The Extent of the Atoning Work of Christ

Peter Brubacher
December 1994

In the book Redemption Accomplished and Applied, John Murray argues for a
limited view of the atonement of Christ. He begins on page 59 by admitting the
possibility that the true biblical position is one of universal atonement. He quotes Is.
53:6, Heb. 2:9, and 1 John 2:2 as verses which apparently support this doctrine. He
immediately sets these aside, however, to discuss issues of interpretation. He focuses on
the use of words and expressions such as "world", "all", and "every one" which seem to
refer to all of humanity inclusively, and demonstrates that they are not always used in
Scripture in a universal sense. To do this, he turns to four specific passages: Rom.
11:12; Rom. 5:18; and 1 Cor 6:12, 10:23. These all have the form of absolute universal
statements, and he attempts to show that taking them at face value produces nonsensical
interpretations. Once he does this, he concludes that quoting "a few texts from the Bible
in which such words as "world" and "all" occur in connection with the death of Christ"
(Murray, 61) will not settle the issue of the extent of the atonement. Following this, he
returns to Heb. 2:9 and appeals to the context to determine the scope of the phrase "every
one". His next major step is to further define the question of who specifically Christ died
for. He speaks of "the concept of redemption" (Murray, 63), and discusses it in terms of
actuality instead of the possibility which he asserts is the result of taking a universal
stance. His next task is providing two biblical arguments for the "necessity" of the
doctrine of limited atonement. The first is based on a lengthy treatment of Rom. 8:31-39.
Murray argues that the apparently universal force of the statement that God delivered his
Son "up for us all" is tempered by examining the context to determine who the "us all" is
actually referring to. By consulting verses 28-30, and following through with the rest of
the passage, Murray establishes that the people being spoken of here are only the elect,
and not humanity in general. The next argument he offers hinges on the fact that "those
for whom Christ died have themselves also died in Christ" (Murray, 69). His argument
here depends on the "inevitable" inference "that those for whom Christ died are those and
those only who die to sin and live to righteousness" (Murray, 70). He concludes his
chapter on the extent of the atonement with an examination of two passages which are
generally quoted to support the universal position: 2 Cor. 5:14,15; and 1 John 2:2. After
doing this, he is satisfied enough to say that "no conclusive support for the doctrine of
universal atonement can be derived from universalist expressions" (Murray, 75).
St. Athanasius avoids the proof-text method to a very large extent. In fact, he
avoids much that is common in Murray. Where Murray seems concerned to proceed
systematically and in a scholarly manner, St. Athanasius gives the impression that he is
writing a letter for the edification of a fellow believer. While this makes his work very
readable, it is a little more difficult to find an issue treated extensively in any one place.
He begins On The Incarnation of the Word of God by considering God in his role as
Creator of all. He continues by telling the story of the Fall, and then goes on to say that
"it was unworthy of the goodness of God that creatures made by Him should be brought
to nothing through the deceit wrought upon man by the devil" (32). The first place that
St. Athanasius begins to make his view of the extent of the atonement known is on page
35, and his language is without exception the language of universal atonement. A limited
atonement does not even seem to be a possibility for him. He argues that God allowed
created humanity to "share in the reasonable being of the very Word Himself" (28) and
"through Him to apprehend the Father; which knowledge of their Maker is for men the
only really happy and blessed life" (38). The argument that the Father's creational intent
is not laid aside in redemption is a very powerful one. "It was impossible, therefore, that
God should leave man to be carried off by corruption, because it would be unfitting and
unworthy of Himself." (32) It's difficult to say much more about this because it does not
seem to have been an issue for St. Athanasius in the same way that it was for John
Murray. In outlining their respective positions, I can really only respond to what they
wrote, and St. Athanasius seems far more concerned about other matters.

The Nature and Character of the Father

Murray does not have much to say directly about the Father. Some insight can be
gleaned, however, from his arguments for the necessity, nature, and extent of the
atonement. In his discussion of the sovereign love of God, Murray makes the comment
that "it is not inherently necessary to that love which God necessarily and eternally is that
he should set such love as issues in redemption and adoption upon utterly undesirable and
hell-deserving objects" (Murray, 10). One of the implications of this is that God would
not have been any less a loving God had he allowed his creation to burn in hell. This
may in fact be a demonstration of sovereignty, but it makes a mockery of the concept of
love. To say that God's sovereign love consists of his arbitrary (and hence, meaningless)
choice distorts (and possibly blasphemes) his character. Our understanding of love must
come from an examination of the One who is love. The love which existed in the
Godhead before all worlds was not some sterile, static idea. It was (and is, and ever shall
be) a dynamic relationship of reciprocity. This relational aspect is one which Murray
completely misses.
As indicated above, St. Athanasius sees redemption as a continuation of the act of
creation. "There is thus no inconsistency between creation and salvation" (26).
Therefore, since God initiated a relationship of love with humanity, it is both ludicrous
and impious to suggest that he would abandon this. The nature of love as a passionate
"relating-with" means that God could not decide not to redeem humanity without denying
his nature.

The Significance of the Incarnation

For Murray, the Incarnation has significance because it was only in this way that
the Father's good pleasure could be accomplished in the redemption of the elect. By
taking to himself both a body and human nature, Christ was able to offer himself in a life
of obedience which could then be imputed to the elect. I found some of Murray's
statements to be a little problematic. For example, when speaking about the sacrificial
self-giving of Christ for our redemption, Murray said that it was "the Son of God
incarnate and he alone, to the exclusion of the Father and Spirit in the realm of the
divine" (Murray, 56) who gave himself. Although patripassionism has traditionally been
considered heresy, there are passages in Scripture which seem to indicate that we cannot
separate the Trinity quite that easily. "Don't you believe that I am in the Father, and that
the Father is in me? The words I say to you are not just my own. Rather, it is the Father,
living in me, who is doing his work. Believe me when I say that I am in the Father and
the Father is in me" (John 14:10-11). This seems to be far from Murray's understanding
of Christ's life and ministry. The impression one gets from reading Murray is that the
Son of God was a divine office boy, employed by his Father to carry out the inscrutable
ends of divine providence through perfect obedience. This may in fact be true, but it
poses a problem when we consider the categories of the accomplishment of the
atonement. On the one hand, we are told that "propitiation presupposes the wrath and
displeasure of God" (Murray, 30), and that his holiness produces a "holy enmity" towards
us sinners (Murray, 33). On the other hand, we are told that God the Son demonstrated
the love of God by dying for us when we were yet sinners (Rom. 5:8). And no matter
how skillfully Murray juggles his forensic categories, there doesn't seem to be a
satisfactory way of reconciling these two statements without positing some sort of divine
schizophrenia or disunity of purpose within the Godhead. Reading Murray may lead one
to suspect that casuistry is not confined to the "Romish" Society of Jesus.
There is no hint of such duplicity in St. Athanasius. Since he acknowledges the
author of our redemption to be one and the same as our Creator, there is no division of
purpose within the persons of the Trinity. Just as God originally created humanity and
"graciously bestowed on them His own life by the grace of the Word" (30), so the Word
of God manifested himself bodily to "recreate the likeness of the Image in men" (48).
This recreation would bring humanity back to our union with the Word. Some of the
implications of this are fairly radical-sounding to North American evangelicals, but the
things which everyone would agree to are as follows: first, he came to "give to mortals
immortality"; second, he came to "teach men about Him and abolish the worship of
idols"; third, he came "to settle man's account with death and free him from the primal
transgression" (49). With this much even John Murray would agree. St. Athanasius,
however, sees implications in the incarnation which are of far greater import. He argues
that in weaving that which is divine Life into the fabric of a human body, the bodies of all
humanity have been changed, freed from the power of death objectively. But even more
than that, because the Word of God joined his nature to ours inextricably, we are once
again partakers of the divine life of the Godhead. The difference between the original
creation and the "new creation" in Christ is that what was once subject to the weakness
due to the contingent nature of created beings is now sealed in flesh by the One who is
uncreated, and the source of all. Near the conclusion of his book, St. Athanasius makes
the amazing statement that Christ "assumed humanity that we might become God" (93).

The Procurement of Our Redemption

For John Murray, the fact of our redemption is primarily a legal transaction
between the Father and the Son accomplished by the Son's perfect obedience. "His
obedience becomes the ground of the remission of sin and of actual justification"
(Murray, 22). The atonement is discussed under four objective categories; sacrifice,
propitiation, reconciliation, and redemption. The concept of sacrifice which Murray
outlines is basically the one found in the Old Testament of substitutionary atonement.
Just as the sins of the worshipper were seen as being transferred to the sacrificial animal,
so Christ takes up the sins of the elect and was put to death to atone for them. The
concept of propitiation states that because God is holy and must be true to his character,
he views sin with holy wrath and displeasure. This wrath is removed from the sinful
objects of it by covering the sin with the blood of a sacrifice, namely Christ.
Reconciliation follows on this work. Since God is holy and abhors sin, he removes
himself from this affront to his character. The resulting alienation is what is addressed in
reconciliation. Because the sins of the elect have been covered over by the efficacious
blood of Christ, God can set aside his holy enmity. (This point does raise the question of
how Christ, who we confess as God, could have allowed himself to be in the company of
such wretched sinners as we all are outside of his objective atoning work on the cross.)
The final stage in the accomplishing of the atonement is redemption. This is seen as
more than just deliverance. It is deliverance effected through the paying of a ransom to
secure the release of the elect from bondage. This bondage is two-fold. Humanity is
under the power of law and under the power of sin. Because the work of Christ is viewed
under the category of substitutionary atonement, his death is sufficient to release the elect
from the just penalty incurred by the sin of Adam, as expressed in part by our two-fold
bondage.
St. Athanasius takes a very different view of the effecting of our redemption.
Although the idea of substitutionary atonement is one which he uses, there is much more
to the incarnation than a legal transaction. By accepting death into his human body,
Christ fulfilled the word of the Father which promised death for disobedience, and he
released all of humanity from the penalty incurred by Adam. St. Athanasius goes beyond
the legal categories of Murray in his discussion of the effects of the death of Christ.
When Christ took on a human body, he re-united our human nature to the divine Logos,
just as it was in the beginning. And this reunion is of a permanent nature now, because it
is sealed in the flesh of the theanthropos.

The Redemptive Role of the Holy Spirit

Neither author had much to say about the Holy Spirit. In Murray's discussion of
union with Christ, he says that "the bond of this union is the Holy Spirit himself"
(Murray, 166). Further, it is the Holy Spirit who communicates all the virtue accruing
from the death of Christ to the elect. Murray's view of his role is that it is dependent on
Christ in such a way that the Holy Spirit appears to be nothing more than a conduit for
Christ's work to be applied to the believer. The distinction which Murray makes between
the accomplished, historical work of Christ and the application of this work in the life of
the elect makes it seem as if the objective work is not actually accomplished until "the
elected one" has experienced its application subjectively. The main job of the Holy Spirit
is the sanctification of the believer.
One of the reasons for the silence of St. Athanasius on the Holy Spirit may be the
fact that the major theological issue of his day was Christological, and the church had not
yet begun to systematize her beliefs about the third person of the Godhead. It is
interesting to note the different emphases placed on John 3:3 by the two authors. Murray
drew out the pneumatological implications of the passage quite well, where St.
Athanasius only quoted the passage in part, without reference to the Holy Spirit's role in
the new birth at all. Again, there was no mention of the Holy Spirit in the union with
Christ. St. Athanasius views our union with Christ to be the result of his incarnation, and
the union of both the human and divine natures in his person.

Conclusion
The interesting thing about this assignment is that both John Murray and St.
Athanasius have a biblical theology. Within their interpretive frameworks, they are
generally consistent, yet they have reached radically different conclusions. I was
especially amused by Murray's comment that it is "grave confusion and error" for some
modern theologians to say that "men by adoption come to share in Christ's Sonship and
thus enter into the divine life of the trinity" (Murray, 134). St. Athanasius not only sees
this as the logical outworking of the significance of the incarnation of the creating Logos,
he also argues that it was the original state of humanity. Obviously, it is not enough for
us to quote the Bible and smugly assert that those who interpret it differently are heretics.
We seem to need some meta-critical method for determining truth. I suspect that it will
not be found in the realm of the merely rational. John Murray was not a stupid man, nor
do I think we are justified in assuming that he was insincere in his attempts to "expound
and defend" the truth of the mystery of godliness (Murray, 5). What are we to make of
the differences in theological understanding? An examination of the theologians'
presuppositions will undoubtedly be of some service to us in our striving for
understanding, but that can only be taken so far until we are confronted with the need to
choose between the different starting points.
My own attempt at resolving this revolves around an understanding of truth as
something more than just a set of accurate, factual statements. Truth is fundamentally a
person, Jesus Christ. There are statements which are true, but this does not guarantee that
they will be used truthfully. (See Luke 4:9-11 for a prime example of this.) The
comment of St. Athanasius in his conclusion is quite instructive here. "One cannot
possibly understand the teaching of the saints unless one has a pure mind and is trying to
imitate their life." (96)
The quality of life which is being modeled by a person is an important part of my
evaluation of his (or her) stated beliefs. In his discussion of the perseverance of the
saints, Murray states that "we may entertain the faith of our security in Christ only as we
persevere in faith and holiness to the end" (155). This follows within two pages of the
statement that:

Scripture itself, therefore, leads us to the conclusion that it is possible to have very
uplifting, ennobling, reforming, and exhilarating experience of the power and
truth of the gospel, to come into such close contact with the supernatural forces
which are operative in God's kingdom of grace that these forces produce effects in
us which to human observation are hardly distinguishable from those produced by
God's regenerating and sanctifying grace and yet be not partakers of Christ and
heirs of eternal life. (153)

The force of these two statements is that no-one can have assurance of salvation,
and that it is only after we have died and faced judgment that we can know with certainty
that we are among the elect. When this is combined with the idea that, although the Lord
has forgiven us of our sins, we do not, nor are we to be so presumptuous as to even think
of forgiving ourselves (cf. Murray, 116), the picture of Christianity which one could get
is that of a miserable, quaking existence in uncertainty and fear. If this is reality, so be it.
Fortunately, I don't feel obligated to accept Murray's view of reality. I believe that his
"enlightenment" presuppositions and selective use of Scripture cast enough doubt on his
method to reject his conclusions.
This does not mean that I whole-heartedly endorse St. Athanasius. His
hermeneutical method is very similar to that used by the New Testament authors (which
is verboten to all save the canonical writers, according to our modern standards for
scientific accuracy), and often the theological point he was attempting to make depended
on a translation of Scripture which has been deemed by modern translators (i.e., from
1611 to the present) to be inaccurate.
Finally, the theological issues must be set aside in favour of the existential ones.
John Murray is spoken of with great love and respect by a former student of his, who in
turn is a man whom I respect, in spite of our theological differences. Truth is
fundamentally a way of being, which corresponds with the character of Christ, for it is he
who is the source of all being.