Atlantic Council: This Content Downloaded From 110.54.237.197 On Tue, 19 May 2020 11:26:14 UTC
Atlantic Council: This Content Downloaded From 110.54.237.197 On Tue, 19 May 2020 11:26:14 UTC
Atlantic Council: This Content Downloaded From 110.54.237.197 On Tue, 19 May 2020 11:26:14 UTC
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Technology’s Role
in Political Decay
The life-changing benefits of high technology often come with damaging side
effects and abuses. This paradox is certainly evident at the intersection of modern
digital communications, data science, and politics. Information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) is disrupting every aspect of human experience. Politics
and governance are no exception. At its best, ICT can foster a better-informed
electorate and greater participation in the political process. Data science can bring
new, evidence-based discipline to policy decision-making, while helping identify
poor proposals and faulty appeals. New communication tools enable candidates
to connect directly with voters without requiring huge sums of money, and bring
greater transparency and enhanced citizen activism. The dark side is that high
technology is arming partisans with powerful new tools to manipulate the public,
and creating social practices and norms that reinforce the political system’s most
damaging pathologies.
In sum, in the words of social-media strategist Clay Shirky, “Whereas the phone
gave us the one-to-one pattern, and television, radio, magazines, books, gave us
the one-to-many pattern, the internet gives us the many-to-many pattern.”100 This
means we can all be journalists, commentators, and information providers quickly
and at scale. The public does not need to wait to hear how trained journalists
deliver the news; we can get it from one another. Politicians can go around their
parties and sidestep the mainstream media to speak directly to the public through
social media. The question is whether the Internet’s elimination of longstanding
guardrails will broaden the boulevards of democracy, or send us careening over the
cliff of irresponsibility and misinformation.
Few topics excite as much spirited debate as the proper limits for how personal
digital information can, and should, be used by third parties. Americans’ personal
electronic data, anonymized or not, is continuously collected and processed to
learn: how they live and think; where they go, virtually and physically; and what
they do, buy, and value. Marketers of goods and services are not alone in studying
individual tastes and behaviors; political marketers are doing so as well. The lessons
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Whither America? A Strategy for Repairing America’s Political Culture
The insight is why, as a CNN feature story on the practice of microtargeting pro-
nounced, “campaigns know you better than you know yourself.”107 The capabilities
have taken on quasi-Orwellian overtones. Algorithms can help political operatives
and issue advocates determine not only whom to target, but what, how, when, and
where to target them to achieve maximum persuasive effect—even to the extent of
pinpointing swing neighborhoods and households in critical election battlegrounds.
Before the era of computerized campaign analytics, the key to victory was winning
over a larger share of the political center than one’s opponent. No longer. The
data-driven ability to microtarget makes mobilizing the base the favored strategy.
Thanks to big data and microtargeting, say Chuck Todd and Carrie Dann, law-
makers have concluded with electoral evidence, “that they don’t need the center
or swing voters to win.”108 Such calculation is yet another factor driving rhetorical
stridence, and the polarization of the public and its elected bodies.
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Computerized Pandering
One might argue that greater understanding by political parties of the public
and its preferences is pro-democracy. That is decidedly not the case when the
knowledge is used to more effectively pit groups against one another for partisan
gain, to pander to potential supporters, or to suppress an opponent’s advocates
by alienating them from the political process with just the right message. Wired,
a publication that follows the cultural effects of emerging technologies, observed,
“It’s no secret that politicians pander. They cling to trite concepts and overused
buzzwords because they’ve got polls, focus groups, and an ever-growing deluge
of data from social media sites telling them that those terms are the ones we want
to hear.”109 The age-old practice is among democracy’s profoundest vulnerabilities.
It is also one that has become exponentially easier to practice thanks to the nich-
ification of media and social networks that prepackage identity groups enabling
parties, politicians, and issue advocates to target and tell precisely them what they
want to hear.
Public opinion polls, however, show that Americans do not like micro-pandering.
In a survey conducted by the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School of
Communications, 86 percent of the respondents said they do not want political
advertising tailored to their interests.110 Moreover, “Sixty-four percent said their
support for a candidate would decrease if they found out a candidate was micro-
targeting them differently than their neighbor. The study also found that 20% more
respondents reacted more strongly to political targeting than they did to being
targeted as a consumer.”111 One wonders what the polling response would be if
the respondents were informed that technology is not only telling politicians what
topics strike home with different individuals, but is on the cusp of telling politicians
precisely what to say, either to gain a person’s support or to alienate his or her
support for an opponent.
The advance of data and behavioral science will bolster campaign analytics, in-
fluencing every step in the political marketing process—but at what price to the
integrity of the democratic process?112
With so much information rushing at people constantly, the speed and brevity
of messaging are at a premium. One hundred-forty character tweets, disappear-
ing Snapchat images, and soundbites that have shrunk to nine seconds cannot
possibly provide a distracted public audience with the just treatment needed to
cope responsibly with modernity’s complex issues.113 As a 2015 Microsoft study
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Whither America? A Strategy for Repairing America’s Political Culture
When Internet political appeals are not seeking to command attention by overtly
inflaming partisan passions, they must, experts say, provide “entertainment.”
Vincent Harris, a top Republican operative with deep expertise in how politicians
can most effectively harness the Internet and social networks for advantage, says
that politicians must figure out how to get noticed in a “twenty-four-second news
cycle.” To do this, says Harris, a politician must be entertaining, unique, and visual.
$3,278.25
FORECAST
$1,990.36
$1076.71
$725.74
$159.21 $71.16
$22.25 $5.39 $14.08 $2.72 $18.02 $11.90
$480.04
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (P) 2016 (P) 2017 (P) 2018 (P) 2019 (P) 2020 (P)
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL
This may be true, and cartooning, which is devoted almost exclusively to satire and
criticism, has an important place in the analysis and commentary about politics.
When it is practiced by politicians seeking to score points, it invariably trivializes
issues and opponents, cheapening the quality of national debate. No matter what
damage it may do, it creates buzz. And as Harris points out, “Buzz online equals
money online. Money online equals money off-line. Money off-line equals GOTV
(get out the vote), which equals votes. This is a very close-knit, tied-together
thing.”115
The more the country’s politics are conducted in the virtual domain, rather than
eye to eye, the worse political trolling will get. Study after study shows that people
tend to speak more crudely, extremely, and disrespectfully online. Psychologists
have labeled this phenomenon the “online disinhibition effect.” Author Farhad
Manjoo describes it as phenomenon “in which factors like anonymity, invisibility, a
lack of authority and not communicating in real time strip away the mores society
spent millennia building. And it’s seeping from our smartphones into every aspect
of our lives.”116 In sum, though today’s issues are highly nuanced—requiring deeper
dialogue and understanding—the political debate is getting shorter, shallower,
and inaner. The more this happens, and the nastier the nation’s political squabbles
become, the more that good people will withdraw.
The Millennial generation (those born between the early 1980s and 2000s) sur-
passed the Baby Boomer generation to become the largest generational grouping,
with nearly seventy-five million people. They have come of age using digital com-
munication devices. Three-quarters of them get their news online and through
social media.117 The penetration of web-connected devices—phones, tablets, and
laptops—and the staggering amount of time Americans use them are giving
campaign strategists and political marketers unprecedented opportunities to con-
tinuously message and influence Americans.
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Whither America? A Strategy for Repairing America’s Political Culture
As many withdraw to the sanctuary of their own social networks, they tend to
seek out and associate with those who see the world as they do, Facebooking
with those they know, and Twittering and Instagramming with the like-minded.120
Parochial social networks can create an echo chamber that amplifies group views
and biases, and reinforces political schema.121 Moreover, electronic flocking enables
the political industry to microtarget messaging that further reinforces parochial
viewpoints and biases. As Wired noted, “Social media…gives campaigns a good
sense of which topics are most correlated with favorable or unfavorable conversa-
tion about a candidate.”122 In the book Connected, Nicholas Christakis and James
Fowler explore how social media invite the tendency to seek out information and
people who align with one’s own beliefs—a phenomenon that social scientists have
labeled “homophily.”123 Their studies say that “social media networks concretize
what is seen in offline social networks, as well—birds of a feather flock together.
This segregation often leads to citizens only consuming news that strengthens the
ideology of them and their peers.”124
One might think that the diversity of information on the Internet broadens
the debate and exposes people to a diversity of opinion. Indeed, more recent
studies question the power of the echo chamber, but the Pew Research Center,
which gathers statistics and analyzes online behavior, found that users who are
more ideological tend to be more politically active on social media.125 Moreover,
numerous studies by psychologists and social scientists show “that when confront-
ed with diverse information choices, people rarely act like rational, civic-minded
automatons. Instead, we are roiled by preconceptions and biases, and we usually
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL
do what feels easiest—we gorge on information that confirms our ideas, and we
shun what does not.”126 Indeed, studies show that not even very accurate online
fact-checking tools help clear the air.127 People believe what they want to believe,
and there are plenty of places in social networks and on the Internet to find some-
thing that helps them believe it.
Last April, former FBI Agent Clint Watts testified before the Senate Intelligence
Committee that Russia used bots “to spread false news using accounts that seem
to be Midwestern swing-voter Republicans.” The purpose was to influence real Mid-
western swing-voter Republicans by, as Watts said, “amplifying the message in the
ecosystem.”132 Per Bloomberg, electronic forensics found that nearly half of Trump’s
Twitter followers were electronic phantoms created by bots.133
This includes Russian government bots, which have continued to cyber meddle in
US political affairs since the 2016 presidential election. Bona-fide public opinion is
the linchpin of representative democracy. When it is misrepresented, or artificially
formed through electronic phantoms created at scale by partisan or foreign ma-
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Whither America? A Strategy for Repairing America’s Political Culture
nipulators, the integrity and legitimacy of the system is undermined. The misuse of
technology is charting new paths for deceiving the public.
In a report on the future of political dirty tricks and deception online, author Julian
Sanchez predicted, “Taking a cue from phishing con artists, political scammers
might seek to hijack or spoof the official sites of campaigns or local election boards,
giving their misinformation an added veneer of credibility. Similarly, spoofed e-mails
could be employed to persuade recipients that information is coming from a trusted
source. In addition to conventional denial of service attacks, the Internet might
also be used to facilitate distributed phone-jamming, of the sort often used to
disrupt get-out-the-vote efforts.”136 An endless roster of online trickery—spoofing,
spamming, and hacking—are at the fingertips not only of official campaign political
operatives, but also of surrogates and rogue operators wishing to game or manipu-
late the system. Almost anyone with a modicum of online savvy can make mischief
at scale. Examples from recent elections include a fictitious 2007 email showing
Democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama swearing his oath as a US senator
on the Quran and a phony 2008 photo of Republican vice-presidential nominee
Sarah Palin brandishing a rifle while wearing a US flag.137 138 For further explanation of
tactics used in making online ads divisive, please see the Appendix.
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ATLANTIC COUNCIL
The cyber world is prowled by many predators, foreign and domestic, hiding
anonymously in the digital back alleys from remote and safe locations for malign
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Whither America? A Strategy for Repairing America’s Political Culture
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