G.R. No.

168168 September 14, 2005 removed their shorts, fondled her vagina and inserted his penis, but when her
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant immediately asked her to dress up.7
vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.
The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant
DECISION
laid complainant down on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made
pumping motion even with their shorts on. Appellant stopped only when he heard
PER CURIAM: the arrival of his wife.8

On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal,
two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the complaints which who upon learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to
read as follows: Camp Crame where they filed a complaint. 9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP
Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found her to have suffered deep
healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10
Criminal Case No. 96-125

Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria
That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Loreto V. Dimaano on December 25, 1976 and begot three children with her,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He alleged that he worked in several companies
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
abroad11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in September 1993. He
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant
contended though that he could not have raped complainant because he was always
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of age,
in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another
against her will and consent.
assignment overseas.12

CONTRARY TO LAW.1
He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995
or January 1, 1996 because there were other people in the house. He argued that
Criminal Case No. 96-150 had he raped complainant, then she would not have accompanied him to the
Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio to apply for police
clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat, Paraaque,
That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, where they applied for membership at the Video City Club. 13 He also maintained
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the that the fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there that he was responsible for it because it is also possible that his daughter had
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned sexual intercourse with another man her age.14
complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12
years of age, against her will and consent.
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible.
2 She narrated the obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of
CONTRARY TO LAW. tender age would have known unless she herself had experienced it. It found the
delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear complainant had of her
Criminal Case No. 96-151 father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious
charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she testified in open court that she was
above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, pursuing the case against her father. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a
consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable
the timely arrival of the complainant's mother. doubt of the crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape
committed in September 1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is imposed the supreme penalty of death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. prision correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision
mayormaximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00
and to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was
first sexually abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside their house
in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant entered her room and laid down beside her. He SO ORDERED.15
removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down then inserted his penis into her
anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the incident to herself The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court,
as her father might hurt her.5 thus:

A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the
asked her to lie on her side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant
position, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina which caused tremendous Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the following
pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal to herself. It was only in MODIFICATIONS:
November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.

In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as

On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on found guilty of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to
the kitchen sink, he raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her breasts. He then a penalty of reclusion perpetua is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR

1
DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00 as moral damages and In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages. testimony of the complainant who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the
court the violations of her person as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as
found guilty of qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as For rape committed in September 1993:
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is
also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php75,000.00 as civil
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?
A: September 1993.
In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as
COURT:
found guilty of attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
No specific date?
amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an
A: I cannot remember, Maam.
indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as
Can you remember how old were you at that time?
maximum. Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR
A: 10 years old, Maam.
DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages,
Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened
and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
next, if anything happened?
A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.
In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?
Death Penalty Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case RECORD: The witness is crying.
is CERTIFIED to the Supreme Court for review. A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.

Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court. Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?
A: No, Maam.
Q: Why not?
SO ORDERED.16
A: Because I was afraid of my father.
Q: Why are you afraid of your father?
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues: A: Because he might hurt me.
Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that
occurred?
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE A: There is, Maam.
PROSECUTION HAS OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF Q: When was it?
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED. A: After a few days after the first incident.
Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?
II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.
EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE BY THE Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY A: He removed his clothes.
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?
REASONS BEHIND THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya
OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17 ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?
A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then
Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have lying on his side.
reported them to the authorities when she accompanied him to Paraaque Police Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened
Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the next, if any?
opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial court considered the A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21
Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Sumbong, it For rape committed on December 29, 1995:
would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that
the complaint. happened?
A: There was, Maam.
We are not persuaded. Q: What is that incident?
A: I was raped by my father on that day.
Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?
This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.
evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?
observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude during A: I was then sitting at our dining set.
direct and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any showing that the trial judge Q: What about your father, what he doing?
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight A: He was cooking.
which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?
appellate court's highest respect.19 A: He told me to approach him.
Q: After you approached him, what happened next?
It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.
full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent Q: What happened after you embraced him?
child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.
undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?
the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to A: He held my breast.
tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20 Q: After that, what happened next?
A: He kept kissing my breast.

2
Q: How many times did he kiss your breast? In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the
A: Many times. charges were fabricated for complainant's reactions were consistent with reason.
Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast? Her complete obedience to appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence
A: He put my shorts down. she kept about her ordeal were all brought about by genuine fear posed by her own
Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any? father against her.
A: He also put down my panty.
Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?
Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant
A: He held my organ.
consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no
ATTY. MALLARES:
persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The
At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with
unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible
respect to organ.
that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested by the
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
When you say organ', what do you mean?
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, repeating her
A: Pekpek.
accusations in open court and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn
COURT: Proceed.
around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case.26
ANSWER:
After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.
Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next? Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22 that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature 27 and had shown her
For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996: resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not
Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.? bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still within its discretion whether or not to
A: We were in our sala on the sofa. proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that the compromise agreement and the
Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to? affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have been filed in court.
A: Me and my father.
Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what
Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State
happened?
belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of
A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing
desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted
my breast.
in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide
Q: What were you wearing at that time?
whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and
A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.
must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31
Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?
A: He raised them.
Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time? In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant
A: Shorts and T-shirt. never retracted her allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give
Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next? any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in the
A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the complaints after the appellant
went on top of me. agreed not to disturb the complainant; to consent to annul his marriage; allow his
Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any? wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his
A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts. children to his wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's
Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time? testimony that appellant raped her on several occasions.
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?
A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23 The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and
without consent.1âwphi1 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and
consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not an element of statutory
The trial court believed the complainant and held that: rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie,
provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over
at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was
The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32
truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete with details. Her
testimony is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.
We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need
not even be employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is
The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the
private complainant's father, would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of
offense, undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal
the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. 33
of testifying to all its gory details if she has not in fact been raped. The Court
The instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his moral and
believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not ordinarily file a
physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.
rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.24

Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent
Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate court.
September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in
Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in
Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
her failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite
opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as
of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so when
follows:
the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions brought about by
fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust
what should otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Court has thus considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
years, after the commission of the offense.25 above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria,

3
thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the
nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged
consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to in the information and proved during trial by the testimonies of the complainant,
the timely arrival of the complainant's mother. her mother and the appellant himself; they were also supported by the photocopy of
the marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.
CONTRARY TO LAW.34
In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held
that a photocopy of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim,
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused;
as the original thereof is a public record in the custody of a public officer. The
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
admission of this secondary evidence is one of the exceptions to the 'best evidence
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Further, we held
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
offense was committed.35What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document
the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring its production.
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. 36 The acts
or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of
a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be the local civil registrar who is a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a photocopies is admissible as secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of well to note that appellant did not dispute their contents when offered as evidence
the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid and timely
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards
suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
of civil indemnity and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.37
for all the crimes committed, by separately awarding the sums of P50,000.00 40 and
P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150,
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape, in
not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. line with the prevailing jurisprudence.
Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than
rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied]
The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory
and attempt[ed] to rapethe complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a
damages, is mandatory upon a conviction for rape. 43 On the other hand, exemplary
complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted
damages is awarded when the commission of the offense is attended by an
the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.44
judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant
to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal
sustained in line with the prevailing jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is
Case No. 96-125 as the rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the
automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, on
commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47
imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when
committed against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the
rape in Criminal Case No. 96-150 which was committed on December 29, 1995, WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263
Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus applies. It provides: affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his own
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case
No. 96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
1. By using force or intimidation; damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150
the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for
and
failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions constituting the
offense.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
SO ORDERED.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 143193 June 29, 2005
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
MELBAROSE R. SASOT and ALLANDALE R. SASOT, petitioners,
vs.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The Honorable court of of appeals, and
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity REBECCA G. SALVADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila,
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the respondents.
victim.

4
DECISION In support of the foregoing, petitioners argue that the fiscal should have dismissed
Welts’s complaint because under the rules, the complaint must be sworn to before
the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal. 9 They
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
also contend that complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is not a
The case subject of the present special civil action for certiorari is a criminal registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they have been using the business name
prosecution against petitioners for unfair competition under Article 189 of the "ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC." since 1972, and their designs are original
Revised Penal Code, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and do not appear to be similar to complainant’s, and they do not use
(Branch 1), and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-166147.1 complainant’s logo or design.10

Some time in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an The trial prosecutor of the RTC-Manila (Branch 1), Jaime M. Guray, filed his
investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against Comment/Opposition to the motion to quash, stating that he has the original copy
petitioners for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on of the complaint, and that complainant has an attorney-in-fact to represent it.
unfair competition. In its Report dated June 4, 1997, the NBI stated that NBA Prosecutor Guray also contended that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense
Properties, Inc., is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the United even without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged is
States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of a public crime.11
NBA basketball teams such as "USA Basketball," "Chicago Bulls," "Orlando
Magic," "Los Angeles Lakers," "Rockets," "Phoenix Suns," "Bullets," "Pacers,"
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied petitioners’
"Charlotte Hornets," "Blazers," "Denver Nuggets," "Sacramento Kings," "Miami
motion to quash in its Order dated March 5, 1999.12
Heat," Utah Jazz," "Detroit Pistons," "Milwaukee Bucks," "Seattle Sonics,"
"Toronto Raptors," "Atlanta Hawks," "Cavs," "Dallas Mavericks," "Minnesota
Timberwolves," and "Los Angeles Clippers." These names are used on hosiery, Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA)
footwear, t-shirts, sweatshirts, tank tops, pajamas, sport shirts, and other garment docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52151 which was dismissed per its Decision dated
products, which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks January 26, 2000.13 According to the CA, the petition is not the proper remedy in
and Technology Transfer. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it assailing a denial of a motion to quash, and that the grounds raised therein should
was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and be raised during the trial of the case on the merits. 14 The dispositive portion of the
distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products. Hence, it recommended assailed Decision reads:
petitioners’ prosecution for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code.2
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent court is hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings
In a Special Power of Attorney dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of with dispatch in Criminal Case No. 98-166147.
NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro,
Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the company’s attorney-in-fact, and to act for and
SO ORDERED.15
on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and administrative
complaints, among others.3 The Special Power of Attorney was notarized by
Nicole Brown of New York County and certified by Norman Goodman, County Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision but this was denied by the CA.16
Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Consul Cecilia B.
Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New York, authenticated the
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
certification.4 Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit on February 12, 1998,
Court, with issues raised as follows:
before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown of the State of New York.5

1. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED AND LICENSE

Thereafter, in a Resolution dated July 15, 1998, Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie
(sic) TO DO BUSINESS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY MAINTAIN A CAUSE
S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners for
OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION.
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. 6 The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
2. WHETHER AN OFFICER OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION MAY ACT IN
BEHALF OF A CORPORATION WITHOUT AUTHORITY FROM ITS BOARD
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila,
OF DIRECTORS.
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named
accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale
Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously 3. WHETHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT ENGAGED IN BUSINESS
manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the appearance of "NBA" AND WHOSE EMBLEM IT SOUGHT TO PROTECT IS NOT IN ACTUAL USE
names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the goods IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW.
offered by them are those of "NBA" to the damage and prejudice of the NBA
Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the "NBA".
4. WHETHER THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND THE PERSONS OF THE
7
CONTRARY TO LAW. ACCUSED.

Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the 5. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
following grounds: DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE PETITION.17
I. THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the
NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal
II. AND THIS HONORABLE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the
OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED 8
investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed to show any
board resolution showing his authority to institute any action in behalf of the
company, and that the NBA’s trademarks are not being actually used in the

5
Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be protected by For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend that they have not committed complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the
acts amounting to unfair competition.18 respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and
supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally
Amended Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for reasons
understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed
stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000.19
before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even
the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. 24
The petition must be denied. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights
of the defendant on the merits.25
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. 20 The In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary
proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without Public Nicole Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998, 26 duly authenticated by the
to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. 21 Thus, petitioners should not have to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they complainant’s representative will present the authenticated notarized original in
should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their court,27 and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on
motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances22 in the present hand.28 It is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal
case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorarishould be presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in
permitted. Clearly, the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.29
dismissing the petition.
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which the
Moreover, the Court does not find any justification for the quashal of the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:
Information filed against petitioners.
(1) The NBI Report dated June 4, 1997, containing an account of the
For one, while petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the facts investigation conducted from April 30, 1997 to May 9, 1997, and the
charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over subsequent search and seizure of several items from petitioners’
the offense charged or the person of the accused, 23 their arguments focused on an establishment;30
alleged defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal, complainant’s capacity to sue
and petitioners’ exculpatory defenses against the crime of unfair competition.
(2) The letter dated May 8, 1997 from the law firm of Ortega, Del
Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell to the NBI, seeking
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in assistance in stopping the illegal manufacture, distribution and sale of
force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds "fake products bearing the ‘NBA’ trademark, and in prosecuting the
for quashing an information, to wit: proprietors of aforesaid factory;"31 and

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (3) The Joint Affidavit executed by Rechie D. Malicse and Dalisay P.
Bal-ot of the Pinkerton Consulting Services (Phils.) Inc., which was
certified to by Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez, attesting to their findings
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense that petitioners were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and
charged or the person of the accused; distributing counterfeit "NBA" garment products.32

c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.33
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189
of the Revised Penal Code34 is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the
State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.

g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,35 a case akin to the present dispute, as
excuse or justification; and it involved the crime of Unfair Competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal
Code, and the quashal of search warrants issued against manufacturers of garments
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of bearing the same trademark as that of the petitioner, the Court succinctly ruled that:
being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded
Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in the this petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging
complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Article 189 of the Revised
for a motion to quash. Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary
investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall
be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner
which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act

6
against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on 16 July
although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would 1996 in this wise:2
become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot allow
a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA with the
contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
assistance of [their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano entered a plea of GUILTY
to the crime charged against them in the information.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our
courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s] accused MARCELO LASOY and
corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states
FELIX BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4, Republic Act 6425 and they
under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the
are hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a
and the period during which said accused are under detention is hereby deducted
solemn international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our
national interest to do so.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence in this case which is the 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The Property
Lastly, with regard to petitioners’ arguments that the NBA Properties, Inc., is not
Custodian is ordered to turn over said evidences to the Dangerous Drugs Board for
entitled to protection under Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered
proper disposition.
patentee, that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition for the
reason that their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to
complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or design, the Court finds On the same date, both accused applied for probation under Presidential Decree
that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated and resolved during trial No. 968, as amended.3
on the merits of the case.
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the Philippines, thru Assistant City
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Let the records of this Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions, first, to admit
case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 24) where amended Information,4 and second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as
Criminal Case No. 98-166147 is presently assigned, for further proceedings with well as the decision of the trial court dated 16 July 1996.5 In plaintiff’s motion to
reasonable dispatch. admit amended information, it alleged:

SO ORDERED. 1. That for some unknown reason both accused herein were charged of (sic)
Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each
G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005
other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, Petitioners, offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited
vs. drug, in violation of said law.
HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76,
QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
When in truth and in fact the said accused should be charged for transportation and
delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried
DECISION marijuana fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La Trinidad to Metro Manila.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 2. That it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it

conformable to the evidence on hand.
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded
guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is most respectfully prayed that the
information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the herewith attached Amended Information against both accused be admitted and
information was allegedly altered/tampered with? subsequently set for arraignment and trial.6 (Emphasis supplied)

In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan- Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its Order dated 03 September 1996,7 held:
Querijero dated 03 July 1996,1 accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were
charged as follows:
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is hereby DENIED, as this court has
already decided this case on the basis that the accused was arrested in possession of
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above- 42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late at this stage to amend the information.
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each
other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
Another Order8 of the same date issued by the trial court resolved the second
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully sell or
motion in the following manner:
offer for sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited
drug, in violation of said law.
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of the Accused as well as the Decision
dated July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor is hereby GRANTED, it
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-66788 was assigned and raffled to
appearing from the published resolution of the Supreme Court dated October 18,
Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, presided by Judge
1995, in G.R. No. 119131 Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon.
Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which was dismissed by this court on
August 20, 1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity as in the case at bar

7
should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although under the statute of R.A. quantity of drugs caught in possession of the accused, the prosecution insisted that
7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993 the penalty for possession or use of the first information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.
prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision [correccional] to reclusion temporal
which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has
In accord with the view of the prosecution, the trial court denied the accused’s
jurisdiction over a criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty attached by
motion to quash, stating:30
the statute to the crime.

. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled that the earlier information filed against
The amended Information reads:
the accused appeared to be sufficient in form. It was discovered, however, that an
alteration was made as to the weight of the marijuana fruiting tops which was
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above- placed at only 42.410 grams when the correct amount should have been in kilos.
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of the proceedings such
other, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer prosecution for the correct offense.
for sale a total of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in
violation of said law.9
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the prior
proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any fundamental requisite which
This second information was assigned to Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City would render void the judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy
presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa,10 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96- based on such proceedings.
67572.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by accused by
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash 11 which was opposed12 by the People in its fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently
Comment/Opposition filed before the trial court. Subsequently, while the motion to it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
quash before the RTC was as yet unresolved, both accused filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari13 which they later moved to withdraw "to pave the
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by collusion
way for Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City to act judiciously on their motion to
of the offender, for the purpose of protecting himself from further prosecution and
quash.’’14 The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November 199615 noted
adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense,
the motion and considered the petition withdrawn.
either on the ground that the conviction is void because of the fraud practiced, or
that the state is not in any sense a party to it and therefore not bound by it. (22
In its now assailed resolution dated 14 February 1997, 16 the trial court denied Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-245)
accused’s motion to quash, and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration, 17duly opposed by
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful
the prosecution,18 was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 16 April 1997. 19
maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight of the marijuana fruiting
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and temporary
tops as alleged in the information.
restraining order20 based on the following grounds:21

They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for which
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT
they were charged before the information was tampered with.
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION AND,
THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY; and They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when they
pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD JURISDICTION Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased weight in
OVER the case, docketed as Criminal CASE NO. Q-96-66799.22 the now altered information which merited a much lighter penalty was irregularly
obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings
in court which was tainted with fraud.
In this Court’s resolution dated 23 July 1997, 23 respondents were required to
comment on the Petition. They submitted their Comment on 18 November 1998. 24
Accused filed their Reply25 on 02 March 2000. In compliance with the Court’s The accused should not be allowed to make a mockery of justice or to trifle with
resolution dated 29 March 2000,26 accused and respondents submitted their the courts by participating in a grand deception of pleading guilty to a lesser
memoranda, respectively, on 26 May 200027 and 26 July 2000.28 offense knowing that they participated/acquiesced to such tampering and then tell
the court that they would be placed in jeopardy for the second time.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present:
(1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; We do not agree with the trial court.
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or
acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings
express consent. 29
dated 03 July 1996 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and received
by Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the accused were apprehended "for conspiring,
The issues boil down to whether or not the first information is valid and whether or confederating and mutually helping with each other in facilitating and effecting the
not the RTC, Branch 103, where the first information was filed and under which transportation and delivery . . . of forty–five pieces of dried marijuana leaves
Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried, had jurisdiction to try the case. (already in bricks) and weighing approximately forty-five kilos.’’31

On the issue of validity of the information, accused and respondents submitted In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and
opposing views -- accused insisting on its validity, whereas respondents asserted arresting officer SPOI Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it is stated that the accused were caught
that the accused were arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there with approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops. 32 For some unknown
being an alteration on the first information, hence it failed to reflect the true reasons, however, the Information filed against the accused reflected a much lesser
quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.

8
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be amended, in
which the accused were arraigned invalid. substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads;
and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:
of the accused.

Section 4. Information defined. – An information is an accusation in writing

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed:34 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial.
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as nothing
more than "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed
by the fiscal and filed with the court." In Sanvicente v. People,40 this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an
accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.35 amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary Respondent People of the Philippines argues, citing the case of Galman v.
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the Sandiganbayan41 that the trial was a sham. We do not agree with the respondent as
matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It the trial in the Galman case was considered a mock trial owing to the act of a then
is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The authoritarian president who ordered the therein respondents Sandiganbayan and
information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.36 Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the entire proceedings to
assure a predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution of the
respondents-accused therein of all the charges.42
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is
valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was
committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person
nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with. shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, it
bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they
were already in the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,37 Section 6, shows on its the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to
face that it is valid. try again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed
under the Constitution.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name the prosecution and at the time when the accused had already been convicted is
of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
the place wherein the offense was committed.

FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the case of Gulhoran and Bobares v.

SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court’s point of view that the Escano, Jr.,43 upon which both trial courts justified their claim of jurisdiction, was
accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they actually based on this Court’s resolution dated 18 October 1995 where this Court
"participated/acquiesced to the tampering," we hold that while this may not be far- held:
fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. 38 Worse, we cannot overlook the
fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the
first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
a hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as amended
1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused by Rep. Act 7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable with
may well be the subject of another inquiry. imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of the fine
(Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that the imposable
penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the range of prision
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. People,39 the Court affirming the finality of a correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling within the exclusive
decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7, Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
Criminal Procedure, stated: cognizance of the charges against petitioners.

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set If we apply the resolution of this Court quoted above, it would seem that the
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case under the first Information.
penalty is imposed a judgment [of conviction] becomes final after the lapse of the Following that argument, the decision dated 16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally was rendered without jurisdiction, thus, accused may not invoke the right against
satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, double jeopardy.
or has applied for probation.

Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view owing to the fact that a later resolution
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information superseding the resolution cited by the trial courts, specifically Administrative
amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained finality after the Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try
accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572. The resolution provides:
that stage.

Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:

9
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, DANGEROUS We are reviewing herein the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 6 February
DRUGS, CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES UNDER R.A. NO. 2007, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01396, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
7659 Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son, Castor and Neil Batin, of
the crime of murder. The conviction was for the killing of one Eugenio Refugio,
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in the interest of speedy and who was shot in the afternoon of 21 October 1994, while he was leaning against a
efficient administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth, mango tree near his house on St. Peter Street, San Paolo Subdivision,
the following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively Nagkakaisang Nayon, Novaliches, Quezon City.
try and decide cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND,
ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL The Information2 against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972,
Prosecutor of Quezon City on 11 April 1995, alleging as follows:
AS AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF
1972, AS AMENDED, AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and penalized
under Rep. Act No. 7659, committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
SALAZAR, JR. intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with
evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with
Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, Re: Clarification on a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him
the applicability of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, declared:
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Eugenio Refugio y
Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the prefatory paragraph in Administrative
Order No. 5-96, to read:
Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.

Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy

administration of justice and subject to the guidelines hereinafter set forth, the The prosecution, presented as its witnesses Eusebio Farrales, Vilma Juadinez
following Regional Trial Court branches are hereby designated to exclusively try Rodriguez, Florante Baltazar, Josephine Refugio, PO3 Marifor Segundo and Police
and decide cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, Inspector Solomon Segundo, offered the following version of the facts, as
ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR summarized by the trial court:
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved. Eugenio’s wife, Josephine Refugio, was with him when he was shot, facing him as
he leaned against the mango tree and, in fact, had her arms resting on his shoulders.
This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. She recalled that before the shooting, she was at home at No. 4-A St. Peter Street
Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:44 that afternoon when, looking out of the window, she caught sight of Castor Batin
washing his feet at a nearby faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and she
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty distinctly heard him say, among the other things he said: "Mga matatandang
imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted in People vs. Simon kunsintidor, dapat manahimik na." Then, being through with washing himself,
(G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. Castor moved towards the street. Seeing this, she went down and also went to the
7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal street because of a feeling of uneasiness ("Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi,
Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional ganoon naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh, pag nalalasing"). Finding her husband
Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of leaning against the mango tree on the side of St. Peter Street, she went to him. She
1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this tried to talk Eugenio into going home with her because Castor was again into one
Section. of his wild ways ("Nagwawala na naman, daldal ng daldal"). As he was talking
with Eugenio, she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The Orders dated their (Batins’) compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments
14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from
City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of
Dismissed. Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun
released from detention45 unless there may be valid reasons for their further was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor
detention. followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.

SO ORDERED. When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his
son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline,
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice from his eye-level.
Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the
latter landing on top of her. As they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: "Nanay,
may tama ako." She then pulled her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she
G.R. No. 177223 November 28, 2007 could take him to their house as he was already slumped to the right. She later
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, rushed her husband to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he underwent
vs. surgery, but later expired.
CASTOR BATIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood were presented and they substantially
corroborated her testimonial account.

10
One of them, Eusebio Farrales, a resident of No. 7 St. Paul Street, in relation to Upon a written request6 from the Novaliches Police Station, Quezon City, Police
which St. Peter Street was perpendicular, recalled being at the barangay outpost Inspector Solomon Segundo, Chief of the Firearms Identification Branch of the
near the corner of St. Peter Street and St. Paul Street between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of Central Crime Laboratory, Northern Police District Command, Quezon City,
the afternoon of October 21, 1994 – engaged in the clearing of the debris of the conducted the ballistics examination to ascertain whether or not the bullet
recent typhoon – when he heard someone cursing and challenging to a fight. recovered from the victim was fired from the specimen firearm submitted for
Walking towards St. Peter Street where the voice came, he saw that it was Castor. examination. P/Insp. Segundo prepared Ballistics Report No. B-042-94,7wherein he
He also saw other neighbors, namely, Eugenio, Josephine, and Eugenio’s mother, certified that the bullet from the recovery box8 and the bullet recovered from the
Emilia Refugio. According to Farrales, Castor was moving aimlessly for around victim’s body9 were fired from the same specimen firearm. 10 This conclusion was
five minutes ("Walang direktion at pa-ikot ikot lang siya doon") while cussing: arrived at after a test fire and a comparison under the bullet comparison
"Putang ina ninyo, sino ang matapang lumabas." microscope.

Farrales stated that a white car and a white-and-yellow colored taxicab were parked The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Neil Batin, Castor’s common-
on the side portion of the street fronting the gate to the compound of the Batins and law wife Maricon Pantoja, and one Restituto Paller. Neil Batin’s testimony is
near where Eugenio and Josephine stood. Emilia, the mother of Eugenio, then summarized by the trial court as follows:
came towards him, but he advised her to seek assistance from the barangay tanod.
After Emilia proceeded towards St. Paul Street to do so, Neil came out through the
Neil substantially claimed that it was his responsibility to conduct his younger
gate, opened the door of the white car, took out a gun from inside, and handed the
brothers to school and fetch them by car; that he also drove their taxicab; that it
gun to Castor, but the latter returned the gun to Neil. Upon getting back the gun,
was about 7:00 o’clock in morning of October 21, 1994, while he was cleaning the
Neil reentered the yard through the gate.
family-owned taxicab, that he found a short gun ("de bola") underneath it beside
the right rear wheel; that he picked the gun and concealed it in the compartment of
Farrales asserted that in the meanwhile Eugenio remained leaning against the the taxicab; that he continued with his chore of cleaning; that as soon as he finished
mango tree with Josephine facing him and her arms resting on his shoulders. They cleaning the taxicab, he drove the white Datsun car to Tondo to fetch his six-year
were in this position when Neil again came out through the gate a few moments old brother Mark, the son of his father with Maricon Pantoja; that Mark was a pupil
later and proceeded to the right side of the car, still holding the handgun. From at the Magat Salamat Elementary School in Tondo; that after picking up Mark,
there, Neil fired twice at the Refugios. The Refugios both fell to the left of the they drove to the house of his uncle, Domingo Batin, in Marulas, Valenzuela, to
mango tree. Farrales saw both Castor and Neil quickly enter the compound. At that get his clothes from his cousin; that they arrived there at 11:00 am, and spent
point, Farrales decided to run home in order to summon Alfredo Dizon, his tenant, around two hours there; that from Marulas, they went home, arriving at St. Peter
who was a police officer because he feared that the Batins might escape from the Street at around 2:30 pm; that he parked the car on the road in front of their fence;
scene by car. that he and Mark first entered the house to deposit Mark’s school things and later
went outside to await the arrival of Mark’s mother; that his other brothers were
outside; that Castor was also outside talking with a man whose name he did not
Farrales and Dizon lost no time in going to the place of the Batins. After Dizon
know but whom he had seen thrice before as well as with Boy Iñigo in front of the
talked with Castor at the gate of the latter’s compound, the latter entered the house
latter’s house; that Iñigo’s house was 15 meters from their gate; that Pantoja soon
of his nephew, Ricky Basilio, which was beside Castor’s own house. A few
arrived at around 2:45 pm; that he continued talking and playing with his brothers;
moments later, Castor came out of Basilio’s house to let Dizon in through the gate.
and that at that point he decided to take the gun from the compartment of the
It was about this time that the responding police officers arrived at the scene. The
taxicab – then parked around 2 ½ meters away from where he and his brothers
victim had been rushed to the hospital immediately.
were – and tucked it in his waistline.

Another neighbor, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez, resident of No. 7-A St. Peter Street,
Having thus tucked the gun, Neil went to stand at the right rear side of the Datsun
declared that while she was at home taking care of her baby at between 3:00 and
car which was parked facing the mango tree ("halos magkatapat lang po"). Maricon
3:30 pm of October 21, 1994, she heard someone challenging others to a fight; that
came out to the street at that point to ask him about the time he had fetched Mark.
looking out of her window ("dungaw"), she saw that it was Boy Batin – Castor –
It was while he was standing there with the others that, according to Neil, he
and he was then walking about on St. Peter Street; that just then, her child cried,
suddenly felt the impulse of drawing the gun from his waistline ("Bigla kong
and so she went to him; that upon returning to the window to call her other child,
naisipang bunutin ang baril"). He thus drew the gun and turned around, but, as he
she saw Castor hand over a handgun to Neil, and the latter thereafter entered
did so, he accidentally pulled the trigger, causing the gun to fire twice ("Tumalikod
through their gate; that she next saw Neil load bullets into the gun and then tucking
po ako, tapos nakalabit ko, pumutok ng dalawang beses").
it in his right waistline; that after loading, Neil went out to the street, went between
the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine
who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that Neil admitted knowing the late Eugenio Refugio and his wife Josephine because
Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na." that, at that instant, Neil fired two they were his neighbors with only a high wall separating their houses; but denied
shots; that as she went down to get her other child upon hearing the gunshots, she seeing them that afternoon beside the mango tree.
heard Josephine say: "Tay, may tama ka"; that she later reentered her house; and
that she knew that Eugenio died afterwards.
At the sound of gunfire, Castor rushed towards Neil from where he was in front of
Iñigo’s house, shouting twice to his son: "Huwag!" Pantoja, for her part, forced
Although Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital right after the Neil to enter the compound, where she brought him inside the house of his aunt.
shooting and was operated on, he expired the next day. His remains were properly Neil concealed the gun in the ceiling of the aunt’s house.
identified in writing by his brother, Tito Eugenio.3
Neil said that he and his father did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession
The medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr. Florante of the gun; that his father did not wrest the gun from him; that he did not enter the
Baltazar, conducted an autopsy on Eugenio’s remains. In his Medico-Legal Report compound to put bullets in the gun; that his father did not order him to shoot
No. M-1715-94,4 he indicated that Eugenio sustained one gunshot wound, which Eugenio; and that his father was not drunk and challenging others to a fight. He
was, however, fatal, because "it went slightly upward, slightly anteriorward from insisted that he and the Refugios, with whom he was acquainted since 1987, had no
the right to the left of the body, fracturing the right to [the] left [of the] thoracic misunderstandings, for he even had shared drinks with the late Eugenio before
region, lacerating the right lumbar region." Dr. Baltazar made the certification as to October 21, 1994.11
the cause of death in the death certificate.5

11
As regards the testimonies of the defense’s two other witnesses, the trial court Castor Batin prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set
could not make an intelligible narrative of the version of the facts presented by aside and a new one entered acquitting him of the crime charged. In the alternative,
them, considering the contradictions it found in their testimonies. The trial court he prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide only, arguing that the
found glaring Maricon Pantoja’s "self-contradiction" as to where she and the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently stated in the Information.
accused were when Eugenio was shot. During the trial, Maricon testified that she,
Neil and Castor were outside their house when Neil drew the gun and accidentally
Whether there was conspiracy in the killing of Eugenio Refugio
fired. However, in her affidavit, 12 she alleged that they went outside their house
upon hearing a gun explosion and saw "Eugenio Refugio alone holding his
stomach x x x we have no any knowledge whether he was hit by a bullet."13 It is evident from Castor’s Supplemental Brief and all his other issuances after the
withdrawal of Neil’s appeal that he had already discarded Neil’s theory of
accidental shooting. Instead, his arguments are geared toward his distancing
On 8 June 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused guilty of
himself from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio.
murder, qualified by treachery, to wit:

We cannot, however, dispose of the discussion of Neil’s theory of accidental

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused CASTOR
shooting. As Neil’s testimony had been the only evidence presented by the defense
BATIN and NEIL BATIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
to rebut the prosecution’s evidence concerning the acts of Castor during the
MURDER as defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as
incident, we should carefully scrutinize Neil’s testimony to determine his
amended, and they are hereby each sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua; and
credibility.
ordered to pay the heirs of EUGENIO REFUGIO, through his wife, JOSEPHINE
REFUGIO, as follows:
Neil claims that while his back was still turned against the Refugios, he suddenly
felt the impulse to draw the gun from his waistline. He drew the gun, turned around
1] ₱50,000.00, as death indemnity;
with the gun in hand, and accidentally fired it twice without aiming it at anyone.

2] ₱61,500.00, as actual damages;

As held by the trial court, this account is plainly far-fetched and incredible. As
observed by the trial court,
3] ₱500,000.00, as moral damages;
The revolver involved herein was a mechanical firearm which belonged to the so-
4] ₱307,920.00, as indemnity for lost of earning capacity; and called double-action type of guns. This type has a firing mechanism which permits
two methods of firing – the first is by manually cocking or retracting the hammer
and then pressing the trigger to release the hammer; the second is by applying
5] The costs of suit.14
continuous pressure on the trigger in order to cock the hammer and then releasing
the trigger. The drop of the hammer by either method propels the firing pin forward
Neil and Castor Batin filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However, on 13 so that its other end strikes the primer cap to explode the propellant charge inside
November 2000, accused Neil Batin filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. the shell which then forces out the bullet through the gun barrel. From the nature of
The People interposed no objection to the Motion, which was granted. the firing mechanism of Exhibit O, and there being no evidence showing that the
hammer was manually cocked before the gun fired, it was absolutely physically
On 6 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision impossible for the gun to fire accidentally.
affirming, with modification, the Decision of the trial court, to wit:
In order to determine for himself how much pressure was necessary to cock the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court hammer into firing position, the undersigned presiding judge personally tested the
of Quezon City, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61003 is hereby trigger pull of Exhibit O. Even assuming that the passage of time from the date of
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil liabilities. With the exception of the the shooting caused some change on the efficiency of the firing mechanism, such
award of moral damages which is reduced to ₱100,000.00 and the indemnity for change can only show up by way of a weakening of the hammer spring.
loss of earning capacity which is increased to ₱723,840.00, the awards for death Nonetheless, it was not surprising for the undersigned presiding judge to find
indemnity and actual damages are retained.15 heavy resistance at each trigger pull, such that he exerted some force to cock the
hammer. This actual testing easily validated the conclusion that firing the gun
accidentally and unintentionally was impossible.17
Castor Batin now comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:

Neil’s claim that he accidentally fired the gun twice in quick succession is, thus,
I even more incredible. Given the difficulty of pulling the trigger to cock the
hammer into firing position, it is inconceivable how the gun could have been fired
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL by Neil twice in quick succession except by a deliberate and intentional pulling of
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- the trigger.
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
PRINCIPAL FOR INDUCEMENT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. Given the physical attributes and condition of the gun involved in the case at bar,
the testimony of Eusebio Farrales is likewise observed to be much more credible
II than that of Neil. Whereas Neil claims that he accidentally fired the gun twice
using only one hand, Eusebio Farrales testified that Neil fired at the Refugios while
holding the gun with both hands and from a standing position.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TRACHERY.16 While the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and
is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence,18 Neil’s credibility has been
severely tarnished by the foregoing portion of his testimony. Thus, we should

12
likewise take with a grain of salt the following parts of his testimony which tend to Q Also, without moving your glance or gaze at Neil Batin, you saw him proceed to
refute the account of the prosecution concerning the acts of Castor during the the right rear portion of the car and open the right rear door of said car, is it not?
incident: (1) that Neil and Castor did not grapple inside the Datsun car for
possession of the gun; (2) that Castor did not wrest the gun from him; (3) that Neil
A Yes, sir.
did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; (4) that Castor did not order
Neil to shoot Eugenio; and (5) that Castor was not drunk and challenging others to
a fight. Q And without also removing your gaze or sight at Neil Batin, you saw him open
and get a gun inside the car?
As stated above, Castor has already discarded Neil’s theory of accidental shooting
and, instead, focuses on distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting A I saw Neil Batin opened the right rear door, as if he is putting all his body inside
Eugenio Refugio. Castor’s principal defense in this appeal is that the conviction of the car, when Mang Boy took hold of Neil, they were grappling for possession of
a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that the inducement be made the gun, and raised it above, and that was the time when my husband saw the gun
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and (2) that such raised, and I also saw the gun.
inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.19
Court
Castor claims that there is no conclusive proof that he participated in the shooting,
and that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words ‘Sige, banatan mo na’" cannot be So they were both inside the car, their arms were both inside the car and the gun
considered as the moving cause of the shooting. According to Castor, if he had was inside the car when you and your husband saw this particular scene?
wanted his son to shoot Eusebio Refugio, he would not have shouted "Huwag" and
struggled for possession of the gun.
A Yes, your Honor.

We are not persuaded.

Atty. Siobal

First of all, the theory presented by the prosecution in both the Information and in
their arguments before the courts is not Castor’s being a principal by inducement, So you saw Castor Batin and Neil Batin grappling for the gun when they were
but rather his being a co-conspirator. If conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the inside the car?
act of all. As stated above, the widow, Josephine Refugio, and the neighbors --
Eusebio Farrales and Vilma Juadinez Rodriguez -- testified to the fact that Castor A Yes, sir, and then Castor Batin shouted "huwag."
handed the gun to Neil and urged the latter to fire at the Refugio spouses. The trial
court, whose assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect,
since it had the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression and Q And at that time they were grappling for the gun inside the car and Castor Batin
demeanor of the witnesses at the trial,20found these witnesses credible, thus: shouted "huwag," after that, you and your husband saw the gun atop the roof of the
car, is that what you want to convey to the Court?

From its careful and thorough evaluation of the record, the Court finds that Castor
and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the A The gun was still inside the car, only we saw it through the glass window, sir.
testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses – that Castor returned the gun back to
Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Q And what happened after that?
Neil then fired his gun twice – were credible and sufficed to prove Castor’s
indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as
A Neil Batin got out of the car, followed by Castor Batin and then Castor gave the
much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the
gun to Neil, and after receiving the gun, Neil placed the gun at his waist, sir.
killing, was.

Q You said Neil Batin got out of the car ahead of Castor Batin, where did Neil
The reliability of witnesses Farrales and Rodriguez, for one, cannot be doubted.
Batin go or proceed, to what direction?
Being the neighbors of both the Batins and the Refugios, their claim of witnessing
the events that culminated into the shooting of Eugenio was unassailable. The
accused, in fact, could not provide any reason or motive for them to testify against A He proceeded to that place labeled as Exhibit G-7, sir.
the Batins unless it was upon the truth.21
Q And you said Castor Batin followed Neil Batin to the place where he proceeded
While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be here at Exhibit G-7?
considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It
was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and A Yes, sir.
urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-
examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for
possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. Thus: Q Of course, when Neil Batin got out of the car ahead, his back, he must have
turned his back from you?

(Atty. Siobal Cross-examining)

A He was sidewise in relation to me, sir.

Q The second time around that you saw him was when he moved towards the right
rear of the car? Q How about Castor Batin, when he got out of the car, he must have turned his
back from you?

A I did not remove my sight at Neil Batin as he moved towards this car, sir.
A Yes, sir.

13
Q And where was Castor Batin facing when you said he gave the gun to Neil qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Batin? Information. The Information filed against the Batins states that "the accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery,
A He was facing Neil, sir.22
taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO
As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor’s utterance REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on
of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death." 28 Castor
circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the claims that this charge does not allege the specific treacherous acts of the accused.
crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused "with treachery x x x,
finally decided to give the gun to Neil – a crystal-clear expression of the agreement attack, assault and employ personal violence" is a mere conclusion of law by the
of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony. one who drafted the said Information. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules
Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and of Court.
after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. 23 Prosecution witnesses Josephine Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 provides:
Refugio and Eusebio Farrales positively indicated in their testimonies that prior to
the shooting of Eugenio Refugio, Castor was drunk, was openly challenging others
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the
to a fight, and was uttering angry words. It was at this juncture that witnesses saw
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
Neil retrieve his gun from the parked car, after which Castor grabbed the gun from
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
his son, grappled with it, returned it to his son, and ordered the latter to shoot the
If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
Refugios.
subsection of the statute punishing it.

Secondly, even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as
results would be the same. Castor’s argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
words ‘Sige, banatan mo na’ cannot be considered as the moving cause of the
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement.
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved
the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that words of
Pertinently, we have held in Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of Batangas 29 that
command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. In People v. Tamayo, 24
the main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set forth in an
we held that the moral influence of the words of the father may determine the
Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
stranger would make no impression.
offense. We added in said case that

There is no doubt in our minds that Castor’s words were the determining cause of
[I]t is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts
the commission of the crime. As stated above, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez testified
necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to
that the eighteen-year-old Neil Batin asked his father before shooting: "Tay,
identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from
banatan ko na?" Neil Batin was clearly seeking the consent of his father before
facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it
proceeding with the act, and it was Castor’s words "Sige, banatan mo na" 25 that
is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a
sealed Eugenio Refugio’s fate.
person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.

Whether treachery was specifically alleged in the Information

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, sufficient without any further explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it.
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly Here are some of the cases:
and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.26
In People v. Lab-eo,30 Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under the following
Information:
According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of Eugenio
because Castor ordered Neil to fire at Eugenio after they clearly saw that he was
That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion, Tadian,
still leaning against the mango tree and being restrained by Josephine who had her
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
arms on his shoulders. Thereby, "the accused insured their safety from any
named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a sharp knife, did then and
defensive or retaliatory act of Eugenio who, in that position of helplessness and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab
unpreparedness, obviously had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate
Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and pointed knife and thereby inflicting a
even if he wanted to. The accused thus consciously used the firearm to assault from
mortal stab wound upon the victim as reflected in that medico-legal certificate, to
a distance, all the more to enhance the chances of killing the victim without risk to
wit:
themselves."27

Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax, which
Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery was
caused the death of the victim thereafter.
sufficiently proven during the trial. All that Castor claims before us is that the

14
That the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening,
superior strength and craft attended the commission of the offense. at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with
The accused in this case argued that the Information above, while captioned as
intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there
"Murder," only charged him with homicide as written. This Court found nothing
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak,
wrong with the Information, and ruled that the Information sufficiently charged the
accused’s father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body, which
accused with murder, not even considering the absence of an explanation of the
caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio
treachery stated therein, thus:
Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by law.

The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength,
not in the first paragraph of the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of
disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication
form or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted. That the Provincial
and relationship attended the commission of the crime.
Prosecutor decided to write the Information differently did not impair its
sufficiency. Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form
or style. As long as the requirements of the law are observed, the Information will CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to] Article 14,
pass judicial scrutiny. paragraph 3 and 15, and Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

xxxx Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the Information to have
sufficiently alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary facts need
not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense.
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common
Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be
understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
proved during the trial.
properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
Information in order not to violate the accused’s constitutional right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to Whether the civil liabilities of the accused were correctly awarded by the lower
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the courts
trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to
be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or
The trial court ordered the accused, Neil and Castor Batin, to pay the heirs of
form adopted in the Information.31
Eugenio Refugio in the following amounts:

This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused therein with murder
1) ₱50,000.00, as death indemnity;
qualified by treachery.

2) ₱61,500.00, as actual damages;

The allegation in the Information of treachery as a qualifying circumstance was
similarly assailed in People v. Opuran,32 wherein the charge was as follows:
3) ₱500,000.00, as moral damages;
Criminal Case No. 4693
4) ₱307,920.00, as indemnity for loss of earning capacity; and
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road,
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the 5) the costs of suit.36
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill and
treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault Jurisprudence pegs the death indemnity in the above amount (₱50,000.00)
and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from pursuant to the current judicial policy on the matter. No proof thereof is required.
tip to handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds The ₱61,500.00 in actual damages consists of the expenses incurred by the family
on the back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death. of Eugenio Refugio, which Josephine Refugio testified to and was summarized in
Exhibit H:37 (1) ₱25,000.00 for medicines, surgery and other expenses for the
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. hospitalization and emergency treatment;38 (2) ₱20,000.00 for funeral expenses,
inclusive of the costs of coffin, funeral services, and expenses during the wake; 39
and (3) ₱6,500.00 as for burial expenses.
This Court again rejected the argument of the defense by finding the allegation of
treachery sufficient, and later on finding the accused therein guilty of murder
qualified by treachery: The Court of Appeals also modified the trial court’s computation of the indemnity
for loss of earning capacity. The trial court, finding the work of Eugenio Refugio to
be hazardous, reduced his life expectancy to 20 years.
We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of
murder for the death of Demetrio, Jr. because treachery was not alleged with
"specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is This modification is in accord with our ruling in Pleyto v. Lomboy. 40 Pleyto offers
belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the the following computation for the award for loss of earning capacity:
attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 – Age at x (Gross Annual
not be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly
qualify an offense.33
Capacity time of death) Income – Reasonable
34
Finally, the following constitutes the Information in People v. Bajar :
& Necessary Living

15
Expenses) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages."2
Eugenio Refugio, who was 31 years old at the time of his death, had a daily income
of ₱145.00. The Court of Appeals multiplied this amount by 26 working days to The Information3 dated December 1, 1998, charged appellant in these words:
get Eugenio Refugio’s monthly income of ₱3,770.00. The Court of Appeals thus
applied the Pleyto formula as follows:
"That sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of Camiling,
Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 – 31) x [(₱3770 x 12) – (₱3770 x 12)]
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Capacity
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully,
Net Earning = 2/3 x (49) x [(₱45,240) – (₱22,620)]
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation succeed
Capacity
in having sexual intercourse with Anna Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old
Net Earning = 32 x [₱22,620]
minor."4
Capacity
Net Earning = ₱723,84041
Capacity Upon his arraignment on October 2, 2000,5 appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio,6 pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the
assailed Decision.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals found the award of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages to
be excessive, and instead fixed the amount at ₱100,000.00. In accord with
prevailing jurisprudence, however, we further reduce this amount to ₱50,000.00.42 The Facts

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification Version of the Prosecution
the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder is AFFIRMED with
FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral damages, which is In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s
hereby reduced to ₱50,000.00. version of the facts in the following manner:

SO ORDERED. "Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who was seven
(7) years old, went to play with Lorena Cachapero and Dino Cachapero
at a nearby house in Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.

"During that occasion, appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena,

made her lie down and removed her shorts and panty. He inserted his
penis into her sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry told her not to tell
her parents because he might be scolded.

G.R. No. 153008 May 20, 2004

"On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was conducting a
remedial class in Reading to her Grade I and II students. While they
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, were reading the word ‘tagtuyot’ or ‘saluyot,’ one of her students
vs. Jocelyn Meneses told her that Anna was sexually abused by ‘Manong
LARRY CACHAPERO y BASILIO, appellant. Larry.’

DECISION "She then ordered the students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and
Anna to stay behind. She confronted Anna and asked her the truth.
Anna covered her face with her two hands, cried, and said yes. The
PANGANIBAN, J.:
teachers had a conference, after which they decided to report the matter
to the parents of Anna.
Time is not an essential element of rape. An information that states the
approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is sufficient in form.
"On September 3, 1998, Anna’s mother brought her to the Camiling
Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised before arraignment,
District Hospital where she was examined. Dr. Mercedes B. Gapultos, a
either through a bill of particulars or a motion to quash; otherwise, objection to
Medico Legal Officer, examined Anna and came out with the following
such defect shall be considered waived.
report:

The Case
"Dr. Gapultos testified that she found old hymenal lacerations and that
it may be caused by many factors like penetration of the hymen by a
Larry Cachapero y Basilio appeals the January 15, 2002 Decision 1 of the Regional hard object, or by an object forcibly entered."7 (Citations omitted)
Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 98-68
Cam, finding him guilty of rape as follows:
Version of the Defense

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused LARRY

Interposing the defenses of denial and alibi, appellant tersely relates his version of
CACHAPERO y [BASILIO] is hereby found GUILTY beyond
the facts in these words:
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory "Accused Larry Cachapero testified that at the time of the alleged
penalties, and [is hereby further] directed to pay the victim the sum of incident, he was in their house together with his father and mother. He

16
 denied seeing the private complainant on that day. He alleged the case We disagree. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. 12 This
was filed against [him] because of the long standing feud between his being so, its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or
mother and the mother of the private complainant."8 (Citations omitted) information.13 Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

Ruling of the Trial Court "SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
According to the trial court, testimony coming from an innocent child like the
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
victim was credible and sufficient to convict appellant of rape, more so because the
possible to the actual date of its commission."(Italics supplied)
testimony was supported by medical findings.

The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in
The lower court thus brushed aside the claim of appellant that he was falsely
March 1998" which, according to private complainant, was more or less at the
accused. It held that, whatever feud may have existed between the mother of the
closing of the school year.14 Being reasonably definite and certain, this
rape victim and the accused, no woman in her right mind would unnecessarily
approximation sufficiently meets the requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of
expose her minor daughter to the humiliation and stigma of a public trial. Citing
Rule 11015 of the Rules of Court merely requires that the information must state,
Section 3(b)(1) of RA No. 7610,9 it added that the sexual abuse of the victim
among others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense.
prejudiced her development.

Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be

Hence, this appeal.10
made for the first time on appeal.16 If the present appellant found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of
Issues particulars,17 for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape;
or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the
In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues for our consideration: prescribed form.18 Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have
waived objection to any formal defect in the Information.19

"I.
By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for the
defense, appellant’s counsel actively took part in the trial. Furthermore, the defense
The court a quo erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of never objected to the presentation of the prosecution evidence 20proving that the
private complainant which is full of inconsistencies. offense had been committed in March 1998. Appellant has not shown that he was
deprived of a proper defense, for he was in fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be
"II. said, therefore, that his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him has been violated.
The court a quo erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond Second Issue:
reasonable doubt. Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence

"III. Appellant contends that private complainant’s testimony, which was tainted with
material inconsistencies, should not have been received by the trial court with
precipitate credulity. Calling the victim a coached witness, he points out that her
The court a quo erred in not considering the Information as insufficient answers were inconsistent on (1) whether or not she bled after the alleged rape and
to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to (2) what time she informed her mother about the incident.
state the precise date of commission of the alleged rape[,] it being an
essential element of the crime charged."11
Appellant’s contentions are unconvincing. It is well-established that the testimony
of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, 21 more so if she is a
Simply put, appellant questions the sufficiency of (1) the Information and (2) the minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
prosecution’s evidence. deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation
of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. 22 In so
The Court’s Ruling testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the
absence of proof of ill motive.
The appeal has no merit; appellant’s conviction for statutory rape is affirmed, but
the award of exemplary damages is deleted. In this case, the victim was a young girl of seven years when she came forward to
declare that appellant had raped her. At age nine, she narrated to the court the
violation of her person in this manner:
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Information
"PROS. GUARDIANO [to Anna]:
Q Do you remember an incident that happened [i]n March, 1998 in
Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape, appellant argues that the
relation [to] the accused?
Information was fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when the
A Yes, Sir.
crime was committed. Such infirmity, he added, jeopardized his right to be
Q [T]hat March, 1998, [is] that x x x, more or less, [about the] closing
properly informed of the charge against him.
of the school year?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you tell us on that date, what did Larry Cachapero do to you?

17
 A Larry Cachapero made [me lie] down and [he] remove[d] my panty "ATTY. JOAQUIN:
and shorts, Sir.
Q Can you tell us if Larry Cachapero was the one who removed your
Q When you heard of this conversation, did you ask what she mean[t]
panty and shorts?
by the word ‘yot.’?
A Yes, Sir.
Q After removing your panty and shorts, what did Larry Cachapero do
after that? A Yes, Sir. I asked her if she understands the word ‘yot.’ [T]he child
A He had sexual intercourse with me, Sir. Jocelyn Meneses said that ‘niyotyot’ ni Mang Larry ni Anna Lorraine’
Q Can you tell us what is [the] sexual intercourse [that] Larry and I asked Anna Lorraine if it is true that she was sexually abused by
Cachapero did to you? Larry and she cried and answered yes, Sir.
A He just removed my shorts and panty and he sexually abused me, Sir.
Q How did he sexually abuse you? Q But you did not ask x x x further questions?
A He made me [lie] down, Sir.
Q After he made you [lie] down, what did he do after that?
A He sexually abused me, Sir. A No more, Sir, because the child cried.
Q And did he put out his penis?
A Yes, Sir. Q So, she did not exactly tell what happened to her and what Larry did
Q Did he place his penis touching your sex organ? to her because she was already crying?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And did you feel any pressure when his penis touched your sex
organ? A No, Sir[,] we again interviewed the child while we were at the
A Yes, Sir. Guidance Center with my co-teachers and she said yes and I even
Q And that feels very painful? asked how the incident happened and Lorena told me that both were
A Yes, Sir. inside the room and they were naked and Larry was on top of Anna
Q And that pain you felt is at the [opening] of your sex organ? Lorraine, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is very painful everytime there was pressure in the opening of Q Are we made to understand Madam Witness that you also
your sex organ? interviewed the sister[,] Lorena?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And how many times did he put pressure in the opening of your
A Yes, Sir.
organ?
A Only once, Sir.
Q And do you remember if his penis penetrated your sex organ? Q Who between the two (2) were naked as narrated to you by Lorena?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you estimate which part of his penis penetrated your organ, how A ‘Labus da’ they were naked, she told us, Sir.
long?
A (Witness demonstrated by spreading her index finger measuring
about two [2] inches as stipulated). Q And that was only the exact narration given by Lorena?
Q After that, did your organ bleed?
A Yes, Sir[,] and that Larry was on top of Anna Lorraine.
A Yes, Sir."23
Q Did Lorena see the private organ[s] of those naked persons?
To be sure, the victim’s testimony was not flawless or perfect in all aspects. We
must remember, however, that it was the narration of a minor who barely A I did not ask about that, Sir.
understood sex and sexuality.24 Hence, in assessing her testimony, it would not be
fair to apply the standards used for adults. 25 Indeed, she fully understood the
defilement of her person, even if she was at a loss for the right words with which to Q And you did not also ask whether the private organ of Larry
describe the horrid details. It was for this reason that the prosecutor had to ask Cachapero was inserted into the private organ of Anna Lorraine?
leading questions, which are allowed under Section 10 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.26 A I did not, Sir."31 (Italics supplied)

Furthermore, the account given by the victim, stating the essential fact that Finally, it is a general rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment
appellant had carnal knowledge of her, refers to details that are not in any way of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some
affected or obscured by the supposed contradictions -- whether or not she bled after facts or circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked,
the rape or how soon she informed her mother of the incident. 27 What further misapprehended or misinterpreted.32 This deference to the trial court’s appreciation
buttressed the story of private complainant were Dr. Gapultos’ medical findings 28 of the facts and of the credibility of witnesses is consistent with the principle that
that there were old lacerations in her hymen. Although not indispensable to a rape when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient
conviction,29 such findings were credible physical evidence of forcible defloration, to convict the accused.33 Thus, when a guileless girl of seven credibly declares that
among others.30 she has been raped, she has said all that is necessary to prove the ravishment of her
honor.34
Similarly corroborative of the girl’s tale of woe was Conchita Donato’s unrebutted
testimony. It disclosed that appellant’s sister, Lorena, had admitted to having seen The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve
the incident in much the same detail as the victim had declared. The pertinent years of age.35 In this case, the prosecution duly established that appellant had
portion of Lorena’s testimony during cross-examination is reproduced below: sexual intercourse with private complainant; and that the latter, as shown by her
birth certificate,36 was under twelve years old at the time.

18
On the other hand, of little probative value is the alibi of appellant that he was in G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010
the house of his parents at the time of the rape. In rape cases, while denial and alibi
are legitimate defenses, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners,
testimony of the victim.37 In particular, the defense of alibi is weak if wanting in
vs.
material corroboration,38 as in this case.
The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Also unpersuasive is the contention of appellant that the charge against him was
precipitated by a long-standing feud between his family and that of private
DECISION
complainant. He himself belied this allegation during his cross-examination, from
which we quote:
MENDOZA, J.:
"PROS. GUARDIANO [to Cachapero]:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Q Mr. Witness, how far is your house [from] the house of the private
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008
complainant?
Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263,
denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who were
A From my seat to the Municipal building, Sir (estimated at 150 charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the denial
meters). of their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August 13, 2008.

Q And you are aware that Anna [Laurence] Toledo and your younger An Information2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with having
sister and brother are friends, is that correct? violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the
government, reads:
A No, Sir.
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for
Q And there was a quarrel between your mother and the mother of the
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED
complainant, as you said earlier?
(THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:

A Yes, Sir.
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality
of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
Q And you said [that] they quarreled [with] each other even before this of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials, being the
crime, is that correct? Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and
A Not yet, Sir. mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private
individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract
Q So they quarrel[ed] after this incident, is that correct? for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and
Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT
A Yes, Sir. THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a
total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱97,000.00), Philippine
Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the
Q Because you are accused of rape by the private complainant who is government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and
the daughter of that mother whom your mother quarreled with, is that thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and
correct? non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and
A Yes, Sir."39 (Italics supplied) prejudice of the government.

Award of Exemplary Damages Improper CONTRARY TO LAW.

The trial court’s award of ₱25,000 for exemplary damages should be deleted. Such This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was
damages may be given only when one or more aggravating circumstances are docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319.
alleged in the information and proved during the trial. 40 In the present case, there
are no such circumstances. In a Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted
petitioners’ Motion to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of the
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Regional prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the
Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, AFFIRMED. The award of exemplary government, an essential element of the crime charged."
damages is DELETED. Costs against appellant.
In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the
SO ORDERED. Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the information
amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Davide, Jr.*, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

19
Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information5 dated August 17, 2007, this time, docketed The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of the
3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the
information must be sustained.
government.

WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the motion

The information, subject of the petition, now reads:
under consideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
arraignment of both accused shall proceed as scheduled.8
The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 9 dated August 6, 2008, submitting
FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as
that the two Informations substantially charged different offenses, such that the
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed
present information constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by a
as follows:
new preliminary investigation.

That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality
On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the
of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion10 in open court.
of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking
public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and
committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court anchored on the
LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, following grounds:
unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late
Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non- I

accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation
Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, of the case a quo, when the second Information in the instant case constituted
Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE substituted Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary
HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN investigation.
THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a
competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
II

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the conduct of a preliminary
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation 6 dated June 4, 2008 which investigation of the case a quo, since the second Information therein contained
was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition7 dated June 18, 2008. substantial amendments whose submission required the conduct of preliminary
investigation.
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary
investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of III
the law because the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation of Section
3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a
substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation
information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new of the case a quo, although the newly discovered evidence mandates due re-
preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence examination of the finding that prima facie cause existed to file the case a quo.11
mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.
From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not the two
On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing
Resolution denying the petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation. The graft undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private
court found that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and
would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. It gave the separate offenses that would warrant a new or another preliminary investigation.
following ratiocination:
In its Comment12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the Philippines,
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that there is no
merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance substituted information in contemplation of law and jurisprudence that would
of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another require the conduct of another preliminary investigation. There is no newly-
preliminary investigation. discovered evidence that would lead to a different determination should there be
another preliminary investigation conducted.

Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the
accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation In their Reply,13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses charged in
is not in order. the first and second Information are not the same, and what transpired was a
substitution of Information that required prior conduct of preliminary investigation.

20
Even assuming there was no substitution, substantial amendments were made in Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag, 20 ruling that, "in substitution of
the second Information, and that its submission should have been preceded by a information another preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has
new preliminary investigation. to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present case because,
as already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in
the nature of the offense charged.
We find no merit in this petition.

Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v.

Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the
Vivar,21 that failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads:
violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory
and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive them of their right to due
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that there was a full-
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful: blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated.

xxx Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial
amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the same must likewise
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving fail.1avvphi1
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second
apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section
other concessions. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to
conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a substantial
The essential elements of the offense are as follows: amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same
transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the
construction of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta,
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution
judicial or official functions; and defense remain the same.

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case
inexcusable negligence; and of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan.22The same is inapplicable to petitioners’ case. In
Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment which entitled the accused to
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the another preliminary investigation. The recital of facts constituting the offense
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, charged therein was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.14 act allegedly committed by the petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to
pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, whereas in the amended
information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled: In the case at bar, there is no substantial amendment to speak of. As discussed
previously, the Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners’ Motion to
that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be amended.
including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,23 where it was written:
disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3
paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of
committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of
a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an
under both.15 offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have
The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new
construction that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."16 preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other
persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original
Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal
charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal.
3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.
recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 17 provides that there are two (2) acts or
modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification
party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted in the nature of the charged offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary
benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode 18 or under both
should both modes concur.19

21
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re- modification of the nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such
examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case, deserves scant conduct of preliminary investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case
consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new investigation be conducted and would be an exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary
to consider newly discovered evidence, in particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor investigation actively participated by both petitioners.
Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the audit report. We are not convinced.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no grave
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying petitioners’
discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, motion for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263.
after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if
admitted, will probably change the judgment.24
SO ORDERED.
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed
by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the G.R. No. 157472 September 28, 2007
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because
it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,
affidavit was among the documents considered during the preliminary vs.
investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’ Supplement to HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
Motion for Reinvestigation,25 offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents.
was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.

DECISION
More important is the prosecution’s statement in its Memorandum that, "after a
careful re-evaluation of the documentary evidence available to the prosecution at
the time of the filing of the initial Information, and at the time of the re-filing of the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Information, the prosecution insists on the finding of probable cause, an exercise
within the exclusive province of the Office of the Ombudsman."26 Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated
Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,27 viz: October 25, 20022 and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E.
Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68,
Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public
office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against
criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It petitioner committed as follows:
is basically his call.
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc,
Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. 28 The the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the Office of the feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite
Ombudsman’s action is grave abuse of discretion.29 rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds
on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and his rank.4
despotism.30
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-
intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.5
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function that acted without or However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued
in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of another Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to
discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public
the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the
be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.31 word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the
opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the
same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the
The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."7
acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order
the conduct of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the
prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was neither a

22
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN
the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM
Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended
Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.8
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion 9 on the ground of double
jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated
DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND
without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated
VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF
without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in
THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY
lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
TERMINATED.15

In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of
Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute
Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from
double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting
Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never
"disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was
Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s ruling that "disregard of
merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the
rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt.
same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so
Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised
no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of
Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which
aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is
serves to affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify
qualified to Murder.
the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is
a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in
an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and
when he denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that
existing jurisprudence.
the original Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his
express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him double jeopardy.
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which
constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to
Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was
respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder,
for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder
it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition
on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek
of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or
the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the
correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14,
Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide
petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
case.

In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order
Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its
amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was
while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with
substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12,
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue
2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14,
hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not
the original information charging the crime of homicide stands.13
entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment
scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is
alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge
merely a generic mitigating 14 circumstance which should not elevate the
when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.
petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first
Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was not dismissed
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following or terminated when the Information was amended.
grounds:
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge
of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy,

23
considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide. upon the filing of the proper information.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda. First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under
Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or
courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. 16 A strict complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases or complaint.
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. 17
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper information may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the
legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information following respects:
under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the
fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while
accused not against the peril of second punishment but against being tried for the
substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the original
same offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent further delay
charge;
in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of
the judicial hierarchy of courts.
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without
leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of
The Court’s Ruling
court as the original information has to be dismissed;

The petition is not meritorious.

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another
preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed
grave abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already and the accused has to plead anew to the new information; and
pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of
petitioner --
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the
original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial
without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
Murder which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information
of the information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the
acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18 information involves a different offense which does not include or is
not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be
second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient;
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

xxx
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other,
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
trial. information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides: constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.20

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as
charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense defined in Teehankee.
charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall

24
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. 24
"Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide,
entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was
as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.25
2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the
amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as
purely formal.21 It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the
case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit
the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not
complaint or information.26
prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case
available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might for homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is
have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. 22 Since the facts misplaced.
alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with
those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or
prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. 27 And for the dismissal to be a
the rights or defense of petitioner. bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.1âwphi1

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon
circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under
ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for
guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and convenience, we quote again --
did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section
back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The
abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:

Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
on any of the following grounds: charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall
xxxx commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information.
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
express consent. offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not
double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.28
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was

25
amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to
"Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case. liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of
payments before the Makati RTC.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-
realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek
was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the
anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier. internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet
discretion. a blogspot6 under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as
a yahoo e-group7 at [email protected]. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge
granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double
jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati
aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read
murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be
for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false
attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,
convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on
terminated without his express consent.29 www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga
discretion committed by respondent Judge. kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely
since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that
Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang
SO ORDERED.
hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

LET’S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN
COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado,
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott
AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners, ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and
vs. deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon
JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents. specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for
amicable settlements.
DECISION
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE
CARPIO MORALES, J.: READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND
THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the
original)
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et
al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
(public respondent) – Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding
the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution 2 of August probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations 11
12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance. charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez 3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005,
on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
(Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and
thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com
Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did
Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously
Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family
of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further
certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com. purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an
article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed,
posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of defamatory article as follows:
Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life
Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC)
- who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were

26
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila,
kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and
as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they
which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and
defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity,
above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco
and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published
before the public. an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed,
posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website
CONTRARY TO LAW.12 accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first
published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a

petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the
withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information 25 which, they alleged, still
that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that
charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14 the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati;
and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public offended party accessed the internet-published article.
respondent, a Motion to Quash16the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on
the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III,
complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for
failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public
constituting the offense of libel.
respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to
allege a particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE
article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati
INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.

2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE

By Order of October 3, 2006, 18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable
JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE
cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan. 19 It found that
DEFICIENT; and
the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually
residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed
their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; 3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE
or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati. INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that
the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited With the filing of Gimenez’s Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether
Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege verbatim petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition
that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public
venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a respondent’s admission of the Amended Information.
resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the
Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, 29 as a
rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, contending, inter concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly
alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the
may be cured by amendment.22 Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain
exceptions.
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecution’s
motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the
"amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue." appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.32

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its
20, 2007,24 the accusatory portion of which reads: discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review
process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal

27
complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC –whether the Amended for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals 36
Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the explained the nature of these changes:
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
4363, reading:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for
criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the Penal Code:
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil
actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published,
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil.
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a
at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one choice of venue.
of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
distant place.
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine
of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts
given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases. Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882,
May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v.
Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz: x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the
appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit: indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or
far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written
where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence,
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether,
and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a
private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever
possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used
should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial
or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
harass.
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory
Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of
Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s
private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website
equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly
requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest
the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein
jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale

28
could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant accused, BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of Barobo,
may have allegedly accessed the offending website. Surigao del Sur, a high ranking public official, with the use of his influence as such
public official, committing the offense in relation to his office, together with
JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction
receive and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) from said
would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being
Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI), a consultancy group charged with conducting a
accessed.1avvphi1
feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource Management Project of the
Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting the said amount to
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as accused Balahay in consideration of the said accused having officially intervened
amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez 37 are in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with the
instructive: Municipality of Barobo.

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani CONTRARY TO LAW.1
rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the
place of printing and first publication, or at the complainant’s place of residence.
Claiming that she was deprived of her right to a preliminary investigation as she
We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in
never received any notice to submit a counter-affidavit or countervailing evidence
Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason
to prove her innocence, petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation 2before the
to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed
Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, where the case was raffled and docketed as
by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to
Criminal Case No. 27959. The Sandiganbayan subsequently granted petitioner’s
file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which
motion on March 29, 2004 and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where
conduct a reinvestigation insofar as petitioner is concerned.3
the libelous matter was printed and first published.

Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion seeking the court’s permission to travel

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
abroad for a family vacation.4 The Sandiganbayan granted the same in an order
dated May 14, 2004 that reads:
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended Information.
Acting on the Motion With Leave Of Court To Travel Abroad dated May 11, 2004
filed by accused Jocelyn E. Cabo through counsel, Atty. Tomas N. Prado, and
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 considering the well-taken reason therein stated, the same is hereby GRANTED.
and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the
However, considering that this case is still pending reinvestigation/review before
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
the Office of the Special Prosecutor; considering further that the accused has not
yet been arraigned by reason thereof; and considering finally that there is a need
SO ORDERED. for the Court to preserve its authority to conduct trial in absentia should the
accused fail to return to the Philippines, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, with her express
G.R. No. 169509 June 16, 2006 conformity, is hereby ordered arraigned conditionally. If upon such
reinvestigation/review, it shall be found that there is no probable cause to proceed
against said accused, the conditional arraignment this morning shall be with no
JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner, force and effect. However, if it should be found that there is a need to amend the
vs. present indictment or to pave the way for the filing of some other indictment/s,
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL then the accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the
PROSECUTOR OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSION ON 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected
AUDIT, REGION XIII, Respondents. against double jeopardy.

DECISION When arraigned, the Information having been read in a language known and
familiar to her, accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her counsel, Atty. Tomas
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: N. Prado, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged in the Information.

This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner Jocelyn E. Cabo Accused Jocelyn E. Cabo, duly assisted by her counsel, shall affix her signature in
seeking to nullify the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, dated the minutes of the proceedings to signify her conformity to her acceptance of the
May 4 and July 20, 2005 in Criminal Case No. 27959. conditional arraignment and the legal consequences thereof as herein explained.

The following are the antecedent facts: SO ORDERED.5

On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or the Petitioner returned from abroad on May 24, 2004. Thereafter, the Special
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against petitioner and her co- Prosecutor concluded its reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her
accused Bonifacio C. Balahay. The information alleged: with violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. 6 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. 7 Thus, the Sandiganbayan set anew the
arraignment of petitioner and her co-accused on October 12, 2004.8
That on or about 08 August 2000 in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

29
On the day before the scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed an Urgent study, which contract accused Balahay in his official capacity has to intervene
Manifestation With Motion9 praying that "she be allowed to [re]iterate on her under the law.
previous plea of ‘not guilty’ x x x entered during her conditional arraignment held
last May 14, 2004, so that she may be excused from attending the scheduled
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
arraignment for October 12, 2004." It does not appear, however, that the
Sandiganbayan acted upon the said motion.
Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended
information. Petitioner was likewise notified of her re-arraignment which was set
The following day, petitioner’s co-accused Balahay failed to appear for
on April 14, 2005.17 However, on April 11, 2005, petitioner filed a Motion to
arraignment. This prompted the Sandiganbayan to order the arrest of Balahay as
Cancel Second Arraignment18 on the ground that the amended information
well the confiscation of his bail bond.10 Upon motion for reconsideration of
pertained to Balahay alone. Petitioner claimed that she could no longer be re-
Balahay, however, the Sandiganbayan recalled the warrant for his arrest and
arraigned on the amended information since substantial amendment of an
reinstated the bail bond.11 His arraignment was subsequently reset for November
information is not allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.
30, 2004.12

On May 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying
On November 24, 2004, Balahay, through counsel, filed a motion to quash the
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit, to wit:
information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense. 13 While
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes the act of "(d)irectly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself [T]he arraignment of accused Cabo on the original information was only
or for another, from any person, in connection with any transaction between the conditional in nature and that the same was resorted to as a mere accommodation
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity in her favor to enable her to travel abroad without this Court losing its ability to
has to intervene under the law," the information alleged only in general terms that conduct trial in absentia in the event she decides to abscond. However, as clearly
Balahay "intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract for stated in the Court’s Order of May 14, 2004, accused Cabo agreed with the
consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo." In other words, the condition that should there be a need to amend the information, she would thereby
information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the said contract under waive, not only her right to object to the amended information, but also her
the law, in his official capacity as municipal mayor. constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Now that the original
information has been superseded by an amended information, which was
specifically filed by the prosecution, and thereafter admitted by this Court, on the
On January 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 14 sustaining Balahay’s
basis of Section 4, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, accused
contention that the facts charged in the information do not constitute the offense of
Cabo is already estopped from raising any objection thereto.19
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Apart from the failure to allege that
Balahay had to officially intervene in the transaction pursuant to law, it also failed
to allege that Balahay accepted and received the money "for himself or for Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the foregoing resolution on the
another." The information was thus defective in that it failed to allege every single additional ground that double jeopardy had already set in. She asserted that her
fact necessary to constitute all the elements of the offense charged. conditional arraignment under the original information had been validated or
confirmed by her formal manifestation dated October 7, 2004, wherein she
reiterated her plea of "not guilty." Thus, her arraignment on the original
The Sandiganbayan, however, did not order the immediate quashal of the
information was no longer conditional in nature such that double jeopardy would
information. It held that under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, "if the
attach.
motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense x x x the (c)ourt should not quash the information
outright, but should instead direct the prosecution to correct the defect therein by The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the second
proper amendment. It is only when the prosecution fails or refuses to undertake assailed resolution dated July 20, 2005.21 Consequently, petitioner filed the instant
such amendment, or when despite such amendment the information still suffers special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that
from the same vice or defect,"15 that the court would be finally justified in granting the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in holding that her arraignment on
the motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan thus gave the prosecution a period of 15 the original information was conditional in nature and that a re-arraignment on the
days from notice within which to file an amended information that is sufficient as amended information would not put her in double jeopardy.
to both form and substance.
The issue here boils down to whether double jeopardy would attach on the basis of
On February 7, 2005, the prosecution filed an amended information which the "not guilty" plea entered by petitioner on the original information. She argues
incorporated all the essential elements of the crime charged, to wit: that it would, considering that her arraignment, which was initially conditional in
nature, was ratified when she confirmed her "not guilty" plea by means of a written
manifestation. In other words, the trial court could no longer assert that she waived
That on or about 08 August 2000, in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur,
her right to the filing of an amended information under the terms of her conditional
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
arraignment because she has, in effect, unconditionally affirmed the same.
accused BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of Barobo,
Surigao Del Sur, a high ranking public official, in the performance of his official
functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of authority, Petitioner’s assertions must fail.
and committing the offense in relation to his office, conspiring and confederating
with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of
receive and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE "conditionally" arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation of the case by the
HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) for his own benefit Ombudsman is not specifically provided in the regular rules of procedure. 22 In
or use from said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated People v. Espinosa,23 however, the Court tangentially recognized the practice of
Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDC), a consultancy group charged with "conditionally" arraigning the accused, provided that the alleged conditions
conducting a feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource Management attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." The
Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo giving and granting said Court ventured further by requiring that said conditions be expressly stated in the
amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the contract for said feasibility order disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, it was held that the arraignment
should be deemed simple and unconditional.24

30
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally set SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
forth the conditions for petitioner’s arraignment pending reinvestigation of the case amended, in form or in substance, without leave court, at any time before the
as well as her travel abroad. Among the conditions specified in said order is "if it accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
should be found that there is a need to amend the present indictment x x x, then the may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy." Petitioner was duly assisted by counsel during the conditional
xxxx
arraignment and was presumably apprised of the legal consequences of such
conditions. In fact, she signed the minutes of the proceedings which could only
signify her informed acceptance of and conformity with the terms of the In Poblete v. Sandoval,26 the Court explained that an amendment is only in form
conditional arraignment. when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and
does not introduce new and material facts. Amendment of an information after the
accused has pleaded thereto is allowed, if the amended information merely states
Thus, petitioner cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such conditions on the
with additional precision something which is already contained in the original
pretext that she affirmed her conditional arraignment by means of a written
information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the
manifestation. To begin with, there is no showing that the Sandiganbayan ruled on
crime charged.
her written manifestation and motion that she be allowed to merely confirm her
previous plea on the original information. It is likewise doubtful that petitioner
may legally confirm her conditional arraignment by means of a mere written In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in the
motion or manifestation. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly indictment, the amended information did not change the nature of the offense
requires that "(t)he accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally which is for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. The amended information
enter his plea." merely clarified the factual averments in the accusatory portion of the previous
information, in order to reflect with definiteness the essential elements of the crime
charged.
At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still petitioner cannot rely upon the
principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information. It
is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused must An examination of the two informations in this case would justify the preceding
have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a observation. While the first information alleged that Balahay committed the
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form and offense "with the use of his influence as such public official" "together with"
substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. 25 In the instant case, the original petitioner, the amended information stated that he did so "in the performance of his
information to which petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" was neither valid nor official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of
sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was also neither dismissed authority" while "conspiring and confederating" with petitioner. Then too, while it
nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore, attach even if petitioner is was averred previously that Balahay received and accepted the money from
assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the original charge. petitioner, with the latter "giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay
in consideration of the said accused having officially intervened in the undertaking
by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services", the amended information
It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959 failed
simply specified that Balahay received the money "for his own benefit or use" and
to allege all the essential elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. It,
that the contract mentioned in the first information was one that Balahay, "in his
in fact, did not charge any offense and was, to all intents and purposes, void and
official capacity has to intervene under the law."
defective. A valid conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such information.
Petitioner was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted when she entered
her plea of "not guilty" to the insufficient indictment. Consequently, even if we treat petitioner’s arraignment on the original information
as "unconditional," the same would not bar the amendment of the original
information under Section 14, Rule 110. Re-arraignment on the amended
Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against petitioner.
information will not prejudice petitioner’s rights since the alterations introduced
What the Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of the information
therein did not change the nature of the crime. As held in People v. Casey: 27
pursuant to the express provision of Section 4, Rule 117, which states:

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based
information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it
on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
despite the amendment. (Emphasis supplied) opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and
not of substance – not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by
Section 13 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when petitioner’s co-
accused filed a motion to quash the original information on the ground that the
same does not charge an offense. Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the original Likewise, it is not necessary, as petitioner suggests, to dismiss the original
information can be cured by amendment even after she had pleaded thereto, since complaint under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which states:
the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of form and
not of substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did not violate the
xxxx
first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which provides:

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information

31
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-
11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. Santos City for development as housing projects.4

The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J.
there was no mistake in charging the proper offense in the original information. As Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,5 executed and signed
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan: bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of ₱10,500.00
per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors
of the purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter of the property.
[I]t is hardly necessary for this Court to order the dismissal of the original
information and then direct the filing of a new one "charging the proper offense".
The reason for this is obvious. The prosecution did not commit a mistake in Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
charging the proper offense; rather, it merely failed to file an information sufficient property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only ₱3,000.00
to charge the offense it intended to charge, namely, violation of Section 3(b) of per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square
R.A. No. 3019. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for
apparently relied upon by accused Cabo contemplates a situation where the registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer
accused will be charged with an offense different from or is otherwise not certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-
necessarily included in the offense charged in the information to be dismissed by RSBS.6
the Court. In the case at bar, however, accused Cabo will not be charged with a
different offense or with an offense that is not necessarily included in the offense
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing
charged in the original information, but with the very same offense that the
the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the
prosecution intended to charge her in the first place, that is, violation of Section
Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other
3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.28
respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or
All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case
ordered the re-arraignment of petitioner on the amended information. Double No. OMB-3-98-0020.
jeopardy did not attach by virtue of petitioner’s "conditional arraignment" on the
first information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper,
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999
the following requisites must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or
Resolution,8 found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
3019 and falsification of public documents, thus:
same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or
the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 29 The WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the
first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar. following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear
below, are probably guilty thereof:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO,
conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to
the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs. xxxx
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO
DECISION twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the
government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-
RSBS;9
CARPIO, J.:

On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations 10

The Case
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations 11 for falsification of
public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to annul the 5 April 2006
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999, 12 with
45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment
a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999, 13 of the Ombudsman’s finding of
on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the
probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order, 14 the Sandiganbayan
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
disposed of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, thus:

The Facts
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to
evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated
Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court within the said
of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of
1994 to 27 July 1998.3 the Ombudsman.

32
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack
(OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On of merit.
review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18
December 2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in
SO ORDERED.21
and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various
agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property.15
The Issue
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the
Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second
recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against
Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB- him?
Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested
before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for The Court’s Ruling
reconsideration.

The petition has no merit.

A panel of prosecutors16 was tasked to review the records of the case. After
thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated
in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the
various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the informations. He claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering the prior
price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that findings of the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against him.
petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, Petitioner claims that heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
which indicated the false purchase price of ₱3,000.00 per square meter. The panel subordinates and that there should be grounds other than the mere signature
of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s continued appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge.
prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum, 17 the panel of prosecutors
recommended the following: Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner’s motion to
set aside his arraignment. Respondent court argues that petitioner’s motion for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the
following: time of his arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent court maintains that the
memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman- was the final decision of the Ombudsman.
Military be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, 22 sanction the immediate filing of an
2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
against Ramiscal and all the other accused for causing damage to the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as
government when it caused the payment of the amount of Php amended, provides:
10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots when the actual amount
should only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –

Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the

panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner. approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the
Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be,
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has
reconsideration19 of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. already been filed in court;

On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not
Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of
petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment 20 pending resolution of his the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause (Emphasis supplied)
against him.

If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the
arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration logically follows the filing of the information.
of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited
pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules,
petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge
April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioner’s that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to
motion to set aside his arraignment, thus: which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.23

33
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,24 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner’s defenses are evidentiary in
Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 nature and are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioner’s
days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of
before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus: probable cause against him is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military,
recommending the dropping of the cases against petitioner, has been effectively
overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the
accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is following:
pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED; 27
8493, provides: (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. – As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding
probable cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. 28 The Ombudsman is endowed
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular,
with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of
the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court
its power to pass upon criminal complaints. 29 As this Court succinctly stated in
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:30

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise
8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time
by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the
powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the
accused appears before the court.
exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint
filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the
116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under integrity of the public service.31
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,32 the Court explained the rationale behind this
policy, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped
confinement for such purpose. if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.33

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.25 Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.341avvphi1

Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion
by Section 7 of RA 8493. when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.35
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his
second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
against him. The Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it.
denied petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration, 26 impugning for the first time The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no termination of the case.36 There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on
longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again the same its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate
finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. dispatch.

34
We remind respondent to abide by this Court’s ruling in Republic v. March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the
Sandiganbayan,37 where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a avail.3
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section
7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for
violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) 5 before the Quezon City
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared
petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders and filed his counter-affidavit. 6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly
expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili
writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums
pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P.
proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied) Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out
that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on
executory. the checks.7 He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein
Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8
Costs against petitioner.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, 9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara
found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
SO ORDERED.
Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-
resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson to
co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the
pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was
denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP

Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to
the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, 11 ACP
Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of
vs. the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial,
CAWILI, respondents. and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998,
more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been
DECISION filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had
already prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief
State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under
TINGA, J.:
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative
should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor. 14 Finally,
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.15
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis
Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
reconsideration.2
Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
The facts, as culled from the records, follow. resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office
P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18
associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three
(3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July
signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18

35
2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information 20 charging petitioner with compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21 instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification
to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the
verification requirement.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a
motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had
already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on
violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original
DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition
provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as before the Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ
a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and resolution dated 9 August 2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as
punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ also
cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
Now, on the substantive aspects.
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and
not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the
violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the Court of Appeals assailing
tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is
the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court
applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that
of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation
certification of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco
April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy. 26
case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution,
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'
Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the
subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a
present case were clearly beyond his control.38
reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition
is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.28 There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave
special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent
error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition
provisions read:
before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to
require consideration.
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
29
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in
(a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission
provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time,
accordance with Act No. 3326. from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings
claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
The petition is meritorious. offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence,
under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)
First on the technical issues.
years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of
Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended the prescriptive period.
simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the
verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither
peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an prescription of the offense is halted.40
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct–the court may simply
order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict

36
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer
conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of
U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals
tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary
dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the
resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED
criminal proceedings against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our
and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the
information against the petitioner.
investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial
proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in
People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, No costs.
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, SO ORDERED.
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on
the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender, 48 and hence, the prescriptive period G.R. No. 166510 April 29, 2009
should be interrupted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN "KOKOY" ROMUALDEZ, and SANDIGANBAYAN,
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved Respondent.
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court
ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for RESOLUTION
preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court TINGA, J.:
ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, 52 another
special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in The relevant antecedent facts are stated in the Decision of the Court dated 23 July
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period. 20081 . We reproduce them, to wit:

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus: The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 The Information reads:
of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the
old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation
of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 or sometime
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial public officer being then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, while
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his
proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad
lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54 faith, cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner: accused
public officer being then the elected Provincial Governor of Leyte and without
abandoning said position, and using his influence with his brother-in-law, then
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. 55 A clear example Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China
would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America
1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is
appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte,
However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of
the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte in the amount of Two
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay Hundred Seventy-six Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 56/100 (US
was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active $276,911.56), US Currency or its equivalent amount of Five Million Eight
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50)
of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-eight Pesos and
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively 86/100 (P293,348.86) both Philippine Currencies, respectively, to the damage and
pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply prejudice of the Government in the aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics
or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of
his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely: (1) that the
signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with which the
and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had accused was charged; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been

37
extinguished by prescription. He argued that the acts imputed against him do not . . . . "Gross negligence" is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
constitute an offense because: (a) the cited provision of the law applies only to omitting to act in a willful or omitting to act in a willful or intentional manner
public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions, displaying a conscious indifference to consequences as far as other persons may be
and the act charged — receiving dual compensation — is absolutely irrelevant and affected. (Emphasis supplied)
unrelated to the act of granting licenses, permits, or other concessions; and (b)
there can be no damage and prejudice to the Government considering that he
The accused may have been inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding
actually rendered services for the dual positions of Provincial Governor of Leyte
of two concurrent positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him
and Ambassador to foreign countries.
criminally liable under the Information charged against him, given the elements of
the crime and the standards set by the Supreme Court quoted above. At most, any
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year liability arising from the holding of both positions by the accused may be
prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary administrative in nature.
investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the
period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division
xxx xxx xxx
of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He
argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense
because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the However, as discussed above, the Information does not sufficiently aver how the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void act of receiving dual compensation resulted to undue injury to the government so
pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG and Cruz, Jr. as to make the accused liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
[sic]. He likewise argued that the Revised Penal Code provision that prescription
does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to The Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument.
his case, as he was charged with an offense not covered by the Revised Penal
Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished under special laws
(Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that found in the The People moved to reconsider this Resolution, citing "reversible errors" that the
Revised Penal Code. Sandiganbayan committed in its ruling. Romualdez opposed the People's motion,
but also moved for a partial reconsideration of the Resolution's ruling on
prescription. The People opposed Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.
The People opposed the motion to quash on the argument that Romualdez is
misleading the court in asserting that Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 does not apply to
him when Section 2 (b) of the law states that corrupt practices may be committed Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan denied via the second assailed Resolution the
by public officers who include "elective and appointive officials and employees, People's motion for reconsideration under the following terms —
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government." On the issue of The Court held in its Resolution of June 22, 2004, and so maintains and sustains,
prescription, the People argued that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution that assuming the averments of the foregoing information are hypothetically
provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by admitted by the accused, it would not constitute the offense of violation of Section
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as the elements of (a) causing undue injury to any party,
shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel, and that prescription is a including the government, by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
matter of technicality to which no one has a vested right. Romualdez filed a Reply to such parties, and (b) that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident
to this Opposition. bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, are wanting.

The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution As it is, a perusal of the information shows that pertinently, accused is being
assailed in this petition. The Sandiganbayan stated: charged for: (a) having himself appointed as ambassador to various posts while
serving as governor of the Province of Leyte and (b) for collecting dual
We find that the allegation of damage and prejudice to the Government in the compensation for said positions. As to the first, the Court finds that accused cannot
amount of P5,806,709.50 representing the accused's compensation is without basis, be held criminally liable, whether or not he had himself appointed to the position
absent a showing that the accused did not actually render services for his two of the ambassador while concurrently holding the position of provincial governor,
concurrent positions as Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte and as because the act of appointment is something that can only be imputed to the
Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and appointing authority.
United States of America. The accused alleges in the subject Motion that he
actually rendered services to the government. To receive compensation for actual Even assuming that the appointee influenced the appointing authority, the
services rendered would not come within the ambit of improper or illegal use of appointee only makes a passive participation by entering into the appointment,
funds or properties of the government; nor would it constitute unjust enrichment unless it is alleged that he acted in conspiracy with his appointing authority, which,
tantamount to the damage and prejudice of the government. however, is not so claimed by the prosecution in the instant case. Thus, even if the
accused's appointment was contrary to law or the constitution, it is the appointing
Jurisprudence has established what "evident bad faith" and "gross negligence" authority that should be responsible therefor because it is the latter who is the doer
entail, thus: of the alleged wrongful act. In fact, under the rules on payment of compensation,
the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be
personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the appointment been
In order to be held guilty of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, the act of the lawful. As it is, the appointing authority herein, then President Ferdinand E.
accused that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or Marcos has been laid to rest, so it would be incongruous and illogical to hold his
with gross inexcusable negligence. But bad faith per se is not enough for one to be appointee, herein accused, liable for the appointment.
held liable under the law, the "bad faith" must be "evident".

Further, the allegation in the information that the accused collected compensation
xxx xxx xxx in the amounts of Five Million Eight Hundred Six Thousand Seven Hundred Nine
Pesos and 50/100 (P5,806,709.50) and Two Hundred Ninety-three Thousand Three
Hundred Forty Eight Pesos and 86/100 (P293,348.86) cannot sustain the theory of

38
the prosecution that the accused caused damage and prejudice to the government, the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary
in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was tantamount to giving investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The time span that elapsed
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party and to acting with from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the subject cases is
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Besides clearly beyond the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period provided under Section 11
receiving compensation is an incident of actual services rendered, hence it cannot of Rep. Act No. 3019.4
be construed as injury or damage to the government.
Admittedly, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) had
It likewise found no merit in Romualdez' motion for partial reconsideration.2 attempted to file similar criminal cases against private respondent on 22 February
1989. However, said cases were quashed based on prevailing jurisprudence that
informations filed by the PCGG and not the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of
of the Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the part of the PCGG
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in quashing the subject information.
to file the same. This made it necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman as the
Private respondent responded with a Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad
competent office to conduct the required preliminary investigation to enable the
Cautelam, wherein he argued that the proper remedy to an order granting a motion
filing of the present charges.
to quash a criminal information is by way of appeal under Rule 45 since such order
is a final order and not merely interlocutory. Private respondent likewise raised
before this Court his argument that the criminal action or liability had already been The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by the
extinguished by prescription, which argument was debunked by the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription
Sandiganbayan. period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 5 the
investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases,
absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft
The Court granted the petition in its 23 July 2008 Decision. While the Court
and corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary
acknowledged that the mode for review of a final ruling of the Sandiganbayan was
investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the first information
by way of a Rule 45 petition, it nonetheless allowed the Rule 65 petition of
is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-
petitioners, acceding that such remedy was available on the claim that grave abuse
year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule that the commencement
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction had been properly and
of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio
substantially alleged. The Decision then proceeded to determine that the quashal of
proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be
the information was indeed attended with grave abuse of discretion, the
accorded any legal effect by this Court.
information having sufficiently alleged the elements of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, the offense with which private respondent was charged. The Decision
concluded that the Sandiganbayan had committed grave abuse of discretion by The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive
premising its quashal of the information "on considerations that either not period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or
appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are evidentiary details not required to otherwise initiates its investigation.6 As such preliminary investigation was
be stated in an Information; are matters of defense that have no place in an commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed,
Information; or are statements amounting to rulings on the merits that a court the offense had already prescribed as of such time.
cannot issue before trial."
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, placing renewed focus on resurrected by mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be
his argument that the criminal charge against him had been extinguished on undertaken, and evidence had again to be adduced before a new information could
account of prescription. In a Minute Resolution dated 9 September 2008, the Court be filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. On the argument of prescription, the to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply
Resolution stated: when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.

We did not rule on the issue of prescription because the Sandiganbayan's ruling on The situation herein differs from that in the recent case of SEC v. Interport, 7 where
this point was not the subject of the People's petition for certiorari. While the the Court had occasion to reexamine the principles governing the prescription of
private respondent asserted in his Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam filed with us offenses punishable under special laws. Therein, the Court found that the
that prescription had set in, he did not file his own petition to assail this aspect of investigative proceedings conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
the Sandiganbayan ruling, he is deemed to have accepted it; he cannot now assert had tolled the prescriptive period for violations of the Revised Securities Act, even
that in the People's petitionthat sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan ruling if no subsequent criminal cases were instituted within the prescriptive period. The
on some other ground, we should pass upon the issue of prescription he raised in basic difference lies in the fact that no taint of invalidity had attached to the
his motion. authority of the SEC to conduct such investigation, whereas the preliminary
investigation conducted herein by the PCGG is simply void ab initio for want of
authority.
Hence this second motion for reconsideration, which reiterates the argument that
the charges against private respondent have already prescribed. The Court required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda on whether or not prescription Indeed the Court in 2006 had the opportunity to favorably rule on the same issue of
lies in favor of respondent. prescription on similar premises raised by the same respondent. In Romualdez v.
Marcelo8 , as in this case, the original preliminary investigation was conducted by
the PCGG, which then acted as complainant in the complaint filed with the
The matter of prescription is front and foremost before us. It has been raised that
Sandiganbayan. Given that it had been settled that such investigation and
following our ruling in Romualdez v. Marcelo, 3 the criminal charges against
information filed by the PCGG was null and void, the Court proceeded to rule that
private respondent have been extinguished by prescription. The Court agrees and
"[i]n contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the
accordingly grants the instant motion.
suspension of the prescriptive periods." As explained by Justice Ynares-Santiago:

Private respondent was charged with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed "on or about and during the period
which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or
from 1976 to February 1986". However, the subject criminal cases were filed with
office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla, this Court ruled that the filing of

39
the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation
had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the case of
Llenes v. Dicdican, this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public
officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.

In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the
PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periods.9
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 December 13, 2005
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ]
Clearly, following stare decisis, private respondent’s claim of prescription has
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, Petitioner,
merit, similar in premises as it is to the situation in Marcelo. Unfortunately, such
vs.
argument had not received serious consideration from this Court. The
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent.
Sandiganbayan had apparently rejected the claim of prescription, but instead
DECISION
quashed the information on a different ground relating to the elements of the
offense. It was on that point which the Court, in its 23 July 2008 Decision,
understandably focused. However, given the reality that the arguments raised after CARPIO MORALES, J.:
the promulgation of the Decision have highlighted the matter of prescription as
well as the precedent set in Marcelo, the earlier quashal of the information is, On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial
ultimately, the correct result still. Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771
TB, "People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al.," for violation of Section 3 of
It would be specious to fault private respondent for failing to challenge the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the
Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement that prescription had not arisen in his favor. The testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B.
Sandiganbayan quashed the information against respondent, the very same relief he Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
had sought as he invoked the prescription argument. Why would the private
respondent challenge such ruling favorable to him on motion for reconsideration or State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical
in a separate petition before a higher court? Imagine, for example, that the People treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during
did not anymore challenge the Sandiganbayan rulings anymore. The dissent the proceedings on the said dates.
implies that respondent in that instance should nonetheless appeal the
Sandiganbayan’s rulings because it ruled differently on the issue of prescription.
No lawyer would conceivably give such advise to his client. Had respondent On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October
indeed challenged the Sandiganbayan’s ruling on that point, what enforceable relief 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two
could he have obtained other than that already granted by the Anti-Graft Court? defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the
proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.

Our 2004 ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan10 cannot be cited against the

position of private respondent’s. The Sandiganbayan in that case denied the Motion State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004
to Quash filed based on prescription, and so it was incumbent on petitioner therein before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20,
to file an appropriate remedial action to reverse that ruling and cause the quashal of 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Ayco’s act of allowing the defense to
the information. Herein, even as the Sandiganbayan disagreed with the prescription present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed
argument, it nonetheless granted the Motion to Quash, and it would be ridiculous that he should not be "coerced" to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and
for the petitioner to object to such action. that their testimonies be stricken off the record.

Notably, private respondent had already raised the issue of prescription in the very By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the
first responsive pleading he filed before the Court – the Motion to Dismiss with Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-
Comment Ad Cautelam11 dated 14 April 2005. The claim that private respondent examine the two defense witnesses.
should be deemed as having accepted the Sandiganbayan’s ruling on prescription
would have been on firmer ground had private respondent remained silent on that Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor
point at the first opportunity he had before the Court. Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for "Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct."
The fact that prescription lies in favor of private respondent posed an additional
burden on the petitioner, which had opted to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the
instead of the normal recourse to a Rule 45. Prescription would have been complaint "to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical
considered in favor of private respondent whether this matter was raised before us handling of the prosecution" of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the
in a Rule 45 or a Rule 65 petition. Yet the bar for petitioner is markedly higher request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the
under Rule 65 than under Rule 45, and its option to resort to Rule 65 instead in the case by the Secretary of Justice.
end appears needlessly burdensome for its part, a burden not helped by the fact that
prescription avails in favor of private respondent.
And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the
prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting it for
WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The hearing.
Decision dated 23 July 2008 and the Resolution dated 9 September 2008 in the
instant case are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition is HEREBY
DISMISSED. No pronouncements as to costs. On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on
November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same as "misleading" and "highly
questionable," complainant’s having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine

40
Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only Respondent’s lament about complainant’s failure to inform the court of his
on said date. inability to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for
postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his
Orders allowing the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be
On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence,
mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules.
respondent justifies the same on complainant’s failure to formally offer the
evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the
purpose. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a
fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the
prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense
witnesses but he refused to do so. Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B.
Pinote, respondent is advised that the same should be lodged before the Secretary
of Justice.
By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with "Contempt of
Court" and "Grave Misconduct" and/or "Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the
Bar and as an Officer of the Court." SO ORDERED.

On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent G.R. No. 190487 April 13, 2011
to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner,
therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with vs.
more severely. PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL WHELAN, TEODORO B. LINGAN, ATTY.
OFELIA B. CAJIGAL and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Respondents.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
DECISION
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of CARPIO MORALES, J.:
the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of 255, 870,000
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case
pieces of finished bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from June
subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal
2005 to January 2007. MSPI facilitated the release of the shipment from the Clark
action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of
Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was brought, to the Philippine Charity
the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for its lotto operations in Luzon. MSPI did not pay
or otherwise withdrawn.
duties or taxes, however, prompting the Bureau of Customs (petitioner) to file,
under its Run After The Smugglers (RATS) Program, a criminal complaint before
x x x (Underscoring supplied) the Department of Justice against herein respondents MSPI Chairman Peter
Sherman, Managing Director Michael Whelan, Country Manager Atty. Ofelia B.
Cajigal and Finance Manager and Corporate Secretary Teodoro B. Lingan, along
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control
with Erick B. Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and Eugenio Pasco, licensed customs
and direction of the public prosecutor.
broker who acted as agents of MSPI, for violation of Section 3601 1 vis-à-vis
Sections 2530 (f) and (l) 52 and 101 (f)3 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there Philippines, as amended and Republic Act No. 7916.4
are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to
State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano, by Resolution of March 25, 2008, 5 found
prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the
probable cause against respondents and accordingly recommended the filing of
private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the
Information against them.
trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.
Respondents filed a petition for review6 before the Secretary of Justice during the
pendency of which the Information was filed on April 11, 2009 before the Court of
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole
Tax Appeals (CTA),7 the accusatory portion of which reads:
and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining
witness.1 It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of
criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its That on or about June 2005 to December 2007, in Manila City, and within the
interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.2 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, in conspiracy with
one another, made forty (40) unlawful importations of 255, 870 pieces of finished
printed bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from Australia
Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the
valued at approximately One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred
absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the
Eighty US Dollars & Fourteen Cents (US$1,240,880.14), and caused the removal
purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
of said imported articles from the Clark Special Economic Zone and delivery
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
thereof to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Offices without payment of its
corresponding duties and taxes estimated at around Fifteen Million Nine Hundred
Respondent’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Eleven Pesos and Eighty Three Cents
the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the (Php15,917,611.83) in violation of Section 3601 in relation to Sections 2530 and
accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

41
101 paragraph (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines to the damage complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a witness, both in the criminal and
and prejudice of herein complainant. civil aspect of the case.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8 Parenthetically, petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in instituting the present petition, which contravenes established doctrine 20
that "the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
Only respondents Cajigal and Lingan were served warrants of arrest following
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
which they posted cash bail bonds.
investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers."21

By Resolution of March 20, 2009,9 the Secretary of Justice reversed the State
IN FINE, as petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA
Prosecutor’s Resolution and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the
Resolution did not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the
Information.
control of the prosecution of the case belongs, the present petition fails.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of April

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
29, 2009,10 it elevated the case by certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA GR SP No. 10-9431.11
SO ORDERED.
In the meantime, Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to
Withdraw Information with Leave of Court12 to which petitioner filed an G.R. No. 188197 August 3, 2010
Opposition.13 Respondents, on their part, moved for the dismissal of the
Information.
LEONARDO U. FLORES, Petitioner,
vs.
The CTA, by the herein assailed Resolution of September 3, 2009, 14 granted the HON. RAUL S. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, and
withdrawal of, and accordingly dismissed the Information. EUGENE LIM, Respondents.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on September 22, 2009 15 was Noted DECISION
Without Action by the CTA by Resolution of October 14, 2009, viz:
NACHURA, J.:
Considering that an Entry of Judgment was already issued in this case on
September 23, 2009, no Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
September 3, 2009 having been filed by State Prosecutor Rohairah Lao-Tamano of
assailing the Decision2 dated March 6, 2008 and the Resolution 3 dated May 28,
the Department of Justice; the "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CEB SP No. 02726.
3 September 2009" filed on September 22, 2009 by Atty. Christopher F.C. Bolastig
of the Bureau of Customs is NOTED, without action.
The antecedent facts and proceedings follow:
16
SO ORDERED. (emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
On June 24, 2004, petitioner Leonardo U. Flores (Flores) filed a complaint-
17
affidavit4 against private respondent Eugene Lim (Lim) for estafa before the City
Hence, petitioner’s present petition for certiorari.
Prosecutor of Cebu City, docketed as I.S. No. 04-5228-F.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Briefly, the complaint alleged that, during the pre-incorporation stage of
Enviroboard Manufacturing, Inc. (EMI) in October 1996, Lim tricked Flores and
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the other EMI’s incorporators (Flores, et al.) to purchase two compact processing
the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are equipments, CP15 and CP14, from Compak System Limited, Inc. (Compak) in
faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute Great Britain for the manufacture of "Fiber Boards." Unknown to Flores, Lim was
violators.181avvphi1 connected with Bendez International Corporation (Bendez), the exclusive
distributor of Compak. Flores executed an agreement to purchase only a CP15.
After the execution of the sales contract and due to some delay in the delivery of
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under
the CP15, Lim, through insidious words and deliberate bad faith, was able to
the direction and control of public prosecutors.19 In the prosecution of special laws,
convince Flores, et al. to purchase instead an unused but later model of the
the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special
compact processing equipment, CP14, for £1,466,000.00 or ₱60,106,000.00, with
prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor.
the assurance that Lim could effect the cancellation of the purchase for the CP15.
The designation does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor having
Flores, et al. agreed and purchased the CP14, using their funds allotted for the
control and supervision over the case.
CP15. Later, however, Lim told them that the purchase of the CP15 could not be
cancelled. Out of fear of lawsuits and acting upon the advice of Lim, Flores, et al.
As stated in the above-quoted ratio of the October 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA, raised the necessary funds through bank loans to pay for the CP15. Then in 2001,
it noted without action petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, entry of judgment Flores, et al. discovered the distributorship agreement between Bendez and
having been made as no Motion for Execution was filed by the State Prosecutor. Compak. Upon further investigation, they learned that the purchase price of the
CP14 was only £908,140.00 or ₱38,174,618.16 (at the conversion of ₱41.80) per
By merely noting without action petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the CTA the Letter of Credit (LC) No. 263-C-6-00073 5, Proforma Invoice No. CP627A
did not gravely abuse its discretion. For, as stated earlier, a public prosecutor has dated June 18, 19966 and the Ocean Bill of Lading7 relative to these documents.
control and supervision over the cases. The participation in the case of a private

42
Lim filed his counter-affidavit 8 denying all the accusations against him. Among Seeking to nullify the March 22, 2007 Resolution, Flores filed a petition for
others, he insisted that the CP14 was actually priced at ₱60,106,000.00, and LC certiorari30 with the Court of Appeals on May 22, 2007.
No. 263-C-6-00073 represented only part of the payment for the purchase price. To
support his refutations, he submitted a Contract Payment Receipt 9 dated August 20,
Meanwhile, on June 20, 2007, the MTCC issued its Resolution 31 denying the
1996 showing that the full price of a CP14, in reference to Proforma Invoice No.
Motion to Withdraw Information. Ratiocinating on the denial of the motion, it
CP627B dated March 4, 1996, was actually £1,466,000.00 or ₱60,106,000.00. He
declared—
also submitted documents showing that a CP10, an older model of the CP14 was
already priced at £1,031,585.00.10
The Court notes the flip-flopping of the Public Prosecutors, notably the Secretary
of Justice in the instant case. On January 16, 2005, the Investigating Prosecutor
After further exchange of pleadings and the case was submitted for resolution, the
dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. After his Motion for Reconsideration
City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution 11 dated January 16, 2005
was denied, the private complainant appealed to the Secretary of Justice who,
dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause. The motion for
however, dismissed the same on a technicality. Private complainant filed a Motion
reconsideration12 filed by Flores was denied in a Resolution13 dated June 2, 2005.
for Reconsideration which the Secretary of Justice granted on Mary 31, 2006. In
that Resolution, the City Prosecutor of Cebu was directed to file within ten (10)
On July 12, 2005, Flores filed a petition for review 14 with the Secretary of Justice days from receipt, an Information charging Accused with the crime of "Other
questioning the January 16, 2005 and the June 2, 2005 Resolutions. Lim opposed Deceits" under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Now the same Secretary of
this petition.15 Justice has reversed himself again and, through his subordinates, is asking the
Court to withdraw the Information.
In a Resolution16 dated March 2, 2006, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the
petition on the ground that there was no showing of any reversible error on the part The Court has conformably to the doctrine laid down in Crespo and other cases
of the handling prosecutors, and for Flores’ failure to append several documents to made its own independent assessment of the evidence thus far submitted and is
his petition. convinced that there exists probable cause to hold accused to trial where the parties
can better ventilate their respective claims and defense[s].32 (Emphasis supplied.)
Flores moved for a reconsideration of this Resolution. 17 Lim opposed,18 to which
Flores replied.19 On June 29, 2007, Flores filed a Manifestation33 with the Court of Appeals,
attaching the June 20, 2007 Resolution of the MTCC.
In his Resolution 20 dated May 31, 2006, the Secretary of Justice reconsidered,
disposing thus— Meanwhile, Lim, on July 20, 2007, moved to reconsider the June 20, 2007 MTCC
Resolution.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Cebu City is hereby directed to file an On August 20, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court
information for other deceits defined and penalized under Article 318 of the of Appeals its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment. 35 The OSG’s position
Revised Penal Code before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, and to was that the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. the complaint and directing the withdrawal of the Information. Lim filed his
Comment36 on September 28, 2007. Flores filed his Reply 37 to Lim’s Comment on
November 8, 2007.
SO ORDERED.21

In the meantime, on November 26, 2007, the MTCC issued an Order 38 holding in
Pursuant to the said directive, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the Municipal
abeyance the proceedings pending before it, including the resolution of Lim’s
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City an Information 22 against Lim for the
motion for reconsideration of the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information. It
crime of Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The case was
held—
docketed as Criminal Case No. 135467-R and was raffled to Branch 4.

In a manner of speaking, the subject incident is straddling on two horses. The

Lim thus filed a motion for reconsideration 23 of the May 31, 2006 Resolution.
ardent desire of the private complainant to prosecute the accused is evident when
Flores opposed.24 Lim replied.25Flores filed a rejoinder.26
he filed the petition before the Hon. Court of Appeals to question the Resolution of
the Hon. Secretary of Justice. There is nothing wrong to be zealous in prosecuting
On March 22, 2007, the Secretary of Justice reconsidered anew and issued another an accused except that his chosen approach coupled with the fact that this court
Resolution,27 disposing as follows— chose to disregard the subject Resolution and insists on its jurisdiction over the
case result in a procedural disorder or confusion. This is taking into account the
WHEREFORE, finding respondent’s motion for reconsideration to be meritorious, unquestionable primacy of the Hon. Court of Appeals over this court by virtue of
the Resolution dated May 31, 2006 is REVERSED. The instant petition for review which any action or resolution by this court on the issue can be negated or voided
is hereby DISMISSED WITH FINALITY. by the former. By reason of such primacy, this court ought to defer to the Hon.
Court of Appeals and observe judicial courtesy to a superior court.

Consequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor is hereby directed to withdraw the
information, if any had been filed in Court, and report the action taken thereon The outcome of the pending case before the Hon. Court of Appeals questioning the
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. resolution and order of the Hon. Secretary of Justice will eventually determine the
merit of the resolution of this court in denying the motion to withdraw filed by the
prosecution acting on the order of the Hon. Secretary of Justice.
SO ORDERED.28

Hypothetically, if the Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain the Hon. Secretary of
Accordingly, on May 3, 2007, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed with the MTCC a Justice, how can this court take a posture different from that of a superior court and
Motion to Withdraw Information.29 insist[s] on hearing this case. Conversely, if the Hon. Court of Appeals will sustain

43
the private complainant, it will, in effect, sustain the resolution of this court discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
denying the motion to withdraw Information, and render the motion for prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot
reconsideration of the public prosecution moot and academic. In such a case, the impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
prosecution of the accused will have to proceed. to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should
be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
If the court will proceed with this case but the Hon. Secretary of Justice will be
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
eventually upheld by the Hon. Court of Appeals, all the proceeding[s] already had
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
in this court would become useless and wasted, including the time and efforts of all
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
parties concerned.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Furthermore, to continue with the proceedings in this case while a case that matters
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
is pending in the Hon. Court of Appeals will constitute discourtesy and disrespect
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
to a superior court. That there is no injunction or restraint on this court to proceed
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
with this case is not an issue since in the first place it was the private complainant
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for
and not the public prosecutor or the accused who initiated the petition for certiorari
the determination of the Court.41
in the Hon. Court of Appeals. In fact, judicial courtesy and respect dictate that the
private complainant ought to initiate the suspension of the proceedings of the case
in this court while the petition is pending, or if he wants the proceedings herein to In this case, on a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice found probable cause
continue, then he should have initiated the withdrawal or termination of the case he for Other Deceits against Lim; thus, the proper Information was filed in Court
filed in the Hon. Court of Appeals.39 pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice. Upon filing of the Information,
the MTCC acquired jurisdiction over the case.
On March 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated the questioned Decision
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the
issuing his March 22, 2007 Resolution. Secretary of Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this course of action
inasmuch as there is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of Justice from
reviewing resolutions of his subordinates in an appeal or petition for review in
Flores filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 8, 2008 Decision. The Court
criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far
of Appeals denied it in its Resolution dated May 28, 2009. Hence, this petition
as practicable, he should not take cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or
anchored on the following issues:
information is already filed in court.42

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION OF THE

This is also true with respect to a motion for reconsideration before the Secretary
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT LIM’S
of Justice. Review, whether on appeal or on motion for reconsideration, as an act of
MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION AND FINDING
supervision and control by the Secretary of Justice over the prosecutors, finds basis
PROBABLE CAUSE, RENDERED THE DISPOSITION OF THE
in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes,
PETITION BEFORE [THE] COURT OF APPEALS ACADEMIC?
abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or
by an administrative agency may be corrected by higher administrative authorities,
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are
COULD RULE IN A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed. 43 In any case, the grant of a motion to
VALIDITY, WEIGHT, ADMISSIBILITY, AND MERITS OF dismiss or a motion to withdraw the information, which the prosecution may file
PARTIES’ DEFENSES, EVIDENCE, AND ACCUSATION? after the Secretary of Justice reverses the finding of probable cause, is subject to
the discretion of the court.44
In gist, Flores asserts in his petition that the June 20, 2007 Resolution of the
MTCC denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by the prosecution and finding In this case, the Secretary of Justice, reversed himself in his March 22, 2007
probable cause to hold Lim for trial for the crime of Other Deceits under Article Resolution, and directed the withdrawal of the Information against Lim. In
318 of the Revised Penal Code rendered his petition for certiorari before the Court compliance with this directive, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
of Appeals moot and academic. He says that this is pursuant to the ruling in the Information on May 3, 2007. Flores, on the other hand, filed on May 22, 2007 a
landmark case of Crespo v. Mogul 40 that once a complaint or information is filed in petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail the March 22, 2007
court, any disposition of the case resulting either in the conviction or acquittal of Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Then, on June 20, 2007, the MTCC denied
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court, who is the best and sole judge the Motion to Withdraw Information on the ground that, based on its own
on what action to take in the case before it. assessment, there exists probable cause to hold Lim for trial for the crime of Other
Deceits. In view of the June 20, 2007 MTCC Resolution, Flores manifested before
Flores further argues that the Secretary of Justice overstepped his jurisdiction in the the Court of Appeals this disposition, attaching a copy of the said Resolution to his
determination of probable cause when he ruled during the preliminary investigation pleading. Meanwhile, Lim filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTCC.
on the validity, weight, admissibility and merits of the parties’ evidence. According Cognizant of the pending petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals and Lim’s
to him, these matters are better ventilated before the court during the trial proper. motion for reconsideration of the June 20, 2007 Resolution, the MTCC suspended
the proceedings before it, and deferred the arraignment of Lim until the resolution
of Flores’ certiorari petition of the Court of Appeals.
Our Ruling

We wish to point out that, notwithstanding the pendency of the Information before
With respect to the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. Indeed, as Crespo the MTCC, especially considering the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of his
declared— May 31, 2006 Resolution, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, anchored on the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as lack of jurisdiction on the part of Secretary of Justice, was an available remedy to
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound Flores as an aggrieved party.451avvphi1

44
In the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals is not being asked to cause the its disposition, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction of the accused, rests on the sound
dismissal of the case in the trial court, but only to resolve the issue of whether the discretion of the Court. And although the fiscal retains direction and control of the
Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in either affirming or prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot
reversing the finding of probable cause against the accused. But still the rule stands impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge of what
—the decision whether to dismiss the case or not rests on the sound discretion of to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
the trial court where the Information was filed.46As jurisdiction was already jurisdiction and competence. Thus, the court may deny or grant the motion to
acquired by the MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost despite a resolution by the withdraw an Information, not out of subservience to the (Special) Prosecutor, but
Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case, in faithful exercise of judicial discretion and prerogative. For these very same
notwithstanding the deferment or suspension of the arraignment of the accused and reasons, we must now refrain from resolving the issues raised by petitioners PPC
further proceedings, and not even if the Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the and APC, considering that the information against respondents AUDI AG officers
higher courts.47 had already been filed before the RTC; the RTC acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 4824-A; and it has already rendered judgment dismissing
the charges against respondents AUDI AG officers.
Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts, since it
is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may This is not to say that we are already affirming the 2 July 2008 Order of the RTC
either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. dismissing Criminal Case No. 4824-A. To the contrary, we are much aware that
Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication petitioners PPC and APC’s Motion for Reconsideration of the said order of
of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 48 Thus, the dismissal is still pending resolution by the trial court. By refusing to go into the
trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on merits of the instant Petition, we are only respecting the exclusive jurisdiction of
the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the the RTC over Criminal Case No. 4824-A and avoiding any pronouncement on our
Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the part which would preempt its independent assessment of the case. Irrefragably, a
latter to produce before it; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the determination by us that probable cause against respondents AUDI AG officers
accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. 49 The trial court does or does not exist would strongly influence, if not directly affect, the resolution
should make its assessment separately and independently of the evaluation of the by the RTC of the matter still pending before it. In any case, the party that would
prosecution or of the Secretary of Justice. This assessment should be embodied in feel aggrieved by the final judgment or order of the lower court in Criminal Case
the written order disposing of the motion to dismiss or the motion to withdraw the No. 4824-A has the option of elevating the same to the higher courts. And if only
information.50 for the orderly administration of justice, the proceeding in Criminal Case No.
4824-A, that is, the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners PPC and APC, should be allowed to continue and take its course.
This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did so. In view of the
above disquisitions, and while the disposition of the issue of whether or not the Under the circumstances, the denial of the present Petition is clearly warranted for
Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable being moot. Where a declaration on an issue would have no practical use or value,
cause against Lim may be persuasive, the MTCC is not bound to dismiss the case this Court will refrain from expressing its opinion in a case where no practical
or to withdraw the Information. For these reasons, the petition for certiorari before relief may be granted in view of a supervening event. Thus, it is unnecessary to
the Court of Appeals has effectively become moot and academic upon the issuance indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a judgment
by the MTCC of its June 20, 2007 Resolution. The March 6, 2008 Decision and the thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
May 28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Secretary of Justice enforced.52
will really make no difference anymore.
Anent the second issue, suffice it to state that these matters are best addressed to
As held in Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn, 51 pursuant to our ruling in the MTCC, where they will be thoroughly ventilated and threshed out in the
Crespo and in the subsequent related cases, this Court held— resolution of Lim’s motion for reconsideration of the MTCC June 20, 2007
Resolution, and eventually, if the trial court denies the motion, during the trial on
the merits before it.
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction in his determination of the
existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition for certiorari before the
establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is declared MOOT AND
and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of ACADEMIC. Consequently, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 2008 and the
discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a Resolution dated May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in the said case are SET
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. ASIDE. No costs.
Grave abuse of discretion is not enough, it must amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case,
SO ORDERED.
but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority.

Republic of the Philippines

There is no escaping the fact that resolving the issue of whether the Secretary of
SUPREME COURT
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Manila
jurisdiction would necessarily entail a review of his finding of lack of probable
cause against the respondents AUDI AG officers.
EN BANC
If we should sustain the DOJ Secretary in maintaining that no probable cause exists
to hold respondents AUDI AG officers liable to stand trial for the crime they were G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990
charged with, our ruling would actually serve no practical or useful purpose, since
the RTC had already made such a judicial determination, on the basis of which it YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,
dismissed Criminal Case No. 4824-A. Lest it be forgotten, the fact that the vs.
Information against respondents AUDI AG officers had already been filed in court, COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as

45
Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO, A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others.
respondents. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any
of said civil actions separately waives the others.
Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present
David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.
its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for

GANCAYCO, J.: the same act or omission of the accused.

Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
was no reservation to file a separate civil action? This is the issue in this petition. against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a
Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee,
Larry Salvado. In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual,
is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight thereof in court for trial. (1a)
physical injuries in an information that was filed on January 6, 1983 with the then
City Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 027184. On October 19,
1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted
David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions
Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317. which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present case. 2

In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil
defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the
and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they civil action prior to the criminal action.
nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case. Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed
independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
expressly made. reservation.

In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the
petition.1 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied on right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil
January 30, 1990. Hence this petition. action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed
in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal
The petition is devoid of merit. action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that
in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this
case is a quasi delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
civil action prior to the criminal action. existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-
the same act or omission of the accused. delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.

46
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal
reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 against respondent Nicdao.
prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First Municipal Circuit
criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan, which, except
far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that as to the amounts and check numbers, uniformly read as follows:
should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.
The undersigned accuses Clarita S. Nicdao of a VIOLATION OF BATAS
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from PAMBANSA BILANG 22, committed as follows:
recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.
That on or about October 06, 1997, at Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within
Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there
separate civil action brought before it. willfully and unlawfully make or draw and issue Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank,
Inc. Check No. [002524] dated October 06, 1997 in the amount of
[₱20,000,000.00] in payment of her obligation with complainant Samson T.Y.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of
Ching, the said accused knowing fully well that at the time she issued the said
Appeals dated November 3, 1989 and its resolution dated January 30, 1990 are
check she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
hereby AFFIRMED.
payment in full of the said check upon presentment, which check when presented
for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was dishonored by the
SO ORDERED. drawee bank for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient funds and
notwithstanding receipt of notice of such dishonor the said accused failed and
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, refused and still fails and refuses to pay the value of the said check in the amount
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. of [P20,000,000.00] or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for the payment
in full of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving the said notice, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Samson T.Y. Ching in the aforementioned
Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave. amount of [P20,000,000.00], Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Footnotes Dinalupihan, Bataan, October 21, 1997.

1 Justice Luis L. Victor was the ponente concurred in by (Sgd.) SAMSON T.Y. CHING
Justices Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Felipe B. Kalalo.
Complainant
2 People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946).
The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9433 up to 9443 involving the
Republic of the Philippines following details:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Check No. Amount Date Private Compla

THIRD DIVISION 002524

₱ 20,000,000 Oct. 6, 1997 Samson T.Y. C
href="#fnt2" 2
G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007 008856
150,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
href="#fnt3" 3
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner,
012142
vs. 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
href="#fnt4" 4
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
004531
50,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
DECISION href="#fnt5" 5

002254
100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
CALLEJO, SR., J.: href="#fnt6" 6

008875
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Samson Ching of the 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
href="#fnt7" 7
Decision1 dated November 22, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23055. The assailed decision acquitted respondent Clarita Nicdao of eleven 008936
50,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
(11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22, otherwise known as href="#fnt8" 8
"The Bouncing Checks Law." The instant petition pertains and is limited to the
civil aspect of the case as it submits that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s 002273
50,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
acquittal, she should be held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the href="#fnt9" 9
dishonored checks in the aggregate sum of ₱20,950,000.00. 008948 150,000 Oct. 6, 1997 "
href="#fnt10"
Factual and Procedural Antecedents

47
 10 date, October 6, 1997, on those checks when respondent Nicdao refused to pay
him.
008935
href="#fnt11" 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " With respect to the ₱20,000,000.00 check (Check No. 002524), petitioner Ching
11 explained that he wrote the date and amount thereon when, upon his estimation, the
010377 money that he regularly lent to respondent Nicdao beginning October 1995 reached
href="#fnt12" 100,000 Oct. 6, 1997 " the said sum. He likewise intimated that prior to 1995, they had another transaction
12 amounting to ₱1,200,000.00 and, as security therefor, respondent Nicdao similarly
issued in his favor checks in varying amounts of ₱100,000.00 and ₱50,000.00.
When the said amount was fully paid, petitioner Ching returned the checks to
At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for violation respondent Nicdao.
of BP 22, were filed against respondent Nicdao by Emma Nuguid, said to be the
common law spouse of petitioner Ching. Allegedly fourteen (14) checks, Petitioner Ching maintained that the eleven (11) checks subject of Criminal Cases
amounting to ₱1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid but Nos. 9433-9443 pertained to respondent Nicdao’s loan transactions with him
were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were filed with the beginning October 1995. He also mentioned an instance when respondent Nicdao’s
same MCTC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9458 up to 9471. husband and daughter approached him at a casino to borrow money from him. He
lent them ₱300,000.00. According to petitioner Ching, since this amount was also
At her arraignment, respondent Nicdao entered the plea of "not guilty" to all the unpaid, he included it in the other amounts that respondent Nicdao owed to him
charges. A joint trial was then conducted for Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and which totaled ₱20,000,000.00 and wrote the said amount on one of respondent
9458-9471. Nicdao’s blank checks that she delivered to him.

For the prosecution in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443, petitioner Ching and Petitioner Ching explained that from October 1995 up to 1997, he regularly
Imelda Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were delivered money to respondent Nicdao, in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 until the
presented to prove the charges against respondent Nicdao. On direct-examination, 13 total amount reached ₱20,000,000.00. He did not ask respondent Nicdao to
petitioner Ching preliminarily identified each of the eleven (11) Hermosa Savings acknowledge receiving these amounts. Petitioner Ching claimed that he was
& Loan Bank (HSLB) checks that were allegedly issued to him by respondent confident that he would be paid by respondent Nicdao because he had in his
Nicdao amounting to ₱20,950,000.00. He identified the signatures appearing on possession her blank checks. On the other hand, the latter allegedly had no cause to
the checks as those of respondent Nicdao. He recognized her signatures because fear that he would fill up the checks with just any amount because they had trust
respondent Nicdao allegedly signed the checks in his presence. When petitioner and confidence in each other. When asked to produce the piece of paper on which
Ching presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank, he allegedly wrote the amounts that he lent to respondent Nicdao, petitioner Ching
HSLB, for being "DAIF" or "drawn against insufficient funds." could not present it; he reasoned that it was not with him at that time.

Petitioner Ching averred that the checks were issued to him by respondent Nicdao It was also averred by petitioner Ching that respondent Nicdao confided to him that
as security for the loans that she obtained from him. Their transaction began she told her daughter Janette, who was married to a foreigner, that her debt to him
sometime in October 1995 when respondent Nicdao, proprietor/manager of was only between ₱3,000,000.00 and ₱5,000,000.00. Petitioner Ching claimed that
Vignette Superstore, together with her husband, approached him to borrow money he offered to accompany respondent Nicdao to her daughter in order that they
in order for them to settle their financial obligations. They agreed that respondent could apprise her of the amount that she owed him. Respondent Nicdao refused for
Nicdao would leave the checks undated and that she would pay the loans within fear that it would cause disharmony in the family. She assured petitioner Ching,
one year. However, when petitioner Ching went to see her after the lapse of one however, that he would be paid by her daughter.
year to ask for payment, respondent Nicdao allegedly said that she had no cash.
Petitioner Ching reiterated that after the lapse of one (1) year from the time
Petitioner Ching claimed that he went back to respondent Nicdao several times respondent Nicdao issued the checks to him, he went to her several times to collect
more but every time, she would tell him that she had no money. Then in September payment. In all these instances, she said that she had no cash. Finally, in September
1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for being insistent and 1997, respondent Nicdao allegedly went to his house and told him that Janette was
challenged him about seeing each other in court. Because of respondent Nicdao's only willing to pay him between ₱3,000,000.00 and ₱5,000,000.00 because, as far
alleged refusal to pay her obligations, on October 6, 1997, petitioner Ching as her daughter was concerned, that was the only amount borrowed from petitioner
deposited the checks that she issued to him. As he earlier stated, the checks were Ching. On hearing this, petitioner Ching angrily told respondent Nicdao that she
dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF." Shortly thereafter, petitioner Ching, should not have allowed her debt to reach ₱20,000,000.00 knowing that she would
together with Emma Nuguid, wrote a demand letter to respondent Nicdao which, not be able to pay the full amount.
however, went unheeded. Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal
complaints against the latter. Petitioner Ching identified the demand letter that he and Nuguid sent to respondent
Nicdao. He explained that he no longer informed her about depositing her checks
On cross-examination,14 petitioner Ching claimed that he had been a salesman of on his account because she already made that statement about seeing him in court.
the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing for almost ten (10) years already. Again, he admitted writing the date, October 6, 1997, on all these checks.
As such, he delivered the goods and had a warehouse. He received salary and
commissions. He could not, however, state his exact gross income. According to Another witness presented by the prosecution was Imelda Yandoc, an employee of
him, it increased every year because of his business. He asserted that aside from HSLB. On direct-examination,15she testified that she worked as a checking account
being a salesman, he was also in the business of extending loans to other people at bookkeeper/teller of the bank. As such, she received the checks that were drawn
an interest, which varied depending on the person he was dealing with. against the bank and verified if they were funded. On October 6, 1997, she
received several checks issued by respondent Nicdao. She knew respondent Nicdao
Petitioner Ching confirmed the truthfulness of the allegations contained in the because the latter maintained a savings and checking account with them. Yandoc
eleven (11) Informations that he filed against respondent Nicdao. He reiterated identified the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and affirmed that
that, upon their agreement, the checks were all signed by respondent Nicdao but stamped at the back of each was the annotation "DAIF". Further, per the bank’s
she left them undated. Petitioner Ching admitted that he was the one who wrote the records, as of October 8, 1997, only a balance of ₱300.00 was left in respondent

48
Nicdao’s checking account and ₱645.83 in her savings account. On even date, her that time, she did not let it bother her thinking that it would eventually surface
account with the bank was considered inactive. when presented to the bank.

On cross-examination,16 Yandoc stated anew that respondent Nicdao’s checks Respondent Nicdao could not explain how the said check came into petitioner
bounced on October 7, 1997 for being "DAIF" and her account was closed the Ching’s possession. She explained that she kept her checks in an ordinary cash box
following day, on October 8, 1997. She informed the trial court that there were together with a stapler and the cigarette wrappers that contained Nuguid’s
actually twenty-five (25) checks of respondent Nicdao that were dishonored at computations. Her saleslady had access to this box. Respondent Nicdao averred
about the same time. The eleven (11) checks were purportedly issued in favor of that it was Nuguid who offered to give her a loan as she would allegedly need
petitioner Ching while the other fourteen (14) were purportedly issued in favor of money to manage Vignette Superstore. Nuguid used to run the said store before
Nuguid. Yandoc explained that respondent Nicdao or her employee would usually respondent Nicdao’s daughter bought it from Nuguid’s family, its previous owner.
call the bank to inquire if there was an incoming check to be funded. According to respondent Nicdao, it was Nuguid who regularly delivered the cash to
respondent Nicdao or, if she was not at the grocery store, to her saleslady.
Respondent Nicdao denied any knowledge that the money loaned to her by Nuguid
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of respondent Nicdao, Melanie
belonged to petitioner Ching.
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. On direct-examination, 17 respondent Nicdao stated
that she only dealt with Nuguid. She vehemently denied the allegation that she had
borrowed money from both petitioner Ching and Nuguid in the total amount of At the continuation of her direct-examination, 19 respondent Nicdao said that she
₱22,950,000.00. Respondent Nicdao admitted, however, that she had obtained a never dealt with petitioner Ching because it was Nuguid who went to the grocery
loan from Nuguid but only for ₱2,100,000.00 and the same was already fully paid. store everyday to collect the interest payments. When shown the ₱20,000,000.00
As proof of such payment, she presented a Planters Bank demand draft dated check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the signature thereon was hers but she
August 13, 1996 in the amount of ₱1,200,000.00. The annotation at the back of the denied issuing it as a blank check to petitioner Ching. On the other hand, with
said demand draft showed that it was endorsed and negotiated to the account of respect to the other ten (10) checks, she also admitted that the signatures thereon
petitioner Ching. were hers and that the amounts thereon were written by either Josie Nicdao or
Melanie Tolentino, her employees whom she authorized to do so. With respect to
the payee, it was purposely left blank allegedly upon instruction of Nuguid who
In addition, respondent Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette
said that she would use the checks to pay someone else.
wrappers18 at the back of which appeared computations. She explained that Nuguid
went to the grocery store everyday to collect interest payments. The principal loan
was ₱2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the On cross-examination,20 respondent Nicdao explained that Josie Nicdao and
payments for the daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she gave Melanie Tolentino were caretakers of the grocery store and that they manned it
to respondent Nicdao. when she was not there. She likewise confirmed that she authorized them to write
the amounts on the checks after she had affixed her signature thereon. She stressed,
however, that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was the one that was reported to her as
The principal loan amount of ₱2,100,000.00 was allegedly delivered by Nuguid to
lost or missing by her saleslady sometime in 1995. She never reported the matter to
respondent Nicdao in varying amounts of ₱100,000.00 and ₱150,000.00.
the bank because she was confident that it would just surface when it would be
Respondent Nicdao refuted the averment of petitioner Ching that prior to 1995,
presented for payment.
they had another transaction.

Again, respondent Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers which indicated the
With respect to the ₱20,000,000.00 check, respondent Nicdao admitted that the
daily payments she had made to Nuguid. The latter allegedly went to the grocery
signature thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to petitioner Ching.
store everyday to collect the interest payments. Further, the figures at the back of
Anent the other ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon
the cigarette wrappers were written by Nuguid. Respondent Nicdao asserted that
were hers while the amounts and payee thereon were written by either Jocelyn
she recognized her handwriting because Nuguid sometimes wrote them in her
Nicdao or Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and
presence. Respondent Nicdao maintained that she had already paid Nuguid the
authorized by her to do so.
amount of ₱1,200,000.00 as evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft which
she gave to the latter and which was subsequently negotiated and deposited in
Respondent Nicdao clarified that, except for the ₱20,000,000.00 check, the other petitioner Ching’s account. In connection thereto, respondent Nicdao refuted the
ten (10) checks were handed to Nuguid on different occasions. Nuguid came to the prosecution’s allegation that the demand draft was payment for a previous
grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Respondent Nicdao said transaction that she had with petitioner Ching. She clarified that the payments that
that she purposely left the checks undated because she would still have to notify Nuguid collected from her everyday were only for the interests due. She did not
Nuguid if she already had the money to fund the checks. ask Nuguid to make written acknowledgements of her payments.

Respondent Nicdao denied ever confiding to petitioner Ching that she was afraid Melanie Tolentino was presented to corroborate the testimony of respondent
that her daughter would get mad if she found out about the amount that she owed Nicdao. On direct-examination,21Tolentino stated that she worked at the Vignette
him. What allegedly transpired was that when she already had the money to pay Superstore and she knew Nuguid because her employer, respondent Nicdao, used
them (presumably referring to petitioner Ching and Nuguid), she went to them to to borrow money from her. She knew petitioner Ching only by name and that he
retrieve her checks. However, petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to return the was the "husband" of Nuguid.
checks claiming that she (respondent Nicdao) still owed them money. She
demanded that they show her the checks in order that she would know the exact
As an employee of the grocery store, Tolentino stated that she acted as its caretaker
amount of her debt, but they refused. It was at this point that she got angry and
and was entrusted with the custody of respondent Nicdao’s personal checks.
dared them to go to court.
Tolentino identified her own handwriting on some of the checks especially with
respect to the amounts and figures written thereon. She said that Nuguid instructed
After the said incident, respondent Nicdao was surprised to be notified by HSLB her to leave the space for the payee blank as she would use the checks to pay
that her check in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 was just presented to the bank for someone else. Tolentino added that she could not recall respondent Nicdao issuing
payment. She claimed that it was only then that she remembered that sometime in a check to petitioner Ching in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00. She confirmed that
1995, she was informed by her employee that one of her checks was missing. At they lost a check sometime in 1995. When informed about it, respondent Nicdao

49
told her that the check could have been issued to someone else, and that it would of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c) subsequent dishonor of the
just surface when presented to the bank. check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.25
Tolentino recounted that Nuguid came to the grocery store everyday to collect the
interest payments of the loan. In some instances, upon respondent Nicdao’s
instruction, Tolentino handed to Nuguid checks that were already signed by According to the MCTC, all the foregoing elements are present in the case of
respondent Nicdao. Sometimes, Tolentino would be the one to write the amount on respondent Nicdao’s issuance of the checks subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-
the checks. Nuguid, in turn, wrote the amounts on pieces of paper which were kept 9443. On the first element, respondent Nicdao was found by the MCTC to have
by respondent Nicdao. made, drawn and issued the checks. The fact that she did not personally write the
payee and date on the checks was not material considering that under Section 14 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, "where the instrument is wanting in any material
On cross-examination,22 Tolentino confirmed that she was authorized by
particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete
respondent Nicdao to fill up the checks and hand them to Nuguid. The latter came
it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by
to the grocery store everyday to collect the interest payments. Tolentino claimed
the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a
that in 1995, in the course of chronologically arranging respondent Nicdao’s check
negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for
booklets, she noticed that a check was missing. Respondent Nicdao told her that
any amount x x x." Respondent Nicdao admitted that she authorized her employees
perhaps she issued it to someone and that it would just turn up in the bank.
to provide the details on the checks after she had signed them.
Tolentino was certain that the missing check was the same one that petitioner
Ching presented to the bank for payment in the amount of ₱20,000,000.00.
The MCTC disbelieved respondent Nicdao’s claim that the ₱20,000,000.00 check
was the same one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary prudence would
Tolentino stated that she left the employ of respondent Nicdao sometime in 1996.
dictate that a lost check would at least be immediately reported to the bank to
After the checks were dishonored in October 1997, Tolentino got a call from
prevent its unauthorized endorsement or negotiation. Respondent Nicdao made no
respondent Nicdao. After she was shown a fax copy thereof, Tolentino confirmed
such report to the bank. Even if the said check was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted
that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was the same one that she reported as missing in
respondent Nicdao for being negligent in keeping the checks that she had already
1995.
signed in an unsecured box.

Jocelyn Nicdao also took the witness stand to corroborate the testimony of the
The MCTC further ruled that there was no evidence to show that petitioner Ching
other defense witnesses. On direct-examination, 23 she averred that she was a
was not a holder in due course as to cause it (the MCTC) to believe that the said
saleslady at the Vignette Superstore from August 1994 up to April 1998. She knew
check was not issued to him. Respondent Nicdao’s admission of indebtedness was
Nuguid as well as petitioner Ching.
sufficient to prove that there was consideration for the issuance of the checks.

Jocelyn Nicdao further testified that respondent Nicdao was indebted to Nuguid.
The second element was also found by the MCTC to be present as it held that
Jocelyn Nicdao used to fill up the checks of respondent Nicdao that had already
respondent Nicdao, as maker, drawer or issuer, had knowledge that at the time of
been signed by her and give them to Nuguid. The latter came to the grocery store
issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
everyday to pick up the interest payments. Jocelyn Nicdao identified the checks on
payment in full of the checks upon their presentment.
which she wrote the amounts and, in some instances, the name of Nuguid as payee.
However, most of the time, Nuguid allegedly instructed her to leave as blank the
space for the payee. As to the third element, the MCTC established that the checks were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for being "DAIF" or drawn against insufficient
funds. Stamped at the back of each check was the annotation "DAIF." The bank
Jocelyn Nicdao identified the cigarette wrappers as the documents on which
representative likewise testified to the fact of dishonor.
Nuguid acknowledged receipt of the interest payments. She explained that she was
the one who wrote the minus entries and they represented the daily interest
payments received by Nuguid. Under the foregoing circumstances, the MCTC declared that the conviction of
respondent Nicdao was warranted. It stressed that the mere act of issuing a
worthless check was malum prohibitum; hence, even if the checks were issued in
On cross-examination,24 Jocelyn Nicdao stated that she was a distant cousin of
the form of deposit or guarantee, once dishonored, the same gave rise to the
respondent Nicdao. She stopped working for her in 1998 because she wanted to
prosecution for and conviction of BP 22. 26 The decretal portion of the MCTC
take a rest. Jocelyn Nicdao reiterated that she handed the checks to Nuguid at the
decision reads:
grocery store.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused is found guilty of violating

After due trial, on December 8, 1998, the MCTC rendered judgment in Criminal
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in 11 counts, and is hereby ordered to pay the private
Cases Nos. 9433-9443 convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) counts of
complainant the amount of ₱20,950,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from date
violation of BP 22. The MCTC gave credence to petitioner Ching’s testimony that
of filing of the complaint until the total amount had been paid. The prayer for
respondent Nicdao borrowed money from him in the total amount of
moral damages is denied for lack of evidence to prove the same. She is likewise
₱20,950,000.00. Petitioner Ching delivered ₱1,000,000.00 every month to
ordered to suffer imprisonment equivalent to 1 year for every check issued and
respondent Nicdao from 1995 up to 1997 until the sum reached ₱20,000,000.00.
which penalty shall be served successively.
The MCTC also found that subsequent thereto, respondent Nicdao still borrowed
money from petitioner Ching. As security for these loans, respondent Nicdao
issued checks to petitioner Ching. When the latter deposited the checks (eleven in SO ORDERED.27
all) on October 6, 1997, they were dishonored by the bank for being "DAIF."
Incidentally, on January 11, 1999, the MCTC likewise rendered its judgment in
The MCTC explained that the crime of violation of BP 22 has the following Criminal Cases Nos. 9458-9471 and convicted respondent Nicdao of the fourteen
elements: (a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or (14) counts of violation of BP 22 filed against her by Nuguid.
for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment

50
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Soon thereafter, Emma Nuguid befriended petitioner and offered to lend money to
separate Decisions both dated May 10, 1999, affirmed in toto the decisions of the the latter which could be used in running her newly acquired store. Nuguid
MCTC convicting respondent Nicdao of eleven (11) and fourteen (14) counts of represented to petitioner that as former manager of the Vignette Superstore, she
violation of BP 22 in Criminal Cases Nos. 9433-9443 and 9458-9471, respectively. knew that petitioner would be in need of credit to meet the daily expenses of
running the business, particularly in the daily purchases of merchandise to be sold
at the store. After Emma Nuguid succeeded in befriending petitioner, Nuguid was
Respondent Nicdao forthwith filed with the CA separate petitions for review of the
able to gain access to the Vignette Superstore where petitioner’s blank and pre-
two decisions of the RTC. The petition involving the eleven (11) checks
signed checks were kept.29
purportedly issued to petitioner Ching was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23055
(assigned to the 13th Division). On the other hand, the petition involving the
fourteen (14) checks purportedly issued to Nuguid was docketed as CA-G.R. CR In addition, the CA also made the finding that respondent Nicdao borrowed money
No. 23054 (originally assigned to the 7th Division but transferred to the 6th from Nuguid in the total amount of ₱2,100,000.00 secured by twenty-four (24)
Division). The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its respective comments checks drawn against respondent Nicdao’s account with HSLB. Upon Nuguid’s
on the said petitions. Subsequently, the OSG filed in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 a instruction, the checks given by respondent Nicdao as security for the loans were
motion for its consolidation with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. The OSG prayed that left blank as to the payee and the date. The loans consisted of (a) ₱950,000.00
CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 pending before the 13th Division be transferred and covered by ten (10) checks subject of the criminal complaints filed by petitioner
consolidated with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in accordance with the Revised Internal Ching (CA-G.R. CR No. 23055); and (b) ₱1,150,000.00 covered by fourteen (14)
Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA). checks subject of the criminal complaints filed by Nuguid (CA-G.R. CR No.
23054). The loans totaled ₱2,100,000.00 and they were transacted between
respondent Nicdao and Nuguid only. Respondent Nicdao never dealt with
Acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 issued a
petitioner Ching.
Resolution dated October 19, 1999 advising the OSG to file the motion in CA-G.R.
CR No. 23054 as it bore the lowest number. Respondent Nicdao opposed the
consolidation of the two cases. She likewise filed her reply to the comment of the Against the foregoing factual findings, the CA declared that, based on the
OSG in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055. evidence, respondent Nicdao had already fully paid the loans. In particular, the CA
referred to the Planters Bank demand draft in the amount of ₱1,200,000.00 which,
by his own admission, petitioner Ching had received. The appellate court debunked
On November 22, 1999, the CA (13th Division) rendered the assailed Decision in
petitioner Ching’s allegation that the said demand draft was payment for a previous
CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 acquitting respondent Nicdao of the eleven (11) counts of
transaction. According to the CA, petitioner Ching failed to adduce evidence to
violation of BP 22 filed against her by petitioner Ching. The decretal portion of the
prove the existence of a previous transaction between him and respondent Nicdao.
assailed CA Decision reads:

Apart from the demand draft, the CA also stated that respondent Nicdao made
WHEREFORE, being meritorious, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
interest payments on a daily basis to Nuguid as evidenced by the computations
Accordingly, the decision dated May 10, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, 3rd
written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Based on these computations, as of
Judicial Region, Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the decision dated December 8, 1998,
July 21, 1997, respondent Nicdao had made a total of ₱5,780,000.00 payments to
of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan,
Nuguid for the interests alone. Adding up this amount and that of the Planters Bank
convicting petitioner Clarita S. Nicdao in Criminal Cases No. 9433 to 9443 of
demand draft, the CA placed the payments made by respondent Nicdao to Nuguid
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment
as already amounting to ₱6,980,000.00 for the principal loan amount of only
rendered ACQUITTING her in all these cases, with costs de oficio.
₱2,100,000.00.

SO ORDERED.28
The CA negated petitioner Ching’s contention that the payments as reflected at the
back of the cigarette wrappers could be applied only to the interests due. Since the
On even date, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment declaring that the above transactions were not evidenced by any document or writing, the CA ratiocinated
decision has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of Judgments. that no interests could be collected because, under Article 1956 of the Civil Code,
"no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing."
In acquitting respondent Nicdao in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, the CA made the
following factual findings: The CA gave credence to the testimony of respondent Nicdao that when she had
fully paid her loans to Nuguid, she tried to retrieve her checks. Nuguid, however,
Petitioner [respondent herein] Clarita S. Nicdao, a middle-aged mother and refused to return the checks to respondent Nicdao. Instead, Nuguid and petitioner
housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd, who is Ching filled up the said checks to make it appear that: (a) petitioner Ching was the
married to a wealthy expatriate. payee in five checks; (b) the six checks were payable to cash; (c) Nuguid was the
payee in fourteen (14) checks. Petitioner Ching and Nuguid then put the date
October 6, 1997 on all these checks and deposited them the following day. On
Complainant [petitioner herein] Samson Ching is a Chinese national, who claimed October 8, 1997, through a joint demand letter, they informed respondent Nicdao
he is a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory. that her checks were dishonored by HSLB and gave her three days to settle her
indebtedness or else face prosecution for violation of BP 22.
Emma Nuguid, complainant’s live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly connected
with Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery store now known as With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations to
the Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store, which was about to be Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for violation of BP
foreclosed, to petitioner’s daughter, Janette Boyd. Since then, petitioner began 22. It was explained that to be held liable under BP 22, it must be established, inter
managing said store. However, since petitioner could not always be at the Vignette alia, that the check was made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
Superstore to keep shop, she entrusted to her salesladies, Melanie Tolentino and According to the CA, the word "account" refers to a pre-existing obligation, while
Jocelyn Nicdao, pre-signed checks, which were left blank as to amount and the "for value" means an obligation incurred simultaneously with the issuance of the
payee, to cover for any delivery of merchandise sold at the store. The blank and check. In the case of respondent Nicdao’s checks, the pre-existing obligations
personal checks were placed in a cash box at Vignette Superstore and were filled secured by them were already extinguished after full payment had been made by
up by said salesladies upon instruction of petitioner as to amount, payee and date. respondent Nicdao to Nuguid. Obligations are extinguished by, among others,

51
payment.30 The CA believed that when petitioner Ching and Nuguid refused to As mentioned earlier, the instant petition pertains and is limited solely to the civil
return respondent Nicdao’s checks despite her total payment of ₱6,980,000.00 for aspect of the case as petitioner Ching argues that notwithstanding respondent
the loans secured by the checks, petitioner Ching and Nuguid were using BP 22 to Nicdao’s acquittal of the eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22, she should be
coerce respondent Nicdao to pay a debt which she no longer owed them. held liable to pay petitioner Ching the amounts of the dishonored checks in the
aggregate sum of ₱20,950,000.00.
With respect to the ₱20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by petitioner
Ching’s claim that he delivered ₱1,000,000.00 every month to respondent Nicdao He urges the Court to review the findings of facts made by the CA as they are
until the amount reached ₱20,000,000.00 and, when she refused to pay the same, allegedly based on a misapprehension of facts and manifestly erroneous and
he filled up the check, which she earlier delivered to him as security for the loans, contradicted by the evidence. Further, the CA’s factual findings are in conflict with
by writing thereon the said amount. In disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA those of the RTC and MCTC.
pointed out that, contrary to his assertion, he was never employed by the La Suerte
Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing per the letter of Susan Resurreccion, Vice-
Petitioner Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s
President and Legal Counsel of the said company. Moreover, as admitted by
acquittal by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve
petitioner Ching, he did not own the house where he and Nuguid lived.
and rule on her civil liability. He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court which, prior to its amendment, provided, in part:
Moreover, the CA characterized as incredible and contrary to human experience
that petitioner Ching would, as he claimed, deliver a total sum of ₱20,000,000.00
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
to respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof thereof, e.g., written
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
acknowledgment that she received the same. On the other hand, it found plausible
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
respondent Nicdao’s version of the story that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was the
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
same one that was missing way back in 1995. The CA opined that this missing
action.
check surfaced in the hands of petitioner Ching who, in cahoots with Nuguid,
wrote the amount ₱20,000,000.00 thereon and deposited it in his account. To the
mind of the CA, the inference that the check was stolen was anchored on Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
competent circumstantial evidence. Specifically, Nuguid, as previous and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
manager/owner of the grocery store, had access thereto. Likewise applicable, Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x
according to the CA, was the presumption that the person in possession of the
stolen article was presumed to be guilty of taking the stolen article.31 Supreme Court Circular No. 57-9733 dated September 16, 1997 is also cited as it
provides in part:
The CA emphasized that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was never delivered by
respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, the said check without the details 1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
as to the date, amount and payee, was an incomplete and undelivered instrument necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such
when it was stolen and ended up in petitioner Ching’s hands. On this point, the CA civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. x x x
applied Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:

Petitioner Ching theorizes that, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. – Where an incomplete instrument Court, the civil action for the recovery of damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and
has not been delivered, it will not, if completed and negotiated without authority, 2176 arising from the same act or omission of the accused is impliedly instituted
be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose with the criminal action. Moreover, under the above-quoted Circular, the criminal
signature was placed thereon before delivery. action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action,
which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored check representing the civil
SEC. 16. Delivery; when effectual; when presumed. – Every contract on a obligation of the drawer to the payee.
negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument
for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate parties and as In seeking to enforce the alleged civil liability of respondent Nicdao, petitioner
regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be Ching maintains that she had loan obligations to him totaling ₱20,950,000.00. The
effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party making, existence of the same is allegedly established by his testimony before the MCTC.
drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be; and, in such case, the delivery Also, he asks the Court to take judicial notice that for a monetary loan secured by a
may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for check, the check itself is the evidence of indebtedness.
the purpose of transferring the property. But where the instrument is in the hands
of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to
make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And where the instrument is no He insists that, contrary to her protestation, respondent Nicdao also transacted with
longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and him, not only with Nuguid. Petitioner Ching pointed out that during respondent
intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved. Nicdao’s testimony, she referred to her creditors in plural form, e.g. "[I] told them,
most checks that I issued I will inform them if I have money." Even respondent
Nicdao’s employees allegedly knew him; they testified that Nuguid instructed them
The CA held that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was filled up by petitioner Ching at times to leave as blank the payee on the checks as they would be paid to
without respondent Nicdao’s authority. Further, it was incomplete and undelivered. someone else, who turned out to be petitioner Ching.
Hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest therein and could not
assert any cause of action founded on the
It was allegedly erroneous for the CA to hold that he had no capacity to lend
₱20,950,000.00 to respondent Nicdao. Petitioner Ching clarified that what he
stolen checks.32 Under these circumstances, the CA concluded that respondent meant when he testified before the MCTC was that he was engaged in dealership
could not be held liable for violation of BP 22. with La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing, and not merely its sales agent.
He stresses that he owns a warehouse and is also in the business of lending money.
The Petitioner’s Case Further, the CA’s reasoning that he could not possibly have lent ₱20,950,000.00 to

52
respondent Nicdao since petitioner Ching and Nuguid did not own the house where which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal
they live, is allegedly non sequitur. action.

Petitioner Ching maintains that, contrary to the CA’s finding, the Planters Bank xxxx
demand draft for ₱1,200,000.00 was in payment for respondent Nicdao’s previous
loan transaction with him. Apart from the ₱20,000,000.00 check, the other ten (10)
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
checks (totaling ₱950,000.00) were allegedly issued by respondent Nicdao to
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
petitioner Ching as security for the loans that she obtained from him from 1995 to
from which the civil might arise did not exist.
1997. The existence of another loan obligation prior to the said period was
allegedly established by the testimony of respondent Nicdao’s own witness,
Jocelyn Nicdao, who testified that when she started working in Vignette Superstore According to respondent Nicdao, the assailed CA decision has already made a
in 1994, she noticed that respondent Nicdao was already indebted to Nuguid. finding to the effect that the fact upon which her civil liability might arise did not
exist. She refers to the ruling of the CA that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was stolen;
hence, petitioner Ching did not acquire any right or interest over the said check and
Petitioner Ching also takes exception to the CA’s ruling that the payments made by
could not assert any cause of action founded on the said check. Consequently, the
respondent Nicdao as reflected on the computations at the back of the cigarette
CA held that respondent Nicdao had no obligation to make good the stolen check
wrappers were for both the principal loan and interests. He insists that they were
and cannot be held liable for violation of BP 22. She also refers to the CA’s
for the interests alone. Even respondent Nicdao’s testimony allegedly showed that
pronouncement relative to the ten (10) other checks that they were not issued to
they were daily interest payments. Petitioner Ching further avers that the interest
apply on account or for value, considering that the loan obligations secured by
payments totaling ₱5,780,000.00 can only mean that, contrary to respondent
these checks had already been extinguished by her full payment thereof.
Nicdao’s claim, her loan obligations amounted to much more than ₱2,100,000.00.
Further, she is allegedly estopped from questioning the interests because she
willingly paid the same. To respondent Nicdao’s mind, these pronouncements are equivalent to a finding
that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The instant
petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks,
Petitioner Ching also harps on respondent Nicdao’s silence when she received his
is thus allegedly already barred by the final and executory decision acquitting her.
and Nuguid’s demand letter to her. Through the said letter, they notified her that
the twenty-five (25) checks valued at ₱22,100,000.00 were dishonored by the
HSLB, and that she had three days to settle her ndebtedness with them, otherwise, In any case, respondent Nicdao contends that the CA did not commit serious
face prosecution. Respondent Nicdao’s silence, i.e., her failure to deny or protest misapprehension of facts when it found that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was a stolen
the same by way of reply, vis-à-vis the demand letter, allegedly constitutes an check and that she never made any transaction with petitioner Ching. Moreover,
admission of the statements contained therein. the other ten (10) checks were not issued to apply on account or for value. These
findings are allegedly supported by the evidence on record which consisted of the
respective testimonies of the defense witnesses to the effect that: respondent
On the other hand, the MCTC’s decision, as affirmed by the RTC, is allegedly
Nicdao had the practice of leaving pre-signed checks placed inside an unsecured
based on the evidence on record; it has been established that the checks were
cash box in the Vignette Superstore; the salesladies were given the authority to fill
respondent Nicdao’s personal checks, that the signatures thereon were hers and that
up the said checks as to the amount, payee and date; Nuguid beguiled respondent
she had issued them to petitioner Ching. With respect to the ₱20,000,000.00 check,
Nicdao to obtain loans from her; as security for the loans, respondent Nicdao
petitioner Ching assails the CA’s ruling that it was stolen and was never delivered
issued checks to Nuguid; when the salesladies gave the checks to Nuguid, she
or issued by respondent Nicdao to him. The issue of the said check being stolen
instructed them to leave blank the payee and date; Nuguid had access to the
was allegedly not raised during trial. Further, her failure to report the alleged theft
grocery store; in 1995, one of the salesladies reported that a check was missing; in
to the bank to stop payment of the said lost or missing check is allegedly contrary
1997, when she had fully paid her loans to Nuguid, respondent Nicdao tried to
to human experience. Petitioner Ching describes respondent Nicdao’s defense of
retrieve her checks but Nuguid and petitioner Ching falsely told her that she still
stolen or lost check as incredible and, therefore, false.
owed them money; they then maliciously filled up the checks making it appear that
petitioner Ching was the payee in the five checks and the six others were payable
Aside from the foregoing substantive issues that he raised, petitioner Ching also to "cash"; and knowing fully well that these checks were not funded because
faults the CA for not acting and ordering the consolidation of CA-G.R. CR No. respondent Nicdao already fully paid her loans, petitioner Ching and Nuguid
23055 with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. He informs the Court that latter case is still deposited the checks and caused them to be dishonored by HSLB.
pending with the CA.
It is pointed out by respondent Nicdao that her testimony (that the ₱20,000,000.00
In fine, it is petitioner Ching’s view that the CA gravely erred in disregarding the check was the same one that she lost sometime in 1995) was corroborated by the
findings of the MCTC, as affirmed by the RTC, and submits that there is more than respective testimonies of her employees. Another indication that it was stolen was
sufficient preponderant evidence to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to him in the fact that among all the checks which ended up in the hands of petitioner Ching
the amount of ₱20,950,000.00. He thus prays that the Court direct respondent and Nuguid, only the ₱20,000,000.00 check was fully typewritten; the rest were
Nicdao to pay him the said amount plus 12% interest per annum computed from invariably handwritten as to the amounts, payee and date.
the date of written demand until the total amount is fully paid.
Respondent Nicdao defends the CA’s conclusion that the ₱20,000,000.00 check
The Respondent’s Counter-Arguments was stolen on the ground that an appeal in a criminal case throws open the whole
case to the appellate court’s scrutiny. In any event, she maintains that she had been
consistent in her theory of defense and merely relied on the disputable presumption
Respondent Nicdao urges the Court to deny the petition. She posits preliminarily
that the person in possession of a stolen article is presumed to be the author of the
that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which
theft.
states:

Considering that it was stolen, respondent Nicdao argues, the ₱20,000,000.00

SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in
check was an incomplete and undelivered instrument in the hands of petitioner
Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action
Ching and he did not acquire any right or interest therein. Further, he cannot assert

53
any cause of action founded on the said stolen check. Accordingly, petitioner The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Ching’s attempt to collect payment on the said check through the instant petition
must fail.
Notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to
appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period
Respondent Nicdao describes as downright incredible petitioner Ching’s testimony
that she owed him a total sum of ₱20,950,000.00 without any documentary proof
It is axiomatic that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
of the loan transactions. She submits that it is contrary to human experience for
liable."34 Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
loan transactions involving such huge amounts of money to be devoid of any
action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of
documentary proof. In relation thereto, respondent Nicdao underscores that
petitioner Ching’s filing of the Informations against respondent Nicdao, Section
petitioner Ching lied about being employed as a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and
1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:
Cigarette Manufacturing. It is underscored that he has not adequately shown that he
possessed the financial capacity to lend such a huge amount to respondent Nicdao
as he so claimed. SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
Neither could she be held liable for the ten (10) other checks (in the total amount of
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
₱950,000,000.00) because as respondent Nicdao asseverates, she merely issued
action.
them to Nuguid as security for her loans obtained from the latter beginning
October 1995 up to 1997. As evidenced by the Planters Bank demand draft in the
amount of ₱1,200,000.00, she already made payment in 1996. The said demand Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
draft was negotiated to petitioner Ching’s account and he admitted receipt thereof. and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Respondent Nicdao belies his claim that the demand draft was payment for a prior Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
existing obligation. She asserts that petitioner Ching was unable to present
evidence of such a previous transaction. xxxx

In addition to the Planters Bank demand draft, respondent Nicdao insists that As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the
petitioner Ching received, through Nuguid, cash payments as evidenced by the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b) 36 of the same Rule,
computations written at the back of the cigarette wrappers. Nuguid went to the also quoted earlier, provided in part:
Vignette Superstore everyday to collect these payments. The other defense
witnesses corroborated this fact. Petitioner Ching allegedly never disputed the
accuracy of the accounts appearing on these cigarette wrappers; nor did he dispute (b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
their authenticity and accuracy. unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist.

Based on the foregoing evidence, the CA allegedly correctly held that, computing
the amount of the Planters Bank demand draft (₱1,200,000.00) and those reflected It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state
at the back of the cigarette wrappers (₱5,780,000.00), respondent Nicdao had "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
already paid petitioner Ching and Nuguid a total sum of ₱6,980,000.00 for her loan accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
obligations totaling only ₱950,000.00, as secured by the ten (10) HSLB checks the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
excluding the stolen ₱20,000,000.00 check. might arise did not exist."37

Respondent Nicdao rebuts petitioner Ching’s argument (that the daily payments In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,38 the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not
were applied to the interests), and claims that this is illegal. Petitioner Ching extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b)
cannot insist that the daily payments she made applied only to the interests on the where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal
loan obligations, considering that there is admittedly no document evidencing these but only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or
loans, hence, no written stipulation for the payment of interests thereon. On this based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted. Thus, under Article 29
point, she invokes Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which proscribes the collection of the Civil Code –
of interest payments unless expressly stipulated in writing.
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
Respondent Nicdao emphasizes that the ten (10) other checks that she issued to that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
Nuguid as security for her loans had already been discharged upon her full damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only
payment thereof. It is her belief that these checks can no longer be used to coerce a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
her to pay a debt that she does not owe. the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.

On the CA’s failure to consolidate CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No.
23054, respondent Nicdao proffers the explanation that under the RIRCA, If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
consolidation of the cases is not mandatory. In fine, respondent Nicdao urges the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
Court to deny the petition as it failed to discharge the burden of proving her civil inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
liability with the required preponderance of evidence. Moreover, the CA’s acquittal ground.
of respondent Nicdao is premised on the finding that, apart from the stolen check,
the ten (10) other checks were not made to apply to a valid, due and demandable The Court likewise expounded in Salazar v. People 39 the consequences of an
obligation. This, in effect, is a categorical ruling that the fact from which the civil acquittal on the civil aspect in this wise:
liability of respondent Nicdao may arise does not exist.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil
The Court’s Rulings aspect of the criminal case where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as

54
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declared that the liability any right or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action
of the accused is only civil; (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from founded on said check,"41 and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. Moreover, the good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P.
civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final Blg. 22."42
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured
omission imputed to him.
by these checks had already been extinguished after full payment had been made
by respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second element for the crime under
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on BP 22, i.e., "that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for
the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the value," is not present.
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However,
the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly
judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully
paid her obligations. The CA computed the payments made by respondent Nicdao
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended vis-à-vis her loan obligations in this manner:
party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute
Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling ₱5,780,000.00 and the
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
₱1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that
petitioner [respondent herein] had already made payments in the total amount of
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the accused ₱6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only ₱2,100,000.00 (₱950,000.00 in the
should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect case at bar and ₱1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23054).43
of the decision," the period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that
granted to the accused.40 With petitioner Ching’s timely filing of the instant
On the other hand, its finding relative to the ₱20,000,000.00 check that it was a
petition for review of the civil aspect of the CA’s decision, the Court thus has the
stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon
jurisdiction and authority to determine the civil liability of respondent Nicdao
as well.
notwithstanding her acquittal.

Third, while petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s liability
In order for the petition to prosper, however, it must establish that the judgment of
did not arise from or was not based upon the criminal act of which she was
the CA acquitting respondent Nicdao falls under any of the three categories
acquitted (ex delicto) but from her loan obligations to him (ex contractu), however,
enumerated in Salazar and Sapiera, to wit:
petitioner Ching miserably failed to prove by preponderant evidence the existence
of these unpaid loan obligations. Significantly, it can be inferred from the
(a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only following findings of the CA in its decision acquitting respondent Nicdao that the
preponderance of evidence is required; act or omission from which her civil liability may arise did not exist. On the
₱20,000,000.00 check, the CA found as follows:
(b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and True, indeed, the missing pre-signed and undated check no. 002524 surfaced in the
possession of complainant Ching who, in cahoots with his paramour Emma
Nuguid, filled up the blank check with his name as payee and in the fantastic
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
amount of ₱20,000,000.00, dated it October 6, 1997, and presented it to the bank
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
on October 7, 1997, along with the other checks, for payment. Therefore, the
inference that the check was stolen is anchored on competent circumstantial
Salazar also enunciated that the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if evidence. The fact already established is that Emma Nuguid , previous owner of
there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or the store, had access to said store. Moreover, the possession of a thing that was
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused stolen , absent a credible reason, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that
did not commit the act or omission imputed to him. the person in possession of the stolen article is presumed to be guilty of taking the
stolen article (People v. Zafra, 237 SCRA 664).
For reasons that will be discussed shortly, the Court holds that respondent Nicdao
cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching. As previously shown, at the time check no. 002524 was stolen, the said check was
blank in its material aspect (as to the name of payee, the amount of the check, and
The acquittal of respondent Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her civil the date of the check), but was already pre-signed by petitioner. In fact,
liability complainant Ching himself admitted that check no. 002524 in his possession was a
blank check (TSN, Jan. 7, 1998, pp. 24-27, Annex J, Petition).

A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil Moreover, since it has been established that check no. 002524 had been missing
liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to since 1995 (TSN, Sept. 9, 1998, pp. 14-15, Annex DD, Petition; TSN, Sept. 10,
petitioner Ching. 1998, pp. 43-46, Annex EE, Petition), it is abundantly clear that said check was
never delivered to complainant Ching. Check no. 002524 was an incomplete and
undelivered instrument when it was stolen and ended up in the hands of
First, the CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable complainant Ching. Sections 15 and 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized provide:
under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the ₱20,000,000.00 check was a
stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to
petitioner Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching "did not acquire xxxx

55
In the case of check no. 002524, it is admitted by complainant Ching that said It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes
check in his possession was a blank check and was subsequently completed by him the allegations – Et incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat; cum per rerum
alone without authority from petitioner. Inasmuch as check no. 002524 was naturam factum negantis probatio nulla sit (The proof lies upon him who affirms,
incomplete and undelivered in the hands of complainant Ching, he did not acquire not upon him who denies; since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact
any right or interest therein and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action cannot produce any proof).48 In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
founded on said stolen check (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Sima We, must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence
219 SCRA 736, 740). is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
It goes without saying that since complainant Ching did not acquire any right or
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
interest over check no. 002524 and cannot assert any cause of action founded on
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
said check, petitioner has no obligation to make good the stolen check and cannot,
opposition thereto.49Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court offers the
therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.44
guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence:

Anent the other ten (10) checks, the CA made the following findings:
SEC. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Evidence sufficiently shows that the loans secured by the ten (10) checks involved In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
in the cases subject of this petition had already been paid. It is not controverted that issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
petitioner gave Emma Nuguid a demand draft valued at ₱1,200,000 to pay for the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
loans guaranteed by said checks and other checks issued to her. Samson Ching opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
admitted having received the demand draft which he deposited in his bank account. facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
However, complainant Samson Ching claimed that the said demand draft interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
represents payment for a previous obligation incurred by petitioner. However, may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
complainant Ching failed to adduce any evidence to prove the existence of the witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
alleged obligation of the petitioner prior to those secured by the subject checks.
Unfortunately, petitioner Ching’s testimony alone does not constitute preponderant
Apart from the payment to Emma Nuguid through said demand draft, it is also not evidence to establish respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to him amounting to
disputed that petitioner made cash payments to Emma Nuguid who collected the ₱20,950,000.00. Apart from the discredited checks, he failed to adduce any other
payments almost daily at the Vignette Superstore. As of July 21, 1997, Emma documentary evidence to prove that respondent Nicdao still has unpaid obligations
Nuguid collected cash payments amounting to approximately ₱5,780,000.00. All to him in the said amount. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
of these cash payments were recorded at the back of cigarette cartons by Emma equivalent to proof under our Rules.50
Nuguid in her own handwriting, the authenticity and accuracy of which were never
denied by either complainant Ching or Emma Nuguid.
In contrast, respondent Nicdao’s defense consisted in, among others, her allegation
that she had already paid her obligations to petitioner Ching through Nuguid. In
Clearly, adding the payments recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by support thereof, she presented the Planters Bank demand draft for ₱1,200,000.00.
Emma Nuguid in her own handwriting totaling ₱5,780,000.00 and the The said demand draft was negotiated to petitioner Ching’s account and he
₱1,200,000.00 demand draft received by Emma Nuguid, it would appear that admitted receipt of the value thereof. Petitioner Ching tried to controvert this by
petitioner had already made payments in the total amount of ₱6,980,000.00 for her claiming that it was payment for a previous transaction between him and
loan in the total amount of ₱6,980,000.00 for her loan obligation of only respondent Nicdao. However, other than his self-serving claim, petitioner Ching
₱2,100,000.00 (₱950,000.00 in the case at bar and P1,150,000.00 in CA-G.R. CR did not proffer any documentary evidence to prove the existence of the said
No. 23054).45 previous transaction. Considering that the Planters Bank demand draft was dated
August 13, 1996, it is logical to conclude that, absent any evidence to the contrary,
Generally checks may constitute evidence of indebtedness. 46 However, in view of it formed part of respondent Nicdao’s payment to petitioner Ching on account of
the CA’s findings relating to the eleven (11) checks - that the ₱20,000,000.00 was the loan obligations that she obtained from him since October 1995.
a stolen check and the obligations secured by the other ten (10) checks had already
been fully paid by respondent Nicdao – they can no longer be given credence to Additionally, respondent Nicdao submitted as evidence the cigarette wrappers at
establish respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to petitioner Ching. Such civil liability, the back of which were written the computations of the daily payments that she had
therefore, must be established by preponderant evidence other than the discredited made to Nuguid. The fact of the daily payments was corroborated by the other
checks. witnesses for the defense, namely, Jocelyn Nicdao and Tolentino. As found by the
CA, based on these computations, respondent Nicdao had made a total payment of
After a careful examination of the records of the case, 47 the Court holds that the ₱5,780,000.00 to Nuguid as of July 21, 1997.51Again, the payments made, as
existence of respondent Nicdao’s civil liability to petitioner Ching in the amount of reflected at the back of these cigarette wrappers, were not disputed by petitioner
₱20,950,000.00 representing her unpaid obligations to the latter has not been Ching. Hence, these payments as well as the amount of the Planters Bank demand
sufficiently established by preponderant evidence. Petitioner Ching mainly relies draft establish that respondent Nicdao already paid the total amount of
on his testimony before the MCTC to establish the existence of these unpaid ₱6,980,000.00 to Nuguid and petitioner Ching.
obligations. In gist, he testified that from October 1995 up to 1997, respondent
Nicdao obtained loans from him in the total amount of ₱20,950,000.00. As The Court agrees with the CA that the daily payments made by respondent Nicdao
security for her obligations, she issued eleven (11) checks which were invariably amounting to ₱5,780,000.00 cannot be considered as interest payments only. Even
blank as to the date, amounts and payee. When respondent Nicdao allegedly respondent Nicdao testified that the daily payments that she made to Nuguid were
refused to pay her obligations despite his due demand, petitioner filled up the for the interests due. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, no interests could be
checks in his possession with the corresponding amounts and date and deposited properly collected in the loan transactions between petitioner Ching and respondent
them in his account. They were subsequently dishonored by the HSLB for being Nicdao because there was no stipulation therefor in writing. To reiterate, under
"DAIF" and petitioner Ching accordingly filed the criminal complaints against Article 1956 of the Civil Code, "no interest shall be due unless it has been
respondent Nicdao for violation of BP 22. expressly stipulated in writing."

56
 Neither could respondent Nicdao be considered to be estopped from denying the I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
validity of these interests. Estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
by law or one that is against public policy. 52 Clearly, the collection of interests
without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law. Consequently, the
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
daily payments made by respondent Nicdao amounting to ₱5,780,000.00 were
Associate Justice
properly considered by the CA as applying to the principal amount of her loan
Chairperson
obligations.

CERTIFICATION
With respect to the ₱20,000,000.00 check, the defense of respondent Nicdao that it
was stolen and that she never issued or delivered the same to petitioner Ching was
corroborated by the other defense witnesses, namely, Tolentino and Jocelyn Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Nicdao. Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
All told, as between petitioner Ching and respondent Nicdao, the requisite quantum
of evidence - preponderance of evidence - indubitably lies with respondent Nicdao.
As earlier intimated, she cannot be held civilly liable to petitioner Ching for her REYNATO S. PUNO
acquittal; under the circumstances which have just been discussed lengthily, such Chief Justice
acquittal carried with it the extinction of her civil liability as well.
Republic of the Philippines
The CA committed no reversible error in not consolidating CA-G.R. CR No. SUPREME COURT
23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 Manila

During the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 23055 and CA-G.R. CR No. 23054 in THIRD DIVISION
the CA, the pertinent provision of the RIRCA on consolidation of cases provided:
G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009
SEC. 7. Consolidation of Cases. – Whenever two or more allied cases are assigned
to different Justices, they may be consolidated for study and report to a single ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
Justice. vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.
(a) At the instance of any party or Justice to whom the case is assigned for study
and report, and with the conformity of all the Justices concerned, the consolidation DECISION
may be allowed when the cases to be consolidated involve the same parties and/or
related questions of fact and/or law.53
NACHURA, J.:

The use of the word "may" denotes the permissive, not mandatory, nature of the
above provision, Thus, no grave error could be imputed to the CA when it This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
proceeded to render its decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23055, without consolidating the Order dated January 2, 20062 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18,
it with CA-G.R. CR No. 23054. Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy
and Tessie Sy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The antecedents are as follows—

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila
against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for
Associate Justice issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860
for ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored
WE CONCUR: upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against
Associate Justice respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case
Nos. 341458-59).
A. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for
failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of
Associate Justice Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953
contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is
ATTESTATION purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."4

57
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
in its Order5 dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases,
identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained
pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.1avvphi1 pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14 that the possible single civil liability arising from the act
of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch
instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22,
18, Manila, a complaint 6 for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil
simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the
Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of ₱600,000.00 covered
prohibition against forum shopping. 15 Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case
by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have
elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal
In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, proceedings to the exclusion of the other.16
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to
collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-
Revised Rules of Court.
969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused
and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the liability
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court denied in its Order9 of the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal effect of a reservation
dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue – by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly
instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.17
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and
Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account
prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed
where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg.
respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
accused (respondents herein)?10
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the same
20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s action to
December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the
application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is
deemed instituted with the latter—
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case;

xxx
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal
action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the case; (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil
liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the right to have
the civil liability litigated in a separate action; Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
liability might arise did not exist;
the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
ex-delicto pursuant to Article 3111 of the Civil Code; and lien on the judgment.

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
2912 of the Civil Code. commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
BP Blg. 22 proceedings. the civil and criminal actions.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now
litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
amount of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
deemed instituted with the criminal cases.13 litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It

58
is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy available to
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.18 petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the
dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied
her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP
Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks.
It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it
civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any
action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be
is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be
the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently
the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 against petitioner.
cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on
account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such
cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22,
benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine
Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.19
simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle of
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on
in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.26
should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.20
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest
would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents the ₱600,000.00 opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation
allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by
Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 technicalities.27 For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of
(Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the
Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
unreasonable length of time.21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the same circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in
defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the favor of petitioner.
amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled
It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered
private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when
he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial and
SO ORDERED.
when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP
Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to
the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to
recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. WE CONCUR:
Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of
evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil Associate Justice
liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the Chairperson
BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their Associate Justice Associate Justice
counsel.22 But this rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s mistake is so
great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2)
where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
of liberty or property without due process of law. 23 Tested against these guidelines, Associate Justice
we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.
ATTESTATION
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws
and rules and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar. 24
Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be more conscientious
in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity Associate Justice
to public service.25 Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself Chairperson, Third Division

59
 CERTIFICATION SO ORDERED.3

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Thereafter, in a Decision dated December 5, 2001 rendered in Criminal Case Nos.
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had 277576 to 78, the MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of the
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC, however, found
opinion of the Court’s Division. Caroline civilly liable in favor of respondent for the amounts covered by these
checks, to wit:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice WHEREFORE, accused Caroline Siok Ching Teng is acquitted of the
charge for violation of BP Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is ordered civilly liable
Republic of the Philippines
to the offended party for the amounts of the checks subject of the three
SUPREME COURT
informations herein, i.e., P1,200,000.00, P1,975,250.00 and
Manila
P2,000,000.00.

THIRD DIVISION
SO ORDERED.4

G.R. No. 158177 January 28, 2008

Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the
deletion of the award of civil indemnity, but it was denied by the MTC per Order
SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG, dated April 12, 2002. Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC, which docketed the case
petitioners, as Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46.
vs.
VICENTE BALBOA, respondent.
In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal the
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61457.
DECISION In the assailed Decision dated November 20, 2002, the CA 5 dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. The dispositive portion of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: the assailed CA Decision reads:

The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding no reversible error
charge Vicente Balboa (respondent) with forum shopping. in the appealed Decision dated August 11, 1998 of Branch 34 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 97-82225, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and said Decision is affirmed
On February 24, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of in toto.
Manila (Branch 34), Civil Case No. 97-82225 for Collection of Sum of Money
against petitioners. The amount sought covers three post-dated checks issued by
petitioner Caroline Siok Ching Teng (Caroline), as follows: Asia Trust Check No. SO ORDERED.6
BNDO57546 dated December 30, 1996 for P2,000,000.00; Asia Trust Check No.
BNDO57547 dated January 15, 1997 for P1,200,000.00; and Asia Trust Check No. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but this was denied per
BNDO57548 dated January 31, 1997 for P1,975,250.00 - or a total of Resolution dated April 21, 2003.7
P5,175,250.00.1
On May 8, 2003, the RTC as an appellate court, rendered its Decision in Criminal
On July 21, 1997, separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Case No. 02-204544-46, modifying the MTC Decision by deleting the award of
Blg. 22 (B.P. No. 22) were filed against Caroline before the Municipal Trial Court civil damages.8
(MTC) of Manila (Branch 10), covering the said three checks. These cases were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78.2
Now before the Court for resolution is the Amended Petition filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, questioning the CA Decision dated November 20, 2002 and
On August 11, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225 Resolution dated April 21, 2003, on the lone ground that:
finding petitioners liable, as follows:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
and against the defendants ordering the latter: ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER TWICE FOR
THE SAME OBLIGATION ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAID PRIVATE
1. To play the plaintiff the sum of P5,175,250.00 plus 6% interest per RESPONDENT'S DELIBERATE FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO
annum until full payment; INFORM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE CIVIL
OBLIGATION BEING SUED UPON IS THE SUBJECT OF
CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS WITH THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
2. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. COURT, AND FOR WHICH THE CIVIL OBLIGATION WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY ADJUDGED.9
3. To pay the cost of suit.
Petitioners contend that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution should be
The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. reconsidered and the RTC Decision dated August 11, 1998 dismissed as
respondent's act of filing Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos.
277576 to 78 constitutes forum shopping.

60
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an adverse application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
civil action for certiorari.10 actions.

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth noting
parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; that Civil Case No. 97-82225 was filed on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on Nos. 277576 to 78 on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court
the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case
any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, the governing rule is Section
under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.11 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:

In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.,12 the SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal
Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil case action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
the dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim. The institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Court stated:
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised
x x x The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to the accused.
maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for
the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused. Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect
of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1)
amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner, represents the there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute
amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. x x x a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint. 14
Since respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil
Case No. 97-82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to
This was reiterated in Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp. v. Demetria,13 where
78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
the civil case for the recovery of the amount covered by the bouncing checks was
also ordered dismissed.
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil
liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed
In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
ahead of the criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the Court noted, viz.:
effective September 16, 1997, which provides:

x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
Procedure ] was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court
Procedure, to wit: is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases
filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil,
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the
policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case
the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. Where petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the

61
 proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover Republic of the Philippines
civil liability is clearly unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied) SUPREME COURT
Manila
Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46, already
deleted the award of civil damages. Records do not disclose that appeal had been THIRD DIVISION
taken therefrom. There is, therefore, no double recovery of the amounts covered by
the checks or unjust enrichment on the part of respondent.
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, Petitioners,
November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
vs.
are AFFIRMED.
ELVIN* CHAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

Costs against petitioners.

DECISION

SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
Associate Justice
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).

Antecedents
WE CONCUR:
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No.
Associate Justice
275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
Chairperson

*RENATO C. CORONA ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAThat sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
Associate Justice Associate Justice accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check No. 0007280
RUBEN T. REYES dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of ₱336,000.00 said
Associate Justice accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days
from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed
to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
ATTESTATION

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00). 2 He alleged in his
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO complaint the following:
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
xxx

2. Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit, and

misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the
CERTIFICATION amount of ₱336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check
is duly funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division of the Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had Annex "A";
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division. 3. However, when said check was presented for payment the same was
dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with the
REYNATO S. PUNO Land Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his
Chief Justice representation that he has an existing account with the said bank and

62
 that the said check was duly funded and will be honored when It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal action is
presented for payment; instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately xxx.
4. Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good the
payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is
hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand defendant On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with
refused and continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff’s valid demand; application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, stating:

5. Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the 1. The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff’s
plaintiff’s valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same
services of counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorney’s parties for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency
fees the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus additional amount of ₱2,000.00 per of Criminal Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
appearance. Eduardo Simon" renders this case dismissable;

ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER 2. The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not
6. The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contest; however, it is the submission of the plaintiff that an implied
contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that
reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first,
there is no sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which
by the fact that the information for violation of B.P. 22 in Criminal
fraud consist in the misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an
Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of damages
existing account and sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his
suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of damages;
account was already closed at the time he issued a check;
on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case,
during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented
7. That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by
one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the
plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;
preliminary attachment;
3. The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the
8. That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned upon Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal action has
the payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.3 judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; however, the
defendant overlooks and conveniently failed to consider that under
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary Section 2, Rule 111 which provides as follows:
attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff
attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.4 In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,5 pertinently averring: party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
xxx only a preponderance of evidence.

On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code
another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the of the Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the prosecuted independently of the criminal action;
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-
CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, xxx 4. In fact we would even venture to state that even without any
reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action still the
plaintiff is authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks
xxx to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by
virtue of the negotiable instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued
While the instant case is civil in nature and character as contradistinguished from the defendant to enforce his liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff
the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, as payee of the check. Assuming the allegation of the defendant of the
Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the herein plaintiff’s criminal alleged circumstances relative to the issuance of the check, still when he
complaint against defendant arising from a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain Pedro Domingo, as
Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in plaintiff’s hands upon it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by delivery by who
presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was valid and
December 26, 1996 in the amount of ₱336,000- drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff effective against the drawer;
by defendant who is the accused in said case, a photocopy of the Criminal
information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila on June 11, 1997
hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "1".

63
 5. Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff’s submission that the herein case for
the circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it would be sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article 33 of the Civil
entirely impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to wit:
was intended only for a definite person and was not negotiable
considering that the said check was payable to bearer and was not even
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
crossed;
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
6. We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart from criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
the criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising from the Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case since the require only a preponderance of evidence."
liability of the defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are
created by the negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation
xxx
at all this instant action may still be prosecuted;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

7. Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff’s complaint the application
for damages against the bond is totally without any legal support and
perforce should be dismissed outright.6 1. Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to 2. Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on August
dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, 7 14, 2000;
dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
3. Charge the plaintiff’s bond the amount of ₱336,000.00 in favor of
xxx the defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of the
implementation of the writ of attachment;
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to GRANT the
Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff’s bond for damages. 4. Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost
dispatch to the defendant’s physical possession the vehicle seized from
him on August 16, 2000; and
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, 5. Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱5,000.00 by way
the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases of attorney’s fees.
should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. xxx SO ORDERED.

A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of Money" and the Chan’s motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000,8 viz:
criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show that the parties are
not only identical but also the cause of action being asserted, which is the recovery
of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the amount of ₱336,000.00. In Considering that the plaintiff’s arguments appear to be a mere repetition of his
both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefs previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already passed upon;
being founded on the same facts, are identical. and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi in the Tactaquin
vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case, the plaintiff therein
expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action, the Motion for
Plaintiff’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
civil case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22
case and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution
evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal SO ORDERED.
Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the
unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the meantime, the offended dismissal of Chan’s complaint, disposing:9
party has instituted a separate civil action. xxx The over-all import of the said
provision conveys that the waiver which includes indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
must be both clear and express. And this must be logically so as the primordial AFFIRMED in toto.
objective of the Rule is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. SO ORDERED.

Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a reservation On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition
as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for violation of BP for review,10 challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint on the
Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view of this court, the ground of litis pendentia.
filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally barred. The right
to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to
In his comment, 11 Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and malice in
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him (Simon) utter
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. xxx
embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the civil case

64
because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule 16 of the The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted. civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this
case.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 12 overturning the
RTC, viz: Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. xxx
xxx

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for damages on
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the
social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired through
Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its
the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury
filing."
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through
indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant suit. The
complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil
Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check which later
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of the criminal
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be true that the
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent
civil action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may be given
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench, since
effective on December 1, 2000, provides that: procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no vested rights in
the rules of procedure.
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to adjudge
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right damages in favor of the petitioner.
to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 13,
Rule 111, Section 2 further states: 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108 affirming the
dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby REVERSED and SET
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action. SO ORDERED.

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon’s motion for reconsideration.13
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the
rule has been changed.
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously
premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court pronounced action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA’s reliance
that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted on the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez 14 stretched the
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a
action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme Court held: sum of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.15
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The In his comment,16 Chan counters that the petition for review should be denied
reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of action,
the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance of a
of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate
Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted civil action.
separately without a reservation".
Issue
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
The lone issue is whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
Ruling
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. The petition is meritorious.

65
 Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court.
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can
actual damages.
give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr.,17 holding:

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused

xxx
in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. separately shall be allowed.18

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which
suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
(United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil 265).
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
xxx commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of
is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was the civil and criminal actions.
issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
so may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check omission charged in the criminal action.
due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee.
The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when
naught. Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
xxx not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. 19 Any new rules may
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,
check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, 20
Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides: except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit
or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense unconstitutional for being ex post factounder the Constitution.21
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of
the civil action prior to the criminal action. any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and
of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes
amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

66
 1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no the civil and criminal actions.1avvphi1
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.22
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It
specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed
2. Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing
the check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action
claimed, in accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees
Section 8 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets
Administrative Circular No. 11-94 effective August 1, 1994. Where the which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
offended party further seeks to enforce against the accused civil liability Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages,
by way of liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit
he shall pay the corresponding filing fees therefor based on the amounts gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.
thereof as alleged either in the complaint or information. If not so The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly
alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
judgment. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil,
only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid
down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial
even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation
accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of
of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil
Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would
only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and
4. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must
circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997. be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings
before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt Industrial unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22,
Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation,23 thus: Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at
bar.24

xxx
The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez 25 to give due
course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for
cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of
checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, 26 the
for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct
The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer needed. The Rules crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the
provide: offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — Code,27 as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22,
however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of
a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the
(a) x x x bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation, supra.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file To repeat, Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved
such civil action separately shall be allowed. in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently
maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which fraud and deceit.
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or B
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
on the ground of litis pendentia
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions

67
 Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in CERTIFICATION
Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in
Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of opinion of the Court’s Division.
parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must
be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
RENATO C. CORONA
same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
Chief Justice
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility
of the existence of the third becomes nil.28 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably
shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties
in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No. FIRST DIVISION
915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in
Criminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth ₱336,000.00
payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed
for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,
in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily vs.
bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND
same claim. CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.

It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October 23,
2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC. G.R. No. 159059

Wherefore, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and, accordingly, we VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION
reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, OF DEMETRIO T. COMENDADOR,Petitioner,
2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan vs.
Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City. VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.

Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent. DECISION

SO ORDERED. PEREZ, J.:

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN At bench are appeals by certiorari1 from the Decision2 of the Fourth Division of the
Associate Justice Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T. Comendador 3 (Mayor Comendador) and
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.4 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of
WE CONCUR: Republic Act No. 3019; (2) dismissing the cases against accused Alberto S.
Angeles;5 (3) ordering the defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. to pay the plaintiffs now
ARTURO D. BRION** respondents Visitacion C. Bombasi (Visitacion) and Cesar C. Bombasi damages;
Associate Justice and (4) dismissing the cases against the spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza 6 and
Acting Chairperson Benita and Isagani Coronado.7

ROBERTO A. ABAD*** MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. The factual antecedents of the case are:
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda. De

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna
Associate Justice (represented by the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a
lease contract whereby the Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property
ATTESTATION comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E. Fernandez
Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan, Laguna, in favor of the respondent’s mother for a
period of twenty (20) years beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998,
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation extendible for another 20 years.8
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall
ARTURO D. BRION on her rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

68
modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential Kung kaya ang Sangguniang Bayan ay buong pagkakaisang IPINASIYA: Ang
rights. pagbibigay kapangyarihan kay Kgg. Demetrio T. Comendador na ipagiba ang
anumang istrakturang nagiging sagabal sa mabilis at maayos na pagbabangon ng
pamilihang bayan.15
Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. 9 From then
on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits.10
On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also
sent a letter16 to Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her store
Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s
the next day. Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter 17 to Asilo,
request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe
alleging that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court
(Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, 11
order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only
Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and
the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further replied
stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality
that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative, criminal and civil
of Nagcarlan.
actions will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will
take part in the demolition.
The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.
On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang
On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from Mayor Comendador Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with
directing her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.
letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 15613dated 30 August
1993 and a Memorandum issued by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Marianito
Engineer Winston Cabrega (Engineer Cabrega), a licensed civil engineer, estimated
Sasondoncillo of Laguna.
the cost of the demolished property as amounting to ₱437,900.0018

The relevant provisos of the Resolution No. 156 states that:

On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi
(Spouses Bombasi) filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a
NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Civil Case19 for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of
Demetrio T. Comendador to enforce and order the Coronado’s to demolish the Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr., and
building constructed on the space previously rented to them in order to give way Alberto S. Angeles. The complaint was soon after amended to include the Spouses
for the construction of a new municipal market building. Benita and Isagani Coronado and Spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza as formal
defendants because they were then the occupants of the contested area.
RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor
of Nagcarlan to file an Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses The spouses prayed for the following disposition:
incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronado’s
continuously resists the order.
1. RESTRAINING or ENJOINING defendant Municipality and
defendant Municipal Mayor from leasing the premises subject of lease
On 3 September 1993, Visitacion wrote a reply letter to Mayor Comendador saying Annex "A" hereof, part of which is now occupied by PNP Outpost and
that: (1) the lease contract was still existing and legally binding; (2) she was by the Municipal Collectors’ Office, and the equivalent adjacent area
willing to vacate the store as long as same place and area would be given to her in thereof, and to cause the removal of said stalls;
the new public market; and (3) in case her proposals are not acceptable to Mayor
Comendador, for the latter to just file an unlawful detainer case against her
2. UPHOLDING the right of plaintiffs to occupy the equivalent corner
pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 156. Pertinent portions of the letter
area of the leased areas being now assigned to other persons by
read:
defendants Municipality and/or by defendant Municipal Mayor, and to
allow plaintiffs to construct their stalls thereon;
x x x With all due respect to the resolution of the Municipal Council and the
opinion rendered by the Laguna Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, it is my considered
3. MAKING the injunction permanent, after trial;
view, however, arrived at after consultation with my legal counsel, that our existing
lease contract is still legally binding and in full force and effect. Lest I appear to be
defiant, let me reiterate to you and the council that we are willing to vacate the said 4. ORDERING defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
building provided that a new contract is executed granting to us the same space or following –
lot and the same area. I believe that our proposal is most reasonable and fair under
the circumstance. If you are not amenable to the said proposal, I concur with the
(a) ₱437,900.00 for loss of building/store and other items
position taken by the Council for you to file the appropriate action in court for
therein;
unlawful detainer to enable our court to finally thresh out our
differences.141avvphi1
(b) ₱200,000.00 for exemplary damages;
On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter
to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was (c) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be
filed against her. (d) ₱30,.00 for attorney’s fees and ₱700.00 for every
attendance of counsel in court.
On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued
Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being 5. GRANTING further reliefs upon plaintiffs as justice and equity may
occupied by Visitacion using legal means. The significant portion of the Resolution warrant in the premises.20
reads:

69
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint 21 against Mayor In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused Demetrio T. Comendador and
Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of
3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Republic Act. No. 3019 as amended, and in the absence of aggravating and
Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an Information 22 against Mayor mitigating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused
Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed, which reads: are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 2 months
imprisonment as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as maximum.
That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public The order of the court dated September 22, 1999 dismissing the cases against the
officers, accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Alberto S. Angeles, who died on November 16, 1997 is hereby reiterated.
accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the Municipal Administrator and accused
Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and Development
In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio
Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime
T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to
herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as actual damages for the destruction of the store;
their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each other, and with
P100,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost
evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, did
of the suit. The prayer for exemplary damages is denied as the court found no
then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the demolition of a public
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.
market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion
Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus, causing
undue injury to the latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY In view of this court’s finding that the defendant spouses Alida and Teddy Coroza
SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (₱437,900.00). are lawful occupants of the subject market stalls from which they cannot be validly
ejected without just cause, the complaint against them is dismissed. The complaint
against defendant spouses Benita and Isagani Coronado is likewise dismissed, it
Upon their arraignments, all the accused entered their separate pleas of "Not
appearing that they are similarly situated as the spouses Coroza. Meanwhile,
Guilty."
plaintiff Visitacion Bombasi is given the option to accept market space being given
to her by the municipality, subject to her payment of the appropriate rental and
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the permit fees.
consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94) 23 with Criminal Case No. 23267
pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
The prayer for injunctive relief is denied, the same having become moot and
1606, which pertinently reads:
academic.

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the

The compulsory counterclaim of defendant Comendador is likewise denied for lack
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
of merit.26
arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily Within the same day, Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such Reconsideration27 of the Decision alleging that there was only an error of judgment
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, when he complied with and implemented the order of his superior, Mayor
however, that where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no liability when a public officer
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed commits in good faith an error of judgment. The Sandiganbayan, on its
with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be Resolution28 dated 21 July 2003 denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for ground that good faith cannot be argued to support his cause in the face of the
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the court’s finding that bad faith attended the commission of the offense charged. The
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.24 Court further explained that the invocation of compliance with an order of a
superior is of no moment for the "demolition [order] cannot be described as having
the semblance of legality inasmuch as it was issued without the authority and
During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16 November 1997.
therefore the same was patently illegal."29
Accordingly, the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On
22 September 1999, the Third Division of Sandiganbayan issued an Order 25
DISMISSING the case against Angeles. The germane portion of the Order reads: The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration 30 on 12
May 2003 alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both
his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan on its Resolution 31granted the
In view of the submission of the death certificate of accused/defendant Alberto S.
Motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied
Angeles, and there being no objection on the part of the Public Prosecutor, cases
the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent
against deceased accused/defendant Angeles only, are hereby DISMISSED.
civil action.

The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a result, the

Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.32
counsel of the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before the
Sandiganbayan informing the court of the fact of Mayor Comendador’s death.
Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public
On 28 April 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
officer must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
of which reads as follows:
negligence. He also contended that he and his co-accused acted in good faith in the
demolition of the market and, thereby, no liability was incurred.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
On the other hand, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor Comendador
prior to the promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor

70
Comendador’s criminal liability but also his civil liability. She also asserted good was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable
faith on the part of the accused public officials when they performed the demolition negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein
of the market stall. Lastly, she contended that assuming arguendo that there was accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store.
indeed liability on the part of the accused public officials, the actual amount of
damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and was not duly
"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
substantiated.
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will.36 [It] contemplates a state of mind
Liability of the accused public officials affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or
under Republic Act No. 3019 ill will or for ulterior purposes.37

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides: It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad
faith in performing the demolition.
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents’ structure is a public
hereby declared to be unlawful: nuisance. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it
is nuisance per se.38 Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under
any circumstance, regardless of location and surroundings. 39 In this case, the
xxxx
market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the
Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the District Engineer Office.40 To quote:
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
An inspection has been made on the building (a commercial establishment) cited
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
above and found out the following:
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

1. It is a two-storey building, sketch of which is attached.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers
or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers
commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in 2. It is located within the market site.
relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party,
whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by
3. The building has not been affected by the recent fire.
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other party; and (5)
that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.33 4. The concrete wall[s] does not even show signs of being exposed to
fire.41
We sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against
petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador as here represented by his Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition.
widow Victoria Bueta. Unlike its predecessor law,42 the present Local Government Code43 does not
expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance. 44 And even assuming that the
power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused public
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that it is undisputable that the first two requisites
officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the
of the criminal offense were present at the time of the commission of the
store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador
complained acts and that, as to the remaining elements, there is sufficient amount
was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to obey
of evidence to establish that there was an undue injury suffered on the part of the
the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of
Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted with evident bad
demolition without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the
faith when they performed the demolition of the market stall.
resolutions, as indeed, it is a legally impossible provision.

Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean
Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then
actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence.34
Mayor Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business
permits45 in favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual." Undue has provides that, through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against
wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or the person relying thereon. The representation made by the municipality that the
property [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual Spouses Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its store binds the
damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.35 municipality. It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the benefits of the
store operation and later on claim the illegality of the business.
It is evident from the records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that
Asilo and Mayor Comendador as accused below did not deny that there was indeed The bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal offense of
damage caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition. We affirm the violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith serves as the
finding that: source of the civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.

xxx. Clearly, the demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried out without a court It must be noted that when Angeles died on 16 November 1997, a motion to drop
order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to him as an accused was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part of the
obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and issued an

71
Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations, were cited
Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which by the prosecution to substantiate its argument that the civil action based therein is
resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor Comendador’s an independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the accused during the
counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground that the civil pendency of the case.
liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived the death of the accused. The
Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the prosecution which disposition was not
On the other hand, the defense invoked Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,
appealed.
as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, in support of its argument that the civil
action was dependent upon the criminal action, thus, was extinguished upon the
We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the death of the accused. The law provides that:
pendency of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the civil liability of Mayor criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
Comendador survived his death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
had it not been for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by, the Sandiganbayan, the
extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality. filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such action shall be recognized.
(Emphasis ours)
We laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas:46

We agree with the prosecution.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed.
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation,
strictiore." the law on human relations.49 The pertinent articles follow:

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
a) Law
And, Art. 32(6) states:
b) Contracts
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
c) Quasi-contracts indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
d) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
e) Quasi-delicts. (Emphasis ours)

xxxx
Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action 47 and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the As held in Aberca v. Ver:
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision [Art. 32 of the New
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
Civil Code] is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which should
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
those sacred rights with impunity. x x x.50

Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused;
human relations. First, the complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for damages
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.48
specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s right
to due process. Thus:

72
xxxx To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of
loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable.55 In this case, the Court finds that the only evidence
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question, the individual
presented to prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized list of damaged
natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a
and lost items56 prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by the
power which belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done with
Spouses Bombasi to estimate the costs.
malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the property rights of
plaintiff(s) without due process of law.
As held by this Court in Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation v. People of
the Philippines,57
xxxx

x x x [W]e agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right to
that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to ₱100,000.00.
private property of the Spouses Bombasi. The accused public officials should have
The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by
accorded the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and
private respondent were the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus
New Civil Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense
R. Regal, Jr. amounting to ₱171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB
will not, as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This
Construction and Steel Fabricator to private respondent for ₱35,000.00
Court in a number of decisions 51 held that even if there is already a writ of
representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works.
execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of
Respondents failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its five-page
demolition issued by the court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or
decision, the trial court awarded ₱150,000.00 as actual damages to private
remove improvements over the contested property.52 The pertinent provisions are
respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such award. Indeed, the trial
the following:
court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of
₱150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special apartment." The appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the
order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Rules amount of ₱100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the appellate court merely
of Court provides: declared:

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. – When the With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no
property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment in question considering the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident. Consequently,
said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of appellants continue, the award of ₱150,000.00 as compensation sustained by the
the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.
the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
Further, in one case,58 this Court held that the amount claimed by the respondent-
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is claimant’s witness as to the actual amount of damages "should be admitted with
necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be
parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition.53 supported by independent evidence." The Court further said that whatever claim
the respondent witness would allege must be appreciated in consideration of his
This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been particular self-interest.59 There must still be a need for the examination of the
litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no documentary evidence presented by the claimants to support its claim with regard
case was even filed by the municipality. to the actual amount of damages.

The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of The price quotation made by Engineer Cabrega presented as an exhibit 60 partakes
justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the person who issued them was
execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision of not presented as a witness.61 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is
the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay
honesty and good faith.54 evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent
can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence
rule.62 Further, exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact
that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein
petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages claimed, this
petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Court grants temperate damages for ₱200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by
Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are awarded in accordance with Art.
Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil 2224 of the New Civil Code when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
and criminal cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising certainty. The amount of temperate or moderated damages is usually left to the
from the offense charged." discretion of the courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that the
temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory. 63
Without a doubt, the Spouses Bombasi suffered some form of pecuniary loss in the
We must, however, correct the amount of damages awarded to the Spouses impairment of their store. Based on the record of the case, 64the demolished store
Bombasi. was housed on a two-story building located at the market’s commercial area and its
concrete walls remained strong and not affected by the fire. However, due to the
failure of the Spouses Bombasi to prove the exact amount of damage in accordance

73
 with the Rules of Evidence,65 this court finds that ₱200,000.00 is the amount just This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
and reasonable under the circumstances. CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated
31 July 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros
Occidental, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 98-2025, finding
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH of the crime of rape, committed against AAA, 3 thus, sentencing him to suffer the
MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court increased the award of indemnity
Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic from ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It also ordered appellant to pay AAA moral
Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In view of the
death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information 4 dated
extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan,
29 December 1997, which reads as follows:
Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda.
De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for
temperate damages in the amount of ₱200,000.00 and moral damages in the That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX,
amount of ₱100,000.00. Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named [appellant], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
Costs against the petitioners-appellants. and/or sexual intercourse with the [AAA], 44 years old, against her will.5

SO ORDERED. On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits ensued thereafter.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the
amount of ₱40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC
WE CONCUR: ratiocinated that AAA’s testimony as regards her ordeal was simple and
straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no
RENATO C. CORONA inconsistency in her testimony. Further, AAA’s declaration that she was raped by
Chief Justice appellant was corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her
Chairperson vagina at 6:00 o’clock quadrant of the crevice, which was explained by Dr.
Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates
the "sweet heart" defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellant’s claim of
CONCHITA CAPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. being AAA’s lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the consequence of
Associate Justice Associate Justice his dastardly lust. AAA’s immediate response of reporting the rape incident carries
the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship between
appellant and AAA, the latter would not have pursued this case. It bears stressing
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO that despite appellant’s repeated plea for the dismissal of the case, AAA remained
Associate Justice steadfast in seeking justice for the violation of her womanhood.6

CERTIFICATION Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a
Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000. 7 In light, however, of this Court’s
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the pronouncement in People v. Mateo,8 the case was transferred to the Court of
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case Appeals for intermediate review per Resolution 9 dated 4 October 2004.
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s
conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity from
RENATO C. CORONA
₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in
Chief Justice
the amount of ₱50,000.00. The Court of Appeals aptly observed that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed
Republic of the Philippines the crime of rape against AAA. It further held that other than the self-serving
SUPREME COURT declaration of appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence was
Baguio ever presented to substantiate such claim. Even the testimony of appellant’s
daughter, who claimed that her father and AAA are maintaining an illicit
relationship, could not be given any considerable weight. Aside from the fact that
SECOND DIVISION appellant’s daughter could not point to any other circumstance supporting her
claim, except for one incident when she allegedly saw her father and AAA holding
G.R. No. 200030 April 18, 2012 hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta, her testimony could not be stripped
of bias and partiality considering that she is the daughter of appellant. In the same
way, her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the time of the
vs. commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in a position to state
NELSON BAYOT y SATINA, Accused-Appellant. with certainty that there was no struggle on the part of AAA. Hence, her testimony
regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of fact.10
RESOLUTION
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006, 11 Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal
PEREZ, J.: Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that

74
appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
his letter is the original copy of appellant’s Certificate of Death.12 right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of Appeal13 dated 31
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution 14
[the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
dated 19 January 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
prescription.18

Taking into consideration appellant’s death, this Court will now determine its
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
effect to this present appeal.
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex
delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished
Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or grounded as it is on the criminal case.19
based on said crime.15
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the Paniterce,20 it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s
effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at
thus: the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and
extinguished: this Court’s ruling in People v. Bayotas.

1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 – finding appellant guilty of the
occurs before final judgment; [Emphasis supplied]. crime of rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA
₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages – had become
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, 16 which was ineffectual.
cited in a catena of cases,17 had laid down the following guidelines:
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No.
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. 00269 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense SO ORDERED.
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the

death of [the] accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts
EN BANC
d) x x x x x x x x x
G.R. No. 127444 September 13, 2000
e) Quasi-delicts
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate DECISION
of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

75
This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course.
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second look at Kepner, it being
twice for the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the accused was the "cornerstone of the battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" in the
acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence against him in the cases for murder and Philippines3 and seriously examine whether the precedents it established almost a
frustrated murder (although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the century ago are still germane and useful today in view of certain modifications
illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged did not constitute a violation of law. wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v.
But the State through this petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed. Wilson4 and United States v. Scott.5

We narrate a brief factual backdrop. Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed.
One is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court where the result actually intended is the reversal of the
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila,
acquittal of private respondent Galvez. The other is the permissibility of a review
was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life
by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict
of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who
against double jeopardy.
permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot.
A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and
burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure. The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins
(not discounting too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from the service)
may arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic, thus calling for a
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two
dismissal of the petition on this basis alone. The Court however is not insensitive
(2) for frustrated homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court
to nor oblivious of the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully
of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and
presented by the Government considering especially the alleged new directions in
Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. On
American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus
14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed
impelled to respond to the issues advanced by petitioner for these bear
against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-
unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and implications in Philippine
M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93).
juristic philosophy and experience, demanding no less, explicit and definitive
Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 (Crim. Case
rulings.
No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence,
a fourth Information had to be filed.
For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of
the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous and
After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred
tortuous route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were
tried or prosecuted a second time for the same offense. 6 This prohibition does not
stamped with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486
consist merely of one rule but several, each rule applying to a different situation,
and Q-94-55487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge
each rule marooned in a sea of exceptions. 7 It must have been this unique
Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and
transpiration that prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S.
the cases were re-raffled to respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
Supreme Court to remark in Albernaz v. United States8 that "the decisional law (in
the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt forming a correct perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on double
of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor jeopardy and the rules so far established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of
Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also judgments of acquittal, a compendious review of its historical growth and
absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the development be undertaken. This approach is particularly helpful in properly
act was not a violation of law. situating and analyzing landmark interpretive applications of the doctrine in light
of the varying legal and factual milieu under which it evolved.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the
Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word," 9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning joke,
Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of jest or game,10 and also from the French term "jeu perdre" which denotes a game
petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie"
responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of means an uncertain game.11 The genesis of the concept itself however rests deep in
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal
Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and concepts of punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original
evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of verdict as can be seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue." 12 The Justinian Digest13
gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination providing that "(a) governor should not permit the same person to be again accused
of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not of crime of which he has been acquitted,"14 suggests certain philosophical
transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this underpinnings believed to have been influenced by works of the great Greek
is necessary because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting man’s "tragic vision" or the tragic
with a verdict of guilt. view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was continuously pitted
against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was
not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to another without
The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a
culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself
the trial court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice
accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional doctrine in the for the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals
decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should
judgment be overturned.1 Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that
sourced from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed
particularly the case of Kepner v. United States,2and because similarly in this on prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of preventing a second
jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in the first law of the

76
Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man and has charged him with run down by repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of
manslaughter and then has not proved [it against him], his accuser shall be put to this rule, a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant is
death."15 acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but not against him." 28 Verily,
these concepts were founded upon that great fundamental rule of common law,
"Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in substance expressed in the
The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is
Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same
consistent with the interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by God
offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this
to his people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the
benign rule of the common law, embodied in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of
second time"16 and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no more." 17
liberty and justice, tempered with mercy - that, in several states of the Union, in
Taken to mean that God does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim
criminal cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State.29
insinuated itself into canon law as early as 847 A. D., succintly phrased as "(n)ot
even God judges twice for the same act."18
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to
order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a no small amount of
The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the
controversy in United States v. Gibert. 30 There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit,
dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas á Becket,
declared that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the first trial had
Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance of certain
been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction." The
customs initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines," one of the
opinion formulated was that the prohibition against double jeopardy applied
known purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church
equally whether the defendant had been acquitted or convicted.
courts be delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions
of Clarendon that the clergy were also subject to the king’s punishment. This was
met with stinging criticism and stiff opposition by the Archbishop who believed But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the
that allowing this practice would expose the clergy to double jeopardy. The issue most serious cases was already being exercised by many American courts, the
between the two erstwhile friends was never resolved and remained open-ended, practice having been observed from an early date, in spite of provisions of law
for Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at the against double jeopardy.31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was stoutly resisted.32
instance of his king.19 As if to taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen33 declared that the
constitutional provision did not prohibit a new trial on defendant’s motion after a
conviction. In Hopt v. Utah,34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally
reversals of his convictions.
institutionalized "as a maxim of common law"20 based on the universal principles
of reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero commented:
"Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball35 affirmed that the
future, but among all nations, it is the same." 21 But even as early as the 15th double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction
century, the English courts already began to use the term "jeopardy" in connection had been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on appeal a reversal
with the doctrine against multiple trials.22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the of a judgment against him could be tried anew upon the same indictment or upon
writings of Hale (17th c.), Lord Coke (17th c.) and Blackstone (18th c.). 23 Lord another indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted. This
Coke for instance described the protection afforded by the rule as a function of principle of autrefois convict was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United
three (3) related common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and States36 where the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
pardon.24 In Vaux’s Case,25 it was accepted as established that "the life of a man Philippines by holding that "since the plaintiffs in error had appealed their
shall not be twice put in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the convictions of the lower offense in order to secure a reversal, there was no bar to
reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good convicting them of the higher offense in proceedings in the appellate court that
plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice Peckham, holding for the Court,
formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of concluded that "the better doctrine is that which does not limit the court or the jury
England that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for upon a new trial, to a consideration of the question of guilt of the lower offense of
the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the
once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before any judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the original
court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in judgment as if it had never been." 37 It was ratiocinated that the result was justified
bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime."26 not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not to be retried but
also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really never intended to x
x x cover the case of a judgment x x x which has been annulled at the request of the
The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an "indispensable
accused x x x x"
requirement of a civilized criminal procedure," became an integral part of the legal
system of the English colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of
1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes and common law It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been
of England, grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a
Justice for one and the same crime, offence or Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action defendant’s jeopardy, and, even when "not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a
betweene partie and partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminall subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental principles of
causes shall be briefly and destinctly entered on the Rolles of every Court by the our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an
Recorder thereof."27 Ineluctably, this pronouncement became the springboard for appeal, even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous."
the proposal of the First Congress of the United States that double jeopardy be
included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that the tradition against placing an
In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs
individual twice in danger of a second prosecution for the same offense followed
of error may be taken from the district court or from the existing circuit courts
ancient precedents in English law and legislation derived from colonial experiences
direct to the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction of the
and necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in the US
Constitution. The following year an issue was raised in United States v. Sanges38 on
Congress, the proposal was subsequently ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to
whether this Act conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of error
the Constitution.
in any criminal case. In that case, existing rules on double jeopardy took a
significant turn when the United States Supreme Court observed that while English
In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an law was vague on the matter, it had been settled by overwhelming American
acquittal from perjury, declaring that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a authority that the State had no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in
writ of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with
no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the same offense. Were it express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or
not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be harassed and upon the determination by the court of a question of law. The Court noted that in a

77
few states, decisions denying a writ of error to the State after a judgment for the jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines and the
defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it Solicitor General of the United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1
would be to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional provision. 39 July 1902 which included the prohibition against double jeopardy should be
Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United construed from the perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines
States Government had no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal prior to its cession to the United States. Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme
as it would expose the defendant twice to jeopardy. Court) could entertain an appeal of a judgment of acquittal since the proceedings
before it were regarded not as a new trial but an extension of preliminary
proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire proceedings constituted one
Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to
continuous trial and the jeopardy that attached in the court of first instance did not
recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in
terminate until final judgment had been rendered by the Audiencia. Double
criminal cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single district
jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real44 as: "After a man
judge (under the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to defeat any
accused of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse
criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the
him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the Siete
proposal until 1906 when President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to
Partidas45 which provided that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any
the US Congress demanded the enactment of legislation on the matter.
offense of which he has been accused, no other person can afterwards accuse him
Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such legislative authority was provided when the
of the offense x x x x" Under this system of law, a person was not regarded as
Criminal Appeals Act became a law40 Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.40 permitting the
jeopardized in the legal sense until there had been a final judgment in the court of
United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision
last resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining courts, exercising
dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the
preliminary jurisdiction only, and the accused was not finally convicted or
statute upon which the indictments is founded."41 The law narrowed the right to
acquitted until the case had been passed upon in the Audiencia or Supreme Court,
appeal by the Government to cases in which the ground of the District Court’s
whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme Court in Madrid (Spain) for
decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the charge was
errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.
founded, and that a verdict in favor of the defendant based on evidence could not
be set aside on appeal no matter how erroneous the legal theory upon which it may
be based. For these purposes, it made no difference whether the verdict be the The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government’s argument and held
result of the jury’s decision or that of the judge. In other words, Government could that the proceedings after acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice in
appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or arresting judgment on the basis jeopardy. It declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment of
of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal statute and conviction was in essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish tradition
from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the defendant would not was, the purpose of Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles
be put in jeopardy.42 of American constitutional jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon
the law of these people newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question
therefore that Kepner soldered into American jurisprudence the precedent that as to
On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United
the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict duly returned and received,
States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State
the court could take no other action than to order his discharge. "x x x (I)t is then
Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until the
the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been
establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the
acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the
military government issued General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of
verdict, and it was found upon a defective indictment. The protection is not x x x
Criminal Procedure then in force by, among others, extending to the Islands the
against the peril of second punishment, but against being tried again for the same
double jeopardy provision under the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. This
offense."46
was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions of President McKinley issued to the
Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft. The Instructions read in
part: "x x x the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills47 where the Court further
should be made to understand, that there are certain great principles of government clarified that "jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an offense of
which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem which a person has already been acquitted x x x x" It was reiterated in 1957 in
essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained in their islands for the sake of their Green v. United States 48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of professed that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed
procedure with which they are familiar x x x x Upon every division and branch of to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible
the Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable conviction more than once for an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth
rules: x x x that x x x no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered final, ending the accused’s
x x x x"43 jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an offense, he cannot be
prosecuted again on the same charge.
General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by
the government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy
1902 of the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored the same since then sailed on, following the main sea lanes charted by Kepner, but not
principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment and in without encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be mentioned, albeit
McKinley’s Instructions by providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same en passant, that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois49 did cause some amount of judicial
criminal offense. It did not take long however for the meaning and significance of soul-shaking in 1959 when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before
the doctrine held forth in McKinley’s Instructions to be placed under severe test a federal district court in Illinois and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a
and scrutiny. year later, Bartkus was indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts
substantially identical to those of the federal charge and was subsequently
convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was
charged with embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court of first
instance, minus a jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the
appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the
reversed. Kepner was sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from public Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to states so that an
office or place of trust. acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state based on the
same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show that the participation of the
federal authorities in the Illinois state prosecution was of such nature as to render
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the
the state proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the state
appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of
indictment essentially a constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double
acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing US
jeopardy attached.

78
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice second trial would be necessitated by a reversal" was attached thereto because
Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black ordinarily, the procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal is
rued that the Court’s ruling by a majority of one only resulted in "further limiting reversed, i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of the case for
the already weakened constitutional guarantees against double prosecution," citing another trial may be allowed if needed.
the earlier case of United States v. Lanza,50 where the Court allowed the federal
conviction and punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and
identical acts by a state court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in
Bartkus, for the first time in its history, the Court allowed the state conviction of a
some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely
defendant already acquitted of the same offense in the federal court. This, Mr.
termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not
Justice Black asserted, was unacceptable, for as the Court previously found in
involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict
Palko v. Connecticut,51 "double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to
acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has
the spirit of our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the
been entered by a trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other
Fourteenth Amendment since some of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of
than insufficiency of evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was
Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by
based is defective; (c) conducts a judicial process that is defective or flawed in
process of absorption x x x x One may infer, from the fewness of the cases, that
some fundamental respect, such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence,
retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse even, in
incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting
the eyes of many, than retrials after conviction."
judgment, i.e., an act of a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict
because of an error appearing on the face of the record that rendered the
Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views judgment;62 or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non obstante
on double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. plea) - one that does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but which
United States,52 decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and is set up as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have been
Kepner that "the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed x x x connected with the case.63 Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of
without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
Constitution." resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of
evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals therefrom non-
repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent
significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the
first time appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining demurrer to This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are
indictment in cases not directly appealable to the Supreme Court.53 However, due to allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To
the many modifications the law was subjected to, construction and interpretation be sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based
became more laborious, effectively transforming appeals into highly technical on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice
procedures. As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete Rehnquist explained that what may seem superficially to be a "disparity in the rules
noire," for even the U.S. Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in a number of governing a defendant’s liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying
occasions with the vagaries of the said Act."54 In one of those unhappy efforts, it purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong
concluded that the Act was "a failure x x x a most unruly child that has not Foo illustrate, the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a
improved with age."55 second trial after an acquittal however mistaken x x x would present an
unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources,
might wear down the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found
The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it
guilty. x x x x On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant to stand trial
with a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government to
again after he has successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset his
appeal whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the legislative
first conviction is not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which
body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional limits of double
the x x x Clause was intended to protect."
jeopardy rather than define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by the courts
on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3)
related protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense after In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy,
acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the seascape of
against multiple punishments for the same offense.56 double jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the
pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are possible provided the
accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this should apply to
In Wilson,57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3)
the case at bar because, anyway, a review of the acquittal of private respondent
protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and
Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only
punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he be
have to examine the evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the
not subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being tried or sentenced
culpability of the accused.
for the same offense.58 And when a defendant has been acquitted of an offense, the
Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to
convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and Petitioner’s own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the case
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." 59 It and receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has been finally
can thus be inferred from these cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the Holmesian
been considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have been permitted only hypothesis in Kepner and, for that matter, the concept under Spanish law then
in few instances and under rigid conditions. applicable in the Philippines before the American colonization, that a trial consists
of one whole continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to
its final disposition by the Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that
Accordingly, in United States v. Scott60 the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2)
this theory has been consistently spurned by both American and Philippine
venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal
jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a
of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the insufficiency of the
judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is,
evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same
quintessentially, a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i. e.,
charge; and second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not
trial by the lower court and the appellate proceedings, as equivalent to two (2)
guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may
separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of
not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be
multiple prosecutions.64 Although Kepner technically involved only one
necessitated by a reversal.61 It would seem that the conditionality of "when a
proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the review by the

79
appellate court, as the equivalent of a second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the
cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle as being addressed to the evil of applicability, if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case.
successive trials.65
Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still
No less than the case of Wilson,66 petitioner’s main anchor for its propositions, behooves us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic
affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected philosophy on double jeopardy vis-à-vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be
the theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that " a man instructive to see how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since
cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause however often Kepner. Has the principle since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an
he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the "unruly child that has not improved with age?"
end of the cause." It declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view
that the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting
The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran
the Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced
observed in People v. Tarok,71 are not indigenous but are a matter of constitutional
that if acquittal is declared on the basis of evidence adduced, double jeopardy
or statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United States, from there
attaches for that particular cause.
it found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of 1902, then in the
Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus a
To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict mere recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adopted from the
ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this
due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the indictment jurisdiction the same line of development - no narrower nor wider - as in the
prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the jury. But Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
it was not an acquittal that involved "factual resolution." It was one anchored on an
extraneous cause. Factual resolution is defined in United States v. Sorenson 67
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this
following the rulings in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as "the finding that government
observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the United
failed to prove all the elements of the offense." It is clear therefore that the acquittal
States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not much
of Wilson, not being based on evidence, could be appealed. The rule therefore
deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For Kepner may be
fixed in Wilson is that where a judge holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and
said to have been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of
not on the basis of evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution
acquittals on jeopardy as they sail safely home. The cases of People v. Bringas,72
may appeal the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed
People v. Hernandez,73 People v. Montemayor,74 City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,75
under the pertinent law.68 This is so since no second trial will ensue, as a reversal
Republic v. Court of Appeals,76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,77 to name a few,
on appeal would merely reinstate the jury’s verdict.69 And if the prosecution is
are illustrative. Certainly, the reason behind this has not been due to a stubborn
upheld, the case simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of the remaining
refusal or reluctance to "keep up with the Joneses," in a manner of speaking, but to
matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy problem was
maintain fidelity to the principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution, statutes
presented because the appellate court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of
and jurisprudence. As early as Julia v. Sotto78 the Court warned that without this
the trial judge, could simply order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated, no new
safeguard against double jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune,
factfinding would be necessary, and the defendant would not be put twice in
safety and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining
jeopardy.70
witness who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and
whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own
The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an accused will and pleasure.
who, having been indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of
two (2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense was prejudiced by pre-
The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person
indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government appealed the
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of double
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The discussions by the
defendant himself seeks to avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a
members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double
mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such
jeopardy of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing
a motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to
appeal on a judgment of acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the
forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier
proposal to make an appeal from acquittal permissible even only "on questions of
of facts."
law provided that a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not be set aside by
reason thereof" was strongly voted down. Thus -
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The
dismissal of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not upon his own
MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The
instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered as
amendment is commendable, but we submit that the reason against far outweighs
having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial on the merits
the reason in favor of it. In the first place, it would tend to multiplicity of suits and
was held during which both government and accused had their respective day in
thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will be expensive if
court.
we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of themselves, who have more
ego than gray matter or more amor propio. In the third place, as has been stated
We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner’s concept of "another by a certain Gentleman, the provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort
trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual interpretation of the of academy of consulting body. In the fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla,
term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the double jeopardy principle fights in the Supreme Court would be one-sided. In the fifth place, as demonstrated
obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause before us, the records show by Delegate Labrador, the matter should be procedural rather than constitutional.
that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous And lastly, as explained by Delegate Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme
it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The Court reverse the judgment of the lower court, the defendant would suffer morally
judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent for the rest of his life. He would walk around under a veil of humiliation, carrying
that the post-verdict acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a with him a stigma.
resolution of facts, Wilson is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case
at bar. The same observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who
For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.
secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any submission to either
judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside

80
PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of double jeopardy or is it just because it need
who are in favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those not be stated in the Bill of Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?
against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is rejected x x x
x
FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we
considered the matter in the Article on the Judiciary. The position I took was that
(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934, p. it was not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict than
361) existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of discretion but it also
required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence.
The case of People v. Bringas79 was the first case to be decided under this
Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme Court, guided by MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to make
Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way 80 against the right of the exercise of that right by the state or offended party restrictive not only through
appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant in a criminal a petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme Court which
case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are really covered by "in
merits or whether his discharge was based upon the trial court’s conclusion of law excess or lack of jurisdiction."
that the trial had failed for some reason to establish his guilt as charged.
But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of the
The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof, opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial court, that is final,
reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935 Constitution. executory and not appealable.
So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary
judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended party or the
Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission state will improve the administration of justice?
attempts were made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the right of
government to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts. The
FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we
proposed text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as follows -
voted on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner
wants to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a motion on the floor.
Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a judgment of
acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court by a petition for
Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.85
review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against the evidence with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 81
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the
effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The
This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed by
pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide -
Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the parties in power,
situation and advantage in criminal cases where the government, with its unlimited
resources, trained detectives, willing officers and counsel learned in the law, stands Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has
arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the courts, unacquainted been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
with their officers or attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified to terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life, liberty or property valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
rested upon the result of the trial."82 substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit
Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that "we could be
the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
subjecting an accused individual to a very serious danger of harassment from a
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information
prosecutor x x x x The harm, however, which will follow from waving this flag of
xxxx
possibility of appeal x x x could be much more than letting a guilty person go." 83
Put to a vote, the proposal was defeated.84
From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites
for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a
Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on the
competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to
Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened the
the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.86 It bears
following exchanges ensued:
repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it
occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction.
MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore,
resolution which allowed an appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is
that states: An acquittal by a trial court is, however, appealable provided that in final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the
such event, the accused shall not be detained or put up bail. This has been deleted trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
by the Commission x x x x
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
FR. BERNAS. Yes. brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.87 Condemning the trial before
the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino,
MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was
which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court minced no
presented and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection
words in declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I recall, the
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal
sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it did not violate
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful. What is the real position, Mr.
denied due process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but a mock trial where the
authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig

81
the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. 99 As
final outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,100 "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
x x x x Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through
process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a
the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of second trial would be unfair.101
acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation,
it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is ‘a
Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw.’ It is a terrible and unspeakable
Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic to the
affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian
American justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts of
head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he
acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the "underlying
invites every man to become a law unto himself; he invites anarchy.’ The
rationale of jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law, has no
contention of respondent-accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal
parallel nor analogy in the Philippine legal system." This is a rather strained if not
ended the case and could not be appealed or reopened without being put in double
facile approach to the issue at hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that
jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:88
insofar as the objective of factfinding is concerned, factfinding forming the core of
the philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a difference between a jury
x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier acquittal and a "judge acquittal, Philippine version." To support its contention,
pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void petitioner sedulously explains that in the United States there is an "emerging
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, consensus to differentiate the constitutional impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis-
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are à-vis judgments of acquittal rendered by the bench." While this consensus may
divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings have emerged in the United States, it is not difficult to surmise that it must have
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts been so because of countless instances of conflict between jury verdicts and
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void x x x x Private judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly, procedural statutes and
respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail the scales must jurisprudence have been wont to draw lines of distinction between the two,
balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society hopefully to keep each other at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our
which they have wronged, must also be equally considered. A judgment of jurisdiction, as we have no juries to speak of, petitioner’s hypothesis is
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither inappropriate.
necessarily spells a triumph of justice.1âwphi1To the party wronged, to the society
offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role.
Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner’s argument lies in its focus on the
They render justice where justice is due.
instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury
versus the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply with the phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the
only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the essential function of factfinding itself which consists of reception, sifting and
prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of factfinding is concerned, there
process.89 The Court in People v. Bocar90 rationalized that the "remand of the exists no difference between the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts are triers of facts. This much petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a close the door on the applicability of the finality rule to our legal system abjectly
second jeopardy."91 fails when one considers that, universally, the principal object of double jeopardy
is the protection from being tried for the second time, whether by jury or judge.
Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
constitutional bedrock is well engraved our own doctrine that acquittals by judges
court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over
on evidentiary considerations cannot be appealed by government. The
the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" 92
jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy having been clearly defined
Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply
by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of
ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
right of an accused against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be finally
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
put to rest.
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty."93 Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent
with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge respondent
judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo,102 it alleges that "respondent
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of
aggravated his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the evidence already presented
his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature
for a proper assessment x x x x It is in completely ignoring the evidence already
of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches
presented x x x that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It
to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." 94 The interest in the
adds that "discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of
finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
liability.95 With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness."103
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.96
Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioner’s certiorari as a
mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial
the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioner’s
completed by a particular tribunal.97 This interest encompasses his right to have his
assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny, review, assessment
guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled
and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot be
to try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal
perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of
trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
the great writ of certiorari.
Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws.98 The ultimate goal is prevention of government

82
We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the G.R. No.148004 January 22, 2007
court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order
that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to the VINCENT E. OMICTIN, Petitioner,
essential requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of vs.
the writ have been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and GEORGE I.
so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems LAGOS, Respondents.
arise concerning the right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general
rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in DECISION
favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly
conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant
contends, in effect, that the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ AZCUNA, J.:
what it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights are being thus
encroached upon.104
This is a petition for certiorari1 with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
seeking the nullification of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as June 30, 2000, and its resolution, dated March 5, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55834
guides to the court in determining the standing of the prosecution to secure by entitled "George I. Lagos v. Hon. Reinato G. Quilala, Presiding Judge of RTC, Br.
certiorari a review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has favored 57, Makati, Hon. Elizabeth Tayo Chua, Asst. City Prosecutor, Makati City, and
the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth the scope and function of Vincent E. Omictin."
certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or
bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication that courts view the writ
of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other In its assailed decision, the CA declared the existence of a prejudicial question and
adequate remedy available,105 and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to ordered the suspension of the criminal proceedings initiated by petitioner Vincent
the effect that the state should not be permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it E. Omictin on behalf of Saag Phils., Inc. against private respondent George I.
cannot do by appeal.106 Thus, if a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered Lagos, in view of a pending case before the Securities and Exchange Commission
after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial (SEC) filed by the latter against the former, Saag Pte. (S) Ltd., Nicholas Ng,
court, the standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to Janifer Yeo and Alex Y. Tan.
be denied than if it were such an order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing
the indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of
guilty.107 The facts are as follows:

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc.,
Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good filed a complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an Makati against private respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that private
accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion. respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles
entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc..
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge
acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G. Bagaoisan recommended the
appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A indictment of private respondent, and on the same day, respondent was charged
reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Makati City. The case was
to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-633, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the George I. Lagos."
prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in
evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence
was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the On June 4, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to recuse praying that Presiding
writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an Judge Reinato G. Quilala inhibit himself from hearing the case based on the
improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors following grounds:
of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
a) In an order, dated May 28, 1999, the presiding judge summarily
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. denied respondent’s motion: 1) to defer issuance of the warrant of
arrest; and 2) to order reinvestigation.
SO ORDERED.
b) Immediately before the issuance of the above-mentioned order, the
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, presiding judge and Atty. Alex Y. Tan, SAAG Philippines, Inc.’s Ad
and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Interim President, were seen together.2
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., agree with J. Panganiban’s separate opinion.
Melo, J., in the result.
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave. basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT It appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-
Manila 6185 for the declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan
and petitioner as President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag
Phils., Inc., declaration of dividends, recovery of share in the profits, involuntary
FIRST DIVISION dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, recovery of damages and an

83
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction against Saag (S) His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its order
Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner. 3 issued on October 29, 1999, respondent filed with the CA the petition for
certiorari[6] assailing the aforesaid orders.
In the action before the SEC, private respondent averred that Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a
foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Singapore, and is On June 30, 2000, the CA rendered its challenged decision. The pertinent portion
fully owned by Saag Corporation (Bhd). On July 1, 1994, he was appointed as reads:
Area Sales Manager in the Philippines by Thiang Shiang Hiang, Manager of Saag
(S) Pte. Ltd. Pursuant to his appointment, respondent was authorized to organize a
In a case for estafa, a valid demand made by an offended party is one of the
local joint venture corporation to be known as Saag Philippines, Inc. for the
essential elements. It appears from the records that the delay of delivery of the
wholesale trade and service of industrial products for oil, gas and power industries
motor vehicles by petitioner to Saag Corporation is by reason of petitioner’s
in the Philippines.
contention that the demand made by Omictin and Atty. Tan to him to return the
subject vehicles is not a valid demand. As earlier mentioned, petitioner filed a case
On September 9, 1994, Saag Philippines, Inc. was incorporated with Saag (S) Pte. with the SEC questioning therein private respondents’ appointment.
Ltd. as the majority stockholder. Private respondent was appointed to the board of
directors, along with Rommel I. Lagos, Jose E. Geronimo, Gan Ching Lai and
If the SEC should rule that the dissolution of Saag Phils. is proper, or that the
Thiang Shiang Hiang, and was elected president of the domestic corporation.
appointments of private respondents are invalid, the criminal case will eventually
be dismissed due to the absence of one of the essential elements of the crime of
Later, due to intra-corporate disputes, Gan and Thiang resigned and divested their estafa.
shares in Saag Corporation (Bhd), thereby resulting in a change in the controlling
interest in Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a prejudicial question exists which calls for
the suspension of the criminal proceedings before the lower court.
Barely three months after, or on June 23, 1998, private respondent resigned his
post as president of Saag Phils., Inc. while still retaining his position as a director
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed Order of September 8, 1999
of the company.4 According to private respondent, the joint venture agreement
and October 29, 1999, are hereby MODIFIED. The motion to suspend proceedings
(JVA) between him or Saag Phils., Inc. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. provided that should
is hereby GRANTED and respondent court is hereby enjoined from hearing
the controlling interest in the latter company, or its parent company Saag Corp.
Criminal Case No. 99-633, entitled "People of the Philippines v. George I. Lagos,"
(Bhd), be acquired by any other person or entity without his prior consent, he has
until the termination of the case with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
the option either to require the other stockholders to purchase his shares or to
The denial of the motion to recuse is hereby AFFIRMED.
terminate the JVA and dissolve Saag Phils., Inc. altogether. Thus, pursuant to this
provision, since private respondent did not give his consent as regards the transfer
of shares made by Gan and Thiang, he made several requests to Nicholas Ng, who SO ORDERED.7
replaced Gan as director, and Janifer Yeo, Executive Director of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.,
to call for a board meeting in order to discuss the following: a) implementation of Incidentally, on January 18, 2001, the SEC case8 was transferred to the Regional
the board resolution declaring dividends; b) acquisition of private respondent’s Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-
shares by Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.; c) dissolution of Saag Phils., Inc.; and d) the 03-SC9 implementing the Securities and Regulation Code (Republic Act No.
termination of the JVA. 8799)10 enacted on July 19, 2000, vesting in the RTCs jurisdiction over intra-
corporate disputes.11
Ng and Yeo failed to appear, however, in the scheduled board meetings. Instead,
on September 30, 1998 they issued a letter appointing Alex Y. Tan as President Ad Meanwhile, on March 5, 2001, the CA, addressing petitioner’s motion for
Interim of Saag Phils., Inc. Tan, in turn, appointed petitioner Omictin as the reconsideration of the aforementioned decision, issued its assailed resolution:
company’s Operations Manager Ad Interim.

Considering that the petition for review on certiorari of the 30 June 2000 decision
Citing as a reason the absence of a board resolution authorizing the continued of this Court, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court
operations of Saag Phils., Inc., private respondent retained his possession of the has already TERMINATED on November 20, 2000 and a corresponding entry of
office equipment of the company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the judgment has already been issued by the High Court, that the same is final and
corporation pending its dissolution and/or the resolution of the intra-corporate executory, the private respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the decision 30
dispute. He likewise changed the locks of the offices of the company allegedly to June 2000 before this Court is NOTED for being moot and academic.
prevent Tan and petitioner from seizing company property.

SO ORDERED.12
Private respondent stressed that Tan’s appointment was invalid because it was in
derogation of the company by-laws requiring that the president must be chosen
from among the directors, and elected by the affirmative vote of a majority of all Hence, this petition raises the following issues:
the members of the board of directors. 5 As Tan’s appointment did not have the
acquiescence of the board of directors, petitioner’s appointment by the former is I
likewise allegedly invalid. Thus, neither has the power or the authority to represent
or act for Saag Phils., Inc. in any transaction or action before the SEC or any court
of justice. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION -

The trial court, in an order dated September 8, 1999, denied respondent’s motion to
suspend proceedings and motion to recuse. A) WHEN IT DECREED THAT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS IN THE
SEC CASE FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AGAINST SAAG (S) PTE.
LTD., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR ESTAFA (WHERE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE ACCUSED THEREIN) IS ACTUALLY

84
SAAG PHILIPPINES, INC. A DOMESTIC CORPORATION WITH A 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the offended party
SEPARATE JURIDICAL PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN AND WHICH IS NOT to the offender:
EVEN A PARTY IN THE SEC CASE; AND,
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par. (b)
B) WHEN IT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN of Art. 315 are as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 99-633 AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the
II offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same;
THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS THE ONLY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE PREMISES.
2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
In support of the above, petitioner argues, as follows:

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice

1. The action before the SEC and the criminal case before the trial court
of another; and
do not involve any prejudicial question.13 SEC Case No. 01-99-6185
mainly involves the dissolution of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., the appointment
of a receiver, the distribution of profits, and the authority of petitioner 4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.15
and Tan to represent Saag Phils., Inc. The entity which is being sued is
Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., a foreign corporation over which the SEC has yet to
Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils.,
acquire jurisdiction. Hence, any decision that may be rendered in the
Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon
SEC case will neither be determinative of the innocence or guilt of the
the authority of the person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Private
accused nor bind Saag Phils., Inc. because the same was not made a
respondent is challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the
party to the action even if the former is its holding corporation;
corporate case pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this
light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no
2. Saag Phils., Inc. has a separate corporate existence and is to be demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
treated as a separate entity from its holding or parent company, Saag (S) Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on
Pte. Ltd. The mere fact that one or more corporations are owned or commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
controlled by the same or single stockholder is not a sufficient ground to deliver or to return the same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only
for disregarding separate corporate personalities; give rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime of estafa. This is
because the crime is committed by misappropriating or converting money or goods
received by the offender under a lawful transaction. As stated in the case of United
3. Private respondent’s petition with the SEC seeks affirmative relief
States v. Bleibel:16
against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. for the enforcement or application of the
alleged terms of the joint venture agreement (JVA) that he purportedly
entered into with the foreign corporation while he was still its Area The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure to return the things received for
Sales Manager in the Philippines. The foreign corporation is not sale on commission, or to deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is defined
licensed to do business in the Philippines, thus, a party to a contract by law, by misappropriating or converting the money or goods received on
with a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a commission. Delay in the fulfillment of a commission or in the delivery of the sum
license is not entitled to relief from the latter; and on such account received only involves civil liability. So long as the money that a
person is under obligation to deliver is not demanded of him, and he fails to deliver
it for having wrongfully disposed of it, there is no estafa, whatever be the cause of
4. There is no pending civil or administrative case in SEC against Saag
the debt.
Phils., Inc. that warrants the application of a prejudicial question and
the consequent suspension of the criminal action it has instituted against
private respondent. If any, the action before the SEC was merely a ploy Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this
to delay the resolution of the criminal case and eventually frustrate the case. The issues raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-
outcome of the estafa case. à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question regarding the supposed authority of
the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the
determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is
In sum, the main issue is whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the
the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred to
suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-
the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
corporate controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.
had the case not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of

Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until
which pertains to another tribunal.14 Here, the case which was lodged originally
after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
before the SEC and which is now pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by
some question arising in the proceeding before the court. 17 The court cannot or will
virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are intimately related to those
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
upon which the criminal prosecution is based.
the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge,
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will experience and services in determining technical and intricate matters of fact.18
determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed
against him by petitioner before the RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by the CA,
one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article

85
 While the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative tribunal, the Court DECISION
believes that the circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe the application
of the doctrine, as the role of an administrative tribunal such as the SEC in
VELASCO, JR., J.:
determining technical and intricate matters of special competence has been taken
on by specially designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. 19 Hence, the
RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary The Case
jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the
domestic corporation, Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008
of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the determination of Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in
which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 2007 2 and
place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal competence to decide intra- March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial
corporate disputes.20 Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no substantial basis in petitioner’s The Facts
contention that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Absent a showing of a despotic, whimsical and arbitrary
exercise of power by the CA, the petition must fail. On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and
Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint
Affidavit dated October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision and resolution of the 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55834, dated June 30, 2000 and March 5, Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
2001, respectively, are AFFIRMED. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22
against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as
No costs. Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S.
Janiola.
SO ORDERED.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a
civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
Associate Justice
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the
WE CONCUR: criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction
agreement.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
CANCIO C. GARCIA cases.
Associate Justice
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an
CERTIFICATION undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based
on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were
issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of
the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
REYNATO S. PUNO criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having
Chief Justice preceded the civil case.

Republic of the Philippines Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to
SUPREME COURT Suspend Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Manila
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the
THIRD DIVISION checks issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases
for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009 case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a
motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

86
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
Reconsideration dated November 29, 2007. prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established
that the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This,
petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008.
would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying
order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
the petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:

On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil
provides:
case is intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private
respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal
when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court
after the criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with
any less prejudicial in character.10 the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45. Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question
exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal
The Issue
action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes
that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND
PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
We cannot agree with private respondent.
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11

First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in

The Court’s Ruling
phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had." 14 In the instant
This petition must be granted. case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the
civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the This interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly
before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanation for the
amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
Resolutions dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial
question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the
merits, we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension
prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of

Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases 12 that the elements of a prejudicial the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
question, as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are: action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an the prosecution rests.
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question
proceed. are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
effective and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which
applies here and now provides: Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which
must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No.
(Emphasis supplied.) 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)

87
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases
construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other involved here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible part of private respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to
leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting
laws. It is only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action,
choosing which law to apply.
there is, still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal case.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly
Rules of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
worded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action;
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil
and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
may proceed.
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor
or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case. Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply
to the present controversy.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement
the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides: between the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks
issued in consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and
cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension
of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the We find for petitioner.
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial,
the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are
the prosecution rests. as follows:

Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant or for value;
provisions of law.

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
18
insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not
In Sabandal v. Tongco, we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.20
action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal
complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the
said: issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line
of cases21 that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:
of the civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner
filed the civil case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against
him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a
proceedings in the criminal cases.19 bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode
complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The
instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid worthless check malum prohibitum.
reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the
construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3)
years from the execution of the construction agreement.

88
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NAC
issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later Associate Justice Associate Justice
on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution
for violation of BP 22, to wit:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
ATTESTATION
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service
given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser. Associate Justice
Chairperson
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the
subject check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans CERTIFICATION
that will be made from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the
check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier opinion of the Court’s Division.
discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship
with Bautista or Unlad.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to Republic of the Philippines
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. 24 SUPREME COURT
(Emphasis supplied.) Manila

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction SECOND DIVISION
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not
affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently
dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under
BP 22.lawphil.net JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case DECISION
before us.
CARPIO, J.:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the August 26, 2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las The Case
Piñas City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the MTC
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of
to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

No costs.
The Antecedent Facts

SO ORDERED.
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent)
Associate Justice
filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner),
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of
WE CONCUR: Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional
Associate Justice Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial
Chairperson

89
of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Civil Case Must be Instituted
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Before the Criminal Case
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
City.
proceed.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information 7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that the August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal
warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was
that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s
respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled: November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit,
DENIED.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
SO ORDERED.4

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the
warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
RTC Quezon City denied the motion.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals,
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 10 A prejudicial question is defined
The Decision of the Court of Appeals as:

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11
would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior
to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime
parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is
of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,
of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes
the crime of parricide from murder 14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the
Appeals’ decision. criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the
victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Issue
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
for frustrated parricide against petitioner. killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
The Ruling of this Court by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. 16 At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
The petition has no merit. subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-

90
 7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the RENATO C. CORONA
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between Chief Justice
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.1avvphi1

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the Republic of the Philippines
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological SUPREME COURT
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Manila
vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the
effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on THIRD DIVISION
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There
was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences." 18 In fact,
the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998
insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned."19
RENATO CUDIA, petitioner,
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. vs.
The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his
issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles
petitioner in the criminal case. City, respondents.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
ROMERO, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993
ANTONIO T. CARPIO dismissing his petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy
Associate Justice by the filing of a second information against him, although a first information
charging the same offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioner's
WE CONCUR: vigorous opposition.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Associate Justice
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez,
Mabalacat, 2 Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* ROBERTO A. ABAD possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo,
Associate Justice Associate Justice Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter
conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.** of firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as
Associate Justice follows:

ATTESTATION That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of
Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. possession and under his control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver
(paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence
Associate Justice without having the necessary authority and permit to carry
Chairperson the same.

CERTIFICATION ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 (Emphasis petitioner's.)

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had (hereafter the Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989,
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the
opinion of the Court’s Division. court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information,
petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.

91
Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is
City RTC as to who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to to commit the same or a frustration thereof.5
criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city. Thereafter, the case
was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary
to prove the existence of the following:
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was
likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the (b) Valid complaint or information
Information, stating "that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel
was misled into hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the (c) Arraignment
apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within
the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga" 4 and that the Provincial (d) Valid plea
Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which
two separate informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. (e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.6
said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on pleaded "not guilty" therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express
the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of consent, nay, over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to
firearms and ammunition — for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. determining whether the first two requisites have been met.
11542, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition — would violate his
right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial
court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in
the same on the ground that the petition could not have been convicted under the jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60,
first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration which originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction
was denied; hence, this appeal. over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:

Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals: The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of
the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City was not the proper
venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction
ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699). In all criminal
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the
ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense
THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE was committed or any one of the essential ingredients
FIRST INFORMATION. thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77).
Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try offenses
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was
FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56.7
ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST
INFORMATION FILED AGAINST It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed
THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID. before it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or
defining its jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be Reorganization Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense . . ." Pursuant to this President of the Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the
provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that "(w)hen Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined as follows:
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent xxx xxx xxx
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of PAMPANGA
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, . . . "
xxx xxx xxx
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second

92
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City — comprising pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution.
well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment
that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.13
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error
of the investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as
penalize him. It is an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped
apportioned. Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges
by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials and employees. 14 To rule otherwise
of the Angeles City RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant
could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to the
case. Writ large in lawbooks in the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law
community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor
and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.
and the accused.

With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its
Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the
dismissal, should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say
offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond
that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals 15 has ruled that even if
his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the
amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite
Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an
information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.
Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the
xxx xxx xxx constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that the absence of
b) Investigate and/or cause to be authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that
investigated all charges of crimes, petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength thereof.
misdemeanors and violations of all
penal laws and ordinances within As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the
their respective jurisdictions and have officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the
the necessary information or requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.
complaint prepared or made against
the persons accused. In the conduct of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
such investigations he or his assistants
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No
shall receive the sworn statements or
costs.
take oral evidence of witnesses
summoned by subpoena for the
purpose. SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied G.R. No. 165975 September 13, 2007

PAYAKAN G. TILENDO, Petitioner,

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who
vs.
should prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside
OMBUDSMAN and SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
DECISION
officer, cannot be filed by another. 8 It must be exhibited or presented by the
prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction.9 CARPIO, J.:

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City The Case
Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. 10 As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information
This petition for certiorari 1 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as
order assails the 13 January 2004 Resolution 2 and the 14 October 2004 Order 3 of
formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in Case No. OMB-M-C-02-0632-K.
by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,
11
The Ombudsman found probable cause against Payakan G. Tilendo (Tilendo) for
questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of
proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused
Practices Act.
(herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this
view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer
signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.12 The Facts

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient College (CCSPC).
because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could
not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be

93
In 1996, the CCSPC had an appropriation of ₱6 million for the construction of its that it had neither the authority to examine the CCSPC’s records nor the technical
Agriculture Building and Science Academic Building. 4 The Department of Budget knowledge of government accounting and auditing procedures.
and Management Regional Office in Cotabato City released ₱5.7 million to the
CCSPC, after deducting the 5% reserve. Out of this amount, ₱3,496,797 was
The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao also endorsed the anonymous complaint to the
allocated for the construction of the Agriculture Building. The release of this
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-
amount to CCSPC was evidenced by the following Notices of Cash Allocation
finding investigation.
(NCA): (a) ₱237,500 per NCA dated 23 January 1996; (b) ₱702,640 per NCA
dated 3 June 1996; (c) ₱763,477 per NCA dated 19 September 1996; and (d)
₱1,793,180 per NCA dated 4 October 1996. Subsequently, the NBI subpoenaed Tilendo several times and informed him of the
complaints against him.6 Tilendo, through counsel, requested for several extensions
of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It was only on 22 October 1999 that he filed
In December 1998, the "Concerned Faculty Members" of the CCSPC filed before
his counter-affidavit.7
the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019.

On 10 March 2000, the NBI filed a Report on the investigation confirming that,
The complaint basically alleged that Tilendo enriched himself and his family while
despite the ₱10,080,000 three-year allocation for the construction of the
he was President of the CCSPC, using government funds for personal purposes.
Agriculture Building, only ₱300,000 was actually used for this construction
The complaint likewise accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds
project. Further, only scrap materials from the old Administrative Building were
allocated for the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building. The complaint
used. The pertinent portions of the report read:
pertinently reads:

Investigation conducted disclosed that the construction of Agricultural Building

3. Sometime in the late part of 1995, the decades-old academic main building was
a[t] Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao has an appropriation of
demolished on instruction of Dr. Tilendo. Coincidentally, an allotment of
₱10,800,000.00 in three years broken down as follows, i.e., in 1996 GAA
₱6,000,000.00 was released by the Department of Budget and Management for the
₱6,000,000.00, in 1997 GAA ₱1,080,000.00 and in 1998 GAA ₱3,000,000.00.
construction of an agricultural building in the college satellite campus at Rebuken,
Witnesses alleged that the project was constructed without the necessary
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. x x x There are no engineering designs, plans and
Engineering Designs, Plans and Programs of Work. Most of the materials used
bill of materials. The contractor, Mr. Mohammad Oliver Uka, who is his nephew
were scrap materials of the demolished Old Administrative Building at CCSPC
was so obedient to Dr. Tilendo that he blindly obeyed his instructions.
Campus, Cotabato City and the estimated amount spent for the said project did not
exceed ₱300,000.00. The said allegations were corroborated by the COA Special
Instead of utilizing the allotment for putting-up the agricultural building, he only Audit finding conducted on September 1996. The same COA report further states
instructed Mr. Uka to buy steel bars, cement, sand and gravel and hollow blocks. that the balance was used in the construction of the Science Building and the
Other materials like lumber. G.I. sheets were taken from the scrap materials of the Makeshift Building at Main Campus. However, the realignment of such funds do
demolished academic school building. x x x This illegal act was in connivance with not have the AUTHORITY from the DBM. Inspection conducted by the NBI
his nephew-contractor MR. MOHAMMAD OLIVER "BOY" UKA who is Investigators disclosed that the project at Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao
subservient to all the wishes and decisions of his uncle Dr. Tilendo. We believe was not completed and some of the materials used were indeed scrap.8
that only an actual inspection of the building can prove the truth. He and his
Budget Officer MR. PASTOR T. TAGURA has (sic) many ways to conceal facts
xxxx
and justify their actions. Any document that will show an implementation of the
project is a mere fabrication in cahoots with other government officials to cover-up
his anomalous activities and enrich himself while in office. COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS:

The conversion of [Tilendo’s] 2-door apartment into a 3-storey building took place xxx
while the agricultural building is being constructed. Truckloads of construction
materials were delivered from the Pigcawayan Hardware in the Poblacion The alleged Program of Works prepared by ENGR. HASANADDIN S. MAMA,
Pigcawayan, Cotabato and other hardware in Cotabato City to two (2) destinations designated Project Engineer of CCSPC in 1996 per directive of [Tilendo] did not
– his house in Pigcawayan and the house of his 3rd wife, MS. SAMSIA jibe or correspond to the ₱6 million appropriation of the said project without
IBRAHIM.5 mentioning the additional budget of the project in 1997 and 1998, as what was
prepared was only ₱1.05 million budget only.
On 2 February 1999, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao (Deputy
Ombudsman-Mindanao) forwarded the anonymous complaint, docketed as CPL- The Counter-Affidavit of President Payakan G. Tilendo did not fully explain the
MIN-99-003, to the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (Ministry of ₱6 million budget of the Construction of Agricultural Building at Rebuken Sultan,
Education) for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation. Kudarat, Maguindanao which is the subject of this investigation, rather it pertains
to the Construction of Extension (4th Floor) of Academic Building in the amount
The Ministry of Education transmitted the complaint to the Chairman of the Board of ₱1,865,000.00. x x x
of Trustees of the CCSPC to decide on who should conduct the investigation.
The admission of [Tilendo] in his Counter-Affidavit that the project had been
In a letter dated 19 March 1999, Commission on Higher Education (CHED) completed in accordance with the funds duly allocated thereto, and in consonance
Chairman Angel C. Alcala instructed CHED Region XII Director, Dr. Carmen V. with the government bidding procedures, Accounting and Auditing regulations and
Dormitorio (Dormitorio), to form and head a committee, together with two other all other legal documents are devoid of merit considering that the documents
members, which would investigate on the complaints against Tilendo, among submitted showed that it did not respond to the questioned project.
others.
The attached publication of the Invitation to Bid dated February 27 to March 1,
On 28 June 1999, the two investigating members of Dormitorio’s committee 1997 which is published one year after the project or the Construction of the
reported that it was the Commission on Audit (COA) which could determine Agricultural Building at Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao was started
whether the government funds were properly used or misused. The CHED alleged sometime in April 1996. The alleged publication seems to be that of the

94
Construction of the Extension of Academic Building. In the instant case, NO The Ombudsman also found that Tilendo’s acts caused undue injury to the
AUTHORITY FOR THE REALIGNMENT OF FUNDS FROM DBM was given government through bad faith. The amount released for the construction of the
to the CCSPC Management.9 Agriculture Building could not be liquidated and was presumed to have been lost
due to Tilendo’s misappropriation. The use of scrap materials for the construction
of a supposedly new building, while it might bring savings to the government, was
On 26 April 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report
actually hazardous to the lives of those who would use the building.
charging Tilendo, Samaon A. Ebrahim, Wilhelmina B. Monte de Ramos, and
Abdulla Oliver Uka with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Articles 217,
218, and 219 of the RPC. The Issues

In January 2003, Tilendo filed his counter-affidavit, 10 alleging, among others, that Tilendo seeks the reversal of the assailed resolutions on the following grounds:
the "dragging of the case for more than three years in preliminary investigation
stage without his fault is violative of his right to speedy disposition of cases."
1. The Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Tilendo also denied the allegations against him, insisting that the complaint was
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disregarding his constitutional right to
aimed purely at harassing him. Tilendo claimed that the construction of the CCSPC
speedy disposition of cases.
Agriculture Building was completed using the funds allocated for it, and following
government bidding procedures and auditing regulations.
2. The Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding
probable cause against him for malversation under Article 217 of the
In its Resolution dated 13 January 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao
RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended.12
disposed of the complaint, as follows:

The Ruling of this Court

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds probable cause to
believe that the crime of Malversation and Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
were committed and that respondent DR. PAYAKAN G. TILENDO is probably The petition has no merit.
guilty thereof. Consequently, let the herein attached Informations be filed with the
proper court. On Tilendo’s right to speedy disposition of cases

Further, the charges against respondents SAMAON A. EBRAHIM, Tilendo contends that the cases against him dragged for more than three years in
WHILHELMINA B. MONTE DE RAMOS, ABDULLA OLIVER UKA, and preliminary investigation phase without his fault. The anonymous letters addressed
NESTOR VILLARIN are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. to the Ombudsman were dated 4 and 28 December 1998. The Ombudsman referred
the matter to the NBI which required Tilendo to file his counter-affidavit, which he
Lastly, the National Bureau of Investigation is hereby directed to forward to the did only on 22 October 1999. Nothing was heard from the NBI or the Ombudsman
Office of the Special Prosecutor the original copy of their report, subject matter of until January 2003 when the Ombudsman directed Tilendo to submit his counter-
the instant case, together with its annexes. affidavit to the various criminal charges against him. According to Tilendo, the
inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates his
right to speedy disposition of cases.
SO RESOLVED.11

The right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is enshrined in the Constitution.

Tilendo moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied in its Order
Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons shall have the
dated 14 October 2004.
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies." This right, however, is considered violated only when the
Hence, this petition. proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are
absent in this case.13
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. 14 A simple
mathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts and
The Ombudsman found probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under
circumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. 15 In ascertaining whether
Article 217 of the RPC and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the following factors
must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
The Ombudsman found that since Tilendo received the ₱3,496,797 appropriated assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused
and released to the CCSPC for the construction of the Agriculture Building, by the delay.16
Tilendo, as head of the CCSPC, is accountable for this amount. Tilendo, however,
failed to account for the fund.
In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary
investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a
The Ombudsman found several lapses in the disbursement of the funds making it complaint against Tilendo for violation of the relevant provisions of RA 3019 and
impossible for Tilendo to liquidate the amount. First, the construction of the the RPC. Contrary to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary investigation did not
Agriculture Building was haphazardly done. Second, there was no bidding for the automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the
construction project as required by law. Third, scrap materials were used in the Ombudsman.17
construction. Fourth, there was no showing when the construction was completed
and whether the construction was according to the alleged plans. Finally, the funds
Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or the Rules of Procedure of the
for the construction of the Agriculture Building were used for another building
Office of the Ombudsman outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and
within the CCSPC main campus. However, Tilendo failed to show the actual
administrative complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO
amount used for the construction of this other building.
7 clearly states that "upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be: (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

95
(b) referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the proper government A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there
office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; or (e) referred for committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
administrative adjudication; or (f) subjected to a preliminary investigation." trial.20 Stated differently, during the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor, or
the Ombudsman in this case, determines whether there is probable cause to hold
the respondent for trial.1âwphi1
Significantly, the Court held in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,18 that by referring the
complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of the case to the NBI. What was delegated was only the Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
conducted by the Ombudsman. prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted."21
In this case, after the fact-finding investigation, the NBI reported its findings to the
Ombudsman and consequently filed a complaint against Tilendo for various In this case, the Ombudsman found probable cause against Tilendo for
criminal charges. If we consider the fact-finding investigation conducted by the malversation under Article 217 of the RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
NBI as part of the preliminary investigation stage, then the NBI served a 3019.
conflicting role. The NBI acted as the investigating body on the charges against
Tilendo, and thereafter, acted as the complainant against Tilendo. This is absurd.
Article 217 of the RPC states:
What the NBI clearly did, in accordance with Section 2(d) of Rule II of AO 7, was
to analyze the facts and gather evidence which could either exonerate or further
implicate Tilendo in the offenses charged. Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of
malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take
Further, the NBI is not among those authorized under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to
or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
conduct preliminary investigations for complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman,
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially,
to wit:
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property, shall suffer: x x x
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of
3) Deputized Prosecutors; public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary
investigations; or xxxx

5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
Ombudsman. any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
Even assuming there was delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation,
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
Tilendo is deemed to have slept on his right to a speedy disposition of cases. From
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
22 October 1999, when he submitted to the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking
for several extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until December 2002. It seems
that Tilendo was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the projected This Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of
criminal prosecution posed against him. He did not take any step whatsoever to probable cause to accord respect to the discretion granted to the Ombudsman and
accelerate the disposition of the matter. Tilendo’s inaction gives the impression for reasons of practicality. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to
that he did not object to the supervening delay, and hence it was impliedly with his review the Ombudsman’s findings in preliminary investigations.22 An exception to
acquiescence.19 He did not make any overt act like, for instance, filing a motion for this rule is where the Ombudsman abused his discretion by ignoring clear
early resolution. He asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases only when insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the
the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao required him to file his counter-affidavit to the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process. 23 Here, no such
NBI complaint. conduct can be imputed on the Ombudsman. Thus, we apply the rule.

Tilendo’s contention of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases must The Ombudsman found that Tilendo failed to account for the subject funds.
fail. There was no unreasonable and unjustifiable delay which attended the According to the Ombudsman, it would even be an impossibility to account for the
resolution of the complaints against him in the preliminary investigation phase. funds due to the various lapses in its disbursement. The Ombudsman cited the
haphazard construction of the Agriculture Building, the absence of any bidding
required by law, the usage of scrap materials, the failure to show the completion
On the finding of probable cause for the offenses charged
date of the building, and the failure to show the actual amount spent for the
construction of another building within the CCSPC main campus.
The Ombudsman conducts preliminary investigations in accordance with Section
3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions in Section 4, Rule II of
Tilendo’s claims of non-receipt of the subject funds, as well as his good faith in the
AO 7.
transfer of the Agriculture Building to the main campus, constitute evidentiary
matters that must be ventilated in a full-blown trial and not during the preliminary
investigation. The presence or absence of the elements of the crimes, which are by

96
their nature evidentiary and defense matters, can be best passed upon after a trial ANTONIO T. CARPIO
on the merits. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and Associate Justice
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. What is presented is evidence only as
may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that
WE CONCUR:
the accused is probably guilty thereof.24

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Whether Tilendo, as a public officer, had custody or control of the funds allocated
Associate Justice
for the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building, and whether he
Chairperson
misappropriated the same are matters requiring an examination of the parties’
evidence, which are not found in the case records and which can be properly
threshed out during the trial. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Based on the records, Tilendo, as President of the CCSPC, after being asked to
liquidate the amount released to the CCSPC for the construction of the Agriculture PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Building, failed to account for the funds. Thus, the presumption that he misused or Associate Justice
misappropriated the funds arises, resulting to the finding of probable cause for
malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. On the other hand, the haphazard ATTESTATION
construction of the Agriculture Building, the absence of any bidding for its
construction, the usage of scrap materials for the construction of a school building
in CCSPC, and the lack of engineering plans clearly demonstrate undue injury to I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
the government. These circumstances support the finding of probable cause for before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Whether there was bad faith on Tilendo’s
part is a different matter which necessarily is subject to proof. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Further, nowhere in the records did Tilendo sufficiently rebut the Ombudsman’s Chairperson
findings or clearly explain what actually happened to the construction project.
Tilendo admits that there was no construction of the Agriculture Building in CERTIFICATION
Rebuken in 1996. Instead, a school building was constructed using funds from the
CCSPC’s MOOE, which construction project used scrap materials taken from the
demolished main building.25 He also claims that the construction of the Agriculture Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Building had to be transferred due to the peace and order problem in the original Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
site. During the fact-finding investigation, Tilendo submitted an "Invitation to Bid" been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
which was published in the 23 February-1 March 1997 issue of The Mindanao opinion of the Court’s Division.
Newscast,26 but there was no evidence that a bidding was held on the scheduled
dates. He also presented documents pertaining to the construction of the Academic REYNATO S. PUNO
Building and a make-shift building, not the Agriculture Building, such as (1) a Chief Justice
"Notice of Award" to Esperanza Gold Construction for the extension (4th floor) of
the Academic Building in the amount of ₱1,865,000;27 (2) a list of materials and
Republic of the Philippines
labor requirements with their corresponding value; 28 and (3) floor plans.29 Instead
SUPREME COURT
of showing completion of the Agriculture Building, Tilendo introduced an
Manila
"Inspection/Evaluation Report" dated 30 April 1999 referring to the 54.71%
accomplishment of the construction of a two-storey Main Library Building inside
the CCSPC Campus worth more than ₱5.2 million and whose contractor was "FFJJ THIRD DIVISION
Construction."30
G.R. No. 163586 January 27, 2009
Tilendo insists that he merely exercised administrative supervision and points to
the CCSPC treasury as the recipient of the funds and to the foreman, engineers, and
SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,
workers as the ones who made the expenses for the construction. Apparently,
vs.
Tilendo is suggesting that these personnel were responsible for the misuse or
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
misappropriation of the funds. However, Tilendo miserably failed to substantiate
Branch 65, Guimaras; the COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and
his allegations. He did not even attempt to mention names to clear his own name.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Tilendo seems contented with alleging that these personnel "made the liquidations
of the amounts they spent for the construction." 31 Aside from this bare allegation,
Tilendo did not introduce any convincing evidence that he had no participation DECISION
whatsoever with the unsatisfactory construction of the Agriculture Building and the
apparent wastage or diversion of the public funds. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Thus, we sustain the finding of probable cause against Tilendo for malversation Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
under Article 217 of the RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 69350; and the March
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. 26, 2004 CA Resolution2 which denied the motion for reconsideration.

SO ORDERED. The facts are of record.

97
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional 2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, Court dated February 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be
under an Information which reads, as follows: made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without violating the
constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused
to due process.13
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in
the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, a public officer, Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation on August 9, 1999 of
being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Buenavista, the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of issuance on March 20, 2001 of
Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of public funds in the the Resolution of the Court in the same case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that
amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC.
collections and other accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the As the investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the
duties of her office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy
office, taking advantage of her public position, with deliberate intent, and with was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set aside in the March
intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence, the Information that was
take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit filed against petitioner was void for at that time the Ombudsman had no
said amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the case.
account for said public funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the government.
The petition lacks merit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, 14 wherein accused
Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy 15 in a
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001. motion to dismiss the 11 counts of malversation that were filed against them by the
Ombudsman before the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed
by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation and file the Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution
to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of promulgated on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling
the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as she was a that the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable
public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by by the Sandiganbayan.
the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor,
and not by the Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.5
has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order 6 dated September 7, 2001. It
held that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is
grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense
plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
charged.7 Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman in
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
the case, pointing out that in Uy, upon motion for clarification filed by the
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9, 1999 Decision and issued a March
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the
20, 2001 Resolution expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory
clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
authority of the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.
embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117,
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty under the Information.8
particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which the RTC denied in its Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
December 18, 2001 Order.10 cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman
to such cases.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari11 with the CA, but the latter dismissed the
petition in the Decision under review.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
12 cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the following: authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Information for Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted against the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and
Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this Supreme prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it
Court’s ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are
that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

98
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy made no declaration of
with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. unconstitutionality of any law nor did it vacate a doctrine long held by the Court
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the and relied upon by the public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon interpretation of the Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to in the same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the Ombudsman,
Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is
mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the
With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and academic.
government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every
case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to
utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or No costs.
deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise
allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770. SO ORDERED.

We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ*
Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 Associate Justice
of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by Acting Chairperson
him with the regular prosecutors.
WE CONCUR:
WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court,
branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) DANTE O. TINGA*
to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED Associate Justice
to try and decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NAC

Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, 16 in which, Associate Justice Associate Justice
citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC dismissed a criminal complaint
that was filed before it by the Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for,
"given the Court’s Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court’s TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**
assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, Associate Justice
be set aside."
ATTESTATION
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy, that the
Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution in Uy cannot Associate Justice
have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would amount to "an ex-post facto law, Acting Chairperson, Third Division
which is constitutionally proscribed."17
CERTIFICATION
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
a new law but construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
contemporaneous legislative intent of that law. 18 Hence, the March 20, 2001
Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Acting Chief Justice

Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a

Republic of the Philippines
doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been
SUPREME COURT
performed under the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of
Manila
its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone
by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation;
thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application. 19 But where no law is SECOND DIVISION
invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be
deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation.20 G.R. No. 163656 April 27, 2007

99
MARINA B. SCHROEDER, Petitioner, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision, but it was
vs. denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
ATTYS. MARIO A. SALDEVAR and ERWIN C. MACALINO, Respondents.
I.
DECISION
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
QUISUMBING, J.: THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENT
SALDEVAR; and
For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated October 30, 2003 and the
Resolution2 dated May 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63418, II.
entitled "Attys. Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino v. Hon. Lydia
Querubin-Layosa, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 217, Regional Trial
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
Court, Quezon City, The Ombudsman, The Department of Justice, National Bureau
SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN FINDINGS FOR THE FINDINGS OF PROBABLE
of Investigation, and Marina B. Schroeder," that partly set aside the Order 3 dated
CAUSE BY THE PROSECUTORIAL ARMS OF THE GOVERNMENT.7
October 30, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-0-00-
1090 [I.S. No. 98-394].
Petitioner contends that the determination of probable cause is an executive
function lodged with the prosecutorial arm of the government, not with the
The pertinent facts are as follows.
judiciary. Petitioner argues the evidence on record clearly establish probable cause
to indict Saldevar with Macalino. Petitioner stresses Saldevar need not actually
Petitioner Marina B. Schroeder owns a liquor store in Robinson’s Galleria, Pasig demand and receive the marked money in order for him to be indicted for direct
City. Respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino are the Legal bribery. Petitioner adds that since respondents never ascribed any ill motive to the
Division Chief and Attorney II, respectively, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, NBI agents who conducted the entrapment operation, the presumption of regularity
Revenue District Office No. 7 in Quezon City. in the performance of their duties applies.

Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Respondents, however, insist that the DOJ erred in endorsing the petition for
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation conducted upon petitioner’s review to the Ombudsman. They aver that the Ombudsman cannot deny the
complaint. petition for review filed in the DOJ. Respondents maintain that the Court of
Appeals can determine probable cause because the DOJ erred in not resolving the
petition for review. They also point out that the Ombudsman glossed over the issue
After inquest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed in the Regional Trial Court of
of illegal arrest. Respondents posit that the operation conducted by the NBI was an
Quezon City, Branch 217, an information for direct bribery against respondents.
instigation, not an entrapment.
The case was remanded to the DOJ for preliminary investigation.

We find the petition meritorious.

The DOJ issued a Resolution4 finding probable cause to indict respondents for
direct bribery. Aggrieved, respondents filed in the DOJ a petition for review of the
said Resolution. The DOJ, however, endorsed the petition to the Ombudsman. In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises wide latitude of
discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Courts
must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the
The Ombudsman treated the petition for review as a motion for reconsideration of
person charged is valid on its face, and no manifest error or grave abuse of
the aforesaid DOJ Resolution. It denied the petition for review for lack of merit,
discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. 8 As a rule, courts cannot
thus:
interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. In the determination of probable cause, the Ombudsman’s
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding no merit to the petition for review discretion prevails over judicial discretion.9
of public respondents Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino, treated herein as
a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Department of Justice,
In this case, there being no clear showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
Manila, dated 07 June 1999, in I.S. No. 98-394 [Crim. Case No. Q-98-76453],
discretion committed by the Ombudsman in finding probable cause against
finding probable cause to continue with the prosecution in court of said
Saldevar for direct bribery, the Court of Appeals erred in supplanting the
respondents for Direct Bribery, the same [Petition for Review a.k.a. Motion for
Ombudsman’s discretion with its own.
Reconsideration] is hereby DENIED, with finality.

Probable cause is simply the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
SO ORDERED.5
excite a belief that a crime has been committed and that the person charged is
probably guilty of the said crime.10 In this case, sufficient evidence on record
Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. clearly shows the existence of probable cause against Saldevar. Contrary to the
The appellate court found no probable cause against respondent Saldevar, but appellate court’s theory, Saldevar need not actually demand and receive the bribe
upheld the finding of probable cause against respondent Macalino. The dispositive money in order for him to be indicted for direct bribery. Mere belief, after
portion of its assailed Decision reads: weighing the relevant facts and circumstances, that Saldevar probably committed
direct bribery suffices for the establishment of probable cause. Whether he is
indeed guilty of direct bribery is a different matter, which can properly be
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED insofar as petitioner Mario A. determined at a full blown trial on the merits of the case.
Saldevar is concerned. Accordingly, the order of the Ombudsman dated October
30, 2000 finding probable cause to prosecute said petitioner for direct bribery is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The subject order is AFFIRMED in all other Furthermore, note that the Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature.
aspects. Hence, when respondents assailed the said findings before the Court of Appeals on
the contention that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion,
respondents clearly raised questions of fact. Respondents’ arguments zeroed in on
SO ORDERED.6 the Ombudsman’s appreciation of facts. It bears stress that a petition for certiorari
admits only of questions of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

100
of jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should have, in the first place, rape, she narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a
dismissed respondents’ petition for certiorari on the ground that it raised questions complaint for rape against Arzadon.
of fact.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a
Lastly, we are not prepared to indulge respondents’ insistence that the DOJ cannot Resolution4 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information
endorse to the Ombudsman the petition for review of the abovementioned DOJ for rape. Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing
Resolution. The Ombudsman’s power to investigate and to prosecute is plenary held on October 11, 2002, petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor.
and unqualified.11 It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or However, she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. 12 In dismissed.
this case, respondents are public officers charged with the commission of a crime.
The DOJ Resolution, subject of the petition for review, found probable cause
On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint 5 with a
against respondents for the crime of direct bribery. The Ombudsman thus acted
comprehensive account of the alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd
within its authority in taking over the said petition for review.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. During the preliminary
investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution 6 finding that a prima facie case of
30, 2003 and Resolution dated May 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. rape exists and recommending the filing of the information.
SP No. 63418 are SET ASIDE. The October 30, 2000 Order 13 of the Ombudsman
in OMB-0-00-1090 [I.S. No. 98-394], finding no merit and denying the petition for
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be
review of herein respondents and finding probable cause to indict respondents
constituted to review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after
Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino for direct bribery, is AFFIRMED.
the clarificatory questioning, the panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution 7
finding probable cause and denying Arzadon’s motion for reconsideration.
No pronouncement as to costs.
An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
SO ORDERED. Fernando, La Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415.
Thereafter, Arzadon filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings
Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable Cause for
Republic of the Philippines
the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 9 On March 18, 2004, respondent
SUPREME COURT
Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her
Manila
witnesses to take the witness stand for determination of probable cause.

THIRD DIVISION
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of
G.R. No. 171465 June 8, 2007 Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal
of the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.10
AAA *, petitioner,
vs. Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Gonzales reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution 11
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. finding that probable cause exists. Thus, a new Information 12 for rape was filed
JAIME O. ARZADON, respondents. against Arzadon docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.

DECISION Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of

Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 13 In an Order dated
August 11, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.

This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 2005 2 Order of the Regional Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of
dismissing the rape case filed against private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack probable cause. Pending resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition 14 with this
of probable cause; and its February 3, 2006 3 Order denying petitioner’s motion for Court for the transfer of venue of Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was docketed
reconsideration. as Administrative Matter No. 05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue
of Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City, La Union, to any Court in Metro
Center from February 28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 Manila.
p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another building
but when she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioner’s request for
was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag. transfer of venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 25, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-242289. However, the
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He proceedings have been suspended pending the resolution of this petition.
told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe
and forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed
inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioner’s
because there was nobody else in the premises. motion for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.

Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her Petitioner raises the following issues:16
family. But when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the

101
 I However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in
directly filing the instant petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals,
thereby violating the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 19 In this case, however,
OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
the gravity of the offense charged and the length of time that has passed since the
filing of the complaint for rape, compel us to resolve the present controversy in
II order to avoid further delay.20

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE COMPLAINANT AND probable cause.
WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
We rule in the affirmative.

III
Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of
probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION with his orders to take the witness stand. Thus –
WHEN HE REFUSED TO INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE
DESPITE WHISPERS OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY
In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering
that the Private Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay
IV contemptuously refused to comply/obey this Court’s Orders of March 18, 2004,
August 11, 2005 and eight (8) other similar Orders issued in open Court that
directed the complainant/witnesses to take the witness stand to be asked
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited jurisprudential rulings of the
WHEN IT ISSUED THE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE Supreme Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion and sound judgment
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT finds and so holds that NO probable cause was established to warrant the issuance
RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 18, 2006, GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF of an arrest order and the further prosecution of the instant case.
VENUE

Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the case, the accused had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant
complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable failed to appear during the last four (4) consecutive settings despite due notice
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She argues that respondent Judge without giving any explanation, which to the mind of the Court may indicate an
Carbonell should have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well apparent lack of interest in the further prosecution of this case. That failure may
as the transcript of stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence even be construed as a confirmation of the Defense’s contention reflected in the
of probable cause. case record, that the only party interested in this case is the Private prosecutor,
prodded by the accused’s alleged hostile siblings to continue with the case.
Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong
mode of appeal, it appearing that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant
an action for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court. case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.21

Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment17 that the finding of probable He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of
cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was arrest shall issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the
justified in requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
to determine probable cause. witnesses he may produce."

The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,22 the Court explained that this
the wrong mode of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally
probable cause. evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he
may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting
The petition has merit. affidavits of witnesses. Thus:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion
certiorari under Rule 65 in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other
while the latter concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally
allowable ground under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause
Rule 45 may be considered a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
alleged that the respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as
in the instant case.18 While petitioner claims to have brought the instant action What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
under Rule 45, the grounds raised herein involve an alleged grave abuse of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
discretion on the part of respondent Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
treat the same as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

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Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the accused of the private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 33 Petitioner has categorically
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s preliminary investigations. Taken with the other evidence presented before the
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing probable
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which
engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
require that the evidence would justify conviction. 34
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. 23

It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,24 where we held
in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground
that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not
that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there
the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review
cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the
the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioner’s
supported by substantial evidence.25
absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in
prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry same.
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 35 As it
held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of
were, the incidents of this case have been pending for almost five years without
issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
having even passed the preliminary investigation stage. Suffice to say that the
proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
credibility of petitioner may be tested during the trial where the respective
guilty of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.26
allegations and defenses of the complainant and the accused are properly
ventilated. It is only then that the truth as to Arzadon’s innocence or guilt can be
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal determined.
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that
such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only
Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and
when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable
February 3, 2006 dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause
cause.27 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Information in the said case is hereby
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila is DIRECTED to
take cognizance of the case and let the records thereof be REMANDED to the said
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is court for further proceedings.
that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In
Okabe v. Gutierrez,28 we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report
SO ORDERED.
of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence
of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, Republic of the Philippines
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the SUPREME COURT
Information.29 If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is Manila
sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
EN BANC

In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983
without taking into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the
panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he vs.
failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’
absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial
determination of probable cause. YAP, J.:

Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated
Salaysay30 dated July 24, 2002 and Complaint-Affidavit 31 dated March 5, 2003. October 16, 1985, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the
She attended several clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated
The transcript of stenographic notes32 of the hearing held on October 11, 2002 August 9, 1985, August 12,1985 and September 17, 1985, and to enjoin the
shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or any other
and place of the incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, an
rape and, in support of her contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
as evidence. In contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the
weakest of all defenses.
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio
After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public
to establish probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the Information (DPI) and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts,

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filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC), Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then the
charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of the Department of Public Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said demand and receive a check for Pl25,000.00 from Roberto
report. Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the payment to said
Corporation of the sum of P588,000.00, for printing services
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner
rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum of
had submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months
January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity
after, or on December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the
had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds for
Tanodbayan (TBP Case No. 8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of
said project.
graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of his office as then Secretary of Public
Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied in the previous report
filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command That the complaint against the above-named accused was
(PSC). filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.

On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President CONTRARY TO LAW.
Ferdinand E. Marcos. On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of
Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding
Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the
Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with the
following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
have violated Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of
Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
recommended appropriate legal action on the matter. and Corrupt Practice Act, committed as follows:

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of
prosecution by virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
his motion for reconsideration was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, Honorable Court, the above- named accused, a public officer
1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were with the Tanodbayan for final being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry)
disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution, dated April 1, of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that the unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the
following informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets
and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
l. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
(1973), as required of every public officer.
preference in the discharge of his official functions through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
That the complaint against the above-named accused was
flied with the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of RA. 3019 for
receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as CONTRARY TO LAW.
consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to
said corporation for printing services rendered for the Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses

3. Violation of Section 7 of RA. 3019 on three (3) counts for FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 3,
his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were flied with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner: That on or about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime
prior thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499 the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
and there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing
Francisco S. Tatad with Violation of Section 3, paragraph
Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private
(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero,
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions, through
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of

104
 South East Asia Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly CONTRARY TO LAW.
a private corporation registered with the Securities and
Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to
organization and operating expenses came from the
quash the informations on the follow grounds:
confidential funds of the Department of Public Information
as it was organized to undertake research, projects for the
government, without requiring an accounting of the funds 1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process
advanced by the Department of Public Information and of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases
reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to the damage and filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the
prejudice of the government. informations;

That the complaint against the above-named accused was 2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos.
filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980. 10499, 10500 and 10501;

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure
to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973)
do not constitute an offense;
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502

4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in

The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses
Criminal Cases Nos. 10500, 10502 and 10503;
FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows: 5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in
Criminal Case No. 10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of
R.A. 3019, as amended;
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer 6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in
being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) Criminal Case No. 10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A.
of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and 3019, as amended.
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the
President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated
liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of motion to quash, stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in
the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the said motion that needed refutation, namely:
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year (1976), as required of every public officer.
1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,10500
and 10501, have already prescribed and criminal liability is
That the complaint against the above-named accused was extinguished; and
filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.

2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 10500 — For failure to file Statement of Assets and
Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense.
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Appeals, 122 SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in
FRANCISCO S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft cases were filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged
and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows: offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31, 1974 and in May 1975,
respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on July 9,
1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of
ten (10) year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed
Manila Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer
with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired,
being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry)
is constitutional.
of Public Information, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the
President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of
and liabilities, as of December 31, 1978, including a Assets and Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount requires "any natural or juridical person having gross assets of P50,000.00 or
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year more..." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities "... regardless of the
(1978), as required of every public officer. networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and
officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution
under these two laws are separate and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also
That the complaint against the above-named accused was
explained that delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair the
filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
validity of the informations filed and that neither will it render said informations

105
defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911, the law which governs constitutional light to due process and the right to a speedy
preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of ten (10) disposition of the cases against him.
days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the
petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so
hold, that the accused's "Consolidated Motion to Quash"
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the
should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
question of amnesty raised by the petitioner.
Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information in
Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be cured by 5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or
amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend non- existence of prima facie evidence to sustain the filing
said information to change the date of the alleged of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned
commission of the offense therein charged from January 31, informations.
1974 toSeptember 30, 1974 within five (5) days from receipt
hereof. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate
of "due process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the
SO ORDERED. termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the
purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August
informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention,
8, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No.
saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was
10500, changing the date of the commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
"nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief"
prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as
which was denied by the Sandiganbayan September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or allowed
filed this petition on October 16, 1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving due course the petition, resolved to "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in
require the respondents to comment thereon and issued a temporary restraining the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as
order effective immediately and continuing until further orders of the Court, would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other
enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at
the trial and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
and 10503. In compliance with said resolution, the respondents, through ,Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the
alleged termination of the proceedings before the
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on
considering the supervening events, including the change of administration that April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which
had transpired, and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar do not appear on record and which both parties did not
far as the Public respondents were concerned, which requires the successor official bother to explain or elaborate upon in detail. It could even be
to state whether or not he maintains the action or position taken by his predecessor logically inferred that the delay may be due to a painstaking
in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the an gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the
charges are not political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
he had no alternative but to pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded official. In this respect, We are the considered opinion that
from pursuing any other legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended,
motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor regarding the resolution of a complaint by the Tanodbayan
General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he concurred with the within ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary
position taken by the new Tanodbayan. investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the
nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a
motion for re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are
praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. clearly set forth in concise language in Rule 117, Section 2,
The Court is not aware of what action, if any, has been taken thereon by the of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other
Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing of the aforesaid motion for re- grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to
evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the duty of this arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the
Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned. performance of its official functions and subject to the
charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such facts
and circumstances which could otherwise justify the
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the
prosecution to comply with due process or any other
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented during the
cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his trial wherein evidence for and against the issue involved
may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably, the

106
 accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent
radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it
precludes a pre-cocious or summary evaluation of can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly
insufficient evidence in support thereof. can not be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately
intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
resolve the issue only after the trial? governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the
other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in
1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at
bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a
largely undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former
(PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a
3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his
widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which
Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years
Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to
the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months after petitioner alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while
Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos — by referring the complaint to presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or
the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but
5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring
the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused
of the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
for setting back time.

A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and
Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view
the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the
of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by
Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.
petitioner.

We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the
revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the
same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was
10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby
politically motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made
not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being
permanent.
used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes
alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving the
interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, SO ORDERED.
whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the of the
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
prosecutor be enhanced.
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can
not be justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911)
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary

107
Footnotes On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds
that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a
motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
1 Salonga vs. Cruz Pano, et al., 134 SCRA 438; Mean vs.
Argel, 115 SCRA 256; Yap vs. Lutero, 105 Phil, 3007;
People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 880. On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to
defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp.
Manila 47-48). The motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had
approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits
and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless
EN BANC
she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not
properly plead and prepare for trial.

On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R. No. 107598 (Miriam
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993 Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents
pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, motion for the bill of particulars).
vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the
prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one amended information
against petitioner.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines. Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution

dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-
164).
QUIASON, J.:

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution,

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the
aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185).
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set for April 12,
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated on March 14, 1993, which
deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35
and pp. 36-94). Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his
by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution
Program (Rollo, p. 36). dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April 12, 1993" (Rollo,
p. 194).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]),
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a
presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the
IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public publication of is letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to
office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed against her. Petitioner
was dismissed on January 13, 1992. claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00
A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41). The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's
column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against
Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the
November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42) Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:

108
 I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding
Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would stop Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard
scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the
Re: Claim of denial of due process
most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left
and returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena
kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were
of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October
lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended
kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156). informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case.
objectionable, reads as follows: In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public
prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her
cases are pending of her intention to travel, whether the In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got
Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting snarled because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in
donations from people transacting with her office at the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was
Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately
charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner
Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela
158). Llana but on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of
four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the charges on
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding
March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review,
Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan
normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
"with having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization
Ombudsman in March 1991.
Program."

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against
Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure
has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
order was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a
charged, thus:
piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-
defeating.
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts
Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
complained of therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident
Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of
bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after
legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after
December 31, 1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting
January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324
her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization
of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government
and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to said In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in
aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative the information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner
functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36). admitted hypothetically in her motion that:

It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the (1) She was a public officer;
permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order
which Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice (2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay
Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, 1984;
have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of
the charge against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no
occasion for the letter had Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against (3) Those aliens were disqualified;
the Sandiganbayan.
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that
the Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. (5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
Unanimity among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a the execution of her official functions."
division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan

109
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. offense the following cases:

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive (1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners
Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by committed by the accused at the same time and at the same
the Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which
she can establish at the trial.
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different
owners from the same coop and at the same period of time
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways
of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the
to any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any
same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of
a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same
act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all
advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of acts of collection were made under the same criminal
the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
claimed by petitioners although there may be instances
where both elements concur.
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:

Re: Delito continuado

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during
the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113
the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two
manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended different occasions.
information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted that petitioner questioned in her
opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the splitting of the
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July,
original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we
1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses committed
therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner
in August and October 1936. The malversations and
failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of
only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).
petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be file against
her.
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963
involving the failure of the collector to turn over the
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving
"continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine
(People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne
in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in (4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent
Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply. of collections from customers of the employer made on
different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308
[1975]).
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a
plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision
violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code,
violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws,
resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.). following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156
[1964] ).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several
crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to
(Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles
Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152). developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws.
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one
criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54). The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a
single offense or separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and

110
perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in . . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the
theft cases. damage and prejudice to the government is concerned, the
same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation
of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is,
stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to
the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at
those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned
the "separate larceny doctrine," under which there is a distinct larceny as to the
property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698
the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many distinct of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated
offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414). March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the
Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to
consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402)
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of
into one information charging only one offense under the original case number,
the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same
i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25,
"transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257,
1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis
138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85
Garchitorena is concerned.
Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

SO ORDERED.
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional
guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense
(Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo
humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused may and Puno, JJ., concur.
be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d
1179).
Separate Opinions

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a
single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens
not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by
petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his
1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) dissent from the majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado
was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the decision in said case, however, having
become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the issues there involved.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original
information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the
each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was majority in simply directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by Mr. Justice
legalized. Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into
a single Information.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors
manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying the FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12,
1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the
extent that that opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has of the Ombudsman to consolidate the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations
conceded categorically that the accusation against Miriam (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one Information under the original
Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law case number, i.e., No. 16698.
represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign
nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization
Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two
concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is (32) Amended Informations, for that court seriously erred in not granting
categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one petitioner's Motion to Quash those Informations. The grounds for my submission in
. . . (Rollo, p. 59). this respect were spelled out in detail in my dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam
Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205 SCRA 162 at
174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same
period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even
exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner as follows:
in the same document.
That on or about October 17, 1988, or
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of for sometime prior or subsequent
particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows: within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Miriam

111
 Defensor-Santiago, being the spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before
Commissioner of the Commission on January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for
Immigration and Deportation, with waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order No.
evident bad faith and manifest 324 — to apply for waiver of passport requirements and,
partiality, did then and there, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No.
willfully, unlawfully and criminally 324, approved such "legalization."
approve the application for
legalization of aliens who arrived in
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing
the Philippines after January 1, 1984
penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive
in violation of Executive Order No.
Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal
324 dated April 13, 1988 which does
liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links
not allow the legalization of the same,
up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic
thereby causing undue injury to the
Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
government and giving unwarranted
Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as
benefits and advantage to the said
follows:
aliens in the discharge of the official
and administrative functions of said
accused. xxx xxx xxx

Contrary to law. It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then

Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was
expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner
324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions.
had, in violation of the provisions of Executive Order No.
Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and
324 approved applications for legalization of the stay of
regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph
aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
16). Secondly, the application and administration of
1984. The information takes the position that the Executive
Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or
Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and
discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature.
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Thirdly, and perhaps most notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of
Requirements for Immigrants under Certain Conditions," the Executive Order provide as follows:
dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section
47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine
11. Except as provided in Paragraph
Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that
12, herein, the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation may
Notwithstanding the provisions of this waive exclusion grounds under the
Act, the President is authorized: Immigration Act in the cases of
individual aliens for humanitarian
purposes to assure family unity or for
(a) when the public interest to
the public interest.
warrants:

12. The following grounds for

xxx xxx xxx
exclusion may not be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration and
(3) to waive the passport requirements Deportation, namely, (a) those
for immigrants, under such conditions relating to criminals; (b) those relating
as he may prescribe. to aliens likely to become public
charges; (c) those relating to drug
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply offenses, except for so much of those
with the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for provisions as relates to a single
waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by offense of simple possession of
the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things, marijuana; and (d) those relating to
that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines national security and members of
before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously subversive organization.
in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the
filing of his application." xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the (Emphasis supplied)

passport requirements of certain aliens who arrived after
January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case,
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner
especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens under the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself
Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian
stated that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the
purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public
Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses
interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration
or minor children of qualified aliens — the latter being alien

112
Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens excluded from officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a
entry into the Philippines include: stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect
from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances
deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
(17) Persons not properly documented
administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of
for admission as may be required
Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v.
under the provisions of this Act.2
Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969];
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA
of persons in whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573
may be granted. [1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be
ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the Court, the official responsible for such interpretation is not,
information assumes to be criminal in nature, constituted for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether
official acts of petitioner done in the course of applying, civilly or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly
interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who
is no question that the applications for waiver of passport has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error
requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt
aliens were admitted and approved by petitioner "for personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See
humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346
disputed that the said alien spouses and minor children did [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made
not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes during the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No.
listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is 16698.
similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that
petitioner had anypersonal or corrupt interest in any of the My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts
cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in nature, is a
she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in
the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to
either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal
own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 issue. There is no real need for proof of any additional
expressly authorizes the Commissioner "in her discretion, essential facts apart from those already admitted by
[to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to
below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal have legal questions like that before this Court resolved at
information, as noted above, included an allegation of the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation
however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the
investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the
allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special very issue at stake.
Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do
information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the
not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime.Indeed, if the acts
preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the
which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal
Government and no unwarranted benefit or advantage" to
offense, very serious consequences would follow for the
the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of
administration of law and government rules and regulations
the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so
in general. For the thrust of the criminal information here
called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the
would appear to be that public officers interpret and apply
interpretation or construction given by petitioner to
statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at
Executive Order
the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of
No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of
any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such
passport requirements by alien wives and minor children,
interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate
arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had
and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and
conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case
humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later,
restoring family unity — there would be no "injury," let the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and indeed appear to
alone an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the me to be back where the case was at the time the original Information was filed.
benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of Had this Court ruled on the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked us
such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now, one
deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not
petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
No. 324 be held to be correct. process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the
very issue at stake.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation
that contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to
implementing regulation by the executive or administrative dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations.

113
Romero, J., concurs. On December 9, 1996, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 53, same city, two separate Informations against respondent,
one for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, docketed as
# Footnotes Criminal Case No. 96-154398, and another for illegal possession of firearm,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154399, reproduced as follows:
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
Criminal Case No. Case 96-154398
1 Gutierrez, Griño-Aquino and Romero, JJ., joined in the
dissent. Melencio That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
Herrera, J. wrote a separate opinion, but adopted the accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did
substantive points made in my dissenting opinion. then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control white crystalline substance separately contained in
five (5) plastic bags marked "AJ" to "AJ4" weighting two hundred twenty and .
2 It is also pertinent to note the following classes of
2462 (222.2462) grams known as "Shabu" containing methamphetamine
excluded aliens:
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
thereof.
(10) Persons who are members of a family accompanying an
excluded alien, unless in the opinion of the Commissioner of Criminal Case No. 96-154399,
Immigration no hardship would result from their admission;

That on or about November 19, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
(11) Persons accompanying an excluded person who is accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
helpless from mental or physical disability or infancy, when possession and under his/her custody and control .38 caliber revolver without serial
the protection or guardianship of such accompanying person number with six (6) live ammos and carrying the same outside his residence
or persons is required by the excluded persons, as shall be without first having secured from the proper authorities the necessary license
determined by the Commissioner of Immigration; therefore.

(12) Children under fifteen years of age, unaccompanied by No bail was recommended in Criminal Case No. 96-154398.
or not coming to a parent, except that any such children may
be admitted in the discretion of the Commissioner of On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for
Immigration, if otherwise admissible; reinvestigation on grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and
that no preliminary investigation was conducted.
xxx xxx xxx"
On January 28, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion.
(Section 29 (a), C.A. No. 613, as amended; emphasis
supplied) On April 14, 1998, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag, designated to conduct the
reinvestigation, was appointed judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not
inform the prosecutor who took his place about the pending reinvestigation.
Republic of the Philippines
Meanwhile, respondent has remained in detention.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the
Informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to
FIRST DIVISION
due process.

G.R. No. 156847 January 31, 2007

On January 12, 2001, the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that
Prosecutor Danilo Formoso, who took over the case, was not aware of the pending
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation
vs. within thirty (30) days.
SPO4 EMILIANO ANONAS, Respondent.
On February 16, 2001, Prosecutor Formoso manifested before the trial court that
DECISION the reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the
allegations in the Informations against respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to
dismiss the Informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Order dated September 7, 2001.
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 11, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
67531.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 67531, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse
On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at the
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to
Western Police District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta.
dismiss both Informations.
Cruz, Manila. The apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other
persons were sniffing methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as
shabu, a regulated drug; and that he was in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber On October 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the
revolver. Order of the trial court dated August 9, 2001 and dismissed the criminal charges
against respondent.

114
The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard
motion for reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, violated his of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five
right to due process. The Court of Appeals then ordered that respondent be released charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
from custody. statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act 3019, which certainly
did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking
and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration,
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
but in its Resolution dated January 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the same.
alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
The only issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in holding that three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case. (Emphasis supplied).
respondent’s right to due process has been violated.
The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that in all criminal than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19,
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial. Section 16, Article 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been
III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All persons shall have the right to afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or court, in an Order dated January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was
administrative bodies." This is reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires that "the investigating "it took some time for the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the
officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the reinvestigation.
investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal
There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be
Circuit Trial Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998) was
confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating
enacted on February 4, 1998. To implement its provisions, the Court issued SC
prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by
Circular No. 38-98 dated September 15, 1998 setting a time limit for arraignment
the Court of Appeals, respondent’s right to due process had been violated.
and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67531. No costs.
The earliest rulings of the Court on speedy trial were rendered in Conde v. Judge
of First Instance,[2] Conde v. Rivera, et al.,[3] and People v. Castañeda.4 These
cases held that accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial by the Bill of Rights SO ORDERED.
and that such right is denied when an accused person, through the vacillation and
procrastination of prosecuting officers, is forced to wait many months for trial.
Republic of the Philippines
Specifically in Castañeda, the Court called on courts to be the last to set an
SUPREME COURT
example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral
Manila
and legal obligation of the courts to see to it that the criminal proceedings against
the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the
custody of the law. FIRST DIVISION

In Angcangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,5 the Court found the delay of six years by the G.R. No. 150606 June 7, 2007
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases. Similarly, in
STATE PROSECUTOR AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS CASES IN
Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman,6 the Court ruled that the delay of almost six
REGION V, ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, AND REGIONAL STATE
years disregarded the Ombudsman’s duty to act promptly on complaints before
PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO M. TURINGAN, as alter ego of the Secretary of
him. In Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan,7 it was held that the Sandiganbayan gravely
Justice in Region V, in their official capacities, and, for and in representation
abused its discretion in not quashing the Information filed six years after the
of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARITES C. DE LA TORRE,
initiatory complaint, thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
in her official capacity as counsel for the Complainant, SOCIAL SECURITY
disposition of the case.
SYSTEM (SSS) Bicol Cluster, petitioners,
vs.
The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused HON. PABLO M. PAQUEO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC,
violates his constitutional right to due process. Thus, in Roque v. Sandiganbayan,8 Branch 23, of the City of Naga, and Accused BENEDICT DY TECKLO,
the Court, restating the pronouncement in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,9held: respondents.

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the DESICION
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
AZCUNA, J.:
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging that respondent Judge
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of due Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr., Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 23, acted
process clause, but under the constitutional guaranty of "speedy disposition" of with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 issuing the Orders dated August 24, 2001 and October 15, 2001. The Order dated
Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional August 24, 2001 granted the Motion to Quash of private respondent Benedict Dy
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or Tecklo, thus dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor
justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not Romulo SJ. Tolentino. The Order dated October 15, 2001 denied State Prosecutor
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by Tolentino’s Objection and Motion dated September 5, 2001.
indulging in the speculative assumption that "delay may be due to a painstaking
and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking The facts are:

115
On June 22, 2001, petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an For resolution is a motion to quash filed by x x x counsel for the
Information charging private respondent Benedict Dy Tecklo, the owner/proprietor accused, with an opposition to the same filed by State Prosecutor
of Qualistronic Builders, of violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28 (e) of Romulo SJ. Tolentino, the prosecutor who filed the information.
Republic Act No. 82821 for failing to remit the premiums due for his employee to
the Social Security System despite demand.
The motion is based on the lack of legal personality of State Prosecutor
Tolentino, [not being] legally clothed with the authority to commence
The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino, thus: prosecution by the filing of the information and, thus, prosecute the
case.
CERTIFICATION
One of the grounds provided by the rules to quash an Information is
paragraph (c), of Sec. 3 of Rule 117.
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN
THIS CASE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND "(c) that the officer who filed the information had no
UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS authority to do so."
REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE
HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY
A glance on the face of the information would glaringly show that it
GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE
was filed by State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino, without the approval
INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND
of the City Prosecutor of Naga City, the situs of the crime, a blatant
APPROVAL OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR.2
violation of the third paragraph of Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by respondent
Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. It was set for arraignment on August 7, 2001. On said
An information filed by a qualified and authorized officer is required
date, counsel for private respondent moved for the deferment of the arraignment
for the jurisdiction of the court over the case (Villa v. Ibañez, et al., 88
and requested time to file a motion to quash the Information, which request was
Phil. 402).
granted by the court.

A justification put up by State Prosecutor Tolentino is a Regional Order

On August 10, 2001, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash, thus:
No. 07-024-A subject of which is the Designation of Personnel issued
by the Regional State Prosecutor which in effect designated him as the
Accused, through counsel, most respectfully moves to quash the special prosecutor to handle the investigation of all SSS cases filed
Information x x x upon the sole ground that State Prosecutor Romulo SJ before the Offices of the City Prosecutor of the Cities of Naga, Iriga and
Tolentino, not being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial Prosecutor, Legaspi and the Offices of the Provincial Prosecutor of the different
has no legal personality nor is he legally clothed with the authority to provinces in the Bicol Region, except the provinces of Catanduanes and
commence prosecution by the filing of the Information and thus Masbate, and if evidence warrants to file the necessary information and
prosecute the case.3 prosecute the same in the court of [appropriate] jurisdiction.

On August 16, 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to The designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino to investigate, file this
Quash4 on the following grounds: information if the evidence warrants, and to prosecute SSS cases in
court does not exempt him from complying with the provision of the
third paragraph of [Sec. 4 of] Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
(1) He (State Prosecutor Tolentino) is authorized to investigate, file the
Criminal Procedure, that no complaint or information may be filed or
necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases since he was designated
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by Regional State Prosecutor
authority or approval of the Provincial or City Prosecutor or Chief State
Santiago M. Turingan by virtue of Regional Order No. 97-024A dated
Prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. The designation given to
July 14, 1997;
Prosecutor Tolentino came from the Regional Chief State Prosecutor
[who] is not one of those mentioned exclusively by the Rules to
(2) In a letter5 dated October 24, 2000, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito approve in writing the filing or the dismissal of an information.
Zuño confirmed such authority and that Informations to be filed in court
by prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the Regional State
Also, as ruled by this court in a similar case which was dismissed, the
Prosecutor or Provincial or City Prosecutor;
second attached document supporting the opposition to the motion, is
but an opinion of the Chief State prosecutor which has no force and
(3) Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Regional State effect to set aside the mandatory requirement of the Rules in the filing
Prosecutor, as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice, is vested with of an information in court.
authority to designate Special Prosecutors; and
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is granted, The
(4) The City Prosecutor has been inhibited by the private complainant information is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.6
from investigating SSS Cases as it is the Panel of Prosecutors that is
now acting as City Prosecutor over all city cases involving violations of
Petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Objection and Motion praying that
the Social Security Act. As acting Prosecutor, the panel outranks the
the Order dated August 24, 2001 be set aside and that the case entitled People v.
City Prosecutor.
Tecklo be scheduled for arraignment without unnecessary delay.

On August 24, 2001, the RTC issued an Order quashing the Information and
In an Order dated October 15, 2001, respondent Judge denied Tolentino’s
dismissing the case, thus:
Objection and Motion, thus:

116
 For consideration is an Objection and Motion filed by State Prosecutor No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
Romulo SJ. Tolentino, praying that the Order of this court dated August investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or
24, 2001 be set aside and the case be scheduled for arraignment. approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.9
Acting on said motion upon receipt thereof, the court gave the defense a
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order dated September Rule 117. Sec. 3. Grounds.— The accused may move to quash the
18, 2001 to file its comment and/or opposition; however, the period complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
lapsed with the court never receiving any comment and/or opposition
from the defense.
xxx

The records show that the issue raised in the pleadings from both parties
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
is whether Prosecutor Tolentino, in filing the information, can just
ignore the provision of the third paragraph of Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on [C]riminal [P]rocedure. Notably, changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. It is
noted that the letter dated October 24, 2000 of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.
It is the stand of this court, when it ruled and so holds that Prosecutor
Zuño, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino relies to support his authority to file
Tolentino may conduct exclusive investigation and prosecute all
the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor, was issued
violations of the provisions of the SSS Laws within the Bicol Region,
before the changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in
but in the filing of the information in court, he must comply with [x x x]
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
the above-cited provision of the rules on criminal procedure, that is, to
have the provincial or city prosecutor at the situs of the offense approve
in writing said information. It was further ruled by this court that failure While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that "[no]
to secure said written authority of the provincial or city prosecutor complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal
would touch on the jurisdiction of this court. without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal of
chief state prosecutor," the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that
"[n]o complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
With the foregoing, this court cannot find any legal basis to disturb its
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
ruling of August 24, 2001. The instant objection and motion is therefore
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy." Since the
denied.
provision is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done
otherwise than designated, it is mandatory.10
SO ORDERED.7
An examination of the functions11 of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of
Petitioners, thereafter, filed this petition praying for the nullification of the Orders Presidential Decree No. 127512showed that they do not include that of approving
dated August 24, 2001 and October 15, 2001. the Information filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
is duly authorized to file the subject Information without the approval of the City or consequence implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio
Prosecutor? alterius.

In their Memorandum,8 petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Tolentino was duly Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers
authorized to file the Information based on the following: authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating
prosecutor, the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not
comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
1. Petitioner Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan, per
Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the
Regional Order dated July 14, 1997, authorized State Prosecutor
Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Tolentino to file the necessary Information for violations of Republic
Procedure.
Act No. 8282 in the Bicol Region, except Masbate and Catanduanes,
and to prosecute the same in courts of competent jurisdiction. This was
in response to the request of the SSS, Region V for the designation of a Petitioners also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before
Special Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of said criminal cases with entering his plea and the trial court is barred from granting further time to the
the Office of the City Prosecutor and Office of the Provincial accused to do so; and that there is no evidence in support of the motion to quash.
Prosecutor of the cities of Naga, Legaspi and Iriga and all provinces of
the Bicol Region.
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash
provides:
2. Per ruling of the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter dated October 24,
2000, ". . . the information to be filed in court by prosecutors-designate
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.—At any time before entering his
do not need the approval of the Regional State Prosecutor or the
plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information.
Provincial or City Prosecutor." An administrative opinion interpreting
existing rules issued by agencies directly involved in the
implementation of the rules should be respected and upheld. SEC. 2. Form and contents.— The motion to quash shall be in writing,
signed by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its
factual and legal grounds. The court shall consider no grounds other
Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the
than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec. 4,
offense charged.
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent with the
Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.
rule above quoted, as it was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum 13 that his
—xxx

117
counsel orally moved to quash the Information before the arraignment on August PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date, respondent Judge required private BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.
respondent’s counsel to file a motion to quash within five days from the issuance
of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed on August 10, 2001.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for
quashing the Information, since it was apparent and within judicial notice that
petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino was not the City Prosecutor or the Provincial The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss
Prosecutor. a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion
and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the
Information, the Court finds that respondent Judge failed to cite in his Order the
correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court where the ground relied On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the
upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is important, however, is Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
that he correctly cited the ground for quashing the Information. Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a
Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
deliberation.14 Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977,
the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977
In this petition for certiorari, the Court finds that respondent judge did not gravely
but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to
abuse his discretion in dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino for failure to comply with the third paragraph of
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
The Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as
Philippines. For the orderlyadministration of justice, the provisions contained CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until
the Government. further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General
he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED for
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the
lack of merit.
accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the
petition for review. 7
No costs.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
SO ORDERED. resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Acting Chairperson, Corona, Garcia, JJ., concur. information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
Puno, C.J.* , Chairperson, on leave. evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an
order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition
thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the
arraignment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting

fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the
Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion
wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for dismissal
for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the
payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only
EN BANC be civil and not criminal.

June 30, 1987 The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence
of the accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the
G.R. No. L-53373
requirements of due process but also erodes the Court's independence
and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, hereby DENIED.
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December
COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE
18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.

118
 SO ORDERED. 11 between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or
final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do
petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary
so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm
restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-
of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner. 30
08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further
orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the
motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the
resolution of February 19, 1980. 15 Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby
filed in Court. 31
petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be
perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and
trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16 determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not
to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed
by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the
comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition. reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter
dismiss the information.
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is
that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion,
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
proceed for the proper determination of the case.
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It
cannot be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed
persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a
to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly
have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis
become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
faciecase. 22 thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know
the existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the
The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is
prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the
certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the
control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the
case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to
same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation
move for the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a
clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or

119
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who
has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
An investigation of the incident then followed.
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation. Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated
investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at
Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the Municipal
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court,
Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio
the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and
information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. The case was docketed as
the determination of the Court.
Criminal Case No. 9211.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July
pronouncement as to costs.
31, 1989 stating therein that:

SO ORDERED.
. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for
the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, questions and answers, concludes that a probable cause has been
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in
Teehankee C.J., took no part. the amended complaint, namely, Jimmy Cabarles, Ronnie Fernandez,
Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez, Jr., Vicente
Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag, Zaldy
Republic of the Philippines
Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy. (Rollo, p. 58, G.R. Nos. 94054-
SUPREME COURT
57)
Manila

xxx xxx xxx

EN BANC

In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners and recommended
G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991
the amount of P200,000.00 as bail for the provisional liberty of each of the
accused.
VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
Petitioners Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog filed a motion for the reduction
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
of bail which was granted by the court and they were allowed to post bail in the
amount of P150,000.00 each. Except for Jimmy Cabarles, all the rest of the
G.R. Nos. 94266-69 February 19, 1991 accused posted bail at P200,000.00 each.

JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, FLORENCIO T. FERNANDEZ, JR., NONILON On August 29, 1989, the entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty
A. BAGALIHOG, MAYOR NESTOR C. LIM and MAYOR ANTONIO one (261) pages were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate.
KHO, petitioners, Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case.
vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. ALFANE,
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the
respondents.
finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation
of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged
Francisco R. Llamas for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57. with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for
each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting
Jolly T. Fernandez, Elenito Bagalihog, Orlando M. Danao and Hechanova, gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante." (Annex "H", Comment of
Ballicid & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69. Fiscal Alfane, p. 186, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57) A motion to reconsider the
Resolution filed by petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim was
denied.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate,
May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
and relying solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a recommendation of no bail.
probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?

120
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us the prosecutor's certification in each information which reads: (pp. 19-
a verified petition for change of venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, 20, Rollo, G.R Nos. 94054-57; Emphasis supplied)
formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
xxx xxx xxx
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of
venue from the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of
The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the July 5, 1990
Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice, to wit:
Order.

Acting on the petition for change of venue of the trial of Criminal Cases
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94054-57, we issued ". . . a
Nos. 5811, 5812, 5813, and 5814 from the Regional Trial Court,
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and continuing
Masbate, Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or
until further orders from this Court, ordering the respondent judge or his duly
Makati, the Court Resolved to (a) GRANT the aforesaid petition for
authorized representatives or agents to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing or
transfer of venue in order to avoid miscarriage of justice (Article VIII,
implementing the warrant of arrest without bail issued against the petitioners in his
Section 5(4) of the Philippine Constitution); (b) DIRECT the Clerk of
Order dated July 5, 1990 in Criminal Cases Nos. 5811-14.
Court, Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate to transmit the records
of the aforesaid cases to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Makati, for raffling among the other branches of the court; and (c) In another Resolution dated July 31, 1990 in G.R. Nos. 94266-69, we resolved:
ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate to desist from
further taking cognizance of the said cases until such time that the xxx xxx xxx
petition is finally resolved.

. . . To ISSUE writs of (1) PRELIMINARY MANDATORY

The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. INJUNCTION, ordering and directing the respondent judge to recall/set
Felix. aside and/or annul the legal effects of the warrants of arrest without bail
issued against and served upon herein petitioners Jolly T. Fernandez,
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr. and Nonilon Bagalihog and release them
several motions and manifestations which in substance prayed for the following: from confinement at PC-CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City; and (2) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of
ordering the respondent judge or his duly authorized representatives or
the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal
agents, to CEASE AND DESIST from enforcing or implementing the
Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable
warrants of arrest without bail issued against petitioners Mayors Nestor
Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause
C. Lim and Antonio T. Kho.
or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of
guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no
warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been The primary issue in these consolidated petitions centers on whether or not a judge
personally convinced of such probable cause. may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for
preliminary investigation as a matter of right; and This is not a novel question. In the case of Placer v. Villanueva (126 SCRA 463
[1983]), we ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest.
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of
However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of
a probable cause, to be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or
arrest. This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973
for admission of bail. (p. 17, Rollo, G.R. Nos. 94054-57)
Constitution which provides:

In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
determine if there really exists aprima facie case against them in the light of
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce . . .

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the
We ruled:
motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest against the accused
including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:
. . . The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls
for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing
In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the
magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6,
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed
and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed
upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the
Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder. preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating
Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that
was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it,
each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on

121
 Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that ". . .
probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard cause to be determined personally by the judge . . ." (Article III, Section
the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of 2, Constitution)
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S. v. Ocampo (18 Phil.
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It
1) and Amarga v. Abbas (98 Phil. 739). And this evidently is the reason
is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election
for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15,
Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the
determination.
prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-
standing practice had been attached to the information filed in his sala,
respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the
determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable
after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents
wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the case where he to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
was satisfied that probable cause existed. ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind
the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge
The case of Soliven v. Makasiar (167 SCRA 393 [19881) was decided after the
to make his determination.
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. We stated:

And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of
of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The
a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which
pertinent provision reads:
ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released.
Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives.
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or Prosecutor.
things to be seized.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and 39 [19891):
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other respondent officers as may be authorized by law",
Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
Instance) no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in them
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
under Sections 13, 14 and 16, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
of 1964, (See Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940;
People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in Moran, Comments on
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause January 1, 1985, (Promulgated on November 11, 1984)
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to which deleted all provisions granting that power to said
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following Judges. We had occasion to point tills out in Salta v. Court
established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate of Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal other basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function . . . (but)
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2)
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the that whenever "there are enough his or prosecutors to
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to
at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and
the fact "that a certain power is granted does not necessary
mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly
laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal
complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal
before their courts. Procedure, declared effective on October 1, 1988, (The 1988
Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin Today
of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges
The decision in People v. Honorable Enrique B. Inting, et al. (G.R. No. 88919,
of Regional Trial Courts; said amendments did not in fact
July 25, 1990), reiterated the above interpretation of "personal" determination by
deal at all with the officers or courts having authority to
the Judge:
conduct preliminary investigations.

122
 This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where
RTC Judges also lost the power to make a preliminary all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
examination for the purpose of determining whether determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
arrest (or search warrant). Such a power –– indeed, it is as commits a grave abuse of discretion.
much a duty as it is a power –– has been and remains vested
in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of
1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing
Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
the people against unreasonable searches and seizures,
respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no
thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court
basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding
Rule or Statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be
the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
made clear while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
preliminary investigations to ascertain whether there is
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent
sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or
Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground
information, he retains the authority, when such a pleading
that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a
is filed with his court, to determine whether there is probable
probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It might
be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts,
with the rationale of Salta because both law and rule, in We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to
restricting to judges the authority to order arrest, recognize personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform
the function to be judicial in nature. the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However,
there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to
whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient
ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. depends on the circumstances of each case.1âwphi1 We cannot determine
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The
part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is
investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
judicial in nature and is lodged with the Judge. . . . circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should
call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing
Finally in the recent case of People v. Delgado, et al. (G.R. Nos. 93419-32,
questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
September 18, 1990) there is a statement that the judge may rely on the resolution
of COMELEC to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to
in the issuance of the warrant of arrest. We, however, also reiterated that ". . . the the respondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies
court may require that the record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it were used to establish a prima facie case against them. Although, the general rule
to satisfy itself that there is probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a is that recantations are not given much weight in the determination of a case and in
warrant of arrest." (Section 2, Article III, Constitution). Reliance on the the granting of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-
COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records 47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972]) the
of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very
relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation least, have gone over the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier
sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not on the strength of the in the light of the evidence now presented by the concerned witnesses in view of
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it. the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases. Even the Solicitor General
recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when he
recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions,
some Judges are still bound by the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant. Prosecutors are also It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to
interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail this Petition are affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by
and hopefully clearer terms. Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo Lozano and an affidavit executed by one,
Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's witnesses, Renato and
Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these earlier written
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far
statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate
between and where there is no duplication of work between the Judge and the
found the existence of a prima facie case against petitioners and
Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or
accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information.
highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and
Evidently, the same written statements were also the very basis of the
witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and
"Fiscal's Certification", since the attached affidavits of recantation were
word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest
not yet then available. Since the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more
is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners have not yet
important judicial functions.
been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair
play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure the petitioners
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution against hasty prosecution and to protect them from an open and public
which requires ". . . probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public
not by any other officer or person. trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive trials
(Salonga v. Paño G.R. No. 59524, February 18,1985). (Rollo of G.R.
Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)

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We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that “no warrant
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when produce.” As was said in the case of U.S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1, 41-42, “The
having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. question whether ‘probable cause’ exists or not must depend upon the judgment
and discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. It does not mean that
particular facts must exist in each particular case. It simply means that sufficient
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on
facts must be presented to the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant to convince
the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990
him, not that the particular person has committed the crime, but that there is
without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the
probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the
existence of a probable cause.
crime charged. No rule can be laid down which will govern the discretion of the
court in this matter. If he decides, upon the proof presented, that probable cause
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order exists, no objection can be made upon constitutional grounds against the issuance
of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of of the warrant. His conclusion as to whether ‘probable cause’ existed or not is final
Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The and conclusive. If he is satisfied that ‘probable cause’ exists from the facts stated in
Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in the the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his
instant Petitions are made PERMANENT. conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for arrest. He may,
however, if he is not satisfied, call such witnesses as he may deem necessary
SO ORDERED. before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is prima facie
evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed ‘probable cause’ for believing
that the person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime charged.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion that ‘probable
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. cause’ exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any other
Sarmiento, J., took no part. person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge
or magistrate.
SECOND DIVISION
The preliminary investigation conducted by the Petitioner under Republic Act No.
[G.R. No. L-8666. March 28, 1956.] 732 which formed the basis for the filing in the Court of First Instance of Sulu of
criminal case No. 1131 does not, as correctly contended by the Respondent judge,
NATALIO P. AMARGA, provincial fiscal of Sulu, Petitioner, vs. dispense with the latter’s duty to exercise his judicial power of determining, before
HONORABLE MACAPANTON ABBAS, as Judge, of the Court of First issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists
Instance of Sulu, Respondent. therefor. The Constitution vests such power in the Respondent judge who,
however, may rely on the facts stated in the information filed after preliminary
investigation by the prosecuting attorney.
DECISION While the Respondent Judge was within his right in requiring the Petitioner to
submit further evidence so as to show probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
PARAS, C.J.:
of arrest, he exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the case which was filed with
The Petitioner, the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu, filed in the Court of First Instance of the Court of First Instance of Sulu not merely for purposes of preliminary
Sulu an information for murder (criminal case No. 1131, People of the Philippines investigation. In other words, the failure or refusal of the Petitioner to present
vs. Madpirol, Awadi, Rajah, Sali, Insa and Maharajah Bapayani). At the foot of the further evidence, although good as a ground for the Respondent Judge not to issue
information the Petitioner certified under oath that “he has conducted the necessary a warrant of arrest, is not a legal cause for dismissal.
preliminary investigation pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 732.” As
Wherefore, the petition is granted and the Respondent Judge ordered to proceed
the only supporting affidavit was that of Iman Hadji Rohmund Jubair, to the effect
with criminal case No. 1131 in accordance with law, it being understood that, if
that the latter “was told that the deceased was shot and killed by three persons
within ten days after notice by the Respondent Judge, the Petitioner still fails or
named:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Hajirul Appang, Rajah Appang and Awadi
refuses to present other necessary evidence, the dismissal will stand for lack of
Bagali,” and the Petitioner had failed or refused to present other evidence
prosecution. Without costs.
sufficient to make out a prima facie case, the Respondent judge issued an order the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “In view of Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and
the foregoing considerations, and considering that the only affidavit supporting the Endencia, JJ., concur.
information does not make out a prima facie case, this case is hereby ordered
dismissed without prejudice to reinstatement should the provincial fiscal support
his information with record of his investigation which in the opinion of the court
may support a prima facie case.” Separate Opinions

Whereupon the Petitioner instituted in this court the present petition for certiorari PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and mandamus, wherein it is contended that, as he had already conducted a
I agree with Mr. Justice Montemayor and wish to add that, if the preliminary
preliminary investigation, it became the ministerial function of the Respondent
investigation conducted by the provincial fiscal, as provided for in section 1687 of
judge to issue the corresponding warrant of arrest upon the filing of the
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 732, takes the
information in criminal case No. 1131.
place of, or dispenses with, the preliminary investigation referred to in sections 1,
Upon the other hand, the Respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, Rule 108, to be done before a warrant of arrest is issued, as
arrest involves a judicial power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty provided for in section 7 of the same rule, or with the preliminary investigation
of first satisfying himself that there is probable cause, independently of and proper as provided for in sections 11 and 12, Rule 108, prior to the transmittal of
notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the provincial fiscal under the case to the court having jurisdiction of the offense, as provided for in section 13
Republic Act No. 732; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to that end he may require of the same rule, then the Court has no alternative but to issue the warrant of arrest
the fiscal to submit such evidence as may be sufficient to show at least a prima of the persons charged with the offense already investigated by the provincial fiscal
facie case. in the manner and form prescribed in section 1687 of the Revised Administrative

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Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 732, because the provincial fiscal acts as a fiscal of Manila is not entitled to the preliminary investigation provided for in the
committing magistrate, and the reason the court has to issue the warrant is because old criminal procedure (General Orders No. 58); chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
the provincial fiscal has no power to issue it. The power and authority vested in the that when a judge issues a warrant of arrest on the strength of a certificate of the
courts to determine “probable cause” before issuance of a warrant of arrest, being city fiscal of Manila that he had conducted the necessary preliminary investigation,
statutory may be taken away and vested in another judicial officer, as it has been the issuance of said warrant of arrest is proof that there was probable cause,
vested concurrently with the courts in the provincial fiscals by the passage of because the magistrate before issuing the warrant of arrest is supposed to satisfy
Republic Act No. 732. Section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of the Constitution refers himself and find that there was really probable cause. In the City of Manila I have
to search warrants. not come across any case where any judge of the city had declined or refused to
issue the warrant of arrest on the strength of the certificate filed by the city fiscal
Petition to annul and set aside the order of dismissal and to direct the Respondent that he had conducted the necessary preliminary investigation.
court to issue a warrant of arrest, so that it may acquire jurisdiction over the
Defendants and proceed with their trial, should be granted. The majority opinion maintains that under our Constitution, particularly section 1,
paragraph 3 of Article III thereof, before a warrant of arrest can issue, a judge must
first determine whether there is probable cause and he must examine under oath or
affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and that the
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary question whether probable cause exists or not must depend upon the judgment and
The majority opinion seeks to lay down a fundamental doctrine of far-reaching discretion of the magistrate issuing the warrant; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand it
implications and effects which would result in the scrapping and abandonment of then proceeds to reproduce but partially the following provisions of the
laws and of the general practice and followed these many years, regarding the Constitution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “ cralaw”, and no warrants shall issue but
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Because I disagree to such doctrine, in my opinion, upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
unreasonable and unwarranted, I find it necessary not only to dissent but also to or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
give my reasons for the same. The facts involved in the present case are without particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
dispute. seized.” The trouble is that the majority has contented itself with reproducing only
a part of said section 1, paragraph 3 of Article III of the Constitution. For purposes
Petitioner Natalio P. Amarga, as provincial fiscal of Sulu, after conducting a of reference, we should reproduce the whole paragraph 3 of said section which
preliminary investigation in a case of murder where on Dugusan Paspasan was reads thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
alleged to have been killed by about six Moros in his house in the municipal
district of Indana, province of Sulu, filed the corresponding information in criminal “(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
case No. 1131 in the Court of First Instance of Sulu, certifying that he had effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no
conducted the preliminary investigation pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
No. 732 and that in his opinion the accused herein was probably guilty of the crime examination under oath or affirmation. The complainant and the witnesses he may
charged. According to Petitioner, Respondent Judge Macapanton Abbas of the produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
Court of First Instance of Sulu asked him for the affidavits and testimonies of the things to be seized.” (Italics supplied.)
witnesses examined by him in order to satisfy himself (Respondent) that there was Before the promulgation of our Constitution, the provisions in our basic law
probable cause. According to Petitioner, not desiring to reveal all the evidence in regarding security against unreasonable searches and seizures and the issuance of
his possession, “for strategic reasons,” he delivered to Respondent Judge only the warrant upon probable cause were contained in the Philippine Bill of 1902, as
affidavit of one Iman Hadji Mohamad Jubair. Said affidavit is to the effect that the amended, and the Jones Law of 1916. They are as
affiant had examined the body of the deceased and found gunshot wounds on the follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
same, and that while he was examining the body, he was told that the deceased had
been shot and killed by three persons who are included in the information. “That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
Respondent after reading the affidavit was of the opinion that portion of the same violated.
referring to what affiant had been told about the killing of the deceased and the
xxx xxx xxx
identity of the killers was hearsay, and concluding that there was no probable
cause, he dismissed the case for not making out a prima facie case, without “That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
prejudice to reinstatement “should the provincial fiscal support his information affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
with record of his investigation which in the opinion of the court may support a things to be seized” (Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.)
prima facie case.” Claiming that Respondent had gravely exceeded and abused his
powers and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act to issue the “That the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
corresponding warrant of arrest against the persons accused in the information, violated.
Petitioner provincial fiscal has filed the present petition asking us to order xxx xxx xxx
Respondent to lift his order of dismissal and to immediately issue the
corresponding warrant of arrest in criminal case No. 1131. “That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
In his answer, Respondent Judge contends that the issuance of a warrant of arrest things to be seized.” (Section 3, Jones Law.)
involves judicial power and that the magistrate called upon to issue said warrant
has the right to exercise discretion before issuing the warrant; chan Our Constitution has combined the two provisions in the Philippine Bill of 1902
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat even where the fiscal had already conducted the and the Jones Law into one single paragraph now contained in section 1, paragraph
preliminary investigation it is still within the power of the judge before whom the 3, Article III, above reproduced. It will be noticed that neither in the Philippine Bill
information is filed to satisfy himself that there is probable cause, and that for said of 1902 nor in the Jones Law was it required that before issuing a warrant a judge
purpose, said judge may require additional evidence or affidavits to be presented or magistrate should first determine probable cause by examining under oath or
before issuing the warrant of arrest. affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. All that was then
required was that the probable cause be supported by oath or affirmation. The
In our study of the present case, we have found no judicial authority or question now to determine is whether this new requirement in our Constitution —
jurisprudence on this particular legal point. What we have found are decisions to section 1, paragraph 3, Article III, that a magistrate before issuing a warrant must
the effect that a preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal of the City of first determine probable cause by examining under oath the complainant and the
Manila under its Charter as amended by Act No. 612 of the Philippine Commission witnesses he may produce, refers to both warrant of arrest and search warrant, or
is sufficient in law for the purpose of proceeding to the trial of the case; chan only to the latter.
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a person accused in an information filed by the city

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I maintain that the new requirement refers to the issuance of a search warrant only a tenor o en consonancia con esta disposicion legal. Como ya he dicho, el
and that was the intention of the members of the Constitutional Convention, as may mantuvieramos el precepto del proyecto de constitucion, esta disposicion de la
be gathered from their discussion of the draft and the amendment thereto which orden general No. 58 podra en cierto modo ser contradictoria el precepto del
was finally approved as section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution. proyecto de constitucion, y nosotros sabemos muy bien que si se aprobara una
Professor Jose A. Aruego, a member of the Constitutional Convention in his book constitucion en la forma como este el precepto, cuya enmienda pido, y si
entitled “The Framing of the Philippine Constitution”, Vol. I, p. 160 under the encontrara una discrepancia sustancial entre dicho precepto y el codigo de
heading Security Against Unreasonable Searches, etc. procedimiento civil [criminal] creo que este utilmo tendria que quedarse derogado
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 6 al menos no puede mantenerse este precepto por anti constitucional. Pero yo creo
que ninguno de los miembros de esta asamblea vera que mi enmienda no responde
xxx xxx xxx a una razon fundamental y a una necesidad que se ha sentido en la practica. Los
“During the debates on the draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment abogados, que estamos en el ejercicio de la profesion hemos visto muchas veces
which was adopted by the convention, the amendment being the insertion of the casos en que agentes secretos consiguen mandamientos da registro solamente
words, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation mediante la presentacion de affidavit que reune los requisitos de la ley. Pero que
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The idea in the Francisco expedido el registro e impugnados despues los terminos del affidavit se descubre
amendment was not new in the Philippines; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryfor it was que los hechos que aparecen en el mismo son completamente falsos. De ahi que si
provided for in the Code of criminal Procedure of the Philippines. The queramos salvaguardar en todo lo posible derecho de un individuo a arrestos o
dignification of the idea into constitutional provision was zealously insisted upon, registros arbitrarios; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysi queremos que el derecho del
in order to make the principle more sacred to the judges and to prosecuting individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes o papeles este rodeado de todas las garantias
officials. The amendment was intended to be a remedy for the evils pointed out in que puedan impedir o que impidan la peticion de registros imotivados o infundidos
the debates, caused by the issuance of search warrants, many of which were in que queden dar lugar a molestias o vejaciones injustas o irreparables, creo que
blank, upon mere affidavits on facts most of which are generally found afterwards debemos hacer que en nuestra constitucion se consigne el precepto tal como yo
to be false.” propongo que se enmienda.” (Araneta, Vol. VI, Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, pp. 3006-3008.)
As to the debates on this particular subject of search warrants Atty. Salvador
Araneta’s Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. 6, p. 3006, we find The attitude and stand of the framers of the Constitution was conservative, that is,
the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary not to incorporate in the Constitution new ideas or principles regarding the
issuance of search warrants but merely to incorporate in said document, legislation
SR. FRANCISCO. Señor Presidente, caballeros de la convencion bajo el proyecto already existing on the subject-matter so as to make it part of the basic law. This
del comite de 7, se puede expedir mandamientos de registro, con tal de que la may be gleaned from the statements of delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
peticion vaya acompañada de un affidavit, en el que aparezcan hechos y Committee on Bill of Rights, which are as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
circunstancias que demuestren causas probables. Bajo mi enmienda, un juez no
puede expidir un mandamiento de registro sino solo despues de haber examinado al “EL SR. LAUREL cralaw . Es preciso y que determinemos claramente, ya que de
denunciante y a sus testigos bajo juramento. Parece ser que la diferencia es grande. todos modos queremos rodear de todas las garantias ese derecho importante del
El texto en ingles del proyecto dice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ciudadano con respecto a la propiedad y a la libertad, no debe haber objecion que
esa disposision que ya existe actualmente en nuestra legislacion, sea incorporada
‘ cralaw and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or que en nuestra constitucion que vamos a adoptar. (Idem. 3014-15.)
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” xxx xxx xxx

Esta expresion ha sido interpretada por los tribunales de America en el sentido de “SR. LAUREL, cralaw Si las garantias que deben rodear a esa constitucion son
que el juez tiene dos medios:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary o puede tomar en cuenta esenciales, hay que incorporarlas en la constitucion, ya que de todos modos existe
para la expedicion de un mandamiento de registro un affidavit en que consten esa legislacion (3015.)” (Italics supplied.)
hechos y demuestre la causa probable, o mediante examen del denunciante. Someto Professor Aruego himself attests to this policy of the Convention not to depart
a la consideracion de esta asamblea que es completamente peligroso permitir que from the then existing legislation because of the philosophy of conservatism. He
un juez expida mandamiento de registro, ateniendose exclusivamente o lo que says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
consta en un affidavit. Esta idea de que se puede expedir mandamiento de registro
mediante affidavit, o sea, solamente mediante un documento jurado en el que “The report of the committee on bill of rights was largely a reproduction of the
aparezcan hechos probables. No ha sido aceptada en esta jurisdiccion no solamente provisions of the bill of rights of the Jones Law, which is in turn were borrowed
en la practica sino tambien por la orden general No. 58. Esta convencion, creo que from American constitutions. Other provisions of the committee report were drawn
se habia fijado quien en dicha general No. 58 esta disposicion que aparece en el from the Malolos constitution and from the constitutions of the Republic of Spain,
proyecto del comite de 7 que es una reproduccion o copia del precepto que aparece Italy and Japan.
en el bill de Filipinas y luego en la ley Jones, aparece reproducido, como ya he
dicho, en la orden general No. 58, como articulo 27. (sic) Este articulo 27 (sic), “The report was struck on a philosophy of conservatism, the same philosophy that
dice lo siguiente:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ‘No se expedira mandamiento de pervaded the debates on the same in the Convention. In submitting its draft of the
registro sino por causa probable y por falta de peticion apoyada por juramento.’ bill of rights to the President of the Convention, the committee on the bill of rights
[Note:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary this is part of section 97, General Orders No. said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
58.] Como ya he dicho, “Peticion apoyada por juramento” puede ser testimonio del ‘Adoption and adaptation have been the relatively facile work of your committee in
testigo o affidavit. Considerandose, sin embargo, que esto es verdaderamente the formulation of a bill or declaration of rights to be incorporated in the
peligroso para el derecho que tiene un individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes y Constitution of the Philippine Islands. No attempt has been made to incorporate
papeles, nuestro mismo Codigo de Procedimiento Civil new or radical changes. Radicalism, no matter how democratic, may prove
[Note:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary should be Criminal] inserta en su articulo 28 detrimental. It were better that we “keep close to the shore; chan
[Note:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary should be 98] una disposicion exige como roblesvirtualawlibrarylet others venture on the deep.”
requisito ‘sine qua non’ el que el jues no puede expidir mandamiento de registro
sino mediante el examen de testigos, especialmente del denunciante. Este articulo ‘The enumeration of individual rights in the present organic law (Acts of Congress
viene a ser el articulo 28 [98] del codigo de procedimiento civil [criminal] que dice of July 1, 1902, August 29, 1916) is considered ample, comprehensive and precise
lo siguiente ‘El juez de primera instancia o el juez de paz, debera, antes de expidir enough to safeguard abuses or encroachments of the Government, its powers or
el mandamiento, examinar bajo juramento al denunciante o a los testigos que agents. Your committee, therefore, has not been allured by attractive innovations
presente, consignando sus declaraciones por escrito.’ De modo que mi enmienda es that are found in some modern constitutions, lest our constitution suffer from the

126
defect of an admixture of “declaration and declamations” in the enunciation of roblesvirtualawlibraryor when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
constitutional dogmas. escaped from a penal establishment. (Section 6, Rule 109, Rules of Court).
‘Modifications of changes in phraselogy have been avoided, wherever possible. But one may ask, if the provision in section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of the
This is because the principles must remain couched in a language expressive of Constitution requiring that a judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
their historical background nature, extent and limitations, as construed and complainant and the witnesses he may produce, refers only to a search warrant,
expounded by the great statesmen and jurists that have vitalized them.’“ (Aruego, why is it that the part of said section reading “and particularly describing the place
Vol. I, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 149-150.) to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” mentions the word
“persons”, which would convey the idea that warrant of arrest of a person was also
Now, what was that existing legislation which the framers of the Constitution contemplated? The mention or inclusion of the word “persons” in the said clause
wanted to incorporate into that instrument? It is sections 97 and 98 of General does not necessarily mean arrest. It will be noticed that this same word “person” is
Orders No. 58 which I reproduce below, and which are found under Chapter XIII contained in section 97 of General Orders No. 58 regarding search warrant, which
— search warrant:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary as already stated, was incorporated into the Constitution under section 1, paragraph
“SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon 3, Article III. The purpose of a search warrant is to search for and seize personal
application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and property which is alleged to have been stolen or embezzled, and other proceeds or
the person or thing to be seized.” fruits of the offense and property used or intended to be used for committing an
offense. (Section 96, General Orders No. 58 and section 1, Rule 122, of the Rules
“SEC. 98. The judge or justice must before issuing the warrant, examine on oath of Court.) Should the official serving a search warrant find in the possession or on
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and their deposition in writing. the person of the party searched personal properties such as stolen or prohibited
(Italics supplied.) articles like counterfeit money, lottery tickets, opium, etc., said party must
necessarily be taken to court with such articles because their possession implies the
From all this, to me it is clear that in drafting, amending, and finally approving
commission of a crime by him unless satisfactorily explained. Should he convince
section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of the Constitution, the delegates to the
the judge that opium found in his possession belongs to and was left there by
Constitutional Convention were satisfied with the practice and procedure then
another, or that the stolen goods were bought by him without knowing their illegal
existing about the issuance of warrants of arrest based merely on probable cause
origin, or that the counterfeit money found on his person was received by him in
supported by oath or affirmation, but they were deeply concerned with issuance of
payment and without knowing that it was counterfeit, he would be released. In
search warrants which according to them had been gravely abused because search
other words, a person’s apprehension under a search warrant is made not because
warrants had previously been issued on the strength of mere affidavits which later
he has committed a crime and therefore subject to arrest but because his possession
proved to be false; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand so to guard against and prevent
of the goods subject of the search warrant establishes a prima facie connection and
further abuses they imposed this constitutional requirement that a judge or
link with the commission of a crime which however may be satisfactorily
magistrate before issuing a search warrant must first examine under oath the
explained and rebutted, resulting in his release.
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. And it will be observed that the
phraseology of the requirement in section 1, paragraph 3 of Article III of the Judge Cooley in his book entitled Constitutional Limitation, Vol. I, p. 622, under
Constitution, namely, “examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant the topic “Unreasonable Searches and Seizures” says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and the witnesses he may produce, is a virtual reproduction of the clause “examine
on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce,” contained in Section “The warrant must also command that the goods or other articles to be searched
98 of General Orders No. 58, on the subject of search warrants. for, if found, together with the party in whose custody they are found, be brought
before the magistrate, to the end that, upon further examination into the facts, the
The framers of the Constitution were fully warranted in surrounding the issuance goods, and the party in whose custody they were, may be disposed of according to
of search warrants with this additional safeguard and guaranty. A search warrant law.” (Italics supplied.)
implies the invasion of the sanctity of a man’s home which is said to be his castle.
Under a search warrant one’s privacy is intruded on, his affairs pried into, his This may be the reason why the law and the constitutional provision on search
secrets discovered, his papers and personal documents may be ransacked and taken warrants require that such a warrant must particularly describe the place to be
to court and later may be used against him in a criminal prosecution. Searches and searched and the persons or things to be seized.
seizures under a search warrant are intimately linked with the fundamental rights of The apprehension of a person under a warrant of arrest is, however, different. In
a citizen not to be compelled to testify against himself. A citizen is practically asking for a warrant of arrest the complainant alleges the commission of a crime
helpless against a search warrant and its effects. Papers and documents and articles and points to a certain person as the one committing it. Stated differently, a person
seized thereunder once taken to court are beyond his reach. He cannot prevent their is expressly and clearly accused of the commission of a crime not clearly linked
being utilized as evidence against him. This is why, the framers of the Constitution with the possession of a prohibited article.
showed so much concern and solicitude in their discussion on the subject of search
warrant, and knowing the abuses and excesses that in the past had been committed Respondent Judge Abbas in refusing to issue the warrant of arrest in the present
under it, decided to surround its issuance with constitutional safeguards. Not so case claims that the determination of probable cause justifying the issuance of a
with a warrant of arrest. A person illegally or wrongly arrested under a warrant of warrant of arrest is a judicial prerogative or judicial power and he cites the case of
arrest improvidently issued, has a ready and simple remedy. He can always sue out U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 42; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the majority
a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from arbitrary or illegal detention. So, opinion sustains him in his contention saying that the determination of probable
there is really no necessity for surrounding the issuance of a warrant of arrest with cause before the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial power. It is interesting,
constitutional safeguards as was done with the issuance of a search warrant. however, to note that when this same case of U. S. vs. Ocampo was appealed to the
Besides, why make elaborate and render difficult the issuance of a warrant of arrest Supreme Court of the United States, that Tribunal held that it is only a quasi-
by a constitutional requirement that a judge must first examine under oath the judicial function or power which can be exercised not only by a judge or magistrate
complainant and his witnesses, when the policy of the Government and the but can be delegated to an executive officer.
intention of the law has always been to effect arrests quickly and easily,
presumably in aid keeping peace and order. Under our law, a warrant of arrest is in “It is insisted that the finding of probable cause is a judicial act, and cannot
many cases not only a peace officer but even a private citizen may without warrant, properly be delegated to a prosecuting attorney. We think, however, that it is
arrest a person when that person to be arrested has committed, is actually erroneous to regard this function, as performed by committing magistrates
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; chan generally, or under General Orders, No. 58, as being judicial in the proper sense.
roblesvirtualawlibraryor when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has There is no definite adjudication. A finding that there is no probable cause is not
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; chan equivalent to an acquittal, but only entitles the accused to his liberty for the
present, leaving him subject to rearrest. It is expressly so provided by section 14 of
General Orders, No. 58, as it is by section 2 of Act 194, above quoted. Such was

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the nature of the duty of a committing magistrate in the common law practice, and duty imposed by the Constitution, then that duty must of necessity be performed.
it is recognized in Revised Statistics section 1014. U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 716. There is no choice or alternative allowed by the Constitution. The judge cannot and
Benson vs. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462, 463, 32 L. ed. 234, 236, 237, 8 Supp. Ct. may not dispense with and shirk said duty and merely rely on what the fiscal
Rep. 1240; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryRe Oteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 335, 34 alleges in the information. That would be a clear violation of the Constitution
L. ed. 464, 467, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1031, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 241; chan because it would be depriving a person of the constitutional protection and
roblesvirtualawlibraryTodd vs. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 283, 39 L. ed. 982; guarantee extended to a citizen that before a warrant of arrest can be issued against
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 889. In short, the function of him, judge must first examine under oath the complainant and his witnesses to
determining that probable cause exists for the arrest of a person accused is only determine probable cause. This is another reason, in my opinion, why we should
quasi judicial, and not such that, because of its nature, it must necessarily be hold that this constitutional provision cannot have been intended to refer to the
confined to a strictly judicial officer or tribunal.” (Ocampo vs. U.S., 58 L. ed. issuance of warrants of arrest.
1231, 1235.)
Let us now consider the question of whether a judge of a Court of First Instance
The case of U. S. vs. Ocampo involved among other things the question of whether after receiving an information subscribed by the fiscal with a certification that he
a fiscal of the City of Manila under authority of Act No. 6I2 of the Philippine had conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause, may as was
Commission could determine probable cause so as to justify the issuance of a done by Respondent judge, refuse to issue the corresponding warrant of arrest. The
warrant of arrest and whether said function devolves exclusively to a judge or majority opinion says that he may decline to issue the warrant of arrest because the
magistrate. As already stated, that function of determining probable cause is only a issuance of that warrant is discretionary, resting upon the judgment or discretion of
quasi- judicial function or involves only an exercise of quasi-judicial power which the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. I believe, however, that the issuance of
may well be performed by a non-judicial officer. This same duty and authority of a warrant of arrest by a judge or magistrate after receiving the corresponding
the fiscal of the City of Manila to conduct preliminary investigation so as to information and the certification by the Fiscal is mandatory and that said Judge or
determine probable cause was extended to provincial fiscals conducting magistrate must issue the warrant of arrest, unless he questions the regularity or
preliminary investigations over offenses which fall under the jurisdiction of the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal. As I have already
Court of First Instance and so we may say that under the authority of Ocampo vs. stated, the Determination of probable cause after preliminary investigation is not
U. S., supra., the determination of probable cause by the provincial fiscal is the purely judicial function but only a quasi-judicial one which can be performed by a
exercise of only a quasi judicial power and can properly be performed by him. non-judicial officer, as held by the Federal Supreme Court in the Ocampo case.
The rule and practice in the United States under the jury system is for the Grand
Now, what was the purpose of delegating this function for determining probable Jury to receive evidence about the commission of an offense. If it finds probable
cause through a preliminary investigation to the fiscal of the City of Manila. It was cause, it prepares the corresponding indictment and upon presentation thereof to
to relieve the Municipal Court and Court of First Instance judges of Manila of this the judge or magistrate, the latter is in duty bound to issue the corresponding
tedious task of conducting preliminary investigation so as to give those judges warrant of arrest. No judicial discretion is involved.
more time to devote to the trial and determination of criminal cases.
“ cralaw Where an indictment fair on its face is returned by the grand jury, the
This practice of delegating the conduct of preliminary investigations to determine court to which it is returned should issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused as a
probable cause, to the Manila City Fiscal was found apparently so satisfactory and matter of course.” (22 C.J. S., Criminal Law, section 317, p. 469).
advantageous to the administration of justice that Congress by means of Republic
Act No. 732 extended the same function and practice to Provincial Fiscals. But In the case of Ex parte United States, 287 U. S. 241, 77 L. ed, 283, decided by the
were we to follow the rule and doctrine laid down by the majority in the present Supreme Court of the United States, the facts were:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
case that only a judge or magistrate can determine probable cause, and that to do so
he must examine under oath the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, “On March 10, 1932, a grand jury for the district, duly empaneled, returned an
then we could have to scrap and annul Act No. 612 and Republic Act No. 732 and indictment against Wingert, charging him with violating certain provisions of the
take away from Fiscals the right and authority to conduct preliminary banking laws of the United States. No question is raised as to the regularity of the
investigations to determine probable cause and require judges to devote their proceedings before the grand jury, or as to the sufficiency of the indictment. On
valuable time to said work. This would be a veritable retrogression and a reversion March 22, the United States attorney presented to the court a written petition
to the old practice and system which experience has shown to be slow and praying that a bench warrant issued for Wingert’s arrest. The district court, with
inefficient and which the law- making body had corrected by the promulgation of nothing before it, so far as the record discloses but the petition and the indictment,
Act No. 612 and Republic Act No. 732. The baneful effects of such a rule could denied the petition and refused to issue the warrant. The sole ground alleged in the
only be imagined. I cannot bring myself to believe that the framers of the return for such denial is that the matter was within the judicial discretion of the
Constitution ever contemplated, much less intended it. court, and, therefore, not subject to mandamus proceedings.” (77 L. ed. 284-285.)

But the majority, presumably realizing the adverse effects of such a rule on an In granting the application for a writ of mandamus, the U. S. Supreme Court made
efficient and speedy administration of justice, suggests that a judge need not the following pertinent rulings:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
examine under oath the complainant and his witnesses to determine probable cause “2. The theory of the court below is that its denial of the petition of the
before issuing a warrant of arrest but that he may rely on the facts stated in the government for a bench warrant was an exercise of its judicial discretion, and,
information filed by the fiscal after the preliminary investigation made by said therefore, not reviewable by mandamus. This view of the matter cannot be
official. I quote the majority opinion on this point. “The preliminary investigation sustained. The question whether there was probable cause for putting the accused
conducted by the Petitioner under Republic Act No. 732 which formed the basis on trial was for the grand jury to determine, and the indictment being fair on its
for the filing in the Court of First Instance of Sulu of criminal case No. 1131 does face, the court to which it was returned, upon the application of the United States
not, correctly contended by the Respondentjudge, dispense with the latter’s duty to attorney, should have issued the warrant as a matter of course. Cases are cited said
exercise his judicial power of determining, before issuing the corresponding to be the contrary, but they are not in point cralaw .
warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. The Constitution
vests such power in the Respondent judge who, however, may rely on the facts “It reasonably cannot be doubted that, in the court to which the indictment is
stated in the information filed after preliminary investigation by the prosecuting returned, the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted
attorney.” (Italics supplied.) But how could a judge rely on the facts stated in the grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose
information filed by the fiscal, when the Constitution itself, according to the same of holding the accused to answer. (Cases cited.) The refusal of the trial court to
majority, requires the judge himself to examine under oath the complainant and his issue a warrant of arrest under such circumstances is, in reality and effect, a refusal
witnesses for the purpose of determining probable cause? If as ascerted in the to permit the case to come to a hearing upon either questions of law or of fact, and
majority opinion above quoted, the determination of probable cause before issuing falls little short of a refusal to permit the enforcement of the law. The authority
a warrant of arrest by examining the complainant and his witnesses under oath, is a conferred upon the trial judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon an indictment does
not, under the circumstances here disclosed, carry with it the power to decline to do

128
so under the guise of judicial discretion; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor, as this designed and could not have been intended to include and cover warrants of arrest
court suggested in Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 61 L. ed. 129, 355, the for the simple reason that there was neither occasion nor necessity for it.
power to enforce does not inherently beget a discretion permanently to refuse to
enforce cralaw .” (Ex Parte United States, 77 L. ed. 283, 287.) There might be other reasons or argument but I believe that those already adduced
in the present modest dissent are sufficiently adequate to support the stand that,
The jury system was never implanted in these Islands. The determination of that portion of section 1, paragraph 3, Article III of the Constitution requiring a
probable cause thru preliminary investigation before the issuance of a warrant of judge or magistrate to examine under oath a complainant and his witnesses before
arrest originally devolved on justices of the peace and judges of Courts of First issuing the warrant, refers not to warrants of arrest but only to search warrants;
Instance. Later, however, for purposes of efficiency and time-saving the duty and chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the function of determining probable cause so as to
function was delegated to the Fiscal in the City of Manila under Act No. 612 and justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest and require the accused to stand trial is
later to Provincial Fiscals under Republic Act No. 732. Under these two Acts, the only a quasi judicial function which may be exercised by a nonjudicial officer, like
function exercised by the Grand Jury in the United States now correspond to the the Fiscal or prosecuting attorney and that the exercise of such function is properly
Fiscal of the City of Manila and Provincial Fiscal. And, just as under the jury and lawfully delegated to the city fiscal of Manila under Act No. 612 and
system in the United States, after a grand jury has found probable cause and provincial fiscals under Republic Act No. 732; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
prepared the corresponding indictment the judge or magistrate is bound to issue the once the fiscal, after conducting the preliminary investigation, finds probable
corresponding warrants of arrest, so, under legal system and judicial procedure cause, files the information and his certification before a judge, the latter is bound
after the Fiscal, counter part of the grand jury, has conducted the preliminary to issue the warrant of arrest, unless he questions the regularity and validity of the
investigation, found probable cause and filed the corresponding information with a preliminary investigation conducted by the Fiscal, because otherwise, the only
certification that he had conducted the preliminary investigation and found thing remaining to be done by the judge is for him to determine the legal question
probable cause, the judge of the court of First Instance is bound to issue the whether the facts alleged in the information constitute an offense or violation of
corresponding warrant of arrest, and if he refuses to do so, he may be compelled by ordinance, and issue a warrant of commitment if they do, or of release if they do
writ of mandamus. not. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil., 859; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary45 Off.
Gaz., 4889) and lastly, that if a judge refuses to issue the warrant of arrest under
This is the first time to my knowledge that a judge of the Court of First Instance said circumstances, as Respondent judge has done, he may be compelled to do so
has refused to issue a warrant of arrest despite the fact that the fiscal has filed an by means of a writ of mandamus.
information and certified that he had conducted the preliminary investigation and
found probable cause. Since the promulgation of Act No. 612 under which the For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
fiscal of the City of Manila exercised this function of conducting preliminary
investigation, way back in 1903 until the present, I know of no instance where a
Republic of the Philippines
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila has refused to issue the SUPREME COURT
corresponding warrant of arrest on the ground that despite the certificate of the Manila
fiscal he is not convinced that there existed probable cause and so he must conduct
said investigation by himself.
THIRD DIVISION
We must assume that when the framers of the Constitution, many of them able
constitutional lawyers, drafted, amended and finally approved the constitutional
G.R. No. 182336 December 23, 2009
provision now found in section 1, paragraph 3 of Article III of the Constitution,
they were aware of the practice adopted and being followed in the City of Manila
since 1903, to the effect that the determination of probable cause thru preliminary ELVIRA O. ONG Petitioner,
investigation was delegated to the city fiscal, and that upon his filing the vs.
information and the corresponding certification, the judge invariably issued the JOSE CASIM GENIO, Respondent.
corresponding warrant of arrest. Said framers of the Constitution could not by the
drafting and by the approval of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III have intended RESOLUTION
it to refer to warrants of arrest, because by so doing they would be radically
changing, yea, abolishing the practice found efficient and satisfactory in the City of
NACHURA, J.:
Manila under Act No. 612 for so many years. In this connection, it is interesting to
note that in June, 1952, Congress passed Republic Act No. 732 extending to the
provinces the practice and procedure in Manila under Act No. 612, and to Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
provincial fiscals the authority of the Manila city fiscal to determine probable of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolution 2
cause by conducting preliminary investigations. A good number of the members of dated January 7, 2008.
Congress who approved Republic Act No. 732 were delegates to the Constitutional
Convention and were lawyers. They could not have extended the practice and Petitioner Elvira O. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against respondent
procedure in Manila under Act No. 612 to the provinces if under section 1, Jose Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was dismissed by the City
paragraph 3, Article III of the Constitution which they drafted, they had already Prosecutor of Makati City. However, pursuant to the Resolutions dated September
abolished said practice. 15, 20063 and October 30, 20064 of the Department of Justice, respondent was
charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information5 which reads:
Before concluding I wish to emphasize that the requirement that a judge must first
examine under oath the complainant and his witnesses cannot possibly refer to a
warrant of arrest. As shown by the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention, That in or about and sometime the month of January, 2003, in the City of Makati,
the delegates in considering the subject of the issuance of warrants, discussed only Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, divest and
search warrants. They referred to and deplored the abuses that had been committed
carry away kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her personal things valued at
in the past in the issuance of search warrants and sought to prevent and do away
Php 700,000.00, belonging to complainant, ELVIRA O. ONG, to the damage and
with said abuses by requiring that the judge before issuing a warrant (search prejudice of the said owner in the aforementioned amount of Php 700,000.00.
warrant) should not be satisfied with mere affidavits but must examine under oath
the complainant and his witnesses. Nothing, absolutely nothing was said about
issuance of warrants of arrest ever having been abused. So the requirement about CONTRARY TO LAW.
examination of the complainant and his witnesses under oath by the judge was not

129
On November 21, 2006, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of WHETHER THE PETITIONER AS THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN A
Probable Cause Pursuant to Sec. 6(a),6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and, in View CRIMINAL CASE HAS NO PERSONALITY TO ELEVATE THE CASE TO
of Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance the THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT THE COMFORMITY OF THE OFFICE
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest7 (Motion to Dismiss). Petitioner filed an OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL EVEN BEFORE THE ACCUSED IS
Opposition8 dated December 11, 2006 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss. ARRAIGNED

In its Order9 of December 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati B.
City, Branch 56, dismissed the case because the other elements of the crime of
Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either violence against or
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO DISMISS
intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically alleged in the
THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Information filed against respondent.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Despite the dismissal of the case, respondent filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration10 dated January 2, 2007, reiterating that the Information should be
C.
dismissed in its entirety for lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed her Opposition 11
to this motion on February 15, 2007.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
DISMISS THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF PROBABLE
In its Order12 dated February 12, 2007, the RTC granted respondent’s Partial
CAUSE WHEN IT HAS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SAME
Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause
INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE[.]22
pursuant to Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The RTC held that the evidence on record failed to establish probable cause to
charge respondent with the crime of Robbery. The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

On March 6, 2007, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, 13 claiming that Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987
the RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on states that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
Criminal Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
arrest, and it does not cover the determination of probable cause for the filing of investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor
the Information against respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily General shall represent the Government in this Court and the CA in all criminal
vested in the Public Prosecutor. proceedings, thus:

In its Order14 dated June 1, 2007, the RTC denied petitioner’s Motion for SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
Reconsideration, holding that the aforementioned provision authorizes the RTC to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
evaluate not only the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
investigation and eventually filed the Information in court, but also the evidence requiring the services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the
upon which the resolution was based. In the event that the evidence on record office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled
clearly fails to establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case. corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of
the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus15 before the CA
on August 28, 2007. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 16 the petition, raising
the issue of lack of personality of petitioner to appeal the dismissal of the criminal (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
case, because the authority to do so lies exclusively with the State as represented all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its Resolution 17 dated September Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
10, 2007, the CA observed that the People of the Philippines was impleaded as special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
petitioner without showing, however, the OSG's participation. Thus, the CA capacity is a party.
ordered petitioner to furnish the OSG with a copy of the Petition, and the latter to
comment thereon.
This doctrine is laid down in our ruling in Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and
Annalisa Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio T. Buenaflor, 23 Cariño v. de
18
On October 22, 2007, the OSG filed its Comment, taking the stand of respondent Castro,24 Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,25 Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,26
that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the People Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,27 and People v. Santiago,28 where we held that
of the Philippines filed before the CA or the Supreme Court. The OSG submitted only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent
that, for being fatally defective, the said Petition should be dismissed insofar as the the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.
criminal aspect was concerned, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to
pursue the civil aspect of the case.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to
pursue the criminal action on his own behalf, 29 as when there is a denial of due
On January 7, 2008, the CA rendered its Resolution, 19 dismissing the case without process, this exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case.
prejudice to the filing of a petition on the civil aspect thereof on the basis of the
arguments raised by both respondent and the OSG. Undaunted, petitioner filed a
Before the CA, the OSG itself opined that the petition therein was fatally defective
Motion for Reconsideration20 which the CA denied in its Resolution 21 dated March
for having been filed without the OSG's participation. Before this Court, petitioner
27, 2008.
failed to advance any justification or excuse why she failed to seek the assistance
of the OSG when she sought relief from the CA, other than the personal belief that
Hence this Petition raising the following issues: the OSG was burdened with so many cases. Thus, we find no reversible error to
disturb the CA's ruling.
A.
Petitioner, however, is not without any recourse. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, 30 we
held:

130
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the G.R. No. 155041 February 14, 2007
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the
civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by REYNALDO DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect vs.
may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the HON. MANUEL B. FERNANDEZ, JR. in his official capacity as Presiding
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, Metro
private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said Manila, Respondent.
offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of
the accused. DECISION

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
CARPIO, J.:
Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the
rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the The Case
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on This petition for certiorari1 assails the Orders dated 5 and 28 August 2002 of Judge
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial
name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of court) in Criminal Case No. 02-0527.2 The 5 August 2002 Order denied petitioner
said complainant.31 Reynaldo de Castro’s (petitioner) Motion for Reinvestigation and the 28 August
2002 Order denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
On this ground alone, the instant Petition fails. Even on the issue of the RTC's
dismissal of the case, the Petition ought to be denied. The Facts

Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly On the evening of 11 June 2002, barangay tanods invited petitioner to the barangay
provides: hall in connection with a complaint for sexual assault filed by AAA, 3 on behalf of
her daughter BBB.4 Petitioner accepted the invitation without any
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — resistance.1avvphi1.net
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting On 12 June 2002, the barangay officials turned over petitioner to the Las Piñas
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly City Police Station.
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant
to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or On 13 June 2002, the police indorsed the complaint to the city prosecutor of Las
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In Piñas City for inquest proceedings.5 Later, the state prosecutor issued a
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the commitment order for petitioner’s detention.6
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
On 18 June 2002, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod filed an Information
complaint or information.32
against petitioner for the crime of rape. The Information reads:

Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an
Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on The undersigned State Prosecutor II accuses REYNALDO DE CASTRO y
record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable AVELLANA of the crime of Rape (Art. 266-A, par. 2 in relation to Art. 266-B,
cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of Revised Penal Code, as amended by R[.]A[.] [No.] 8353 and R[.]A[.] [No.] 7659)
probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days and in relation with R[.]A[.] [No.] 7610, committed as follows:
from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing
of the information.331avvphi1
That on or about the 11th day of June 2002 or prior thereto, in the City of Las
Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if feloniously commits [sic] act[s] of sexual assault with one [BBB], a seven (7) years
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. 34 This, the RTC [sic] old minor, by touching and inserting his finger into her vagina against her will
judge clearly complied with in this case. and consent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals CONTRARY TO LAW.7
dated January 7, 2008 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

On 1 July 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation praying that the trial
SO ORDERED. court issue an order directing the Office of the Prosecutor of Las Piñas City to
conduct a preliminary investigation in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules of
Republic of the Philippines Court. Petitioner also asked that the charge filed against him be amended to acts of
SUPREME COURT lasciviousness instead of rape since "fingering" is not covered under Article 266-A,
Manila paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353).8 In the Order dated 5 August
2002, the trial court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reinvestigation.
SECOND DIVISION

131
On 22 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the Order In this case, the information against petitioner was filed with the trial court on 18
dated 28 August 2002, the trial court denied the motion. Hence, this petition. June 2002. On 20 June 2002, one Glenn Russel L. Apura, on behalf of Atty.
Eduardo S. Villena (Atty. Villena), requested for copies of the pertinent documents
on petitioner’s case.20 On 25 June 2002, Atty. Villena entered his appearance as
The Issues
counsel for petitioner.21 Yet, petitioner only asked for a reinvestigation on 1 July
2002 or more than five days from the time petitioner learned of the filing of the
Petitioner raises the following issues: information. Therefore, petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to ask for a
preliminary investigation.
1. WHETHER A FINGER CONSTITUTES AN OBJECT OR
INSTRUMENT IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT Petitioner also questions the charge filed against him by the prosecutor. Petitioner
NO. 8353; and insists that a "finger" does not constitute an object or instrument in the
contemplation of RA 8353.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IN FULL ACCORD WITH RULE 112 OF THE Petitioner is mistaken. Under the present law on rape, Article 266-A of the Revised
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.9 Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, and as interpreted in People v. Soriano,22 the
insertion of one’s finger into the genital of another constitutes "rape through sexual
The Court’s Ruling assault." Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging petitioner with the crime of
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 223 of the Revised Penal Code.

We dismiss the petition.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed Orders dated
5 August 2002 and 28 August 2002 of Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., Regional
At the outset, we declare that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy in assailing Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254.
the trial court’s Orders. Petitioner filed before this Court a petition captioned
"Petition for Certiorari" and specifically stated that the petition is based on Rule
65. However, petitioner also stated that the issues raised are pure questions of SO ORDERED.
law,10 which properly fall under Rule 45.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Under Rule 65, a special civil action for certiorari lies where a court has acted Associate Justice
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 11 WE CONCUR:
In this case, petitioner failed to allege any circumstance which would show that in
issuing the assailed Orders, the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
or with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, following the hierarchy of courts, a
Associate Justice
special civil action for certiorari assailing an order of the Regional Trial Court
Chairperson
should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not with this Court. 12 Petitioner did
not raise any special reason or compelling circumstance that would justify direct
recourse to this Court.13 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TI
Associate Justice Asscociate Ju
On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review under Rule
45, the petition would fail because only judgments or final orders that completely PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
dispose of the case can be the subject of a petition for review. 14 In this case, the Associate Justice
assailed Orders are only interlocutory orders. Petitioner should have proceeded
with the trial of the case and if the trial court renders an unfavorable verdict,
ATTESTATION
petitioner should assail the Orders as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken
from the final judgment to be rendered in this case.15
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Additionally, the petition will not prosper because petitioner failed to comply with
the requirements under Rule 45 as to the documents, and their contents, which
should accompany the petition. Petitioner failed to submit a duplicate original or LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
certified true copy of the 28 August 2002 Order denying the Motion for Associate Justice
Reconsideration.16 Petitioner also failed to show the timeliness of the filing of the Chairperson
petition because the petition did not state the date when petitioner received the 28
August 2002 Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.17 CERTIFICATION

Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner, this Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
petition must fail. Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
On the merits, petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary opinion of the Court’s Division.
investigation. Under Section 7 of Rule 112,18 if an information is filed in court
without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five days from the REYNATO S. PUNO
time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation. The accused’s Chief Justice
failure to request for a preliminary investigation within the specified period is
deemed a waiver of his right to a preliminary investigation.19
EN BANC

132
 [G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.] (quoting from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50
entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoñez vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et al."), as follows:
192 SCRA 183
"x x x
LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA,
RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC "6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is
MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO starkly bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11,
VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO ORTIZ, 1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone
NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are
PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, the subjects of this petition will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30
ROMULO AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE for undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by
LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO petitioning counsel informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al.
DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO ILANO, JR., DOMINGO was to be at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant
CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been received
HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES by any of the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under
C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. detention were already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It
CALISTE, Petitioners, vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL was only at 3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him
V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL. alleged statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged
DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel
RICARDO TENSUAN, Respondents. Agapito Abad 'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to the office of
Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;' and said
Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel
Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today — I am only the
DECISION custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when
the charges against Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was
informed that the said charges were never coursed through the Records Office.
MEDIALDEA, J.: "7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong
arm of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al.
the right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition
under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances,
This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of
almost verbatim the same utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No.
petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon
37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be
City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners Lino
released on bail as a matter of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly
Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter
made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative of Article
Brocka, et al.). On learning that the corresponding informations for this offense has
142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming
been filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental
layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng
petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding
imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See
Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024
Annex B)
and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests,
including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered "8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel
the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become requested that they be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with
moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the question of whether their clients — the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals
or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be demanded that said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under
enjoined.:-cralaw Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request,
which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police
already under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the
District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in
right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was made by
sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport
the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).
Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in
Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President
Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2 F. E. Marcos. The circumstances of their release are narrated in Our resolution
dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as
Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal
follows:
Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were
released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered "G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Petitioner, vs. Col. Julian Arzaga, et
only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, al., Respondents). — Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoñez filed this petition for habeas
1985 were held. corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander
Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention
However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al.
Action (PDA) issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985.
remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action
They were charged in three separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly
(PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the
under Art. 146, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834.
original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to
On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial
them (p. 367, Rollo).
Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing the
Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which
Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the
349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original accused filed their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to
informations filed recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances be held in detention by order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985,
surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. these same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to

133
sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which Respondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s
corresponding cases were filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution release from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This
requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February
RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines
on February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours
argued that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139
continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for
sedition." (p. 395, Rollo). its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the
invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).
Hence, this petition.
The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are fact they found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396,
sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the Rollo).
second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the
same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational
that while there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue
does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two criminal charges against Brocka, et al.
informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.
We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom
The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate
case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of
against the sedition charge. the PDA, at the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).
We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of
second offense of inciting to sedition. criminal offenders. We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run
roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or
Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.
by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which
are: We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers
of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95); information, We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious
or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty
vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep
607); Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could
be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily
Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202); filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention
was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs.
Gil, 67 Phil. 62); Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of
democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young
national grandeur.: nad
vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Paño, We point out:
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia,
109 Phil. 1140); "Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-
and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R.
25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo,
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the
CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are
30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.
1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases
quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February subject of the petition. No costs.
18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
SO ORDERED.
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August Republic of the Philippines
1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.) SUPREME COURT
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that Manila
the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been
undertaken by state officials in bad faith.: nad FIRST DIVISION

134
G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988 An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty.
Batuampar (joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest
and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the
HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN
Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no
PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN PANGANDAMAN, MAMINTAL
searching questions" having been propounded. 11 The respondent Judge denied the
PANGANDAMAN, PACALUNDO PANGANDAMAN, MANGORAMAS
motion for "lack of basis;" 12 hence the present petition.
PANGANDAMAN, MACADAOB P. PANGORANGAN KILATUN
PANGANDAMAN, MARIO PANGANDAMAN, MACABIDAR
PANGANDAMAN, PUYAT P. ROMAMPAT, SANTORANI P. While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary
DIMAPENGEN, NASSER P. DIMAPENGEN and DIAMA OPAO petitioners, investigation of the offenses involved, which are cognizable by Regional Trial
vs. Courts, the petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the Judge in the case at
DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE OF bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the procedure prescribed
POONABAYABAO, TAMPARAN AND MASIU, LANAO DEL SUR and in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court ; 13 and that that failure constituted a
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the
issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest. 14 It is further contended that
August 10, 1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open
NARVASA, J.:
from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only, ..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for
respondent Judge to determine the existence of probable cause against sixty- four
The petitioners ask this Court: (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and degree in a matter of
hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day;" 15 and that there was undue
1) to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge Dimaporo T. haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly
Casar of the Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, in Criminal Case on the supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when
No. 1748 entitled People vs. Hadji Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman et al.; presented to him by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator." 16

2) to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal Case No. The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary
1748; and investigation of the charges "... in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who,
as said respondent well knew, had already taken cognizance of the matter twelve
(12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own investigation of the same; 17
3) to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case No. 1748 to and that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does" transgressed
the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur for proper disposition. 1 the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly
describe the persons or things to be seized.18
Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest was
issued by the respondent Judge without a proper preliminary investigation. 2 The There can be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a pre investigation
Solicitor General agrees and recommends that their petition be granted and the of any crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, a judge of an inferior court
warrant of arrest voided. 3 (other than in Metro-Manila or the chartered cities, where no authority to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested in such officials) must observe the procedure
On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. And
which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact although not specifically so declared, the procedure mandated by the Rule actually
transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked a consists of two phases or stages.
residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties.
4
Another version has it that a group that was on its way to another place, Lalabuan, The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint
also in Masiu, had been ambushed.5 and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with
the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with
On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of
widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that
Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident. the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with
6
The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.
parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however, identified — and
promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint,
Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st indorsement" to the respondent Judge, access to the complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-
transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a
filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that,
be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases." 7 in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the Judge
rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the
No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the
until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder provincial fiscal for appropriate action.
was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No.
1748. 8 On that same day, the respondent Judge "examined personally all (three) The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or
witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru .. (his) closed and direct information is filed in the Regional Trial Court. Failure to do so will result in a
supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's denial of due process. 19
answers. 9 Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were
named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." 10 Here, no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial Court. There is
no pretense that the preliminary investigation has been completed, insofar as the
respondent Judge is concerned, and that he does not intend to undertake the second
phase. In this situation, it cannot be said that he has failed to observe the prescribed

135
procedure. What has happened is simply that after receiving the complaint and witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused; and, second, the
examining the complainant's witnesses, and having come to believe, on the basis reading to the accused after his arrest of the complaint or
thereof, that the offenses charged had been committed, the respondent Judge issued information filed against him, and his being informed of the
the warrant now complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now substance of the evidence against him, after which he is
petitioners) named and Identified by the witnesses as the perpetrators of the allowed to present evidence in his favor, if he so desires.
killings and injuries, as well as against 50 "John Does." Probable cause, in regard to the first stage of preliminary
investigation, depends on the discretion of the judge or
magistrate empowered to issue the warrant of arrest. It
The real question, therefore, is whether or not the respondent Judge had the power
suffices that facts are presented to him to convince him, not
to issue the warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure
that a person has committed the crime, but that there is
for preliminary investigation. Stated otherwise, is completion of the procedure laid
probable cause to believe that such person committed the
down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a
crime charged. The proceeding is generally ex parte unless
warrant of arrest?
the defendant desires to be present and while under the old
Rules the Justice of the Peace or investigating officer must
There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation take the testimony of the complainant and the latter's
must be completed before a warrant of arrest may be issued. What the Rule 20 witnesses under oath, only the testimony of the complainant
provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the shall be in writing and only an abstract of the testimony of
Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. But nowhere the other is required. Regarding preliminary investigation, it
is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of arrest may has thus been ruled that 'the occasion is not for the full and
issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the
112 clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even presentation of such evidence only as may engender well-
before opening the second phase of the investigation if said court is satisfied that a grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that
probable cause exists and there is a necessity to place the respondent under the accused is probably guilty thereof. ... 23
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
The rule on arrest after preliminary examination has, of course, been modified
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.- somewhat since the occurrence of the facts upon which Mayuga was decided, but
not to abrogate the authority of the investigating judge to order such arrest, and
xxx xxx xxx only to prescribe the requirement that before he may do so, he must examine the
witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be under oath and reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers. This modification was
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge introduced by Republic Act 3838, approved June 22, 1963, amending Section 87 of
conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an the Judiciary Act of 1948, and the "searching questions and answers" requirement
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant is incorporated in the present Section 6 of Rule 112 already quoted.
and his witnesses in the form of searching question and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without
warrant of arrest. 21 first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a
finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of
This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the preliminary investigation .
investigation was expressly denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish
it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper. Thus, the former
Section 6 of Rule 112 provided: Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that there was
scarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the fourteen
petitioners and fifty "Does") within a matter of hours on a Saturday when
SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. That argument
satisfied from the preliminary e petition conducted by him or founders upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that he had personally
by the investigating officer that the offense complained of and closely examined under oath the three witnesses to the complaint 24 and that he
has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to had issued the warrant of arrest "believing that the offense thus filed had been
believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a committed." 25 Nothing in the record before this Court belies or discredits those
warrant or order for his arrest. affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of the legal presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed. 26 The contention that the witnesses to the
In Mayuga vs. Maravilla, 22 this Court found occasion to dwell in some detail on complaint had merely sworn before the respondent Judge to statements prepared
the process of preliminary investigation and, incidentally, to affirm the power of a beforehand and submitted by a military investigator 27 must, in view of the
justice of the peace or municipal judge conducting a preliminary investigation to foregoing considerations and for lack of any support in the record, be dismissed as
order the arrest of the accused after the first stage (preliminary examination), mere speculation.
saying:
The same argument also unwarrantedly assumes that the respondent Judge limited
Appellant should bear in mind that a preliminary the proceedings on preliminary examination to the usual Saturday office hours of
investigation such as was conducted by the Justice of the 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in addition to not making any persuasive showing that such
Peace has for its purpose only the determination of whether proceedings could not have been completed within that time-frame. For all that
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable appears, said respondent could have put off the 1:00 p.m. adjournment until he had
cause to believe the accused guilty thereof, and if so, the finished interrogating the witnesses to his satisfaction. And there is really nothing
issuance of a warrant of arrest. And it should not be unusual in completing within a three-hour period the questioning of three witnesses
forgotten that a preliminary investigation has two stages: in a preliminary examination to determine the existence of probable cause.
First, a preliminary examination of the complainant and his

136
The record which, lacking proof to the contrary, must be accepted as an accurate Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one
chronicle of the questioned proceedings, shows prima facie that the respondent of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature
Judge had personally examined the witnesses to the complaint, and a consideration of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and
of the latter's sworn answers to his questions satisfies this Court that the finding of once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." 30 Clearly
probable cause against the petitioners was neither arbitrary nor unfounded. violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized, 31the warrant must, as regards its
unidentified subjects, be voided.
The three witnesses to the complaint, Misandoning Monasprang, a student,
Lawandato Ripors, an engineering graduate, and Sanny Monib a farmer gave
mutually corroborative accounts of the incident. Under separate questioning, they The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may have announced his intention of
declared that they were members of a party that was passing by Pantao on its way investigating the incident himself did not, in the view of the Court, legally inhibit
to Lalabuan from Talaguian, all in Masiu, Lanao del Sur, at about 10:00 a.m. on the respondent Judge from conducting his own inquiry into the matter if, as is
July 27, 1985, when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group which made to appear here, it was regularly brought before him and no formal complaint
included the petitioners and about fifty other unidentified persons; that five of the was filed before the Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that in those circumstances
party had been killed and two (the witnesses Lawandato Ripors and Sanny Monib) he leave the investigation to the Fiscal and simply endorse to the latter the
wounded; that even after they had killed their victims, the ambushers had complaint filed with him; duty did not, and if he nonetheless chose to conduct his
continued to fire at the dead bodies; that the witnesses managed to escape their own investigation, nothing in the rules states or implies that he could not do so.
attackers and return to Talaguian, where they informed their relatives about what
had happened, and thence went to the municipal hall in Masiu to report to the
Be that as it may, since the action and final resolution of the respondent Judge after
authorities; that the dead victims were recovered only late in the afternoon of that
completing the second stage of the preliminary investigation are subject to review
day because the authorities could not "penetrate" the area and the ambushers
by the Provincial Fiscal, practical considerations of expediency and the avoidance
refused to release the bodies; and that the ambush was an offshoot of a grudge
of duplication of work dictate that the latter official be permitted to take over the
between the families of the ambushers and those of the victims. 28
investigation even in its present stage.

The witnesses named and Identified the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang,
WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as
Macacrao Guiling Macrang Hadji Alawi, Alicman Ripors and Malabato Diator. All
it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is
of them also Identified by name each of the fourteen petitioners as members of the
issued against fifty (50) "John Does." The respondent Judge is directed to forward
ambush group. The respondent Judge can hardly be faulted for finding enough
to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation
cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements of three eyewitnesses to
of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for further appropriate
killings perpetrated in broad daylight.
action. Without pronouncement as to costs.

29
In Luna vs. Plaza, this Court ruled that the term "searching questions and
SO ORDERED.
answers" means —

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

...only, taking into consideration the purpose of the
preliminary examination which is to determine "whether
there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof
so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused
held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show the
commission of a crime and the perpetuator thereof. What
would be searching questions would depend on what is
sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense,
the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible
motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education,
status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward
the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit
the offense; the victim, his age, status, family
responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, THIRD DIVISION
characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of inquiry
may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore must
to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the G.R. No. 136396 September 21, 2000
investigation. ...
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Upon this authority, and considering what has already been stated above, this Court vs.
is not prepared to question the propriety of the respondent Judge's finding of ROLANDO ZASPA and JULIUS GALVAN, accused-appellants.
probable cause or substitute its judgment for his in the matter of what questions to
put to the witnesses during the preliminary examination. DECISION

Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question validly VITUG, J.:
issued against the petitioners, such issuance having been ordered after proceedings,
to which no irregularity has been shown to attach, in which the respondent Judge
found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime Elevated and certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court for review is the
complained of. decision, dated 08 January 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao
Oriental, Branch 5, penned by Judge Ricardo M. Berba. The case, docketed
Criminal Case No. 2621 before the trial court, has charged Rolando Zaspa, a.k.a.

137
"Tata," and Julius Galvan with violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, were investigated and detained until they were brought the following day to the
otherwise also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. P.C. Barracks at Mati.

The case originated from an Information, dated 13 October 1994, which read: After trial, the court a quo found the two accused guilty of the crime with which
they were charged; the trial court held:
"That on or about April 29, 1994, in the Municipality of Tarragona, Province of
Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the "WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rolando Zaspa alias `Tata' and Julius
abovenamed accused, with intent to use did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, Galvan both GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8 in relation
feloniously own and possess five point six (5.6) kilos of marijuana dried leaves to Section 20 of the Republic Act 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and hereby
with stalks, a prohibited dangerous drugs, without proper license or permit from imposes upon each of them the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a
the authorities."1 fine of P500,000.00, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
Upon arraignment, both accused pled "not guilty" to the charge.
"The marijuana leaves subject hereof (Exhs. `D,' `D-1' and `D-2') are hereby
ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, thru the National Bureau of
Culled from the findings of the trial judge, as well as the decision of the Court of
Investigation (NBI), for disposition in accordance with law.
Appeals,2 promulgated on 09 November 1998 and penned by Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, the facts could be gathered, thusly:
"SO ORDERED."4
At about two o'clock in the morning of 29 April 1994, Chief of Police Rosauro
Francisco of Tarragona, Davao Oriental, received a tip from a police informer that Zaspa and Galvan appealed their conviction, albeit the penalty imposed, to the
Rolando Zaspa and a companion were bringing dried marijuana leaves bound for Court of Appeals for review. The appellate court upheld the conviction; it said:
Mati, somewhere at Crossing Banhawan, Tarragona, Davao Oriental. The police
chief promptly organized and dispatched to the area a team composed of SPO2
"Regarding the first issue, the appellee asseverates that there is entirely no merit in
Honorio Carasca (the team leader), PO1 Letecio Rafael and SPO1 Cesar
appellants' claim that they were not in possession of marijuana when the police
Travelegio. The group immediately proceeded to Crossing Banhawan, arriving
authorities apprehended them at Banhawan Crossing. The testimonial evidence
thereat at about five o'clock in the morning. There, the team saw Zaspa and his
submitted by the prosecution clearly pointed out that the two appellants were
companion standing by the side of the road with a big black "loalde" bag in front of
standing by the side of the road, with the black bag containing the prohibited
them. Just as SPO2 Carasca and PO1 Rafael, who were both in uniform, proceeded
marijuana just 1/2 foot away. The absence of any other person within the vicinity
to approach the two men, Zaspa tried to flee. He was intercepted by the policemen.
indicates that the contraband belonged to the appellants and to no one else. Now,
Zaspa claimed that the contents of the bag did not belong to them. When the bag
the appellants could not sufficiently explain the presence of the bag in their
was opened, Zaspa told the policemen that the dried marijuana leaves were owned
possession. Neither could they explain why the police would `plant' the same as
by one Bito Mangandan. Zaspa and his companion, who turned out to be Julius
evidence. Likewise, they did not substantiate the alleged `maltreatment' suffered in
Galvan, were arrested and brought to the Tarragona police station for investigation.
the hands of the law enforcers. Moreover, no improper motive was attributed to the
Samples of the leaves taken from the bag were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
police as to why they would testify falsely against the appellants -- if such was the
in Ecoland, Davao City, where the specimen were tested and confirmed to be
fact.
marijuana leaves. Chemistry Report No. 035-94, submitted by Police Senior
Inspector Noem; Austero, a forensic expert, contained the following findings:
"With respect to the alleged unlawful and warrantless arrest, the People manifests
that Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes an arrest without
"Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave
a warrant when the person to be arrested has committed a crime, is actually
positive result to the tests for marijuana, a prohibited drug."3
committing or about to commit a crime in the presence of the police officers. As
the appellants were found to be in possession of the prohibited drug at the time of
Zaspa, taking the witness stand in his defense, testified that sometime in January their arrest, the same is admissible as evidence.
1994 he was hired by Maturino Masanguid to cut an Antipolo round timber for the
amount of P5,000.00. He was paid P3,500.00 and was about to get the balance of
"We agree with the appellee. Well-settled is the rule that peace officers may pursue
P1,500.00 on 29 April 1994 when the incident transpired. He stated that he was
and arrest without a warrant any person under circumstances reasonably tending to
walking towards Barrio Sambarangay when an armed man in civilian outfit pointed
show that such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of
a gun at him and proceeded to examine the brown bag he was holding. He was
the peace (People vs. Bautista, 227 SCRA 152). In the case at bench, the facts and
thereafter dragged to the side of the road and questioned whether a black bag also
circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused at dawn of April 29, 1994 would
belonged to him. He denied either ownership or possession of the bag. He was
show that the arresting officers have proper and justifiable reasons to arrest the two
brought to the police station in Tarragona with another man whom he later learned
(2) suspects. First, they received a confidential information from a police informer
to be Julius Galvan. At the police station, a certain Francisco slapped him and
that a certain Rolando Zaspa with a companion were bringing dried marijuana
made him and Galvan crawl on the floor. The man also tried to smash the face of
leaves bound for Mati. Second, when the police arrived at the crime scene, the two
Galvan. He was detained in Tarragona Municipal jail from 29 April until he was
(2) suspects were suspiciously at the side of the road with a big black bag in front
brought, on 02 May 1994, to the PC Barracks at Menzi, Mati, Davao Oriental.
of them. Third, there were no other people in sight and it is therefore safe to
conclude that the bag containing the contraband belonged to no one else but the
Galvan corroborated the testimony of Zaspa. He asserted that on 12 April 1994, he suspects. Lastly, when the police officers were approaching, the appellant Zaspa
was contracted by Algin Divinagracia to spray their mango trees in Banhawan. The attempted to escape.
first spray was made on 15 April; he returned to Mati on the same day. The second
spray was made on 28 April but, unable to finish the work that day, he stayed
"A warrantless arrest and seizure was valid where it was done by the police team
overnight with Divinagracia. At about four o'clock in the morning, he was on his
dispatched to look for persons responsible for the crime (People vs. Acol, 232
way to Banhawan crossing when he was stopped by a man holding a gun. He was
SCRA 406). In any case, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection,
brought to a place where some police officers were questioning a man about the
defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
ownership of a black bag. The two were brought to the police station where they
plea (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402). Thus, any irregularity

138
attendant to the arrest of the accused was cured when they voluntarily submitted to Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals has basically done likewise in finding no
the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by reason to alter the conclusion of the trial judge.
participating in the trial (People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93).
In almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused would put up the
"As to the seized marijuana, the same is admissible in evidence, for trite is the defense of frame-up.1âwphi1 The Court views such a claim with disfavor for, like
jurisprudence that the search of the appellant's person and the seizure of the alibi, the frame-up theory can easily be concocted. 6 In the instant case, the police
marijuana in his possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful informer has particularly mentioned the name of Rolando Zaspa as being one of
warrantless arrest (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756). As the appellant Zaspa those who would be bringing the bag containing the marijuana,7 thus paving the
opened the black bag containing the prohibited drug, then it is a consented search. way for the authorities to conduct their operation. When Zaspa, indeed, has made
Settled is the rule that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is an attempt to run away upon seeing the police officers, he inadvertently has also
admissible in evidence (People vs. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325). confirmed the information given to the police. It bears to repeat that absent any
convincing proof of an intent on the part of police authorities to falsely impute a
serious crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance
"In the case at bench, it is clear that the appellants were really in possession of the
of official duty will ordinarily have to prevail.8
seized marijuana. Prosecution witness SPO2 Honorio Carasca's testimony that the
black bag containing the contraband was just 1/2 foot from infront of the appellants
(TSN, 4/25/95, p. 10), apart from the fact that there were no other people in the On the validity of the warrantless arrest, along with the corresponding search and
vicinity, would clearly show that the two (2) appellants were the possessors of the seizure, suffice it to say that any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest
prohibited item. The appellants' respective defenses denying the ownership and must be made before the accused enters his plea; 9 otherwise, the defect shall be
possession of the marijuana cannot topple the evidence proffered by the deemed cured by the voluntary submission by the accused to the jurisdiction of the
prosecution. In the first place, denial, like an alibi, is a weak defense which trial court.10
becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses (People vs. Ompad, 233 SCRA 62). Second, the appellants
No significant value could be given to the allegations of accused-appellants that
failed to present any receipts proving that on different occasions, they were at the
they were maltreated. Zaspa only decided to file charges against the apprehending
crime scene merely by chance. It must be noted that the appellant Zaspa failed to
police officers after almost a year following the incident. For his part, Galvan
present any evidence to show that he collected the sum of P3,500.00, or that he was
chose to remain silent. Neither one of the two accused-appellants submitted
to collect the balance of P1,500.00 from the witness, Mr. Maturino Masanguid. In
himself to medical examination. The attendant circumstances scarcely augur well
the same manner, the appellant Galvan failed to present the receipts for the
to support the asseveration of maltreatment allegedly suffered by accused-
medicine he purportedly bought for the spraying of the mango trees (TSN, 7/19/95,
appellants from the police authorities.
p. 22). Third, if the appellants were really maltreated in order to confess to the
crime charged, then why is it that they failed to submit to a medical examination or
treatment? (TSN, 6/8/95, p. 48 and TSN, 7/19/95, p. 36). Why is it that the WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
appellants filed a case before the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human against accused-appellants.
Rights only after almost a year from the time of the incident (Exhibit `1' and `2')?
In any case, there is nothing on record which indicates that the police operatives SO ORDERED.
were actuated by improper motive against the appellants. Credence can be given to
the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses, who as police officers
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
proof to the contrary (People vs. Bautista, 227 SCRA 152). Lastly, as the seized
items were positive for marijuana, then, the corpus delicti of the crime had been
fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness (People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555).
Footnotes
"In sum, the guilt of the accused-appellants has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, the affirmance of the appealed judgment is in order. 1
However, considering that the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the second Records, p. 1.
paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court shall apply.
2
With Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna and Rodrigo V. Cosico,
"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Let this case concurring.
be CERTIFIED and ELEVATED to the Honorable Supreme Court for review.
3
Exh. C, Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
"SO ORDERED."5
4
Records, p. 146.
Although the appeal from the decision of the trial court imposing reclusion
perpetua should have been directly appealed to this Court, considering the penalty 5
Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 5-7.
involved, the Court has decided to ignore this breach of technicality and to
nevertheless consider the appeal and evaluate the case. 6
Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558.

The testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense 7
TSN, SPO2 Honorio Carasca, 27 April 1995, page 18.
are diametrically opposed to each other on almost every point. In resolving such a
conflict, so dealing as it does on the credibility of the witnesses, the Court relies
8
heavily on findings of the trial court being in the best position, certainly more than People vs. Lacbanes, 270 SCRA 193.
the appellate court, in making that judgment. Thus, often repeated, is the standing
rule that absent any showing that the trial judge has overlooked, misunderstood or 9
People vs. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199.
misappreciated any evidence that could otherwise alter the result of the case, the
Court would adhere to the assessment made by the trial court on the question.

139
 10
People vs. Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221. for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757
before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the
Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the
EN BANC
Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the
Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and
Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994 On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge
issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but
denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners, under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld;
vs. opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the
Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only
TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National
respondents. Capital Judicial Region);. . .

Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order
under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines. October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the
instant petition, raising the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT A COURT

MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN
REGALADO, J.: APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT IN CONNECTION
WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis
COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS
case through the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of
AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO
an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed
CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A
outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search
PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS
on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from
xxx xxx xxx
the findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be
any dispute, to wit:
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the
trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the
temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection
Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt.
therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be
Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now
reversed through the present recourse before us.
Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in
violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories
Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could
Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement.
respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate
Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to
members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible
warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's
where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially
Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other.
According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall
firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, be discussed seriatim.
among others, were seized and taken during the search. And
all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises I
searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but
most of them were later released, with the exception of the
herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated

140
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed
invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly
cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an
that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No.
aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the
1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search
course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and
warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since
tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such
venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such
train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip,
warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
including the place of departure and arrival.

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal
course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted
action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal
and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of
process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a
any municipality or territory through which the vessel
criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the
principles of international law.
issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution
of a criminal action.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but
punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the
constitutes process.4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
charge is first filed. (14a)
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. 5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the
akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a
and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6 search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate
venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with
that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and
file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out
provisions on search warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a
to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and
not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that
this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein. matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, 13
have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would
seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other
the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both deliberate
formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end,
and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and
including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of
even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of
courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ,
national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on
summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a
those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such
person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, 10 or a writ,
conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be
warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. 11
reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to
a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14
by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already
been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a
bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules
criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is
as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no
needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the
such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial
criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due
jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then
compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an
located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary
different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where
jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there
different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal
would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would
offense.
resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which
aspect will be addressed hereafter.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible
position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after
110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial
Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15 invite our attention to
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. — the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial
Court 17 over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an
application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position

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is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the
on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987. place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.

We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer
intended to be of general application to all instances involving search warrants and exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that
in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of
Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was
is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving
courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with search of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase
respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of
the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular
court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply to single-sala courts No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of
and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the that provision, thus:
Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to
legal and constitutional objections.
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties
are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that court, said case shall be distributed conformably with
Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and
territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of the subject thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has
matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued
courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)
provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of
which states:
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the
criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the
branch. — The Supreme Court shall define the territory over place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as
which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primaryjurisdiction to issue the search
the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive
determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in
whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.) Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not
not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the
jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling
basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a
Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending
station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under
municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified
assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, range of enforcement of search warrants.
did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches,
such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The
II
administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within
which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction
conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a
executive judges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place
search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the
pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129. negative. We hold otherwise.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that 1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a
the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is
warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the
intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of
noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the
applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery
had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing
warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable
his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime
raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is

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implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may 3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners,
or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and
seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a
court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when
would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed
the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so
apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a
state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by
permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a
necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be
"friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process,
complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation
not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically
on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.
enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for
the issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search
heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant 27
enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of
instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless
and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court. 22 On the there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does
other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of
were enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not
Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are only property and privacy, but persons and liberty.
now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and
contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to
contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable
3. Writs and processes. — power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render
foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the
habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with
may be enforced in any part of the region. the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution,
obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo,
as quoted by respondent court:
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial
court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or
municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of
Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of
certification by the judge of the regional trial court. a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing
(Emphasis ours.) magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in
the city or municipality, within the region, where the place
to be searched is located. 28
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or
enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes
which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the
judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a
processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be
anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of
judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters
reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory
its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and
interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction
or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in III
paragraph (b).
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property
as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not
location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted,
convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the
and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not limited scenario contemplated therein.
impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of
jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy
instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on
guidelines:
territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., 24
the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of
therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to
Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application
Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and
challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the
being general warrants. latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on

143
the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:
primary jurisdiction thereover.
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the
be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper crime may validly entertain an application for and thereafter
recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of issue a search warrant in connection with the commission of
the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known such crime; and
shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with
which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case;
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is however, under extreme and compelling circumstances,
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the another court may issue a search warrant in connection with
warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts said case.
with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a
search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall
consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion adopts, it
of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over the crime
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in
proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in
wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
documentation therefor. and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is
of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in
charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts
nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of
which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be
considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our
warrants incident to the criminal case. jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such
warrant is definitively considered merely as a process
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this
hereby AFFIRMED.
fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this
opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
SO ORDERED.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law;
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur. also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders
of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to
Padilla, J., took no part.
include a writ, summons, or order in a judicial proceeding to
acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite
the cause or enforce judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate,
or other processes issuing from a court of justice.

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a

judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an
incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted,
or in anticipation thereof. . . ." (citations omitted)

Separate Opinions What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition

on the concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the
nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is
generally issued by a court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction,"
and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the
DAVIDE, JR., J., main case . . . or in anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on
the assumption that the court entertaining the application for and issuing

144
 the search warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of (b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial
course, the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or
was issued. municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the
Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a
certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes
issued by a court in a case pending before it and not to a case yet to be
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of
filed with it or pending in another court.
the indictment or information, the court may order the
attorney for the government to permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a
documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial
to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of
process, upon a showing that the items sought may be justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime
material to the presentation of his defense and that the committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies
request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and Procedure with that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain
Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124). an application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime
committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the
municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the indictment
committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the
or information.
Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the
entire archipelago.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental to an
original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an
incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's
determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the
jurisdiction of an action. statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the
country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial
and may, as incident to disposition of matter properly before courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to
it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case, specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses
though district court could not have taken cognizance of that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction
them if they had been independently presented. upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for
. . ."Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to
involves either proceedings which are concerned with quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.
principal case or proceedings which affect property already
in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of
1979]). the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in
connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce, must be be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several
within the court's jurisdiction. Incident is defined thus: Judges — specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b)
Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City
which, either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) — there is no definite showing that
upon, appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy. the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties
Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were
belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and
thing, called the "principal". Also, less strictly, it denotes some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila and
anything which is usually connected with another, or Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both
connected for some purposes, though not inseparably. . . . belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional
(Id., at 686) ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the
unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads: B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where
another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a
3. Writs and processes. — (a) Writs of certiorari, search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court.
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly
injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any
any part of the region. property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila
already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases

145
of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870
[1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does
VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA,
not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in
petitioner,
connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant
vs.
is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA,
the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents
COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith.
Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide
room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify.
I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF:
that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
broad powers and authority. vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I
respectfully submit that: G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990

1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative vs.
Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
observed. STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA,
P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, AROJADO, respondents.
search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said
court. Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Republic of the Philippines Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
EN BANC

Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF G.R. No. 85727.
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA.
MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners, Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, PER CURIAM:

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents. The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have
been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990 issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to
produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should
not be set at liberty without further delay.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners, In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of
vs. the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court
CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, against them.
S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

146
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988,
without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-
the informations filed against them are null and void. CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow
Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective
the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the
the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in
circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM,
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural
recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the
are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
which provides: soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato
Manligot.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the
person: Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
commit an offense; 30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was
amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is on 15 February 1988.
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. been released on bail. 2

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just
caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said
offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The
rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the
case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus: However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many the Court in an earlier case:
instances.

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these
petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant
were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.

A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions
is in order.

147
 From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia
or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in
in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set permit or authority to possess.
them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees
y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities,
was well within the bounds of the law and existing
told military agents about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
(CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of
his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, the CPP-NPA.
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the
judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture
is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less
justified. . . . 3 d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and
at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the
writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his
arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a
complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him.
To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we
find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to
bringing him personally before the court, he could have been possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment.
released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When
for damages against the person who arrested him we need questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he
not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking
sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines
sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error. (CPP).

II At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo
Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound.
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular
Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka

148
Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On III
further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he
was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo
were the following:
and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are
admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing
& Co." dated August 11, 1988; subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had
no license to possess or carry.
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell
datre)" dated August 11, 1988; The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of
13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of
Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic",
surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on
dated August 11, 1988.
their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns.
Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were
jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the
Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the following articles:
whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the
next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the
a) Voluminous subversive documents
morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking
permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a
search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with
the place, one Jesus D. Olba. one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live
ammunition of same caliber;
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP.
They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit
diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live
Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition of same caliber.
ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia
Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque
Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously
admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and
surrendered to the military.
that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the
said other occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary
evidence were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for
conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was
charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases
as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-
Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The
filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on heard.
behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case,
however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested
Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas corpus
because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows
filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque
that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms
remains for resolution.
and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are
and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was
null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information,
not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by
admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without
the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural.
The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the
time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.
them. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for
an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be filed by the offended party,

149
 peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of that her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was
the offended party or arresting officer or person. conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112
of the Rule of Court, as amended.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information,
the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation
by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must V
sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person
Roque claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to
of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply
have been found in their possession when they were arrested, did not belong to
for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary
arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to
investigation having been first conducted, the accused may
accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in
within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of
these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel
the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the
same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner
evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of
prescribed in this Rule.
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in
In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, the rebel movement.
as follows:
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in
accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners
Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful
conducted because the accused has not made and signed a
search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at
there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been
Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-
depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had by former members of the underground subversive
been filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date,
deprived of their constitutional right to due process. nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment,
firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
IV

The military agents working on the information provided by

In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya
Constantino that other members of his group were coming to
is justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when
his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation
she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the
whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind
PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a
the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and
search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at
Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II,
Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when
Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by
frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his
Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya
person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a
arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds
cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra
of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver
result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for
the letters to Constantino.
investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to
possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and
was released from custody. Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be
unreasonable for the military agents to believe that
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf
to visit Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's
of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was
information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that
illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the
part of the military agents, not to frisk and search anyone

150
 who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed
Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to at the National Press Club.
leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on
authorities to effect her arrest without warrant considering November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into
that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection commodities, water and the immediate release from
with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang
the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we
number as written on a piece of paper taken from heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON
Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation
have not offered any plausible reason so far. of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide
strike on November 23, 1988. 8
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they
acted reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances of Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to
the events in question, especially considering that at the time investigate him, but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00
of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of
ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to
their possession. say:

Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol
nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay
time, place and circumstances, from which one can ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng
reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot, spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si
involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy. Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)

IV The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was
invited for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an
Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for
Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted. Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is
detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail
association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines,
(P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
organized for their mutual aid and protection.

VII
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988,
while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila,
he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the
persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully
immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of
headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner- 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the
type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila.
accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police
away. on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on
of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the
police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at
the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's
Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00
guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso
o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim and, there
Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II
and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is
brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained,
restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion
was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in
to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the
view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of
same trial court.
Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with
violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).

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On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people.
behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention
habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is
Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military
and thereafter resolve the petition. authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide
behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as
an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
arbitrary State action.
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for
habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law.
in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court
because of the strength of the evidence against him). sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan
case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to
limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom
are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same.
the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself
pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated
states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta:
12 petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits
of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the
due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be
reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate
of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is scrutiny and disposition.
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the
arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
to be detained participated therein.

SO ORDERED.
VIII

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the Separate Opinions
process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as
amended is quite explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If CRUZ, J., dissenting and concurring:
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, surveillance on suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears may be arrested when he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged washing his hands, or taking his supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the ground
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, that he is committing the "continuing" offense of subversion. Libertarians were
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to appalled when that doctrine was imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a that even now this new Court is willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person to discard it altogether as one of the disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right of the people against unreasonable
supplied) searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are really to reject the past
oppression and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if it be argued that the
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, military should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain
thereafter, abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas that that fight must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do
corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person not believe that in fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which
detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court are precisely what we are fighting against. I submit that our more important
where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said ruling, motivation should be what are we fighting for.
which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and
strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and

152
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision. SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight cases.

G.R. No. 81567

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

The majority says that Rolando Dural's arrest without a warrant is lawful under the
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions for
Rules of Court, which reads:
Habeas Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning certain
statements made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) (Part I of
the Decision) and in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision). Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiam opinion states
categorically that: "the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
nature of continuing crimes." The majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. commit an offense;
Enrile (121 SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there made the same equally broad
statement but without any visible effort to examine the basis, scope and meaning of (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
such a sweeping statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
offenses which it regarded as "in the nature of continuing offenses which set them be arrested has committed it; and
apart from the common offenses" (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R.
No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision), the per curiam opinion has
in effect included the offense of "inciting to sedition" penalized under Article 142 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
of the Revised Penal Code as a "continuing offense" under the capacious blanket of escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
the majority opinion in Garcia-Padilla, at least for purposes of determining the serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
legality of the arrest without a warrant of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu. case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that "inciting to
sedition" is defined in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in terms of speech 1 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
and that consequently it is important constantly do distinguish between speech warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 1
press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded as violative of Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely because speech which the police "Rolando Dural," so states the majority, "was arrested for being a member of the
authorities might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may well New People's Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization," 2 and that
turn out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would "[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a
submit that we must apply the concept of "continuing offense" narrowly for warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
purposes of application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. arrested." 3

In my view, the very broad statement made about "continuing crimes" in G.R. No. As I said, I beg to differ.
81567 (Umil, et al v. Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural
and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. had already been tried in the court below for "double
murder, etc." and found guilty of the offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and First, Rolando Dural was charged with "Double Murder with Assault upon Agents
at least in the case of Rolando Dural, service of the sentence imposed upon him by of Authority." 4 If he had been guilty of subversion — the offense for which he was
the trial court had already begun. supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest — subversion was the logical crime
with which he should have been charged.

Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of
petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account of
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the Anti-
necessary, considering that the petitioner had already been charged in a valid Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, "he was not arrested while in
information filed with the competent court, which court had presumably issued an the act of shooting [them] . . . [n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the
order for his commitment, and considering further that he is entitled to bail. said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident." 5

There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine of

"continuing crimes" as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to
sedition and possibly other offenses, in some future case where that issue is raised
squarely and is unavoidable.

Cortes, J., concurs.

153
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen's) arrest is possible in case of corpus in view of its far-reaching importance to the motion, I do not see how we
subversion — in the absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to should act differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves
act. "Subversion," as the term is known in law, means "knowingly, wilfully and by persons who think and believe differently from the rest of us.
overt acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversion
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were ranking
association as defined in sections two and three hereof. . . . " 6 Logically, the
officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the majority,
military could not have known that Dural, at the time he was taken, was a member
Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions. 15
of the New People's Army because he was not performing any over act that he was
truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a "verification"6 before he could be identified
as allegedly a member of the underground army. Under these circumstances, I am That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the
hard put to say that he was committing subversion when he was arrested, assuming Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of the
that he was guilty of subversion, for purposes of a warrantless arrest. military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not justify the
couple's arrest without warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military,
this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime
"Overt act" is made up of "[e]very act, movement, deed and
(subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely,
word of the [accused]," 7 indicating intent to accomplish a
below.
criminal objective. Dural, at the time he was arrested, was
lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated
by law. G.R. Nos. 84583-84

Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been apprehended in I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple to be
flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the peace officer has contrary to law. That they are "admittedly members of the standing committee of
"personal knowledge" that he, the suspect, is guilty. (second paragraph.) As I the NUFC" 16 and that "subversive materials" 17 and unlicensed firearms were
stated, Dural was not caught in the act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence found in their possession, are, like Buenaobra's and Roque's cases, barren claims of
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a the military. I also fear that by the majority's strong language (that Añonuevo and
mere "confidential information." I do not think that this is the personal knowledge Casiple are admitted NUCF officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners
referred to by the second paragraph. 8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay. guilty, when the lower courts have yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the
last to preempt the decision of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the
presumption of innocence accused persons enjoy.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its language,
it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender
is plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely and simply, the military G.R. No. 83162
taking the law in its hands.
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards the
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural's warrantless arrest, I am afraid that the same conclusion. There was basis — at the outset — to say that Ocaya was
majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my brethren has probably guilty of illegal possession of firearms. As I have observed, a warrantless
accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria arrest must be predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed
without a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a or having been committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a
continuing offense. successful fishing expedition conducted by the military upon an unwary citizen. I
am quite distressed to note that this is still possible under a supposed democracy.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army" 9
is furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established that Dural is G.R. No. 85727
indeed a member of the Communist Party's military arm. And unless proven guilty,
he is presumed, and must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent. Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under arrest.
For the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in one's own
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because Dural has home and held moments later without a warrant of arrest.
been convicted and is serving sentence. I likewise take exception. It has been held
that: "The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final." 10 Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech delivered
in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21, 1988. He was,
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ. 11
Vindication of due process is its however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under these circumstances, it
historic office. 12 eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court,
Espiritu's detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had "manifested his
information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an
desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade," 13 for which habeas corpus has supposedly
information means "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense
become moot and academic. I am not convinced that that is reason enough to
subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court." 18 It is not, however, an order to
dismiss habeas corpus as moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my
keep one under detention.
opinion, to make sure that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily.
Personally, I find it indeed strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scot-
free. G.R. No. 86332

There is further no doubt that Buenaobra's petition is one impressed with a public The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held — the fatal shooting of
interest. In one case 14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition for habeas Romulo Bunye II — was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, only
on December 28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala, who

154
subsequently pointed to Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1) informed of
Nazareno, under these circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and independent counsel. 27
without a warrant or the existence of the circumstance described under either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above-quoted: The crime had long been committed
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the
prior to the arrest.
military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and Casiple) are
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines — and that they have
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162; supposedly confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed organization. The
85727 & 86332; Postscripts question that has not been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions
are admissible, for purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the
absence of any showing that they were apprised of their constitutional rights. I am
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of what I view as
perturbed by the silence of the majority. I am distressed because as we held in one
doctrines that have lost their luster:
case, violation of the Constitution divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the
accused to habeas corpus. 28
19
1. The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, which held that subversion is a
continuing offense;
According to the majority, a "re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of
the Ilagan doctrine is not the answer." 29 In my considered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile
2. The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile. 20 30
does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine jurisprudence. In that
case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were held by virtue of a simple
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the information ("the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of
fundamental rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities' the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion . . . and the issuance of a
handling of the petitioners' cases. Warrant of Arrest against them" 31 ) without any preliminary investigation
(examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance of a
warrant).i•t•c-aüsl As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present Constitution. fact that an information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process of law. ("The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which 32
require the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation (examination). It
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is forms part and parcel of due process of law .33
bailable." 21 Under the 1987 Constitution, not even "[a] state of martial law
suspend[s] the operation of [the Charter]. . ." 22 Second, it leaves the liberty of I find the majority's reliance on U.S. v. Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, inapt
citizens to the whim of one man ("On these occasions [the existence of a state of and untenable. In that case, the accused had been served with a warrant and
emergency], the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation thereafter taken into custody. The question that faced the Court was whether or not
and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so the warrant was valid, amid the accused's charges that the judge who issued it did
doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. not examine the complainant under oath. We held that the query was academic,
For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can because the accused had already pleaded, and the case had entered the trial stage.
only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty and without patriotism, the
President will not fail them." 23 ) Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I submit
Executive shares, to a certain extent, the exercise of emergency powers, with
that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the writ of
Congress. 24
liberty.

As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the soundness of
xxx xxx xxx
Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny under the 1987
Constitution. The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of
arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial decree. Four
years ago at "EDSA", and many years before it, although with much fewer of us,
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was handed
we valiantly challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had stood for:
down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in my view has
repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We set up a popular
significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla's very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice
government, restored its honored institutions, and crafted a democratic constitution
Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I feel that with this Court's
ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so
xxx xxx xxx painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years of struggle
against tyranny.
16. After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the
proper complaint or information against him must be filed It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of
with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law. . Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an
. impression that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and modesty
aside, my views reflect a strong bias on my part — forged by years of experience
17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid and sharpened by a painful and lonely struggle for freedom and justice — toward
reason would constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised men and women who challenge settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any
Penal Code, as amended. And the person detained would be adherent for now, let it nevertheless go on record as a plea to posterity and an
entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus, unless he appeal for tolerance of opinions with which we not only disagree, but opinions we
is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent loathe.
court. 26
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.

155
 in Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive
bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source
of the same, they came upon one Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the
Republic of the Philippines air.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting
the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the
FIRST DIVISION house, specifically a cement pavement or porch leading to the same, the patrol
chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as
to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told that he had
already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately
observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked,
admitted the same to be a .38 revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a
G.R. No. 93828 December 11, 1992 member of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm, the gun
was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's
SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants. permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found,
not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the
repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became the basis for
the present indictment against Evaristo.

PADILLA, J.: For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in question,
alleging that they were forcibly taken into custody by the police officers and even
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires, subjected to physical and mental indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge
Cavite, * in Criminal Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the Philippines v. of any of the firearms presented in evidence, contending that these were purposely
Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding the accused guilty of illegal possession planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and other police
of firearms in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and accordingly authorities.
sentencing them to the penalty of life imprisonment.
After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed
The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the decision dated 18 April 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
appellants) reads:
Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses P.D. No. 1866, accused Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo
SANTIAGO EVARISTO AND NOLI CARILLO of the are hereby sentenced to serve the penalty provided for under
crime of VIOLATION of P.D. 1866, committed as follows: Sec. 1 thereof. The full period of their preventive
imprisonment shall be deducted from the aforementioned
penalty.
That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the
Municipality of Mendez, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- With costs de oficio.
named accused being private persons not authorized by law
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously SO ORDERED. 2
manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their possession,
custody and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with
two live ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
two (2) 12 gauge home made shot guns, one (1) caliber 22
revolver (sumpak) and two (2) vise grips and one (1) plier 1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to
use (sic) in the manufacture and repair of said firearms "F" in evidence considering that those are illegally seized
without any permit or license from competent (sic) evidence;
authority.

2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally

CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW. seized evidence are firearms as contemplated in Presidential
Decree No. 1866; and
Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1
3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the
Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced, with arresting officer's testimonies which are patently
the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective witnesses and evidence contradictory and half truths (sic) testimonies. 3
to support their divergent versions of the events leading to the arrest of the
appellants. First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III of
the Constitution, the relevant portion of which provides:
A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses,
Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
indicates that on the day in question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
Vallarta, together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the Philippine Constabulary, seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
and two (2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol duty inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall

156
 issue except upon probable cause to be determined under The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the part of
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he the peace officer of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be the offense. Again, reference to the records resolves said query. Giving chase to
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants who were then asked
concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge
on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation along with the earlier report of
Sec. 3. (1) . . . .
gunfire, as well as the peace officer's professional instincts, are more than
sufficient to pass the test of the Rules. Consequently, under the facts, the firearm
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in arrest.
any proceeding.
The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the statute's
It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are coverage does not extend to firearms that are not functional or serviceable. The
unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, Court does not agree.
there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial
officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully
warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, orpossess any firearms, PART OF
several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among
FIREARM, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." 9 It is clear that the law
jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in
makes no distinction as to serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the
Harris vs. U.S.4 and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire. 5 Thus, it is recognized that
possession of even a part of a firearm is sufficient to come within the prohibitive
objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be
ambit of the statute. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence. 6
Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, maintaining that these were inconsistent with each other, thereby giving
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the
rise to the conclusion that the entire incident was a contrivance on their part.
appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend
Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in the statement of the prosecution
Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the
witnesses that there were only three (3) individuals in the vicinity (aside from the
search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby
peace officers) as opposed to the testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a
rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.
hostile witness, that aside from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other
people in the vicinity, such as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains
the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule
The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings easily
on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
shows that the two (2) prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC Vallarta,
Criminal Procedure provides:
testified in a straightforward and candid manner, categorically identifying the
appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and clearly narrating
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has given no possible reason
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a or motivation for these peace officers to make false accusations against the
person: appellants. Absent the presentation of such defense evidence, the testimony of the
peace officers should deserve full credence.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in
commit an offense; Criminal Case No. NC-267 finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel Carillo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Possession of Firearms as defined in
Presidential Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia
found in the possession of the appellants, in favor of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to be disposed of in accordance with law.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his No pronouncement as to costs.
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
SO ORDERED.

For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless
Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace
officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate
the matter. This incident may well be within the "offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) Separate Opinion
of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held in People of the Philippines v.
Sucro, 7 "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
CRUZ, J., concurring:
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES
CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE
THEREOF."8

157
I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the firearms CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed to its search
and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and open to eye and
Before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01164
hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion that the bulge in
dated 9 October 2007 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the warrantless search of
(RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 1528,
his person and the seizure from him of thepaltik.
finding accused-appellant Ricardo Alunday guilty of violation of Section 9,
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."
This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also dissented.
As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not come under any of
On 7 August 2000, two informations were filed against accused-appellant before
the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court,
the RTC of Bontoc, Mountain Province, for violating the provisions of Section 9 of
where a warrantless arrest and search may be made. Paragraph (a) and (c) are
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, 2
clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b) because although it may be
and Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
conceded that a crime had just been committed, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed it. In fact, they were pursuing
Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in the air, and not Carillo, whose In Criminal Case No. 1528, accused-appellant was charged with violation of
assistance they even sought. The circumstance that the search resulted in the Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6425, committed in the following manner:
discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and could not retroactively validate the
warrantless search for it was clearly void ab initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of
That on or about August 3, 2000, in the morning thereof at a marijuana
the poisonous tree and should not have been used in evidence against Rosillo.
plantation with an area of TEN (10) hectares, more or less, and which
form part of the public domain at Mount Churyon, Betwagan, Sadanga,
Footnotes Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, and with
intent to plant and cultivate, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
* Presided over by Hon. Enrique M. Almario.
feloniously plant, cultivate and culture marijuana fruiting tops weighing
more than 750 grams, with an estimated value of TEN MILLION
1 Rollo, p. 4. (P10,000,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, knowing fully well that
the same is a prohibited drug or from which a dangerous drug maybe
manufactured or derived.3
2 Rollo, pp. 21-22.

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 1529, accused-appellant was additionally
3 Rollo, Appellant's Brief, p. 55.
charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, 4 committed as
follows:
4 390 U.S. 324.
That on or about August 3, 2000, in the morning therof at a marijuana
5 403 U.S. 443. plantation situated at Mount Churyon, Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain
Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any license or permit thereof, did then
6 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 1989 and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
Edition, p. 427. an M16 Rifle, a high powered firearm, bearing Serial No. 108639, with
engraved marks of "COREY BOKZ" on the left side of the gun butt and
7 G.R. No. 93239, 18 March 1991, 195 SCRA 388. six (6) letter "x" on the handgrip which he carried outside his residence
without any written authority or permit previously acquired from the
authorities to carry or transport the same.5
8 Ibid., citing U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 and U.S. vs.
Samonte, 16 Phil. 516.
On 22 November 2000, accused-appellant assisted by a counsel de oficio pleaded
not guilty6 to both charges. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.
9 Emphasis (underscoring and capitals) supplied.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 1 George Saipen; (b) SPO1 Felix Angitag; (c) Police Officer
(PO) 2 Joseph Aspilan; (d) Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad, Chief,
Intelligence Section, Police Provincial Office, Mountain Province; (e) PO2 Roland
Republic of the Philippines Ateo-an; (f) Edward Sacgaca, Philippine Information Agency; (g) SPO1 Celestino
SUPREME COURT Victor Matias; and (h) Emilia Gracia Montes, Forensic Analyst, Philippine
Manila National Police (PNP), Crime Laboratory, Camp MBAdo Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet.
THIRD DIVISION
The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-appellant Ricardo Alunday,
G.R. No. 181546 September 3, 2008 Wayto Alunday and Linda Dalasnac, aunt and daughter respectively, of accused-
appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The prosecution's version of the case is as follows:
RICARDO ALUNDAY, accused-appellant.
Sometime in May 2000, the Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of
DECISION Mountain Province received a report from a confidential informant of an existing
marijuana plantation within the vicinity of Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain
Province. Acting on the confidential information, Chief of the Intelligence Section

158
of Mountain Province, Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad (Cayad), engaged involved in the commission of the offense not having been
the services of another confidential informant to validate said report. After a series shown to be part of the public domain; and
of validations, the confidential informant confirmed the existence of the subject
plantation.7
2. Acquitting the above-named accused in Criminal Case
1529 on reasonable doubt.15
Cayad reported the matter to the Provincial Director, who immediately directed
Cayad to lead a 70-men police contingent to make an operation plan. A joint
From the decision of conviction, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.16
operation from the whole Mountain Province Police Force was formed. 8 The police
operation was termed Operation Banana.
On 11 November 2004, accused-appellant filed an appellant's brief 17 before the
Supreme Court. On 4 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
On 2 August 2000, a contingent composed of policemen from Bauko, Sabangan,
People's Brief.18
Tadian, Sadanga, Provincial Headquarters and Bontoc Municipal Headquarters
proceeded to Mount Churyon. Edward Sacgaca of the Philippine Information
Agency (PIA) was invited to videotape the operation. 9 The team left Bontoc for Since the penalty imposed by the trial court was reclusion perpetua, the case was
Betwagan, Sadanga, in the afternoon of 2 August 2000. 10 They reached Betwagan remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition pursuant
at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon and slept there up to midnight. Thereafter, they to our ruling in People v. Mateo.19
proceeded to Mount Churyon where they arrived at around 6 o'clock in the
morning of the following day or on 3 August 2000.11 A group of policemen, one of
On 9 October 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of
whom was SPO1 George Saipen (Saipen) of the Bontoc PNP, was dispatched to
the RTC, the fallo of which reads:
scout the area ahead of the others, while the rest stayed behind as back-up security.
At a distance of 30 meters, Saipen, together with the members of his group, saw
Ricardo Alunday (Alunday) herein accused-appellant, cutting and gathering WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated 8 May 2003 of the Regional
marijuana plants. SPO1 Saipen and others approached Alunday and introduced Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain
themselves as members of the PNP. 12 SPO1 Saipen, together with the other Province is hereby AFFIRMED.20
policemen, brought said accused-appellant to a nearby hut.
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal21 on 5 November 2007. Thus, the Court
Inside the hut, the operatives saw an old woman, an M16 rifle and some dried of Appeals forwarded the records of the case to us for further review.
marijuana leaves. The other members of the raiding team uprooted and thereafter
burned the marijuana plants, while the team from the Provincial Headquarters got
some samples of the marijuana plants and brought the same to their headquarters. In our Resolution22 dated 19 March 2008, the parties were notified that they may
The samples were turned over by Police Superintendent Rodolfo Anagaran to the file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Emilia Gracia Montes, Forensic Analyst, notice. People23 opted not to file a supplemental brief on the ground that it had
PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp MBAdo Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, received exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in its brief, and the filing of a
17 pieces of fully grown suspected marijuana plants for laboratory examination and supplemental brief would only entail a repetition of the arguments already
analyses. She tested the subject specimens and found all to be positive for discussed therein. Accused-appellant submitted his supplemental brief on 12 June
marijuana.13 2008.

Accused-appellant presented a disparate narration of the incident. In the beginning, accused-appellant raised a lone error, thus:

He vehemently denied the accusations. He maintained that on 2 August 2000, he THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
went to Mount Churyon to haul the lumber that he had cut and left by the river. He THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
spent the night at the hut of an old woman named Ligka Baydon. REASONABLE DOUBT.24

At around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day or on 3 August 2000, Later, in his supplemental brief dated 11 June 2008, he added another alleged error,
he went out of the hut to search for squash to cook for breakfast. A group of thus:
policemen suddenly came. Two of them approached him and asked if he owned the
marijuana plants growing around the premises and the land on which these were THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
planted. He answered in the negative and further stated that he did not even know CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE DESPITE ITS
how a marijuana plant looked like. The policemen then proceeded to uproot and INADMISSIBILITY FOR BEING THE RESULT OF AN
burn the supposed marijuana plants. Subsequently, the policemen took him with UNLAWFUL ARREST.25
them to the PNP Headquarters in Bontoc despite his refusal to go with them.
As regards the guilt of accused-appellant, we find the expostulations of the Court
Wayto Alunday and Linda Dalasnac, the aunt and daughter of Ricardo Alunday, of Appeals worth reiterating:
respectively, corroborated the latter's testimony that he was indeed at Mount
Churyon on 3 August 2000 to get some lumber.14
It is jurisprudential that factual findings of trial courts especially those
which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty in Crim. Case No. 1528 respected when no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension
but was acquitted in Crim. Case No. 1529. The dispositive portion of the trial of the facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
court's Decision, dated 8 May 2003 reads: conclusions, can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by the
WHEREFORE, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered- trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses'
deportment, demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.

1. Sentencing Ricardo Alunday alias "Kayad" in Criminal

Case 1528, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to We have carefully scrutinized the record and found no cogent reason to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos-the land depart from this rule.

159
 xxxx marijuana plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, in May 2000, until they effected
accused-appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000. Also, accused maintains that the
arresting officers' failure to secure a warrant can never be justified by the urgency
Indeed, in the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish the
of the situation.
following with conviction:

Accused-appellant's claim of irregularity in his arrest is, at the most, limp.

(1) On 3 August 2000, a police continent raided a
marijuana plantation located in Mount Churyon,
Sadanga, Mountain Province. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

(2) In the course thereof, appellant was seen Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
cutting and gathering marijuana plants from the private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
premises.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
(3) There were no other plants except marijuana committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
which were growing in the said area. commit an offense;

(4) There was a hut apparently used by appellant (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
and an old woman as a camp or temporary probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
dwelling which existed alone within the area of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
the subject plantation. committed it; and

(5) The samples taken from the said plantation (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
were all found to be positive for marijuana. escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
On the face of these positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
one confinement to another.
appellant's bare denials must necessarily fail. Moreover, it is interesting
to note that appellant never mentioned his aunt, Wayto Alunday, in his
testimony. In fact, she contradicted appellant's testimony when she said Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
that he ate and slept in her hut. This only bolsters the conclusion that warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
Wayto Alunday was not present when appellant was captured by the committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section
police.26 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto.29 In flagrante delicto means caught in the
act of committing a crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without
warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime, or is
Needless to state, the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive
committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of
identification of the accused.27
the arresting officer.30

Contrarily, we find accused-appellant's posturings tenuous. Again, we cannot

It must be recalled that the Intelligence Section of the Provincial Office of the
deviate from the Court of Appeals' valid observation:
Mountain Province received the information sometime in May 2000, and accused-
appellant was arrested by SPO1 Saipen during the police raid at the plantation at
Aside from appellant's preposterous claim that he was looking for Mount Churyon, Sadanga, only on 3 August 2000. This is so because the arrest
squash in the subject area where only marijuana plants were planted, he was effected only after a series of validations 31 conducted by the team to verify or
did not advance any explanation for his presence thereat. Besides, confirm the report that indeed a marijuana plantation existed at the area and after
prosecution witness Saipen categorically stated that he caught appellant an operation plan was formed. As admitted by the accused in his supplemental
red-handed harvesting marijuana plants. Thus, We find it facetious that brief, the information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally
appellant did not even know what a marijuana plant looked like. confirmed only on 2 August 2000.32 On 3 August 2000, the arresting team of
SPO1 Saipen proceeded to the marijuana plantation. SPO1 Saipen saw accused-
appellant personally cutting and gathering marijuana plants. Thus, accused-
Appellant asserts that the plantation in question was maintained by the appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because he was caught in flagrante
Cordillera People's Liberation Army which witness Cayad confirmed delicto; that is, the persons arrested were committing a crime in the presence of the
likewise. Thus, appellant theorizes that he could not have been the arresting officers.33
perpetrator of the crime charged.

In People v. Sucro34 we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at
We find appellant's assertion specious. A perusal of Section 9, Art. II of a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the
R.A. No. 6425 shows that a violation exists when a person shall scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Section 5,
cultivate, plant or culture on any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy par. (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the offense is deemed committed in his
(papaver somniferum) or any other plant which may hereafter be presence or within his view. In essence, Section 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that
classified as dangerous drug. Indeed, ownership of the land where the the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught in the act of committing a
marijuana seedlings are planted, cultivated and cultured is not a crime.
requisite of the offense.28

SPO1 George Saipen testified on direct examination, thus:

Accused-appellant further assails his conviction for being improper and illegal
asserting that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over his person because
he was arrested without a warrant and that his warrantless arrest was not done Q. When you reached that Mount Churyon at about 6:00 o'clock in
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 the morning of August 3, 2000, what did you see there Mr. Witness, if
Rules of Court. He insists that the arresting officers had three months within which any?
to secure a warrant from the time they received the information about an existing

160
A. We were able to see a man cutting plants which we came to The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
know as marijuana plants. the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.36 We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
Q. You said we, who were you companions when you saw a man
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against
cutting marijuana?
him before his arraignment.37 And since the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, any defect in the arrest of
A. The Bontoc Operatives. the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction
of the trial court.38 We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of
an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
Q. All of you? upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate
the validity of the conviction of the accused.
A. Yes, sir.
Herein, accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.
Q. You mentioned a while back about marijuana plantation, will Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of
you describe to us why you say that [it] is a marijuana plantation? irregularity of his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore,
deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his
A. That is marijuana plantation because I think, more or less four actively participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his
(4) hectares were planted with marijuana plants. arraignment.

Q. And how tall were these marijuana plants in that marijuana It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid
plantation Mr. Witness? information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed,
and a judgment of conviction rendered against him.39
A. Some are fully grown around 4 to 5 feet while some are still
young about 2 feet while some are still seedling. Accused-appellant was not even denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal
arrest, because of his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as
Q. And you said that you saw a man gathering marijuana plants, manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted plea he entered during
how far were you when you saw this man? Could you give us an arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.40
estimate?
In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation, appellant casts
A. From this witness stand up to there. questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of the police officers.
Unfortunately for appellant, jurisprudence instructs us that in cases involving
illegal drugs, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers,
COURT: for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary.41 Where there is nothing to indicate that the
You stipulate counsel. witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is
that they were not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith
and credit.42 In this case, the records are bereft of any indication which even
PROS. DOMINGUEZ: remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the police officers. The following
observations of the trial court are, indeed, appropriate, thus:
About 30 meters, Your Honor.
Absent as it is in the record indications of personal interest or improper
PROS. DOMINGUEZ: motive on their part to testify against the accused, the witnesses for the
prosecution being government law enforcers and/or officials, actually
present during the incident in question in the performance of their
And how was the terrain of that Mount Churyon, is it flat? duties, are trustworthy sources. And the recollections in open court of
such witnesses of the events that transpired on the occasion, given in
A. Where the plantation is located it is somewhat slope and a little clear and direct manner, corroborating and complimenting each other
bit flat. on material points, and highly probable in the natural order of things,
are easy to believe and thus accorded full credence.

Q. You mean rolling hills?

In contrast, the accused himself, his aunt, and his daughter who testified
in behalf of the former are obviously biased and unreliable witnesses on
A. Yes, sir. account of self-interest and blood kinship. Situated as they are, their
inclination to be truthful is highly suspect. And quite aside from being
Q. What did you do when you saw a man cutting or gathering self-serving and dubious, their testimonies are inconsistent, and
marijuana plants? manifestly concocted or improbable to be seriously considered.43

A. Upon seeing that man cutting marijuana plants, I cautioned my All told, the cultivation of marijuana fruiting tops by accused-appellant having
companions at my back telling them that there is a man down cutting been established beyond reasonable doubt, we are constrained to uphold appellant's
marijuana which prompted them to move; that others proceeded to the conviction. The penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
camp while me and my one companion went to the man and cautioned being in accord with law, is likewise affirmed.
him not to make unnecessary movements.35

161
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 October 2007 of the "That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01164, affirming in toto the Decision and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and
of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero
Province, in Criminal Case No. 1528, is hereby AFFIRMED. one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper
authorities to possess the same.
SO ORDERED.

CONTRARY TO LAW."7
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

"That at about 3:00 o’clock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler,
Republic of the Philippines
Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully
SUPREME COURT
transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without
Manila
any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.

SECOND DIVISION
CONTRARY TO LAW."8

G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to
vs.
visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.
charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the
circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van,
DECISION blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea
Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police
station for investigation.9
NACHURA, J.:

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment 10 convicting appellant of

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court 2 (RTC) Joint Decision 3 penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00; but acquitted him of
dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. affirmed the RTC decision.11
9165.

Hence, the present appeal.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the confiscated drug because of the team’s failure to mark the specimen immediately
transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the
member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He
group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the
appellant.4 The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical fruit of the poisonous tree.
description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the
following day.
The appeal is meritorious.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him
that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of We have repeatedly held that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual
same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a affected the case.13
tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to
board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure
suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as
of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is
he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom
noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by
which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5
the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence
against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The upon by the trial and appellate courts.
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera
who marked it with his initials and with appellant’s name. The field test and
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive
review.1avvphi1 This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.6
even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just
disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused
of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 14
same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:

162
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m.,
arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis
inadmissible in evidence against him. bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway
in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest
Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him
before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue.
as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle,
Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected
we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily
of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended
the suspected drug.23 The team then brought appellant to the police station for
his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
his person. Appellant’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
his acquittal. 15
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant,
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora
lawful.16
carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that
information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried arrest.
out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence
obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 17 Said
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not
proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. 24 We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta, 25 People v. Tudtud,26 and People v.
Nuevas.27
3. Search of a moving vehicle;

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain
4. Consented warrantless search; "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large
volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed
5. Customs search; themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus
positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two
females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the
6. Stop and Frisk; and woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team
approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18 bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was
found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police
involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.19 the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence
Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and
learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back
was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a
crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m.,
bringing with him a sachet of shabu. 20 Consequently, the warrantless search was two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police
considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest. officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box
which yielded marijuana leaves.29
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest
must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the person, more or less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 21 Thus, upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a
given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and
officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description,
exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid
he is charged.22 to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would
make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them,
reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying.
the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.30

163
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and
overt act indicative of the criminal design. to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement,
within ten (10) days from notice.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of No costs.
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or
about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted
SO ORDERED.
from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in
any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not Associate Justice
have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently,
the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
WE CONCUR:

We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As
Associate Justice
cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v. Maspil, Jr., 31 People v. Bagista,32
Chairperson
People v. Balingan,33 People v. Lising,34 People v. Montilla,35 People v.
Valdez,36and People v. Gonzales.37 In these cases, the Court sustained the validity
of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually Associate Justice Associate Justice
committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court,
except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the
rule against warrantless searches.38
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them
to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio
Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped ATTESTATION
information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only
the appellant’s physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant.39
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, Chairperson, Second Division
the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section
3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." CERTIFICATION

Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of opinion of the Court’s Division.
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A
waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the RENATO C. CORONA
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 40 Chief Justice

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right Manila
to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full
protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to THIRD DIVISION
gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the
alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014
enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of
justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace vs.
and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.
and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
justifies the means.42
DECISION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant LEONEN, J.:
Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

164
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through Article III, According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La Union,
Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve their autonomy "waiting for a jeepney to take him" 28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel so he could
and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The alleged compromise buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao, his younger brother’s
with the battle against dangerous drugs is more apparent than real. Often, the friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel, Dayao and Cogaed alighted
compromise is there because law enforcers neglect to perform what could have from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for [Cogaed’s] help in carrying his
been done to uphold the Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge things, which included a travelling bag and a sack." 32 Cogaed agreed because they
of society. were both going to the market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them,
and when SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied
that he did not know.34SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however, Cogaed was
Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized as a
not privy to their conversation.35 Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac arrested Dayao and
result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged perpetrator
Cogaed and brought them to the police station.36 These facts were corroborated by
through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge. The information as
an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-ot, who was standing across the parking lot where
to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text message. The accusedwho
Cogaed was apprehended.37
never acted suspicious was identified by a driver. The bag that allegedly contained
the contraband was required to be opened under intimidating circumstances and
without the accused having been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the head." 38
reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was inside.39
suspicion that would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver
of rights by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and Dayao
improper pressure or coercion.
were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Republic Act No.
9165.40 The information against them states:
The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded consistent
with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no possible
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San
admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.
Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and SANTIAGO
I DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in
According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police
their control, custody and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a
Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel Police Station in
total weight of seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17,
San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian
429.6) grams.
informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the
Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4 CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002").41
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." 5 PSI Bayan
ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the San Gabriel
Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City, La
bound for San Fernando City. 6 A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty. 43 The case was dismissed against
arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s checkpoint. 7 The jeepney driver disembarked and Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was exempt from criminal
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No.
marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later 9344.44 Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a decision 45 dated May 21, 2008, the
identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. 9 Cogaed was Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision
carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10 states:

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11 WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed Marvin. 12 After this No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of one
marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46
gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is]
contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and
The trial court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
brought them to the police station." 15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their
"Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
respective bags"16 inside the station.17
was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted from
the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that called for his
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should also be
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags. 18 Inside considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding the
Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," 19 illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity" 49
and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.20 when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked
him to open his bag."50
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI Bayan
personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 22 Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals denied
Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of Appeals found that
the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana. 23 The Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when "[w]ithout any
marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a total weight of 8,091.5 grams. 24 prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag." 53 Hence, this
The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack weighed 4,246.1 grams. 25 The marijuana appeal was filed.
collected from Dayao’s bag weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams
werecollected from Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.27
The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

165
 I 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;
DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
II suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-COMPLIANCE 4. Consentedwarrantless search;
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
5. Customs search;

III
6. Stop and frisk; and

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED
DANGEROUS DRUGS.54 III

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid search One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and frisk". "Stop
and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the evidence and frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests
obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether there was enough under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a
evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused. crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the
vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no
weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.64
In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with respect to
the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs unnecessary.55
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 65
We find for the accused.
was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either to determine the
identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily while
II the police officer seeks to obtain more information."66 This court stated that the
"stop and frisk" search should be used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding
and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no
The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
time to secure . . . a search warrant."67
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection
through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution: The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did
not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose "Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches 68) are necessary
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to
upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examination prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be the Constitution.
seized.
The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an
judge.56The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that
asking searching questions and answers.57Probable cause at this stage can only the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
exist if there is an offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
searches done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the
place and the things to be searched.58
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed about
a place frequented by people abusing drugs. 70 When they arrived, one of the police
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was] walking in a swaying
warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man avoided the police officers.72
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into account the These observations led the police officers to conclude that the man was high on
"uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or drugs.73 These were sufficient facts observed by the police officers "to stop[the]
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search petitioner [and] investigate."74
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured."61 The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless
In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. 76 This
searches and seizures are:
man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit." 77 Upon seeing the

166
police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the suspicion. 79After stopping him, the For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of
police officers found an unlicensed "homemade firearm" 80 in his possession.81 This suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
court ruled that "[u]nder the circumstances, the government agents could not cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
possibly have procured a search warrant first."82 This was also a valid search. he is charged."88

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to
suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based be probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion. 90 It has to be a "genuine
on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception:92
A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably hiding something as well.
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required to
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who person detained has weapons concealed about him. 93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes
signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious." omitted)

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself: In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. 95 There should be
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken together,
COURT:
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." 96 The Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by him circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search.98
in the passenger jeep?
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no
WITNESS: approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The
person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor
A Not yet, Your Honor.83 Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance.
SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated: This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant.
COURT:
V
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have reason
to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana? Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception,
unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the
search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
WITNESS:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
A No, Your Honor.84 crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been identified by approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
the police officers otherwise. without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be
stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything less than this would be an The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the
infringementupon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects. purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. 100 As in Manalili, 101 jurisprudence also
allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.
IV
The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. 102 In that case, an
informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared
confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 86 themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street 105 and
one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk" doctrine in Philippine identified her as "Aling Rosa." 106 The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they
jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious circumstances as probable alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. 107The bag contained
cause: marijuana leaves.108

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 109
flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the
same.87 (Emphasis supplied) police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was not admissible because of
the illegal search.112Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.113

167
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the VII
police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume
The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. 114 Here, the that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. As this court
National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as previously stated:
somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and
accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. 116 Like in the case at
Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and found bundles of what turnedout to be
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the searchand seizure was illegal. 118
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
Aminnudin was acquitted.119
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police
police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police
"different karaoke bars in Angeles City." 121 One night, the police received carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not
so they conducted a stakeout. 122 A car "arrived and parked" 123 at the hotel.124The to be presumed.
informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The
man alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can be
immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his
discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-examination:
person and in the juice box he was holding.128

ATTY. BINWAG:
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s
situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no
valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129 Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the contents
of their bags, is it not?
VI
WITNESS:
None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to
be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful A Yes, ma’am.
arrest.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is it not?
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of
A Yes, ma’am.
arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court:
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person: A None, ma’am.

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were the
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright from them, is
it not?
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a opening the bags, is it not?
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were surprised. 133
(Emphasis supplied)

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the
instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s responses
whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not to Judge Florendo’s questions:
committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in People v.
Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements COURT:
must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting ....
officer."130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was arrested. 131 There were
no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?
was in possession of drugs at that time.
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he was
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have somewhat frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when he was
qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.

168
 already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "what’s that," and he ATTESTATION
answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked me to carry."134
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not before the case was assigned to the writer of the oofnion of the Court's Division.
sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as a
police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to be
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any of his or
Associate Justice
her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The
Chairperson, Third Division
police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known to the
person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be
anassurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her CERTIFICATION
rights. The fundamental nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires
no less.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
VIII been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
The Constitution provides: opinion of the Court's Division.

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.135 Chief Justice

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree Republic of the Philippines
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. 136 This SUPREME COURT
rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go Manila
on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the
SECOND DIVISION
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." 137 It ensures
that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not
lightly infringed upon and are upheld. G.R. No. 182348 November 20, 2008

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there vs.
is no evidence left to convict Cogaed. CARLOS DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to eradicate this DECISION
menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform
their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s
fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as VELASCO, JR., J.:
slowlydismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
This is an appeal from the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 entitled People of the Philippines v. Carlos
Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. Dela Cruz which affirmed the September 16, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish Court (RTC), Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case Nos. 6517 (Illegal
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y Possession of Firearm and Ammunition) and 6518 (Possession of Dangerous
ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement Drug). The RTC found accused- appellant Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond
unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs. reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

SO ORDERED.
The Facts

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were made before the
RTC. The Informations read as follows:

WE CONCUR:
Criminal Case No. 6517

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice That, on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of
Chairperson San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a private
citizen, without any lawful authority, did then and there willfully,
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.* unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
Associate Justice Associate Justice and control One (1) Gauge Shotgun marked ARMSCOR with Serial
No. 1108533 loaded with four (4) live ammunition, which are high
powered firearm and ammunition respectively, without first securing
the necessary license to possess or permit to carry said firearm and
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
ammunition from the proper authorities.
Associate Justice

169
 Criminal Case No. 6518 In his appeal to the CA, accused-appellant claimed that: (1) the version of the
prosecution should not have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession of an illegal drug;
That on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of
(3) his arrest was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the
San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
chain of custody of the illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession, direct custody and control one (1) heat-sealed The CA sustained accused-appellant's conviction. 5 It pointed out that accused-
transparent plastic bag weighing 49.84 grams of white crystalline appellant was positively identified by prosecution witnesses, rendering his
substance, which gave positive results for Methamphetamine uncorroborated denial and allegation of frame-up weak. As to accused-appellant's
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.1 alleged illegal arrest, the CA held that he is deemed to have waived his objection
when he entered his plea, applied for bail, and actively participated in the trial
without questioning such arrest.
Accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.

On the supposedly broken chain of custody of the illegal drug, the appellate court
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20,
held that accused-appellant's claim is unpersuasive absent any evidence showing
2002, an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police
that the plastic sachet of shabu had been tampered or meddled with.
Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa
hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once
there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted On December 20, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA
"Boy Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy Bicol Decision.
you have a warrant of arrest.)" Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a
shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant was seen holding a shotgun
On June 25, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if
through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his
they so desired. The parties later signified their willingness to submit the case on
firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant.
the basis of the records already with the Court.
They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug
paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr.
put the markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag containing Accused-appellant presents the following issues before us:
the seized drug.
I
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the
hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He
CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
was thus separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of
firearm.
II
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol's house having been
asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicol's motorcycle. While accused-appellant THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
was there, persons who identified themselves as police officers approached the ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTION
place, prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied face down when 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get up. He saw the police PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE
officers searching the premises and finding shabu and firearms, which were on top OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
of a table or drawer.2 When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told
that it was because he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that
the gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was III
only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.3
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE
ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs. The dispositive THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF HIS ARREST
portion of the RTC Decision reads:
IV
WHEREFORE, the Court based on insufficiency of evidence hereby
ACQUITS accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO in THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
Criminal Case No. 6517 for violation of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11,
8294. ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF
In Criminal Case No. 6518 for Possession of Dangerous Drug under THE ILLEGAL DRUG ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN HIS POSSESSION
Section 11, 2nd paragraph of Republic Act 9165, the Court finds said
accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO, GUILTY beyond Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense of
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life Imprisonment and to possession of dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both
Pay a Fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00). actual and constructive possessions were not proved. He asserts that the shabu was
not found in his actual possession, for which reason the prosecution was required
SO ORDERED.4 to establish that he had constructive possession over the shabu. He maintains that
as he had no control and dominion over the drug or over the place where it was
found, the prosecution likewise failed to prove constructive possession.
On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC
Decision.
The Court's Ruling

170
The appeal has merit. confiscated by the police operatives. The court [surmises] that the
accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding in that nipa hut
where they were caught red-handed with prohibited items and
The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in
dangerous [drugs].13
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.6 On the third element, we have held that the possession The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecution's evidence, that accused-
must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the appellant was part of a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in
possession or control of said articles.7 Considering that as to this knowledge, a Boy Bicol's nipa hut, the prosecution was not able to show his participation in any
person's mental state of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that: drug-dealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely
found inside a room with shabu, not as the room's owner or occupant but as a
guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust team, the prosecution
Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter
curiously failed to produce the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly used.
state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary.
Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-
case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime
acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its absent a showing of either actual or constructive possession by the accused-
existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in appellant.
each particular case.8
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's
The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was inside nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
the nipa hut at the time the buy-bust operation was taking place; he was talking to Procedure on warrantless arrest provides:
Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga,
Jr. pointed his firearm at accused-appellant, the latter dropped his shotgun; and
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a
when apprehended, he was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital weighing
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines. Accused-appellant later
admitted that he knew what the content of the seized plastic bag was.9
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession
of the shabu, whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-
appellant. b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
The two buy-bust team members corroborated each other's testimonies on how
they saw Boy Bicol talking to accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That
table, they testified, was the same table where they saw the shabu once inside the c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
nipa hut. This fact was used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
exercised dominion and control over the shabu on the table. We, however, find this temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
too broad an application of the concept of constructive possession. being transferred from one confinement to another.

In People v. Torres,10 we held there was constructive possession of prohibited The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a
drugs even when the accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were found suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two
in the master's bedroom of his house. requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
In People v. Tira,11 we sustained the conviction of the accused husband and wife
the arresting officer.14
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched and their
bed was found to be concealing illegal drugs underneath. We held that the wife
cannot feign ignorance of the drugs' existence as she had full access to the room, Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been
including the space under the bed. sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not
able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was committing an offense.
Although accused-appellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the
In Abuan v. People,12 we affirmed the finding that the accused was in constructive
prosecution's charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He
possession of prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer located in her
was eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His arrest,
bedroom.
independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not
lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.
In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal
drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises
In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt
where these drugs were found.
beyond reasonable doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive
possession by accused-appellant of the seized shabu and his succeeding illegal
In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issue raised.
owner of the nipa hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have
dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated November 29,
occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the
2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol. But
appellant Carlos Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA 9165
in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of
in Criminal Case No. 6518 of the RTC, Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal.
drugs, the trial court declared the following:

SO ORDERED.
It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol
he knew that the shabuwas on the table with other items that were

171
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. SYLLABUS
Associate Justice
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED
WE CONCUR: THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some
three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace
dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the
killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as
Associate Justice one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
Chairperson knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and
two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If
CHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled
Associate Justice Associate Justice the law as his two companions did.

ARTURO D. BRION
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT
Associate Justice
WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. —
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was
made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to
lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
ATTESTATION weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited
in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may
Associate Justice be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or
Chairperson within his immediate control may be seized."

3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS;

RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial
CERTIFICATION court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that
the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person
Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division. circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the
murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-
REYNATO S. PUNO testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
Chief Justice companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim
with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no
Republic of the Philippines evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
SUPREME COURT improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is
Manila entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence,
the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
FIRST DIVISION
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The
Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
DECISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y
BULLO, accused-appellant.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1)

172
day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged
Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling
Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival.
of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy
maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary imprisonment in case object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident
took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and
two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente
Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no
of the three men who killed Clarito.
aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping.
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as
Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his
imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.) pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves
were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The Forensic
Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II
of R.A. 6425, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads: Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other
suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial
above-named accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A.
and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in 6425, and for Murder.
foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are considered
prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
A joint trial of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of
was charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of Murder.
the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in
above-named accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and against
evidence by the prosecution; and
whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block 2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes
and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond
and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit reasonable doubt.
with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the
latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves
which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.) as evidence in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal
search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started
drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her possession were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill
Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel,
papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed:
"Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.) 'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace
at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, "(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;"
against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit
him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

173
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of hereby increased to P50,000.00.
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to
death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the
SO ORDERED.
policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until
they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was Manila
effected one (1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was
held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, EN BANC
63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:

"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a
large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999
of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was vs.
made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @
126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "NENETH," accused-appellants.

"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
PUNO, J.:

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation
who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The information reads:
disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's
Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual being
arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City
arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction
immediate control may be seized." of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding
one another and without having been authorized by law, did,
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11)
Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing
of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only. 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the CONTRARY TO LAW.2
concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance,
even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November
for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police
act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian
Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in
that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-
block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom
principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith Mandaluyong City.
and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not
err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony. On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP
Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco
Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four
innocence.
(4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the
poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District
P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to PNP Narcom, gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses. From this
P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643. sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6)
one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price

174
of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on
his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. 4 The team rode in December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where
two cars and headed for the target area. she lived with her husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay,
aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day,
accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit
children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan
as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the
five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left
marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at
for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson,
the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from
and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door
his associate.5 An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03
open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his
school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home.
bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit
Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping
forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked
water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and
"Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that
grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out
he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. 6 "Jun" led the police
later that the man was P03 Manlangit.
team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.

Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun"
asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box.
identified the woman as his associate. 7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the
The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box
P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door,
and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and
PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the
its contents.
box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to
him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria
took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) was a friend of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the
allegation that marked bills were found in her person.12
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills
from "Neneth."8 The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-
together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the appellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of
Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks
recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. 9
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA
The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, they are both
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on
December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of
tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy."
Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of
There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were
Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively
strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-
discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty
appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community.
imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a
When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-
pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of
appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's"
Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly
house.
state that:

Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the
The maximum penalty shall be
men, later identified as P03 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his
imposed if the offense was committed
companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes.
by any person who belongs to an
Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of
organized/syndicated crime group.
the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked
Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and
kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, An organized/syndicated crime group
three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, means a group of two or more persons
overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, collaborating, confederating or
Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. mutually helping one another for
P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. purposes of gain in the commission of
They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated. any crime.

Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby
the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"
sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to
not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.11 DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.

175
 The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for WORST.
destruction in accordance with law.
IV
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of
accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused
VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA
Women, Mandaluyong City.
ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately
to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust
operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of
13
SO ORDERED. the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and
house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way
I
of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense. 16
Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING constitutional and legal safeguards.17
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES
FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-
TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES,
century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and
INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI
undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics
OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM
offenses.18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public
APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY
interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement
THE POSEUR-BUYER.
of criminal law.19 It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using
the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that
II they might otherwise resist.20

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative
ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not
FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution
THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A against him.21 The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,22 the first Supreme Court decision to
WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. 14 acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an
offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of the officers." 23
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends: It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out
by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime;
I and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials
rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the
creative activity of the law enforcement officer.24
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY
OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to
ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED. outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is
forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to
violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal
II career.25 Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping
person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. 26 Where,
BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public
REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY. officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or
that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the
evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must
III be convicted.27 The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a
criminal.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense 28 that can be raised by an accused and
DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance. 29 It is a positive defense.
IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden
WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS shifts to the governmet to show otherwise. 30 When entrapment is raised as a
RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective"
RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine

176
whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on
before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to
accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to
committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug.57 The conduct of
before the crime.33 The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." 58 In People v. Abella,59 we
commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an attempt to acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the
draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The
criminal."35 If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the police officer offered "a tempting price, . . . a very high one" causing the accused
offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct, persistent and
police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.36 Some states, however, have effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
adopted the "objective" test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the evidence sufficient to convict the accused.60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,
61
case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part
other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman
legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the
the propriety of police conduct.39 The inquiry is focused on the inducements used accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that
by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely
to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of
conduct.40 The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest
agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is of the surreptitious importers.62
ready and willing, to commit the offense;41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed
that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid
that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct
down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement.
that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct,
Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,64 we held:
such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, 43 or appeals to sentiments such as pity,
sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not. 44 Proponents of this test
believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has
conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime
established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be
crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere
courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.45 entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the been held to prevent the act from being criminal or
accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
would on a normal person.46 done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting in its commission.
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected
Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense
to. It is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the
is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation
court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere
level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed
deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the
impermissible.47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures
offense was committed by him, free from the influence or
the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and
owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense
general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular
to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the
crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements. 48 On the other extreme, the
original design was formed independently of such agent; and
purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular
where a person approached by the thief as his confederate
accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may
notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being
have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police
authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out
and and their agents was proper. 49 The undisputed fact that the accused was a
the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is
dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a
generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an
criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.50
illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a
"spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some holding the contrary. 65
states in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" 51 In
Cruz v. State,52 the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of
conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis
Appeals. In People v. Galicia,66 the appellate court declared that "there is a wide
turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. 53 In Baca v.
difference between entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces
State,54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis
the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his
which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper
criminal plan.67 In People v. Tan Tiong,68 the Court of Appeals further declared that
investigation.55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and
"entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.69
"subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.

The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by

As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while
this Court in People v. Tiu Ua.70Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to
apprehending the accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,56
public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.71
we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the
government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime

177
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class,' justifies
similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the the employment of illegal means. 88
Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a
defense and is considered an absolutory cause. 72 To determine whether there is a
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the
entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor
apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime.
General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself
The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a
prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights
series of similar cases.73 Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not
of the individual.89 It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,74
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. 90 Courts
we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust
should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest
operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious
an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous his
offenses.91
convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious past and membership
with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely,
the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that
criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This
defense that led to his acquittal. must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the
offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. 92
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material
The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money,
law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other
and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police
entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding
anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. 77 They are rules of convenience
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the
violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.78 They are not the traditional type of
police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to
criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes
commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency,
mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws defining crimes mala
recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts
prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against
should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit
public order.80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is
an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. 81 These offenses
inducement.1âwphi1.nêt
are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to
avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he
condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who
It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the
these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of
the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as
time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was
informants, spies or stool pigeons.82 apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to P03
Manlangit.
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the
confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical
accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and manner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense
gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. The counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material
informant himself maybe a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the
For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their
and order is not an inspiring one.83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing invaluable service to the police.93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant
with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies
unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment, extortion, in the testimonies of the arresting officers,94 or there are reasons to believe that the
vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, 95 or that only
This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases 84 the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, 96
where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be
prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.85 The corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. 97 There is no
use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and
illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.98
persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have
compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. 86 Criminal activity
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the
is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the
other police officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and
police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession
weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust
and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People
operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution
v. Barraza,87
proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which
he sold and delivered the marijuana.
[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with
illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by
detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless
him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the
enforcement. They all spring from common motivations.
trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1)
Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation.
brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it
Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when
together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained
eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1)

178
brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may
were identified and marked in court. Thus: we just limit the inquiry to the basic
question of the fiscal as to what was
handed to him by the accused Jun,
ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio
your Honor?
Doria:

PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is

Mr. Police Officer, when you
already a ruling by this Honorable
identified that box,. Tell the court,
Court, your Honor, despite
how were you able to identify that
reconsideration.
box?

COURT Let the prosecution do its

A This is the box that I brought to the
own thing and leave the appreciation
crime laboratory which contained the
of what it has done to the court.
eleven pieces of marijuana brick we
confiscated from the suspect, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your
Honor.
Q Please open it and show those
eleven bricks.
A This brick is the one that was
handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out
from the said box. . .
COURT Why do you know that that
is the thing? Are you sure that is not
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for
"tikoy?"
Violeta Gaddao:

A Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, I must protest the line of
questioning considering the fact that
we are now dealing with eleven items Q What makes you so sure?
when the question posed to the
witness was what was handed to him
A I am sure that this is the one, your
by Jun?
Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which
I marked before I brought it to the
COURT So be it. PCCL, your Honor.

ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of Q What are you sure of?

record that the witness is pulling out
them after item from the box showed
A I am sure that this is the brick that
to him and brought in front of him.
was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.

COURT Noted.
Q What makes you so sure?

Q Now tell the court, how did you

A Because I marked it with my own
know that those are the eleven bricks?
initials before giving it to the
investigator and before we brought it
xxx xxx xxx to the PCCL, your Honor.

A I have markings on these eleven xxx xxx xxx

bricks, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we request that
Q Point to the court, where are those a tag be placed on this white plastic
markings? bag and this be marked as Exhibit
"D?"
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials
with the date, sir. COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."

PROSECUTOR Witness showed a Q To stress, who made the entries of

white wrapper and pointing to CLM this date, Exhibit "A" then the other
and the signature. letters and figures on this plastic?

Q Whose signature is that? A This one, the signature, I made the

signature, the date and the time and
this Exhibit "A."

179
 Q How about this one? xxx xxx xxx 99

A I don't know who made this The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to
marking, sir. [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick,
including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D,"
"D-l," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. 100
PROSECUTOR May it be of record
that this was just entered this
morning. We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team
waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of
marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize
Q I am asking you about this "itim"
on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not
and not the "asul."
change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which
requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the
A This CLM, the date and the time marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur- buyer and the
and the Exhibit "A," I was the one pusher.101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana
who made these markings, sir. from the accused-appellant. 102

PROSECUTOR May we place on We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
record that the one that was Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule
enclosed. . . 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
also entries included in that enclosure officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
where it appears D-394-95 also person:
Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not
pointed to by the witness. I want to
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
make it of record that there are other
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
entries included in the enclosure.
commit an offense;

COURT Noted. The court saw it.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
Q Now, and this alleged brick of be arrested has committed it; and
marijuana with a piece of paper, with
a newspaper wrapping with a piece of
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped
paper inside which reads: "D-394-95,
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
as our Exhibit "D-2?"
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
xxx xxx xxx 103
Q This particular exhibit that you
identified, the wrapper and the
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without
contents was given to you by whom?
a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
sir. delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 104
Q Whereat?
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence,
and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
A At the corner of Boulevard and
Jacinto St., sir.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
Q How about the other items that you proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made
were able to recover? without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a
xxx xxx xxx moving motor vehicle; 108 (3) search in violation of customs laws; 109 (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 111
A These other marijuana bricks,
because during our follow-up, because
according to Jun the money which I The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of
gave him was in the hands of Neneth arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were
and so we proceeded to the house of likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants
Neneth, sir. were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was
an incident to her lawful arrest.

180
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua
three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on who can testify regarding this buy-
Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the bust money, sir.
arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx 112
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for
appellant Gaddao:
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-
examination that:
We submit at this juncture, your
Honor, that there will be no basis for
Q What was your intention in going to
that question.
the house of Aling Neneth?

Q This particular exhibit that you

A To arrest her, sir.
identified, the wrapper and the
contents was given to you by whom?
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when
you reached the house of Aling
A It was given to me by suspect Jun,
Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q Whereat?

Q As far as you can see, she was just

A At the corner of Boulevard and
inside her house?
Jacinto Street, sir.

A I saw her outside, sir.

Q How about, the other items that you
were able to recover?
Q She was fetching water as a matter
of fact?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this
juncture, your Honor, that there will
be no basis for that question. A She was 'sa bandang poso.'

COURT There is. Answer. Q Carrying a baby?

A These other marijuana bricks, A No, sir.

because during our follow-up, because
according to Jun the money which I
Q At that particular time when you
gave him was in the hands of Neneth
reached the house of Aling Neneth
and so we proceeded to the house of
and saw her outside the house, she
Neneth, sir.
was not committing any crime, she
was just outside the house?
Q Whereat?
A No, sir.
A At Daang Bakal near the crime
scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any
crime because she was just outside the
Q And what happened upon arrival house doing her daily chores. Am I
thereat? correct?

A We saw alias Neneth inside the A I just saw her outside, sir.
house and we asked him to give us the
buy-bust money, sir.
Q And at that point in time you
already wanted to arrest her. That is
Q You mentioned "him?" correct, is it not?

A Her, sir. We asked her to give us A Yes, sir.

the money, the marked money which
Jun gave her, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your
testimony is correct, according to you
Q And what happened? SPO1 Manlangit approached her?

A PO3 Manlangit, sir.

181
Q You did not approach her because A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
P03 Manlangit approached her?
Q What you are now saying for
A Yes, sir. certain and for the record is the fact
that you were not the one who
retrieved the money from Aling
Q During all the time that this
Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
confrontation, arrest or whatever by
SPO3 Manlangit was taking place,
you were just in the side lines? A I saw it, sir.

A I was just watching, sir. Q It was Manlangit who got the

money from Aling Neneth?
Q So you were just an on-looker to
what Manlangit was doing, because A The buy-bust money was recovered
precisely according to you your role from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
in this buy-bust operation was as a
back-up?
Q It was taken from the house of
Aling Neneth, not from the person of
A Yes, sir. Aling Neneth. Is that what you are
trying to tell the Court?
Q Who got the alleged marijuana
from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth? A No, sir.

A P03 Manlangit, sir. ATTY. VALDEZ:

Q Manlangit got the marijuana? I am through with this witness, your

Honor. 113
A Yes, sir.
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest
A I don't know, sir. in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the
policemen pounced on her.
Q You did not even know who got the
money from Aling Neneth? Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance
of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under
Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an
PROSECUTOR: "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." 115 The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
There is no basis for this question, suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
your Honor. Money, there 's no offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
testimony on that. strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested.116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.117
ATTY. VALDEZ:

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged

I was asking him precisely. identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his
direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his
PROSECUTOR: (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was. 118 Appellant Doria
did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the
person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily
No basis. lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, 119 with or
COURT: without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she
was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected
Sustained. the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
Q Alright. I will ask you a question objectionable.120
and I expect an honest answer.
According to the records, the amount Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that
of P1,600.00 was recovered from the the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills
person of Aling Neneth. That's right? and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to

182
the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana A It was open, sir. Not like that.
was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
COURT
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe
Go down there. Show to the court.
introduced in evidence.121 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a INTERPRETER
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it
is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
Witness went down the witness stand
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 122 The law enforcement officer
and approached a carton box.
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area.123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 124 The object A Like this, sir.
must be open to eye and hand125 and its discovery inadvertent.126
PROSECUTOR
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the
object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and Can we describe it?
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents ATTY. VALDEZ
are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized.127 In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is Yes.
deemed in plain view.128 It must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise PROSECUTOR
subject to seizure.129
One flap is inside and the other flap is
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross- standing and with the contents visible.
examination as follows:
COURT
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Noted.
So here we are. When you and Badua
arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the
house? Q At this juncture, you went inside
the house?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q Badua demanded from Aling

Neneth the buy-bust money? Q And got hold of this carton?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q At that particular instance, you saw Q Did you mention anything to Aling
the carton? Neneth?

A Yes, sir. A I asked her, what's this. . .

Q This carton, according to you was Q No, no. no. did you mention
under a table? anything to Aling Neneth before
getting the carton?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

A I think it was Badua who accosted
Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust
Q I noticed that this carton has a money and he asked "Sa iyo galing
cover? ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-
bust money namin?" sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana
Q I ask you were the flaps of the that was given by alias Jun?
cover raised or closed?
A Yes, sir.

183
Q When you proceeded to take hold A Here, sir.
of this carton, Aling Neneth was not
yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
Q What you see is a carton?

A I just don't know if she was frisked

A Yes, sir, with plastic.
already by Badua, sir.

Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?

Q Who got hold of this?

A Yes, sir.
A I was the one, sir.

Q With a piece of plastic visible on

Q You were the one who got this?
top of the carton?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.

Q At that particular point in time, you

Q That is all that you saw?
did not know if the alleged buy-bust
money was already retrieved by
Badua? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. PROSECUTOR

Q You went inside the house? For the record, your Honor. . .

A Yes, sir. Q You were only able to verify

according to you . . .
Q You did not have any search
warrant? PRESECUTOR

A Yes, sir. Panero, wait. Because I am objecting

to the words a piece of plastic. By
reading it . . .
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far
as you were concerned to validate the
fact that Mrs. Gadao was in ATTY. VALDEZ
possession of the buy-bust money
because according to you, you did not
That's a piece of plastic.
know whether Badua already
retrieved the buy-bust money from
her? PROSECUTOR

A Yes, sir. By reading it, it will connote . . . this

is not a piece of plastic.
Q How far was this from the door?
ATTY. VALDEZ
A Two and a half meters from the
door, sir. It was in plain view. What is that? What can you say,
Fiscal? I'm asking you?
Q Under the table according to you?
PROSECUTOR
A Yes, sir, dining table.
With due respect, what I am saying is,
let's place the size of the plastic. A
Q Somewhere here?
piece of plastic may be big or a small
one, for record purposes.
A It's far, sir.
COURT
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
May we request the witness to place
it, where he saw it?
PROSECUTOR

184
 Leave that to the court. Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box
could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. 134 It was not
Q The only reason according to you,
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana.
you were able to . . . Look at this, no
The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
even Superman . . . I withdraw that.
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the
Not even a man with very kin [sic]
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial
eyes can tell the contents here. And
court.136
according to the Court, it could be
"tikoy," is it not [sic]?
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the
house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is
A Yes, sir.
guilty of the crime charged.138 Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,139 viz:

Q Siopao?
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government
against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
A Yes, sir. enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot
Q Canned goods? be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
A Yes, sir. including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers
with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty
alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
Q It could be ice cream because it authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified
A I presumed it was also marijuana in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of
because it may . . . order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some
Q I am not asking you what your criminals should escape than that the government should
presumptions are. I'm asking you what play an ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free
it could possibly be. society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself. 140
A It's the same plastic, sir.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale,
ATTY. VALDEZ administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
I'm not even asking you that question P10 million, to wit:
so why are you voluntarily saying the
information. Let the prosecutor do Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
that for you. Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five
COURT hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
Continue. Next question. distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx 130
xxx xxx xxx
P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house
because they were led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is
testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the
appellant Doria name her and led them to her. 131 Standing by the door of poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
appellant Gaddao's house, P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.141 The prosecution has clearly
said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he
underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred
something wrapped in plastic. seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer.
The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.
the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower
contents.132 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.142
the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-
bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig
was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and
Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old modified as follows:
newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color. 133 PO3

185
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Delicto Arrests
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.2 The
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted. accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
SO ORDERED.
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, or within the view of the arresting officer.3
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion. appears suspicious. Thus, in the recent en banc case of Malicat v. Court of
Appeals,4 the Court, through now Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., held that the
fact that the appellant's eyes were "moving very fast" and looking at every
Separate Opinions approaching person were not sufficient to suspect him of "attempting to commit a
crime," much less to justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. The
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion; Court said that "there was nothing in [Malacat's] behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion" that he was armed with a deadly
weapon. In other words, there was no overt physical act on the part of the suspect,
I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was committing or
Puno. This Decision rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on attempting to commit one. There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police
warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been modified through an officers to arrest or search him.
obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.1 I just wish to outline some guidelines on when
an arrest or a search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help,
especially to our law enforcers who are often faced with actual situations that The same was true in People v. Mengote,5 where the arresting police tried to justify
promptly call for their application. the warrantless arrest of the appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious.
The "suspicious" acts consisted of his darting eyes and the fact that his hand was
over his abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification, stated: "By no stretch of
Valid Arrests the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just
been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted
Without Warrants in their presence.6

Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly
without a warrant is lawful. It states: indicative of a criminal act. If there is no outward indication at all that calls for an
arrest, the suspect cannot be validly apprehended under this paragraph,
notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time be undertaking a
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace felonious enterprise.
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin 7 and again in People v.
Encinada.8 In both cases, the appellants were arrested while disembarking from a
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has ship, on account of a tip received from an informant that they were carrying
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to prohibited drugs. The Court invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that at
commit an offense; the moment of their arrests, the appellants were simply descending the gangplank,
without manifesting any suspicious behavior that would reasonably invite the
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he attention of the police. To all appearances, they were not committing a crime; nor
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to was it shown that they were about to do so or had just done so. There was,
be arrested has committed it; and therefore, no valid reason for their arrests.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final distinguished Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado in People v. Montilla,9 when he
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest of the appellant while the latter was
or has escaped while being transferred from one merely alighting from a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla could not have
confinement to another. been perceived as committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney
carrying a traveling bag and a carton. He did not exhibit any overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he
xxx xxx xxx was embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was no outward manifestation
that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to commit an offense.
I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid because he
misapplied and misinterpreted, not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and was caught in flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him
lawyers as well. down was his implied waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest.

At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must 2. "Hot Pursuit"
have personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under
Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he Arrests
knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let me elaborate.

Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests. 10 Here, two
1. In Flagrante elements must also concur prior to the arrest: (1) and "offense has in fact been

186
committed," (2) the arresting officer "has personal knowledge of facts indicating To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote
that the person to be arrested . . . committed [the offense]." In effecting this type of these inspiring words from the precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos:18
arrest, "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable
committed first. . . . The fact of the commission of the offense must be
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
undisputed.11
most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is
Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
constituting the offense, they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
right after its commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot
committed. AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
arrested, indicating that he perpetrated the crime. Again, mere intelligence extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided
information that the suspect committed the crime will not suffice. The arresting by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
officers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts showing that the set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of
suspect performed the criminal act. Personal knowledge means actual belief or full protection.
reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime.12
Valid Searches

In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain
Without Warrant
individuals or groups were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed
information was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of the lawmen. In
People v. Burgos,13 a certain Masamlok informed police authorities that the The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search
appellant was involved in subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such and seizure may be conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may
information and without securing a judicial warrant, the police proceeded to be conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to lawful arrest, (2) search
appellant's house to arrest him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) searches
firearm and subversive materials. incidental to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and
frisk.19
The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting
officers, since the information came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We 1. Search Incident
pointed out that at the time of his arrest, appellant was not in actual possession of
any firearm or subversive document; neither was he committing a subversive act. 14
to Lawful Arrest
His warrantless arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the instances in
Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the Rules of Court.
Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched
without a warrant for dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as
Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification
evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is, however, limited to the person
that the arresting officer "received an intelligence report that appellant who was
of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended to or
carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl." The
made in a place other than the place of the arrest.20
Court categorically stated that such "[r]aw intelligence information is not a
sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest." 15 And since, at the time of his arrest, no
act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant, 2. The "Plain View"
there was no valid justification for his arrest.
Doctrine
To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses
for which the culprit could be arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v.
Ramos,16 there were strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a suspected The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
member of the New People's Army (NPA), while he was being treated for a enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or
gunshot wound in a hospital. He alleged that there was no valid justification for his has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across
arrest without a warrant, because he was not then committing any offense nor were (or sees in plainview) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately
there any indications that he had just committed or was about to commit one; he apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a
was in fact confined in a hospital. contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.21

The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently 3. Search of
charged, was a continuing offense. For purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA
member "did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, . . . simply because he Moving Vehicles
was, at the time of his arrest, confined in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike other so-
called 'common' offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft)
base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence is justified by practicability, viz.:22
until the overriding object of overthrowing organized government is attained.17
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so seizures construed as recognizing a necessary difference
were the searches conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
to the invalid search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained
unlicensed firearm), were considered inadmissable as evidence against the person and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
wrongfully arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
without a judicial warrant must be prcceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
without a warrant duly issued therefor. locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

187
 xxx xxx xxx protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . .
assault him.
Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling
express trains they furnish for successful commission of As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just
crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift committed a crime, mere suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk."
escape unknown in the history of the world before their There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's experience
advent. The question of their police control and reasonable and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
search on highways or other public place is a serious weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.29
question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called
'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals
matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, 30
and in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.31 In Manalili, the law enforcers who were
they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, observed during
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes
their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobby manner
or on private premises, the privacy of which the law
along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular
especially guards from search and seizure without process.
hangout of drug addicts. Based on police experience, such suspicious behaviour
The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to
was characteristic of persons who were "high" on drugs. The Court held that past
facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to
against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape,
stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana
burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge.
that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts
proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search
of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the
public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in necessity of a judicial warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly
its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in construed. Foremost in our minds must still be every person's prized and
view of all the circumstances under which it is made. fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our
Constitution.
4. Customs Searches
WHEREFORE, I vote to ACQUIT Appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama, as well as
to REDUCE the penalty of Appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado to reclusion
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made
perpetua and a fine of P500,000.
even without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically
allows police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, Republic of the Philippines
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, SUPREME COURT
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope Manila
or any person on board[;]or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
SECOND DIVISION
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.23

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

5. Search With Consent

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY

Waiver of any objection to the unresonableness or invalidity of a search is a
FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
recognized exception to the rule against a warrantless search. 24 The consent to the
vs.
search, however, must be express knowing and voluntary. A search based merely
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
on implied acquiescene is not valid, because such consent is not within the purview
of the constitutional gurantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given
under intimidating and coercive circumstances.25 DECISION

6. Stop and Frisk BRION, J.:

The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
being Terry v. Ohio.27 The idea is that a police officer may after properly challenging the decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution 2 dated April
introducing himself and making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 91541.
manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer
clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion
should be applied has been laid down as follows:28 The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight
Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners)
. . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their subsequent
leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his motion for reconsideration.
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating The Antecedent Facts
this behaviour, he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso
for his own and others' safety, he is entitled for the

188
(Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently explained the
the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3 grounds for the denial of the motion.

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills Police The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its
Station) to report the incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl Primitivo Resolution of April 17, 2008;18 hence, the present petition.
Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to
go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SP02 Javier, together with
The Issues
augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7 The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This I.
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police
Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY
Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon
ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
II.
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE
POLICE PRECINCT.
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident premeditation, treachery and III.
taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt
acts, by then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
with a bladed weapon, but said accused were not able to perform all the acts of PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO
execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS
accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was BASED.
able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest
CONTRARY TO LAW.11 warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a response to the
arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of Arrest, which
actually used the word "invited. "
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged
that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened
were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the crime scene. The
improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they had no
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.13 personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15 issued.

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 The Court's Ruling
petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their motion for preliminary We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal
investigation.16 proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.

The Assailed CA Decision It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this
Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion was
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65 petition has
merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by been abused.
SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting officer clearly meant
to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty. Generoso. The CA also But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully
recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and
inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the R TC did not establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the guidance of the bench and
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents to us the
Preliminary Investigation. opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable
interpretation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the

189
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902, 19 and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
the 1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. Arrest falls temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
under the term "seizure. "23 being transferred from one confinement to another.

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
(Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the
River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. 25 The Magna Carta
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a)
Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to
above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section
proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war. 27 The
5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the
foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.28 It provides: For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) – the provision applicable
in the present case. This provision has undergone changes through the years not
just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence.
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed;
nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis supplied] appropriate present application.

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without
judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable. 32 With regard to an arrest, it
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of reasonableness.33

Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of
common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the
warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of America
Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law for the
and England that, according to the Court, were not different from the Spanish
Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on the
provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be
36 37 detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson that Section 37 of Act
offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents, to arrest:
No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest
without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al., 38 the Court held that in the absence of any
provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
functions as those of the officers established under the common law of England greater than that of confinamiento.
and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the Philippines.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos 39 that the rules on warrantless than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case
arrest were based on common sense and reason. 40 It further held that warrantless would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when summoned by
arrest found support under the then Administrative Code 41 which directed the judicial authorities.
municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of public offenses.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 30 43 of who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may
the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will appear whenever
taken from the Spanish Law. summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be
and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the
summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5. Arrest without following circumstances are present:
warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful
act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person
arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable and underscoring supplied]
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of Manila,
which provided that certain officials, including police officers may, within the

190
territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the
that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not
peace. necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting
officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as
to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer may
committed it.
arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to
suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a felony having
been committed. However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that
there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the
arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense."
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a
Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was
probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause
limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has
as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted
in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing that the accused is guilty.
the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
of the 1964 Rules of Court.
requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not
liable even if the arrested person turned out to be innocent.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it
was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial
actually committed. What was necessary was the presence of reasonably sufficient changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113
grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime; and of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained
participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
the phrase "reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
which, the warrantless arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held
liable for its breach.48
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
49 actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
In The US. v. Hachaw, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman
because the arresting person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting
suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance which aroused the arresting (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
person's curiosity. personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the
rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its commission. temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling
officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion. under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause) As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however,
it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were
been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the
substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as
arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of
follows:50
gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime.
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the
arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable committed the crime.
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a Criminal Procedure provides that:
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
underscoring supplied]
arrested has committed it.

191
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing probable cause to arrest
purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes: first, the without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable cause may
contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus,
second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on the arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a
probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal crime; and under the circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed information.58
it.
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2)
whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. According to Feria,
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must
these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or
be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
hearsay.51
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
it. officers making the arrest.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that the Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary investigations and the
offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal knowledge of judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
Procedure: Probable cause guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de
Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his
which he was prosecuted.
personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the person to be arrested
has committed the crime.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to
the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of the
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62

In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a
of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although
warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that
such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v. Quinn, 53 the warrantless
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of violating the law is not a
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
violation of due process.

Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States 54 that the
the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed
Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may
and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the
be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a warrant or whether there
criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence
was time to get one, but whether at the time of the arrest probable cause existed.
submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally
The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and "reasonable
evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
grounds."55

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal
thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment are not less
committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw
stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrant is sought
evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
and not on the information acquired later.56
the part of the peace officers making.the arrest.

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of everyday life upon
to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion,
determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular
based on actual facts.65
offense involved.57

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable
In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information
for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge
in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere
issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that

192
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway
may be. tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the
determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The
existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance within their unlawful arrest was held invalid.
possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a reasonable
man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules,
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the commission of
upon which they must determine probable cause.
the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed.
Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon
his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime; the shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take
public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the evidence down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
submitted by the parties. the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal
knowledge."
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts,
evidence or available information that he must personally gather within a limited In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day
time frame. was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he
personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating that the accused
was one of the perpetrators.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining
probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in
these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an ordinary In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours
policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the
Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts
haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal.67 indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was
held valid.
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal In People v. Alvario, 75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person officers received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the
to be arrested has committed it personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived from the information
supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at
the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest. In People v.
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our
Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the
jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the Court's
scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the
determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were made pursuant to
assailant only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of
facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on held valid.
December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas
requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed identification of two
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
(2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four
Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it
persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The
cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming,
that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.
invalidated the warrantless arrest.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A
Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily
radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden
surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to
Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place,
become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this
they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon
information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was
the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby
then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information
statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense
from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as
just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
regards the commission of a crime.

In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the
just been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy
commission of the offense.
between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was
an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a
warrant of arrest must be secured. In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a
relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by
SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these
certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in
requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime
the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked
and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not
for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report.
present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no personal

193
P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as he believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him
up as he was about to run towards his house.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat valid warrantless arrest
as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's
seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident
misapprehended the facts in its decision. 81From a review of the records, we
report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause. Based on these
upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless
discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts
offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and
in the present case is purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the
the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.
particular circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of
''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Based on the police blotter 82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, the
date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for
investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter stated that the
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the
alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along Kasiyahan
Black's Law Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts,
St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the
actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the
scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty.
actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the occurrence of the
existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2) hours after the
crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or commission of the crime is unfounded.
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in
order to comply with the element of immediacy.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they
arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that
In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner Macapanas and his brother
circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that they did it in self-defense against
circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard Atty. Generoso.
to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate 84
officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or
that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged
circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m.
on the date of the incident, showed the following findings: "Contusion Hematoma,
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm;
are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest
and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion
officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited
period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded
the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the
alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we his mauling and, notably, the petitioners 85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the
hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise of arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty.
discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.87
facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the
existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they
for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable
have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at
arrests.
the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the
for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal
Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make
committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal the warrantless arrests.
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime?
and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson, 88 the police officers in the present case
the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person
saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively

194
identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him; however, instead of In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order
fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the police denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for
officers. allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr. 89 where Tonog did not
flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not
the present case even admitted to have been involved in the incident with Atty. persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the
Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired. accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise
of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and hereby gives
preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon
the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the requirements set
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order.
specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal knowledge The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the
of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best
cause that the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading
up to the trial.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that
personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact alone negates the petitioners' argument should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In
that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had been resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the
committed - the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which
crime had been committed.1âwphi1 was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the
RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the
considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated
above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime
January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby
crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe
ORDERED to proceed with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
SO ORDERED.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it
took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the ARTURO D. BRION
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and warrantless Associate Justice
arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding that
the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.
WE CONCUR:

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
mean as an authoritative command
Associate Justice
Chairperson
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the
petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZ
an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or Associate Justice Associate Justice
by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus,
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a
formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to Associate Justice
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.92
CERTIFICATION
Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest, 93 SP02 Javier could
not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso' s
account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical restraint when a simple Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police station would produce a Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance. opinion of the Court's Division.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen ANTONIO T. CARPIO
have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the Acting Chief Justice
alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the perpetrators pointed to by
the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a particular Republic of the Philippines
offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their SUPREME COURT
arrest, of the charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Manila
Station for investigation.94

G.R. No. 90319 October 15, 1991

V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid

195
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, SO ORDERED. (p. 26, Rollo)
vs.
MARIO BRIONES, GERARDO JAVIER and EUSEBIO ALLIED, accused.
The antecedent facts, as stated in the plaintiff-appellee's brief, are as follows:
MARIO BRIONES & GERARDO JAVIER, accused-appellants.

In the evening of April 23, 1988, Pantaleon Francisco, 31 years old, was
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
tending his sari-store in Barangay Dela Paz, San Simon, Pampanga (pp.
Public Attorney's Ofrtce for accused-appellants.
10, 13, tsn, July 12, 1988). At about 11:30 p.m., appellants Gerardo
Javier and Eusebio Allied came to Francisco's store and ordered beer (p.
16, Ibid). They drank four bottles of beer (p. 17, Ibid). Appellant Mario
Briones arrived and was offered beer by Gerardo Javier and Eusebio
Allied. Mario Briones declined and left (pp. 17-18, Ibid). After about 30
PARAS, J.:
minutes, appellants Gerardo Javier and Eusebio Allied also left the store
(p. 19, Ibid).
The accused-appellants are questioning their conviction by the Regional Trial
Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga of robbery with
About eight meters away from Pantaleon Francisco's store was the
double homicide. The contend that the trial court erred in holding that the crime
house of spouses Felicisimo Gutierrez and Florencia Diaz Gutierrez at
committed is robbery with double homicide despite insufficiency of evidence, in
the ground floor of which was also a store (p. 11, tsn, July 1988; p. 12,
not holding that the evidence obtained against them is inadmissible for violation of
tsn, July 26, 1988). At the street near the store was a lighted 100-watt
their constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and against self-incrimination
electric bulb (p. 25, July 12, 1988). A tall coconut stood between the
during custodial investigation, and in not holding that their guilt was not proved
houses of Pantaleon Francisco and the Gutierrezes (p. 35, Ibid),
beyond reasonable doubt. They likewise argue that their arrest was illegal for
having been made without a warrant.
At past 11:00 o'clock, Pantaleon Francisco closed his store when all his
customers had left. Not long after, he heard the barking of dogs from
The information filed in said case reads:
the Gutierrez residence (p. 21, tsn, July 12, 1988). Feeling something
untoward was taking place, Pantaleon Francisco went of his store (p.
That on or about the 23rd day of April 1988, at Barangay Dela Paz, 22, Ibid).
municipality of San Simon, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Pantaleon Francisco saw appellants Mario Briones and Gerardo Javier,
accused MARIO BRIONES y GUINTO, GERARDO "JERRY"
together with Eusebio Allied, under the electric bulb, mauling Florencia
JAVIER y ALLIED and EUSEBIO ALLIED y GALICIO alias
Diaz Gutierrez who was lying prostrate on the ground ( 25-28, tsn, July
"KIKOY", conspirating, confederating and mutually helping one
12, 1988). The three later dragged Florencia Diaz Gutierrez inside her
another, with intent of gain, and with force and violence against
house and closed the door (pp. 31-32, Ibid).
persons, entered the house of spouses Felicisimo B. Gutierrez and
Florencia Diaz-Gutierrez and once inside, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with them cash While Mario Briones, Gerardo Javier and Eusebio Allied were inside
money amounting to P60,000.00, Philippine currency, and assorted the Gutierrez residence, the lights on the second floor of house were
jewelries valued at P50,000.00 or a total amount of P110,000.00, switched on (p. 34, tsn, July 12, 1988). The dogs continue to bark (p,
belonging to the said spouses, to the damage and prejudice of said 35, Ibid).
spouses, in the total amount of P110,000.00, Philippine Currency, and
on the occasion thereof, in pursuance of their act of conspiracy, with
When the wife of Pantaleon Francisco arrived from Barangay Libutad,
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
San Simon, where she attended a fiesta, at about 4:00 a.m., Pantaleon
assault, attack, strike and hit said spouses on the head, face and different
Francisco told her about what he witnessed (p. 37, tsn, July 12, 1988).
parts of their body with the use of hard objects and bladed objects or
instruments, inflicting mortal and fatal injuries upon spouses which
caused their instantaneous death. In the morning of April 24, 1988, Pantaleon Francisco went to the
house of the Gutierrezes. He found it in disarray, with the spouses
sprawled dead on the first floor near the store (pp. 38-39, tsn, July
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. (pp. 19-20, Rollo)
1988).

After trial on the merits involving only appellants Mario Briones and Gerardo
Informed of the crime, Pat. Emerito Maniago, Chief Investigation of the
Javier as accused Eusebio Allied was at large, the trial court, rendered its decision,
San Simon Police Force, formed a team of investigators proceeded to
the dispositive portion of which reads:
the scene (p. 8, tsn, July 26, 1988). They found Felicisimo Gutierrez
and Florencia Diaz Gutierrez lying dead in the sala with broken bottles
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding both accused guilty as principal of soft drinks were scattered all over (p. 10, tsn, July 1988). They also
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide, noticed blood stains at the gate before the door of house (pp. 9, 42, tsn,
hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused Mario Briones and July 26, 1988).
Gerardo Javier, as follows:
Pantaleon Francisco disclosed to the police officers the Identity of the
1. To each suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and the perpetrators of the crime on April 25, 1988 at 9:00 a.m. (p. 40, July 13,
accessories of the law. 1988). Acting on the information supplied by Pantaleon Francisco, Pat.
Maniago and his team went to the house of Ofelia Javier, a sister of
appellant Gerardo Javier, at Hulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, where
2. To indemnify the heirs of the late Felicisimo Gutierrez and Florencia
appellants Mario Briones and Gerardo Javier were working as
Diaz Gutierrez in the amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages and
construction workers. They came upon Mario Briones as he was going
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

196
 to the house of Ofelia Javier (p. 23, tan, July 26, 1988). At first Mario Besides, under a 100-watt electric light, Francisco could readily recognize the
Briones denied having anything to do with the crime (p. 25, Ibid). But culprits. To quote a portion of his testimony,
when a necklace and two bracelets belonging to the victims were found
in his possession (pp. 26-28, tsn, Ibid), he admitted his complicity and
Q When you were already outside your store, what did you see?
revealed that his two companions in the commission of the crime were
Eusebio Allied and Gerardo Javier (p. 25, tsn, July 26, 1988).
A I saw three persons Mario Briones, Gerry Javier and Eusebio Allied,
sir.
On the basis of the disclosure of Mario Briones that Gerardo Javier had
some relatives in Daang Hari, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, Pat.
Maniago and his team proceeded to the place. They found Gerardo Q Where did you see these three persons whose names you have just
Javier sleeping in the house of a relative (pp. 29-30, tsn, July 26, 1988). mentioned?

Mario Briones and Gerardo Javier were brought to San Simon, A They were near the door of the store of the spouses Felicisimo
Pampanga. On April 26, 1988, Pantaleon Francisco was invited to the Gutierrez and Florencia Gutierrez, sir.
police precinct to Identify the culprits. From among the persons present
at the precinct, he readily pointed to Mario Briones and Gerardo Javier Q What were they doing, I am referring to these three persons whose
as the culprits (p. 46, tsn, July 12, 1988) and Identified them by name names you mentioned when you saw them near the door of the store of
(p. 47, Ibid). In the course of the investigation, Mario Briones disclosed the Gutierrez?
the place where they hid their loot (p. 28, tsn, July 26, 1988). Part of the
loot, consisting of coins, was dug up at the back of a school building in
Dela Paz, San Simon, Pampanga, which Mario Briones indicated (p. 33, A I saw them assaulting a person who was already lying prostrate on
tsn, July 26, 1988). The loot was placed in a bag and jute sack (p. 34, the ground.
Ibid). It was valued at P4,000.00 (p. 35, Ibid)."(pp. 5-11, Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 49, Rollo) Q When you said you saw them assaulting, how were they assaulting a
person lying prostrate on the ground?
It is the contention of the accused-appellants that it was difficult, if not impossible,
for Pantaleon Francisco, the sole prosecution eyewitness, to Identify the persons A They were boxing, sir.
who mauled Florencia Diaz Gutierrez since a coconut tree, a barbed wire, and
flower pots obstructed his vision (p. 13, Appellant's Brief).
Q What was the position of that person they were boxing when you saw
them?
The accused-appellants try to destroy the credibility of Pantaleon Francisco by
asserting that: 1) said witness did not report what he saw the morning immediately
following the incident; 2) he gave inconsistent answers as to how long he had been A Yes, sir, the person they were assaulting was already lying on the
residing in Barangay Dela Paz, San Simon, Pampanga; 3) on the one hand, he ground.
claimed that on April 26,1988 he worked in Makati, but on the other hand, he
declared that he was called to the police precinct; and 4) if he was inside his store Q Did you recognize that person they were mauling that evening.
he could not see the store of the spouses, but if outside his house he could see it.
(pp. 13-14, Appellant's Brief).
A Yes, sir.

It is likewise their contention that conspiracy was not established and their
Q Who is he?
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and against self-incrimination were
violated (pp. 16 & 18, Appellant's Brief), that the alleged stolen articles were not
formally offered in evidence (p. 15, Ibid.), and that their arrest was illegal because A She is Florencia Diaz, sir.
it was made without the warrant of arrest prescribed by law.
Q And you said you recognized that person they were mauling to be
The issues raised in the appeal, being closely interrelated, will be discussed jointly. that of the person of Florencia Diaz, are you referring to Florencia Diaz
Gutierrez the wife of Felicisimo Gutierrez your neighbor?
After reviewing the evidence as shown by the records of this case, We find no
reason to deviate from the well-settled doctrine that the findings of facts of the trial A Yes, sir.
judge on the credibility of witnesses deserve respect by the appellate court in view
of its privilege of examining the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify and in Q Could you tell us Mr. Francisco as it was about past 11:00 o'clock in
the absence of grave abuse of discretion. (People v. Alcantara, 151 SCRA 326; the evening when this incident took place how were your able to
People v. Adones, 144 SCRA 364) recognize Florencia and the three persons mauling her?

We are convinced that Pantaleon Francisco was certain that the culprits were A There was a light outside the house which was on, sir.
appellants, Briones and Javier, and Eusebio Allied. Before the incident, Francisco
had known Briones for some seven (7) years (p. 12, tsn, July 12, 1988) and Javier,
a relative of Allied, for about a week already (p. 16, tsn, July 12, 1988). Q What kind of a light was that?
Immediately before the incident, Javier and Allied drank four bottles of beer in
Francisco's store (p. 16, Ibid). When Briones arrived, they offered him beer but he A An electric light which was bright, sir, maybe about 100 watts.
refused. Briones, Javier and Allied stayed for about thirty more minutes in
Francisco's store, giving the latter more opportunity to recognize the appellants and
Allied before they robbed and killed his neighbors some eight meters away. Q In relation to the place where you saw the three accused mauling the
late Florencia Gutierrez where was the electric bulb?

197
 A It is almost above them, sir. (pp. 22-26, tsn, July 12, 1988) (pp. 14- allegation of torture was neither formally complained the police nor confirmed by
16. Brief for plaintiff-appellee; p. 49, Rollo) any medical report.

If the court has previously held that the light of stars (People v. Vacal, 27 SCRA Finally, on appellants' claim that since their warrrantless arrest is void, all the other
24) or moon (People v. Pueblas, 127 SCRA 746), flames from an oven (People v. proceedings, including their conviction, are also void, We find such claim
de la Cruz, 147 SCRA 359), wick lamp or "gasera" (People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA undeserving of merit. It is unequivocally clear that no valid arrest was made on the
404) can give ample illumination to enable a person to identify or recognize accused-appellants, the arrest having been made without any warrant at all. Neither
another, then with more reason a 100-watt bulb is sufficient to enable Francisco to can the appellants' arrest qualify as lawful arrest without a warrant under Sec. 5 (b)
Identify appellants at a distance of about eight meters. of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because the police officer effected
the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has commited the crime. It is eyewitnesses Francisco who had such
Also, Francisco's testimony that appellants and Allied boxed Florencia Gutierrez
personal knowledge. In like manner, We cannot accept appellee's allegation that
outside her house and later dragged her inside is corroborated by physical evidence
Briones was a fugitive from justice at the time of the latter's arrest because it is not
(the blood stain near the gate and before the house) noted by the police
supported by the evidence on record. In sum, therefore, the warrantless arrest of the
investigators (pp. 9 and 42, tsn, July 26, 1988).
appellants is illegal. Nevertheless, such unavailing technicality cannot render all
the other proceedings, including the conviction of the appellants, void. It cannot
The appellants likewise stress heavily Francisco's failure to report the incident to deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point
the authorities in the morning of April 24, 1988. We tend to believe that such to their culpability. In this regard, the case of De Asis v. Romero,41 SCRA 235
silence is not an unexpected reaction to the murder which had taken place and finds application. Thus,
which Francisco was unfortunate enough to have witnessed. Francisco and his wife
were afraid of appellants and Allied who were then still at large. Be it noted,
In the reported decisions of this Court is a fairly excellent catalogue of
however, that on the second day he disclosed to the authorities the Identity of the
dissertations on the previous position of personal freedom as part of the
culprits since his conscience bothered him.
nation's heritage and the country's political consciousness. But although
the existing legal order guarantees to every individual security against
Next, the matters where Francisco allegedly gave inconsistent answers refer to any non-due process type or form of restrain detention, it nonetheless
minor details which are usual among witnesses and do not affect his overall leaves it to and expects him to initiate assertion of his corresponding
credibility. As aptly stated by the appellee, Francisco's answers refer to his right, in conformity with rules laid down or expounded by the
recollection of time, and whether he stayed in De la Paz, San Simon, for seven or institution which the people themselves, their sovereign capacity, have
nine years at the time he testified or whether (on April 26, 1988) he went to Makati by covenant established.
or remained in De La Paz are things which do not touch upon the occurrence of the
crime. The said inconsistencies merely show that Francisco had not acquired a
One of the most important of these settled rules is that any objection to
keen ability to estimate time or recall dates. What is important is that Francisco
the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of
steadfastly testified that he had witnessed the actual commission of the crime that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised
evening and gave positive Identification of the perpetrators thereof.
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. (De
Asis v. Romero, et al., 41 SCRA 235, citing People Romero, et al., 41
Relative to the defense of alibi, all that the appellants stated was that they were at SCRA 235, citing People v. Marquez, 27 SCRA 808). (Emphasis
the San Pablo Libutad attending a jamboree with the children of Briones. The trial supplied)
court rejected the said excuse reiterating that alibi is one of the weakest defenses
that can be resorted to by an accused (People v. dela Cruz, 76 Phil. 601). We agree.
Immediately after their arrest, appellants Briones and Javier could have objected to
"As a minimum requirement for the theory of alibi to be accepted, the accused
the legality thereof due to the failure of the police officer to secure first a warrant
must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be in the scene
for their arrest. Not only that, without having questioned the legality of their arrest
of the crime." (People v. Sambangan, 125 SCRA 726). Noteworthy is the fact that
they even pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against them.
the place of the incident was a walking distance from the place where the
Appellant's acts constitute a clear waiver of their right against unlawful restraint of
appellants allegedly were. Since the appellants and Allied were positively
liberty. Besides, it would be impractical, if not ridiculous to order the court a quo
Identified by Francisco, and it was not shown that the latter had any evil motive to
to set the appellants free then issue a warrant for their arrest, and try them all over
implicate the former, the defense of alibi cannot be accepted.
again when appellants themselves have waived their right to object to such
irregularity and when their conviction is truly based on overwhelming evidence.
We also support the trial court's finding of conspiracy. It is undisputed that
apellants and Allied were together in the store of Francisco prior to the incident. It
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court convicting the appellants Mario
was established the they mauled and manhandled Florencia Gutierrez, and
Briones and Gerardo Javier of the crime robbery with homicide is hereby
thereafter dragged her inside her house. Their concerted acts in the perpetration of
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the death indemnity to the heirs is
the offense show that conspiracy is present. It has been consistently held that
increased to P50,000.00 for each of the victims, in accordance with the policy
conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts
adopted by the Court en banc on August 30, 1990. The award of moral and
of the accused showing concerted action and community of design (People v.
exemplary damages are also AFFIRMED.
Pineda, 157 SCRA 71; People v. Batahan, 157 SCRA 215; People v. Roncal, 79
SCRA 616, People v. Pagaduan, 29 SCRA 54).
SO ORDERED.
Coming now to the constitutional rights of the appellants to remain silent and to
counsel, the same cannot be held to have been violated. It is not disputed that the Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
appellants were investigated by the police. However, it is important to note that the Melencio-Herrera, (Chairperson), J., is on Leave.
confession, admission or evidence obtained from the appellants was never offered
in evidence by the prosecution. Their conviction was not based on said confession
Republic of the Philippines
or admission but on the strength of the testimony of the lone eyewitness. SUPREME COURT
Furthermore, appellants' claim of police brutality cannot be given weight as their Manila

198
 THIRD DIVISION that Pat. Reynaldo Lechido will act as the poseur-buyer
while the rest of the team are to give Lechido a (sic) back-up
support. Lechido was furnished by Cpl. Tamondong with a
G.R. No. 82293 July 23, 1992
P10-bill with Serial No. BG4-32975 which he instructed his
men to familiarize with (sic) (Exh. "A"). Cpl. Tamondong
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, also marked the P10-bill in the presence of his men with a
vs. slant in ball pen (sic) across the figure "10" at its lower left
ROLANDO MADRIAGA y BAUTISTA @ OLAN and ROLANDO portion (Exh. "A-1"). Soon after the briefing, the team on
PANGILINAN y CRUZ @ OLAN, respondents. board two (2) motor vehicles, proceeded to the area
mentioned by the informant. They parked their vehicles
somewhere at Marcela Street and from there they went on
DAVIDE, JR., J.: foot to Elisa Street, taking caution not to be detected or
suspected. At Elisa Street, Lechido positioned himself near
In an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch the opening of an alley which leads to the interior of a
124, and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-28540, appellants Rolando cluster of squatter houses, while the other members of the
Madriaga y Bautista @ Olan and Rolando Pangilinan y Cruz @ Olan, were team scattered and strategically posted themselves within the
charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, vicinity. Not long thereafter, a man which fitted (sic) the
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, committed description earlier given by the civilian informant appeared.
as follows: 1 Lechido approached the man and told the latter that he
would want to buy a (sic) P10-worth of marijuana. Lechido
handed the P10-marked money (sic) (Exh. "A"), to the man
That on or about the 27th day of March 1987 in Caloocan who told Lechido to wait. Thereafter, the man left and some
City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this (sic) few minutes later, he returned, at which point Lechido
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring gave the pre-arranged signal to his companions. The man
together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, handed to Lechido something wrapped in a newspaper,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, whereupon the other members of the team swooped in.
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to Pat. Reynaldo Lechido identified himself to the man as a police officer
Lechido, who acted as poseur-buyer dried marijuana while the rest of the team placed the man under arrest.
flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper, a prohibited drug, Asked by Lechido as to what his name is, the man identified
knowing the same to be such. himself as the herein accused, Rolando Madriaga. Lechido
asked the man where he got the stuff, to which the man
After each of them entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment, 2
trial on the answered he got it from a certain man also nicknamed
merits ensued. "Olan", whose place is at the interior of the alley. Together
with Rolando Madriaga, Lechido and two of his companions
entered the alley and as they were walking, Madriaga,
After hearing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely: Patrolman pointed to a man standing some 7 to 10 meters away from
Reynaldo Lechido, Corporal Alfredo Rodillas, Corporal Wilfredo Tamondong and where he was apprehended, as the source of the stuff.
Neva G. Gamosa, and the appellants, who took the witness stand in their defense, Lechido and his two companions approached the man,
the trial court promulgated on 17 September 1987 a judgment of conviction, 3 the identified themselves to him as police officers, and
dispositive portion of which reads: thereafter frisked the man. Found by Lechido inside the right
pocket of the man's pants was the marked P10-bill. When
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the herein accused queried, the man answered that the money came from the
ROLANDO MADRIAGA Y BAUTISTA @ OLAN, and other accused, Rolando Madriaga. Lechido got the marked
ROLANDO PANGILINAN Y CRUZ @ OLAN, GUILTY, money from the man who gave his name as Rolando
beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense charged against Pangilinan. The team brought both accused to the office of
them in the manner alleged in the information, and are each the Anti-Narcotics Unit whereat they turned over the persons
sentenced by this Court to THIRTY (30) YEARS OF life of both accused as well as the suspected marijuana stuff and
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with the P10-marked money (sic) to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong.
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. . . . In the ensuing investigation, both accused refused to give
any written statement upon being apprised of their
constitutional rights. For their part, Pat. Lechido and three of
On 30 September 1987, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal. 4 the members of the team executed a joint statement relating
therein the circumstances that transpired during the buy bust
The facts of the case which the conviction is based are summarized by the trial operation (Exh. "B"). That same afternoon of March 27,
court as follows: 1987, the suspected marijuana flowering tops as wrapped in
a piece of newspaper which Lechido received from accused
Rolando Madriaga (Exh. "F-2"), was (sic) forwarded to the
In the morning of March 27, 1987, a civilian informant NBI chemist for examination after Cpl. Tamondong had
appeared at the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Caloocan placed his initials reading "WLT" (Exh. "F-2-B-2"), on the
City Police Station, and informed Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong newspaper wrapper. The item was received by NBI chemist
and his men that a certain "Olan" whose description was Neva Gamosa who, for purposes of identification, placed her
given by the informant, is engaged in the illegal traffice (sic) own identifying marked (sic) on the newspaper wrapper
of marijuana somewhere at Elisa Street, Marcela, Maypajo, (Exh. "F-2-A"). After subjecting a representative sample of
Caloocan City. Forthwith, Cpl. Tamondong, as Assistant the suspected marijuana flowering tops to microscopic,
Chief and investigator of the same unit, formed and chemical and chormotographic tests, chemist Neva Gamosa
dispatched a surveillance team of narcotics operatives to the found that the specimen submitted "gave positive results for
place mentioned by the informant. The team returned with marijuana" (Exh. "G"). 5
positive result (sic). After clearing the matter with the chief
of the Anti-Narcotics Unit who arrived in the office in the
afternoon of the same date, Cpl. Tamondong gathered his
men for a buy-bust operation. At the briefing, it was agreed

199
On the other hand, the appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed ordinary common sense would deliver marijuana in a crowded place within the
that they were the victims of a frame-up. This defense was summarized by the trial view of many people.
court, to wit:
They further contend that the search conducted on appellant Pangilinan's person
Thus, accused Rolando Pangilinan who admitted being was illegal as it was done without a search warrant; hence, the marked P10.00 bill
jobless on March 27, 1987, testified that while he was on his obtained from him is inadmissable in evidence.
way to buy cigarettes from a corner store at Elisa Street in
the afternoon of March 27, 1987, men in civilian clothes
As to the second assigned error, appellants disagree with the trial court's
suddenly grabbed him and boarded (sic) him in a jeep
characterization of the apprehensions as entrapment and vigorously maintain that it
together with his co-accused Rolando Madriaga, a close
was Lechido who offered to buy marijuana from appellant Madriaga; the former
friend and neighbor of him (sic) at Elisa Street. After
therefore, induced the latter to commit the crime of drug pushing.
boarding (sic) them in the jeep, the men brought them to the
Caloocan City Police Station. He denied being the source of
the marijuana allegedly sold by Madriaga to Pat. Lechido in The third assigned error is anchored on the conclusion that the prosecution failed to
the afternoon of March 27, 1987. He also denied that there discharge its duty to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
was found from (sic) his pocket the marked money involved
in this case (Exh. "A").
After a judicious review of the facts and the law, We conclude that there is no
merit in this appeal. The challenged decision has to be affirmed in all respects, save
For his part, the other accused Rolando Madriaga, who gave for the penalty of thirty (30) years of life imprisonment, which should be modified
his occupation as a carpenter in the furniture shop of one to life imprisonment.
Senying de Leon at Elisa Street, declared that in the
afternoon of March 27, 1987, while he was doing carpentry
We shall take up the assigned errors in seriatim.
work at the shop of his employer, men in civilian clothes
picked him up and boarded (sic) him, together with his
friend Rolando Pangilinan, into an owner-type jeep. The 1. The allegations of inconsistencies in the testimony of Lechido as to the marking
men brought him and Pangilinan to the police headquarters of the buy-bust money for the purpose of casting doubt on the identity of the
whereat they were immediately locked inside a cell. From P10.00 bill is more apparent than real. It is clear from his testimony that he was
there, they were subsequently transferred to the Caloocan positive that the serial number of the ten-peso bill was recorded although he was
City Jail, where they (sic) now detained. He denied having not sure whether any other marking existed. Thus:
allegedly sold marijuana to Pat. Lechido, much less having
received a P10-bill from the latter. He added that when the
men picked him up and placed him under arrest, he and his Q And how could you determine that
employer Senying de Leon, complained (sic) why he was it is the same money which will be
being arrested but the men merely told him to go with them. used or utilized for the purchase of
On cross-examination, he testified that the men first arrested marijuana?
him, after which the same men also arrested his friend
Rolando Pangilinan, as the latter was coming out from his A From our office I already
house at the interior of the alley along Elisa Street. 6 segregated the money from my own
money. I placed it in my pocket
In this appeal, appellants, assisted by their counsel de oficio, Atty. Ramon C. wherein there is no other money
Fernandez, interpose the following assignment of errors:7 except that money.

I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE COURT:

TO THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION.
After segregating that money with
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (sic) your other money, what did you
THE BUY-BUST OPERATION ILLEGAL. do first with that money? Did you
mark that money?

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING

THE TWO ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN WITNESS (A):
THE INFORMATION.
No, sir. The one who marked it is our
In support of the first assigned error, appellants contend that the testimonies of Pat. investigator.8
Lechido and Pat. Rodillas on the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of
the appellants and the buy-bust operation are biased, erratic and contradictory. The COURT:
inconsistencies pointed out involve the different versions showing how the buy-
bust money was marked and what the pre-arranged signal for the appellants'
apprehension was. They point out that Pat. Lechido contradicted himself when he While ago (sic) you testified that it
initially said that the mark used was the serial number, while in his later testimony, was not you who put the marking in
he said that it was a slant placed on the buy-bust money. (sic) that money?

As to the pre-arranged signal, they claim that while Lechido testified that it was to A Yes, Your Honor.
be the pulling out of his handkerchief, Cpl. Tamondong declared that it was to be
Lechido's scratching of his head. They furthermore present the theory that since COURT:
Lechido is a stranger to appellant Madriaga, it would have been stupid and naive
for the latter to immediately deal with the former; they assert that no person with

200
 According to you it was the Q Where did he jot down the serial
investigator? number?

A Yes, sir. A It was listed in our dispatch book or

the blotter.
COURT:
Q When was that made?
What was the marking he made in
(sic) that money? Were you not told A It was made before the actual
by the investigator what was the operation, sir, but the same date (sic)
identifying mark he made in (sic) that March 27.11
money so that you would detect that is
(sic) the same marked money you
xxx xxx xxx
used in the buy-bust operation?

COURT TO WITNESS:
A The serial number.

Q What I an telling you is, you

COURT
identified a slant across the lower
corner of the P10-bill. Is this the usual
You said it was your investigator who procedure you used (sic) in indicating
marked that money, what was the or marking the buy-bust money for
marking he made in (sic) that money purposes of identification?
or were you told it was marked by
him?
A Yes, sir.

A That is clarification (sic) our

Q You always put a slant?
investigator must also testify in this
Court.9
A No, sir. It is not variable (sic).
Pat. Lechido's failure to recall the marking on the bill can be attributed to the fact
that when he first testified on 1 September 1987, the ten-peso bill was not yet Q What markings are usually placed
available and thus was not presented in court. In fact, the non-availability of the on the face of the money?
ten-peso bill was the reason for this being recalled to the witness stand. It was upon
being recalled to the witness stand on 2 September 1987 that he remembered that
A Sometimes we placed (sic) a letter
in addition to recording the serial number, a slant was placed on the bill. Lechido
X, sometimes a circle and sometimes
cannot be blamed for not remembering all the details involved because human
we wrote (sic) an initial of a name and
memory is frail. Thus, We find no reason to doubt him when he said:
sometimes we placed (sic) the figure
O. 12
FISCAL SILVERIO:
There is no inconsistency in the testimony of Pat. Lechido because the police
Q You earlier, in your previous investigator recorded the serial number of the ten-peso bill and at the same time
testimony, stated that your police placed a slant on the bill itself. As testified to by Cpl. Tamondong on direct
investigator marked the P10-bill. examination:
Where is that Mr. Witness?
Q How did you know that this is the
A This one, sir (witness pointing to a same P10.00-bill you gave to Pat.
slant imposed across the figure 10 on Lechido during the conference.
the lower left hand corner of the P10-
bill which slant appears to be written
A I put a slant to (sic) this P10.00 bill.
in ink).10

FISCAL SILVERIO:
xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you please point (sic) the

ATTY. YAP: (Q — ADDITIONAL
slant?
CROSS-EXAMINATION)

WITNESS:
Q Aside from the marking (sic) slant
on the face of this P10-bill, was the
serial number of this alleged marked A (Witness pointing to the right side
money jot (sic) down by your of the P10.00 bill wherein there
investigator? appears a slant on the P10.00 to the
left.)
A Yes, sir.

201
 FISCAL SILVERIO: A Yes, sir.

Which slant was already marked COURT:

Exhibit "A-1".
Alright.
Q What was Pat. Lechido supposed to
do with this P10.00-bill?
ATTY. YAP (Q):

A I gave him the piece of paper to

Was this the usual way of marking
write the serial number to identify the
when you conduct buy-bust operation,
marked bill.
slanting?

Q What did Pat. Lechido do with this

A Except that, it was put in our
serial number written in (sic) a piece
dispatch book, the serial number.
of paper?

Q My question is: Is this the usual

A And to pass it to other members so
way of marking money (sic) to
that they will familiarize (sic) the said
conduct buy-bust operation (sic)?
P10.00-bill.

A Yes, sir. 14
Q You mean the same serial number
written in (sic) the piece of paper were
(sic) passed around the members of The other inconsistency as to the pre-arranged signal is inconsequential. According
the raiding team? to Pat. Lechido, the pre-arranged signal was his act of pulling out his handkerchief.
15
He, however, explained that this was the signal to show that the accused had
answered him "in a positive way that there is stuff."
A Yes, sir. 13

Thus:
On cross-examination, Cpl. Tamondong further explained the marking placed on
the ten-peso bill, thus:
COURT:
Q Before you took this money from
your pocket, was this money already What was your understanding with
marked? respect to your handkerchief before
you proceeded to the place?
A I marked it, sir, before I gave (sic)
to Pat. Lechido. WITNESS (A):

COURT: That is (sic) one of our plans.

Where did you mark it? COURT:

A In our office, sir. What is that plan.

COURT: A I said to my companions that when

I approach that person and when he
answered (sic) me in a positive way
In whose presence?
that there is a (sic) stuff so I will draw
my handkerchief and that once I drew
A The members of the Unit, sir. (sic) my handkerchief that must alert
all deployed personnel. 16
COURT:
On the other hand, Cpl. Tamondong testified that the signal he told Pat. Lechido to
use was the scratching by the latter of his head. Thus, he said:
You mean during the briefing?

COURT:
A Yes, sir.

Now, in the role which Lechido was

COURT:
supposed to play in that buy-bust
operation, did you give him specific
All of them knew that you made your instructions on what he is supposed to
marking in (sic) the money? do?

202
 A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

COURT: COURT:

What was this instruction? And this permission was also that
(sic) they will devise their pre-
arranged signal?
A When he handed (sic) the marked
P10.00-bill to the suspect and the
suspected marijuana is handed to A Yes, sir.
Lechido, he will scratch his head.
COURT:
COURT:
Why do you have to discuss a definite
In other words, during the briefing the pre-arranged signal if after all they
agreed pre-arranged signal was can invent their own signal?
Lechido's scratching his head and this
is supposed to be this (sic) pre-
A Sometimes, your Honor, when
arranged signal when the marijuana is
somebody was (sic) holding a
already in the possession of Lechido,
cigarette and the suspect handed to
is that what we understand from you?
him a suspected marijuana, the
poseur-buyer throws the cigarette
A Yes, sir. stick.

COURT: COURT:

And this is (sic) also made known to In this case?

the rest of the members of the team
during the briefing?
A I instructed Pat. Lechido to scratch
his head.
WITNESS (A):
COURT:
Yes, sir. 17
In this particular case, did you know if
From the foregoing, no serious inconsistency even appears. The pulling out of the Pat. Lechido changed the signal and
handkerchief was a signal to inform Lechido's group that appellant Madriaga has invented a signal of his own?
the marijuana, while the scratching of the head was supposed to signal that Lechido
already had the marijuana in his possession. In any event, the inconsistency, if any,
A I do not know sir.
was sufficiently explained by Cpl. Tamondong when he testified that:

FISCAL SILVERIO (Q):

FISCAL SILVERIO:

So you did not know, Mr. Witness,

Just one question, your Honor.
whether on the way of the team (sic)
to the place of the operation they
FISCAL SILVERIO (Q — Cont'n): devised another pre-arranged signal?

You said, Mr. Witness, that the pre- A Yes, sir.

arranged signal was for Pat. Reynaldo
Lechido to scratch his head in order
Q Is it possible that they made their
(sic) that he pay (sic) the P10.00 bill
own pre-arranged signal?
and receive (sic) the marijuana stuff,
is that correct?
A But I gave already pre-arranged
signal to Pat. Lechido.
WITNESS: (A)

Q But is it possible?
Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. 18
FISCAL SILVERIO (Q):

The only conclusion that can be reached, therefore, is that Pat. Lechido decided to
But did you allow him to devise his
change the pre-arranged signal for some reason or another. The fact that the pre-
own way of pre-arranged signal in the
arranged signal used was the act of pulling out the handkerchief was further
buy-bust operation?

203
confirmed by Pat. Alfredo Rodillas, who was present during the buy-bust Drug pushing when done on a small level as in this case
operation. He testified that: belongs to that class of crimes that may be committed at
anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted
and the exchange is made, the illegal transaction is
COURT TO WITNESS:
completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a
public place and in the presence of other people mat not
Q When you were (sic) at the always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as
headquarters, is it not normal that these factors may even serve to camouflage the same.
everytime you conduct a buy-bust Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug
operation the one designated as pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall, in front
poseur-buyer is usually required to of a store, along a street at 1:45 p.m., and in front of a house.
26
give a pre-arrange (sic) signal to
signal his companions that the
transaction is consummated and its
The contention that the search conducted on appellant Pangilinan was illegal and
(sic) time for them to apprehend or to
the evidence obtained by reason thereof is inadmissable in evidence pursuant to
arrest the suspect?
paragraph (2), Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is likewise devoid of
merit. The arrest of both appellants was validly effected. Paragraphs (a) and (b),
A Yes, your Honor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

Q Now, when you were still having Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.— A peace
that briefing at your unit, was there an officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
agreement reached among the person:
members of that unit as to what was
the pre-arranged signal to be used by
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
the poseur-buyer?
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
A There was, sir.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
Q What was that? has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; . . . .
A He will put out his handkerchief,
sir. Appellant Rolando Madriaga was arrested in Flagrante delicto; he was
apprehended while in the act of giving the marijuana to Pat. Lechido, the poseur
buyer. As such, his arrest, effected pursuant to paragraph (a) of the aforesaid
Q Who was supposed to put out his Section 5, 27 was valid. Furthermore, the search conducted on his person was
handkerchief? likewise valid because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which
A Pat. Lechido, sir. 19 provides:

Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that inconsistencies exist, such are on minor Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
details which do not affect the case of the prosecution. Settled is the rule that lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses' honesty. 20 These an offense, without a search warrant.
inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even
tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of The warrantless arrest of the other appellant Rolando Pangilinan falls under
the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
21 paragraph (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. Pat. Lechido, as
What is important is that the testimonies agree on the essential facts and that the the poseur buyer in the buy bust operation, had personal knowledge that an offense
respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each other to make — the sale to him by Madriaga of the marijuana — had in fact been committed. He
a consistent and coherent whole. 22 also had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Pangilinan was the source of
the prohibited drug by virtue of the information given to him by Madriaga to this
Equally unmeritorous is appellants' final argument under this assigned error. They effect. Thus the arrest of appellant Pangilinan was likewise valid. Consequently,
want this Court to believe that appellant Madriaga would not have sold a the search of Pangilinan's body incident to his valid arrest was also valid. The
prohibited drug to Pat. Lechido, a stranger, since "no person engaged in the illegal evidence obtained from the search is, therefore, admissable in evidence.
traffic of prohibited drugs will be stupid or naive to immediately deal with a
stranger; and no person with ordinary common sense would deliver marijuana in a In People vs. Paco, 28 We said:
crowded place within the view of many people.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the

In real life, small-quantity or retail drug pushers sell their prohibited wares to buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized
customers who have the money to pay for the drug, be they strangers or not. 23 but were also under (sic) obligation to apprehend the drug
What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the drug pusher, pusher even without a warrant of arrest. And since the
but rather their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
prohibited drug. 24 incident to the arrest was also valid. (Rule 126, Sec. 12.
Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 (1946); People vs. Claudio,
Also, with respect to the sale of drugs on a small scale basis, this Court, in People G.R. No. 72564, April 15, 1988).
vs. Paco, 25 held:

204
2. In their second assignment of error, appellants claim that they were instigated six respondents in their official capacities as members of the State
into selling the marijuana; hence, their apprehension should be declared illegal. Prosecutor's Office), respondents.

We are not persuaded. Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.

What actually obtained in the case at bar was an entrapment, not an inducement or The Solicitor General for respondents.
instigation. Appellants miserably failed to prove that they were in fact induced into
committing the offense. Upon the other hand, the prosecution successfully proved
beyond any shadow of a doubt that the appellants were engaged in the illegal
traffic of marijuana, and that the surveillance team dispatched to conduct the buy-
bust operation confirmed their illegal business. the operation then was to expose,
arrest and prosecute the traffickers. The latter were committing a crime and needed CRUZ, J.:
no one else to induce them to commit it.
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeakable
capturing the law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the crime. On him, the verdict has already been rendered by many outraged persons
instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the who would immediately impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for all the
offense; the inducer thus becomes the principal. Entrapment then does not bar the prejudgments against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent as long
prosecution and conviction of the person entrapped. In instigation, however, the as the contrary has not been proved. Like any other person accused of an offense,
instigated party has to be acquitted. 29 he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.

Entrapment has consistently proven to be an effective method of apprehending Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge
drug peddlers. 30 denying his motion to quash the informations for rape with homicide filed against
him and six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any other suit filed by any
litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment from this Court.
The foregoing renders unnecessary a discussion on the third assigned error.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
We thus affirm the decision of the trial court. However, the penalty of "THIRTY
(30) YEARS OF life imprisonment" imposed by it is not correct because the
penalty for drug pushing provided by Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
6425, as amended, is life imprisonment and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection
P30,000.00. The penalty is not divisible into periods or into specific durations. with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Also, it is not the same as the penalty of reclusion perpetua provided under the
Revised Penal Code which carries accessory penalties. 31 The proper penalty then Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
should just be life imprisonment. conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was
not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects, except as above-modified. On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the
petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in
No pronouncement as to costs. Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993,
and he was immediately taken to the said camp.

SO ORDERED.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio
Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur. implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of
Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival,
with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
EN BANC
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was
issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to
93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713.
Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
remains confined.

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,

On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial
vs.
Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding
Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea
Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable
and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO
R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO
C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last

205
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a countermand with all these
warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with statements.
the said crime.
Q. So, you are waiving your
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that submission of counter-affidavit?
the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the
tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are
relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This Court
other witnesses who will come up
thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro
soon. 3
Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuño, told
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the
Atty. Brion that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No
killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
such counter-affidavit was filed.

On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuño furnished the petitioner's
substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993,
counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of
after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed
Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could submit counter-affidavits on or
with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
before August 27, 1993. The following exchange ensued:
temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.

ACSP Zuño:
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be
quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the For the record, we are furnishing to
investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not you the sworn statement of witness
acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the
from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio
they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public Malabanan y Angeles.
officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
Do I understand from you that you are
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a again waiving the submission of
Reply from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of five days.1 The Reply counter-affidavit?
was filed five days late. 2 The Court may consider his non-compliance an implied
admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his
Atty. Panelo:
petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this
procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments
before us. Yes.

The Preliminary Investigation. ACSP Zuño:

The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor
contention that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits. Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this
case is submitted for resolution. 4
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel,
Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation
counter-affidavit, thus: that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13,
1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by
Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the
petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to Atty. Panelo.
rebut or countermand all these statements as far as Mayor
Sanchez is concerned, We are not going to submit any
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as
counter-affidavit.
his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel
speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly
ACSP Zuño to Atty. Brion: bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the
respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
Q. So far, there are no other
affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
statements.
presented by the complainant.

A. If there is none then, we will not

Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary
submit any counter-affidavit because
investigation5, so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other
we believe there is nothing to rebut or
evidence in his defense.

206
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a the said camp for investigation.
ground for quashing the information.6
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may,
on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an
proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the
invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions,
respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in
which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure,
her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.
is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation
comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of
ranking military officers issued at a time when the country
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the
has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension
proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void because it
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely
had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the
been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a
Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases
military camp, the same can be easily taken, not as a strictly
involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only defy at his
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
6770 to investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official.
However, as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the
this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise
authority in. respect of the offense charged."
of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner
could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers
information filed in this case needed the approval of the who had come to fetch him.
Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and
amended information here did not have the approval of the
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval
"custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but
was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545
merely "invited" for questioning.
(1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any
public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on
must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person
Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño himself acknowledged
any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of
exclusiveauthority but rather a shared or concurrent authority the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of
sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse
of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
legal consequence upon the authority the panel of
prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information. Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of
Justice, in connection with the charge of sedition, 10 and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases, 11 may conduct the (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
investigation, committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
The Arrest
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
be arrested has committed it; and

"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission
escapes from a penal establishment or place where he is
of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
of the person making the arrest.
one confinement to another.

Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a

It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner
formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on
allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part of the other
Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner
to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. 12
was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements
of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta

207
allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate
the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died
the petitioner was arrested. seven times.

The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit
him and the other accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to
rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason
be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes
court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule committed.
is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may
move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of
accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived
rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus,
that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.14
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape,
loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance.
arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape
No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest
this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention. degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the
suspension of the application of the death penalty by the
Constitution).
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the
issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained
will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102
Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information
must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. — which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his various offenses.
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111,
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
amending the Revised Penal Code.
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order,
the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused
judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all
seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had
been arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping
declared that a new warrant specifically naming her had been issued, thus Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping
validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the Court and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege
said: that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of
Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers.
The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused,
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch
culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
as the new warrant of arrest complies with the requirements
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the
particular description of the person to be arrested. While the It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were
first warrant was unquestionably void, being a general killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the
warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be a petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest
pursuant to the new and valid warrant, returning her to the
The Alleged Discrimination
same prison she will just have left. This Court will not
participate in such a meaningless charade.
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of
17 Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court, more recently in
the Umil case. 18
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his
opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the
The Informations
information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt
exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part

208
of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the [T]he relation between the crime and the office
petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. 20 contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct
and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution,
the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of
cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office
Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court
must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the
cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find
statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to
Penal Code.
prosecute him.

Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse
human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a
of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive.
private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for
except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took
mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief,
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which
the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case
event the penalty is increased.
must first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for
such inclusion.23
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as
an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed
materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof,
against Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused
not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but
should also be dropped.
from the manner of the commission of the crime

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with
homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of
officials or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission
cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the
not of the regular courts. This contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in
discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned. People v. Montejo. 25

Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides: In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the
death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police
substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from
representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an
essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code: It is apparent from these allegations that, although public
office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by the main respondents herein, according to the
committed by public officers and amended information, the offense therein charged is
employees in relation to their office, intimately connected with their respective offices and was
including those employed in perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
government-owned or controlled improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they
corporations, whether simple or had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would
complexed with other crimes, where not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
the penalty prescribed by law is offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown,
higher than prision correccional or obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer,
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a as Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis
supplied) We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that
the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate
obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being
cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
in relation to the office of the petitioner.
Conclusion
In Montilla v, Hilario,24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to
the office" as follows: As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not
supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They must,

209
therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge, who has started the of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her
trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian
therewith without further hindrance. Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. But he
stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located
10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN, September
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits
6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
of the criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be decided by the
respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is still being received. At
this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's
Court will caution against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on
only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance. her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya birds together with other children. While they
were playing, appellant was always around washing his
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED
clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN,
to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144,
August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp.17; 20-
101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
22).

SO ORDERED.
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined
Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 o'clock in
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur. Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out
with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also
owned a store fronting the compound, saw Ma.Victoria on
Bellosillo, J., is on leave. that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip's
unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The
Republic of the Philippines unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's
SUPREME COURT store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
Manila
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian
EN BANC Street, went to his in-law's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m.
to call his office regarding changes on the trip of President
Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the
house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni
met appellant along Dian Street. That same evening,
between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999 front of the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September
27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant. Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera
informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice
that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought.
His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a
dazed manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he
PER CURIAM: did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the
compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and
unexposed to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma.
not only her future but of the youth population as well, who in the teachings of our Victoria, was missing. She last saw her daughter wearing a
national hero, are considered the hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon,
confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity, committed no less upon printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and
a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock on the blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically
evil act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that
death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor night. On the following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in
does there exist any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven
ought not to last. by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at
the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9;
horrible experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the September 27, l995; pp. 14-17).
bloody hands of appellant, as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record:
1
* That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the
dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents,
Maria Isip on November 20, 1953. His task was to take care Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).

210
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14,
Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic tank. She was 1995, pp. 8-9).
wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore
bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the
findings:
second floor of the house under construction, they retrieved
from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds, brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by
Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They
also found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Isip identified as that of appellant. Also found in the yard,
three armslength away from the septic tank were an
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm. underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a
pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's belongings.
These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of 14, 1995, pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23,
the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 1995, pp. 21-25).
cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left,
7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular
area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right A police report was subsequently prepared including a
4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar referral slip addressed to the office of the Valenzuela
area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved
third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 the victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August
x 5.0 cm, forearms, left, posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right
antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally
anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower
arrested in Barangay Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He
3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 X 1.0 cm.
was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7,
lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect
1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes,
2.2 x 1.0 cm.
appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also,
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm. when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother
and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping
and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, co-conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp. 13-21).
subepicardial, subpleural petechial hemorrhages.

Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area. Information which reads:2

Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested. That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Other visceral organs, congested. Court the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles. then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with
and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without her
Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory. consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the
above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which,
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at said victim died.
4:00 and 8:00 o'clock position corresponding to the face of a
watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18,
1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126). Contrary to law.3

Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a
Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that her houseboy, decision convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to
appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According to her, it suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the
was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
apartment since whenever he would go out, he would
normally return on the same day or early morning of the WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado
following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-11-27). guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is
hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic). He is
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
townmate of appellant was working in a pancit factory at Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the
Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said further sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake
place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that of the victim.
appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know
his present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other
hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found

211
 Let the complete records of the case be immediately This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in
forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for the the review thereof since "there can be no stake higher and no penalty more
automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised severe . . . than the termination of a human life." 7 For life, once taken is like
Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. virginity, which once defiled can never be restored. In order therefore, that
7659. appellant's guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the records
are not shy, for him to verify.
SO ORDERED. 4
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant's proffered
excuse are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence relative to the commission of
Penal Code. (RPC), as amended, 5 appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not
presented by the prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond
necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence 8
reasonable doubt. In his testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered
and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had on circumstantial
his version of what transpired as follows:
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:

(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street,

1. there is more
Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined
than one
Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree.
circumstance;
Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellant's
employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he
was summoned by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished 2. the facts
cleaning the jeepney at 12 o'clock noon. Then he had lunch from which the
and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go inferences are
out with his friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash derived are
advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-5-5). proven; and

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out 3. the

with his friend, opted to rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy combination of
for another drinking session. They consumed one case of red all the
horse beer. Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, circumstances
fetched him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They went to is such as to
Zaldy's house and bought a bottle of gin. They finished produce a
drinking gin around 8 o'clock p.m. After consuming the conviction
bottle of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of gin beyond
from a nearby store. It was already 9 o'clock in the evening. reasonable
While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. doubt.
After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant
left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other,
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera's consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed him that there time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every
was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to Isip's other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 10 Facts and circumstances
apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute
sleep at the second floor of Isip's unfinished house. Around evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
10 o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. evidence in its effect upon the court.11
The two placed the body inside the room where appellant
was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial
knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of
evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove
the child or they would kill him. He, however, refused to
appellant's guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial
follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist
evidence are as follows:
them in bringing the dead body downstairs. He obliged and
helped dump the body into the septic tank. Thereupon, Zaldy
and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, FIRST — Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law
they would kill him. At 4 o'clock the following morning, he of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where the
left the compound and proceeded first to Navotas and later crime happened and the septic tank where the body of Maria
to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13). Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is
located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the
evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police
her store located in front portion of the compound of her
officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police officers allegedly
sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is
brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There,
situated buying rice noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the
appellant heard the police officer's plan to salvage him if he
accused's hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed
sigsagging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and
the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession.
seems to be thinking deeply. That the accused did not reply
He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes
to her queries why he looked worried but went inside the
only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial
compound.
confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).6

SECOND — Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C. Suni,

categorically testified that on June 25, 1995 between 6:00

212
and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws house, he findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual
met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory
his in-law's residence which is about 50 to 75 meters away substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused
to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also saw that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table
victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the and the victim lost consciousness.
unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in
the same evening.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan
ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko
THIRD — Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the siya, tapos tumama iyong ulo niya sa
unfinished big house where victim's body was found inside mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos
the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is her ni-rape ko na siya.
houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of
June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in
from her to leave. That after finishing some work she asked
giving the statement. There were no medical certificate
him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary
submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was
on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the
mauled by the police officers.
same day or sometimes in the next morning. That accused
Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in
Batangas on July 7, 1995. There being no evidence presented to
show that said confession were
obtained as a result of violence,
FOURTH — Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a
torture, maltreatment, intimidation,
passenger jeepney driver plying the route Karuhatan-Ugong
threat or promise of reward or
and vice versa which include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon,
leniency nor that the investigating
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry
officer could have been motivated to
Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his
concoct facts narrated in said
passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning
affidavit; the confession of the
and alighted on top of the overpass of the North
accused is held to be true, correct and
Expressway.
freely or voluntarily given. (People v.
Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v.
FIFTH — Personal belongings of the victim was found in Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v.
the unfinished big house of Maria Isip where accused Larry Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v.
Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a clear Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said
premises.
SEVENTH — Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open
Court that he was notable to enter the apartment where he is
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution sleeping because it was already closed and he proceeded to
witnesses (sic) fabricated or there was any reason for them the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said
to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of any while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver
evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the of the victim and dumped it inside his room. That at the
conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex with the
testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist
faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the septic
1988 162 SCRA 276,. 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October tank downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October 16, 1995). This is
30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756). unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is
staying in the apartment and not in the unfinished house.
That he slept in the said unfinished house only that night of
SIXTH — Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial
June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying
investigation and after having been informed of his
was already closed. The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy
constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor
Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his
of the unfinished house.
statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said
confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by
freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the second floor of the
to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was
(People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150 SCRA sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver
311). He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when upstairs only to be disposed/dump later in the septic tank
he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily
was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by
That his confession abound with details know only to him. themselves.
The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was
Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his
taken to the room where accused Larry Mahinay was
constitutional rights and was present all throughout the
sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead
giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given
body of the child.
by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is
expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any
irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the We have no test to the truth of human
physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem testimony except it's conformity to

213
 aver knowledge observation and The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
experience. Whatever is repugnant to
these belongs to the miraculous.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a
(People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16,
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
1979)
be reclusion perpetua to death.

EIGHT — If the accused did not commit the crime and was
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
only forced to disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in
has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
the septic tank, he could have apprise Col. Maganto, a high
ranking police officer or the lady reporter who interviewed
him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
unnatural. An innocent person will at once naturally and committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty
emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against
prejudicing himself. A person's silence therefore,
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide
particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that
is committed the penalty shall be death.
he is not innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21,
1978).
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following attendant
NINTH — The circumstance of flight of the accused
circumstances:
strongly indicate his consciousness of guilt. He left the crime
scene on the early morning after the incident and did not
return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995. 12 1.) When the
victim is under
eighteen (18)
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 13
years of age
and the
1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is offender is a
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, parent,
though innocent, to disprove; ascendant, step-
parent,
guardian,
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where
relative by
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
consanguinity
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
or affinity
within the third
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own civil degree, or
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the the common-
weakness of the defense. law spouse of
the parent of
the victim.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of
rape with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659, which 2.) When the
provides: victim is under
the custody of
the police or
When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by
military
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
authorities.
following circumstances.

3.) When the

1.) By using
rape is
force or
committed in
intimidation;
full view of the
husband,
2.) When the parent, any of
woman is the children or
deprived of other relatives
reason or within the third
otherwise degree of
unconscious: consanguinity.
and
4.) When the
3.) When the victim is a
woman is under religious or a
twelve years of child below
age or is seven (7) years
demented. old.

214
 5.) When the and 8:00 o'clock position and that the
offender knows edges were congested.
that he is
afflicted with
Q: Now, what might have caused the
Acquired
laceration?
Immune
Deficiency
Syndrome A: Under normal circumstances this
(AIDS) disease. might have (sic) caused by a
penetration of an organ.
6.) When
committed by Q: So, the laceration was caused by
any member of the penetration of a male organ?
the Armed
Forces of the
A: Adult male organ, sir.
Philippines or
Philippine
National Police Q: You are very sure of that, Mr.
or any law Witness?
enforcement
agency
A: I am very sure of that.20

7.) When by
reason or on the Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself
occasion of the admitted that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
rape, the victim
has suffered 15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga
permanent sandali o oras na iyon?
physical
mutilation. 14
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay
ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime bahay na ginagawa, tapos dumating
against chastity,15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya
rape has since been re-classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa
and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the kamay tapos tinulak ko siya. Tapos
offended party. tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon
na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a ko na siya.
woman by force and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape may be
committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a 16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes babae na sinasabi mo?
immaterial18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, 19 but the
absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this case, not dirty white short placed atop this
only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other investigator's table. Subject evidence
element that the perpetrator's evil acts with the offended party was done through were part of evidences recovered at
force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are the crime scene).
present in this case.
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately batang babae?
proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted
post mortem examination on the child's body: S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi
ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.
Q: And after that what other parts or
the victim did you examine? 18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom
bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of
the victim. S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.

Q: And what did you find out after 19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay
you examined the genitalia of the ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung
victim? batang babae?.

A: The hymen was tall-thick with S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.

complete laceration at 4:00 o'clock

215
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni
nangyari? ATE MARIA.

S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, 30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang

araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-
matandaan kung anong petsa, basta negra?
araw ng Linggo.
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, siya?
Valenzuela, M.M.
S: Natatakot po ako.
22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng
batang babae na ni rape mo?
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?

S: Hindi ko po alam.
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong
masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa
iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA.
na iyong ni rape at pinatay ay si MA.
VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa
VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo
poso-negra?
ha ito?

S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung

S: Oho.
pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa
poso-negra.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka
ba?
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong
krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
S: Naka-isa po.
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo
kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling
"NAKARAOS", maaari bang
gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA
ipaliwanag mo ito?
CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o patay na?

S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.

S: Buhay pa po.

26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan

36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
parte na katawan ng batang babae
yung iyong ari?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.21
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung
babae. In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's
vagina; rather the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ
is enough to consummate the sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA.
male's organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman's
VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang
private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
sumunod mong ginawa?

From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
indeed employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant's own
account, he pushed the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious
VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile invasion,
terrace? was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not given free and
voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which
he, however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra
But his contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer
na sinasabi mo?
who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-
interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer:

216
Q — Will you please inform the A — If I am not mistaken at around
Court what was that call about? 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon,
sir.
A — We went to the station, police
investigation together with Atty. Q — And when this question and
Froilan Zapanta and we were told by answer period started, what was the
Police Officer Alabastro that one first thing that you did as assisting
Larry Mahinay would like to confess lawyer to the accused?
of the crime of, I think, rape with
homicide.
A — First, I tried to explain to him
his right, sir, under the constitution.
Q — And upon reaching the
investigation room of Valenzuela PNP
Q — What are those right?
who were the other person present?

A — That he has the right to remain

A — Police Officer Alabastro, sir,
silent. That he has the right of a
Police Officer Nacis and other
counsel of his own choice and that if
investigator inside the investigation
he has no counsel a lawyer will be
room and the parents of the child who
appointed to him and that he has the
was allegedly raped.
right to refuse to answer any question
that would incriminate him.
Q — And when you reached the
investigation room do you notice
Q — Now, after enumerating these
whether the accused already there?
constitutional rights of accused Larry
Mahinay, do you recall whether this
A — The accused was already there. constitutional right enumerated by
you were reduced in writing?
Q — Was he alone?
A — Yes, sir, and it was also
explained to him one by one by Police
A — He was alone, sir.
Officer Alabastro.

Q — So, when you were already

Q — I show to you this constitutional
infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and
right which you said were reduced
the other PNP Officers, what did they
into writing, will you be able to
tell you, if any?
recognize the same?

A — They told us together with Atty.

A — Yes, sir.
Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay
would like to confess of the crime
charged, sir. Q — Will you please go over this and
tell the Court whether that is the same
document you mentioned?
Q — By the way, who was that Atty.
Zapanta?
A — Yes, sir, these were the said
rights reduced into writing.
A — Our immediate Superior of the
Public Attorney's Office.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
Q — Was he also present at the start
of the question and answer period to May we request, Your Honor, that this
the accused? document be marked as our Exhibit
A. proper.
A — No more, sir, he already went to
our office. I was left alone. Q — Do you recall after reducing into
writing this constitutional right of the
accused whether you asked him to
Q — But he saw the accused, Larry
sign to acknowledge or to conform?
Mahinay?

A — I was the one who asked him,

A — Yes, sir.
sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.

Q — Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at

Q — But you were present?
what time did the question and answer
period start?

217
A — I was then present when he A — I had also explained to him, sir.
signed.
Q — In Filipino?
Q — There is a signature in this
constitutional right after the
A — In Tagalog, sir.
enumeration, before and after there
are two (2) signatures, will you please
recognize the two (2) signatures? Q — And there is also a signature
after the waiver in Filipino over the
typewritten name Larry Mahinay,
A — These were the same signatures
"Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is
signed in my presence, sir.
that?

Q — The signature of whom?

A — This is also signed in my
presence.
A — The signature of Larry Mahinay,
sir.
Q — Why are you sure that this is his
signature?
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
A — He signed in my presence, sir.
May we request, Your Honor, that the
two (2) signatures identified by my
Q — And below immediately are the
compañero be encircled and marked
two (2) signatures. The first one is
as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
when Larry Mahinay subscribed and
sworn to, there is a signature here, do
Q — After you said that you apprised you recognize this signature?
the accused of his constitutional right
explaining to him in Filipino, in local
A — This is my signature, sir.
dialect, what was the respond of the
accused?
Q — And immediately after your first
signature is a Certification that you
A — Larry Mahinay said that we will
have personally examined the accused
proceed with his statement.
Larry Mahinay and testified that he
voluntary executed the Extra Judicial
Q — What was the reply? Confession, do you recognize the
signature?
A — He said "Opo".
A — This is also my signature, sir.23
(emphasis supplied).
Q — Did you ask him of his
educational attainment?
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the
victim and forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of
A — It was the Police Officer who
Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of New Jersey, 24
asked him.

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the

Q — In your presence?
mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself -
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
A — In my presence, sir. can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have
no test or the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.
Q — And when he said or when he Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous,
replied "Opo" so the question started? and is outside of judicial cognizance.

A — Yes, sir. Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses.
Settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of
Q — I noticed in this Exhibit A that witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of
there is also a waiver of rights, were having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
you present also when he signed this deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
waiver? appellate courts.25 In this case, the trial court's findings, conclusions and evaluation
of the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, 26 the
same being supported by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing
A — Yes, sir, I was also present. that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances
which when considered would have affected the outcome of this case 27 or justify a
Q — Did you explain to him the departure from the assessments and findings of the court below. The absence of
meaning of this waiver? any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses for the prosecution

218
all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists. 28 Neither was Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was
any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant. attended by one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the
Civil Code38 after proof that the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and
compensatory damages. 39 Under the circumstances of this case, appellant is liable
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct.
to the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"when by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death." This special complex crime is treated by law in the same degree as
qualified rape - that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) "attendant circumstances" Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the
enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as
death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties
penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the
which will affect the imposition of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 53 time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance with the Constitution,
of the RPC However, if any of those circumstances proven but not alleged cannot jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our law-
be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the same enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called
cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63 of the RPC in Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in
mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and the light of new legal developments:
15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the
information/complaint, it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is
1. The person arrested, detained,
not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, in which case
invited or under custodial
the only penalty is death - subject to the usual proof of such circumstance in either
investigation must be informed in a
case.
language known to and understood by
him of the reason for the arrest and he
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for must be shown the warrant of arrest, if
the crime of "rape with homicide", the court has no option but to apply the same any; Every other warnings,
"regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended information or communication must
the commission of the crime" 29 in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as be in a language known to and
amended. 30 This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty of death which understood by said person;
is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides:
2. He must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent and that
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it anystatement he makes may be used
must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty as evidence against him;
person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of
3. He must be informed that he has
age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by
the right to be assisted at all times and
the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not
have the presence of an independent
obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which
and competent lawyer, preferably of
cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
his own choice;

(emphasis supplied).
4. He must be informed that if he has
no lawyer or cannot afford the
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, services of a lawyer, one will be
appellant tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few provided for him; and that a lawyer
months old at the time he committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription may also be engaged by any person in
on the imposition of death if the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years at the his behalf, or may be appointed by the
time of the commission of the crime.31 Again, the record rebuffs appellant on this court upon petition of the person
point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of age when arrested or one acting in his behalf;
he did the heinous act.
5. That whether or not the person
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity arrested has a lawyer, he must be
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or informed that no custodial
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is investigation in any form shall be
authorized by present amended law, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be not conducted except in the presence of
less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).32 In addition to such his counsel or after a valid waiver has
indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the been made;
Civil Code 33 in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from the award
6. The person arrested must be
of moral and exemplary damages. 35 The requirement of proof of mental and
informed that, at any time, he has the
physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with
right to communicate or confer by the
because it is "recognized that the victim's injury is inherently concomitant with and
most expedient means - telephone,
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of
radio, letter or messenger - with his
moral damages". 36 Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the
lawyer (either retained or appointed),
award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the
any member of his immediate family,
basis thereof. 37
or any medical doctor, priest or
minister chosen by him or by any one
from his immediate family or by his

219
 counsel, or be visited by/confer with Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
duly accredited national or Panganiban, Quisumbing, Martinez, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes,
international non-government JJ., concur.
organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;

7. He must be informed that he has

the right to waive any of said rights
provided it is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently and
ensure that he understood the same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested

waives his right to a lawyer, he must
be informed that it must be done in
writing AND in the presence of
counsel, otherwise, he must be
warned that the waiver is void even if
he insist on his waiver and chooses to
speak;

9. That the person arrested must be

informed that he may indicate in any
manner at any time or stage of the
process that he does not wish to be
questioned with warning that once he
makes such indication, the police may
not interrogate him if the same had
not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has
already begun;

10. The person arrested must be

informed that his initial waiver of his
right to remain silent, the right to
counsel or any of his rights does not
bar him from invoking it at any time
during the process, regardless of
whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some
statements;

11. He must also be informed that any

statement or evidence, as the case may
be, obtained in violation of any of the
foregoing, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.

Four members of the Court — although maintaining their adherence to the separate
opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional — nevertheless submit to the
ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the
death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the

award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to
P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of

the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case
be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

220