Issues: Whether or Not Petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay Is Entitled To A Writ of Mandamus To

Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two (2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to
Atty. Eliseo Pitargue (Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task Force, concerning
information on former President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Jose Mario C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag), demanding payment of
25% informer's reward on the P118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the
Philippine government through compromise agreements with the Marcoses. He also
insisted on the need for the government to collect Fortune Tobacco Corporation's tax
deficiencies.
On January 10, 2008, Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

(President Macapagal-Arroyo), insisting on the need to recover the Marcos' wealth that
he identified and his corresponding entitlement to an informer's reward.
Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August 11, 2009,
reiterating his entitlement to an informer's reward.
On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official
actions on his letters, Lihaylihay filed the present Petition dubbed a Petition for
"Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment."
Insisting on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and
Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him the amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00;
that the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him
several government lands; and that the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be
ordered to garnish in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from
former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
Issues:
whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to

compel respondents then Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan.
Ruling:
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original
jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed
without exhausting administrative remedies, in violation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing amounts to an
act of forum shopping.
This Petition should clearly be denied.

Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spells out the parameters for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus:
Section 3. Petition for mandamus.
- When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time
to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a
prospective entitlement that is yet to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, this
Court emphasized that "[m]andamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to
enforce one that is already established."
In Pefianco v. Moral,... this Court underscored that a writ of mandamus "never issues in
doubtful cases."
Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act
mandated by law. Clear in the text of Rule 65, Section 3 is the requirement that
respondents "unlawfully neglect" the performance of a duty. The mere existence of a
legally mandated duty or the pendency of its performance does not suffice.
The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary.
This Court distinguished discretionary functions from ministerial duties, and related the
exercise of discretion to judicial and quasi-judicial powers. In Sanson v. Barrios:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of
their own judgments and consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of
others.
A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an

officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of
discretion of an inferior tribunal, when the act complained of is either judicial or quasi-
judicial.
It is the proper remedy when the case presented is outside of the exercise of judicial
discretion.
Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it, is shown that "there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65, i.e., certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus.
A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another "plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Furthermore, this is, of course, is the processing of his claims by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Department of Finance, and their final resolution by the Secretary of
Finance.
Petitioner's own recollection of antecedents reveals his initial attempt at complying with
the prescribed procedure with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, but also his own
impatience for these pending proceedings. This Court cannot indulge his impetuosity for
proceedings in progress. It cannot legitimize a manifest attempt at infringing statutorily
institutionalized processes.
The availability of a more basic recourse ahead of a Petition for Mandamus before this
Court similarly demonstrates that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
This Court's competence to issue writs of mandamus does not also mean that petitioner
was free to come to this Court and ignore the concurrent jurisdiction of inferior courts
equally competent to entertain petitions for mandamus.
It is basic that although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum"
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Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two (2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to

On January 10, 2008, Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to

This Petition should clearly be denied.

A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an

A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another "plain,

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