very case is an illustration of that possible
condition. Plaintiff in the action in the court below asked for a mandamus to
compel the issuance to him of a cockpit license. In that action he obtained a
mandatory injunction compelling the issuance of one to continue during the
pendency of the action. A member of this court, upon a proceeding in
certiorari, issued an injunction against the plaintiff in the court below
restraining him from exploiting his cockpit under that license until the
Supreme Court should finally pass upon the certiorari proceeding. This court,
acting upon the application, dismissed it, at the same time dissolving the
injunction against the plaintiff in the court below. If, now upon the proceeding
presented for the assessment of damages, this court should find that the
plaintiff in the court below was entitled to the sum asked, namely, P33,000, we
might possibly be met in the future with a judgment of the Court of First
Instance upon the merits of the cause, declaring that the plaintiff in that action
was not entitled to a cockpit license and therefore suffered no damage by
reason of not having been permitted to use it while the injunction was in force.
If that judgment were well founded, then the plaintiff in that action could have
suffered no damage by reason of the restraining order issued by the member of
this court. It is apparent, therefore, that, before this court can determine
intelligently and properly the question of damages resulting from an injunction,
it must have before it for adjudication the merits of the cause. The merits never
being before the court in a proceeding for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, no
damages can be assessed by this court in that proceeding. This court is not, in
certiorari proceedings, "the court trying the action" which has cognizance of the
"final trial."
As we have already said, certiorari is not an action within the meaning of
section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While the decisions of this court
frequently refer to the proceeding as "an ordinary action," such language,
although correct in the sense used, is not intended to convey the idea that the
proceeding is such in all that term implies, especially in the sense in which the
word is used in the section just referred to.
 4.) ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC V. CA
G.R. No. 113296
January 16, 1998

FACTS:
On October 6, 1980, a complaint for a sum of money, attorney's fees and
damages1 was filed by petitioner before the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Davao City which was raffled to Branch XVI. The pre-
trial was conducted by Judge Pacita Canizares-Nye and later by Judges
Alejandro Siazon and Cristeto Dinopol.2 During the trial on November 20,
1984, Judge Renato Fuentes heard the evidence for petitioner and private
respondent, but the latter's cross examination on August 28, 1985 and the
presentation of the parties' rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences were heard by
Judge Roque Agton, having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When the
judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino administration, Judge Agton was
transferred to another branch of the Regional Trial Court,3 (RTC) but within
the same Judicial Region. Meanwhile, Judge Romeo Marasigan, who assumed
office on February 3, 1987, was assigned to Branch XVI.
Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent's
motion for extension of time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 a decision
penned by Judge Agton was rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent
moved to reconsider said decision, but the same was denied in an order dated
March 1, 1988, issued by Judge Marasigan. Private respondent appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified Judge Agton's decision on the ground
that at the time he rendered the judgment, he was neither the judge de jure
nor the judge de facto of RTC Branch XVI, and correspondingly remanded the
case to the lower court.
ISSUE:
WON the decision of Judge Agton is valid.
RULING:
YES. It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules, or by the
court. Records disclose that this case was submitted for decision sometime on
March 1987 after the parties' submission of their memoranda as required by
the court, at which time Judge Marasigan was already presiding in Branch
XVI. Thus, the case was submitted for decision to Judge Marasigan and not to
Judge Agton who by then was already transferred to another branch. Judge
Agton's decision, therefore, appears to be tainted with impropriety.
Nevertheless, the subsequent motion for reconsideration of Judge Agton's
decision was acted upon by Judge Marasigan himself and his denial of the said
motion indicates that the subscribed with and adopted in toto Judge Agton's
decision. Any incipient defect was cured. Besides, the presumption that both
magistrates (Agton and Marasigan) have regularly performed their official
functions, have not at all been rebutted by contrary evidence.
 Moreover, for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and
promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature appears
thereon. This is in line with the Court's En Banc Resolution of February 10,
1983 implementing B.P. 1298 which "merely requires that the judge who pens
the decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a judge of the same
court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is
promulgated." Branches of the trial court are not distinct and separate
tribunals from each other. Hence, contrary to private respondent's allegation,
Judge Agton could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because
jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to the court. The continuity of a
court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the death,
resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. To
remand a validly decided case to the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch
XVI, as what the CA suggests, would only prolong this rather simple collection
suit and would run counter to the avowed policy of the Court to accord a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition for every action.

1. ) INTERLINK MOVIE HOUSES, INC V. CA

G.R. No. 203298
January 17, 2018
FACTS:
On 22 July 2008, petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink),
represented by its president, petitioner Edmer Y. Lim (Lim), filed before the R
TC a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondents
Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions), a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and Joseph Lim
Bon Huan (Bon Huan).4 Interlink sought from Expressions the recovery of the
latter's unpaid rentals and damages resulting from its alleged breach of their
lease contract.
In the Sheriffs Return, dated 26 September 2008, Sheriff Benedict R.
Muriel (Sheri.ff Muriel) of the RTC's Branch 167 certified that on 24 September
2008, he served the summons issued in the subject case, together with the
copy of the complaint, on the respondents at the office of the defendant
company's president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan (Liwanan). Sheriff
Muriel stated that Liwanan undertook to forward the said documents to her
superior.
Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their
failure to file their answer. On 6 January 2009, respondents entered a special
appearance through Atty. Generosa Jacinto (Atty. Jacinto) alleging that the
service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over them. They further prayed that Interlink's motion for
declaration of default be denied.
The RTC denied Interlink's motion to declare defendants in default. The
trial court agreed that the summons was not served in accordance with Section
11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering such service defective. Thus, it
ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the respondents. Sheriff
Muriel certified that on 11 May 2009, he served the summons on Expressions
at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a certain Amee Ochotorina
(Ochotorina), a person of suitable age and discretion, who introduced herself as
one of the secretaries of Bon Huan. Sheriff Muriel added that Ochotorina
assured him that the summons would be brought to the attention of Bon
Huan.
Interlink filed another motion to declare defendants in default. To this
motion, respondent again entered a special appearance through Atty. Jacinto
on 10 July 2009. The respondents alleged that the second service of the
summons was still defective because Ochotorina did not work for nor was
connected with the office of the president of Expressions, and that she was
neither its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, nor its in-house counsel. The RTC granted the motion to declare
defendants in default and allowed Interlink to present evidence ex parte. The
trial court was convinced that there was sufficient compliance with the rules on
service of summons to a juridical entity considering that the summons was
received by the assistant/secretary of the president. The trial court further
stated that corporate officers are usually busy and as such, summons to
corporations are usually received only by assistants or secretaries of corporate
officers. The RTC ruled in favor of Interlink. It opined that Interlink was able to
prove its claims against Expressions and Bon Huan. The CA annulled the R TC
decision. The appellate court ruled that the second service of summons was
still defective, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons
of the respondents, thus rendering the RTC decision void.
ISSUE:
WON the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents.
RULING:
NO. It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is
acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance
in court and submission to its authority. In the absence of service or when the
service of summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him
is null and void. In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money
and damages, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
through personal or substituted service of summons.
Personal service is effected by handling a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it
to him. If the defendant is a domestic private juridical entity, service may be
made on its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It has been held that this
enumeration is exclusive. Service on a domestic private juridical entity must,
therefore, be made only on the person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court. If the service of summons is made upon persons other than
those officers enumerated in Section 11, the same is invalid.
There is no dispute that respondent Expressions is a domestic
corporation duly existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, and
that respondent Bon Huan is its president. Thus, for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon
Huan, or to its managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. It is further undisputed that the questioned
second service of summons was made upon Ochotorina, who was merely one of
the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated
under Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus
void and, therefore, does not vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over
Expressions.

6.) PCIB V. SPS DY

G.R. No. 171137
June 5, 2009

FACTS:
Sps. Amadeo are indebted to petitioner PCIB, a domestic uni-banking
corporation, as sureties for Streamline Cotton Dev. Corp. The promissory notes
became due and demandable, but the Sps. Amadeo failed to pay their
outstanding obligations despite repeated demands. As of Feb. 15, 1994, their
obligation is at P10, 671,726.61. Petitioner subsequently discovered that a
month before the due date of the promissory notes, the Sps. Amadeo sold 3 or
nearly all of their real properties to respondents, Sps. Dy and Sps. Chuyaco,
and immediately transferred the titles covering the parcels of land in favor of
the latter. The consideration for these sales was grossly insufficient or
inadequate.
Believing that the transfers were done in fraud of creditors, petitioner
filed an action for rescission and damages. In its Complaint against Sps.
Amadeo, Dy and Chuyaco, petitioner asked the RTC OF MAKATI CITY for the
annulmentof the Deeds of Absolute Sale and cancel the TCTs issued in the
name of Sps. Dy and Sps. Chuyaco, and in lieu thereof, issue new ones under
the name of Sps. Amadeo. Upon service of summons on the Sps. Amadeo, the
latter filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Complaint violated the
explicit terms of SC Circular No. 04-94, as the Verification was executed by
petitioner’s legal counsel. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss, where it argued that (a) the rule cited by Sps. Amadeo should not be
applied literally, and (b) petitioner’s legal counsel was authorized by petitioner
to institute the Complaint. RTC denied the Motion to dismiss.
The Sps. Amadeo filed an Answer where they alleged that petitioner failed
to release the loans to Streamline Cotton Dev. Corp. on the agreed date,
thereby constraining them to loan from third parties at high interest rates to
keep the company afloat. These loans were covered by postdated checks which
had to be funded once the obligations fell due, lest the Sps. Amadeo face
criminal prosecution. In order to pay the loans, they sold properties subject of
this case. The Sps. Amadeo further claimed that the purchase price for the 3
parcels of land was the fair market value, and that they had other personal and
real properties which may be availed of to answer for their obligations. In their
Counterclaim, they prayed for moral damages of P200, 000.00, attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation.
Petitioner filed its Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. Petitioner filed an
Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication on Sps. Dy and
Chuyaco. However, this was denied in on the ground that summons by
publication cannot be availed of in an action in personam. Petitioner filed an
Amended Complaint to include allegations in prayer of a writ of preliminary
attachment. Petitioner presented evidence in relation thereto, and the RTC
issued an Order for the issuance of the writ. Upon petitioner’s ex-parte motion,
the RTC directed the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Davao City to designate a
Sheriff to implement the writ.
Petitioner was directed to inform the court whether it still intended to
pursue the case because of the fact that no property of the defendants had
been attached as of yet. Petitioner did not comply with the said Orders; the
case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Petitioner had
already caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the
Titles. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, alleging that
its failure to notify the RTC of its intention to pursue the case was prompted
solely by the difficulty of locating properties against which the writ of
attachment could be enforced. In the interest of justice, the trial court granted
the motion.
Defendant then filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and to Annul All the
Proceedings Taken Against them, in which motion they questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over their persons. Petitioner filed its Opposition
thereto. Defendants filed their Reply, while petitioner filed its Rejoinder. Said
motion, however, was merely noted without action since its notice of hearing
was addressed only to the Clerk of Court, viz.: It appears from the Motion that
its Notice of Hearing is not addressed to any of the parties concerned as
required by Rule 15, Sec. 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court. As such, the Motion is
deemed a mere scrap of paper as held in PIRC v. CA.
The record shows that defendants Sps. Amadeo have been served with
summons so they are within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, defendants
Spouses Dy and Chuyaco have not been served with summons and so the
Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them. Since aforesaid Motion is
deemed a scrap of paper, it cannot be construed to manifest a voluntary
appearance on their part. Wherefore, the Omnibus Motion is noted without
action. Let alias summons be issued to defendants Sps. Dy and Chuyaco. For
plaintiffs guidance, it may avail itself of Rule 14, Sec 14 on summons by
publication if it so desires, upon proper motion. SO ORDERED.
Sps. Dy and Chuyaco subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, in which they accused petitioner of not serving summons upon
them and losing interest in the case. Petitioner filed its Opposition, and the
trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on account of (a) petitioners
Compliance and Manifestation that it had not lost interest in pursuing the
case, and (b) the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication
that petitioner filed simultaneously with its Opposition. The Motion for Leave of
Court to Serve Summons by Publication was submitted for resolution.
Respondent Sps. Dy and Chuyaco next filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute on June 17, 2003. The significant portions of the motion
state:
2. That based on the order of this Court, the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve
Summons by Publication was submitted for resolution, but the movants-
defendants would like to remind the Honorable Court that a Motion of the
same nature was already filed on Sept. 13, 1995 and was DENIED the next
day;
3. That therefore, the order dated of this Court which advised the complainant
to avail of Rule 14 Sec.14 of the Rules is contrary to its order dated Sept. 14,
1995;
4. That up to this date, the complainant has not lifted a finger to pursue this
case against movants-defendants, hence, this Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that
this case be dismissed against the movants-defendants and to order the
deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens at the back of the subject title.
Petitioner opposed and argued that it had already filed a motion for the
service of summons by publication, but the trial court had yet to act on it. This
Motion was submitted for resolution. On Nov. 4, 2003, Sps. Dy and Chuyaco
personally, not through their counsel, filed a Motion for Inhibition without
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court:
1. That since 1998, the defendants-movants have been moving for the
dismissal of this case as far as the movants are concerned and to nullify the
proceedings taken against them since the Court has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over their persons when the plaintiff presented its evidence against
defendants Sps. Amadeo and thereafter;
2. That, only after more than 3 years, that this Court denied the said Motion to
Dismiss due to technicality and merely require the plaintiff to serve the
summons either personally or thru publication;
3. That, however in the order of Court it already denied the Ex-Parte Motion for
Leave to Serve Summons by Publication considering that the action herein is in
personam, hence, this order is contrary to its latest order dated August 2,
2001;
4. That another Motion to Dismiss was filed on the ground of lack of interest to
pursue the case but up to this date, the Court has done nothing that delays
the proceedings to the prejudice of the defendants-movants;
5. That this continuous delay in the proceedings shows that the Court may not
be competent enough to further hear this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed for the
inhibition of this Court from further hearing this case. The motion for
inhibition was adopted by their counsel, Clarissa Castro, through a Motion to
Adopt Motion for Inhibition and Manifestation, which was filed and noted by
the trial court in an Order. However, the RTC (a) denied the motion for
inhibition for lack of merit, (b) ruled that Sps. Dy and Chuyaco have voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, and (c) gave them 15
days from receipt of the Order within which to file their respective answers.
Unsatisfied, respondent Sps. Dy and Chuyaco filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion when he considered the Motion to Inhibit
(without submitting to the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court) which they had
filed to question his impartiality and competence due to the delay in resolving
the Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, as voluntary appearance,
and wherein he required the respondents to file their Answer within the
required period. The CA granted the petition in this wise:
The old provision under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court provided that:
Section 23. What is equivalent to service. The defendants voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service.
Under Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
provision now reads as follows:
Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. What remains the
same, carry over from the old doctrine, is that the issue of jurisdiction must be
raised seasonably. But everything else changed.
What changed is that: if a motion is filed, whatever kind it is, it need no
longer be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court because the motion may raise myriad issues in that one motion of
special appearance as long as the objection to the jurisdiction of the court is
included. What necessarily changed also is that the medium of special
appearance is no longer restricted to a motion to dismiss because one could
now file any type of motion provided you included the issue of lack of
jurisdiction due to defective service of summons.
Thus in this case, the 2 motions to dismiss and the motion to inhibit
may be treated as special appearance since they all included the issue of lack
of jurisdiction due to non-service of summons. They did not constitute as
submitting the movant to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper
service of summons on petitioners and there being no voluntary appearance by
petitioners, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants, the herein petitioners. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial
court against them would consequently be null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed RTC Makati City, is
hereby declared null and void as against herein petitioners. The complaint filed
by Philippine Commercial International Bank is hereby DISMISSED as against
herein petitioners DY and CHUYACO only, no jurisdiction over their persons
having been acquired. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON there has been voluntary appearance on the part of respondent
Spouses Dy and Chuyaco as to confer the trial court with jurisdiction over their
persons.
RULING:
YES. Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is
acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his
person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one
who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court.48 It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare
that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner;
and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that
respondents have acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as
June 17, 2003, when they filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute. Significantly, the motion did not categorically and expressly raise
the jurisdiction of the court over their persons as an issue. It merely (i)
"reminded" the court of its purportedly conflicting Orders in respect of
summons by publication, (ii) alleged that because petitioner "has not lifted a
finger to pursue this case against movants-defendants," the case may be
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and (iii) prayed additionally for the deletion
of the Notice of Lis Pendens indicated at the back of the transfer certificates of
title covering the subject properties. We note, furthermore, that the motion
failed to qualify the capacity in which respondents were appearing and seeking
recourse. It is in this light that the Court’s pronouncement in Busuego v. Court
of Appeals finds cogent application:
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An
appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person. While the formal method of entering an appearance in a cause
pending in the courts is to deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him
to enter the appearance of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be
made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method
of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal
appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may
appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he
specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance
dissipate when the respondents’ motion for inhibition is considered. This
motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further
hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of
the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from
later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction.
To be sure, the convenient caveat in the title of the motion for inhibition
(i.e., "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court") does not detract from this conclusion. It would suffice to say that the
allegations in a pleading or motion are determinative of its nature; the
designation or caption thereof is not controlling.Furthermore, no amount of
caveat can change the fact that respondents tellingly signed the motion to
inhibit in their own behalf and not through counsel, let alone through a
counsel making a special appearance.

2. TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
FACTS:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and
Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid,
plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by
the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved
upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same
month.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer
in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments
of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was
answered by the plaintiffs. After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become
final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
attachment was issued by the court against defendants'... properties, but the
same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and
the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond... against which the
Surety filed a written opposition... upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the
amount due under the judgment. The Court denied this motion on the ground
solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Thereafter the necessary demand... was made, and upon failure of the
Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for
execution against the counter-bond. The Court, upon motion of the Surety's
counsel, granted the latter... a period of five days within which to answer the
motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for
execution and the corresponding writ was issued. The Surety moved to quash
the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing... after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion Two days later the Surety filed
a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees'
action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic
Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive...
jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject
matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of
interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the case. Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has
the 'exclusive' appellate jurisdiction over 'all cases in which the jurisdiction of
any inferior court is in issue' (Sec. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal
will prosper.
RULING:
NO. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches
or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean,
136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule,
it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo.
58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked
the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief,
to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned
in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the
effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan
etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and
Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the
law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the
court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect
be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire
record, We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to
quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety. UPON ALL THE
FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.