Micro Finance Assignment
Micro Finance Assignment
Micro Finance Assignment
Abstract
Andhra Pradesh is the motherland of Indian microfinance largely due to the early and
extraordinary work of its state government. In the late 1980s, it built the Self-Help Group-Bank
Linkage Programme (SHG-Bank Linkage) with support from the National Bank of Agriculture and
Rural Development and World Bank Loans. It invested heavily in client education and, along with
the not-for-profit sector, built up a robust microfinance portfolio.
But over the last two decades, many lenders that began as non-profit organizations have
transformed into commercial microfinance institutions (MFIs) — among them, BASIX, SHARE,
SKS, and Spandana. As compared to SHG-Bank Linkage, these institutions have posted faster
growth rates and reached far more borrowers.
Last month, the state government put a halt to that with the AP Microfinance Ordinance,
suspending operations of MFIs in the state and for all intents and purposes allowing borrowers to
stop repaying their loans. The announcement of the Ordinance stressed the need to protect the poor
— but the move might well, in the long term, leave them far worse off.
The government has complained that too many poor borrowers find themselves subject to coercive
collection practices by MFIs. It knows that its SHG members sometimes “double-dip” by taking on
additional loans from the commercial lenders, and it sees that they tend to repay MFIs faster.
However, there are explanations other than coercion that might explain that. MFI loans are more
expensive than SHG loans, so a customer with two loans outstanding might reasonably choose to
repay the MFI loan first. The MFIs’ disciplined system of doorstep loan management might also
account for the greater customer responsiveness.
Now, the manager of the government program, SERP, has pushed the accusation of coercive
practices to a new level, blaming the MFIs’ attempts to recover loans for the suicides of 54 men
and women. This is a serious allegation and, again, prompts the question of whether there might be
alternative explanations. At the most basic level, note that according to the National Crime
Records Bureau, suicides in India occur at the rate of 10.8 deaths per 100,000 people every year
(based on 2008 data). If we apply this rate to the 6 million clients who are members of SKS
Microfinance, we might expect that there would be 648 clients succumbing to suicide every year.
This reasoning, of course, is rather absurd; but so is drawing a link from borrower suicides to MFIs
without evidence. (For a far more subtle discussion of the drivers of suicide among Indian
farmers, see these articles by Palagummi Sainath, an editor at The Hindu.)
What we are really seeing in Andhra Pradesh is the fallout from a long-standing competition
between MFIs and the state government, each of which believes it should be the source of financial
services to the poor. The government feels that it has a mandate to alleviate poverty; indeed, it has
a responsibility to disperse US$22.2bn to SHG members by 2014. MFIs believe that the poor are
ideal customers who have the right to financial inclusion. The two clashed first in 2006, also in
Andhra Pradesh, and that Krishna crisis left many large MFIs crippled. But that time, private
equity investors stepped in, and with strong inflows of both debt and equity capital, timely access
to skilled talent, and significant use of technology, MFIs in general managed to continue growing
and even to vault past the government program.
Now, with the AP Ordinance, the government seems determined to remove borrowers’ access to
MFIs. As a piece of legislation, the AP Ordinance has more to do with helping the state
government program enjoy a monopoly over the poor than with preventing strong-armed debt
collection.
Clearly it would be better for the government to understand that the poor have the right to make
choices — and that there are better ways to serve the poor than crippling its competition.
At the same time, the MFIs need to understand that social businesses are complex and that, as they
scale and become part of the mainstream financial system, they need to be more careful managers,
of both their operational reality and their external image. When the most substantial plank in your
reputation platform is poverty alleviation, perceptions are all-important. In contrast to the Indian
Information Technology Industry, which has done a good job of managing values and reputation
without moving the focus from commercial objectives, the MFIs have allowed others to shape
perceptions of them. They are perceived as lacking in transparency about their interest rates and
unable to effectively manage external stakeholders such as the media and the State. This perception
comes closer to the truth when a leading MFI allows a post-IPO spat among its own leaders to play
out in front of the public.
The fight over the poor seems to be getting uglier, but microfinance is too good a tool for financial
inclusion to be thwarted by poor positioning. If both sides do not look inwards and make adequate
course corrections, their destructive competition has the potential to set us back by 10 years.
The story covers a microfinance crisis in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, triggered
by sensationalized newspaper accounts of suicides among over-indebted clients of some of
India’s biggest microfinance institutions (MFIs): SKS Microfinance, Spandana, Share, and others .
These cases underscore rising debt stress among possibly tens of thousands of clients,
brought on by explosive growth of microfinance organizations in southern India.
In the quest to meet their growth targets, loan officers often sell loans to clients already
indebted to other organizations
The reports offered an opening for the state government, which runs a rival self-help
group (SHG) program, to pass a restrictive ordinance severely curtailing the MFIs.
The crisis threatens microfinance not only in Andhra Pradesh, but nationwide, as the
Reserve Bank of India moves toward removing the priority sector designation that has
fueled the sector’s growth (by making it advantageous for banks to lend to MFIs).
The blame for this unfortunate situation falls most squarely on the MFIs that failed to
restrain aggressive growth even as the market became increasingly saturated. Investors
must also swallow a big spoonful of blame. Because they paid dearly for shares in the
MFIs, they need fast growth to make their investments pay off.
The divvying up of blame doesn’t stop there, however. Perhaps the most important
target is the public sector policy environment that has treated microfinance institutions
as orphan children of the financial sector rather than helping them to build solid
foundations. In fact, the environment in which MFIs have grown up could almost have
been expressly designed to promote over-lending.
lack of control in the lending process of the MFIs themselves, and the protectionist
nature of India’s financial sector.
For his efforts, Yunus won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. In awarding Yunus the peace
prize, which was actually awarded jointly to Yunus and his bank, the Nobel committee
noted that it was honoring Yunus and his bank "for their efforts to create economic and
social development from below." In other words, the committee paid homage to Yunus'
concept of creating economic opportunity from the ground up.
Annapurna Microfinance
Getting access to credit, sometimes, becomes difficult even for a salaried or self-employed professional.
Imagine, how would a poor un-employed individual get a loan amidst enormous banking formalities? A large
segment of people who live under poverty find it hard to get finance from established lending institutions. As
the country aim for an inclusive growth at all sectors, the provision of micro credit is certainly a powerful tool
that will bring financial inclusion.
Having visualized financial inclusion is the only way for development, Annapurna Microfinance helps poor
communities to establish small businesses in the society. The beneficiaries include fishermen, artisans,
farmers, small entrepreneurs, deprived communities etc.
The group’s members meet periodically when the new savings come in, recovery of
past loans are made from the members and also new loans are disbursed. This model
has been very much successful in the past and with time it is becoming more popular.
The SHGs are self-sustaining and once the group becomes stable it starts working on
its own with some support from NGOs and institutions like NABARD and SIDBI.
High transaction cost – generally micro credits fall below the break-even point of
providing loans by banks
Absence of collaterals – the poor usually are not in a state to offer collaterals to
secure the credit
Loans are generally taken for very short duration periods
Higher frequency of repayment of installments and higher rate of Default