Pillage Manual 20101025

O P E N S O C I E T Y J U S T I C E I N I T I AT I V E P U B L I C AT I O N
Corporate War Crimes
Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources

James G. Stewart
Corporate War Crimes:
Prosecuting the Pillage of
Natural Resources
James G. Stewart
Corporate War Crimes:
Prosecuting the Pillage of
Natural Resources
Open Society Justice Initiative

Copyright © Open Society Foundations. All rights reserved.
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in any form or by any means without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN: 978-1-936133-32-1
Published by
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www.soros.org
For more information contact:
Ken Hurwitz
Senior Legal Officer
Anticorruption
[email protected]
James G. Stewart
Assistant Professor
University of British Columbia
Faculty of Law
[email protected]
Cover designed by Judit Kovács l Createch Ltd.

Cover photo © Marcus Bleasdale/VII
Text layout and printing by Createch Ltd.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments 7
I. Introduction 9
II. Sources of Law Prohibiting Pillage 11
III. Terminology: Pillage, Plunder, Spoliation, and Looting 15
IV. Defining Pillage: Elements of the Offense 19
V. The Armed Conflict Requirement 23
VI. A Nexus to the Armed Conflict 29
VII. Appropriation of Property 33
VIII. Ownership of Natural Resources 39
IX. Exceptions in the Laws of War 53
X. Consent 63
XI. The Mental Element of Pillage 67
XII. The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations and Their Representatives 75
XIII. Jurisdiction 85
XIV. The Obligation to Prosecute 91
XV. Annex 1: Table of Cases 95
XVI. Annex 2: Pillage Elements Worksheet 125
Notes 133
5
Acknowledgments
This manual was written by James G. Stewart and edited by William Kramer, David
Berry, Ken Hurwitz, and Robert O. Varenik.
This project benefited from the feedback of a number of leading experts and
organizations in areas of law that inform each of the sections of Corporate War Crimes.
In particular, we are very grateful to the following experts for constructive and often
highly detailed criticisms of an earlier draft.
• Ana Elizabeth Bastida, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy,
University of Dundee, Scotland.
• Bruce Broomhall, Professor of Law, Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada.
• Antonio Cassese, President, International Criminal Tribunal for Lebanon and

Professor University of Florence, Netherlands and Italy.
• Andrew Clapham, Professor of Public International Law, Graduate Institute of

International and Development Studies, Switzerland.
• Roger Clark, University Professor of Law, Rutgers University Camden, United

States
• Norman Farrell, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the

former-Yugoslavia, the Netherlands.
• Ward Ferdinandusse, War Crimes Prosecutor, National Division, Netherlands.
7
• Marco Sassòli, Professor, Universite de Geneve, Switzerland.
• Nico Schrijver, Chair of Public International Law, Grotius Centre for International
Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, Leiden University, Netherlands.
• Stefan Talmon, Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford,

United Kingdom.
• Martin Witteveen, Judge International Crimes, District Court, The Hague,

Netherlands.
• University of California–Los Angeles Law Clinic, United States.
The participation of these individuals and organizations in the review of this

publication should not, however, be taken to imply endorsement of the contents.
The Justice Initiative bears sole responsibility for any errors or misrepresentations.
8 C O R P O R AT E W A R C R I M E S
I. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the illegal exploitation of natural resources has emerged
as a primary means of financing armed violence. In countries as diverse as Afghani-
stan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, the sale of natural resources within conflict zones has not only created perverse
incentives for war, it has also furnished warring parties with the finances necessary to
sustain some of the most brutal hostilities in recent history. As a consequence of the
illegal trade in minerals, metals, timber, and other natural resources, armed conflicts in
which participants are able to draw upon easily accessible natural resource wealth are
often more bloody, financially costly, and intractable than other forms of armed violence.
Resource wars also contribute to the so-called resource curse, whereby the richest
nations in terms of resource endowment are poorest in terms of social development
and most prone to violent upheaval. While there is broad consensus that the correla-
tion between resource wealth and armed violence must be addressed through a range
of initiatives geared at fighting corruption, policing the resource sector domestically,
and building judicial capacity in countries recovering from war, the liability of foreign
businesses for trading in illicit conflict commodities is also vital. Resource wars, after
all, are entirely dependent on commercial actors to purchase, transport, and market the
resources that are illegally acquired in order to sustain violence.
As part of this growing interest in resource wars, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecut-
ing the Pillage of Natural Resources explores the elements of corporate liability for the war
crime of pillage. Although the term pillage has a long pedigree in the laws of war, the
9
offense also features as a contemporary war crime in the statutes of all modern inter-
national criminal courts and a large number of domestic criminal systems. In essence,
pillage means theft during war, and is synonymous with other equally evocative terms
such as looting, spoliation, and plunder.
A substantial body of jurisprudence has applied the offense in practice. Modern
courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
enforce the offense as a matter of course. At present, Liberia’s former president Charles
Taylor and the former vice-president of Congo Jean-
Pierre Bemba are facing trial before international
courts for having allegedly perpetrated acts of pillage
“Various reports have during war, but the most important precedents derive
pointed to links between from World War Two. In the wake of that conflict, a
the activities of some significant number of business representatives were
African, European, and prosecuted for pillaging natural resources in circum-
Middle Eastern companies stances that are often strikingly similar to corporate
and the atrocities taking practices in modern resource wars.
place in the Democratic By exploring these cases and the law govern-
Republic of the Congo. ing pillage in detail, Corporate War Crimes seeks to
Their activities allegedly guide investigative bodies and war crimes prosecutors
include gold mining, the engaged with the technicalities of these issues. We
illegal exploitation of oil, also hope that this manual will be useful for advocates,
and the arms trade.” political institutions, and companies interested in
curbing resource wars. Our belief is that the deterrent
Prosecutor, International
effect created by even a single case is likely to trans-
Criminal Court
form conflict financing in a large number of ongoing
conflicts. At the same time, we are conscious of the
potential humanitarian consequences of depriving
warring factions of access to resource wealth in some contexts, and of the serious dan-
gers of tarnishing reputable companies that provide the legitimate investment essential
to rehabilitating economies ravaged by war. With this balance in mind, this project seeks
to act as a catalyst for reinvigorating prosecution of the war crime of pillage and to bring
accountability to companies that illegally trade in conflict commodities.
II. Sources of Law Prohibiting Pillage
The Prohibition of Pillage in International

Humanitarian Law
1. The laws of war, also known as international humanitarian law, protect property
against pillage during armed conflict. In the Hague Regulations of 1907, for instance,
two provisions categorically stipulate that “the pillage of a town or place, even when
taken by assault, is prohibited,”1 and that “pillage is formally forbidden.”2 After the end
of World War Two, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 again reaffirmed that “pillage is
prohibited.”3 These provisions bind all states. The Geneva Conventions are presently
ratified by all states within the international community, and both the Hague Regula-
tions and Geneva Conventions are also widely accepted as reflecting customary inter-
national law. In both these respects, the prohibition of pillage is universally binding.4
2. The prohibition against pillage governs civil war as well as interstate warfare.
Although the provisions concerning pillage contained in the Regulations and Geneva
Conventions traditionally applied uniquely during armed conflict between states, devel-
opments in more recent years have seen the extension of the offense to non-interna-
tional armed conflicts. Article 4(2)(g) Additional Protocol II of 1977, which governs
“armed conflicts not of an international character” explicitly prohibits pillage. Although
a strict reading of this provision would limit the offense to the pillage of property from
“persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities,”
11
experts have never seen this restriction as limiting the scope of the offense.5 The Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross’ extensive review of state practice concludes that
the prohibition of pillage is a norm of customary international law applicable in both
international and non-international armed conflicts, and that the limitation based on
“persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities” does not reflect the state of cus-
tomary international law.6 This, as we will see in the following section, is reinforced
by provisions of criminal codes and statutes that criminalize acts of pillage in identical
terms within both of these contexts.
Further Reading
Jean-Marie Henkaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian

Law, Vol. I, 182–185 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), also available at http://www.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule52.
For a compilation of state practice on pillage, see ICRC, Customary IHL Database,
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule52.
Codifications of the Crime of Pillage

3. Pillage is also a criminal offense in the statutes of international courts and in the
domestic criminal law of most countries. The offense enjoys a long history. The criminal
nature of pillage first featured within the Lieber Code of 1863, which stipulated that “all
pillage or sacking, even after taking place by main force […] are prohibited under the
penalty of death.”7 The fact that acts of pillage can be criminally punished was again
reflected in the work of the Commission of Responsibilities established at the end of
World War Two, which listed pillage as one of the war crimes perpetrated during the
conflict.8 Since then, pillage has featured in all international criminal statutes and a
raft of domestic criminal legislation governing war crimes. This section sets out various
examples of these codifications.
4. The statutes of two international courts codify pillage and plunder as equivalents.
Article 6(b) of the Statute of the Nuremberg Charter criminalized “plunder of public
or private property,” while the French version of the same statute prohibited “le pillage
des biens publics ou privés.”9 The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia replicated the linguistic differences contained in the Nurem-
berg Charter by again criminalizing “pillage” and “plunder” in the French and English
versions respectively. As the next chapter of this manual examining the terminology
confirms, both courts have treated pillage and plunder as synonyms in practice.
5. Other codifications of the offense within international criminal statutes list “pil-
lage” as a war crime, but do so by adopting archaic language devoid of contemporary
legal meaning. The Statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Iraqi
Special Court prohibit “pillaging a town or place even when taken by assault.”10 The
reference to a town or place even when taken by assault might be consistent with the
wording contained in one of the provisions within the Hague Regulations of 1907, but
the language adds nothing of contemporary relevance.11 As the definitions of pillage set
out in chapter IV of this manual show, the reference to a town or place even when taken
by assault is legally redundant in modern international criminal law.
6. The final group of international criminal statutes that codify pillage are consider-
ably simpler than their various counterparts. The Statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) simply list
“pillage” among war crimes applicable within their jurisdiction.12 This less complicated
approach avoids the antiquated language and duplication in terminology adopted in
other international criminal statutes. Moreover, these definitions reinforce the potential
application of pillage in non-international armed conflicts, because both the Statutes
of the ICTR and the SCSL apply uniquely to armed conflicts not of an international
character.
7. A large number of states have also codified pillage within their national legal
orders, albeit through divergent methodologies. The U.S. War Crimes Act exemplifies
a trend amongst several domestic lawmakers toward criminalizing pillage by simply
cross-referencing pertinent treaty provisions within a criminal statute. Section 2441(c)(2)
of the U.S. War Crimes Act 1996 defines war crimes as including any conduct “prohib-
ited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed October 18, 1907.” Article 28 of the
Hague Regulation, to which the provision refers, states that “[t]he pillage of a town or
place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.” In this sense, U.S. federal courts have
jurisdiction over an offense that also features within the Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
8. Other countries have incorporated pillage within their national legal order by
referring to the definitions of war crimes contained within the ICC Statute or custom-
ary international law more generally. The Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes Act (2000) typifies this trend. The act criminalizes pillage by prohibiting
“war crimes” and defining the term as any infraction that attracts individual criminal
responsibility “according to customary international law or conventional international
S O U R C E S O F L AW P R O H I B I T I N G P I L L A G E 13
law applicable to armed conflicts, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the
law in force at the time and in the place of its commission.”13 As previously seen, the
war crime of pillage is prohibited in both custom and convention, thereby satisfying the
definition contained within this legislation.14 Other countries, such as the United King-
dom, implement pillage as a domestic offense by cross-referencing the relevant article
of the ICC Statute that governs war crimes.15 By either methodology, pillage becomes
an independent domestic crime within each of the countries.
9. A third and final group of states, which includes Germany and Australia, crimi-
nalize pillage by defining the offense explicitly within domestic legislation rather than
cross-referencing provisions of treaties or international criminal statutes. The Australia
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002, for instance,
makes pillage a federal crime by explicitly replicating the ICC Elements of the Crime
within national criminal legislation. Sections 268.81 and 268.54 of the Australian Act
emulate the ICC’s definition exactly. Similarly, German legislation has also codified
pillage as part of a comprehensive code governing international crimes. In the German
Code, however, pillage is attributed an independent definition that ostensibly departs
from the wording of the ICC Elements of Crimes.16 In these and other states that have
adopted equivalent legislation, pillage exists in domestic criminal law independently of
international treaties or statutes.
III. Terminology: Pillage, Plunder,
Spoilation, and Looting
10. The previous chapter noted a duplication of the terms pillage and plunder in the
statutes of international criminal tribunals. Unfortunately, this overlapping terminology
is exacerbated by the use of the labels spoliation and looting. In this section, we explore
jurisprudence that highlights the common legal meaning of pillage, plunder, spolia-
tion, and looting, pointing out that pillage is the only one of these terms that features
in treaties governing the laws of war. This clarity allows subsequent chapters to draw
on cases involving the plunder of natural resources, and justifies use of these cases as
precedents in jurisdictions that only criminalize pillage.
11. Plunder and pillage are legally synonymous. As early as the 17th century, Grotius
used the two terms interchangeably,17 creating a practice that became widespread among
subsequent commentators.18 At the turn of the 19th century, Westlake again described
pillage as “indiscriminate plundering,” amounting to “the unauthorized taking away of
property, public or private.”19 Aside from the clear linguistic equivalence of pillage and
plunder identified within the French and English versions of the Statutes of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal,20 the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment also used the terms interchange-
ably by addressing the widespread incidents of property violations during World War
Two under a heading entitled “pillage of public and private property,” and by treating
the terms pillage and plunder as analogues throughout the course of its reasoning.21
15
12. The ICTY’s Statutes not only replicated the Nuremberg Charters’ linguistic dif-
ferences; the tribunal’s verdicts also reflected the essentially interchangeable nature of
the two labels. In more than one judgment, an accused was convicted of pillage in the
original version of the judgment, but of plunder in the English translation.22 The tribu-
nal also acknowledged that the “the unlawful appropriation of public and private prop-
erty in armed conflict has varyingly been termed “pillage,” “plunder,” and “spoliation,”
and that the term plunder “should be understood to embrace all forms of unlawful
appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility
attaches under international law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pil-
lage’.”23 The finding that plunder merely includes pillage stemmed from a hesitation
that “pillage in the traditional sense implied an element of violence.”24 Although the
tribunal considered that it was not necessary for their purposes to rule on this issue,
a more thorough investigation reveals that its hesita-
tion was unfounded. Even though a select number
of historical definitions of pillage had associated the
“[t]he prohibition of the offense with physical violence,25 this association was
unlawful appropriation never broadly accepted.26 On this basis, modern codi-
of public and private fications of pillage almost invariably omit reference to
property in armed conflict overt violence in defining the offense.27 For all these
is well-established in reasons, pillage and plunder share a common mean-
customary international ing in modern international criminal law.
law where it has been
variously referred to as 13. The term spoliation also describes the same
‘pillage’, ‘plunder’ and offense. Like plunder, the label spoliation does not
‘looting’.” feature in international treaties or codified lists of
international crimes, but in the wake of World War
Brima Trial Judgment,
Two, prosecutors preferred the term spoliation over
para. 751
the more legally correct alternative. The directors of
IG Farben, for instance, were charged with spoliation,
prompting the court to clarify that “the term ‘spolia-
tion,’ which has been admittedly adopted as a term of convenience by the prosecution,
applies to the widespread and systematized acts of dispossession and acquisition of
property in violation of the rights of the owners, which took place in territories under
the belligerent occupation or control of Nazi Germany during World War II.”28 The
same tribunal then confirmed that “spoliation is synonymous with the word ‘plunder’ as
employed in Control Council Law No. 10, and that it embraces offenses against property
in violation of the laws and customs of war of the general type charged in the indict-
ment.”29 By extrapolation, the terms spoliation, plunder, and pillage share a common
legal meaning.
14. To exacerbate an already unnecessary duplication of terms used to describe pil-
lage, “looting” has also emerged as a further label for an established legal concept. The
Australian War Crimes Act adopted after World War Two criminalized “[p]illage and
wholesale looting,”30 without distinguishing between the two terms. In the same vein,
the United States Uniform Code for Military Justice provides for the punishment of
persons engaged in “looting or pillage,” again without elaborating on the content of
either offense.31 Courts, however, have dismissed the notion that there is any distinc-
tion between the terms. The Simić Trial Judgment found that “‘looting’ is likewise a
form of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict and is therefore embraced
within ‘plunder’ as incorporated in the Statute.”32 In fact, there is unanimity that “the
prohibition against the unjustified appropriation of public and private enemy property
is general in scope, and extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers
for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken within the
framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory.”33 The same
conclusion was reached by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which explained that
“the prohibition of the unlawful appropriation of public and private property in armed
conflict […] has been variously referred to as ‘pillage’, ‘plunder’ and ‘looting.’”34 Looting
then, like spoliation and plunder, is merely another colloquial label for pillage.
T E R M I N O L O G Y : P I L L A G E , P L U N D E R , S P O I L AT I O N , A N D L O O T I N G 17
IV. Defining Pillage:
Elements of the Offense
15. Although pillage enjoys a long history in the laws of war, the earliest codifications
of the crime did not identify the elements of the offense with any degree of precision.
The Lieber Code of 1863, for instance, made pillaging a capital offense but failed to
expand on the elements of the crime or clarify when the offense was perpetrated. More
than a century later, the initial definitions of pillage adopted by the ICTY simply defined
pillage as “embrac[ing] all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict
for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law.”35 Since
then, the Assembly of States Party to the International Criminal Court has adopted the
so-called ICC Elements of Crimes, which are an influential but non-binding series of
definitions adopted by consensus vote in order to “assist” the court in its adjudicative
function.36 According to the ICC Elements of Crimes, “pillaging” in both international
and non-international armed conflicts includes the following key legal components:37
1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property;
2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appro-
priate it for private or personal use; [*]
3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner;
19
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an inter-
national or non-international armed conflict; and
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the

existence of an armed conflict.
[*] As indicated by the use of the term “private or personal use,” appropriations justified by military necessity
cannot constitute the crime of pillaging.
16. While the definition above provides an extremely useful guide that inspires the
structure of the remainder of this manual, one of these requirements does not reflect
accepted understandings of the offense in customary international law. By restricting
pillage to appropriation “for personal or private purposes,” the ICC Elements of Crimes
depart from the vast majority of relevant World War Two cases that condemned acts
of pillage perpetrated in furtherance of the Axis war effort. In one instance involving
Japanese seizure of oil stocks from Singapore, a judge declared that “the seizure and
subsequent exploitation by the Japanese armed forces of the oil resources of the appel-
lants was economic plunder of private property in violation of the laws and customs of
war.”38 The reference to “personal or private purposes” within the ICC definition not
only contradicts this and other similar historical precedents, it also runs counter to
modern interpretations of the offense. As a more recent war crimes judgment has reaf-
firmed, the laws of war “do not allow arbitrary and unjustified pillage for army purposes
or for the individual use of army members.”39 For all these reasons, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone was correct in declaring that “the requirement of ‘private or personal
use’ is unduly restrictive and ought not to be an element of the crime of pillage.”40
17. Moreover, the reference to military necessity in a footnote to the phrase “personal
or private purposes” is also inconsistent with the laws of war. To reiterate, the ICC Ele-
ments of Crimes contain a footnote stipulating that “[a]s indicated by the use of the term
‘private or personal use’, appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute
the crime of pillaging.” This position is inaccurate. For one reason, military necessity
cannot act as an independent and separate justification for pillage, primarily because
military necessity was already taken into account in crafting the exceptions contained
in the Hague Regulations. During the negotiating of the regulations, diplomats and
military personnel who drafted the convention considered but dismissed military neces-
sity as a justification for pillage, precisely on the grounds that the necessary exceptions
were already explicitly incorporated into the Hague Regulations.41 Moreover, it is also a
settled principle of the laws of war that military necessity will not act as a justification
for a violation unless the term “military necessity” is explicitly listed as an exception to
the rule in question.42 This is not the case for pillage, which is prohibited in absolute
terms.43
18. Instead of limiting pillage to appropriation “for personal or private purposes” or
“military necessity,” most war crimes jurisprudence defines pillage as appropriation
without the consent of the owner subject to a series of exceptions contained in the
Hague Regulations. The U.S. Military Tribunal established at Nuremberg after World
War Two, for instance, defined pillage in the IG Farben case by stipulating that “[w]here
private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed
to exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private
property against the will and consent of the former
owner, such action, not being expressly justified by any “for the crime of plunder
applicable provision of the Hague Regulations, is in [pillage] to be established,
violation of international law.”44 Modern war crimes the appropriation of
jurisprudence also adopts this position. The Martić private or public property
Trial Judgment, to cite but one example, defined pillage must be done without
as appropriation of either public or private property lawful basis or legal
without the consent of the owner, subject to the same justification… According
set of limitations set out in the Hague Regulations.45 to the Hague Regulations,
Consequently, the remainder of this manual uses the forcible contribution of
criteria in the ICC Elements of Crimes, substituting money, requisition for the
exceptions contained in the Hague Regulations for the needs of the occupying
overly restrictive requirement that exploitation must army, and seizure of
occur “for personal or private purposes.” material obviously related
to the conduct of military
19. We also recommend using this definition in operations, though
non-international armed conflicts. This is legally con- restricted, are lawful in
troversial. Formally speaking, only foreign military principle.”
occupiers are able to exercise the exceptions con- Martić Trial Judgment,
tained in the Hague Regulations. Consequently, when para. 102.
a leader of the Revolutionary United Front rebel group
claimed that the exceptions in the Hague Regulations
justified his appropriation of property during the civil
war in Sierra Leone, the SCSL declared the argument “to be misconceived.”46 According
to the SCSL, “[t]he rights and duties of occupying powers, as codified in the 1907 Hague
Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, apply only in international armed con-
flicts.”47 Despite this formality, we would advise prosecutors to assume the contrary as
a matter of caution rather than law. First, there is a small body of jurisprudence that
extends aspects of the Hague Regulations of 1907 to warring factions operating in non-
international armed conflicts.48 Second, the policy arguments for allowing rebel groups
to seize certain types of property during war are sometimes strong—there is little basis
DEFINING PILLAGE: ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 21

for expecting rebel groups to comply with the laws of war without offering certain
privileges. Third, as a subsequent section of this manual explains in greater detail, rebel
groups are often proxies for foreign governments.49 Under these circumstances, a rebel
group acting as an agent for a foreign state might be able to formally claim privileges
that derive from the law governing international armed conflicts. For all these reasons,
we advise prosecutors to adopt a cautious approach that treats the exceptions contained
in the Hague Regulations as applicable in both international and non-international
armed conflicts.
20. In light of this synthesis of the law governing pillage, the remainder of this
manual adopts the ICC’s definition as a basis for assessing the liability of commercial
actors for the pillage of natural resources in conflict zones, except that it substitutes
exceptions to the Hague Regulations for the reference to “private or personal use” in the
Elements. This, as we have seen, aligns with most historical and contemporary defini-
tions of the offense.
Further Reading
Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, pp. 272–280 (Cambridge, 2002).
Gunénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96–98 (Oxford,
2005).
V. The Armed Conflict Requirement
21. War crimes can only be perpetrated during armed conflict. As a consequence,
evidence that the illegal exploitation of natural resources took place during an armed
conflict is essential in sustaining a charge of pillage. To use language adopted in the ICC
Elements of Crimes, the relevant conduct must have taken place in the context of and been
associated with an international or non-international armed conflict. In order to clarify the
definition of international and non-international armed conflict, this chapter explores
the law defining both concepts. The chapter also highlights a third approach that avoids
the cumbersome process of distinguishing between these two types of armed conflict by
simply concluding that an armed conflict existed without classifying the hostilities one
way or the other. Although either or both of these types of conflict might arise in any
given situation, courts are increasingly adopting the easier approach in pillage cases on
the basis that the offense shares the same content in both types of armed conflict.
The Definition of International Armed Conflict

22. International armed conflict is armed violence between two or more states.
According to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, “the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not rec-
ognized by one of them.” In other words, an international armed conflict is the resort to
23
armed force between two parties to the Geneva Conventions. An armed conflict between
two or more states can arise in a number of ways. The Tadić Appeal Judgment found that:
[i]t is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between

two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out
on the territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the
circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict)
if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively
if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that
other State.50
23. The first of these standards is easily established. There is incontestably an inter-
national armed conflict when two states wage war directly against one another—conflict
between Britain and Germany during World War Two is one obvious example. When
pillage takes place in this context, the qualification of the armed conflict as international
is a mere formality and will probably not require careful assessments of fact or law. The
two standards for indirect international armed conflicts are, however, significantly more
complex.
24. In applying the first of these standards, namely international armed conflict
through foreign intervention, the Blaškić Trial Judgment found that the conflict between
a non-state group named the Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia Herzegovina
Army was rendered international based on the Croatian government’s military inter-
vention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The presence of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 regular
Croatian Army troops was found to have had an impact on the conflict between the
Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia Herzegovina Army, sufficient to render the
conflict between the two warring parties an international armed conflict.51 In a simi-
lar fashion, the Kordić and Cˇerkez Judgment found that Croatian military intervention
rendered the conflict between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims international “by
enabling the Bosnian Croats to deploy additional forces in their struggle against the
Bosnian Muslims.”52 While open to a degree of criticism,53 this same reasoning was
endorsed by a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, which concluded that Ugandan presence
in the Northeast of the Congo was sufficient to internationalize surrounding conflict
between non-state groups.54
25. An international armed conflict also exists where states wage war against one
another by using domestic military groups as proxies. Three different standards deter-
mine whether an armed entity could be considered a proxy for a foreign state, each of
which differs according to the nature of the entity and the control exerted by the state.55
By far the most common form of state control over foreign organized military groups
is that “of an overall character”.56 In practice, this term means that a state must have
“a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military
group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support
to that group” but that it “does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific orders
by the State, or its direction of each individual operation.”57 On this basis, a number of
judgments have found that the armed conflict that took place in the Republika Srpska
within Bosnia was international in nature because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
had overall control over the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
forces during their hostilities with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.58 Likewise, the
ICC has held that because the Ugandan government was the main supplier of weapons
and ammunition to Congolese rebel groups, the conflict concerned was international.59
26. Finally, an international armed conflict can also arise where a foreign army occu-
pies territory belonging to another state, irrespective of whether armed violence ever
erupted. During World War Two, a number of countries simply capitulated to occupa-
tion on the basis that armed resistance was futile. On the basis of this capitulation, the
German occupiers denied that the laws of war applied in these territories, claiming that
the law only applies where there are hostilities. In response, the drafters of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 explicitly included a provision that “[t]he Convention shall also
apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”60 This develop-
ment has special importance for the liability of commercial actors for pillaging natural
resources in a number of modern contexts, because it establishes that the offense might
be perpetrated even when foreign occupation was not met by substantial military resis-
tance, or in instances where resistance subsided a long time prior to the exploitation of
natural resources.
Further Reading
Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 88–171.
C. Byron, “Armed conflicts: International or non-international?,” Journal of Conflict and

Security Law, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2001.
J.G. Stewart, “Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humani-

tarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict,” International Review
of the Red Cross, June 2003, Vol. 85, No. 850, 313.
THE ARMED CONFLICT REQUIREMENT 25

Non-International Armed Conflict
27. Pillage is also a war crime in civil wars. The technical term for civil war within the
Geneva Conventions is “conflict not of an international character,” but commentators
and courts also frequently use the phrase non-international armed conflict to describe
the same phenomenon. The leading definition of non-international armed conflict was
articulated in the Tadić Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, which found that “an
armed conflict exists whenever there is… protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups
“ascertain[ing] whether within a State.”61 The terms “protracted armed con-
there is a non- flict” and “organized armed groups” are understood to
international armed demand an appraisal of the intensity of armed violence
conflict does not depend between the two warring factions and an assessment
on the subjective of the military character of the parties engaged in this
judgment of the parties violence. As the International Committee of the Red
to the conflict; it must be Cross has argued “ascertain[ing] whether there is a
determined on the basis non-international armed conflict does not depend on
of objective criteria; the the subjective judgment of the parties to the conflict; it
term ‘armed conflict’ must be determined on the basis of objective criteria;
presupposes the existence the term ‘armed conflict’ presupposes the existence of
of hostilities between hostilities between armed forces organised to a greater
armed forces organised or lesser extent; there must be the opposition of armed
to a greater or lesser forces and a certain intensity of the fighting.”62
extent; there must be
the opposition of armed 28. In terms of intensity, the Tadić definition
forces and a certain emphasizes that armed violence must be “protracted.”
intensity of the fighting.” Although this term cannot be defined in the abstract,
factors such as the duration of hostilities, the types of
International Committee
weapons used, and the number of victims caused by
of the Red Cross
hostilities are all relevant to this assessment. Courts,
for instance, have found that armed violence of a
relatively limited duration might constitute an armed
conflict. In the La Tablada case, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
found that an armed attack by a military group on a state army barracks that lasted a
mere 30 hours was governed by the laws applicable in non-international armed conflict
because of the nature of the hostilities between essentially military groups.63 Similarly,
a non-international armed conflict need not produce massive loss of life. The ICTY,
for instance, has concluded that hostilities in 2001 between Macedonian forces and a
national liberation organization constituted a non-international armed conflict, even
though the armed confrontations between the two groups only caused 168 deaths over
the course of the year.64 Together with the La Tablada case, this decision provides some
rough guidance as to the lower end of what might satisfy intensity requirements neces-
sary to prove a non-international armed conflict.
29. The second criterion for establishing a non-international armed conflict requires
an assessment of the command structure of the warring factions. This inquiry is impor-
tant in order to distinguish armed conflict from ordinary criminality, riots, or isolated
terrorist acts, all of which are capable of precipitating widespread violence which would
not be governed by the laws of war. The element of organized military command might
involve assessing whether the group has an organized hierarchical structure, controls
territory, and is capable of formulating a common military strategy. Other factors con-
sidered in practice include the existence of a military headquarters, the promulgation
and enforcement of laws, and the issuance of internal rules and regulations. In applying
these standards to hostilities between the Kosovo Liberation Organization (KLA) and
Serbian armed forces, one war crimes trial concluded that the KLA was a sufficiently
organized military group, even though the organization operated in secrecy under-
ground and its commanding officers did not meet regularly because of the threat posed
by their militarily superior adversary.65 The existence of a military chain of command,
the organized nature of armed confrontations and the internal regulations within the
KLA were deemed sufficient to convert the violence between the KLA and Serb forces
into a non-international armed conflict.66
Further Reading
Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, paras. 83–179 (Nov. 20, 2005).
International Committee of the Red Cross, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in
International Humanitarian Law?, March 2008 http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.
nsf/htmlall/armed-conflict-article-170308/$file/Opinion-paper-armed-conflict.
pdf.
The Unified Approach

30. Recent war crimes trials have dispensed with the task of classifying armed con-
flicts as either international or non-international where the war crimes charged share
THE ARMED CONFLICT REQUIREMENT 27

a common legal meaning in both types of conflict. This practice has allowed courts
charged with adjudicating certain war crimes to avoid what often proves to be a time
consuming, imprecise, and controversial process of classifying armed conflicts. A num-
ber of courts have adopted this unified approach in cases involving allegations of pil-
lage, based on the supposition that the offense shares
the same elements in both types of conflict. In the
Martić Trial Judgment, for instance, the ICTY applied
“It is immaterial whether the crime of pillage to a conflict that was not qualified
the armed conflict as either international or otherwise, precisely because
was international pillage is criminalized in both types of war.67
or noninternational
in nature.” 31. This unified approach to conflict qualification
Delic´ Trial Judgment, has also gained ascendancy as the preferable means of
para. 40 addressing other offenses that share the same origins
as pillage. For example, the Orić Trial Judgment prose-
cuted the war crime of wanton destruction, which also
derives from the Hague Regulations, without qualify-
ing the surrounding conflict as either international or non-international.68 In this and
the other instances, courts merely determine that there was protracted armed violence
between organized armed groups, then proceed to assess the substantive elements of
the offense without attempting to ascertain whether the surrounding conflict was purely
internal, whether military groups were otherwise under the control of foreign states,
or whether the conflict was rendered international by the intervention of foreign state
forces. The unified approach to conflict qualification thus simplifies the task of proving
armed conflict for the purpose of cases involving corporate liability for the pillage of
natural resources.
Further Reading
Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, paras. 41–43 (June 10, 2007).
VI. A Nexus to the Armed Conflict
32. According to the elements of all war crimes contained in the ICC Elements
of Crimes, the illegal exploitation of property must take place “in the context of” and
“associated with” an armed conflict in order to constitute pillage. This so-called nexus
requirement distinguishes war crimes from other violations of domestic criminal law.
The distinction stems from the observation that pre-existing rates of ordinary crime,
such as murder, robbery, rape, and fraud are not spontaneously transformed into war
crimes as soon as war erupts. In the context of allegations of corporate responsibility
for illegally exploiting natural resources in conflict zones, the nexus requirement thus
delineates actions governed by domestic law from those susceptible to prosecution as
pillage.
33. The distinction is important, because even though acts amounting to pillage are
unquestionably prohibited by domestic analogues such as theft, receiving stolen prop-
erty or money laundering, pillage offers a number of advantages over these domestic
alternatives. Like other war crimes, pillage is not subject to statutes of limitations,69 falls
within the jurisdiction of international criminal courts,70 and triggers state obligations
to investigate and prosecute violations.71 A robust understanding of the nexus require-
ment is therefore essential in assessing potential liability for corporate implication in
the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
29
34. According to decisions rendered by the ICC, the terms “in the context of” and
“associated with” are best interpreted in light of earlier war crimes jurisprudence.72 This
jurisprudence has emphasized that conduct must be “closely related” to a surround-
ing armed conflict in order to constitute a war crime. In elaborating on the meaning
of this standard, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has opined that “[w]hat ultimately
distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is shaped
by or dependent upon the environment—the armed conflict—in which it is commit-
ted.”73 According to the chamber, “[t]he armed conflict need not have been causal to the
commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum,
have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to
commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was com-
mitted.”74 At times, courts also appear to have condensed this standard into the question
of whether the crime occurred “under the guise of an armed conflict,”75 but we view the
term “closely related” as a better reflection of the relevant jurisprudence.
35. One series of cases has sought to define further guidelines for determin-
ing whether a particular act is closely related to armed conflict, but it seems doubt-
ful whether these criteria are an accurate reflection of the law governing war crimes.
According to the Kunarac Appeal Judgment,
In determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the

armed conflict, the Trial Chamber may take into account, inter alia, the following
factors: the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a
non-combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the
fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and
the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetra-
tor’s official duties.76
The passage is controversial because each of the factors is unnecessarily lim-

ited—civilians can perpetrate war crimes, combatants can be victims of war crimes, war
crimes can be committed irrespective of the military’s ultimate goals, and can certainly
be perpetrated in a personal capacity. Given that each of the criteria in the Kunarac
Appeal Judgment is at least incomplete, it seems doubtful whether the test is a meaning-
ful guide to differentiating domestic offenses from war crimes. Courts are thus likely
to focus more on whether commercial actions were “closely related” to armed conflict
in the sense identified in the previous paragraph.
36. Companies operating in conflict zones will satisfy these standards in a range of
circumstances. In instances where companies collaborate directly with armed groups
involved in the exploitation of natural resources as part of their war effort, the resulting
property transactions are clearly “shaped by and dependent upon the surrounding hos-
tilities.” Without the warring factions participation in war, there would be no commerce.
Even a company that purchases natural resources inde-
pendently from civilians during armed violence might
be “closely related” to hostilities and perpetrate pillage, “What ultimately
since war will frequently play a substantial part in the distinguishes a war crime
ability of businesses to purchase conflict commodities from a purely domestic
such as diamonds, coltan, or gold. In this sense, the offence is that a war crime
armed conflict provides the company’s “ability” to per- is shaped by or dependent
petrate the crime. After all, resource wars by definition upon the environment—
involve the financing of armed violence through illicit the armed conflict—in
trafficking in natural resources by commercial actors. which it is committed.”
Kunarac Appeals Judgment,

37. A corporation is not required to acquire natural para. 58
resources from a battlefield during active hostilities to
perpetrate pillage—the illegal exploitation of conflict
commodities may still be closely related to hostilities
when the corporate acts occur after hostilities in a particular region and away from
open gunfire. As one leading authority declared, “the requirement that the acts of the
accused must be closely related to the armed conflict would not be negated if the crimes
were temporally and geographically remote from the actual fighting.”77 This is con-
sistent with a large number of convictions of corporate representatives for pillaging
property during World War Two, which frequently occurred a considerable distance
from battlefields and well after sustained confrontations in the region had ceased. As
a consequence, the illegal exploitation of natural resources from outside a particular
zone of combat or after foreign troops depart can still constitute pillage, provided the
acts remain closely related to hostilities in a broader sense.
38. Likewise, a company is not required to support or otherwise endorse one side
of the conflict in order to perpetrate pillage. War crimes jurisprudence has found that
it is not necessary that the crime alleged “be part of a policy or of a practice officially
endorsed or tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual
furtherance of a policy associated with the conduct of war.”78 For example, in one case
involving allegations of war crimes perpetrated in Rwanda, a civilian mayor was initially
acquitted of war crimes charges on the grounds that he had not acted “for” either of the
A NEXUS TO THE ARMED CONFLICT 31

warring factions in perpetrating acts of murder. The Appeals Chamber overturned this
finding on the basis that war crimes do not necessitate a relationship with the warring
parties.79 This position again accords with precedents derived from World War Two,
where numerous business representatives and other civilians were convicted of pillage
even though their commerce was not formally linked to a particular army.80 Even com-
panies operating more independently in the peripheries of a surrounding conflict are
therefore potentially bound by the prohibition against pillage.
39. Finally, a recent Dutch judgment dealing with war crimes suggests that acts
that “stimulate warfare” can also satisfy the nexus requirement for war crimes. In this
particular case, the Dutch court found a business employee named Joseph Mpambara
guilty of torture, but acquitted him of war crimes because his acts were insufficiently
linked to an armed conflict.81 After a comprehensive review of the jurisprudence dealing
with the nexus requirement, the court dismissed war crimes charges on the basis that
the defendant’s acts did not “contribut[e], not even in the least, to the accomplishment
of the RAF [Rwandan Armed Forces] in its conflict with the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic
Forces].”82 Similarly, the fact that the defendant was accompanied by soldiers was not
sufficient to establish a nexus, since the soldiers assistance in the torture “did not serve
any military purpose.”83 By contrast, commercial actors involved in exploiting natural
resources from war zones frequently “stimulate warfare,” contribute to the trajectory of
ongoing violence, and become linked to the military purposes of armed groups. In all
these regards, companies and their employees who illegally exploit natural resources
during warfare might be liable for pillage.
Further Reading
Gunénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 38–47 (Oxford, 2005).
William Schabas, UN International Criminal Tribunals, 236–239 (Cambridge, 2007).
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 49–50 (2nd ed, Oxford, 2008).
VII. Appropriation of Property
40. According to the ICC Elements of Crimes, a person accused of pillaging natural
resources must “appropriate” property during armed conflict in order to commit pil-
lage. In many instances, foreign companies operating in conflict zones “appropriate”
natural resources directly from the rightful owners by extracting the resources them-
selves. In other circumstances, companies appropriate natural resources indirectly from
the owner by purchasing the commodities from an intermediary. This chapter focuses
on defining the term “appropriation,” and explores the prodigious jurisprudence that
shows that appropriation includes both direct and indirect alternatives. In other words,
pillage encompasses extraction of natural resources directly from the owner as well as
purchasing resources illegally acquired during war. As will become apparent, the signifi-
cance of this interpretation is hard to overstate, because it means that an entire supply
chain perpetrates pillage provided that it satisfies other elements of the crime. Before
we proceed to investigate this law in detail, it is worth recalling that this section only
deals with the objective element or actus reus of pillage, leaving a subsequent section to
explore the contours of intention required to prove pillage.
33
Direct Appropriation
41. Companies operating in conflict zones frequently appropriate natural resources
directly from the owners, usually in one of three ways. First, companies appropriate
natural resources directly from the owner by collaborating with a warring army. In a
classic illustration of this scenario, the Nuremberg Tribunal convicted Walther Funk
for his role in the management of a commercial enterprise named the Continental Oil
Company, which exploited crude oil throughout occupied Europe in conjunction with
the German army.84 According to Funk’s own testimony, whenever German troops
seized oil wells German officials assigned the Continental Oil Company the task “of pro-
ducing oil in these territories and of restoring the destroyed oil-producing districts.”85
The Nuremberg Tribunal unanimously considered that this constituted pillage, finding
Funk personally culpable for his role in these practices.86 In the same way, commercial
actors that collaborate with rebel groups or foreign governments in the extraction of
natural resources in conflict zones “appropriate” these resources from the true owners.
42. Second, companies also exploit natural resources directly from the owner by rely-
ing on the authorization of a warring party to exploit resource wealth. For instance, the
U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found Paul Pleiger, the manager of Mining and
Steel Works East Inc. (BHO), guilty of pillaging coal from mines located in Poland.87
According to the tribunal, BHO exploited these Polish coal mines after the Reich gov-
ernment issued a so-called trusteeship to the company. Given that the Reich govern-
ment had no authority to seize these properties, Pleiger became personally culpable for
the appropriation his company carried out. In particular, Pleiger personally appointed a
local manager to the mines, maintained an active interest in the development of these
sites, and supervised a yield in excess of 50,000 tons of coal from the area each year
of the war.88 Although the tribunal never addressed the issue specifically, this type of
extraction constitutes appropriation for the purposes of the offense.
43. Third, overharvesting of an otherwise legitimate concession provides another

common form of direct appropriation of natural resources from an owner. In a number
of contemporary armed conflicts, corporate representatives take advantage of the sur-
rounding climate of insecurity to overharvest concessions lawfully granted to them. For
instance, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission cited one foreign company
3
for “unlawfully extract[ing] approximately 80,000m of logs monthly by clear cutting
its concession area in violation of Liberian law and FDA regulations.”89 In fact, a World
Bank contractor concluded that the same company had not respected the legal cutting
limits in any of the three years of operations during the war, and that “[o]ver harvesting
in concession area” was common practice during the conflict.90 Each of these scenarios
illustrates common forms of resource “appropriation” during war.
Indirect Appropriation—Receiving Stolen Property

44. The term “appropriate” also includes indirect appropriation from an intermedi-
ary by purchasing stolen property. First and foremost, a literal interpretation of the ICC
Elements of Crimes supports this reasoning. Given that the term “appropriate” appears
in the elements without qualification, a literal interpretation would extend the term
to situations where a purchaser “appropriates” the property from a warring faction or
foreign army. As this section will show, an analysis of customary international law on
the topic provides compelling corroboration of this literal interpretation.
45. A considerable body of international precedent explicitly supports the view that
receiving stolen property during war falls within the rubric of the term “appropriate”
as employed in the ICC Elements of Crimes. In one example, an individual named
Willi Buch was convicted of pillage for purchasing silverware at auction, which the
German Kommandantur at Saint-Die had illegally requisitioned in occupied France.91
In a similar case, a German couple and their daughters were convicted of pillage for
purchasing furniture and other property from a German custodian in charge of an aban-
doned farm.92 When reflecting upon the daughters’ convictions, the UN War Crimes
Commission reasoned that “[t]he case against the daughters of the Bommer couple is
an illustration of how receiving stolen goods may, under the same principles, equally
constitute a war crime.”93
46. A range of other cases apply this thinking to corporate representatives for pil-
lage, by openly accepting that receiving stolen property constitutes pillage. A Tribunal
of Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany tried and con-
victed representatives of the Roechling firm for pillage arising out of the commerce in
illegally seized scrap metal from the German Raw Materials Trading Company, known
by the acronym ROGES.94 Herman Roechling, the director of the Roechling firm, was
convicted of pillage for purchasing illegally seized property known as “Booty Goods”
from ROGES. The tribunal rejected Roechling’s claim that the seizures were justified
by the Reich annexing French territory because “[k]nowingly to accept a stolen object
from the thief constitutes the crime of receiving stolen goods.”95 Hermann Roechling
was thus convicted of pillage on the basis that he was “a receiver of looted property.”96
A P P R O P R I AT I O N O F P R O P E R T Y 35
47. In a much larger number of instances, individuals were convicted of pillage for
appropriating property from an intermediary in terms that tacitly support this position.
A table annexed to this manual indicates that at least 26 pillage cases have involved
receiving stolen property during war. In the IG Farben case, for instance, company rep-
resentatives were convicted of pillage for purchasing “land, buildings, machinery, equip-
ment” from the Boruta factory, which the Reich Ministry of Economics had seized.97
Similarly, representatives of the firm Krupp were convicted of pillage for purchasing
an office in Paris “not from the rightful owners of
the premises but from the provisional administrator
“It is not correct to say, of the Société Bacri Frères by virtue of a decision of
as defense counsel says, a commissariat for Jewish questions.”98 And in one
that because a crime has final example, the chairman of the Hermann Goering
been completed no further Works was convicted of pillage because his company
crime may follow from it. “was the recipient of considerable property seized in
Receiving stolen goods is Poland.”99 These and the other examples evidenced
a crime in every civilized within the annex confirm that, as a matter of custom-
jurisdiction and yet the ary international law, pillage can involve either direct
larceny, which forms its or indirect appropriation from the rightful own
basis, has already been
completed.” 48. This definition is not conceptually troubling.
While it is essential not to confuse the scope of pillage
U.S. Military Tribunal
in customary international law with domestic notions
at Nuremberg,
of theft, national law is helpful in confirming that
Pohl Case, p. 1244.
there is nothing philosophically objectionable in treat-
ing receiving stolen property as a subset of pillage. In
at least one national jurisdiction, theft and receiving
stolen property are also amalgamated into a single offense on the basis that the original
thief and the receiver both appropriate property with the intent to deprive the rightful
owner of the asset.100 As the commentary to the U.S. Model Penal Code argues, “[a]
nalytically, the receiver does precisely what is forbidden by [the prohibition against
theft]—namely, he exercises unlawful control over property of another with a purpose
to deprive.”101 On a similar basis, a leading British commentator has rightly observed
that “[a]lmost every handling is also a second theft—the handler dishonestly appropri-
ates property belonging to another with the intention permanently to deprive the other
of it.”102 So while a number of other countries still maintain a distinction between theft
and receiving stolen property that derives from the way the crimes developed histori-
cally,103 this distinction neither affects the definition of pillage in international law nor
raises compelling conceptual criticisms that justify a departure from customary inter-
national law.
49. There is thus good reason to agree with the United Nations War Crimes Commis-
sion’s conclusion that “[i]f wrongful interference with property rights has been shown,
it is not necessary to prove that the alleged wrongdoer was involved in the original
wrongful appropriation.”104 As a result, the purchase by commercial actors of “appro-
priated” natural resources falls within the meaning of pillage, irrespective of whether
the commercial actors were implicated in the initial extraction of the resources. This
highlights how many commercial actors involved in the purchase of conflict commodi-
ties can commit pillage as principal perpetrators even though they were not involved in
the initial misappropriation.
A P P R O P R I AT I O N O F P R O P E R T Y 37
VIII. Ownership of Natural
Resources
50. In order to establish a case of pillage, property must be appropriated without the
consent of the rightful owner. Consequently, a court tasked with adjudicating allegations
of pillage will have to determine ownership of the property in question. This chapter
draws on four areas of law that might require consideration in determining ownership
of natural resources. Which of these areas of law is relevant will depend on the circum-
stances of each particular case, but as a general rule national law and constitutional
principles are most likely to define ownership within war crimes cases involving allega-
tions of natural resource pillage.
Ownership of Natural Resources in National Law

51. In the past, cases involving the pillage of natural resources have defined own-
ership by considering the domestic law governing mineral rights. At Nuremberg, for
instance, representatives of the firm Krupp were charged with having pillaged a tung-
sten mine in northern France, which lead a judge in the case to define ownership of
the tungsten ore by assessing the applicable French law. The judge stated that “[u]nder
French law all mineral rights are owned by the State but the extracted ores become the
property of the individual to whom the government grants a lease or concession for the
39
purpose of exploiting a mine.”105 A similar approach to defining ownership of natural
resources in modern resource wars will require courts to assess ownership based on
laws applicable within the country at war. To that end, this section provides an overview
of natural resource ownership in various national legal systems.
52. Ownership in natural resources varies between jurisdictions and depending on

the nature of the natural resource—forestry in Liberia is not subject to the same system
of ownership as oil in Iraq. There are, however, three
models of natural resource ownership which cover
most scenarios.106 The first of these models, known as
“The deposits of mineral the claims system, confers ownership of minerals on
substances, including anyone who discovers the deposit, subject only to cer-
artificial deposits, tain formalities. According to this model of ownership,
underground water and undiscovered minerals belong either to the state or to
geothermal deposits on no one and become the property of whoever asserts
surface or in the sub-soil first title. In the United States, for instance, minerals
or in water systems of the such as gold, silver, tin, and copper located on public
National Territory, are the land are still subject to a claims system.107 By contrast,
exclusive, inalienable and the accession system stipulates that natural resources
imprescriptible property such as timber or copper belong to the owner of the
of the State. However, land where the resources are found. This system
the holders of mining or derives from Roman law, which considered ownership
quarry exploitation rights of land to imply ownership of all property below the
acquire the ownership of surface to the center of the earth and above as far as
the products for sale by the sky. The accession system remains in force with
virtue of their rights.” respect to many natural resources in the United King-
dom, although the British Government has created
Congolese Mining Code exceptions for specific minerals such as oil, gas, and
(2002), Article 3 coal.108 The third and final model of resource owner-
ship is known as the concession system, which typi-
cally vests ownership of natural resources in the state,
and gives a particular state organ authority to grant rights to search for, extract, process,
and sell these resources.
53. Although a court will have to investigate the laws applicable within the specific
country at war in order to bring pillage charges, the concessionary system is likely to be
the most common model. In the vast majority of developing nations, where resource
wars are most prevalent, domestic legislation indicates that the state owns specific
natural resources within the territory, except when these resources are allocated to a
private party through a concession or agreement.109 In Ecuador, for example, the
Ecuador Mining Law of 1991 states that “[a]ll the mineral substances existing in the
territory….belong to the inalienable and imprescriptible domain of the State…” Like-
wise, Article 14(1) of the Sierra Leonean Mines and Minerals Decree of 1994 states that
“[a]ll rights or ownership in, of searching for, mining and disposing of minerals in,
under or upon any land in Sierra Leone and its minerals continental shelf are vested in
the Republic of Sierra Leone.” By way of further example, Section 2 of the Philippines
Mining Act (1995) states that “[a]ll mineral resources in public and private lands within
the territory and exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Philippines are owned
by the State.” Most states have passed legislation that contains equivalent provisions.
54. Many state constitutions also address the ownership of natural resources. Article
9 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo states that “the State
exercises a permanent sovereignty over Congolese soil, sub-soil, waters and forests
as well as maritime and airspace. The modalities of the management of the State’s
domain mentioned in the preceding sentence are determined by law.”110 Similar provi-
sions are contained in the Chinese Constitution, which also emphasizes that “[m]ineral
resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and other
natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, with the exception
of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by
collectives in accordance with the law….” These provisions provide anecdotal examples
of legislative and constitutional provisions that are likely to determine ownership of
natural resources in cases focused on the pillage of resource wealth.
55. It nonetheless bears recalling that natural resources are sometimes privately
owned, either when the resource in question is governed by a claims or accession sys-
tem of ownership or when a state has conferred title in the resource to a private party.
For example, Congolese legislation recognizes the right of private entities to acquire
ownership in natural resources when it stipulates that “[t]he deposits of mineral sub-
stances, including artificial deposits, underground water and geothermal deposits on
surface or in the sub-soil or in water systems of the National Territory, are the exclusive,
inalienable and imprescriptible property of the State. However, the holders of mining
or quarry exploitation rights acquire the ownership of the products for sale by virtue of
their rights.”111 Similarly, according to the Peruvian Law of Sustainable Use of Natural
Resources, natural resources at their source, be these renewable or nonrenewable, are
owned by the nation, but the products derived from them, and obtained in the form as
prescribed under the law, are owned by the title holders of rights granted to them.112
Consequently, prosecutors should bear in mind that private entities can also own natu-
ral resources that are pillaged from conflict zones.
O W N E R S H I P O F N AT U R A L R E S O U R C E S 41
Further Reading
James Otto and John Cordes, The Regulation of Mineral Enterprises: A Global Perspective
on Economics, Law and Policy, 2–6 to 2–7 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Founda-
tion, 2002).
International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects (Elizabeth
Bastida et al. eds., Kluwer, 2005).
Elizabeth Bastida, Basic Instruments and Concepts of Mineral Law, http://www.natural-

resources.org/minerals/education/docs/Mineral%20Law%20&%20Policy-Unit2.
pdf.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

56. The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has the potential
to affect the reliance on domestic law in determining ownership of natural resources in
certain contexts. In general terms, sovereignty dictates which entity can freely dispose of
natural resources, or in other words, who has the power to determine ownership. The
doctrine’s relevance to pillage is disputed. In the Uganda v. Congo case, the International
Court of Justice concluded that although permanent sovereignty over natural resources
“is a principle of customary international law,” there was nothing suggesting that it is
“applicable to the specific situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural
resources by members of the army of a State militarily intervening in another State.”113
Nonetheless, as Judge Koroma cogently argues in a separate opinion in that case, “these
rights and interests [permanent sovereignty over natural resources] remain in effect at
all times, including during armed conflict and occupation.”114 Consequently, this section
reviews the development of permanent sovereignty over natural resources then goes
on to explore the two instances where this principle may be most relevant for present
purposes.
57. The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources developed during
the decolonization process in order to ensure that newly-independent states were not
bound to respect pre-existing resource concessions agreed to during colonial rule. At
the same time, newly-independent states involved in drafting the notion of permanent
sovereignty were motivated to emphasize that “peoples” still struggling for indepen-
dence had power over their nations’ resource wealth. As a result of these two purposes,
the first codifications of the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources
inconsistently vested ownership in “peoples,” “nations,” and “states.” For instance, in
the most frequently cited source of the right to permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, UN General Assembly Resolution 1803, states that “[t]he right of peoples and
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exer-
cised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people
of the State concerned.”115 And yet, the preamble to the same resolution speaks of “the
inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources…”116
This duality was replicated in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,117
and apparently also in the International Covenants
on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Cultural
and Social Rights.118 In addition, a large number of
“Even if, as I suspect, the
General Assembly resolutions speak of “countries” or
question of permanent
“states” as the holders of permanent sovereignty over
sovereignty in relation to
natural resources.119
independent States is a
right of States rather than
58. Although some scholars argue that only peoples
peoples, in the context of
enjoy permanent sovereignty over natural resources,120
colonial self-determination
a majority of experts tend to the view the right as one
it seems clearly to be a
that inheres in peoples or states depending on the
peoples’ right.”
context. Schrijver, for instance, advocates for a return
to the roots of permanent sovereignty by favoring a Professor James Crawford
people-centered interpretation of the concept,121 but
later concedes that “a clear tendency can be discerned
to confine the circle of direct permanent sovereignty
subjects solely to States, that is all States.”122 In the same vein, despite clear wording in
human rights treaties stating that “[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose
of their natural wealth,” Hossain argues that “[a]t the core of the concept of permanent
sovereignty is the inherent and overriding right of a state to control and dispose of
the natural wealth and resources in its territory for the benefit of its own people.”123
Others, such as Brownlie conclude that, loosely speaking, “permanent sovereignty is the
assertion of the acquired rights of the host State which are not defeasible by contract
or perhaps even by international agreement,”124 whereas the UN Security Council has
referred to peoples’ rights to natural resources on more than one occasion.125 Given
that permanent sovereignty over natural resources vests in both peoples and states, the
doctrine can arguably be relevant to pillage cases in either scenario.
59. In the first of these scenarios, the people’s right to permanent sovereignty over
natural resources may be relevant where resources are appropriated from peoples who
enjoy an unrealized right to self-determination. Crawford, for instance, states that “even
if, as I suspect, the question of permanent sovereignty in relation to independent States
is a right of States rather than peoples, in the context of colonial self-determination it
seems clearly to be a peoples’ right.”126 The same opinion finds support in the views of
the UN legal advisor involved in drafting the principles, who suggests that the terms
“peoples and nations” were originally intended to cover non-self-governing territories
“which could not be covered by any concept of the sovereignty of States over natu-
ral resources.”127 In this light, ownership of Nauruan phosphates exploited during the
Australian, New Zealand, and British mandate over Nauru,128 for instance, might be
determined pursuant to rules of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, not the
national law of the trustee nations. In these sorts of instances, permanent sovereignty
might be central to liability for pillage.
60. In the second scenario, an independent state’s right to permanent sovereignty

over natural resources might be pertinent if privately owned resources were expropri-
ated by national decree. This occurs most frequently where a state seeks to rescind a
previous concession over natural resources, despite the binding contractual agreements
between the recipient of the concession and the state. Determining ownership in this
context may require recourse to the state’s right to permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources. Although many would argue that this type of expropriation is inherent
in a state’s inherent territorial sovereignty, a majority of states attribute the ability to
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In the Amoco award, for instance, the
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal explicitly found that “the right to nationalize property is today
unanimously recognized, even by states that reject the notion of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources, considered by a majority of states as the foundation of such a
right.”129 On this basis, the doctrine may have some role to play in the limited number
of cases involving pillage of resources previously expropriated by a government.
Further Reading
Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 268–269 (Cambridge Univ. Press,
1997).
Kamal Hossain and Subrata Roy Chowdhury (eds.), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources in International Law, (St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
Indigenous Ownership of Natural Resources
61. In other circumstances, indigenous groups might own natural resources within
a conflict zone. Although it is important to recall that ownership and sovereignty are
distinct concepts, a number of recent cases have found that indigenous groups have
proprietary interests in natural resources in areas they traditionally occupied, as well as
procedural entitlements surrounding the use and allocation of these resources. Indige-
nous peoples might thus enjoy ownership of certain natural resources illegally exploited
during armed conflict, irrespective of whether national mining legislation or domestic
constitutional principles explicitly recognize these rights. It is therefore essential to
understand the legal principles and precedents governing indigenous rights to natural
resources, because this body of law might require closer consideration in assessing the
liability of commercial actors for the pillage of natural resources within countries at war.
62. A number of international instruments support the notion of indigenous prop-

erty rights in natural resources located within areas traditionally occupied by indige-
nous peoples. The International Labor Organization’s Convention (No. 169) concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, for example, affirms indigenous peoples’ rights of own-
ership and possession of the lands they traditionally occupy, and requires governments
to safeguard those rights and to provide adequate procedures to resolve land claims.130
In addition, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples con-
firms the rights of indigenous people to “lands, territories, and resources which they
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”131
63. International courts have implemented these rights by relying on the human
right to property. In the Awas Tingni Community case, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights found that Nicaragua had violated the human right to property enjoyed
by the Awas Tingni indigenous community by issuing concessions over their traditional
lands to companies interested in developing roads and exploiting forestry from the
territory.132 According to the court, the property rights protected by the human rights
conventions are not limited to those property interests already recognized by states or
defined by domestic law—the right to property has an autonomous meaning in interna-
tional human rights law. As such, property rights of indigenous peoples are not defined
exclusively by a state’s formal legal regime, but also include property that arises from
indigenous custom and tradition.133
64. These principles were further advanced by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights in the Maya Indigenous Communities case, where the commission
endorsed the notion that indigenous groups own natural resources by finding that
the state authorities in Belize had violated an indigenous group’s right to property by
assigning companies concessions to exploit timber and oil from ancestral land.134 The
Inter-American Commission found that “the right to use and enjoy property may be
impeded when the State itself, or third parties acting with the acquiescence or tolerance
of the State, affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of that property without due
consideration of and informed consultations with those having rights in the property.”135
Although the commission agreed that a state was sovereign and could therefore expro-
priate an indigenous group’s entitlement to natural resources, it also emphasized that
the expropriation would require fully informed consent, the absence of discrimination
and fair compensation.136 Where these conditions are not met, indigenous peoples
arguably retain ownership of natural resources in areas they historically occupied.
65. The notion that indigenous peoples own natural resources not explicitly appropri-
ated by the state is also reflected in a number of national legal systems. In the landmark
decision known as Mabo, the High Court of Australia declared that indigenous inhabit-
ants of Australia have traditional land ownership rights that remain in force provided
that the sovereign government has not acted to extinguish these rights.137 Similarly, the
Canadian Supreme Court in Delgamuukw recognized that indigenous peoples enjoy
ongoing proprietary interests in land and resource wealth. According to the Supreme
Court, “aboriginal title encompasses mineral rights and lands held pursuant to aborigi-
nal title should be capable of exploitation.”138 The South African Constitutional Court
has adopted a similar principle by finding that at least one indigenous community
owned land prior to British colonial rule, and that this ownership still entitles the com-
munity “to use its water, to use its land for grazing and hunting and to exploit its
natural resources, above and beneath the surface.”139 In each of these contexts, the
precise nature of the indigenous rights over natural resources varies, but the decisions
highlight the potentially importance of indigenous title in determining natural resource
ownership.
Further Reading
Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Final Report of

the Special Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30/Add.1, 12
July 2004.
Nico Schrijver, “Unravelling State Sovereignty? The Controversy on the Right of Indige-
nous Peoples to Permanent Sovereignty over their Natural Wealth and Resources,”
in Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights (Nico Schrijver and
Jenny Goldschmidt eds., 2008).
James s. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, pp. 141–148 (Oxford, 2004).
A Rebel Group’s Ownership of Resources

under Its Control
66. In many civil wars such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma,
and Cote d’Ivoire, rebel factions take over large portions of territory, then establish their
own parallel administration. This often involves rebel groups appointing their own min-
ister of mines, creating a separate body charged with granting mining concessions and
issuing formal decrees cancelling earlier mining rights. The two conflicting systems of
resource regulation create an inescapable tension. On the one hand, concessions issued
by state authorities become irrelevant formalities in rebel-held territory where national
law is ignored. On the other, decrees issued by rebel movements purporting to grant
rights in natural resources contravene constitutional principles and the terms of the
national legislation. Even though certain national jurisdictions have accepted that the
rebel groups’ seizures might be lawful to the extent that the group effectively controls
the territory,140 a growing body of more recent jurisprudence insists that ineffective
national law remains applicable in rebel held territories.
67. During the American Civil War, the Confederate rebellion established in the
South of the United States purported to pass legislation seizing state property. In White
v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine the right of two
individuals named White and Chiles to national bonds they purchased from the Con-
federacy after the bonds had been seized by Confederate legislation. In declaring the
legislative acts that claimed to seize the property null and void, the Supreme Court
reasoned that while an unlawful government might be capable of passing laws regulat-
ing marriages and protecting other basic functions of daily life, “acts in furtherance or
support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of
citizens, and other acts of the like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and
void.”141 The Confederacy thus had no power to pass legislation seizing state bonds,
meaning that White and Chiles received no title in the bonds they purchased.142
68. The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning on this topic was later adopted by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, albeit in a slightly different context that did not involve rebel
groups as such. In an important advisory opinion dealing with the consequences of
South Africa’s then continuing presence in Namibia, the International Court of Justice
applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in White v. Texas in a case that dealt with
natural resource exploitation more explicitly. In advising states on the legal implica-
tions arising from South Africa’s illegal presence in Namibia, the International Court
of Justice reasoned that:
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory

should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived
from international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termi-
nation of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to
those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages,
the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of
the Territory.143
69. Consequently, attempts by the then South African government to grant title in
Namibian natural resources were “illegal and invalid,” since the expropriation of natural
resources could hardly be reconciled with the humanitarian exceptions to the general
rule—expropriating natural resources is not analogous with registering births, deaths,
and marriages. One of the judges on the case explicitly confirmed this interpretation
in a separate opinion by stating that “other States should not regard as valid any acts
and transactions of the authorities in Namibia relating to public property, concessions,
etc.”144 Other leading authorities, such as the UN Security Council and United Nations
Council for Namibia, later confirmed this view.145 And even though the case involved
foreign occupation rather than legislation passed by a rebel group, the principles derived
from the advisory opinion would appear to apply with equal relevance to situations
where a rebel group seizes territorial control in a civil war.
70. The European Court of Human Rights has tacitly confirmed this view in a case
involving the seizure of private property from an entity that was not recognized as a
state by the international community. In Loizidou v. Turkey, the court ruled that the
petitioner’s right to property was violated by expropriations premised on legislation
enacted by an unrecognized government, namely the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC). The TRNC had seized control of the property in Northern Cyprus fol-
lowing the Turkish military intervention in the territory in May 1974, which sparked
the partitioning of Cyprus along ethnic lines. Over the years that followed, the TRNC
authorities established a government, promulgated a constitution, and declared inde-
pendence. The international community, however, universally rejected these claims,
relegating the TRNC to a status approximately equivalent to a rebel group in most
contemporary resource wars. As a consequence of the TRNC’s unrecognized status, the
European Court of Human Rights deemed the provision of the TRNC Constitution that
purported to expropriate private property void. In reliance of the International Court of
Justice opinion on Namibia, the European Court declared that:
[t]he Court cannot attribute legal validity for purposes of the Convention to such
provisions as Article 159 of the fundamental law on which the Turkish Govern-
ment rely…. The Court confines itself to the above conclusion and does not
consider it desirable, let alone necessary, in the present context to elaborate a
general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts
of the ‘TRNC’. It notes, however, that international law recognises the legitimacy
of certain legal arrangements and transactions in such a situation, for instance
as regards the registration of births, deaths and marriages…146
71. As previously mentioned, certain domestic jurisdictions adopt a different inter-

pretation in their own private international law,147 but it is doubtful whether these
limited exceptions remain valid in light of the more recent international precedents
identified above. Moreover, international criminal courts and tribunals will follow prec-
edents derived from public not private international law, thereby confirming the reason-
ing in the White v. Texas, Namibia, and Loizidou cases. Consequently, domestic courts
are also likely to adopt this position in order to ensure that their domestic standards are
compliant with those applicable before international courts. This pressure for harmo-
nized standards between international and domestic legal systems is especially strong
in international criminal law, because the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction creates real
incentives for national courts to follow international interpretations. In the vast major-
ity of instances, then, national legislation will define ownership in natural resources
during war, even when rebel groups promulgate new law in territory they control. As
a later section explains, potentially adverse humanitarian effects of this interpretation
are partially offset by aspects of the law of war.148
Further Reading
Antonello Tancredi, “A Normative ‘Due Process’ in the Creation of States Through

Secession, in Secession,” International Law Perspectives 171, 200-207 (Cambridge,
2006).
Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 152–159 (Clarendon Press,
1999);
Enrico Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law: Reconciling Effective-

ness, Legality and Legitimacy, 136-150 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).
Ownership through Recognition of Governments

and New States
72. In some instances, it may be necessary for a court adjudicating allegations of pil-
lage to identify the government. In international law, recognition serves this purpose.
This recognition can have important consequences for determining ownership of natu-
ral resources in conflict zones, because it effectively distinguishes actions that would
be illegal when carried out by private actors from those that are legitimate exercises of
sovereign authority. In other words, the forcible acquisition of natural resources by an
unrecognized group will generally amount to theft, whereas a recognized government
not only has the authority to control natural resources through regulations in force, it
also enjoys the power to amend legislation governing resource exploitation or to expro-
priate pre-existing property rights. In order to clarify the potential relevance of these
issues, this section provides an overview of the law governing the concept of recognition
in international law together with a series of cases that highlight how the doctrine might
potentially impact corporate liability for pillaging natural resources from war zones.
73. In certain conflicts, recognition plays very little role in determining ownership of
natural resources, because the UN Security Council has passed resolutions that prevent
states from recognizing a particular faction as a government. In the case of the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus, for instance, Security Council Resolution 541 (1983)
called upon all states “not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the Republic of
Cyprus ...”149 As a result, the European Court of Human Rights was adamant that the
constitution passed by the TRNC purporting to acquire private property was null and
void.150 These types of situations have also arisen in Rhodesia, Namibia, and Kuwait,
creating situations where warring factions are unlikely to be able to claim the rights of
a government over resource wealth.151 In these situations, armed groups have no title
to state-owned or privately held mineral wealth, rendering corporate trade with these
groups equivalent to receiving stolen property.
74. Recognition is also less relevant when a de facto administration of part of a

country has no plausible claim to represent a national government. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, for instance, rebel groups controlled large portions of Congolese
territory, but never claimed to represent the national government or to secede from the
Congo. In such situations, recognizing these rebel movements as the governments of
the Congo would violate international law, which stipulates that “[r]ecognizing or treat-
ing a rebellious regime as the successor government while the previously recognized
government is still in control constitutes unlawful interference in the internal affairs of
that State.”152 While states might recognize these groups as rebellions or insurgencies,
these forms of recognition have not been exercised since the American Civil War and
would only mean that rebel groups become bound by
the law governing international armed conflict.153 As
the subsequent section on exceptions in the laws of “[c]ourts of high repute
war will show, rebel groups would not enjoy the right have held that confiscation
to exploit natural resources in these circumstances. by a government to which
recognition has been
75. In other instances, however, recognition by refused has no other effect
foreign governments will play an important role in in law than seizure by
determining which group enjoys governmental status bandits or by other lawless
in foreign courts when multiple parties claim to rep- bodies.”
resent the state. A case heard in U.S. courts relating
New York Supreme Court,
to competing claims to government during the Libe-
Sokoloff v. National City
rian civil war best highlights this scenario. In Bickford
Bank of New York (1924)
v. Liberia, the Interim Government of Liberia and the
National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Govern-
ment (NPRAG) both sought payment of funds held in
the United States that belonged to the state of Liberia.154 The funds, held in the United
States as a result of payments to the Liberian state mining company, unquestionably
belonged to the state of Liberia. The only question requiring clarification was which
of the two entities represented the state. To answer the question, the court obtained
a certificate from the U.S. Department of State indicating that it favored the claim of
the interim government. By implication, the exploitation of natural resources by the
NPRAG “government” was unlawful insofar as this unrecognized government went
beyond transactions such as the registration of births, deaths, and marriages. Compa-
nies that trade natural resources with unrecognized governments such as these there-
fore risk liability for pillaging these commodities.
76. Companies are also vulnerable to criminal prosecution for trading natural
resources with secessionist movements that are not recognized as new states. During
the Biafran civil war, for instance, a Nigerian separatist group traded oil expropriated
from within territory under its control, but failed to garner sufficient recognition from
foreign states to achieve political autonomy. The extraction of oil was therefore unlawful
for reasons similar to those applicable in the NPRAG government mentioned above—
the Biafran separatist movement had no capacity to displace state ownership in the
oil it sold to businesses or to substitute for the state during the conflict. By contrast,
the widespread recognition of Bangladesh after it claimed independence from Paki-
stan enabled the Bangladeshi authorities to legitimately exercise eminent domain over
natural resources within the territory. Unlike failed succession attempts in Biafra and
elsewhere, Bangladeshi authorities could therefore issue decrees granting commercial
actors rights to resource wealth. As the next paragraph shows, this analysis becomes
more complicated when some states recognize the secessionist movement as a new
state while others do not.
77. The more problematic scenario arises when foreign states are split in their rec-
ognition of competing governments within a country at war. There are several perti-
nent examples of this phenomenon. At the outset of the Angolan Civil War in 1975,
countries aligned with the Soviet bloc recognized the MPLA Government (the People’s
Republic of Angola), while the United States, South Africa, and others supported and
recognized the claims of the Democratic People’s Republic of Angola lead by UNITA.
Although this situation later changed as the MPLA gained ascendancy over the ensuing
years of bloodshed, the task of identifying the government capable of allocating natural
resources during these initial years was inescapably problematic—both armed groups
had internationally supported claims to constitute the lawful government of the state.
Although complexities of this sort probably make a conviction for pillage less viable
during this period, they are nonetheless rare and need not detract from the range of
situations where armies trading natural resources with commercial actors are simply
never recognized.
Further Reading
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 85–102 (Oxford, 7th Edition,
2008).
Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 152–159 (Clarendon Press,

1999).
Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference

to Governments in Exile, pp. 1–111 (Oxford, 1998).
IX. Exceptions in the Laws of War
78. In the earlier section dealing with the definition of pillage, we observed that the
majority of contemporary war crimes trials define pillage as appropriation of either
public or private property without the consent of the owner, subject to limitations set
out in the Hague Regulations.155 As that section shows, these exceptions in the Hague
Regulations color the interpretation of pillage; not “private or personal use” or “military
necessity” as set out in the ICC Elements of Crimes.156 In keeping with this position,
this chapter explores the law governing each of the exceptions contained in the Hague
Regulations, showing that although an army might have a limited ability to exploit
resources in occupied territory for the benefit of the local population, the forcible exploi-
tation of natural resources from outside occupied territories or where an occupying
army does not apply the proceeds of resource sales to the needs of the local population
constitutes pillage.
Requisitions “for the Needs of the Army of

Occupation”
79. The Hague Regulations condone requisitions of privately owned property “for the
needs of the army of occupation.”157 The term is widely understood as meaning property
essential to the army’s immediate upkeep. The Krupp Judgment, for instance, considered
53
that requisitions entailed “billets for the occupying troops and the occupation authori-
ties, garages for their vehicles, stables for their horses, urgently needed equipment and
supplies for the proper functioning of the occupation authorities, food for the army of
occupation, and the like.”158 Other authorities define the category as including such
things as “food and supplies, liquor and tobacco, cloth for uniforms, leather for boots,
and the like.”159 Even allowing for a broader interpretation in modern warfare, natural
resources extracted or traded for profit during war are not comparable to these objects,
all of which are necessary for the day-to-day needs of an army.
80. The transfer of requisitioned property to areas outside occupied territory would
also contradict “the needs of the army of occupation.” In a decision of obvious rel-
evance for companies exporting natural resources acquired from contemporary conflict
zones, an Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal found that the shipment to Germany
of a quantity of cotton seized by the German army of occupation in Antwerp during
World War One could not constitute a requisition because the export of the property
evidenced a purpose that was patently inconsistent with the immediate needs of the
occupying army.160 Companies exporting minerals such as gold, coltan, and cassiterite
from conflict zones can therefore be confident that the resources were not legitimately
requisitioned.
81. The sale of requisitioned property is also categorically prohibited, further under-
mining suggestions that conflict commodities could be legitimately requisitioned.
A robust body of judicial authority emphasizes that requisitions cannot be effected for
the purposes of commerce without transgressing the “needs of the army of occupa-
tion.”161 In the words of one Belgian court, “[i]f a measure was taken in reliance on
Article 52 [of the Hague Regulations], the chattel must be used for the needs of the
army of occupation and therefore cannot, in principle, be sold.”162 The French Cour de
Cassation has agreed with this finding, insisting that although international law might
afford an army the right to requisition property owned by private individuals, “it does
not give an army of occupation the right to sanction the transfer to private individuals
of goods taken from others by acts of violence.”163 On the strength of these various
precedents, leading commentators confirm that “not only requisitioning for shipment
to the occupant’s home country has been held illegal, but also requisitioning for resale
and profit rather than for the use of the occupying army.”164 Requisitions, therefore, will
not suffice to pass title in natural resources traded by rebel groups or foreign armies.
Moveable State Property “of a Nature to Serve
Operations of War”
82. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations stipulates that “[a]n army of occupation can
only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the
property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and,
generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military
operations.”165 Although the provision contains an ambiguity this section explores in
more detail, publicly owned moveable resources, such as artisanal diamonds or gold,
do not fall within the correct interpretation of the rule.
83. The rule contains a contradiction. One the one hand, the authoritative French
equivalent of the phrase “used for military purposes,” is “of a nature to serve operations
of war.”166 This implies that an occupying army can only seize moveable state property
that could be used immediately in battle, such as “depots of arms, means of transport,
stores and supplies.” On the other, as one leading commentator points out, “cash, funds
and realizable securities” are also listed in the rule, even though they inevitably require
conversion in order to serve military purposes.167 Given this ambiguity, the provision’s
negotiating history becomes important. This history confirms that the word “nature”
in Article 53 was intended to limit legitimate seizures of state moveable property to
property which, “by its very nature” is capable of military use.168 In fact, the word
“nature” was inserted precisely in order to avoid the argument that “everything that
can be converted into money can serve the goals of war.”169 Consequently, a majority of
commentators rightly interpret the term “of a nature to serve operations of war” as only
covering objects “susceptible to direct military use.”170 Diamonds, gold, and timber, of
course, are no more susceptible of direct military use than art, which is frequently the
subject of pillage proceedings.171
84. A number of cases support this interpretation. In the Krupp case, for instance,
the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found that “machinery and raw materials” hur-
riedly removed by corporate representatives from a state-owned steel works in Ukraine
during an evacuation constituted pillage.172 The tribunal rejected arguments that the
state property was legitimately seized, finding that “the property removed did not fall
into any category of movable public property which the occupant is authorized to seize
under the Hague Regulations.”173 If publicly owned machinery and raw materials from
a steel works cannot be lawfully seized as state moveable property, forcible acquisition
of artisanal minerals such as gold and diamonds cannot be justified based on the same
provision. This reasoning is consistent with a variety of other decisions, which have
E X C E P T I O N S I N T H E L AW S O F W A R 55
condemned the trade in a wide range of state property that was seized then sold by occu-
pying forces.174 And although at least one decision has adopted a divergent position,175
it is difficult to reconcile the position adopted in this case with the bulk of the case-law
on the subject, the majority position among academics or the negotiating history set out
above. The preferable interpretation of Article 53(1), to cite a Belgium court, is that “the
decision of the enemy to alienate a chattel which he has seized in pursuance of Article
52 or Article 53, and all subsequent alienations, must be regarded as unlawful.”176 This
precludes commercial exploitation of state owned moveable resources, including natu-
ral resources like alluvial diamonds.
Munitions-de-Guerre
85. The Hague Regulations also recognize the ability of an army to seize munitions
of war, irrespective of whether these munitions are owned by public or private parties.
Article 53(2) of the Hague Regulations reads “all appliances, whether on land, at sea,
or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or
things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds
of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must
be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.”
86. The precise definition of the term munitions of war, together with its more fre-
quently deployed translation “munitions-de-guerre,” has primarily centered around the
legality of seizing privately held crude oil stocks from occupied territories. In the lead-
ing case on point, colloquially known as Singapore Oil Stocks, a Singaporean court
considered competing claims to crude oil reserves located in Singapore that were ini-
tially attributed to a Dutch oil conglomerate, then seized by Japanese troops during the
war, before ultimately being recaptured by British forces when Singapore was liberated
toward the end of the war.177
87. In rejecting the British government’s claim that the crude oil they had recap-
tured constituted munitions-de-guerre, the court drew on a passage contained in the
then British Manual of Military Law that rightly defined the term munitions-de-guerre
as “such things as are susceptible of direct military use.”178 On the strength of this
definition, the court ruled that the need for sophisticated installations and considerable
processing to extract and refine the oil meant that the crude oil failed to qualify as “arms
or ammunition which could be used against the enemy in fighting.”179 Clearly, most
commodities that motivate contemporary resource wars are even less likely to satisfy
this standard, because resources such as diamond, gold, coltan, and cassiterite can only
deliver a military application once converted into cash or exchanged for arms.
88. Two years after the decision in Singapore Oil Stocks, a revised British manual
emerged repudiating the rule in question on the largely unsubstantiated grounds that
“there is no justification for the view that ‘war material’ means materials which could be
used immediately without being processed in any way for warlike purposes: for example
crude oil could be included in the term ‘war material.’”180 Unfortunately, this change
of position was maintained in subsequent editions of the British Military Manual. The
most recent version asserts that an army may seize “raw materials such as crude oil.”181
As this section shows, however, this definition is inconsistent with the majority of expert
opinion, the negotiating history to the Hague Regulations, and law applied in contem-
porary war crimes jurisprudence.
89. The vast majority of expert commentators interpret the term munitions of war as
implying property “susceptible of direct military use.”182 After completing a full review
of the negotiating history to the Hague Regulations, one leading commentator also
concluded that the regulations “did not include within the conception of munitions-
de-guerre real property or raw materials which would require processing of a costly or
lengthy character in order to make them suitable for use in war—despite the fact that
when so processed they might be of the utmost value.”183 The preferable definition of
munitions of war is thus reflected in the U.S. Military Manual, which defines the con-
cept as “everything susceptible to direct military use.”184
90. Courts prosecuting pillage have also endorsed this interpretation in practice. In
the Esau case in 1948, for example, the Special Court of Cassation in the Netherlands
ruled that the chief commissioner of Germany’s high frequency research council could
be held guilty of plunder of public and private property for ordering the removal of a
range of scientific instruments together with a sum of gold for war related purposes.
In response to the claim that the property was munitions of war, the court ruled that
“[n]either the text nor the history of Article 53 gave grounds for the thesis that the term
‘munitions-de-guerre’ should be extended to materials and apparatus such as boring
machines, lathes, lamps, tubes, and gold, nor even to the other objects removed, how-
ever important they might be for technical or scientific research.”185 Over half a century
later, the Naletilić Trial Judgment independently reached a similar conclusion in defining
war booty as “material obviously related to the conduct of military operations.”186 The
Hadžihasanović Judgment also adopted the standards contained in the Singapore Oil
Stocks Judgment when it declared that “weapons, ammunition, and any other materials
which have direct military applications, even if they are private property, may be seized
as war booty.”187 The seizure of natural resources and crude oil cannot be reconciled
with this standard.
Usufruct
91. The Hague Regulations restrict the appropriation of immoveable state property
through the Roman law device known as usufruct. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations
stipulates that “[t]he occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usu-
fructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of
these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” The
term usufruct literally means “use of fruit.” As the translation suggests, the doctrine
traditionally allowed an occupant to exploit and consume the fruit from an occupied
orchard on the condition that the value of the trees and land was preserved.
92. The extrapolation of this paradigm to natural resource exploitation during war
was originally premised on the misconceived perception that minerals were naturally
renewable—Roman legal scholars believed that resources within the ground automati-
cally regenerated.188 These geological misconceptions not only infiltrated early inter-
pretations of usufruct in the law of war, the inaccuracy has endured even in the face of
commonly accepted scientific understandings to the contrary. Soon after the Brussels
Declaration of 1874 adopted the doctrine of usufruct as a then novel means of limiting
an occupying power’s rights over immoveable state property, one author argued that the
principle entitled an occupying army to “lop forests and work the mines.”189 Having
copied this original error, several contemporary military manuals still state that a bel-
ligerent has a right “to work the mines” of publicly held property,190 without recognizing
the fallacy of treating minerals as fruits.
93. The misconception of mineral wealth as renewable creates an inescapable inter-

nal contradiction. Mining depletes a limited supply of resources, when the central
tenet of usufruct demands preservation of capital. As one of the earlier commentators
queried: “[t]he products of mines and quarries are certainly not a fruit, but a part of
the ground. It is therefore the substance of the thing which the exploiter successively
depletes; how can the usufructuary have the right to exploit the mines and quarries
when he must conserve the substance?”191 Evidently, the U.S. Department of State
shared this misgiving. In a memorandum addressing the legality of Israeli oil exploita-
tion in occupied Sinai in light of usufruct, the State Department officials argued that
“[r]esources such as oil deposits, which are irreplaceable and have value only as they
are consumed, cannot be used without impairing the capital of the oil bearing land.”192
For these reasons, the exploitation of non-renewable resources contradicts the expressed
wording of Article 55, which mandates that the occupying power “must safeguard the
capital of these properties.”
94. Commentators are conscious of this legal fiction but reluctant to declare that an
occupying army is categorically prohibited from exploiting resources in all contexts.
In an article that resembles much of the academic writing on the subject,193 Claggert
and Johnson argue that usufruct “logically prohibits any exploitation of minerals.”194
They nonetheless endorse a portion of definitions of
usufruct derived from a number of civil law coun-
tries that permit a usufruct to continue exploitation
at pre-occupation rates.195 As the authors themselves “Just as the inhabitants
acknowledge, the interpretation that a usufruct is enti- of the occupied territory
tled to continue pre-occupation rates of extraction is must not be forced to
“a not wholly logical compromise between the basic help the enemy in waging
concept of usufruct and a misconceived application the war against their
of that concept in the law of ancient Rome.”196 The own country or their own
compromise, which is illogical and based on obsolete country’s allies, so must
science, employs a legal fiction that places a state’s the economic assets of the
natural resource wealth in the hands of any foreign occupied territory not be
army. used in such a manner.”
In Re Krupp, at 623.
95. A number of cases have rejected this position
in practice. To cite but one illustration, the Ministries
Judgment at Nuremberg found Paul Pleiger, chairman
of Mining and Steel Works East Inc., guilty of pillage. Through this company, Pleiger
was responsible for the massive exploitation of state held mines in occupied Russia.197
In response to submissions that Article 55 of the Hague Regulations allowed seizures
of this nature, the tribunal held that “[t]his claim is far too broad.”198 The tribunal thus
concluded that the manganese, coal, and iron exploited from these state-owned proper-
ties “were seized and used without regard to the rules of usufructuary.”199 Other cases
involving pillage of natural resources simply overlook usufruct without addressing the
concept at all. For example, of the pillage cases set out in Annex A to this manual, we
anticipate that courts could have but did not consider usufruct in over 10 instances,
often in contexts that led to convictions for pillaging state-owned natural resources.200
Precedents of this nature would preclude all exploitation of all non-renewable natural
resources in conflict zones.
96. Despite these precedents, we cautiously endorse the fiction that non-renewable
resources can be exploited by an occupying army, provided that the money from these
sales is spent exclusively on the humanitarian needs of the local population. Allowing
this exception accounts for one of the real concerns with enforcing pillage. A report
by a UN panel of experts in 2007, for instance, recommended against imposing sanc-
tions on companies involved in the illicit diamond trade, precisely because “the con-
siderable dependence on artisanal mining… exposes these miners to potentially severe
consequences should measures be taken that could threaten an already vulnerable live-
lihood.”201 A Congolese NGO expressed the same concern in more striking terms,
arguing that “calling regulations or relationships established by warring factions for
the exploitation of resource wealth ‘illegal’ is meaningless in a country where the illegal
informal economy has been the sole mechanism of survival for large parts of the popu-
lation.”202 But instead of dispensing with legality altogether, usufruct might be inter-
preted as creating a limited exception that responds to these humanitarian concerns.
97. This appears to have been the position adopted at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg
Judgment, for instance, found that “[t]hese articles [in the Hague Regulations] make
it clear that … the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear the
expense of the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of the
country can reasonably be expected to bear.” Although the phrase “expense of the occu-
pation” could be interpreted very broadly,203 the more compelling interpretation limits
the term to costs associated with an occupier’s humanitarian obligations toward the
local population.204 A wider reading of the exception risks permitting a legal fiction to
justify a self-financing military occupation, thereby creating perverse incentives for war.
A wider interpretation would also allow a nation’s resources to be used to fuel violence
against its own people, contradicting the declaration in the Nuremberg Judgment that,
“[ j]ust as the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not be forced to help the enemy
in waging the war against their own country or their own country’s allies, so must the
economic assets of the occupied territory not be used in such a manner.”205
98. In the face of these concerns, courts have rightly limited the term “expenses of
the occupation” to the humanitarian needs of the local population. The International
Court of Justice, for instance, found that exploitation of natural resources “carried out
for the benefit of the local population” was “permitted under international humanitarian
law.”206 As a result, if courts endorse the fiction that the doctrine of usufruct applies
to non-renewable resources, proceeds from natural resource exploitation in occupied
territory must be spent exclusively on the needs of the local population in order to
avoid criminal liability for pillage. In this light, a company or business representative
perpetrates pillage by acquiring natural resources through an occupying army when
proceeds from the transaction are not spent on the local population. A range of factors
are capable of satisfying this standard. These might include situations where (a) the
occupier uses proceeds from the sale to purchase weapons or to finance the war effort
more broadly; (b) where proceeds from resource rents only benefit military or political
elites; or (c) when the proceeds from illicit resource transactions are repatriated to a
foreign country or region beyond the occupied territory.
99. Some also argue that a usufruct cannot exploit natural resources beyond pre-
occupation rates, although we do not consider this claim sufficiently settled to jus-
tify criminal liability. According to many interpretations of usufruct, an occupying
army cannot increase rates of exploitation within the territory it controls. As one expert
explains, an occupant “may not cut more timber than was done in pre-occupation
days.”207 In accordance with this interpretation, the French Court of Cassation held that
a businessman who felled in excess of 13,000 trees from state and municipal forests in
occupied France during World War Two “could not escape civil and criminal responsi-
bility,” because the exploitation exceeded rates permitted by pre-existing regulations.208
There is, however, considerable opposition to this interpretation. In a dispute involving
the drilling of new oil fields in the Sinai, the Israeli government argued that usufruct
“includes the obligation and right to continue reasonable, considered and orderly new
drillings.”209 Given the number of experts who support this minority view,210 criminal
charges for violating the principle seem difficult to justify. Accordingly, pending legal
clarification, we do not recommend charging companies that are only responsible for
exploiting natural resources beyond pre-occupation rates.
100. These principles should extend to territories administered by rebel groups during
civil wars. As previously mentioned, this proposition is legally controversial, because
only foreign military armies who establish an occupation are formally able to exercise
the exceptions contained in the Hague Regulations. Recall, for instance, the SCSL’s find-
ing that at least in the context of pillage, a range of arguments favors extending these
exceptions to non-international armed conflicts as a matter of prosecutorial strategy. To
reiterate, certain cases have already extended aspects of The Hague Regulations, which
include the right to usufruct, to warring factions operating in non-international armed
conflicts. Moreover, offering rebels privileges in the laws of war also creates incentives
for them to comply with this body of rules during the course of their hostilities. Finally,
rebel groups are frequently subject to the law applicable to international armed conflict
insofar as they fight as proxies for foreign governments.211 With respect to usufruct
specifically, if the doctine serves purely humanitarian purposes, then extending it to
civil wars merely promotes the plight of civilian populations in rebel-held territories.
In this sense, applying usufruct in civil wars is not only sage prosecutorial strategy, it
also furthers fundamental aspirations of international humanitarian law.
Further Reading
Edward R. Cummings, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories under the Laws of Bel-
ligerent Occupation, 9 J. Int’l L. and Econ. 533, 563 and 565 (1974)
Claggett and Johnson, May Israel as Belligerent Occupant Lawfully Exploit Previously
Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez? 72 Am. J. Int’l L. 558, 568 (1978)
Eliu Lauterpacht, The Hague Regulations and the Seizure of Munitions-de-guerre, 32 Brit.
Y.B. Int’l L. 218, 226 (1955).
X. Consent
101. Pillage is essentially appropriation of property without consent. In the words of

the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, “[w]e deem it to be of the essence of the crime
of plunder or spoliation that the owner be deprived of his property involuntarily and
against his will.”212 This focus on the lack of consent is reinforced by the definition of
pillage within the ICC Elements of Crimes, which also insists that “the appropriation
was without the consent of the owner.”213 Importantly, this consent must come from
the rightful owner. In the context of natural resource exploitation, the earlier chapter
on ownership concluded that in most countries suffering the scourge of resource wars,
either the state or private parties own natural resource wealth. When the state owns
the resources, it frequently consents to the exploitation and trade of these resources by
passing legislation that defines procedures for obtaining the right to exploit resources
and by empowering a state body to allocate these resources. When private entities own
resources, a commercial contract most frequently provides consent. Although this man-
ual cannot explore the various national laws that govern these principle in great detail,
this section illustrates several broad examples of the absence of consent in war-time
resource extraction and provides guidance on how to determine consent in a particular
context.
102. Companies operating in conflict zones often ignore the need for state con-
sent entirely by relying on authorizations granted by rebel groups or foreign military
forces. In one such example, the Nazi Hans Kehrl was convicted of pillage for having
63
exploited large quantities of iron, crude steel, and coal from the Vitkovice Works in
then Czechoslovakia.214 Like a number of companies operating in modern resource
wars, Kehrl purported to derive authority from a decree issued by a warring party to
the hostilities.215 The illegitimacy of these sorts of decrees had serious legal ramifica-
tions—Kehrl himself was convicted for pillaging steel
and coal from the mines. In a similar case, six direc-
tors of the firm IG Farben were convicted of pillaging
“[w]e deem it to be of the the Strassbourg-Schiltigheim oxygen and acetylene
essence of the crime of plants in Alsace-Lorraine on the basis that the Ger-
plunder or spoliation that man civil administration’s decree confiscating the
the owner be deprived of plants was “without any legal justification under inter-
his property involuntarily national law.”216 As a result, the company’s directors
and against his will.” were found criminally liable because they “acquired
these plants from the German Government without
IG Farben case, at 1134
payment to or consent of the French owners.”217 Thus,
the concessions issued by rebel groups or foreign mili-
tary in modern war zones will not protect companies
against liability for pillage, because these concessions have neither a greater claim to
legal justification in international law, nor go further in obtaining adequate consent in
accordance with applicable state legislation.
103. In other circumstances, businesses trade in state-owned natural resources with-

out regard to the various forms of consent expressed in relevant national legislation.
These forms of consent often vary depending on the nature of the natural resource and
the means of extraction. In the context of industrial mining, for instance, states gener-
ally consent to exploitation of valuable resources by issuing a concession or entering
into a mining agreement that gives the recipient the exclusive right to extract specific
resources within a given area.218 In some countries, consent to undertake artisanal min-
ing functions differently, by allowing a state representative to designate artisanal mining
zones and then by licensing others to exploit and sell resources from these zones.219
In the Congolese context, for example, the Mining Code of 2002 allows the minister of
mines to designate a specific zone from which licensed Congolese nationals can exploit
artisanal resources,220 provided they are then on-sold to registered middlemen (négo-
tiants), who in turn trade the commodities to registered trading houses (comptoirs).221
It follows that the trade in artisanal resources such as diamonds or gold harvested from
outside designated zones or by individuals who have no state-sanctioned authority to act
in these capacities is devoid of consent and therefore illegal. The misappropriation of
natural resources in violation of these rules is legally equivalent to Wilhelm Stuckart’s
conviction for pillaging “cut and uncut precious stones,”222 because in both instances
property is acquired without respecting the proprietors’ wishes.
104. Business entities can also pillage natural resources from private owners by
exploiting resources allocated to competitors or by simply stealing extracted resources
from warehouses or from vehicles during transportation. As the previous section on
ownership shows, private entities often own natural resource wealth. In these circum-
stances, consent must emanate from the private owner, generally through a binding
contract or lease. A number of precedents govern the pillage of privately owned prop-
erty in violation of these standards. For instance, in one war crimes trial convened in
Poland soon after the end of World War Two, Joseph Buhler was found guilty of pillage
for “economic exploitation of the country’s resources,” in this instance through the
issuance of decrees confiscating privately held mining rights and mining shares.223
Companies operating in modern-day war zones might not issue decrees or seize private
shareholdings in mines in precisely the same way, but in certain circumstances they
also benefit from the backing of warring parties to exploit privately held property in
natural resources without the consent of the rightful owners. This, once again, risks
liability for pillage when the transaction is bereft of the owner’s consent.
105. The purchasers of illicitly-seized conflict resources also appropriate property

without the owner’s consent. Jurisprudence from World War Two again best illustrates
the absence of consent in these contexts. In the Roechling case, the German business-
man Hermann Roechling was found guilty of pillage for purchasing scrap steel from
the German company ROGES, knowing that the merchandise had been illegally seized
without the consent of the owners. The company ROGES was a mere front established
for the German Army High Command and other Nazi authorities, tasked with acquir-
ing property from German military and economic agencies then selling the property
to German industry.224 As previously seen, the tribunal established in the French zone
of occupation in Germany convicted Roechling of pillage for purchasing from ROGES,
declaring that “Hermann Roechling, like all other German industrialists in the same
circumstances, was a receiver of looted property.”225 These allegations are similar to
incidents in contemporary resource wars, where businesses have traded with warring
factions who exploit natural resources they do not own. In both these situations, the
rightful proprietors of the resources do not consent to the trade.
106. Coercion can also vitiate consent in natural resource exploitation during war,
which also gives rise to criminal liability for pillage. As the IG Farben case famously
stated, “[w]hen action by the owner is not voluntary because his consent is obtained by
CONSENT 65
threats, intimidation, pressure, or by exploiting the position and power of the military
occupant under circumstances indicating that the owner is being induced to part with
his property against his will, it is clearly a violation of the Hague Regulations.”226 Dur-
ing war, commercial transactions involving natural resources frequently satisfy this
standard. In a relatively obvious example, the director of the Dresden Bank, Karl Rasche,
was found guilty of pillaging the Rothschild-Gutmann share in the Vitkovice steel plants
by negotiating the “sale” of the shareholdings on behalf of the German authorities while
one of the owners of the steel plant was held by the Gestapo in Vienna.227 This, accord-
ing to the tribunal, constituted pillage.
107. In a further example of coercion, the directors of IG Farben were convicted of pil-
laging French chemical industries by compelling three of the then primary producers of
dyestuffs to agree to participate in a venture named Francolor, in which Farben acquired
a 51 percent shareholding to the severe economic detriment of the other participants.228
After sustained protest, the French companies resigned themselves to essentially gifting
their market dominance to a foreign company that was instrumental in the enemy’s war
effort. The transaction was deficient because Farben had used their relationship with the
German army to influence negotiations, such that the transaction was undertaken “in
utter disregard of the rights and wishes of the owner.”229 Representatives of IG Farben
were thus convicted of pillage for their role in the deal. There are, therefore, a range of
circumstances through which businesses acquiring natural resources during war do so
without the consent of the rightful owner. A more intricate understanding of how these
principles function in a specific context will nonetheless require a closer understand-
ing of the domestic law governing the allocation of the natural resources in the country
at war.
Further Reading
For Global Mining Legislation, see www.Barrowscompany.com.
James Otto and John Cordes, The Regulation of Mineral Enterprises: A Global Perspective
on Economics, Law and Policy, 2–6 to 2–7 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Founda-
tion, 2002).
International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects (Elizabeth
Bastida et al. eds., Kluwer, 2005).
Danièle Barberis, Negotiating Mining Agreements: Past, Present and Future Trends (Kluwer,
1998).
XI. The Mental Element
of Pillage
108. Intent differentiates liability for the pillage of natural resources within a con-
flict zone from the unwitting participation in the trade of stolen conflict commodities.
Unfortunately, the Geneva Conventions themselves are unhelpful in defining the men-
tal element required to perpetrate the offense—the Conventions merely stipulate that
“pillage is prohibited.”230 The requisite mental elements may therefore vary depend-
ing on the jurisdiction that prosecutes pillage. This reality requires a careful study of
the applicable standards within the criminal code, legislative act or statute applicable
within the jurisdiction that will hear the charges. As a general rule, however, at least
two graduated degrees of intention—direct and indirect intent—are possible. As the
Martić Trial Judgment ruled, “with respect to the mens rea of this crime, the unlawful
appropriation of the property must have been perpetrated with either direct or indirect
intent.”231 In the context of pillage, direct intent refers to a situation where an accused
acquires natural resources with the purpose of unlawfully depriving the owner of the
property, whereas indirect intent implies a lower degree of intent approximately equiva-
lent to recklessness in certain common law jurisdictions and dolus eventualis in civil law
systems. This chapter explores these alternatives in greater detail, providing examples
of both that might guide future pillage cases.
67
Direct Intent
109. In all jurisdictions that criminalize pillage, direct intent will suffice to prove
the offense. The “direct” intention to perpetrate pillage requires that a business rep-
resentative purposefully acquires natural resources knowing that the owner does not
consent. Hermann Roechling’s conviction for the pillage of iron ore from mines in east-
ern France typifies this standard. Roechling was the president of the board of a family
company, which owned three subsidiaries in the iron, steel, and coal industries.232 After
the German invasion of France, Roechling was appointment as general plenipotentiary
for the region, which handed him exclusive administrative authority over mines located
within the territory. Roechling promptly seized steel plants at Moselle and Meurthe-et-
Moselle that yielded 9 million tons of liquid steel per annum “without furnishing to the
real owners a proper inventory.”233 In convicting Roechling of pillage, the French Tribu-
nal found that in March 1944 German authorities operating in the region celebrated the
mining of 100 million tons of ore from pits located in eastern France alone.234 Clearly,
Reochling’s purpose was to acquire natural resources while knowing that the property
he acquired was obtained without the true owner’s approval. In the words of the tribu-
nal itself, “[t]he act committed by him constitutes, especially in this case, a robbery.”235
The corporate appropriation of natural resources based on the authority of a foreign
government or domestic rebel factions will frequently satisfy this same standard.
110. Many national criminal jurisdictions also distinguish a marginally lower standard
of direct intent, where the perpetrator does not want to acquire property unlawfully but
is nonetheless aware that this is a virtually certain consequence under the prevailing
circumstances.236 In many jurisdictions, this is known as oblique intention. Again, the
example of the company ROGES from the World War Two jurisprudence illustrates the
application of this principle to the corporate pillage of natural resources.237 To recall,
ROGES was created by the German Army High Command together with other Nazi
authorities.238 The company was tasked with acquiring property from German military
and economic agencies, then on-selling the property to German industries. The Krupp
firm purchased two categories of property from ROGES—illegally seized property
known as “booty goods” and so-called “purchased goods” that the German economic
agencies were compelled to purchase from vendors on the black market.239 The tribunal
found that Krupp “received wares and goods of all kinds from ROGES,” particularly
large quantities of scrap steel.
111. The tribunal was also satisfied that the Krupp directors received clear indicators
that the Booty Goods were in fact stolen property. According to the tribunal, the pur-
chased goods were delivered to the Krupp firm with an attached invoice reflecting the
price ROGES had paid for the property, whereas stolen booty goods were simply sent to
Krupp without an invoice or any other indication of price.240 In reimbursing ROGES for
its “commerce,” Krupp would immediately repay the amount indicated on the invoices
for purchased goods, whereas the two companies would negotiate a nominal price for
booty goods some considerable time after Krupp received the property. From the dispar-
ity in these accounting procedures, the tribunal deduced that “the Krupp firm knew the
source of these goods purchased from ROGES and that certain of these items such as
machines and materials were confiscated in the occupied territories and were so-called
booty goods.”241 Six representatives of the firm were convicted of pillaging the booty
goods as a consequence.
112. The same principles will apply to companies operating in modern conflicts,
where correspondence from military groups selling natural resources, transportation
records, the origins of certain types of resources and other relevant evidence also render
the illicit origins of the commodities virtually certain.
Indirect Intent–Probably Stolen

113. Commercial actors are also guilty of pillage in a number of jurisdictions based on
what international courts often refer to as an indirect standard of intent. As previously
mentioned, indirect intent involves taking impermissibly high risks, which national
legal systems describe as recklessness or dolus eventualis. Some but not all criminal
jurisdictions will allow liability for pillaging natural resources based on an indirect stan-
dard of intent. Ad hoc international criminal tribunals, for instance, have consistently
affirmed that pillage can be perpetrated with only indirect intent. As mentioned earlier,
the Martić Trial Judgment and other international jurisprudence have clearly found that
pillage may be perpetrated “with either direct or indirect intent.”242 These findings are
especially important for other courts, because they purport to represent the current
state of customary international law on the issue. Nonetheless, there remains some
doubt whether the ICC Statutes are equally broad.243 This inconsistency is also true
at a domestic level. In some, indirect intent will suffice to prove pillage—a number of
common law jurisdictions adopt a rule that, in the absence of specific language defin-
ing the mens rea requirement for a crime (as is the case with pillage), intent should be
interpreted as at least implying recklessness.244 Similarly, in continental European juris-
dictions, case-law extends the concept of dolus eventualis to all offenses, which would
logically extend to pillage.245 Yet, other national jurisdictions may insist that only direct
T H E M E N TA L E L E M E N T O F P I L L A G E 69
intent suffices.246 For the benefit of those jurisdictions where indirect intent might
suffice to prove pillage, this section provides a general overview of indirect intent stan-
dards, then explores how these standards might apply to commercial actors pillaging
natural resources.
114. Indirect intent encompasses different concepts in different jurisdictions, but

knowledge that natural resources are probably stolen provides helpful general guid-
ance. In many common law jurisdictions, recklessness means “consciously disregarding
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result”.247
In continental European jurisdictions, the concept of dolus eventualis demands that
the perpetrator perceive the occurrence of the criminal result as possible, and that he
or she at least makes peace with this possibility.248 In a bid to harmonize these dif-
ferences, ad hoc international criminal tribunals refer to indirect intent as requiring
proof of “awareness of a substantial likelihood” or “knowledge that the offense was a
probable consequence of the act or omission.”249 Conveniently, this latter description
aligns with definitions of intention attributed to theft in the U.S. Model Penal Code. The
Model Penal Code stipulates that theft is perpetrated when a person “purposely receives,
retains, or disposes of moveable property of another knowing that it has been stolen,
or believing that it has probably been stolen…”250 On this basis, the rest of this manual
employs the phrase “probably stolen” for ease of reference in describing indirect intent,
conscious that the actual legal test will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
115. A range of evidence can be used to establish that a company acquired natural
resources from a war zone knowing that they were probably stolen. Although the type
of proof necessary will very much depend on the circumstances of each case, several
indicators are especially common. Payment of a price well below market rates is a
primary factor in establishing knowledge that property is stolen within domestic legal
systems.251 At Nuremberg, six representatives of the firm Krupp were convicted of pil-
lage for purchasing machinery in occupied France for “a ridiculously low price.”252 The
principles underlying the conviction parallel events in certain contemporary resource
wars, where companies purchase minerals from warring factions at prices well below
market rates available elsewhere.253
116. In other situations, the clandestine nature of certain mineral transactions also
serves as an indicator that natural resources acquired from a conflict zone were prob-
ably illicitly acquired. For example, purchasing conflict commodities like diamonds
from known arms traffickers or a warlord under a shroud of secrecy could suggest
that the purchasers knew that the property was probably stolen. In the same vein,
unheeded warnings from reputable authorities that property stems from illicit sources
can also evidence the requisite degree of knowledge. A company that continues to
source natural resources from a warring faction, even once informed of the origins of
their merchandise by investigators, public authorities, NGOs or other credible sources,
is therefore aware that their resources are probably
stolen. Depending on the circumstances, other types
of evidence such as transportation logs, commercial
contracts, and testimony from customs officials might
“With respect to the mens
also be useful in demonstrating the applicable mental
rea of this crime, the
element.
unlawful appropriation of
the property must have
117. A case from World War Two highlights the
been perpetrated with
application of these principles in practice. In the Min-
either direct or indirect
istries case, the managing director and vice president
intent.”
of the Reich Bank, Emil Puhl, was found guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity for the receipt of Martić Trial Judgment,
property taken by the SS from victims at concentration para. 104.
254
camps. The tribunal rejected Puhl’s claim that he
had not realized the nefarious origins of the property
housed within the bank, highlighting the extraordinary
nature of the transactions through which the bank came upon the goods, the secrecy
associated with the transactions, and dissent amongst colleagues employed within the
bank.255 According to the tribunal, “that this was not looked upon as an ordinary transac-
tion within the scope of its corporate purposes or official functions by the Reich Bank
officials, including Puhl, is evidenced by the extreme secrecy with which the transaction
was handled, the fact that the account was credited in the first instance to a fictitious
name, Max Heiliger, and the contemporaneous misgivings expressed by officials and
employees of the bank at the time.”256 On this same basis, the purchaser of conflict
commodities in modern resource wars might be deemed to have known that the prop-
erty was probably stolen where the transaction was carried out in secrecy with warring
parties when others have publicly denounced the trade.
Intention and Usufruct

118. In earlier sections, we concluded that the doctrine of usufruct in the laws of war
allows an occupying army or rebel group to exploit state-owned immoveable natural
resources without the owner’s consent, provided that the proceeds of the transaction are
used to meet the humanitarian needs of the local population.257 This conclusion modi-
fies slightly the means of proving the mental elements for pillage. This section briefly
explains this variation, in order to avoid confusion about how usufruct intersects with
intention. As the following paragraphs explain, in situations where usufruct applies,
the focus shifts from whether companies acquired natural resources aware of the cer-
tainty, virtual certainty, or probability that the resources were acquired without the own-
er’s consent, to whether they were aware that the requirements of usufruct were not
satisfied.
119. This chapter has shown that different jurisdictions adopt different mental ele-
ments for pillage, depending on the extent to which they embrace direct and indirect
standards of intent.258 In the context of pillage, these mental elements modulate the
degree of awareness an individual must possess in order to merit blame for pillaging
natural resources. As we have seen, each of the three standards (awareness with cer-
tainty, awareness of a virtual certainty, and awareness of the probability) relate to the
illegality of the underlying resource transaction.259 In most circumstances, this illegality
is proved where the businessperson is aware that the resources in question are acquired
without the owner’s consent. As the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared “[w]
e deem it to be of the essence of the crime of plunder or spoliation that the owner be
deprived of his property involuntarily and against his will.”260 Nonetheless, because
usufruct acts as an exception to the need for consent, establishing intent in this scenario
requires proof of an awareness that the exploitation in question did not comply with the
law of usufruct.
120. The first means of establishing this awareness is to show that the exploitation
was not “carried out for the benefit of the local population.”261 Earlier in this manual,
we concluded that a range of factors are capable of proving this standard, including
situations where (a) the occupier uses proceeds from the sale to purchase weapons or to
finance the war effort more broadly; (b) where proceeds from resource rents only benefit
military or political élites; or (c) when the proceeds from illicit resource transactions are
repatriated to a foreign country or region beyond the occupied territory.262 The second
means of establishing this awareness, also articulated earlier, arises where the occupy-
ing army exploits resources at a rate that exceeds that “done in pre-occupation days.”263
In cases where occupying armies of rebel groups exploit state-owned immovable natural
resources from territories they control, the emphasis in pillage prosecutions will there-
fore shift to showing the business representative was aware of these elements, which
render the transaction illegal.
Further Reading
Elies van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law 46 (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003).
Roger S Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12(3) Criminal Law
Forum 291–334 (2001).
Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, pp. 99–116 (T.M.C. Asser Press,
2005).
XII. The Criminal Responsibility
of Corporations and
Their Representatives
Individual Criminal Responsibility of Business

Representatives
121. The traditional means of prosecuting corporate criminality involves indicting
representatives of a company in an individual capacity for crimes perpetrated during the
course of business. As early as 1701, a British court dismissed the corporate structure as
irrelevant in criminal trials of business representatives, declaring that “a corporation is
not indictable, but its individual members are.”264 This reasoning continues to govern
white-collar crime in common law jurisdictions, where individual business representa-
tives are frequently prosecuted for offenses like insider trading, tax evasion, and fraud.
Civil law states adopt the same approach. In Germany, for instance, the absence of
criminal liability of the corporate entity itself requires public prosecutors to “find out
individual allegations against single employees of the company and to accuse these
employees individually.”265 Other jurisdictions, such as France, have codified provi-
sions within the Criminal Code that formally stipulate that “the criminal responsibility
of the corporate entity does not exclude that of natural persons who are perpetrators or
75
accomplices to the same act”266 In all of these different systems, criminal courts are
perfectly capable of prosecuting business representatives for pillage perpetrated during
the course of commercial activities in a conflict zone. This chapter explains the legal
basis for and precedents supporting this form of individual criminal liability.
122. The individual liability of corporate representatives for war crimes such as pillage
is premised on the idea that civilians can be prosecuted for violations of the international
laws applicable during war. The liability of civilians for war crimes was made clear after
World War Two, when the Nuremberg Tribunal stated
that “[i]nternational law… binds every citizen just as
does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal
“[r]esponsibility does not when done by an officer of the Government are crimi-
automatically attach to an nal also when done by a private individual.”267 The
act proved to be criminal Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Proto-
merely by virtue of a col II signed several decades later contributed to the
defendant’s membership notion that the laws of war bind civilians by creat-
in the Vorstand [Company ing norms that bind rebel groups, even though these
Board]. Conversely, groups almost never negotiate or endorse the relevant
one may not utilize the treaties. Broad consensus has thus emerged that the
corporate structure to laws of war bind individuals even though they are not
achieve an immunity from party to the relevant international law treaties. As a
criminal responsibility reflection of this consensus, numerous domestic mili-
for illegal acts which he tary manuals now accept that “acts constituting war
directs, counsels, aids, crimes may be committed by combatants, noncomba-
orders, or abets.” tants, or civilians.”268
IG Farben Case, p. 1153.

123. A host of jurisprudence has ratified this the-
ory by convicting civilians of war crimes in practice.
In the Essen Lynching case, for instance, three German
civilians were convicted of murder as a war crime for their role in intercepting then kill-
ing captured British airmen. The civilians, who formed part of a local crowd that inter-
vened when the airmen were transported to a Luffewaffe base for interrogation, were
held criminally responsible for their part in throwing the captives from a bridge and
then firing upon the survivors.269 In the Hadamar trial, civilian personnel of a medical
institution located in Hadamar, Germany, were found guilty of the same offense for
administering lethal injections to over four hundred Russian and Polish nationals admit-
ted to their sanitarium.270 The convicted perpetrators included a chief administrative
officer, the institution’s bookkeeper, and a telephone switchboard operator.271 Elsewhere,
civilian judges and prosecutors were convicted of murder as a war crime for their role in
sham trials engineered to give the unlawful executions of prisoners the semblance of
legality.272
124. In a World War Two case of particular relevance, members of a German family
were convicted of pillage for retaining illegally-acquired property from a deported civil-
ian’s farm.273 In commenting on the this trial, the United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission described the verdict as “confirmation of the principle that laws and customs
of war are applicable not only to military personnel, combatants acting as members of
occupying authorities, or, generally speaking, to organs of the State and other public
authorities, but also to any civilian who violates these laws and customs.”274 A much
wider body of precedent also holds civil administrators, politicians, concentration camp
inmates and other civilians liable for war crimes.275 As one modern international crimi-
nal tribunal has found, “the laws of war must apply equally to civilians as to combatants
in the conventional sense.”276 On this basis, courts in Belgium and Switzerland have
convicted civilians of war crimes in recent years.277
125. A vast body of jurisprudence confirms that this reasoning is equally applicable to
individual corporate representatives acting in a commercial capacity. After World War
Two, the Nuremberg Judgment’s conclusion that crimes against international law “are
committed by men, not by abstract entities,” was deployed to ensure that the corpo-
rate structure did not shield business representatives from individual criminal liability.
As we have noted earlier in this manual, the IG Farben Judgment stipulated that “respon-
sibility does not automatically attach to an act proved to be criminal merely by virtue
of a defendant’s membership in the Vorstand [Board]. Conversely, one may not utilize
the corporate structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for illegal
acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets.”278 On the basis of this statement
and the practice reviewed, there is little doubt that the traditional approach to prosecut-
ing commercial actors for international crimes involves dispensing with the corporate
entity and assessing whether individual business representatives satisfy require-
ments for regular modes of liability such as aiding and abetting, instigating or direct
perpetration.
126. A number of courts, both historical and contemporary, have convicted individual
businessmen for various war crimes in accordance with this approach. Soon after the
close of hostilities in World War Two, two businessmen were convicted for murder as a
result of commercial transactions involving the supply of the industrial chemical Zyklon
B to the Nazi’s, cognizant that the merchandise was destined to asphyxiate civilians in
gas chambers.279 In concluding its review of this case, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission again described the affair as “a clear example of the application of the rule
T H E C R I M I N A L R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y O F C O R P O R AT I O N S A N D T H E I R R E P R E S E N TAT I V E S 77
that the provisions of the laws and customs of war are addressed not only to combat-
ants and to members of state and other public authorities, but to anybody who is in a
position to assist in their violation.”280
127. In more recent years, Dutch courts have also prosecuted businessmen for war
crimes.281 In one of these cases, a Dutch businessman named Frans Van Anraat was
convicted of inhuman treatment as a war crime for commercial transactions that
involved the sale of chemicals ultimately subjected upon Iraqi Kurds.282 The court held
Van Anraat personally responsible for transactions performed through intermediary
firms in which he was a leading figure. These subsidiaries supplied a total of 1,400
metric tons of a vital chemical precursor to the then government of the Republic of Iraq
knowing that the chemicals would used as mustard gas during the ongoing hostilities
against Iran.283 In sentencing Van Anraat to 17 years imprisonment for his complicity
in the war crimes that ensued, the appellate court cautioned that “[p]eople or companies
that conduct (international) trade, for example in weapons or raw materials used for
their production, should be warned that—if they do not exercise increased vigilance—
they can become involved in most serious criminal offences.”284
128. Modern international criminal courts have also convicted businesspeople for
these most serious international crimes. Before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, members of the commercial radio station Radio Station Milles Collines were
charged and convicted of incitement to genocide even though their calls for bloodshed
were made during their employment with a commercial broadcasting facility.285 Simi-
larly, the tribunal also convicted a tea factory director of genocide for failing to prevent
or punish acts of genocide perpetrated by his employees.286 Although these judgments
relate more to genocide than war crimes, they demonstrate the probable stance of courts
when called to adjudicate international offenses perpetrated by individuals acting in
commercial capacities. This same stance was evident from language adopted by an
internationalized court operating under UN mandate in Kosovo, which completed a
review of the principles governing the issue by stating that “not only military personnel,
members of government, party officials or administrators may be held liable for war
crimes, but also industrialists and businessmen, judges and prosecutors…”287 In short,
business representatives, like other civilians, can be convicted of war crimes.
129. Commercial actors engaged in the pillage of natural resources are prone to crimi-
nal sanction on this same legal basis. As previously noted, the IG Farben Judgment
defined pillage as “[w]here private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to
exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent
of the former owner.”288 In a classic illustration of the application of these standards to
corporate representatives for acts of pillage in which they personally participated, the
director of the Dresden Bank, Karl Rasche, was found guilty of pillage in a personal
capacity for his role in the transfers of Jewish property to German interests. According
to the court, Rasche was criminally culpable because the confiscations concerned were
“carried out under the control of the Dresdner Bank, whose policies in these respects
reflected the attitude and purposes of defendant Rasche.”289
130. The focus on assessing the individual responsibility of business representatives

evidenced in the Rasche trial also leads to the differentiated liability of company employ-
ees depending on their implication in specific transactions. In the IG Farben case,
Georg Von Schitzler was convicted of plunder for his role in the company’s exploitive
practices in France and Poland but discharged of responsibility for similar corporate
practices in Norway and Alsace-Lorraine.290 As justification for the partial acquittal, the
tribunal recalled that “[r]esponsibility does not automatically attach to an act proved to
be criminal merely by virtue of a defendant’s membership in the Vorstand [Board].”291
On the other hand, perpetrating, aiding, and abetting or instigating pillage of natural
resources renders individual business representatives guilty of a war crime.
Corporate Criminal Responsibility

131. While the concept of corporate criminal liability was discussed during the nego-
tiation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, states ultimately rejected the
proposal to include corporate criminal liability within the court’s jurisdiction.292 A large
number of domestic criminal courts, however, have jurisdiction over war crimes perpe-
trated by companies even if the International Criminal Court does not. The domestic
capacity to try corporate entities for criminal offenses was initially unique to Anglo-
American legal systems, but other jurisdictions have gradually adopted laws permit-
ting corporate criminal liability in the past decades. As a reflection of the growth, two
contemporary surveys of a limited number of national jurisdictions reveal that over
two dozen states in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australasia have promulgated laws
permitting the prosecution of corporate entities.293 This chapter explores the legal basis
upon which these criminal courts can assert jurisdiction over acts of pillage perpetrated
by corporate entities, and highlights the circumstances under which a corporation will
be attributed criminal blame for the offense.
132. Domestic legal systems adopt a number of different legislative techniques to

ensure that corporations might be prosecuted for violations of international criminal
law. Legal systems that favor the codification of a comprehensive criminal code often
dedicate a provision to corporate criminal liability among the preliminary provisions of
their code, before proceeding to prohibit war crimes elsewhere within the same legal
instrument. In Australia, for example, the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code
of 1995 initially states that “[t]his Code applies to bodies corporate in the same way as
it applies to individuals,”294 then later lists and defines pillage as a domestic criminal
offense.295 By implication, Australian courts can convict corporate entities of pillag
133. In other countries, an interpretative act enables prosecutors to charge companies

with war crimes that are defined in separate legislation. Section 35 of the Canadian
Interpretation Act, for example, states that “[i]n every enactment … ‘person’, or any
word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation.”296 Consequently,
the statement within the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act
that every “person” who commits a war crime is guilty of an indictable offense must
be read as including companies.297 British courts, likewise, will enjoy jurisdiction over
corporate entities responsible for pillage based on a strikingly similar legislation.298 In
the same vein, U.S. federal courts are also capable of prosecuting corporate entities for
pillage, because the terms of the Dictionary Act of 2000 compel an interpretation of
the American War Crimes Act of 1996 as conferring jurisdiction over corporate entities
for war crimes.299
134. Customary international law does not affect these domestic laws. In recent
months, a United States Court of Appeal rendered an opinion concluding that compa-
nies could not be sued pursuant to the American Alien Tort Statute for “violations of
the laws of nations,” on the grounds that “the concept of corporate liability for violations
of customary international law has not achieved universal recognition or acceptance
as a norm in the relations of States with each other.”300 This conclusion is certainly
controversial, but the controversy does not affect the ability of states to try corpora-
tions in accordance with the rules of domestic criminal legislation set out above. Most
importantly, a state is perfectly free to define its criminal law governing corporations in
terms that extend beyond the scope of customary international law, and states frequently
exercise this right when passing legislation implementing international crimes.301 Con-
sequently, customary international law has no bearing on the legislation set out in the
preceding paragraphs. As the majority in the US Appeals Court rightly recognized,
“[n]or does anything in this opinion limit or foreclose criminal, administrative, or civil
actions against any corporation under a body of law other than customary international
law—for example the domestic laws of any State.”302 Prosecutors, judges, and other
officials are therefore entitled to interrogate their own national legislation in assessing
the viability of prosecuting companies for pillage.
135. Courts adopt different standards for determining when a corporation is guilty
of a criminal offense, each of which relies on a different theory of blame attribution.
These different means of attributing criminal responsibility to a company fall into three
broad categories. The first holds companies vicariously liable for criminal offenses per-
petrated by company employees “within the scope of
his employment and with intent to benefit the cor-
poration.” This theory, which is frequently described
by reference to the latin phrase respondeat superior, “Companies convicted
holds the corporate entity vicariously liable for their of criminal offences are
employees’ criminal offenses perpetrated in the course vulnerable to a range
of business. Companies might therefore be convicted of important sanctions
for the pillage of natural resources in conflict zones in including pecuniary fines,
jurisdictions that adopt respondeat superior, provided at ‘imprisonment’ through
least one of their employees is implicated in the pil- court orders requiring
lage of conflict commodities. These countries include the company to suspend
Austria, South Africa, and the United States. business, or compulsory
compliance regimes
136. Other jurisdictions have opted for a more supervised by court-
restrictive model of corporate criminal responsibil- appointed managers.
ity that only holds a corporate entity criminally liable Courts can even issue a
when a senior member of the company’s management kind of corporate death
is responsible for the offense. In this model of cor- penalty by requiring that
porate criminal liability, only crimes perpetrated by a company be dissolved
senior management make the company criminal liabil- permanently.”
ity. In 1971, the British House of Lords affirmed this
Celia Wells, Corporations
so-called identification model on the grounds that only
and Criminal Responsibility,
sufficiently senior employees could constitute the cor-
p. 37.
poration’s “directing mind and will.”303 In more recent
years, legislation within Canada has also endorsed the
identification model of corporate criminal liability.
According to the amended Canadian Criminal Code, an organization is a party to the
offense requiring a specific intent if one of its “senior officers” is a party to an offense,
directs subordinates to commit an offense, or fails to intervene when cognizant of an
impending violation. The overarching condition that the senior officer’s conduct must
by motivated “at least in part to benefit the organization,” will generally describe the cor-
porate pillage of natural resources during war, which is almost invariably characterized
by the illegal acquisition of natural resources for corporate profit. Canadian and British
courts might thus hear allegations of corporate liability for pillage where evidence sug-
gests that senior management illegally acquired resource wealth from conflict zones.
137. The third and final method of attributing criminal liability to companies focuses
on failures in corporate culture. In certain jurisdictions, corporate entities operating
during armed violence can be convicted of pillage for their failure to create a corporate
policy that prevents the offense. In Australia, for instance, criminal courts can convict
companies of offenses for a body-corporate’s failure “to create and maintain a corporate
culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.”304 Likewise, according
to the terms of the Swiss Penal Code, a corporation can be criminally responsible inde-
pendently of the criminal liability of its employees “if the corporation can be said to
have not taken all reasonable and necessary organizational measures to prevent such
a breach.”305 While a rigorous analysis of whether these provisions couple with war
crimes will be essential in each particular jurisdiction, there are strong possibilities that
companies could be convicted of pillaging natural resources based on these standards.
The failure to instill a culture of respect for property rights in natural resources while
mining within a foreign conflict zone might thus give rise to corporate criminal liabil-
ity, especially where the company culture is entirely indifferent to the origins of these
natural resources.
138. Corporate criminal liability and the individual criminal liability of business repre-
sentatives should function in tandem. A number of experts agree that “a dual focus on
the firm and the individual is necessary. Neither can be safely ignored.”306 This seems
especially true in the context of liability for pillaging natural resources. On the one
hand, a range of factors militate in favor of prosecuting corporations—corporations are
better placed than state authorities to detect, prevent and sanction the illegal exploitation
of natural resources undertaken by their employees in foreign conflict zones, are often
too large to locate a specific representative who appropriated resources with the culpable
mental element, and are frequently more able to pay reparations to victims upon con-
viction.307 On the other, prosecuting individual business representatives is also vital in
certain circumstances. For example, smaller firms involved in trafficking conflict com-
modities are frequently dissolved after each illicit transaction as a means of subterfuge,
leaving individual criminal responsibility as the only feasible means of redress. There
is also broad recognition that only individual criminal liability is likely to create a disin-
centive that transcends the pressures of corporate culture,308 which seems particularly
important within the extractive industry. Thus, the dual use of corporate and individual
criminal liability will allow prosecutors to tailor their case to the circumstances and, as
the subsequent section shows, expands the number of jurisdictions capable of trying
the offense.
Further Reading
Anita Ramastray and Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict, Legal Rem-
edies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law: A Survey of
16 Countries, (2006) http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf.
Megan Donaldson and Rupert Watters, “Corporate Culture” as a Basis for the Criminal
Liability of Corporations, Prepared by Allens Arthur Robinson for the United Nations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Business, (Feb.
2008) http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-
Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf.
Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities (Albin Eser et al. eds., 1999).
XIII. Jurisdiction
Active Personality—Jurisdiction Based on Nationality

139. The first and most compelling basis for prosecuting commercial actors for the
pillage of natural resources involves state prosecutors bringing charges against their
own companies or business representatives. The so called “nationality” or “active per-
sonality” principle entitles states to assert criminal jurisdiction over offenses perpetrated
by their nationals overseas. The concept extends to companies registered within a state’s
jurisdiction as well as individual citizens operating abroad. In common law jurisdic-
tions, war crimes are widely recognized as one of this limited category of offenses that
warrant extra-territorial application. In the United Kingdom, for instance, active person-
ality attaches to a limited series of explicitly defined offenses including war crimes.309
British courts, therefore, have a strong claim to jurisdiction over corporate entities
alleged to have pillaged natural resources in conflict zones. While the United States has
also adopted active personality in relation to only a limited range of criminal offenses,
the U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996 also includes provisions that confer criminal jurisdic-
tion on U.S. federal courts over pillage perpetrated by “a national of the United States,”
regardless of whether the offense occurred “inside or outside the United States.”310 The
act thus furnishes federal courts with jurisdiction over both American companies and
citizens alleged to have perpetrated pillage in foreign conflicts.
85
140. In the vast majority of civil law systems, active personality is a general principle
of criminal jurisdiction governing even minor criminal infractions. Thus in Spain, for
example, acts considered by Spanish criminal law to be crimes are susceptible to pros-
ecution before local courts, “even if they are committed outside the national territory.”311
The active personality principle has gained such a strong foothold within continental
legal traditions that the Swedish Supreme Court has even upheld convictions for viola-
tions of the Swedish traffic code committed on foreign roads.312 These principles have
profound implications for a state’s ability to investigate and prosecute acts of pillage
perpetrated by companies and their representatives.
141. Other states are also capable of investigating and charging companies and their
representatives for pillage based on active personality jurisdiction. A recent survey of a
portion of criminal jurisdictions reveals that the vast majority of states surveyed extend
domestic criminal jurisdiction to crimes of nationals committed overseas.313 These
states include countries as diverse as Argentina, Japan, and South Africa. To provide
one illustration, Russian courts could have exercised jurisdiction over the infamous
Russian arms smuggler Viktor Bout for what a UN panel of experts described as a lead-
ing role in the transportation of illegally acquired natural resources from theaters of
war to Western markets.314 There are thus established jurisdictional grounds that allow
foreign courts to adjudicate allegations of pillage when law enforcement mechanisms
within war-torn societies are no longer functioning adequately. These jurisdictional
bases, which will vary according to the country concerned, can generally be identified
in criminal codes or specific legislation governing international crimes.
Further Reading
Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law (Cavendish, 2nd e., 2003),
p. 152 .
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge, 7th
ed., 1997), p. 111.
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, 2003), pp 281–282.
Universal Jurisdiction
142. Universal jurisdiction provides another basis upon which states can investigate
and prosecute corporations or their representatives for pillaging natural resources. The
often controversial notion of universal jurisdiction has developed based on the idea
that certain offenses are sufficiently grave that all states can assert criminal jurisdiction
over the perpetrators regardless of where the offenses took place or the nationality of
the respective participants. War crimes clearly meet the requisite degree of gravity. As
a Swiss Military Court found when exercising universal jurisdiction over a Rwandan
mayor accused of war crimes, “given their qualification as war crimes, these infractions
are intrinsically very serious.”315 War crimes are also widely regarded as peremptory in
character and thus enjoy a higher rank in the international hierarchy of norms than
treaty law or even ordinary customary rules. The Kupreškić Trial Judgment affirmed this
proposition in declaring that “most norms of international humanitarian law, in par-
ticular those prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also
peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overrid-
ing character.”316 On the strength of a comprehensive synthesis of state practice on the
subject, the International Committee of the Red Cross has also concluded that “[s]tates
have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war crimes.”317
143. There are at least two different variations of universal jurisdiction. One group of
states has enacted a more restrained form of universality that requires the presence of
the accused within the state’s territory before jurisdiction can be asserted. In Canada,
the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act provides that any person who has
committed a war crime within or outside Canada may be prosecuted on the condition
that the accused is present in Canada after the offense was committed.318 This jurisdic-
tional principle may allow the investigation and prosecution of foreign companies or
their representatives who, aside from operating in war zones, also maintain offices or
carry out commerce within Canadian borders. One might therefore anticipate a more
frequent exercise of universal jurisdiction conditional upon the presence of the author
within countries that enjoy this jurisdictional capacity in response to allegations of cor-
porate pillage, especially given the ever increasing mobility of commercial actors within
a globalized market.
144. Other states have enacted an unconditional or pure rendition of universal juris-
diction, which presents states with even greater possibilities for the judicial scrutiny
of corporate pillage. These unconditional versions of universal jurisdiction formally
disregard the requirement that the accused be present within the territory. The Ger-
man Code of Crimes against International Law states that “[t]his Act shall apply to
all criminal offences against international law designated under this Act, to serious
criminal offences designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad and
bears no relation to Germany.”319 In declining to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by
this article over acts of torture allegedly committed by Donald Rumsfeld and others in
Afghanistan, Cuba, and Iraq, the German prosecutor general insisted that she retained a
discretion not to proceed in cases committed abroad “if a perpetrator is neither present
JURISDICTION 87
in the country nor can be expected to be present.”320 Nonetheless, according to German
criminal procedure, this discretion will not exist when the perpetrator is German or
located within German territory.321 This not only covers German business representa-
tives operating abroad, it also has consequences for foreign businesses that operate
within Germany.
145. Other courts, particularly in Spain, have already proved willing to exercise uncon-
ditional universal jurisdiction over individuals for pillaging natural resources. In Febru-
ary 2008, a Spanish judge confirmed the indictment of several high ranking Rwandan
military officials for a range of international crimes that included the pillage of natural
resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.322 In particular, the court indicted
the chief of staff of the Rwandan Army for the pillage of natural resources, ignoring that
an official Belgian Parliamentary Commission indicated that the same Rwandan official
habitually sold minerals to a series of companies jointly owned by a Swiss national.323
As previous chapters of this manual demonstrate, there is little legal basis for distin-
guishing between the indicted Rwandan military leader who extracted the resources and
the Swiss businessman who purchased the proceeds. Although changes to the Spanish
law on universal jurisdiction now mean that this case will proceed on the basis that nine
of the victims were Spanish, the case remains an important illustration of the potential
of universal jurisdiction. It is plausible that universal jurisdiction could be employed
to charge businesses and their representatives implicated in the illegal acquisition of
natural resources from war zones.
Further Reading
Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives

(Oxford Univ. Press, 2003).
Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and The Prosecution Of Serious Crimes Under Inter-
national Law (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
The Jurisdiction of International Courts

146. The final series of courts capable of exercising jurisdiction over the pillage of nat-
ural resources are international. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for instance, could
indict foreign corporate representatives involved in the pillage of diamonds during the
Sierra Leonean wars. The same is true of other internationalized criminal tribunals,
which serves as important cautions to commercial actors in contemporary conflicts,
since each of these courts was established after the conflict was underway in order to
enforce international criminal norms like pillage, which were perpetrated prior to the
tribunals’ establishment. The creation of similar ad hoc bodies might thus create seri-
ous risks of criminal liability for companies implicated in the illicit trade of natural
resources during war.
147. The International Criminal Court, however, is the more likely venue for prosecu-
tion of corporate representatives in the pillage of natural resources. Unlike its various
ad hoc predecessors, the International Criminal Court enjoys the ability to commence
proceedings in a large number of states, either against nationals of states parties to
the court’s statute or in relation to citizens of non-states parties who have perpetrated
international crimes within the territory of a member state. In other words, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court has jurisdiction over Belgian and British nationals who perpetrate
pillage in Iraq, but also over American or Chinese business representatives responsible
for pillaging natural resources from the Congolese conflict and other situations within
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.324
148. The ICC prosecutor appears to be aware of this potential. In a press release dated
July 16, 2003, his office publicly acknowledged that “various reports have pointed to
links between the activities of some African, European, and Middle Eastern companies
and the atrocities taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo... Their activities
allegedly include gold mining, the illegal exploitation of oil, and the arms trade.”325 The
statement then cautioned that “[t]he Office of the Prosecutor is establishing whether
investigations and prosecutions on the financial side of the alleged atrocities are being
carried out in the relevant countries.”326 The warning was subsequently reissued in
more striking terms during an address to the United Nations General Assembly several
months later. During the address, the prosecutor personally reported that:
[d]ifferent armed groups have taken advantage of the situation of generalised

violence and have engaged in the illegal exploitation of key mineral resources
such as cobalt, coltan, copper, diamonds and gold… Those who direct mining
operations, sell diamonds or gold extracted in these conditions, launder the dirty
money or provide weapons could also be authors of the crimes, even if they are
based in other countries.327
149. Statements of this sort not only identify the availability of a supranational juris-
diction capable of adjudicating acts of pillage perpetrated by business representatives,
they also impart a degree of pressure on national courts to exercise other forms of
jurisdiction over these offenses. To conclude this manual, we now turn to a range of
other formal legal obligations that compel states to exercise jurisdiction over pillage.
JURISDICTION 89
XIV. The Obligation to Prosecute
150. States not only enjoy jurisdiction over acts of pillage; there are also a range of
obligations to investigate and prosecute appropriate cases. The obligations stem from
a range of sources in both international law and domestic criminal law. Together, these
legal duties create an overlapping network of pressures that are likely to affect a prosecu-
tor’s exercise of discretion when faced with allegations of commercial pillage. Moreover,
they also create positive duties on states that may have implications for international
institutions, political bodies, and government officials faced with these issues. In this
chapter, we briefly outline several of these obligations.
151. The laws of war themselves create an obligation to investigate and prosecute acts
of pillage. At the end of World War Two, signatories to the Geneva Conventions agreed
to “search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before
its own courts.”328 Although pillage is not technically a grave breach of the Geneva Con-
ventions, there is significant evidence that customary international law now extends the
same duty to all war crimes. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross’
study of customary international humanitarian law concludes that states must “inves-
tigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their
territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”329 Given that both corporations
and businesspeople are nationals of states, the obligation implies a duty to prosecute
both entities for pillaging natural resources.
91
152. The notion of “complementarity” in the Statute of the International Criminal
Court creates another legal incentive for domestic courts to investigate and prosecute
acts of commercial pillage that fall within their jurisdiction. In simple terms, a case
of commercial pillage will only be admissible before the ICC if national courts that
enjoy jurisdiction are “unwilling” or “unable” to bring proceedings.330 In at least one
recent instance, this rule has forced British courts to try their own soldiers for war
crimes allegedly perpetrated in Iraq.331 Along with the prosecution of Dutch business
representatives for war crimes before courts within the Netherlands in the past decade,
the British trial suggests that the pressure of complementarity may have implications
for allegations of commercial liability for pillage. This is especially true when the ICC
prosecutor announces that “[t]hose who direct mining operations, sell diamonds or
gold extracted in these conditions… could also be authors of the crimes, even if they are
based in other countries.”332 This manual has provided guidance on the law necessary
to achieve that possibility.
153. In other circumstances, resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil impart another layer of legal duty to prosecute specific allegations of commercial
pillage. For instance, after a United Nations panel of experts alleged that a large number
of predominantly Western companies had illegally exploited natural resources from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo between the years 2000 and 2003, the UN Security
Council issued resolution 1457 urging all states to “conduct their own investigations,
including as appropriate through judicial means.”333 Later, the council issued resolution
1499 insisting that information should be provided to relevant governments to enable
them to “take appropriate action according to their national laws and international
obligations.”334 As a matter of international law, UN Security Council resolutions of this
sort that are issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are formally binding on all
member states of the United Nations. The war crime of pillage provides the substantive
framework that enables states to comply with these obligations.
154. Certain domestic criminal jurisdictions also contain obligations for courts to
hear allegations of pillage, primarily by restricting the scope of discretion open to
prosecutors. In a number of civil law countries, for instance, a doctrine called partie
civile enables victims or their representatives to bring charges directly before criminal
courts.335 To cite one apt example, a group of nongovernmental organizations recently
used partie civile to lodge a criminal complaint against the multinational timber
company Dalhoff, Larsen, and Horneman for allegedly receiving stolen timber during
the Liberian civil war.336 In an appropriate context, partie civile could also be used to
initiate a criminal charge for pillaging natural resources. Similarly, the German doctrine
of Legalitätsprinzip implies mandatory prosecution of all provable cases within the
jurisdiction. Although there are numerous exceptions, this principle would appear to
extend to business representatives from or resident in Germany.337 These domestic
obligations to investigate and prosecute crimes compliment the international duties
identified above. In unison, these obligations promote a resurgence of commercial
liability for pillaging natural resources in the modern era.
T H E O B L I G AT I O N T O P R O S E C U T E 93
XV. Annex 1:
Table of Cases
95
96
Case Source Page No. Incident Location Property Type Perpetrator Incident Description Civil or Domestic Verdict
Name Name Type Criminal Equivalent
IG Farben Trials of War 1143 Boruta Factory Poland Factory, land, Businessman Farben requested and received a lease from the Reich Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals buildings, Ministry of Economics to manage the Boruta factory,
machinery, which was located in territory occupied by Germany.
equipment Although competition was fierce, Farben ultimately
purchased the “land, buildings, machinery, equipment.”
IG Farben Trials of War 1143-1144 Winnica Poland Plant and Businessman Although Farben acquired the French shares in the Criminal Theft Partially
Criminals Factory equipment Winnica factory, there was not sufficient evidence that Guilty
the French were coerced. There was evidence of plunder
of plant equipment.
IG Farben Trials of War 1144-46 Norsk-Hydro Norway Shares Businessman The Norwegian company Norsk-Hydro, which was Criminal Theft Guilty
C O R P O R AT E W A R C R I M E S
Criminals owned by French shareholders, was forced to participate
in the Nodisk-Lettmetall project with Farben and the
German Reich. The French majority shareholding in
Norsk-Hydro was converted in a minority shareholding
at a meeting, which the French shareholders were
prevented from attending.
IG Farben Trials of War 1146-47 Mulhausen France Factory Businessman The plant was initially leased to Farben by the German Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Plant chief of civili administration, then after a formal decree
of seizure and confiscation transferring the property to
the Reich, it was sold to Farben. “Farben acquired these
plants from the German government.”
IG Farben Trials of War 1147 Strassbourg- France Factory Businessman In the case of the oxygen and acetylene plants, referred Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Schiltigheim to as Strassbourg-Schiltigheim, similar action was taken
by Farben. After first taking a lease, Farben proceeded
to, and did, acquire permanent title to the plants
following the governmental confiscation.
IG Farben Trials of War 1147 Diedenhofen France Factory Businessman Although the plant was leased by Farben, the Tribunal Criminal Receiving Not Guilty
Criminals found that there was no evidence that Farben ever
acquired title or that the lease was without the owner’s
consent.
IG Farben Trials of War 1147 Francolor France Shares Businessman Farben coerced three of the major French dyestuff Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Agreement producers to enter into a new company called Francolor
in which Farben enjoyed a majority interest. The French
companies only reluctantly agreed when Germans
refused to issue licences, cut off raw material, and the
Vichy government consented.
IG Farben Trials of War 1151 Rhône-Poulec France Factory Businessman Although Farben threatened to strangle the supply of Criminal Theft Not Guilty
Criminals natural resources and bring illegitimate patent claims,
this did not amount to plunder because the Rhone-
Poulec factory was not in occupied territory and could
not be physically seized.
IG Farben Trials of War 1152 Continental Russia Oil Businessman Whilst Farben made elaborate plans to plunder Russia, Criminal Receiving Not Guilty
Criminals Oil Company they were never completed and there was inadequate
evidence to link Farben to plunder in the Russian
theatre.
Singapore Oil Singapore Oil Singapore Oil Military The Japanese Army seized crude oil owner by three Civil Theft Damages
Stocks Stocks Dutch companies and exploited it during the war. When to owners
the British recaptured the area, they claimed that the oil of conces-
was captured as war booty and therefore passed into the sions
hands of the British. The court found that the Japanese
had committed “economic plunder”.
Krupp Trials of War 1348 Austin Plant France Factory Businessman Krupp leased the Austin plant from an administrator Criminal Conversion Guilty
Criminals appointed by the German occupier, who had seized the
plant because it was Jewish-owned.
Krupp Trials of War 1351 Paris Office France Offices Businessman The Krupp firm’s representative in Paris, Walter Stein, Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals acting as attorney-in-fact for Krupp Essen, obtained a Receiving
lease of the property with right to purchase it within
6 months after the date of the lease. The deal was not
made with the rightful owners of the premises but from
the provisional administrator of the Societe Bacri Freres
by virtue of a decision of a commissariat for Jewish
questions.
Krupp Trials of War 1350, 1353 Austin France Machinery Businessman Krupp purchased machinery from a German appointed Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Machinery adminsitrator, who had seized it from a Jewish owner.
Krupp paid “a ridiculously low price” for the machinery
and the court found six representatives guilty of
plundering the property “by purchasing and removing
the machinery.”
Krupp Trials of War 1353-1358 ELMAG Plant France Machinery Businessman Krupp removed several pieces of machinery it had Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals initially illegally leased from a German adminstrator.
The true owners, a French company known in German
A N N E X 1 : TA B L E O F C A S E S
as ELMAG, were deprived of large numbers of machines
when the Germans retreated from France.
97
98
Krupp Trials of War 1358 Alsthom Plant France Machinery Businessman The Krupp firm dismantled and used several bending Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals machines for the production of submarines. Alsthom, Receiving
the owner of the machines, objected and refused
to pay the price offered on a number of occasions.
Subsequently, Krupp declared that it considered that the
machine was confiscated by the German Inspectorate
and that it was for them to settle the affair.
Krupp Trials of War 1361 Other French France Machinery Businessman The Krupp firm obtained this machinery from the local Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals Plants French economy, partly through their own efforts, and Receiving
partly through those of various government offices.
Some French machines were obtained from booty
depots. Some were directly requisitioned from French
firms, with payment offered to the owners after the
confiscation. Some were purchased by Krupp through
its representatives in Paris.
Krupp Trials of War 1361 ROGES Europe Household goods, Businessman ROGES, the German Raw Material Trading Company, Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals raw materials, seized goods in conjunction with the German military
textiles, machines, or purchased goods through the black market. “The
tools, shoes, scrap Krupp firm received wares and goods of all kinds from
metal ROGES.” Krupp also knew of the source of these goods,
because the items were sent without an invoice and a
price was later settled with ROGES.
Krupp Trials of War 1364 Holland Holland Fire-tubes, iron for Businessman Between 1942 and Sept 1944, the German authorities Criminal Receiving, Guilty
Criminals Phase I reinforced concrete seized products owned by Dutch municipal and private Theft
and shaped iron enterprises, which were then shipped by Krupp to
Germany. “The prices for these goods were arbitrarily
set by the German authorities without the consent or
approval of the Dutch owners.”
Krupp Trials of War 1366 Rademaker Holland Machinery Businessman A member of the Reich Ministry for War Production Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals came to the factory with a requisition order. The
following day he returned with Krupp firm to dismantle
and remove machines.
Krupp Trials of War 1368 De Vries Holland Zinc wire, bolts, Businessman In April 1944, the De Vries firm was advised by the Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Robbe and nuts Reich Ministry for Armament and War Production that
it had been placed under Krupp’s sponsorship. German
military authorities carried away wire, bolts and nuts,
which were shipped to Krupp. Krupp then came and
designated machinery that was also shipped to them.
Krupp Trials of War 1369 Lips Firm Holland Machinery Businessman In December 1944, members of Krupp came to the Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Lips plant, removed machinery and threatened that
they would call the Wehrmacht if the company did not
co-operate. “Active resistance was impossible, but
the Lips owners refused to accept money in order to
emphasise that the transaction was forced.”
Flick Trials of War 1205 Rombach Lorraine Factory Businessman Flick leased a factory in Lorraine owned by French Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals industrialists. The court (wrongly) decided that the
seizure was justified by military necessity, but found that
retaining possession violated the Hague Regulations.
Flick invested all profits into the factory, only because he
expected to acquire title. “While the original seizure may
not have been unlawful, its subsequent detention from
the rightful owners was wrongful.”
Flick Trials of War 1209 Vairogs Latvia Factory Businessman Flick acted as a trustee of this factory, that the Germans Criminal Theft Not Guilty
Criminals invested in significantly in order to reactivate. There
was no plunder because evidence suggested that raw
materials for production came from Germany. The
capital for operations came from the German state.
Flick Trials of War 1209-1210 Dnjepr Stahl Ukraine Factory Businessman Flick acted as a trustee of the Dnjepr Stahl property. Criminal Theft, Not Guilty
Criminals The trusteeship was negotiated with the BHO (Germany Receiving
government body), which the Court (wrongly) concluded
had a right of usufruct over the property. In our opinion,
this decision is anomolous.
Roechling Trials of War 1112 Warehouse Meurthe- Warehouse stocks Businessman Hermann Roechling was found guilty of plunder for Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals stock et-Moselle, having sold warehouse stocks in a firm he had no
France authority to govern.
99
100
Roechling Trials of War 1112–1113 Société Moselle, Factory, iron ore Businessman From February 1941 to March 1944 Goering had the iron Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Lorraine France works in the Moselle divided among various German
Miniere et firms (with the right to acquire the plants by purchase
Métallurgique from the German government after the cessation of
hostilities) ; in this connection Hermann Roechling
had the plants of the Société Lorraine Miniere et
Métallurgique at Thionville (Karlshuette) assigned to
him, the management of which already devolved upon
him by virtue of his administrative office. The court
explicitly found that “Knowingly to accept a stolen
object from the thief constitutes the crime of receiving
stolen goods”. The court concluded that in total 100
milion tons of iron ore was exploited in the region,
and that H. was guilty because the factories “produced
maximum quotas for the German war potential.”
Roechling Trials of War 1113, 1124 Tréfileries Moselle, Factory, iron ore Businessman In April 1941 Hermann Roechling was also assigned the Criminal Receiving, Guilty
Criminals et Cableries France “Trefileries et Cableries Julien Wuerth at Reichshoffen,” Theft(?)
Julien Wuerth which he had leased since June 1940. In order to put
the plant into operation he had ordered several months
prior that his cousin acquire machinery from France.
The court concluded that in total 100 milion tons of iron
ore was exploited in the region, and that H. was guilty
because the factories “produced max. quotas for the
German war potential.”
Roechling Trials of War 1115 Roechling Holland, Machinery Businessman Hermann Roechling was convicted for removing Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Machines Belgium, the rolling mill of Ymuiden in Holland, the Halles
France D’Angleur-Arthus in Belgium, and a 950-ton iron
framework in Meuthe-et-Moselle. The court found that
“he is guilty… for taking away essential equipment
belonging to factories in those countries.”
Roechling Trials of War 1116, 1120 French France Credit Businessman Hermann Roechling was found guilty of plunder for Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Government having induced the French government to credit a
Credit German company with 180 million francs, which were
used to reduce Roechlings debts while selling material
at less than cost to the German government.
Roechling Trials of War 1116 ROGES France Machinery, Raw Businessman Hermann Roechling was guilty of plunder for Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Materials purchasing “booty” from ROGES, the official German
Raw Materials Trading Company, knowing that it
was illegally seized. The court found that Reochling
purchased RM558,000 from the purchasing department
(which was presumably legal) and RM175,000 from
the booty department (which was not legal). The court
found that “Hermann Roechling, like all other German
industrialists in the same circumstances, was a receiver
of looted property.”
Roechling Trials of War 1118 Societe Lorsar France Metal Products Businessman The Societe Lorsar was a Paris based subsidiary of Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Roechling, which was procurement agency for the
German Army. It procured somewhere between 500 and
120 million francs of metal products for the Germans,
although these were only nominally paid for through
a fictious “clearing account,” which was in fact forced
credit never repaid
Roechling Trials of War 1118 Perrin Patents France Patents Businessman Hermann was charged with plundering patents Criminal Patent Not Guilty
Criminals concerning the steel production methods of a rival, Violation
but the court held that he only threatened to do so and
never made good on the threat. Essentially, the seizure
never took place.
Roechling Trials of War 1122 Societe de France Finance Businessman Ernest Roechling was convicted for his role in a French Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Credits et company that “aimed at obtaining participations in the
d’Ivestisse- business capital of French enterprises, in order thereby
ments to increase the Reich war potential.” The reasoning
is suspicious, since it is unclear that the transactions
facilititated pillage.
Ministries Trials of War 691 von Europe Occupation Minister von Weizaecker, the Secretary of State of the German Criminal Theft, Fraud Not Guilty
Criminals Weizaecker indemnities, Foreign Office, was found not guilty of plunder because
clearing accounts, there was no evidence that “he bore responsbility for
foreign investments the spoliation program in the West, or took such part
cultural objects in the administration thereof as to make him criminally
liable.”
101
102
Ministries Trials of War 695 Continental Soviet Oil Businessman Keppler was originally a manufacturer and businessman, Criminal Theft Not Guilty
Criminals Oil Company Union who was made deputy-chairman of the Continental
Oil company, which plundered Soviet oil. The Court
acquitted him, stating that “from the evidence, we
cannot draw the conclusion that he participated or
directed the Continental Oil Company, in its spoliation
activities or programs.”
Ministries Trials of War 695 DUT Poland Furniture Businessman Keppler was convicted of plunder for his role as Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals chairman of an organization established by the Nazi’s
called the “Deutsche Umsiedlungs-Treuhandgesellschaft
(DUT).” The company was reasonable for administering
deportees’ property, particularly furniture. The Court
found that Keppler’s participation in the seizures and
administration of this property constituted plunder.
Ministries Trials of War 697 Food Europe Food Minister Darre was Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture. Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Darre was found guilty of plunder for exploiting food
and agricultral products from occupied Europe in total
disregard of the needs of the local populations.
Ministries Trials of War 701 Lammers Europe Food, art, cultural Minister Lammers was Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals objects, furniture, Chancellery. Lammers was convicted of plunder for his
mining rights role in issuing laws and decrees that served as a pretext
for plundering property in the Netherlands, Poland
and Russia; seizing food and mining rights in Poland;
stealing art and cultural treasures in occupied Europe;
and illegally acquiring Jewish household goods in Paris.
Ministries Trials of War 720 Coal Decree Poland Coal Civil Servant Stuckart, a civil servant active in the German agency Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals charged with spoliation of Polish property (Main Trustee
Office East), was found guilty for having signed a decree
that provided for the assignment of the coal mines for
the so-called Incorporated Eastern Territories to the
district of the Upper Silesian Coal Management, and
“gave the Reich Minister of Economy wide and arbitrary
powers with respect to the coal industry thus taken
over.”
Ministries Trials of War 720 Polish Poland Money, shares, Civil Servant Stuckart, a civil servant active in the German agency Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Valuables mortgages, deeds, charged with spoliation of Polish property (Main Trustee
Decree gold, silver, precious Office East), was found guilty for having signed a decree
stones that provided for the expropriation various property
in Poland. The property included “Money, specie,
bills, stocks and other securities of all kinds; bills of
exchange and checks; mortgages and land charge deeds;
unclaimed gold and silver; foreign exchange; cut and
uncut precious stones; and other valuables.”
Ministries Trials of War 725 Eastern Art Poland Food, art Civil Servant Berger was chief of the political directing staff of the Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Treasures Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. He
was acquitted of plundering art and food, as a result of
a lack of evidence that he was implicated in spoliation
programs.
Ministries Trials of War 730 Poland Food, ore, Civil Servant, Koerner was Goering’s deputy, and had various roles Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals petroleum Businessman as a civil servant and in various mining companies. He
was convicted of plundering food, ore and petroleum in
Poland through the issuance of directives to that effect.
Ministries Trials of War 731 Brick Works Poland Factory Businessman Koerner was also convicted, in his capacity as Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals representative of the Herman Goering Works, for
receiving considerable property including earth works.
The Tribunal stated that “[t]hrough the HTO much
property was plundered and taken over by the Reich.
Attention is called to the fact that defendant Koerner
was chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of the Hermann
Goering Works, which organization, according to a
report in evidence, was the recipient of considerable
property seized in Poland through the Main Trustee
Office East. Notable among the property thus
mentioned were certain brick works.”
Ministries Trials of War 734 Russian Oil Russia Steel, oil, and food Civil Servant, Koerner was Goering’s deputy. He held various Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals and Food Businessman positions as a civil servant and on the boards of mining
Meeting industries. He was convicted for plunder in Russia for
having indicated at a top secret meeting that, “The
economic command in the newly occupied territories
should direct its activities to extracting the maximum
quantities of goods required for the war effort,
particularly steel, mineral oil, and food. All other points
103
of view should take second place.”
104
Ministries Trials of War 738 Poldihuette Czecho- Factory, profits Businessman Pleiger held managerial roles within the Hermann Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Steel slovakia Goering Works. In exchange for another Polish factory
the HGW had illegally seized, Pleiger convinced the
owners of Poldihuette to issue new shares in the
company and gift them to the HGW. In so doing, HGW
acquired a 75% share in Poldhuette, one of the world’s
largest steel refining enterprises. Pleiger was convicted
of plundering Poldihuette and the profits that resulted
from the enterprise.
Ministries Trials of War 738 Vitkovice Coal Czecho- Factory, profits Businessman Pleiger managed Hermann Goering Works. HGW Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals slovakia acquired, apparently without consent, Vitkovice Coal
works and exploited the factory without concern for the
needs of the population. The profits were placed at the
Reich Marshall’s disposition.
Ministries Trials of War 739, 741 Polish Iron Poland Factory, machinery Businessman The Hermann Georing Works, and Pleiger as its Criminal Receiving, Guilty
Criminals Works representative, was assigned two iron works and Theft
foundries in Poland by the German High Command.
Although the assignment was initially by way of lease,
it provided for means to acquire the works permanently
and Pleiger sought to exercise these rights. During
the period HGW controlled the factories, hundreds of
machines were expropriated.
Ministries Trials of War 741 Plundered Poland Coal Businessman Pleiger was convicted for plundering coal from mines. Criminal Receiving, Guilty
Criminals Coal “We find further spoliation activities in Poland by Theft
Pleiger in behalf of the Hermann Goering Works in
connection with the coal mines in Upper Silesia” “on
23 July 1940, [HTO] gave to the Hermann Goering
Works a so-called “trusteeship” of all peat coal mines
in Upper Silesia. Subsequently, certain of these coal
enterprises were by the Reich government transferred to
a subsidiary of the Hermann Goering Works… there was
taken from such coal mines in 1940, 62,000 tons; 1941,
62,400 tons; 1942, 69,300 tons; 1943, 74,800 tons; and
in 1944, 77,900 tons, and that of these amounts two-
thirds went to Germany.
Ministries Trials of War 744 Russian Russia Manganese, coal, Businessman Pleiger was also the manager of a company named Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Manganese ron, ore BHO. In that capacity, he was convicted of plundering
manganese ore, iron mines, coal and ore mining in
Russia. According to the Court, he himself reported that
BHO had mined 110,000 tons of manganese in 1942
from Russian sources.
Ministries Trials of War 753 Czech Banks Czecho- Banks, credit Civil servant Kehrl was convicted of plundering Czech banks in Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals slovakia Bohemia-Moravia
Ministries Trials of War 755 Bruenner- Czecho- Factories Civil servant “There is ample credible evidence in the record to Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals Waffen slovakia satisfy beyond reasonable doubt that such acquisitions Coercion
were accomplished in no small measure through
coercive measures.” “It was not necessary for Mr. Kehrl
to threaten us personally. We were quite aware of who
Mr. Kehrl was, and Mr. Kehrl never made any secret
of it. For example, when, immediately after 15 March,
he came to Prague and said that he had to take over
armament concerns for Goering, we realized what was
going on; in our position such suggestions were orders
of the Reich authorities, the Reich government, and all
the power of the Third Reich.”
Ministries Trials of War 758 Vitkovice Coal Czecho- Factories Civil Servant Kehrl was convicted of plundering the Vitkovice Coal Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals slovakia Factory, but detailing Louis Rothschild, then negotiating Coercion
with the other Rothchilds in order to secure their
holding in the plant. Although the agreement of sale
was never fully completed, Kehrl played a vital role in
taking possession of the plant and controlling it.
Ministries Trials of War 760 Aryanization Czecho- Factories Civil Servant Kehrl was convicted of plunder for his role in planning Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals slovakia and organizing the confiscation of businesses in Coercion
occupied Czeckoslovakia. “The Czech stockholders
either had to sell their stocks or become unimportant
minorities…” Kehrl was convicted for his “active
participation in the acquisition and control of these
industries.”
Ministries Trials of War 763 Kehrl Plan France, Raw materials, Civil Servant Kehrl was convicted of plunder for hundred of Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Belgium wool, cotton, flax thousands of tons of wool, cotton, flax and rags in
Belgium and France.
105
106
Ministries Trials of War 769 Ostfaser Russia Raw materials, Businessman Kehrl was found guilty of plunder in his capacity as Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals G.m.b.H wool, textiles, chairman of various companies exploiting raw materials
cellulose, paper from Russia.
Ministries Trials of War 773 BEB Bank Czecho- Bank Businessman Rasche, the chairman of the Dresdner Bank, was Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals slovakia found guilty of plunder for having coerced owners of
the BEB Bank to decrease their shareholding in the
bank, then issue new shares in favour of the Dresdner
Bank. The court found that “the BEB was taken over
and dominated by the Dresdner Bank and Rasche, by
and through coercive police-state measures, including
the use of threats and concentration camps and
Aryanization of holdings in such bank...”
Ministries Trials of War 776 Aryanization Czecho- Jewish property Businessman Rasche, the chairman of the Dresdner Bank, was found Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals slovakia guilty of plunder for his involvement in the spoliation
of jewish proerty through Aryanization. The court found
that “The foregoing references allude to but a small part
of the evidence, which establishes clearly that Rasche
participated with the Dresdner Bank in the Reich’s
indefensible program of Aryanization in connection with
the illegal program of spoliation of Czechoslovakian
economy.”
Ministries Trials of War 777 Rothschild– Czecho- Shares Businessman Rasche, the chairman of the Dresdner Bank, was found Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals Gutmann slovakia guilty of plundering the Rothschild-Gutmann share Coercion
in the Vitkovice steel plants. Rasche obtained the
“consent” for the sale by negotiating with one of the
Rothschild owners while he was held by the Gestapo.
This was highly coercive.
Ministries Trials of War 778 Handelstrust Netherlands Various properties Businessman “It is amply proved that, through coercion, Aryanization Criminal Theft, Guilty
Criminals West tactics, and other police-state measures, vast amounts Receiving
of property were transferred to German interests,
and that the Dresdner Bank and Rasche took an
active part in various ways in such nefarious traffic.
In Holland, this was largely done through the agency
of the Handelstrust West, a concern organized and
controlled by the Dresdner Bank as a subsidiary. The
Aryanization activities and the traffic in confiscated
property in Holland, as carried out by this agency, it is
abundantly proved, was extensive and was carried out
under the control of the Dresdner Bank, whose policies
in these respects reflected the attitude and purposes of
defendant Rasche.”
Ministries Trials of War 784 Oil, Coal and Poland Oil, coal, ores Minister von Krosigk, the Nazi Finance Minister, was convicted of Criminal Theft Guilty
Criminals Ore plunder for his role in the “formulation, implementation
and furtherance of the Reich’s spoliation program as it
dealt with Poland.” Of most importance, von Krosigk’s
responsibility was established because he ordered that,
“Oil, coal, ores, and other raw materials are to be taken
out of the East for the purposes of the German, nay the
European economy.”
Ministries Trials of War 793 Reich Main France Precious metals Minister von Krosigk, who was the German Finance Minister, Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals Pay Office was convicted of plunder for his role in “administering
plundered property taken over by the Ministry of
Finance through the Reich Main Pay Office…” In
particular, the court found that he ordered the Pay
Office, also known as the War Booty Office, to use
“precious metals, precious stones, and pearls”, together
with objects made out of platinum, gold and silver.
He was found guilty for his “part in the custody and
subsequent administration and liquidation of the
Reich’s illegally confiscated property...”
107
108
Pohl Trials of War 988 Pohl East Gold, clothing, Officer, Pohl was the head of the SS adminsitration WVHA, Criminal Receiving, Guilty
Criminals industry Businessman but also the chairman and principal shareholder of Theft
the OSTI (East Industry). He was convicted of plunder
for acting as a clearing house for property looted
from concentration camp detainees as part of Action
Reinhardt, then for his actions in dealing with stolen
property through the OSTI.
Pohl Trials of War 997 Frank East Gold, clothing, Officer Frank was an SS member, and deputy to Pohl, in the Criminal Receiving Guilty
Criminals industry management of the WVHA, which was charged with
the management of concentration camps and supply of
slave labor to surrounding industry. He was convicted
for plunder because he knowingly took a major part
in the redistribution of property stolen from both the
concentration camp and industry. Indeed, he openly
referred to the property acquired as “originating from
thefts, receiving of stolen goods and hoarded goods.”
The court found that “any participation of Frank’s was
post facto participation and was confined entirely to
the distribution of property previously seized by others.
Unquestionably this makes him a participant in the
criminal conversion of chattels, but not in the murders
which preceded the confiscation.”
Pohl Trials of War 1244 Mummenthey East Loans As the manager of the German Earth and Stone Works ? ? ?
Criminals (DEST), Mummenthey was convicted for his role in the
plunder of money obtained from the Action Reinhardt.
The Court found that “the Allach Ceramic Works under
Mummenthey received a loan of over 500,000 marks in
May 1943 from the Reindhardt fund through the DWB.”
On review, the court reiterated that this amounted to
plunder even though Mummenthey did not participate
directly in the Action Reinhardt, because in accepting
the loan, “he derives some benefits.” According to the
Court, “Nevertheless, it is not correct to say, as defense
counsel says, that because a crime has been completed
no further crime may follow from it. Receiving stolen
goods is a crime in every civilized jurisdiction and yet
the larceny, which forms its basis, has already been
completed”
Nuremberg Trial of Major 238, 281, 295, Nuremberg Various Raw materials, scrap Various Goering, Rosenberg, Seyss-Inquart and Schacht were all Criminal Theft Guilty
Judgment War Criminals 329, 346 metals, machines, convicted of plunder for the systematic exploitation of
food, crude oil, art, raw materials, scrap metals, machines, food, crude oil,
furniture, textiles art, furniture and textiles. The Court variously described
these acts as pillage, plunder and spoliation.
Yamashita Law Reports 1, 6 Yamashita Phillipines Money, valuables, Military Yamashita was found guilty of faliing to prevent or Criminal Theft Guilty
of Trials of food and other punish troops under his control, who pillaged money,
War Criminals, private property valuables, food and other private property throughout
Vol. IV Manilla between 1 Jan and 1 March 1945.
Trial of Franz Law Reports 22–26 Holstein France Personal property of Military Various members of German units active in occupied Criminal Theft Guilty
Holstein and of Trials of villages France were convicted of pillage for the theft of the
Twenty-Three War Criminals, personal property of villagers as part of a program
Others Vol. VIII of reprisals for acts of the French Resistance. The
reprisals also included murder, torture and destruction
of property. According to the Court, “convictions on the
count of pillage were made for the lootings which took
place at Dun-les-Places, Vermot and Vieux-Dun.”
Trial of Hans Law Reports 59 Szabados France Personal property, Military The accused, a German non-commissioned officer of Criminal Theft Guilty
Szabados of Trials of radios, food the 19th Police Regiment, was convicted for pillage
War Criminals, when he stole radio sets, food and personal belongs
Vol. IX during a raid on French towns. The raid also involved
destruction of property, murder and arson.
Trial of Alois and Law Reports 62 Bommer France Furniture Civilians The accused were a family of five members, who Criminal Receiving Guilty
Anna Bommer and of Trials of were convicted of theft and receiving stolen property
their Daughters War Criminals, belonging to French citizens as a result of purchasing
Vol. IX furniture and other belongings from a German
custodian in charge of a deported person’s farm.
Trial of Karl Law Reports 67 Lingenfelder France Horses and vehicles Civilian The accused, Karl Lingenfelder, a German from Criminal Theft Guilty
Lingenfelder of Trials of Mussbach, came to France as a settler in the first days
War Criminals, of occupation and took possession of a farm called “
Vol. IX Bello “ at Any, Moselle, whose owners had been expelled
by the German authorities. He was convicted of pillage
for removing four horses and two vehicles belonging to
the French farm he had occupied during the war.
109
110
Trial of Christian Law Reports 68 Baus France Furniture, crockery, Civilian The accused, a German transport contractor, was Criminal Theft, Guilty
Baus of Trials of bed linen appointed by the German authorities to manage Embezzel-
War Criminals, a number of French farms. Some of the moveable ment
Vol. IX property from one of these farms had been given to the
accused by the owner, Joseph Hocquart, for his personal
use during the assignment. During the retreat, he took a
large amount of property from the farms, including that
entrusted to him.
Trial of Heinrich Law Reports 70 Weber France Wireless Civilian The accused, Heinrich Weber, a German farmer who Criminal Embezzel- Guilty
Weber of Trials of settled in France during the war, was charged with ment
War Criminals, having abused his lodger’s confidence by removing the
Vol. IX latter’s wireless set to Germany. He was convicted under
Article 408 of the Penal Code and Article 2, paragraph
8, of the Ordinance of 28th August, 1944, the penalty
being a short term of imprisonment as provided in the
Penal Code (six months).
Trial of Elisa Law Reports 71 Kespar France Furniture Civilian The accused, Elisa Kespar, wife of a German settler Criminal Embezzel- Guilty
Kespar of Trials of in France, removed to Germany the furniture of the ment
War Criminals, French family whose dwelling she occupied with her
Vol. IX husband. She was convicted for abuse of confidence and
sentenced to imprisonment for four months.
Unnamed Trial Law Reports 71 Horse Sale France Horse Civilian The accused, a German engineer who rented a French Criminal Embezzel- Guilty
of Trials of enterprise, was convicted for abusing the owner’s ment
War Criminals, confidence by selling a horse belonging to the enterprise
Vol. IX and “ dissipating “ the money received from the sale.
The conviction was made under Article 408 of the Penal
Code and Article 2, paragraph 8, of the Ordinance of
28th August, 1944.
Trial of August Law Reports 65 Bauer France Sewing machine, Civilian In the case against August Bauer, a German gendarme, Criminal Receiving Guilty
Bauer of Trials of furniture the accused was convicted for stealing a sewing
War Criminals, machine and other objects, which he took to Germany
Vol. IX during the retreat from France. He was also convicted
for removing and using furniture, which his predecessor
in the gendarmerie post had stolen from a French
inhabitant and which the accused knew belonged to this
Frenchman. The conviction on this latter case was for
receiving stolen goods.
Trial of Wili Buch Law Reports 65 Buch France Silverware Civilian Wili Buch, a paymaster (Oberzahlmeister) during the Criminal Receiving Guilty
of Trials of occupation of France, was convicted of receiving stolen
War Criminals, goods through purchase. The German Kommandantur
Vol IX at Saint-Die had seized silverware which a French doctor
had left behind in crates before leaving the locality. The
goods were sold at an auction by the Kommandantur
and part of it bought by the accused.
Trial of Benz Law Reports 65 Benz France Various personal Civilian A German couple named Benz had come during the war Criminal Receiving Guilty
of Trials of property to settle in Metz. When going back to Germany at the
War Criminals, end of the war they took with them various moveable
Vol IX properties belonging to French inhabitants, including
that of the owner of the flat they occupied in Metz.
The husband was convicted for theft and the wife for
receiving stolen goods.
Trial of Elisabeth Law Reports 65 Neber France Crockery Civilian In the trial of Elisabeth Neber, another German settler Criminal Receiving Guilty
Neber of Trials of in France (Lorraine), the accused was found guilty of
War Criminals, receiving crockery stolen by her nephew from a French
Vol IX woman, which she took with her when returning to
Germany towards the end of the war.
Trial of Takashi Law Reports 1 Sakai China Food, Books Military The accused, Takashi Sakai, was a commander of a Criminal Theft Guilty
Sakai of Trials of Japanese Infantry Brigade in China, between 1939-1945.
War Criminals, He was convicted of pillaging rice, poultry, other food
Vol XIV and books. The court used the terms plunder and
pillage interchangeably.
Trial of Dr. Joseph Law Reports 23 Buhler Poland Mining rights, Official Buhler, was entrusted with the highest functions of Criminal Theft Guilty
Buhler of Trials of industrial German Civil Administration in occupied Poland. He
War Criminals, equipment, raw was convicted of “looting of Polish art treasures,”
Vol XIV materials, iron ores, “seizure of public property,” “economic exploitation of
crude oil, chemicals, the country’s resources,” and systematically depriving
coal Polish citizens of private property. Decrees were
issued confiscating mining rights and mining shares,
installations and equipment of the mineral oil industry,
raw materials, iron ores, crude oil, nitrogen, phosphates
and coal. Ultimately, this amounted to pillage.
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112
Trial of Hans Albin Law Reports 89 Rauter Netherlands Clothes, wireless Official Rauter served as Higher S.S., Police Leader and Criminal Theft, Guilty
Rauter of Trials of sets, personal General Commissioner for Public Safety in occupied Extortion
War Criminals, property Netherlands. He was convicted of pillaging household
Vol XIV items such as clothes and wireless sets. In the
disposition, the court equated extortion and larceny in
Dutch law with the international crime of plunder of
private property.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 142 Blaskic Bosnia Money, jewels Military Blaskic was commander of HVO armed forces in central Criminal Theft Guilty
Tihomir Blaskic Bosnia during the time the acts were committed.
He was accused of, in concert with HVO, aiding and
abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of
each of the crimes alleged (against Bosnian Muslims).
Money and jewels were among items stolen from
the living and the dead. Blaskic was convicted of the
plunder on the basis that he did not take precautions
to prevent crimes that were reasonably foreseeable
outcomes of his orders. The decision was upheld on
appeal.
The Prosecutor ICTY website 391–394 Delalic et al Bosnia Money, watches, Military Delic and Mucic were charged with the plunder of Criminal Theft Dismissed
v. Zejnil Delalic, wallets, a signed private property perpetrated in a prison camp, through
Zdravko Mucic, cheque, bank card, both direct involvement with the alleged crimes and by
Hazim Delilc, and jewellery (rings, virtue of their alleged positions as superiors. Money,
Esad Landoo chains, bracelets) watches, and other property belonging to persons
and other valuables detained in the prison camp were stolen. The charges
were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds - it was
found that the thefts as alleged in the Indictment were
not serious enough to give the International Tribunal
authority for prosecution.
The Prosecutor ICTY website 545–549 Hadzihasa- Bosnia Livestock, valuables Military The village of Miletici was attacked in April 1993. Criminal Theft Dismissed
v. Edver novic and The prosecution alleged that units subordinated to
Hadzihasanovic Kubura– Hadzihasanovic and Kubura plundered property, and
and Amir Kubura Miletici Hadzihasanovic and Kubura failed to take necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the acts from being
committed or to punish the perpetrators.
The Prosecutor ICTY website 549–556 Hadzihasa- Bosnia Clothing, household Military The village of Guca Gora was attacked in June 1993. Criminal Theft Dismissed
v. Edver novic and appliances, Indictment alleges Hadzihasanovic knew or had reason
Hadzihasanovic Kubura–Guca furniture, to know that members of units under his control were
and Amir Kubura Gora jewellry, technical about to commit acts of plunder or had done so, and
equipment, food, that he failed to take the necessary and reasonable
building materials measures to prevent those acts from being committed
or to punish the perpetrators. Charges were dismissed
after Chamber found that the accused took preventive
measures to prevent acts of plunder and measures to
punish the perpetrators.
The Prosecutor ICTY website 556–562 Hadzihasa- Bosnia Cars, tractors, Military The village of Maline was attacked in June 1993. The Criminal Theft Dismissed
v. Edver novic and trucks, a bicycle, civilian population was evacuated. Some villagers
Hadzihasanovic Kubura– food, tobacco, returned to prevent plundering, which they witnessed
and Amir Kubura Maline livestock, household upon their return. The plundering was done not only
appliances by ABiH soldiers, but also by Muslim civilians from a
neighbouring village. Hadzihasanovic was found to have
taken preventative measures to prevent acts of plunder
and measures intended to punish perpetrators. Kubura
was found not to have had effective control over the
perpetrators of the crimes committed in Maline.
The Prosecutor ICTY website 562–568 Hadzihasa- Bosnia Tractors, livestock, Military The village of Cukle was attacked in June 1993. After a Criminal Theft Dismissed
v. Edver novic and furniture, breach of the defensive line, HVO units and civilians (Hadziha-
Hadzihasanovic Kubura–Cukle househould withdrew. Plundering occurred in stores and homes in sanovic)
and Amir Kubura appliances, the empty village. Hadzihasanovic was found to have
taken preventative measures to deal with acts of plunder
and measures intended to punish perpetrators.
The Prosecutor ICTY website 568–581 Hadziha- Bosnia Cars, household Military This area was attacked in June 1993. Extensive, repeated Criminal Theft Dismissed
v. Edver sanovic appliances, radio, plundering of stores and homes followed, perpetrated (Hadziha-
Hadzihasanovic and Kubura VCR, tractor, both by military personnel (largely members of the sanovic),
and Amir Kubura –Susanj/ televisions, military police) and civilians. Hadzihasanovic was Guilty
Ovnak/ photographs, fournd to have taken preventative measures to prevent (Kubara),
Brajkovici/ technical acts of plunder and measures intended to punish and upheld
Grahovcici equipment, building perpetrators. Kubura was found to have preventive on appeal
material, food measures to prohibit plunder but failed in his duty to
punish the perpetrators of those crimes. Thus Kubura
was found responsible for acts of plunder.
113
114
The Prosecutor ICTY website 581–592 Vares Bosnia Automobiles, Military Vares was attacked in November 1993. Homes and Criminal Theft Guilty
v. Edver food, stationary, stores were extensively and repeatedly plundered, both (Kubura),
Hadzihasanovic furniture, household by military personnel and civilians. and upheld
and Amir Kubura appliances, clothing on appeal
The Prosecutor ICTY website 581–592 Vares Bosnia Automobiles, Military Vares was attacked in November 1993. Homes and Criminal Theft Guilty
v. Edver food, stationary, stores were extensively and repeatedly plundered, both (Kubura)
Hadzihasanovic furniture, household by military personnel and civilians. Kubura was found a)
and Amir Kubura appliances, clothing to have been in control of the subordinates who pillaged
Vares, and b) Kubura failed in his duty to take necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent the crimes, and did
not take punitive measures against those responsible.
Thus, Kubura was responsible for acts of plunder.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 11 Luka camp Bosnia Money, watches, Military It was alleged that money, watches, jewellry, and other Criminal Theft Accused
Goran Jelisic jewellry, valuables valuables were stolen from persons detained at Luka pleaded
camp upon their arrival in May 1992. guilty
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 283–287 Novi Travnik Bosnia Cars Military Novi Travnik was attacked in October 1992. Buildings Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and were destroyed and cars were stolen by HVO soldiers. (Kordic)
Mario Cerkez Kordic was convicted on the grounds that he was a
high-ranking political official, and plunder was a feature
of HVO attacks committed as part of a common plan.
Thus he was implicated in the commissioning of these
crimes. This line of reasoning was given for all charges
on which he was convicted.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 284 Busova-a Bosnia Cars, property Military Busova-a was attacked in January 1993. The town was Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and plundered for a number of months, pillaged, and (Kordic)
Mario Cerkez destroyed. In May 1993, there were complaints about
local police robbing locals of their cars and property.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 284 Lon-ari Bosnia Livestock, valuables Military Lon-ari wa attacked in April 1993. Houses were pillaged Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and and destroyed, and cattle was stolen and destroyed. (Kordic)
Mario Cerkez
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 284 Grahovci Bosnia Cars, buses, Military Grahovci was attacked after January 1993. The HVO set Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and livestock, fire to buildings in the town, and pillaged cars buses, (Kordic)
Mario Cerkez and livestock.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 285 Rotilj Bosnia Vehicles, tractors, Military The village of Rotilj was attacked in April 1993. Houses Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and cattle, valuables were looted and burned down. . (Kordic)
Mario Cerkez
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 285 Han-Plo-a- Bosnia Cars, tractors, cattle Military The village of Han-Plo was attacked between April and Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and Grahovci June 1993. The mosque was burned and destroyed, (Kordic)
Mario Cerkez followed by houses. Kordic was convicted on the
grounds that he was a high-ranking political official,
and plunder was a feature of HVO attacks committed as
part of a common plan. Thus he was implicated in the
commissioning of these crimes.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 285 Vitez Bosnia Watches, gold, Military After October 1992, several properties were looted Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and money, cars, trucks, and destroyed. The noted items were among those (Kordic
Mario Cerkez tractors plundered. Cerkez was convicted on grounds that and
he was a co-perpetrator by virtue of his position as Cerkez)
commander of the brigade. This was the reason given
for both of his convictions.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 285–286 Stari Vitez Bosnia Money, valuables Military In January 1993, homes and religious buildings were Criminal Theft Guilty
Dario Kordic and plundered and destroyed. The noted items were among (Kordic
Mario Cerkez those plundered. and
Cerkez)
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 133 Martic– Cars, tractors, tools, Military In September and October 1991, Hrvatska Dubica was Criminal Theft Guilty
Milan Martic Hrvatska cattle, machinery, attacked and taken over. Some houses were burned,
Dubica and furniture and there was widespread looting committed both by
armed groups, local civilians, and detained prisoners.
Martic was convicted on the basis that the commission
of the crimes was a foreseeable consequence of the
implementation of the common purpose of the joint
criminal enterprise.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 135 Martic– Car Military In September 1991, the village of Cervljani was attacked. Criminal Theft Not guilty
Milan Martic Cerovljani A number of houses were burned and one car was noted
to have been plundered. This charge was thrown out
as it was found that there was not sufficient evidence
to establish that the appropriation resulted in grave
consequences for the victim.
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 142 Martic– Cars, tractors, Military Serb soldiers and policemen who participated in the Criminal Theft Guilty
Milan Martic Saborsko livestock attack looted businesses and homes. Nearly every
household in Saborsko had a tractor stolen. Martic
was convicted on the basis that the commission of
the crimes was a foreseeable consequence of the
implementation of the common purpose of the JCE.
115
116
The Prosecutor v. ICTY website 211–213 Naletilic and Gold jewellery, Military Mostar was attacked in May 1993, and the court Criminal Theft Guilty
Mladen Naletilic Martinovic a computer, found that there was a serious pattern of plunder that (Naletilic and
and Vinko other valuables, took place over the course of the next few months. Martinovic)
Martinovic a car, household Martinovic was found guilty of plunder as he knew
appliances, that it was being committed by his subordinates in
nameplates from several instances but did not take reasonable steps to
doors, prevent it or punish the ofenders. In other cases, he was
present at the time of plunder and played a strong role
in organizing and committing the acts. Naletilic was
convicted of plunder as he had notice of plunder taking
place but did not take reasonable measures to prevent
the plunder or punish the offenders. Both convictions
were upheld on appeal.
Prosecutor v. ICTY website Simic et al. Cars, car keys, Military Immediately after takeover in April 1992, widespread Criminal Theft Not guilty
Blagoje Simic, car documents, looting occurred in Bosanski Samac municipality in (all accused)
Miroslav Tadic, and jewellery, money, the the towns of Bosanski Samac, Odzak, Kornica,
Simo Zaric farm equipment, Hrvatska Tisina, Novo Selo, Hrvatska Dubica, Grebnice,
household Tramosnica, Gornji and Donji Hasici, and Gornica.
appliances, Civilians performing forced labour were also required
furniture, gambling to assist with the plundering. While many of the listed
machines, goods items were stolen outright, others were then sold after
from factories, the fact. The Trial Chamber did acknowledge that the
gold jewellery, a plundering took place, but ruled that the Prosecution
gas station was had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that any
appropriated, other of the accused had been sufficiently involved in the
valuables commission of the crime to warrant a conviction.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 131 Lalehun Sierra Leone Doors, roofs, zinc Military From mid-February to at least mid-March 1998, Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone from houses Kamajors looted in Lalehun. They looted the noted dismissed
and Allieu items, told to take other items they wanted, and burned
Kondewa nine houses. Citizens were ordered to carry loads of
looted goods for the Kamajors. The charges in Lalehun
and Koribondo were dimissed on the basis that such
acts were not included in Norman’s (the commanding
officer) order, thus it could not be established beyond
a reasonable doubt that Fofana knew or had reasons to
konw the criminal acts would be committed.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 137–138 Koribondo Sierra Leone Videos, tape- Military After the capture of Koribondo in February 1998, the Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone recorders, money, Kamajors looted property from houses. dismissed
and Allieu generators, rice,
Kondewa zinc, household
property
Prosecutor v. Special Court 258 Bo Town– Sierra Leone Ammunition Military In February 1998, OC Bundu (a police officer, thus Criminal Theft Guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone OC Bundu’s considered a collaborator with the junta) was forced (Fofona),
and Allieu House to go to his house by Kamajors, where they took his Not guilty
Kondewa ammunition. The Chamber was satsifed that bboth the (Kondewa)
general requirements of war crimes and the specific
elements of pillage as a war crime were established.
Fofona was convicted of pillage for the incidents in
Bo on the basis that these elements were met and he
was the superior officer of those committing the crimes.
However, the Chamber found that although Kondewa
was present at the meeting where the attack on Bo was
planned, this evidence does not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Kondewa aided and abetted in
the planning, perparation or execution of the criminal
acts.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 258 Bo Town– Sierra Leone Medicine Military In February 1998, Kamajors under command of TF2-017 Criminal Theft Guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Pharmacies looted medicine from two pharmacies. (Fofona),
and Allieu Not guilty
Kondewa (Kondewa)
Prosecutor v. Special Court 151, 258 Bo Town– Sierra Leone Watch, money Military In February 1998, a group of Kamajors entered a Criminal Theft Guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone TF2-001 (15 000 leones), victim’s (a police officer, thus considered a collaborator (Fofona),
and Allieu suitcases destroyed, with the junta) house and threatened him. They Not guilty
Kondewa valuables searched the house for ammunition and soldiers. While (Kondewa)
searching, the Kamajors broke suitcases and took
valuable belonging to victim’s family. They also took his
watch and 15 000 leones.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 151 Bo Town–MB Sierra Leone Women’s dresses, Military In February 1998, a group of Kamajors entered the Criminal Theft Guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Sesay’s House men’s clothes, fans victim’s (considered a collaborator with the junta) hotel (Fofona),
and Allieu and looted civilian property, which is noted. Then they Not guilty
Kondewa set the hotel on fire. This particular civilian was targeted (Kondewa)
specifically as he was considered a junta collaborator.
117
118
Prosecutor v. Special Court 152 Bo Town– Sierra Leone Clothes, shoes, Military In February 1998, Kamajors looted a number of Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone other looting utensils, other properties and shops, taking a variety of property. (Kondewa)
and Allieu household property,
Kondewa and the business,
which was worht
800 000 leones
Prosecutor v. Special Court 151 Bo Town– Sierra Leone Tape recorder, radio, Military Sometime after the arrival of ECOMOG in Bo, Kamajors Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone TF2-067 video, freezer came to this victims house and stole the listed items. (Kondewa)
and Allieu They also tried to take a double bed but it was too
Kondewa large for them to carry. ECOMOG came to help and
the Kamajors ran away. After ECOMOG left, Kamajors
returned and took more items.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 151 Bo Town– Sierra Leone Television, freezer, Military Sometime after the arrival of ECOMOG in Bo, Kamajors Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone TF2-056 water filter, other came to this victim’s house and stole the television, (Kondewa)
and Allieu items freezer, water filter and other items. They accused the
Kondewa victim of being a junta soldier and said they were taking
the items because they belonged to the junta. The
victim was not a junta, and the items taken were his
personal property.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 165 Bonthe Town Sierra Leone Household items Military In February 1998, Kamjor commander Lamina Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone –Government and equipment Gbokambama and his men looted the listed items from (Fofona),
and Allieu buildings a number of government-owned buildings. Guilty
Kondewa (Kondewa)
Prosecutor v. Special Court 166 Bonthe Town– Sierra Leone Money Military In February 1998, a house in Bonthe was looted and Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone TF2-116 (17 900 000 leones) vandalized by Commander Julius Squire and his troops. (Fofona),
and Allieu Guilty
Kondewa (Kondewa)
Prosecutor v. Special Court 166 Bonthe Town Sierra Leone Materials, drugs, Military On same day as TF2-116 looting, Kamajors looted Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone –Government household materials materials and drugs from the government hospital and (Fofona)
and Allieu hospital/ household materials from the doctors’ quarters.
Kondewa doctor’s
quarters
Prosecutor v. Special Court 171 Bonthe Sierra Leone Money Military In March 1998, TF2-086 and her business partner Jitta Criminal Theft Guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone District– (140 000 leones) went to Sabongie. They were ambushed on their way (Kondewa)
and Allieu Motumbo back by five Kamajors. Jitta was then killed and TF2-086
Kondewa was cut on the neck with a machete, stabbed, and left
for dead. She nearly died. Kondewa was found criminally
responsible as a superior.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 180–181 Kenema– Sierra Leone Mattress, money, Military In late February 1998, TF2-144 and his family were told Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone TF2-144 personal property to vacate the house as it was to be used as a place for (Fofona),
and Allieu worship. Five days later a different group of Kamajors Not guilty
Kondewa came and started removing the victim’s personal (Kondewa)
belongings, including the mattress in which he stored
his money.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 186 Talia/Base Sierra Leone Furniture, Military In late 1997, TF2-109 was captured by Kamajors along Criminal Theft Not guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Zero–Mattru household items, with other women and three men in her village of (Kondewa)
and Allieu Jong–TF2-109 clothing Mattru Jong and taken to Talia. They also took her
Kondewa property, which is noted.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 292 Talia/Base Sierra Leone Money Military TF2-09’s friend was selling cassava and accused of Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Zero–TF2- (40 000 leones) being a rebel by Kondewa’s bodyguards. She was dismissed
and Allieu 096’s friend arrested and taken to Nyandehun where she was held in
Kondewa a cage until 40 000 leones were paid to Kondewa.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 193 Sembehun– Sierra Leone Food, personal Military In November 1997, Kamajors came to Sembehun and Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Checkpoints items, money, took control of the area. They set up checkpoints and dismissed
and Allieu clothing took food and other property from villagers who were
Kondewa stopped.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 193–194 Sembehun– Sierra Leone Car Military One villager, Mr Fofana, was harrassed at the entry Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Mr. Fofana check point and was stripped of his clothes, money, dismissed
and Allieu and car. The Kamajors did end up giving his car back,
Kondewa though Kamajors in another town ultimately ended up
with the car after he fled.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 194 Sembehun– Sierra Leone Car Military The same evening as the attack on Mr. Fofana, Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone Mrs. Gorvie Mrs. Gorvie was stopped by Kamajors at the same dismissed
and Allieu checkpoint. Although sick, she was forced out of the car
Kondewa and left on the ground. Her car was taken from her.
119
120
Prosecutor v. Special Court 194 Sembehun– Sierra Leone Livestock, food, Military The Kamajors also went to the surrounding villages and Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone villages clothing looted food and other goods, both on the night of their dismissed
and Allieu arrival and the next night. Items taken are noted.
Kondewa
Prosecutor v. Special Court 194–195 Sembehun– Sierra Leone Car, car keys, garage Military Kamajors came to TF2-073’s house in the evening. Criminal Theft Guilty
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone TF2-073 keys, generator, car They surrounded him at gunpoint and inspected his (Kondewa),
and Allieu tires, other gadgets garage for arms and ammunition. They found other Not guilty
Kondewa and personal items items in his garage and house, which the took and are (Fofana)
noted. TF2-073 did eventually get his car back but it was
damaged and he had to spend a lot of money repairing
it. Kondewa was convicted on the basis that he had
knowledge that the pillage was being committed, but
he made no attempt to punish the offenders. In fact,
he chose to support their actions by using the vehicle
himself. Fofana was acquitted on the basis that it could
not be established that he had a superior-subordinate
relationship with the Kamajors.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 195 Yakarji Sierra Leone Van Military Kamajors visited a village called Yakarji, and stole TF2- Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone 073’s brother-in-law’s van. They also beat the man and dismissed
and Allieu he died from his injuries a few weeks later.
Kondewa
Prosecutor v. Special Court 196 Shenge Sierra Leone Goods, livestock, Military Kamajors visited Shenge with the three cars they’d Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone food, petrol looted in Sembehun and returned in the evening with dismissed
and Allieu the items listed.
Kondewa
Prosecutor v. Special Court 198 Bradford– Sierra Leone Clothing, food, Military Kamajors arrived in Bradford on four separate occasions Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone second arrival 63 bags of husk rice in March 1998. They pillaged on the second, third, and dismissed
and Allieu fourth visits. In the second instance were items taken
Kondewa that are noted in the facts of the case.
Prosecutor v. Special Court 198–199 Bradford– Sierra Leone Money Military Kamajors arrived in Bradford in late March 1998 and Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone fourth arrival (1 600 000 leones) fired at civilians. They took money (1 600 000) from dismissed
and Allieu TF2-1268’s wife and then shot her.
Kondewa
Prosecutor v. Special Court 204 Masiaka Sierra Leone Tapes, bicycles, Military T42-021, a child soldier, was initiated and trained by the Criminal Theft Charge
Moinina Fofana for Sierra Leone clothing Kamajors to fight. In his first mission after training, he dismissed
and Allieu shot an unarmed woman in the stomach, T42-021 and
Kondewa the other Kamajors took the noted possesions back to
their base along with other women they’d captured.
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 400 Bo District– Sierra Leone Money Military In June 1997, a group of soldiers travelling by van Criminal Theft Guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Sembehun (800 000 leones), entered Sembehun. Their leader introduced himself as (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and cassette player Bockarie and identified himself as a member of the RUF. Kallo,
Augustine Gbao Bockarie and his subordinates first entered the house of Gbao)
Ibrahim Kamara, the section chief, whom they forced to
the ground and then stole money from. The group then
went to the house of Tommy Bockarie, demanded his
cassette player, and when he refused, shot him dead.
It was found that all three defendents shared in the JCE
the requisite intent to commit these crimes.
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 356 Kono District– Sierra Leone Bicycle, money Military Rebels appropriated a bicycle, money, and cigarettes Criminal Theft Guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Tombodu (500 000 leones), from TF1-197. (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and cigarettes Kallo,
Augustine Gbao Gbao)
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 400 Kono District– Sierra Leone Vehicles, food Military AFRC/RUF fighers engaged in a systematic campaign Criminal Theft Guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Koidu Town of looting upon their arrival in Koidu, marking the (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and continuation of “Operation Pay Yourself”. Some items Kallo,
Augustine Gbao taken were of significant value (vehicles), others were Gbao)
on such a large scale to cumulatively constitute a
serious violation (food).
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 400 Kono District Sierra Leone Money Military AFRC/RUF fighters looted funds from the Tankoro Bank. Criminal Theft Guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone –Koidu Town– Sufficient funds were taken to constitute a serious (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and Tankoro Bank violation. Kallo,
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 476 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money, watch Military In January 1999, rebels appropriated 209 000 leones Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone TF1-235 and a wristwatch from witness TF1-235. For all (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and charges in Freetown and the Western Area, the three Kallo,
Augustine Gbao Accused were acquitted on the grounds that no JCE Gbao)
could be established among the accused, and that
no subordinate-insubordinate relationship could be
established between the Accused and the fighters
committing the criminal acts.
121
122
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 476 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money Military In January 1999, rebels appropriated 80 000 leones Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone TF1-021 from TF1-021 at the Rogbalan Mosque in Kissy (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and Kallo,
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 476 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money Military In January 1999, rebels entered a clinic in Wellington Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Wellington (300 000 leones), and appropriated the listed items. (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and clinic rice, jewellery, food, Kallo,
Augustine Gbao medical supplies, Gbao)
other supplies
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 476 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money and property Military In February 1999, a group of rebels attacked this house Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Witness of TF1-235 and took money and property from those (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and TF1-235 hiding there. Kallo,
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 477 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money Military In Februar 1999, armed rebels appropriated 50 000 Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Witness (50 000 leones) leones from TF1-331. (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and TF1-331 Kallo,
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 477 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money Military In February, rebels accused TF1-104 of being a soldier Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Witness and appropriated money from him. (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and TF1-104 Kallo,
Prosecutor v. Issa Special Court 477 Kissy– Sierra Leone Money Military In February 1999, rebels near Connaught Hospital in Criminal Theft Not guilty
Hassan Sesay, for Sierra Leone Connaught (5000 leones) Kissy forced TF1-022 to undress and appropriated 5000 (Sesay,
Morris Kallon, and Hospital leones from him. Kallo,
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 397 Kono District– Sierra Leone Palm wine Military In March 1998, soliders under command of ‘Savage’ Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone Tombudo (5 gallons) forcefully appropriated five gallons of palm wine from a (Kamara)
Brima Bazzy civilian and consumed it.
Kamara, and
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 397 Kono District– Sierra Leone Boxes and Military In April 1998, AFRC and RUF soldiers attacked Yardu Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone Yardu Sando valuable property Sando and stole boxes and valuables from civilian (Kamara)
Brima Bazzy homes.
Kamara, and
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 398 Freetown– Sierra Leone Vehicles Military In April 1998, witness TF1-334 was present when Brima Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone State House ordered the Operation Commander to collect all the (Brima,
Brima Bazzy vehicles parked at UN House and have them delivered. Kamara,
Kamara, and The witness also noted that the rooms in the State Kanu)
Santigie Borbor House were extensively vandalized and looted.
Kanu
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 399 Freetown– Sierra Leone Food, money Military In January 1999, two men wearing plain clothes and Criminal Theft Guility
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone Kissy–TF1-104 military trousers and one other man wearing full (Brima,
Brima Bazzy military uniform and carrying a gun took away money Kamara,
Kamara, and and food from witness TF1-104 and his family. Kanu)
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 399 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money Military During the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, soldiers Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone Kissy–TF1-021 (15 000 leones) attacked a mosque and took 15 000 leones from (Brima,
Brima Bazzy TF1-021. Kamara,
Kamara, and Kanu)
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 399 Freetown– Sierra Leone Televisions, radio, Military In January 1999, “rebels” wearing military uniforms Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone Kissy–TF1 084 money ($200) looted civilian homes of the listed items. (Brima,
Brima Bazzy gold-plated watch, Kamara,
Kamara, and Kanu)
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 399 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money, clothes, Military In January 1999, armed “rebels” broke into a house. Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Leone Kissy–TF1-083 other valuables TF1-083 told the court that the noted items were stolen. (Brima,
Brima Bazzy Kamara,
Kamara, and Kanu)
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
123
124
Prosecutor v. Alex Special Court 399 Freetown– Sierra Leone Money, clothing Military On the same day as the previous incident, TF1-083 Criminal Theft Guilty
Tamba Brima, for Sierra Kissy - Locust encountered several armed “rebels” who took the (Brima,
Brima Bazzy Leone and Samuel witness’ shirt and wore it, and another rebel took money Kamara,
Kamara, and from his pocket. Kanu)
Santigie Borbor
Kanu
The Prosecutor v. ICTR website 13–14 Witness SQY Rwanda Undefined Military Witness SQY testified that at the end of April 1994, Criminal Theft Not guilty
Ephram Setako the Accused participated in the looting of the of the
European Economic Community building in Kigali. The
Chamber found that the Prosecution had not proved
any of the pillage allegations against the Accused and
acquitted him of the charge. Note that this is the only
instance in the ICTR where a charge of pillage was
laid: generally pillage/looting was incorporated and/or
supported charges related to genocide.
XVI. Annex 2:
Pillage Elements Worksheet
125
Contents
Overview of This Worksheet 127
I. The Armed Conflict and Nexus Requirements 128

A. International Armed Conflict 128
B. Non-International Armed Conflict 128
C. A Nexus to the Armed Conflict 128
II. Appropriation 129

A. Direct Appropriation from Owner—Extraction or Harvesting 129
B. Indirect Appropriation—Purchasing Illicit Resources 129
III. Ownership of Natural Resources 129
IV. Absence of Consent 130
V. The Mental Element 130

A. Outside Territories Occupied by Foreign Armies or Rebel Groups 130
B. Within Territories Occupied by Foreign Armies or Rebel Groups 130
VI. Individual and Corporate Criminal Liability 131
Overview of This Worksheet
The following worksheet is intended to help prosecutors and investigators decide if pil-
lage has taken place. By completing the boxes below, it should be possible to determine
if all of the elements of the crime are satisfied. Pillage is a complex, multi-part crime;
this worksheet, while not intended to be comprehensive, is meant to be helpful in mak-
ing a decision on whether or not to pursue a pillage prosecution.
ANNEX 2: PILLAGE ELEMENTS WORKSHEET 127

I. The Armed Conflict and Nexus Requirements
A. International Armed Conflict
• Direct International Armed Conflict—evidence that the exploitation of natural

resources in question took place in association with an armed conflict waged
directly between two states. (See Manual, para. 23);
• Foreign Military Intervention—evidence that the exploitation of natural resources

in question took place in an armed conflict in which a foreign state’s troops
directly intervened (See Manual, para. 24); or
• International Wars through Proxies—evidence that the exploitation of natural

resources in question took place in a conflict that involved a foreign state using
local military groups as proxies in a conflict against a foreign state. This requires
evidence of the foreign state supplying logistics, weapons or other material to the
rebel group, as well as some role in directing military operations (See Manual,
para 25);
• Foreign Occupation without Violence —evidence that the natural resources in

question were exploited from a territory that was militarily occupied by a foreign
state, even though there were no active hostilities (See Manual, para 26).
B. Non-International Armed Conflict
• Intensity—evidence of an internal armed conflict’s intensity, based on duration

of hostilities, the types of weapons used, and the number of victims caused by
hostilities (See Manual, paras 27–28); and
• Military Groups—evidence that the war involved military groups, namely, groups
that have organized hierarchical structures, control territory, formulated common
military strategy, established military headquarters, or promulgate and enforce
laws (See Manual, para. 29).
C. A Nexus to the Armed Conflict
• War Provides Opportunity—eevidence that the armed conflict provided the oppor-
tunity for the illicit resource exploitation in question (See Manual, paras 32–38);
• War Motivates Illicit Resource Transaction—evidence that the armed conflict cre-
ated the motivation for the illicit resource exploitation in question (See Manual,
paras 32–38);
• The Company has a Relationship with Armed Groups—evidence of the com-
pany’s relationship with armed groups in extracting resources (See Manual, paras
32–38);
• The Transaction Finances the Conflict—evidence that profits from the sale of the
specific natural resource being used to finance the conflict (See Manual, paras
32–38).
II. Appropriation
A. Direct Appropriation from Owner—Extraction or Harvesting
• Collaboration with Military Groups—evidence that the company collaborated with

military groups to extract the natural resources in question (See Manual, para. 41);
• Reliance on Decrees by Occupiers or Rebel Groups—evidence that the company

relied on a decree by a foreign government or rebel group as a basis for exploiting
natural resources in the territory (See Manual, para. 42); or
• Over-harvesting Legal Concessions—evidence that the company operating in a

war zone over-harvested natural resources within or around a concession lawfully
granted to it (See Manual, para. 43).
B. Indirect Appropriation—Purchasing Illicit Resources
• Purchasing Illicit Resources—evidence that the company purchased natural

resources that were illegally acquired. The company’s intention is irrelevant here
(See Manual, para. 46).
III. Ownership of Natural Resources

• Ownership in National Law—evidence of the national law that governs owner-
ship of these resources, and if ownership is allocated to private owners, copies of
concession or mining agreements conferring title (See Manual, paras 51–54);
• Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources—if relevant, evidence that the

transactions took place in a country where a people enjoy an unrealized right
to self-determination, or if the matter is contested, evidence that the natural
resources were previously nationalized by the state (See Manual, paras 56–60).

• Indigenous Rights—if relevant, evidence of recognized indigenous rights over the
natural resources in question that are not explicitly extinguished by legislation
(See Manual, paras 61–65).
IV. Absence of Consent

• Identify Legal Requirements of Consent—evidence of the specific legal require-
ments for conferring and acquiring the owner’s consent to exploit the natural
resource in question (See Manual, paras 101–107); and
• Breach of these Legal Requirements—evidence that the company acquired the

natural resources in question without complying with the relevant legal require-
ments for conferring consent (See Manual, paras 101–107).
V. The Mental Element

A. Outside Territories Occupied by Foreign Armies or Rebel Groups
• Direct Intention—evidence that a company representative purposively acquired

the natural resources in question, knowing with certainty that the owner did not
consent (See Manual, paras 108–109);
• Oblique Intention—evidence that a company representative purposively acquired

the natural resources in question, knowing with virtually certainly that the owner
did not consent (See Manual, paras 110–112); or
• Indirect Intent—evidence that a company representative purposively acquired

the natural resources in question, aware that the owner probably did not consent
(This test is approximate—see Manual, paras 113–117).
B. Within Territories Occupied by Foreign Armies or Rebel Groups
• Usufruct Exception—if the resources were initially exploited by a rebel group or

foreign army within occupied territory, evidence that the company that appropri-
ates the resources was aware that proceeds from the transaction would certainly,
virtually certainly, or probably be used to (a) purchase weapons; (b) enrich elites;
or (c) finance warfare (See Manual, paras 118–120).
VI. Individual and Corporate Criminal Liability
• Liability of Business Representative—in relevant jurisdictions, evidence that a
specific company representative both performed the appropriation and satisfied
the mental element of the crime (See headings III and IV above) (See Manual,
paras 132–135);
• Identification Theory—in relevant jurisdictions, evidence that a specific company

representative involved in the management of the company both performed the
appropriation and satisfied the mental element of the crime (See headings III and
IV above) (See Manual, para 136); or
• Corporate Culture—in relevant jurisdictions, evidence that a specific company did

not create and maintain a corporate culture that ensured that natural resources
were acquired through legal sources (See Manual, para. 137).

Notes
1. Hague Regulations 1907, Article 28.
2. Hague Regulations 1907, Article 47.
3. Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 33, second paragraph.
4. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, I Customary International Humanitarian
Law 182–185 (2005). [hereafter Customary International Humanitarian Law Study], Rule 52 (“Pillage
is prohibited”). For a compilation of state practice supporting this conclusion, see Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Study, Vol II, pp. 1076–1122.
5. Although Article 4 of Additional Protocol II appears to limit pillage to property taken from
persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities, the commentaries to the article indicate that the pro-
vision is intended to extend to the pillage of public and private property generally. See Commentar-
ies, Additional Protocol II, para. 4542 (“The prohibition of pillage is based on Article 33, paragraph
2 of the fourth Convention. It covers both organized pillage and pillage resulting from isolated acts
of indiscipline. It is prohibited to issue order whereby pillage is authorized. The prohibition has a
general tenor and applies to all categories of property, both State-owned and private.”).
6. Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, pp. 182–185.
7. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code),
April 24, 1863, Article 44.
8. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penal-
ties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, Annex A, p. 40.
9. See Nuremberg Charter, Article 6(b).
133
10. See ICC Statute, Articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v); Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute, art. 2(b)(17).
December 10, 2003.
11. The reference to ‘even when taken by assault,’ is reflective of a period of history when it was
lawful to pillage a town as retribution for local resistance to siege. See N. Bentworth, The Law of
Private Property in War (London: Sweet & Maxwell,1907), at 8. When the Brussels Declaration of
1864 was confronted with this practice, it elected to do away with even the exception by prohibiting
pillage categorically. The Hague Regulations of 1907 emulated this language, even though it was
merely intended emphasize that the prohibition of pillage abandoned this earlier exception.
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 4(f); Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Article 3(f).
13. Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 c. 24 (Can.) §§ 6(3) and 6(4).
14. In this respect, §§ 4(4) and 6(4) of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act also state that “[ f ]or greater certainty, crimes described in articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 of
article 8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according to customary international
law, and may be crimes according to customary international law before that date.”
15. International Criminal Court Act, 2001, 17, § 50(1) (Eng.) (“‘war crime’ means a war crime
as defined in article 8.2.”).
16. Gesetzes zue Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches [German Code of Crimes against
International Law] 30 June 2002 BGBl 2002, I, at 2254, § 9(1) (F.R.G) (“Whoever in connection
with an international armed conflict or with an armed conflict not of an international character
pillages or, unless this is imperatively demanded by the necessities of the armed conflict, otherwise
extensively destroys, appropriates or seizes property of the adverse party contrary to international
law, such property being in the power of the perpetrator’s party, shall be punished with imprison-
ment from one to ten years.”).
17. William Whewell (trans.), Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace (Cambridge, 1953), p. 345
(“They who condemn this practice nay, that greedy hands, active in pillage, are so forward as to
snatch the prizes which ought to fall to the share of the bravest; for it commonly happens that they
who are slowest in fight are quickest in plunder.”).
18. See Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation 30
(Carnegie, 1942) (who uses the two terms interchangeably) [hereafter Feilchenfeld].
19. John Westlake, International Law, Part II: War (Cambridge, 1907), p. 108.
20. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9.
21. At one point, for instance, the tribunal indicated that “[p]ublic and private property was
systematically plundered and pillaged in order to enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense
of the rest of Europe.” International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment (1946), 1 Trial of the
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1945). p. 228 [hereafter Nuremberg
Judgment].
22. See for instance Kubura’s conviction for “pillage” in the original French, but for “plunder” in
the English translation. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al. Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, (March
15, 2006), disposition [hereafter Hadžihasanović Trial Judgment].
23. Prosecutor v Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, (November 16, 1998), para. 591
[hereafter Delalić Trial Judgment].
24. Id.
25. See Australian Defence Force, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian
Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1—Interim Edition, 7 March
1994, Art. 970 (“pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is prohibited”); see
also The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Canadian Office of the Judge
Advocate General, 1999, p. 15 (“pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is
prohibited. Pillage is theft, and therefore is an offence under the Code of Service Discipline.”).
26. At Nuremberg for instance, the tribunal observed that “[p]roperty offences recognised by
modern international law are not limited to offences against physical tangible possessions or to
open robbery in the old sense of pillage.” WCC, Vol. X, Notes on the Case, p. 164.
27. See infra, Chapter IV of this manual.
28. United States v. Krauch et al., (IG Farben), 8 Trials of War Criminals 1081, p. 1133 [hereafter
IG Farben Case].
29. IG. Farben Case, p. 1133.
30. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Annex Vol. 5, p. 95.
31. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C § 903, art. 103 (2008).
32. Prosecutor v Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, para. 98 [hereafter Simić Trial Judgment].
33. Delalić Trial Judgment, para. 590.
34. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, para. 751 (June 20, 2007) [here-
after Brima Trial Judgment].
35. Delalić Trial Judgment, para. 591.
36. ICC Statute, Art. 9(1) (“[e]lements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and
application of articles 6, 7 and 8.”) (emphasis added).
37. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi).
38. N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Others v. The War Damage Commission, Sin-
gapore Law Reports (1956) p. 65 [hereafter Singapore Oil Stocks].
39. Hadžihasanović Trial Judgment, para. 52.
40. Brima Trial Judgment, para. 754; see also Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No.SCSL-04-14-T,
Judgment, para. 160 (August 2, 2007) [hereafter Fofana Case].
41. See Doris Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation: A Historical Survey,
198 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1949) [hereafter A Historical Survey] (claiming that the Italian Delegate
at the Brussels meeting in 1874 that codified the exceptions that were later adopted in the Hague
Regulations proposed “that the protection of private property should be made dependent on military
necessity, as in the Russian draft.” This proposal “was defeated on the ground that the principle
expressed in the article is a general one, and that exceptions to it are discussed in the articles deal-
ing with requisitions and contributions.”).
NOTES 135
42. The leading case for this proposition is Heinz Heck et al. (Peleus case) (1949), Law Reports of
Trials of Major War Criminals, Vol. 1 (rejecting a German submarine commander’s claim that the
killing of surviving crew members of a sunk military vessel was justified by “military necessity” to
save his own life and that of the submarine crew). On this basis, military manuals define military
necessity as permitting “a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of
force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the
legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy…” U.K.
Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict § 2.2 (Oxford, 2005) (emphasis added).
43. See Art. 33, Geneva Convention IV (stating that “pillage is prohibited.”); Art. 28 Hague Con-
vention, supra note 38 (stating that “the pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is
prohibited.”) This language contrasts with the right of relief personnel to unrestricted access during
war, which can be curtailed by military necessity because the Geneva Conventions state that “[o]nly
in case of imperative military necessity may the activities of the relief personnel be limited to their
movements temporarily restricted.” Additional Protocol I, Art 71(3).
44. IG Farben Case, p. 1133.
45. Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, (June 10, 2007), para. 102. [hereafter
Martić Trial Judgment] (“for the crime of plunder [pillage] to be established, the appropriation of
private or public property must be done without lawful basis or legal justification… According to the
Hague Regulations, forcible contribution of money, requisition for the needs of the occupying army,
and seizure of material obviously related to the conduct of military operations, though restricted,
are lawful in principle.”).
46. Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, para. 982 (March 2, 2009).
47. Id.
48. See for instance, Martić Trial Judgment, paras. 100-104 (applying the provisions of the Hague
Regulations despite have failed to qualify the conflict). Causa originalmente instruida por el Consejo
Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas en cumplimiento de Decreto 158/83 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional,
Cám. Nac. Apel. Cr. y Correcc., Judgment of 30 December 1986, published in en Fallos de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Tomo 309, Vol. II, 1986 (applying terms of the Hague Regulations
in non-international armed conflicts).
49. See infra, Chapter V of this manual.
50. Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 84.
51. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, March 3, 2000, paras. 75, 76 and 94 [hereafter
Blaškić Trial Judgment].
52. Prosecutor v. Kordić and Cˇerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, February 26, 2001, para. 108(2)
[hereafter Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment].
53. See J.G. Stewart, “Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humani-
tarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross,
June 2003, Vol. 85, No. 850, pp. 328–333.
54. Le Procureur c. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Décision sur la confirmation des charges, No.:
ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007 para. 220. For an English translation, see http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf.
55. Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 13 [hereafter Delalić
Appeal Judgment].
56. Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 137.
57. Id.
58. See for example, Prosecutor v. Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch., Judgment, September 1,
2004, paras. 144–155; see also Delalić Appeal Judgment, paras. 28–50.
59. Prosecutor v. Katanga et al., Decision on Confirmation of Indictment, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30
September 2008, para. 240.
60. Geneva Conventions, Common Article 2.
61. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka “Dule” (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), October
2, 1995, para. 70.
62. International Committee of the Red Cross, Working Paper, June 29, 1999.
63. See Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, November 18, 1997. http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm.
64. Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, July 10, 2008, paras. 244 and 249.
65. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, November 20, 2005, para. 132
[hereafter Limaj Trial Judgment].
66. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, paras. 83–179 (November 20, 2005).
67. See Martić Trial Judgment, paras. 41-46.
68. See Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, June 30, 2006, paras. 259–260 [here-
after Orić Trial Judgment].
69. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 75 (entered into force November 26, 1968); see also European
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes (January 25, 1974) E.T.S. 82; Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Vol. I, pp.
614–618 (concluding that, as a matter of customary international law, “statutes of limitations may
not apply to war crimes.”); see generally, Ruth A. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007).
70. See infra, Chapter XIII of this manual.
71. Id.
72. The International Criminal Court has itself followed this course. See Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, para. 381 (Sept. 30, 2008) (“[a]s neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes define the
phrases ‘in the context of’ and/or ‘was associated with’, the Chamber applies the case-law of the
international tribunals”).
73. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 58 (February 22,
2002) [hereafter Kunarac Appeal Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment,
para. 536 (January 17, 2005).
NOTES 137
74. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 58.
75. Id., (“if it can be established, as in the present case, that the perpetrator acted in furtherance
of or under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were
closely related to the armed conflict.”); Prosecutor v. Bagambiki et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judg-
ment and Sentence, para. 793 (February 25, 2004) (“the Chamber considers that when soldiers
took part in the massacre of refugees at the Gashirabwoba football field on 12 April 1994, they did
so under the guise of the underlying armed conflict.”); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A,
Judgment, para. 345 (March 22, 2006) [hereafter Stakić Appeal Judgment] (“All of the crimes the
Appellant carried out through his role as President of the Crisis Staff were thus, in effect, carried
out “under the guise of the armed conflict”).
76. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 59 (emphasis added).
77. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 57; see also Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T,
Judgment, para. 105 (“it is not necessary that actual armed hostilities have broken out in Mabanza
commune and Kibuye Prefecture for Article 4 of the Statute to be applicable. Moreover, it is not
a requirement that fighting was taking place in the exact time-period when the acts the offences
alleged occurred were perpetrated.”). See also Blaškić Trial Judgment, para. 69 (“This does not mean
that the crimes must all be committed in the precise geographical region where an armed conflict
is taking place at a given moment”).
78. Blaškić Trial Judgment, para. 70.
79. Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para. 444.
80. IG Farben’s acquisition of the Boruta dyestuff factories in Poland from the Reich Ministry
of Economics, for instance, was temporarily hampered by the occupying power because “competi-
tion developed for the purchase of the property, and price negotiations were protracted.” IG Farben
Case, p. 1143. Likewise, when IG Farben acquired the Nordisk-Lettmetall factory through a coerced
shareholder takeover, it only accepted the Reich as a partner in the project reluctantly. The tribunal
found that “Farben immediately entered into this large-scale planning and fought for as large a
capital participation as possible. It may have accepted the Reich nominees as partners reluctantly,
but its consenting participation in the project cannot be doubted.” IG Farben Case, p. 1145. As for
representatives of the Flick concern, the tribunal itself concluded that with one exception “the defen-
dants were not officially connected with the Nazi government but were private citizens engaged as
businessmen in the heavy industry of Germany.” Trial of Frederick Flick and Five Others (Flick), 6
Trials of War Criminals, p. 1191 [hereafter Flick Case].
81. The Hague District Court, Mpambara, March 23, 2009, LJN: BK0520, Rechtbank’s-Graven-
hage, 09/750009-06, http://www.rechtspraak.nl.
82. Id., para. 60.
83. Id., para. 62.
84. Nuremberg Judgment, p. 306.
85. Trials of German Major War Criminals 13 (British Transcripts), 170 http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.
cgi/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-13/ftp.py?imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-13//tgmwc-13-123.04 (“This company was con-
cerned with oil industries all over Europe. It had its beginnings in the Rumanian oil interests and
whenever German troops occupied territories where there were oil deposits, that company, which
was a part of the Four-Year Plan, was given the task by the various economic offices, later by the
armament industry, of producing oil in these territories and of restoring the destroyed oil-producing
districts.”).
86. Nuremberg Judgment, p. 307.
87. U.S.A. v. Von Weizsaecker et al. (Ministries Case), 14 Trials of War Criminals 314, p. 741 (1949)
[hereafter Ministries Case]. BHO standards for Berg und Huettenwerke Ost.
88. Ibid.
89. See Report of Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Appendices, Volume III: Eco-
nomic Crimes and the Conflict, Exploitation and Abuse, paras. 29–33.
90. Report of the Forest Concession Review Committee, Phase III, May 31, 2005, at 20.
91. Judgment of the Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz, 2nd December, 1947, in 9 Law Reports
of Trials of War Criminals, p. 65. Likewise, a German settler in France named Elisabeth Neber was
found guilty of receiving crockery stolen by her nephew from a French woman, which she took with
her when returning to Germany towards the end of the war. Id.
92. Trial of Alois and Anna Bommer and their Daughters, Permanent Military Tribunal At Metz,
9 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, (February 19, 1947), p. 64 [hereafter Bommer Case].
93. Id.
94. France v. Roechling, 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under
Control Council Law No. 10, app. B, (1949), pp. 1117–1118 [hereafter Roechling Case].
95. Id., p. 1113.
96. Id., p. 1118.
97. IG Farben Case, p. 1143; see also IG Farben Case, pp. 1146–1147 (convicting Farben executives
of pillage for purchasing the Mulhausen Plant from the German Reich and for purchasing the
oxygen and acetylene plants, referred to as Strassbourg-Schiltigheim, under similar circumstances).
98. Krupp Case, p. 1351. Similarly, members of the firm Krupp were convicting of pillage for pur-
chasing machinery from a German appointed administrator who had seized the machinery from a
Jewish owner.
99. Ministries Case, p. 731.
100. The Model Code stipulates that “a person is guilty of theft if he purposely receives, retains,
or disposes of moveable property of another knowing that is has been stolen, or believing that it
has probably been stolen…” American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part II,
§223.6 (The American Law Institute, 1980) (emphasis added) [hereafter Model Penal Code].
101. Model Penal Code, p. 232.
102. See also Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law 848–849 (David Ormerod ed., Oxford University
Press 2005).
103. In most of these countries, the separation between theft and receiving stolen property
occurred at a time in history when lawmakers were seeking to address problems in treating receiv-
ing stolen property as a type of complicity in the original theft. As the law on complicity matured,
lawmakers realized that it is improper to hold a receiver complicit in an original theft, since the
NOTES 139
receiver made no causal contribution to the original offense. See Wayne R. Lafave, Criminal Law,
985 (Thomson West, 4th ed. 2003); see also Michele-Laure Rassat, Droit Penal Special: Infractions
Des Et Contre Les Particuliers para. 187 (Dalloz, 3rd ed., 2001). Nothing in these systems precludes
amalgamating the two offenses into a single crime, then treating receiving stolen property as a new
act of theft.
104. “Digest of Laws and Cases,” 15 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, p. 130.
105. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wilkins, U.S. v. Krupp, 9 Trials of War Criminals, p. 1461. [hereaf-
ter Krupp Case]. The judgment was dissenting because Wilkins disagreed with the majority’s finding
that the court had no jurisdiction to consider these allegations of pillage.
106. Eva Liedholm Johnson, “Rights to Minerals in Sweden: Current Situations from an Historical
Perspective,” 19(3) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 278–286, p. 280 (2001) .
107. Jan G. Laitos and Joseph P. Tomain, Energy and Natural Resources Law (West Publishing,
1992).
108. Peter C. Morgan, “An Overview of the Legal Regime for Mineral Development in the United
Kingdom,” 1081–1094, International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects
(Elizabeth Bastida et al. eds., Kluwer, 2005).
109. See infra Chapter X of this manual.
110. (Unofficial translation.) The original reads “L’Etat exerce une souveraineté permanente
notamment sur le sol, le sous-sol, les eaux et les forêts, sur les espaces aérien, fluvial, lacustre et
maritime congolais ainsi que sur la mer territoriale congolaise et sur le plateau continental. Les
modalités de gestion et de concession du domaine de l’Etat visé à l’alinéa précédent sont détermi-
nées par la loi.”
111. Law No. 007/2002 of July 11, 2002 Relating to the Mining Code, Art. 3. [hereafter Congolese
Mining Code], Art. 3 (emphasis added).
112. Ley Organica para el Aprovechamiento Sostenible de los Recursos Naturales, Law Nbr 26821,
published on 26 June 1997, Article 4.
113. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J, 19 December 2005, para. 244. [hereafter DRC v. Uganda Case]
114. DRC v. Uganda Case, Declaration of Judge Koroma, para. 11.
115. General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, Article 1.
116. Id., Preamble.
117. Article 21(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that “[a]ll peoples
shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources,” whereas Article 21(4) of the same treaty
indicates that “states parties … shall individually and collectively exercise the right to free disposal of
their wealth and natural resources with a view to strengthening African unity and solidarity.”
118. Both Covenants state, at Article 1(2), that “[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
tional economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law.”
Nonetheless, the Human Rights Committee has issued a formal opinion that appears to treat this
right as belonging to states. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Self-Determination of Peoples (Art. 1), March 13, 1984 (“States should indicate any factors or difficul-
ties which prevent the free disposal of their natural wealth and resources contrary to the provisions
of this paragraph…”).
119. See, for instance, GA Res 2158 (XXI), Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 25
November 1966, para. 1 (“the inalienable right of all countries,”); GA Res 3201 (S-VI), Declaration
on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, 1 May 1974, para. 4(e) (“[ f ]ull permanent sover-
eignty of every State over its natural resources”); GA Res 3016 (XXVII), Permanent sovereignty
over natural resources of developing countries, December 18, 1972, para. 1 (“Reaffirms the right of
States to permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources, on land within their international
boundaries as well as those found in the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof within their national
jurisdiction and in the superjacent waters”); GA Res 3171 (XXVIII), Permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, December 17, 1973, para. 1 (“Strongly reaffirms the inalienable rights of States
to permanent sovereignty over all their natural resources…”); GA Res 3281 (XXIX) Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, December 12, 1974, Article 2, (“Every State has and shall freely
exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth,
natural resources and economic activities.”); GA Res 34/201. Multilateral development assistance
for the exploration of natural resources, 19 December 1979, preamble (“the permanent sovereignty
of States over their natural resources and all economic activities.”); GA Res XX, 3517. Draft World
Charter for Nature, October 30, I980, preamble (“Reaffirming the principle of the permanent sov-
ereignty of States over their natural resources”).
120. Emerka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in Inter-
national Law, 38 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 33 (2006), p. 54.
121. Nico Schrijver, Sovereighty over Natural Resources, 268–269 (Cambridge University Press,
1997), p. 371.
122. Ibid, p. 390.
123. Kamal Hossain, “Introduction,” in Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in Interna-
tional Law, (Kalal Hossain and Subrata Roy Chomdhury eds., St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. xiii
(emphasis added).
124. Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some Aspects), pp. 270–271.
125. S/Res/1483 (2003), p. 1 (Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own
political future and control their own natural resources”.); see also S/Res/1511 (2003), p. 1 (“Under-
scoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi
people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources”).
126. James Crawford, “The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions,” in The Rights of Peoples
(Crawford ed., Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 171.
127. Karol N. Gess, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 13 Int’l and Comp. L. Q. (1964),
p. 446.
128. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), 1992 I.C.J. 240, June 26 (Pre-
liminary Objections, Judgment); Antony Anghie, ‘The Heart of My Home’: Colonialism, Environmen-
tal Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 445 (1993).
NOTES 141
129. The Amoco International Finance Corp. Case, (1987) 15 Iran-US C.T.R. 189. para. 113.
130. Article 15(1), ILO Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Inde-
pendent Countries, states that “[t]he rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources per-
taining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded.”
131. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article 26(1), adopted by
the General Assembly on September 13, 2007.
132. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of August 31, 2001,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001), paras. 146 and 153 (“the State has violated the right of
the members of the Mayagna Awas Tingni Community to the use and enjoyment of their property,
and that it has granted concessions to third parties to utilize the property and resources located in
an area which would correspond, fully or in part, to the lands which must be delimited, demarcated,
and titled.”) [hereafter Awas Tingni Case]. Similarly, see Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Judgment of November 28, 2007, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R.
133. Awas Tingni Case, para. 153.
134. Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5, rev. 1, para. 5 (2004).
135. Ibid, para. 140.
136. Ibid, para. 117.
137. Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), (1992) 75 C.L.R. 1, para. 128(3).
138. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, December 11, 1997.
139. Alexkor Limited and the Government of the Republic of South Africa v. The Richtersveld Com-
munity and Others, Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 19/03, October 14, 2003, para.
62. available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2003/18.pdf.
140. See, for instance, American cases after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia: Sokoloff v. National
City Bank of New York (1924), 239 NY 158; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925), 240 NY 149;
Salimoff v. Standard Oil (1933), 262 NY 220. Similarly, with respect to the Spanish Civil War, see the
British judgment Banco de Bilbao v. Rey, [1938] 2 All.E.R. 253. See too, Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean
Turkish Holidays, (1977) 3 W.L.R. 656 (Eng. C.A.).
141. Texas v. White 74 U.S. 733, 733 (1868).
142. Id., p. 736 ( “[a]s these persons acquired no rights to payment of these bonds as against the
State, purchasers could acquire none through them.”)
143. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971,
I.C.J. Reports, para. 125 (1971) [hereafter Namibia Opinion].
144. Namibia Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge De Castro, pp. 218–219. See also Mohamed
Bennouna, Le droit international relatif aux matières premières, 177 R.C.A.D.I. 103, 120 (1982) (affir-
ming that “L’Afrique de Sud ne peut donc disposer légalement des ressources du territoire”).
145. The UN Security Council passed a resolution endorsing the decision, which also declared
that “franchises, rights, titles or contracts relating to Namibia granted to individuals or companies
by South Africa after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) are not subject to
protection or espousal by their States against claims of a future lawful Government of Namibia,”
SC/Res/301, October 20, 1971, para. 12. UN Council for Namibia, Decree No. 1 for the Protection
of the Natural Resources of Namibia, (September 27, 1974) (stating that “[a]ny permission, conces-
sion or licence for all or any of the purposes specified in paragraph 1 above whensoever granted by
any person or entity, including any body purporting to act under the authority of the Government
of the Republic of South Africa or the ‘Administration of South West Africa’ or their predecessors,
is null, void and of no force or effect.”).
146. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, para. 44–45 (1996). The European
Court of Human Rights has itself upheld this reasoning on a number of occasions. See Cyprus v.
Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001 IV), Demades v. Turkey (no. 16219/90, § 46, 31 July 2003),
Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey (no. 16163/90, § 31, 31 July
2003), and Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (No. 46347/99, ECHR 2005, December 22, 2005).
147. For guidance in determining the position in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Sri Lanka, the UK, and USA, see Stefan Talmon, Recogni-
tion in International Law: A Bibliography, 11.2 (1 ed. 2000).
148. See infra, Chapter IX of this manual.
149. SC Res 541, November 18, 1983, para. 7.
150. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, paras. 44–45 (1996).
151. SC Res 216 (1965) 12 November 1965, para. 2 (“Decides to call upon all States not to rec-
ognize this illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from rendering any
assistance to this illegal regime.”); SC Res 662 (1990) August 9, 1990 (“Calls upon all States,
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain
from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation.”);
SC Res 283 (1970) July 29, 1970 (“Calls upon all States maintaining diplomatic or consular relations
with South Africa to issue a formal declaration to the Government of South Africa to the effect that
they do not recognize any authority of South Africa with regard to Namibia and that they consider
South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia illegal.”).
152. The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§ 203(g).
153. Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit International Public (L.G.D.J, 2002), p. 569 (“Les
pouvoirs de l’autorité “belligérante” sur la portion de territoire qu’elle contrôle sont assimilables à
ceux d’un occupant de guerre…”).
154. Republic of Liberia and Another v. Bickford, 787 F. Supp. 397, 401 United States District Court,
Southern District, New York, 24 March 1992 reported in International Law Reports, Vol. 96, p. 90.
155. See infra Chapter IV of this manual.
156. See infra Chapter IV of this manual.
157. Article 52 stipulates that “Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in
proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants
in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country. Such requisitions
NOTES 143
and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.
Contributions in kind shall as far is possible be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and
the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.”
158. Krupp Case, p. 1345; For other definitions of property generally contemplated by the term
requisition, see John Westlake, International Law, Part II: War 110 (Cambridge, 1907) (“food for men
and animals and clothes, wagons, horses, railway material, boats and other means of transport, and
of the compulsory labour, whether gratuitous or otherwise, of workmen to make roads, to drive
carts, and for such other services.”); see also Percy Bordwell, The Law of War Between Belligerents,
320 (Callaghan and Company, 1908) (indicating that “requisitions in kind extend to all objects inci-
dental to the shelter of troops, to the subsistence of the army in campaign, to transportation and
communication, to the care of the sick and wounded, to objects of clothing and camp equipment,
and finally to all materials, tools, apparatus, etc., suitable for use of the army.”); see also Manual of
Military Law, (HMSO, 1958) para. 598 [hereafter U.K. Military Manual 1958].
159. U.K. Military Manual 1958, para. 598.
160. Ralli Brothers v. German Government, 2 I.L.R. 446 (Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Trib. 1923);
Gros Roman et Cie v. German State, 2 I.L.R. 449 (Franco-German Mixed Arbitral Trib. 1924); Scotti
v. Garbagnati and Marconi, 15 I.L.R. 604 (Italy Ct. of Cassation 1948) (finding that an order of the
German Military Authorities in occupation of Northern Italy purporting to requisition buildings
for use as a workshop by an Italian firm engaged in export to Germany was not a lawful act of
requisitioning in the meaning of Hague Convention).
161. De Riard v. Medoro, Italy, Court of Cassation (United Civil Sections), March 11, 1950, ILR
(1950) Case No. 141, pp. 426–427 (interpreting the pertinent provisions of the Hague Regulations
as implying that “a requisitioned object may be used and consumed in its natural state, but it cannot
be sold or exchanged for another.” See also Muhlmann v. Bauer 18 I.L.R. 692 (Italy Ct. of Cassa-
tion 1951), where the same court held that article 52 of the Hague Regulations was violated “where
goods were requisitioned from one person and sold or otherwise transferred to another.” Likewise,
in Kostoris v. Meinl, an Italian court found that a requisition then sale of Jewish property was not
sufficient to pass title in the property because “these acts cannot possibly be regarded as dictated
by the needs of the army of occupation.” Kostoris v. Meinl, Court of Appeal of Trieste, January 28,
1949, ILR (1949) Case No. 171, p. 473.
162. Thiriez v. Deschamps, 15 I.L.R. 608 (Ct. of First Instance of Mons 1948).
163. Blum v. Société d’Injection Rapide et de Conservation des Bois, 22 I.L.R. 1007 (Fr. Ct. of Cassation
1955) (upheld on appeal). See Société d’injection Rapide et de Conservation des Bois v. Blum, France,
Court of Cassation. October 27, 1958.
164. Feilchenfeld, p. 36.
165. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), 36 Stat
2277, ch 1, art 53(1).
166. The original reads, « toute propriété mobilière de l’Etat de nature à servir aux opérations de
la guerre. »
167. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, (2nd ed, Oxford University
Press, 2009), p. 219 [hereafter Dinstein].
168. According to Mechelynck, this reference to “nature” in the original provision was expressly
inserted in order to restrict seizures to objects which, “by their very nature,” are capable of military
use. Albert Mechelynck, La Convention De La Haye Concernant Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre
Sur Terre D’apres Les Actes Et Documents Des Conferences De Bruxelles De 1874 Et De La Haye De 1899
Et 1907, (Maison d’Éditions et d’Impressions, 1915), p. 407.
169. Actes De La Conference De Bruxelles, 121 (F. Hayez, 1874)
170. Max Huber, La Propriété Publique en Cas De Guerre Sur Terre, 20 R.G.D.I.P. (1913), p. 668
[hereafter Huber] (“il faut comprendre dans la propriété mobilière de l’Etat de nature à servir aux
opérations de la guerre, les objets pouvant directement servir à des buts militaire.”); see also Charles
Cheney Hyde, Land Warfare, 21 (Government Printing Office, 1918) (arguing that “[t]he Rules of
Land Warfare advert to the fact that while all movable property belonging to the State, and which is
directly susceptible of military use, may be taken possession of as booty and utilized for the benefit
of the invader’s Government,’ other movable property, not directly susceptible of such use, ‘must
be respected and can not be appropriated.”); Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict,
715-716 (Stevens and Sons, 1959) [hereafter Stone]; Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of War
(Univ. Calif. Press, 1959), p. 292 [hereafter Greenspan] (“Moveable public property which may not
be appropriated by the occupant is that not directly susceptible of military use.”) (emphasis added).
For authors who consider property that only indirectly contributes to military operations, see Yutaka
Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law,
and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law, 200 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) [hereafter
Arai-Takahashi]; Dinstein, pp. 218–220.
171. See Wayne Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change, 71–100 (Oxford University
Press, 2007) [hereafter Sandholtz] (detailing the history of the relationship between pillage and
art); see also Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300; 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, reprinted in 60 Am. J. Int’l L. 851,
853–853 (1966) (discussing the pillage of a painting by Marc Chagall from occupied Belgium).
172. Krupp Case, p. 1483.
173. Id.
174. See, for example, P. v. A.G.K and P. Annual Digest 1948, Case No. 196 (where the Swiss
Federal Tribunal found that the German occupant was not entitled to seize a calculating machine
owned by the Polish government, because that machine was not one used for operations of war.”);
see also Ministero Difesa v. Ambriola, Italy, Court of Cassation. June 15, 1951, ILR (1951) Case No.
213, pp. 690–691 (reiterating that Article 53 of The Hague Regulations “indeed permits occupying
forces to seize cash and securities, depots of arms, means of transportation, magazines and stores,
and in general all movable property of the occupied State, but only in so far as they may be of use
in military operations, and not for purposes of trafficking with individuals.”).
175. See Al Nawar v. Minister of Defence, Case H.C. 574/82, Judgment of 11 August 1985, published
in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 321–328.
176. Thiriez v. Deschamps (1948) ILR, Case No. 205, p. 609.
177. Singapore Oil Stocks. For commentary, see N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij c. The
War Damage Commission, A.J.I.L. 808 (1956), 51, p. 808. B, The Case of the Singapore Oil Stocks,
Int’l. and Comp. L. Q. 5(1). 84-98 (Jan., 1956); Evan J. Wallach, The Use of Crude Oil by an Occupying
Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre, 41(2) Int’l. and Comp. L. Q. 287–310 (April 1992).
NOTES 145
178. Singapore Oil Stocks, p. 78.
179. Id., p. 79.
180. U.K. Military Manual 1958, para. 597. For commentary that supports this criticism, see
Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 812, 817 (Yale
University Press, 1961).
181. U.K. Military Manual, p. 301.
182. Institut de droit International, Réglementation internationale de la contrebande de guerre, §2
(1896) (defining munitions-de-guerre as “articles which, to be used directly in war, need only be
assembled or combined.”); Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law, Vol I: International Law as
Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 272 (Stevens & Sons, 1945), (“In the case, however, of
private property susceptible to direct military use, only seizure is permitted, and, in accordance with
Article 53, paragraph 2, it must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is declared.”), Erik
Castréns, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 236 (Helsinki, 1954), (“Raw materials and semi-
manufactured products necessary for war production can hardly be regarded as munitions of war.”);
J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land, 412 (Macmillan 1911) (“[w]arlike material, and all property which
is directly adaptable to warlike purposes (railways and other means of communication, etc, may be
seized by the occupant, whether belonging to the State or to individuals.”); see also Department
of the Army, International Law, Da Pam 27-161-2, p. 177 (“arms and munitions of war include all
varieties of military equipment including that in the hands of manufacturers, component parts of
or material suitable only for use in the foregoing, and in general all kinds of war materials”). It will
be noted that many items that could be extremely useful to a State at war are not included. Such
items in occupied areas are heavy industry not yet converted to war production, crude oil and other
petroleum products. Efforts to interpret broadly the term of the Hague Regulations ‘ammunition
of war’ have not been successful.”; Greenspan, p. 296.
183. Eliu Lauterpacht, The Hague Regulations and the Seizure of Munitions-de-guerre 32 Brit. Y.B.
Int’l L. 218, 226 (1955).
184. Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual No. 27–10, (July 1956),
§ 410(a) [hereafter U.S. Field Manual].
185. In re Esau, Holland, Special Criminal Court, Hertogenbosch, 483–484 (February 21, 1949)
in Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1949).
186. Prosecutor v. Naletilić et al., Case No. IT-98-34-T, March 31, 2003, para. 616; see also Martić
Trial Judgment, para. 102.
187. Hadžihasanović Trial Judgment, para. 52.
188. Brice M. Clagett and O. Thomas Johnson, “May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully
Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?” 72 The American Journal of
International Law, 558–585, 558, 568 (1978) [hereafter Clagett and Johnson].
189. T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, (D.C. Heath and Co., 2nd ed., 1899),
p. 368.
190. U.S. Field Manual, § 402; U.K. Military Manual, p. 303; New Zealand Defence Force, Interim
Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, (1992), § 1341(2) [hereafter New Zealand Military Manual].
See also Feilchenfeld, p. 55; Stone, p. 714.
191. F. Laurent, Principes De Droit Civil, 563-564 (1887).
192. Department of State Memorandum of Law on Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in
Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, 16 Int’l Legal Materials 733, 740 (1977) [hereafter US Department of State
Legal Memorandum].
193. Edward R. Cummings, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories under the Laws of Belligerent
Occupation, 9 J. Int’l L. and Econ. 533, 563 and 565 (1974) (acknowledging that appropriating prop-
erty that would be consumed by use, “would not be permissible under the classical law on usufruct,”
but endorsing certain domestic interpretations that enable an occupying power to exploit mines
“already open and in operation at the beginning of the usufruct.”); Iain Scobbie, “Natural Resources
and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent Sovereignty,” in S. Bowen (ed.) Human
Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 221, 250
(Kluwer, 1997) (conceding that “there is room to argue that an occupant, as usufruct, is not entitled
even to continue the exploitation of resources in which the displaced sovereign was engaged on its
own account,” but later condoning a degree of continuing exploitation); U.S. Department of State
Memorandum, p. 740 (stating that the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in accordance
with the doctrine of usufruct constitutes “an illogical compromise,” but latter accepting a degree of
exploitation provided new mines are not opened).
194. Clagett and Johnson, p. 574.
195. For examples of civil law countries that do not allow a usufruct to exploit non-renewable
natural resources, see U.S. Department of State Legal Memorandum, pp. 736–739. For other civil law
precedents that conclude similarly, see Clagett and Johnson, pp. 571–572.
196. Id., p. 570.
197. Ministries Case, p. 744 (finding that the company BHO “concentrated its efforts largely upon
the manganese ore mines in Nikopol, the iron mines in Krivoi Rog, and the coal and ore mining
in the Donetz Basin.”).
198. Id., p. 746.
199. Id., p. 747.
200. For example, see Ministries Case, p. 734 (convicting Koerner of pillage for having ordered that
“[t]he economic command in the newly occupied territories should direct its activities to extracting
the maximum quantities of goods required for the war effort, particularly steel, mineral oil, and
food. All other points of view should take second place.” As a consequence, he became criminally
responsible for the plunder that resulted in Russia); see also Trial of Dr. Joseph Buhler, Law Reports
of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIV, p. 23 [hereafter Buhler Case] (convicting Buhler of pillage in
Poland for “economic exploitation of the country’s resources,” achieved through the confiscation
of mining rights and mining shares, installations and equipment of the mineral oil industry, raw
materials, iron ores, crude oil, nitrogen, phosphates and coal). For further examples, see Annex 1 to
this Manual.
201. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/68, para. 57.
202. Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera, Digging Deeper: How the DR Congo’s Mining Policy Is
Failing the Country, 16 (Pole Institute, 2005); see also Leiv Lunde and Mark Taylor, “Regulating
NOTES 147
Business in Conflict Zones: Challenges and Options” in Profiting from Peace, at 332–333 (discussing
the difficulties of designing targeted regulations that do not harm civilians.
203. See R. Dobie Langenkamp and Rex J. Zedalis, What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some
Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields, 14 EUR
J INT LAW 417–435, 432 (2003) (“’Expenses of occupation’ might be seen as including a vast range
of things. In regard to the occupation of Iraq, could it be understood to include the costs associated
with preparing for the invasion, stationing forces overseas and at-the-ready in advance of the inva-
sion, conducting the military operations that result in the occupation, administering the oil fields
following the successful wrap-up of operations and the commencement of occupation, providing
assistance to the indigenous Iraqi population in helping the creation of a transitional and, eventu-
ally, permanent governing structure?”).
204. These obligations include duties to ensure education for children, provide food and medical
supplies to the local population, maintain medical and hospital establishments and preserve law
and order. See Geneva Convention IV, Arts. 50, 55, and 56. See also, Hague Regulations, Art. 43.
205. Krupp, at 1341. McDougal and Feliciano make a similar point when arguing that a major
purpose of the law of belligerent occupation has been to mitigate the ancient and recurrent demand
that “war must support war.” McDougal and Feliciano, at 809.
206. DRC v. Uganda Case, 249.
207. Gerhard Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory, 177 (1957). See also, U.S. Department
of State Legal Memorandum, p. 741 (“an occupant may not open wells in areas where none existed
at the time the occupation began, since the prior or normal rate of exploitation was zero”); Claggett
and Johnson, pp. 576–577 (“a rule that allows occupants to work mines or wells that were being
exploited at the commencement of the occupation is not wholly consistent with this policy”.)
208. Administration of Waters and Forests v. Falk, p. 563.
209. Government of Israel, Israel: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Law on the Right
to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 432 (1978), p. 10.
210. See McDougal and Feliciano, p. 812; Allan Gerson, Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a Belligerent
Occupant: the Gulf of Suez Dispute, 71 A.J.I.L. (1977), p. 731 (“international law forbids exploitation
of natural resources, including oil, only where the practice is marked by wanton dissipation of such
resources”).
211. See infra, Chapter V of this manual.
213. See, Chap. IV. of this manual.
214. Ministries Case, pp. 758, 763. (In finding Kehrl guilty of pillage, the tribunal concluded that
“through his active participation in the acquisition and control of the industries and enterprises
hereinbefore specifically referred to, [Kehrl] violated the Hague Convention with respect to belliger-
ent occupancy.”)
215. Id., p. 758.
217. Id., p. 1146, 1164. In a more specific application of the same reasoning, the manager of
Farben’s Offenbach plant, Friedrich Jaehne, was found guilty of pillage on the basis of an employee’s
testimony to the effect that “[n]o negotiations were conducted with these former owners, nor were
their interests considered by us. We rather negotiated with the sequestrators appointed by the
German Reich.”
218. For further information about the distinction between concessions and mining agreements,
see Danièle Barberis, Negotiating Mining Agreements: Past, Present and Future Trends (Kluwer, 1998).
219. Congolese Mining Code, Arts. 5, 109 and 111.
220. Id., Art. 5 (stating that “[a]ny person of Congolese nationality is authorized to engage in arti-
sanal exploitation of mineral substances in the National Territory, provided that he is the holder of
an artisanal miner’s card, issued or granted by the relevant government entity in accordance with
the provisions of the present Code.”).
221. Id. See also, Congolese Mining Code, Arts. 116–126.
223. Buhler Case, pp. 23, 30, 39.
224. See Krupp Case, pp. 1361–1362.
225. Roechling Case, p. 1118.
226. IG Farben Case, pp. 1135–1136.
229. Id. (concluding that “[t]he essence of the offence is the use of the power resulting from the
military occupation of France as the means of acquiring private property in utter disregard of the
rights and wishes of the owner. We find the element of compulsion and coercion present in an
aggravated degree in the Francolor transaction, and the violation of the Hague Regulations is clearly
established.”); for other incidents of coercion in trade, see the Nordisk-Lettmetal takeover, IG Farben
Case, p. 1146.
230. Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 33, second paragraph. For other codifications of
pillage in the law of war, see infra, paras. 1–2 of this manual.
231. Martić Trial Judgment, para. 104; see also Hadžihasanović Trial Judgment, para. 50 ( “the mens
rea element of the offence of plunder of public or private property is established when the perpetra-
tor of the offence acts with the knowledge and intent to acquire property unlawfully, or when the
consequences of his actions are foreseeable.”)
232. Roechling Case, pp. 1110–1111.
233. Id., p. 1080.
234. Id., p. 1116.
235. Id., p. 1113.
236. In the United Kingdom for example, courts have found that “[a] court or jury may also find
that a result is intended, though it is not the actor’s purpose to cause it, when (a) the result is a
NOTES 149
virtually certain consequence of the act, and (b) the actor knows that it is a virtually certain conse-
quence.” Smith and Hogan, p. 94. These standards appear to approximate to what German criminal
law considered dolus directus (2nd degree). See Albin Eser, “Mental Elements: Mistake of Fact and
Mistake of Law”, The Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 889, 906
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
237. As previously noted, the businessman Roechling was also convicted of pillage for purchasing
stolen property from ROGES. See infra, para. 104 of this manual.
238. Krupp Case, pp. 1361–1362.
239. Id.
240. Id., p. 1363.
241. Id.
242. Martić Trial Judgment, para. 104. Although the terminology seems slightly different to estab-
lished tests for indirect intent, see also Hadžihasanović Trial Judgment, para. 50. (The Hadžihasanović
Trial Judgment articulated this standard in slightly different terms by stating that “the mens rea
element of the offence of plunder of public or private property is established when the perpetra-
tor of the offence acts with the knowledge and intent to acquire property unlawfully, or when the
consequences of his actions are foreseeable.”)
243. Although the initial decisions of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber affirm that dolus eventualis can
attach to international crimes charged before the court, the most recent decision suggests that this
is inconsistent with the wording of Article 30 of the statute and the intention of states who drafted
it. See Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, 360–369 (conclud-
ing that with respect to dolus eventualis and recklessness, that “the Chamber is of the view that such
concepts are not captured by article 30 of the Statute”).
244. In Australia, the Criminal Code Act states that “[t] f the law creating the offence does not
specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, reckless-
ness is the fault element for that physical element.” Criminal Code Act 1995, Act No.12 of 1995
as amended. In the United Kingdom, cl. 20 of the draft Criminal Code states that “[e]very offence
requires a fault element of recklessness with respect to each of its elements other than fault ele-
ments, unless otherwise provided.” In the United States, the Model Penal Code insists that “when
the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such
element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” See
Model Penal Code, supra note 99, §2.02(3).
245. Jacques-Henri Robert, Droit pénal général, 325 (6e éd. refondue. ed. 2005) (describing dol
eventuel); Elise van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, 43–53 (2003) (explaining dolus eventualis in civil law jurisdictions and comparing
to recklessness); Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law, 63–67 (2008) (explaining
dolus eventualis in German criminal law). See also Commentario Breve al Codice Penale, 103 (Cedam,
1986) (discussing dolus eventualis in Italian criminal law).
246. A number of jurisdictions will not view recklessness as a component of intention. Moreover,
if the ICC cannot prosecute pillage perpetrated with indirect intent, this may influence national
courts. For example, in the United Kingdom’s legislation implementing the ICC Statute, a provision
insists that “[i]n interpreting and applying the provisions of the articles referred to in subsection (1)
[war crimes] the court shall take into account any relevant judgment or decision of the ICC.” U.K.
International Criminal Court Act 2001, § 50(5).
247. U.S. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(c). See also R v. G and another [2004] 1 A.C. 1034, 1057 (stat-
ing that “[A] person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act
1971 with respect to-(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a
result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him,
unreasonable to take the risk…”) (United Kingdom). See also R v. Crabbe (1985) 58 ALR 417, 470
(“A person who does an act causing death knowing that it is probable that the act will cause death
or grievous bodily harm is…guilty of murder”) (Australia).
248. BGHSt 36, 1–20 [9–10] (“the perpetrator is acting intentionally if he recognizes as possible
and not entirely unlikely the fulfilment of the elements of an offence and agrees to it in such a way
that he approves the fulfilment of the elements of the offence or at least reconciles himself with it
in order to reach the intended result, even if he does not wish for the fulfilment of the elements of
the crime”) (Germany). See also Commentario Breve al Codice Penale, Cedam, Padua (1986), p. 103
(“the occurrence of the fact constituting a crime, even though it is not desired by the perpetrator, is
foreseen and accepted as a possible consequence of his own conduct.”) (Italy).
249. Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 358 (July 10, 2008) (“indirect intent
may be expressed as requiring knowledge that destruction was a probable consequence of his
acts.”), 382 (“indirect intent, i.e. in the knowledge that cruel treatment was a probable consequence
of his act or omission”); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, 261 (Jan. 28, 2005)
(“the Chamber holds that indirect intent, i.e. knowledge that cruel treatment was a probable conse-
quence of the perpetrator’s act or omission, may also fulfill the intent requirement for this crime.”);
296 (“the mens rea requirement for a crime under Article 3(b) is met when the perpetrator acted
with either direct or indirect intent, the latter requiring knowledge that devastation was a probable
consequence of his acts.”); Martić Trial Judgment, 65 (“The mens rea element of extermination
requires that the act or omission was committed with the intent to kill persons on a large scale
or in the knowledge that the deaths of a large number of people were a probable consequence of
the act or omission”); 79 (reasoning that the term “likely” as a synonym for “probable”); the same
jurisprudence appears to treat “an awareness of a substantial likelihood” as a synonym. Prosecutor v.
Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T , Judgment, 509 (Nov. 20, 2005) (“The requisite mens rea is that
the accused acted with an intent to commit the crime, or with an awareness of the probability, in the
sense of the substantial likelihood, that the crime would occur as a consequence of his conduct.”).
250. Model Penal Code, § 223.6 (emphasis added).
251. LaFave, p. 989 (“[t]he circumstance that the buyer paid an inadequate price for the goods,
that the seller was irresponsible, that the transaction between them was secret—these factors all
point towards the buyer’s guilty knowledge.”) Rassat, p. 205 (“caractère bizarre de la négociation
qui est à l’origine de la détention, liens du receleur et du voleur, absence de facture, prix dérisoire
payé ou même absence de prix … ”). See also J.C. Smith, The Law of Theft, 211–215 (Butterworths,
4th ed., 1979); Smith and Hogan, pp. 853–858.
NOTES 151
252. Krupp Case, p. 1353.
253. Erik Kennes, “The Mining Sector in Congo: The Victim or the Orphan of Globalization?,”
in The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: The Pitfalls of Enforced Democracy and
Globalization, 170 (2005) ( “the war situation allows [companies] to purchase important quantities
of raw materials at a lower price than would be possible in the context of normal production pro-
cesses.”).
254. Ministries Case, pp. 609, 620–621.
255. Id., p. 618.
256. Id.
257. See infra, paras 95–99 of this manual.
259. Id.
262. DRC v. Uganda Case, 249.
262. See infra, para. 97 of this manual.
263. Glahn, supra note ___ at 177. For further discussion, see infra, para. 98 of this manual.
264. 88 Eng Rep 1518 (KB 1701).
265. Survey Response, Laws of Germany (Remo Klinger), “Commerce, Crime and Conflict:
A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions,” FAFO AIS, 2006, p. 8.
266. Article 121–2, Code Pénal Francais. Apparently, the phrase was deliberately included to coun-
ter the critique that corporate criminal liability might shield corporate officers and directors from
individual criminal responsibility. See Gerard Couturier, « Répartition des responsabilités entre
personnes morales et personnes physiques, » 111 Revue des Sociétés (Dalloz, April 1993), p. 307.
267. Flick Case, p. 1192. See also Krupp Case, p. 1375 (“[t]he laws and customs of war are binding
no less upon private individuals than upon government officials and military personnel.”).
268. U.S. Navy, The Commander’s Handbook On the Law Of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, § 6.2.6
(July 2007); see also U.S. Field Manual, § 499 (“The term ‘war crime’ is the technical expression for
a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian.”); New Zealand Military
Manual, § 1701(1)] (“The term ‘war crime’ is the generic expression for large and small violations of
the laws of warfare, whether committed by members of the armed forces or by civilians.”) Office
of the Judge Advocate General (Canada), The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical
Level, § 48; UK Military Manual, § 16.30.1.
269. Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (Essen Lynching case), British Military Court for the Trial
of War Criminals, Essen, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 88–92 (December 22, 1945).
270. Trial of Alfons Klein and Six Others (“the Hadamar trial”), United States Military Commis-
sion Appointed by the Commanding General Western Military District, U.S.F.E.T., Wiesbaden,
Germany, 1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 46–54 (October 15, 1945).
271. Alfons Klein was the chief administrative officer of the institution. Adolf Wahlmann was the
institution’s doctor, Heinrich Ruoff the chief male nurse, and Karl Willig a registered male nurse.
Irmgard Huber served as the chief female nurse, while Adolf Merkle was the institution’s book-
keeper in charge or registering incoming and outgoing patients. Philipp Blum was a doorman and
telephone switchboard operator, although his tasks extended to burying the bodies of murdered
patients. Klein, Ruoff, and Willig were sentenced to be hanged. Wahlmann was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Merkle, Blum, and Huber were sentenced to 35 years, 30 years, and 25 years impris-
onment respectively. Id.
272. U.S. v. Joseph Altstoetter et al. (Justice case), 3 Trials of War Criminals, 954–1201.
273. Bommer Case, p. 62. The case is similar to that of Karl Lingenfelder, a German from Muss-
bach, who came to France as a settler in the first days of occupation and took possession of a farm
whose owners had been expelled by the German authorities. He was convicted of pillage for remov-
ing four horses and two vehicles from the farm. Trial of Karl Lingenfelder, Permanent Military
Tribunal at Metz, 9 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, at 67 (March 11, 1947).
274. Bommer Case, pp. 65–66.
275. For a compilation of only WWII cases, see Digest of Laws and Cases, 15 Law Reports of Trials
of War Criminals, pp. 58–62.
276. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 634 (Sept 2, 1998). On appeal,
the Appeals Chamber ruled that “there is no explicit provision in the Statute that individual criminal
responsibility is restricted to a particular class of individuals.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-A, Appeal Judgment, para. 436 (June 1, 2001) [hereafter Akayesu Appeal Judgment].
277. Procureur v. Niyonteze, Tribunal Militaire d’Appel 1A, audience du 15 mai au 26 mai 2000 ;
see also Consolata Mukangango et al., Cour d’assises Bruxelles, (June 8, 2001). http://www.justice-
tribune.com/index.php?page=v2_article&id=1703.
279. Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (the Zyklon B case), British Military Court, Hamburg,
1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 93 (March 8, 1946).
280. Id., p. 103.
281. Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Netherlands, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof’s-Gravenhage, 2200050906-2,
(May 9, 2007) [hereafter Van Anraat]; Prosecutor v. Kouwenhoven, Netherlands, LJN: AY5160, Rech-
tbank’s-Gravenhage, 09/750001-05 (July 28, 2006).
282. Van Anraat, para. 11.5.
283. Id., para. 11.5.
284. Id., section 16 “Grounds for the punishment.”
285. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, (December
3, 2003).
286. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, (Nov. 16, 2001). Musema was direc-
tor of a public enterprise named the Gisovu Tea Factory at the time he orchestrated his employees
to engage in the killings.
287. Prosecutor v. Kolasinac, District Court of Prizren , Case No. 226/200, (January 31, 2003)
288. IG Farben Case, p. 1132 (emphasis added).
NOTES 153
290. IG Farben Case, pp. 1156–1157.
291. Id., p. 1153.
292. Cristina Chiomenti, “Corporations and the International Criminal Court,” Transnational Cor-
porations and Human Rights, 287 (Olivier De Schutter ed., 2006); Andrew Clapham, “The Ques-
tion of Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome
Conference on a International Criminal Court,” in Liability of Multinational Corporations Under
International Law, 139 (Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
293. Anita Ramastray and Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict, Legal Remedies
for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law: A Survey of 16 Countries, (2006)
(finding that 11 of 16 jurisdictions surveyed contain legal provisions that allowed for the prosecu-
tion of corporate entities for international crimes). See also Megan Donaldson and Rupert Wat-
ters, “Corporate Culture” as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations, prepared by Allens
Arthur Robinson for the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human
Rights and Business, (Feb. 2008) http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-
Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf).
294. Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995, Section 12.1(1).
295. Id., Section 268.54.
296. Interpretative Act, R.S. 1985, c. I-21, Section 35.
297. Corporations will also be responsible for the war crime of pillage in Canada through an
alternative legal route. Section 34(2) of the Interpretative Act stipulates that “[a]ll the provisions of
the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enact-
ment.” Because Article 2 of the Canadian Criminal Code defines the term “every one” as including
organizations, all offenses created by the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 c.
24 (Can.) can be charged against companies.
298. Section 51(2)(b) of the U.K. International Criminal Court Act 2001 confers British courts
with jurisdiction over acts of pillage orchestrated “outside the United Kingdom by a United King-
dom national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject to U.K. service jurisdiction.” Article
67(2) states that “[i]n this Part a ‘United Kingdom resident’ means a person who is resident in the
United Kingdom.” Finally, section 5 of the Interpretations Act 1978 states that “[i]n any Act, unless
the contrary intention appears, words and expressions listed in Schedule 1 to this Act are to be con-
strued according to that Schedule.” The Schedule states that “’[p]erson’ includes a body of persons
corporate or unincorporate.”
299. The War Crimes Act 18 U.S.C. § 2441(1996) stipulates that “whoever” commits a war crime
is subject to criminal punishment including fine, imprisonment and death. The Dictionary Act of
2000 states that “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress… the words ‘person’ and
‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.” Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
300. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir.
September 17, 2010), p. 49.
301. For instance, in implementing genocide into domestic criminal law, a number of states have
passed legislation that adds protected groups capable of being victims to genocide. For a survey
of this legislation, see Ward Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in
National Courts, 23-29 (2006). In the context of war crimes, see the intentional extension of grave
breaches to non-international armed conflicts in countries like Belgium, even though this goes
beyond customary international law. Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, “Grave Breaches, Universal Juris-
diction and Internal Armed Conflicts: Is Customary Law Moving Towards a Uniform Enforcement
Mechanism for all Armed Conflicts?,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5 (2000), pp. 89–90.
302. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, pp. 11–12.
303. Tesco Supermarkets v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153.
304. Section 12.3(2)(d) Commonwealth Criminal Code Act of 1995, Australia.
305. Article 102(2), Code Pénal Suisse.
306. J. Coffee, “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem
of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1980–1981), p. 410.
307. Id. See generally, Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University
Press, 2001); Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime, and Accountability (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993); Bernd Schünemann, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A German
Perspective,” Buffalo Criminal Law Review 8 (2004): 35–50.
308. Coffee, supra note 306, at 409–10 (detailing a series of scenarios whereby incentives within
a corporate entity are more compelling than the fear of corporate criminal liability); Schünemann,
supra note 307, at 36 (highlighting, in fact, how the use of corporate criminal liability alone “leads
to a weakening of the deterrent effect of an individual level”); Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 307,
at 180–81 (detailing instances where individual criminal liability will still be necessary, albeit within
a system where corporations have a duty to first institute internal discipline themselves).
309. International Criminal Court Act, 2001, 17, § 51(2)(b) (Eng.) (conferring British courts with
jurisdiction over war crimes perpetrated “outside the United Kingdom by a United Kingdom
national, a United Kingdom resident or a person subject to U.K. service jurisdiction.”).
310. 18 U.S.C. 2441 (1996) § 2441.
311. Article 23.2 Organic Law on Judicial Power, cited in Ana Libertad Laiena and Olga Martin-
Ortega “The Law in Spain,” Commerce, Crime and Conflict: A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions, 12 (Fafo
AIS, 2006) [hereafter FAFO Survey].
312. Public Prosecutor v. Antoni, 32 I.L.R. 140 (App. Ct. of Svea 1960).
313. FAFO Survey, p. 16.
314. Ugolovnyi Kodeks [U.K.] [Criminal Code] art. 12(1) (Russ.) http://www.russian-criminal-code.
com/PartI/SectionI/Chapter2.html (“[c]itizens of the Russian Federation and stateless persons who
permanently reside in the Russian Federation and who have committed crimes outside the boundar-
ies of the Russian Federation shall be brought to criminal responsibility under this Code…”).
315. Niyonteze Case, p. 37 (“[q]ualifiées de crimes de guerre, ces infractions sont intrinsèquement
très grave”).
NOTES 155
316. Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, para. 520 (January 14, 2000).
317. See Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, p. 604. The study defines war crimes
as “serious violations of international humanitarian law.” See Rule 156, Vol. I, p. 568.
318. Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 c. 24 (Can.) § 8(b).
319. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zue Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches [German Code of
Crimes against International Law] June 30, 2002 BGBl 2002, I, p. 2254, § 1 (F.R.G).
320. The Prosecutor General at the Federal Supreme Court Karlsruhe, Re: Criminal Complaint
against Donald Rumsfeld et, 3 ARP 156/06-2, April 5, 2007, p. 4. http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/
ProsecutorsDecisionApril2007ENGLISH.pdf.
321. Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 153f, available online at http://www.mpicc.de/shared/data/
pdf/vstgbleng.pdf.
322. See Jean-Paul Puts (trans.), Tribunal Central d’Instruction No. 4, Cour Nationale, Adminis-
tration de la Justice Royaume d’Espagne, Résumé 3/2000 – D, p. 23 www.veritasrwandaforum.org
(« Les actes de pillage ont servi, tantôt au financement de la guerre et des opérations militaires
subséquentes, de mêmes que pour l’enrichissement personnel des hauts commandants militaires
de l‘A.P.R/F.P.R. »).
323. Sénat belge, Rapport de la Commission d’enquête parlementaire chargée d’enquêter sur l’exploi-
tation et le commerce légaux et illégaux de richesses naturelles dans la région des Grands Lacs au vu de
la situation conflictuelle actuelle et de l’implication de la Belgique, Session 2002–2003, Document
législatif n° 2-942/1 (February 20, 2003), § 3.3.1.
324. Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 12(2) (stating that “the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: (a) The State on the territory of which the
conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State
of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
national.”). See also Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals
of Non-State Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J.Int’l Crim. Just. 618–650 (2003) (affirming the Courts
ability to seize jurisdiction over nationals of non-state parties who perpetrate international crimes
in states party to the convention).
325. The Prosecutor, press release 16 July 2003, “Communications Received By The Office Of The
Prosecutor Of The ICC,” http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/newspoint/mediaalert/pids009_2003-en.pdf.
326. Id.
327. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC (Sept. 8, 2003).
328. Geneva Conventions, Common Arts 49(GCI), 50(GCII), 129(GCIII), 146(GCIV).
329. Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Rule 158, Vol. I, at 607 (emphasis added).
330. ICC Statute, art. 17(1)(a) (“Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the
Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or pros-
ecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely
to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”).
331. See Steven Morris, “British soldier admits war crime as court martial told of Iraqi civilian’s
brutal death,” The Guardian, September 20, 2006, (reporting on the trial of British soldiers for
inhumane treatment perpetrated in Iraq).
332. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC (September 8, 2003).
333. S/RES/1457 (2003), January 24, 2003, 15.
334. S/RES/1499 (2003), August 13, 2003, 3.
335. For a helpful outline of partie civile in Belgium and France, see Mireille Delmas-Marty and
John R. Spencer, European Criminal Procedures, 94, 247 (2002).
336. See Global Witness, Bankrolling Brutality - Why European timber company DLH should be held
to account for profiting from Liberian conflict timber, Briefing Document – 18/11/2009, http://www.
globalwitness.org/media_library_get.php/1152/1280525282/briefing_paper_eng.pdf.
337. For a discussion of these exceptions in English, see Markus Dirk Dubber and Mark Kelman,
American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and Comments, 101–105 (2005).
NOTES 157
The Open Society Justice Initiative uses law to protect and empower people around
the world. Through litigation, advocacy, research, and technical assistance, the Justice
Initiative promotes human rights and builds legal capacity for open societies. We fos-
ter accountability for international crimes, combat racial discrimination and stateless-
ness, support criminal justice reform, address abuses related to national security and
counterterrorism, expand freedom of information and expression, and stem corruption
linked to the exploitation of natural resources. Our staff are based in Abuja, Amsterdam,
Bishkek, Brussels, Budapest, Freetown, The Hague, London, Mexico City, New York,
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The Justice Initiative is governed by a Board composed of the following members:
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QC, Jenny S. Martinez, Juan E. Méndez, Wiktor Osiatyński, Herman Schwartz,
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legal officer, national criminal justice; Amrit Singh, senior legal officer, national security
and counterterrorism; and Rupert Skilbeck, litigation director.
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than 70 countries, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights,
freedom of expression, and access to public health and education.
www.soros.org
Pillage means theft during war. Although the prohibition against pillage
dates to the Roman Empire, pillaging is a modern war crime that can
be enforced before international and domestic criminal courts. Following
World War II, several businessmen were convicted for commercial pillage
of natural resources. And although pillage has been prosecuted in recent
years, commercial actors are seldom held accountable for their role in
fuelling conflict.
Reviving corporate liability for pillaging natural resources is not simply

about protecting property rights during conflict—it can also play a
significant role in preventing atrocity. Since the end of the Cold War, the
illegal exploitation of natural resources has become a prevalent means
of financing conflict. In countries including Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, and Sierra
Leone, the illicit trade in natural resources has not only created incentives
for violence, but has also furnished warring parties with the finances
necessary to sustain some of the most brutal hostilities in recent history.
In Corporate War Crimes, law professor James G. Stewart offers a

roadmap of the law governing pillage as applied to the illegal exploitation
of natural resources by corporations and their officers. The text traces
the evolution of the prohibition against pillage from its earliest forms
through the Nuremburg trials to today’s national laws and international
treaties. In doing so, Stewart provides a long-awaited blueprint for
prosecuting corporate plunder during war.
Corporate War Crimes seeks to guide investigative bodies, war crimes

prosecutors, and judges engaged with the technicalities of pillage. It
should also be useful for advocates, political institutions, and companies
interested in curbing resource wars.

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What is the purpose of prosecuting corporate pillage of natural resources?

What is the purpose of prosecuting corporate pillage of natural resources?

O P E N S O C I E T Y J U S T I C E I N I T I AT I V E P U B L I C AT I O N

Corporate War Crimes

Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources

Open Society Justice Initiative

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted

For more information contact:

Cover designed by Judit Kovács l Createch Ltd.

• Bruce Broomhall, Professor of Law, Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada.

• Antonio Cassese, President, International Criminal Tribunal for Lebanon and

• Andrew Clapham, Professor of Public International Law, Graduate Institute of

• Roger Clark, University Professor of Law, Rutgers University Camden, United

• Norman Farrell, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the

• Ward Ferdinandusse, War Crimes Prosecutor, National Division, Netherlands.

• Stefan Talmon, Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford,

• Martin Witteveen, Judge International Crimes, District Court, The Hague,

• University of California–Los Angeles Law Clinic, United States.

The participation of these individuals and organizations in the review of this

The Prohibition of Pillage in International

Jean-Marie Henkaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian

Codifications of the Crime of Pillage

1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property;

3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner;

5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the

DEFINING PILLAGE: ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 21

The Definition of International Armed Conflict

[i]t is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between

Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 88–171.

C. Byron, “Armed conflicts: International or non-international?,” Journal of Conflict and

J.G. Stewart, “Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humani-

THE ARMED CONFLICT REQUIREMENT 25

The Unified Approach

THE ARMED CONFLICT REQUIREMENT 27

In determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the

The passage is controversial because each of the factors is unnecessarily lim-

Kunarac Appeals Judgment,

A NEXUS TO THE ARMED CONFLICT 31

William Schabas, UN International Criminal Tribunals, 236–239 (Cambridge, 2007).

43. Third, overharvesting of an otherwise legitimate concession provides another

Indirect Appropriation—Receiving Stolen Property

Ownership of Natural Resources in National Law

52. Ownership in natural resources varies between jurisdictions and depending on

Elizabeth Bastida, Basic Instruments and Concepts of Mineral Law, http://www.natural-

Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

60. In the second scenario, an independent state’s right to permanent sovereignty

62. A number of international instruments support the notion of indigenous prop-

Indigenous Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Final Report of

A Rebel Group’s Ownership of Resources

In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory

71. As previously mentioned, certain domestic jurisdictions adopt a different inter-

Antonello Tancredi, “A Normative ‘Due Process’ in the Creation of States Through

Enrico Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law: Reconciling Effective-

Ownership through Recognition of Governments

74. Recognition is also less relevant when a de facto administration of part of a

Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 152–159 (Clarendon Press,

Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference