THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-67451. September 28, 1987.]

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC. ,

petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third
Civil Cases Division), HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge,
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, MORRIS G. CARPO,
QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION, and
COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION , respondents.

DECISION

CORTES , J : p

The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land which are the subject of
this petition started in 1927 when an application for their registration under the Torrens
System was rst led. In the present petition for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
(hereafter referred to as Realty) and Macondray Farms, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
Macondray) seek a reversal of the Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, and an a rmance of the Court of Appeals Decision of December 29,
1982. Cdpr

Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang
Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens
titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408, issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958,
pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO
Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.

2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris
G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970
pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record
No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the
name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT
No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206,
GLRO Record No. N-31777.

On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo led a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera
thereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394
and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray
Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. Subsequently, however, Carpo
withdrew his complaint as against the last named defendant, and the answer led on
behalf of said government o cial was ordered stricken off the record. The complaint
alleged that TCT No. 20408, as well as OCT No. 1609 from which it was derived, is a
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 nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, then presided over by Judge Andres Reyes
thereafter referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued the order dated May 21, 1958
directing the issuance of a decree of registration, was not sitting as a land registration
court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the original
records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the basis for the
issuance of said order of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during World War II
and were still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order
the issuance of a certificate of title.
LLjur

Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court was acting as
a court of land registration and in issuing the order of May 21, 1958, was actually
performing a purely ministerial duty for the registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO
Record No. 29882 (and the two other cases, Cases Nos. 758 and 976, with which said
case had been jointly tried and decided) which on August 19, 1935 had rendered a
decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga (father of
Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty and Macondray), which decision
was upheld by the Court of Appeals. It was alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is
null and void, having been issued over a parcel of land previously registered under the
Torrens System in favor of another.
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray led a third-party complaint against
the Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation (hereafter referred to as
QCDFC) and the Commissioner of Land Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982
and 333985 in the name of QCDFC also covered the same parcels of land subject of the
dispute between Carpo and the two corporations, Realty and Macondray. They thus
prayed that Decree No. N-135938 issued on July 22, 1971, OCT No. 8931 issued on
July 27, 1971, as well as TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985 derived from OCT No. 8931 be
declared null and void.
In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the validity of its own
title alleging that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null and void. QCDFC also
led a fourth-party complaint against Carmelino Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia,
Felicisimo Alvendia, Jose na Alvendia, Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa G. Miranda, Isabel G.
Miranda, and Feliciano G. Miranda, alleging that it bought said parcels of land from
them. It prayed that in the event of an unfavorable judgment against it, fourth party
defendants be ordered to reimburse the purchase price which the corporation paid to
them. However, QCDFC failed to prosecute its case, and the fourth-party complaint was
dismissed for lack of interest.
After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20, 1981, sustaining
the title of Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in question and declaring the titles of
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC null and void.
On March 20, 1981, Realty led a Petition for Certiorari with this Court docketed
as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the lower court. It also asked that it be
allowed to appear directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. After
respondents led their comments to said petition, this Court passed a resolution dated
October 19, 1981 referring the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal."
In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals, through its Ninth
Division, with Justice Patajo as ponente, concurred in by Justices Gopengco and
Kapunan, set aside the decision of the trial court and rendered a new one upholding the
validity of the title in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null and void
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 the titles in the name of Calpo and QCDFC.
Carpo led a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court. In the
meantime, by virtue and pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court of Appeals was reorganized into the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). As a consequence, there was a rera ing of cases
and the case was assigned to the Second Special Cases Division which, however,
returned the records of the case for another re-ra ing to the Civil Cases Divisions as it
deemed itself without authority to act on a civil case in view of the allocation of cases
to the different divisions of the IAC under Section 8 of BP 129. The case was then
assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division, composed of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia,
Zosa and Bartolome.
Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves, and Justices Camilon and
Bidin were assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division.
On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases Division, with
Justice Zosa as ponente, concurred in by Justices Camilon and Bidin, promulgated its
Resolution granting Carpo's motion for reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the
decision of December 29, 1982, and a rming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this
petition docketed as G.R. No. 67451.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I.

The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the Intermediate Appellate

Court (for brevity, referred to herein as SPECIAL DIVISION) which promulgated the
disputed RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the provisions
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction and
adjudicatory power to pronounce any decision of final resolution for the Court.

II.

On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is legally vested with

jurisdiction and adjudicatory powers under the provisions of BP 129, it decided
questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court because:
(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION's Resolution of May 2, 1984
amounted to a denial to the Petitioners of their right to appeal and judicial
review over fundamental issues of law duly raised by them in their Petition
for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 56471), as authorized by the Constitution
(Art. X, sec. 5 (2) (e), the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Rule
42, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court; and

(b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984, it ruled that the decision

of the Court of Appeals could not have gained the nature of a proper and
valid judgment" as the latter had no power to pass upon the appealed
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the Vera Court), as appeal
and not certiorari was the proper remedy;

Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by giving a perverted and
obviously unjusti ed and illogical interpretation of the RESOLUTION of July 25,
1983, of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, holding and declaring that "it
has in effect erased or cancelled the validity of (the DECISION of December 29,
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 1982), when the said RESOLUTION merely "RESOLVED to return the records of the
case . . . for rera ing and reassignment . . . in view of the allocation of cases to
the different Divisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court under Section 8 of BP
129."

III.
The SPECIAL DIVISION by con rming the appealed judgment of the lower
court in effect sanctioned the contemptible disregard of law and jurisprudence
committed by Judge Vera, which call for an exercise of the power of supervision;
IV.

The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 a

deliberate falsehood, namely, that Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in good faith
and for value when there is absolutely no evidence, whether written or testimonial,
that was presented by Carpo, or by anyone else that he was, in fact, a purchaser
for value and in good faith — a material matter which was neither alleged nor
referred to in the complaint and in all the pleadings, nor covered by any of the
exhibits presented by all of the parties herein and solely on the bases of which the
case at bar was submitted by the parties for consideration and decision.

1. To support their contention that the Special Third Civil Cases Division of
the Intermediate Appellate Court which promulgated the Resolution of May 2, 1984 had
no legal standing under the provisions of BP 129 and, as such, not vested with
jurisdiction and adjudicatory power, petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8 of BP 129, to wit:
Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions. — The Intermediate Appellate
Court shall exercise its powers, functions and duties, through ten (10) divisions,
each composed of ve members. The Court may sit en banc only for the purpose
of exercising administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory functions.
Sec. 8. Grouping of Divisions. — Of the ten (10) divisions of the Court, four
(4) divisions, to be known as Civil Cases Divisions, shall take cognizance of
appeals in civil cases originating from the Regional Trial Court; two (2) divisions,
to be known as Criminal Cases Divisions, of appeals in criminal cases originating
from the Regional Trial Courts: and four (4) divisions, to be known as Special
Cases Divisions, of original actions or petitions, petitions for review, and appeals
in all other cases, including those from administrative agencies, except as
provided in Section 9 hereof.

Except with respect to the Presiding Appellate Justice, the appointment of

a member of the court shall speci cally indicate whether it is for the Civil Cases
Divisions, the Criminal Cases Divisions, or the Special Cases Divisions of the
Court. No member of the Court appointed to any of the three classes of divisions
shall be assigned to any of the other classes of divisions, except when authorized
by the Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the Intermediate Appellate Court
en banc, if the exigencies of the service so require. . . . (emphasis supplied)
As o cially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division was composed of Justice
B.S. de la Fuente, as Chairman. Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa, and Floreliana
Bartolome, as Members. In view, however, of the voluntary inhibition of Justices Coquia
and Bartolome from taking part in the case, Justices Bidin and Camilon were
reassigned to the Third Civil Cases Division to form the Special Third Civil Cases
Division. cdrep

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 Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases Division, not being
one of the ten (10) Divisions of the Court duly vested with jurisdiction, had no
adjudicatory powers. It is also alleged that the reassignment of Justices Bidin and
Camilon is violative of the injunction against appointment of an appellate Justice to a
class of divisions other than that to which he is appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily show that what BP
129 prohibits is appointment from one class of divisions to another class. For instance,
a Justice appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil
Cases Divisions.
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division, while Justice
Camilon was reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come
from the same class of divisions to which they were appointed.
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third
Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is
still within legal bounds. Otherwise, a situation would have arisen where a regular
division could not decide a particular case because some members thereof inhibited
themselves from participating in said case.
2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the correctness of
the ruling of the IAC that the CA Decision of December 29, 1982 could not have gained
the nature of a proper and valid judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy) and that the Resolution of July 25, 1983 had in effect erased or
cancelled the validity of said Decision.
The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2, 1984:
Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was effectively an
acknowledgment by the Division that promulgated it that the earlier Decision
dated December 29, 1983 rendered in a Special Civil Action case for certiorari, CA-
G.R. No. SP-13530, was not appropriate and beyond the authority of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals to promulgate. The said Resolution was actually
a statement that the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals had over-stepped its
bounds by reviewing in certiorari proceedings a decision in a purely civil case that
should have passed through the processes of an ordinary appeal. We are not
aware of any legal doctrine that permits an appellate court to treat a petition for
review on certiorari upon purely questions of law, such as that led by petitioners
herein, as an ordinary appeal. Neither can we nd any legal basis or justi cation
for the elimination by the appellate court of the essential requisites then
prescribed for the validity of an appeal, such as the submission of a formal notice
of appeal, an appeal bond and approved record on appeal. Without any of these
mandatory requisites, the appeal could not have been deemed perfected and
ought to have been dismissed outright.

The Court does not agree.

There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First
Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to
the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the
Supreme Court. To the latter category belong cases in which only errors or questions of
law are involved. Each of these modes have different procedural requirements. prLL

As stated earlier, Realty originally led a Petition for Certiorari with this Court
docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and asking
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 that it be allowed to appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law.
However, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction for proper determination on the merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition rst led as an
appeal, and not as a special civil action for certiorari. After all, a petition for review by
certiorari is also a form of appeal. (People v. Resuello, L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69
SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure outlined in Rule
45 which, unlike ordinary appeals, does not require a notice of appeal, an appeal bond
and a record on appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot
be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not
certiorari was the proper remedy." Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this Court
on appeal, albeit by way of certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not a substitute for
appeal. Those cases are not in point. They refer to the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65, and not to appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the Resolution
dated July 25, 1983 of the Second Special Cases Division (to which the case was
assigned after the reorganization under BP 129) as having "erased or cancelled" the
validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division, A perusal of said Resolution shows that it
merely made clari cation about the nature of the case and why it should be reassigned
to the Civil Cases Division of the IAC. There was not the slightest implication that it
"erased or cancelled" the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted the validity of
the Decision of the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's motion for reconsideration. It
would have been incongruous to grant a motion to reconsider a decision, reverse and
set it aside, if in the rst place it did not have any validity. It would have been necessary
only to declare its invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, and the
IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the validity of the title in the
name of Carpo and declaring null and void the titles in the values of Realty and of
QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint led by Carpo, which was the same basis for the
rulings of the Vera Court and the IAC Special Division, is that the Reyes Court had no
authority to issue the order of May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was not sitting
as a land registration court and also because the original records of LRC Case No 657,
Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still
pending reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347
(1914), jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred
upon the Courts of First Instance of the respective provinces in which the land sought
to be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon
the ling in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the
litigation. The issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire land
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 registration process; and as such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador
Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally led on June 24, 1927 a
registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal to con rm his title over parcels of land described as
Lots 1, 2, and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation
among Carpo, Realty and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases,
LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 led by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No.
758, GLRO Record No. 33721 led by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved
identical parcels of land, and identical applicants/oppositors.
On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued a
consolidated decision on the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:
En meritos de todo lo expuesto, se ordena el registro de los lotes, 1, 2 y 3
del plano Psu-47035 a nombre de Estanislao Mayuga, desestimando oposicion
de Florentino Baltazar y Eduardo Guico con respecto a dichos lotes . . .

On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was a rmed by the Court of Appeals in
its decision dated November 17, 1939 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Por todas las consideraciones expuestas, con rmamos la decision
apelada en cuanto adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de su plano y
que equivalen a los lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del plano de Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plano de Guico.
xxx xxx xxx
Guico led a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the petition
was dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision was a rmed ( See Guico v. San
Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, led a petition with the
Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the only heir of the
deceased Estanislao Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of registration
over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be
overemphasized that the petition led by Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate
proceeding from, but a continuation of, the original land registration proceedings
initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo Guico. In the same vein,
the Reyes Court, as Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, was continuing in
the exercise of jurisdiction over the case, which jurisdiction was vested in the CFI-Rizal
upon filing of the original applications. cdrep

On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition of
Dominador Mayuga and directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a
decree of registration over Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as
registered owner Dominador Mayuga in lieu of Estanislao.
Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC Case No.
657 were not properly reconstituted, then there was no pending land registration case.
And since the Reyes Court was acting without a pending case, it was acting without
jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's Memorandum, pp. 2-8.)
He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27 SCRA
1119) where this Court said that upon failure to reconstitute pursuant to law, "the
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 parties are deemed to have waived the effects of the decision rendered in their favor
and their only alternative is to le an action anew for the registration in their names of
the lots in question," citing the case of Ambat v. Director of Lands, (92 Phil. 567 [1953])
and other cases. The basis of said ruling is Section 29 of Act No. 3110, An Act to
provide an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of the records of pending judicial
proceedings and books, documents, and les of the o ce of the register of deeds,
destroyed by fire or other public calamities, and for other purposes.
However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure to
reconstitute records on the status of the case in its entirety, was modi ed in the case
of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93 Phil. 595 [1953]), where this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in the sense that
Section 29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only where the records in the Court
of First Instance as well as in the appellate court were destroyed or lost and were
not reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court of First Instance are
intact and complete, and only the records in the appellate court were lost or
destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason for this view is that section 29
of Act 3110 is found among the sections and provisions dealing with the
reconstitution of records in the Court of First Instance in pending civil cases,
special proceedings, cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act (No.)
3110 . . . will show that there are separate procedures for the reconstitution of
records in the Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the
reconstitution of records in the Supreme Court, now including the Court of
Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records in the o ce of
the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of
destroyed records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47, under
which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.

The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or

destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may
continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss
of the records. The law contemplates different stages for purposes of
reconstitution. . . .

. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was pending trial
in the Court of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost;
section 6 evidently refers to the stage where the case had been tried and
decided but was still pending in the Court of First Instance at the time the
record was destroyed or lost; section 6 covers the stage where the case
was pending in the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) at the time the
record was destroyed or lost. *
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not
reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding stage
where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go
beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring
proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not
only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must again
perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it
anew, — all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and
complete, and uncontroverted.
xxx xxx xxx

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 . . . (T)o require the parties to le their action anew and incur the expenses
and (suffer) the annoyance and vexation incident to the ling of pleadings and
the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses
may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on
the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all along
and all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and
decision are there and are not disputed, all this should appear to be not exactly
logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which
has not committed any negligence or fault at all.

The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the
reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated to penalize
people for failure to observe or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It
was enacted rather to aid and bene t litigants, so that when court records are
destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and
starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If
they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose
the advantages provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at the stage
when the records were destroyed). cdll

Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties
thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the
preceding stage where records are available. The land registration case itself remained
pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when all that remained to
be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration O ce to issue a decree of
registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certi cate of
Title) to implement a judgment which had become nal ( See Government v. Abural, 39
Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 25 SCRA 316). There are however
authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots
1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an o cial report
of the decision of this Court a rming both the CFI and the CA decisions. A nal order
of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction as
a land registration court when it issued the order directing the issuance of a decree of
registration, "substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in lieu of the
original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the a davit of self-adjudication,
subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which order is in
consonance with the ruling of this Court in the Guico decision, and the decisions of the
CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939, respectively, We
uphold the validity of said order and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set
it aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and QCDFC, the
Special Division also relied on Carpo's being an innocent purchaser for value.
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as an
issue in the trial court. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual basis
exists to support such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his
being an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good
faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code. Cdpr

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 It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying
on the certi cate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606
[1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare,
supra.)
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered
owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila
dated October 9, 1970 . However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970 , that the decree
of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the
Province of Rizal and that an Original Certi cate of Title was issued. It was on the same
day October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and
Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property, and the Original Certi cate of Title was
cancelled as Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued.
(Exhibit 12, Rollo, pp. 270-273.) cdrep

Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have
relied upon so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not being a
purchaser for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-
in-interest.
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar,
an oppositor in the original application led by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated
earlier, the CFI-Rizal con rmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-
47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes .
. ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land
registration proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo
Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as well as the decisions rendered
therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from
whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of
the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two
certi cates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . In
successive registrations, where more than one certi cate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certi cate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certi cate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certi cate issued in respect thereof .."
(Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia v. CA, Nos. L-
48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)
TCT No. 20408, derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT No.
303961, derived from OCT 8629.
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation (QCDFC) alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as thirty-party
defendant inasmuch as Realty's alleged cause of action against it is neither for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in respect of Carpo's claim
against Realty. It likewise alleges that Realty had no cause of action against it since the
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 third party complaint did not allege that QCDFC violated any legal right of Realty, QCDFC
also assails the Vera Court decision in that it declares QCDFC directly liable to Carpo
and not to Realty.
In the rst place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera Court, nor
from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1982, nor from the
resolution of the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division dated May 2, 1984 — all of which
voided QCDFC's title to the disputed property. Hence, said decisions/resolution have
become final and executory as regards QCDFC. LexLib

Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint
filed against it by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief being sought by the
latter from the former is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the
factual circumstances of the case compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's
claim to the disputed property. ** To rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity
of suits and to put to rest these con icting claims over the property. After all, QCDFC
was afforded full opportunity, and exercised its right, to prove its claim over the land. It
presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It was even permitted to le a
fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed since it failed to prosecute its
case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et al., the original registered
owners. Original Certi cate of Title No. 8931 in the name of Spouses Carmelino
Alvendia, et al. was issued on July 27, 1971, or thirteen (13) years after the issuance of
Mayuga's title in 1958.
Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier than OCT
No. 8931 from which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title must prevail over that of
QCDFC.
6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners led a manifestation alleging
that the case at bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-46953, Jose N. Mayuga et al. v.
The Court of Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., et al., and
moved for consolidation of the two cases involving as they do the same property. By
Resolution of August 29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for consolidation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action led by Carpo against
Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real property. By
asserting its own title to the property in question and asking that Carpo's title be
declared null and void instead, and by ling the third-party complaint against QCDFC,
Realty was similarly asking the court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of
such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic
Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies, Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking,
in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment
in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil.
421 [1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's nal
determination of G.R. No. L-46953.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court
and the Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and
the Decision of December 29, 1982 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
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 SO ORDERED.
Fernan andFeliciano, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part as I participated in the companion case of L-46953
in the Court of Appeals.
Bidin, J., took no part. I participated in the appealed resolution of the
Intermediate Appellate Court.

Footnotes

* Section 65 covers the stage where the decision of the Supreme Court on the case had become
final but something has still to be done on the case, e.g. execution.
* * See Balbastro, et al. v. CA, No. L-33255, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 231, and Rubio v.
Mariano, L-30403, January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 319, where this Court glossed over
procedural technicalities to do substantial justice.

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