myREVIEWnotes

CONSITUTIONAL LAW

THE CONSTITUTION

Preamble
Is the preamble of the constitution a source of a substantive right for purposes of applying
article 8 section 1? (duty of the court to settle actual controversies) – it does not create
right; it does not create any legally demandable right; does not create substantive right; it
introduces the constitution, those embedded principles; the authors of the constitution
(people) in their sovereign capacity.

travaux preparatoire - In interpreting treaties it is often permissible to consult preparatory

materials, usually in the event of their being an ambiguity. Sometimes a treaty may make
specific reference to some foundation report and that maybe resorted to as an aid.

In int’l law, they make use of preambular clause

Written constitution – look into the intent at the time of the enactment

Interpret a certain word/law in the context on the way it was drafted at the time of its
enactment; respect the intendment of the author

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: Ways to interpret the Constitution

1. Verba legis – Wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Art X Sec 6
Shift of principle is considered a revision
Saguisag vs Ochoa – entry of military but already in the Phils.; entry stated in the
constitution (re-entry?)

2. Ratio legis est anima – Where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.

Francisco vs HOR –
Art. XI – deliberation of constitutional commissioners
Enter into treaty by the Pres. requires 2/3 concurrence by the Congress; how
about in withdrawing by the Pres.?

Pangilinan case
Treaty has a status of a law but not a law; IRR has a force and effect of a law but
not a law;
Art VII sec 17 – execution of laws
 3. Ut magis valeat quampereat – The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
-don’t interpret provision of the constitution isolatedly; relate provision of the
constitution with the other provision in the constitution

Villanueva case: Judges appointed during election ban; SC unanimously nullify

appointment; prohibition under art VII also applies to judiciary
De Castro vs JBC – Villanueva ruling is stray; prohibition under art VII does not
apply under art VIII

Essential Parts of Constitution

1. Constitution of Sovereignty – Provisions pointing out the modes or procedure in
accordance with which formal changes in the Constitution may be made(1987
Constitution, Art. XVII).

2. Constitution of Liberty – Series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental

civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the power of
the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights(1987
Constitution, Art. III).

How do you construe? Strictly against the state. Bill of Rights can be invoked only
against the state or its agents? Yes…

“Color of Authority”

3. Constitution of Government– Provides for a structure and system of government;

provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its
powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the
electorate [1987 Constitution, Art. VI (Legislative Dep’t); Art. VII (Exec. Dep’t)];
Art. VIII (Judicial Dep’t); Art. IX (Constitutional Commissions)].

How do you interpret provisions – liberal construction in favor of state

sovereignty

Speech is the index of intention- go back to the time the law was enacted

Respect the intendment of the author – go back to the time the law was enacted

What is living tree doctrine?

Living Tree Doctrine - is a doctrine of constitutional interpretation that says that a
constitution is organic and must be read in a broad and progressive manner so as to
adapt it to the changing times.

The Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void
and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])

Self-executing and Non-self-executing Provisions of the Constitution

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. (Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])

Provisions of the Constitution are presumed to be Self-executing

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional

mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 [1997] [Bellosillo])

What is political law? public law that deals with the organization and operations of the
governmental organs of the State and defines its relations with the inhabitants of the
territory

Do you consider criminal law a political law

Is criminal law considered a municipal law

In succession of states, is the successor state bound with the succeeded state?
 Macariola vs Asuncion
- Is the judge prohibited in acquiring property that is under litigation? Yes
- Is the judge prohibited under the code of commerce? Yes
- is the code of commerce still effective? No:
- what is the classification of the commerce of law? In the case it is a political law;
If it is a political law, the successor state is not bound, but if it is a municipal law,
the successor state is still bound
- if it is a criminal law and is a municipal law, the successor state is bound

If there is already judgment and to be executed, during the interregnum , there is change
of state, is the judgment prior to the change of state effectual? Yes
 Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh
- It partakes the nature of civil law- a municipal law, it is still effectual
  People vs Perfecto
- Do you consider crime of libel a political law or criminal law? SC: Both
- Political law and there is succession of state – the law is ineffectual
- Whether or not it is a political law or non-political law (civil, simple municipal
law); if it is POLITICAL LAW and there is a change of state, the successor state is
NOT bound by the obligation of the predecessor state, unless the successor states
adopts the former state

What if the subject matter is political, is there a case when a successor state is still
bound to a former state? Yes
 Laurel vs Misa
- Judgment on Treason –the judgment is still effectual
- If the political law have created territorial boundaries
Clean Slate Doctrine
- In connection with state succession, a rule by which a successor state generally
does not inherit the prior treaty rights or obligations of a predecessor state.
- Exception: Vienna Convention on the succession of state where
this political law have created territorial boundaries; XPN to XPN: revolutionary
government

SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASSIFYING A LAW WHETHER IT IS POLITICAL OR NOT

All Political laws are deemed abrogated by operation of law; laws are not mandatory or
obligatory to the succession state
XPN Masa case on treason; creation of territorial boundaries (change of state does not
negate the obligation); expressly adopted by the successor state
XPN to XPN – if revolutionary state is the successor state; reason: extra constitutional

Three Essential Parts of a Good Constitution

4. Constitution of Sovereignty – Provisions pointing out the modes or procedure in

accordance with which formal changes in the Constitution may be made (1987
Constitution, Art. XVII).

5. Constitution of Liberty – Series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental

civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the power of
the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights(1987
Constitution, Art. III). All rights in the constitution
- Bill of Rights

6. Constitution of Government– Provides for a structure and system of government;

provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its
powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration and defining the
electorate [1987 Constitution, Art. VI (Legislative Dep’t); Art. VII (Exec. Dep’t)];
Art. VIII (Judicial Dep’t); Art. IX (Constitutional Commissions)].
SELF-EXECUTING AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS

Self-executing provision
Provision which is complete by itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected; nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Do you consider Art XII Sec. 2 par 2 a self-executing provision?

In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State SHALL give preference to qualified Filipinos – FILIPINO FIRST
POLICY; mandatory provision that creates an obligation that creates a right

 Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Why is this provision considered self-executing provision
- The text of the constitution SHALL give a mandatory provision
- Whether or not Manila Prince Hotel is a cultural property falling under the
doctrine of cultural heritage? Yes, manila prince hotel mirrors out the Filipino
culture

 Knights of Rizal vs DMCI (J. Carpio)

- Is the Rizal monument considered a cultural property? Yes

- Is the sightline to Rizal Monument considered cultural property? No

In Venice Charter, sightline is considered as cultural property

Is Venice Charter a Treaty? Yes; when does a country be bound by a Treaty? When the
country is a signatory
 Is Venice Charter an executory provision in our constitution? No; Why? – the
Philippines is not a signatory to the Venice Charter; Venice Charter is neither a
customary law and therefore the Philippines is not bound

Knights of Rizal vs DMCI (2016): injunction filed in the SC- converted it to mandamus to
assume jurisdiction. Whether or not the court should issue a writ of mandamus against
the City Officials to stop the construction of Torre de Manila. RULING: No, The SC ruled
that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project. It was not even
considered as contrary to morals, customs and public order.

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY CLAUSE - Constitution is the fundamental and

supreme law of the land; any and all acts of the legislative or the executive in
contravention to the constitution is null and void, and without any force and effect.

Judge made decision – the decision is deemed incorporated at the time the law was
enacted (judicial interpretation)
doctrinal pronouncement - effectivity is at the time of the promulgation of the court
(prospective in nature)
a law enacted in 2002- questioned in 2008 -declared by SC unconstitutional in 2010=
DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENT

- What is the effect of the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the law in 2010,
when will the effect be applicable – 2010 and above or 2002?
- Interpretation of what the law is –JUDGE MADE DECISION
- Prospective in Nature – DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENT; XPN: Operative Fact
Doctrine

Pro Hac Vice ruling – ruling of court is applicable only on the present case (on this
occasion only); cannot be used as precedent
- De Castro vs JBC
- Hacienda Luisita Inc. vs PARC (2nd ruling)

 Imbong vs Ferrer (page 9 of Nachura Book)

- ¾ votes is not required for the implementation of any
Doctrine of Constituency
- Constitutional creature (constitutional assembly) are independent but not
separate

 Macalintal vs COMELEC, PET

- PET is an independent but not a separate body
 Planas vs COMELEC
- Already moot and academic because of supervening facts

WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION CONFERS OR CONFIRMS RIGHTS

Will the constitution recognizes rights?

 Republic vs Sandiganbayan, Dimaano
- Unreasonable search and seizure during the time of revolutionary government
- Ousting of Pres Marcos during the revolutionary government, time without
Constitution

SC: rights not founded on the constitution but on the ICPPR and UDHR – Doctrine on
Incorporation (Article II Section 2)

(Under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda ICPPR as international law; we are bound to
recognize- accdg to Atty Rafa)

Impeachable Officers are removed by impeachment

- 1973 constitution – 10 magistrates of the SC; 9 were asked to give courtesy
recognition; is the action of Pres Cory Aquino constitutional or not?
- Impeachable officer with security of tenure vested in its office given by the
Constitution
- How did Pres Cory Aquino assumed office – Revolutionary Govt – extra
constitutional
 - Is the act of Pres Aquino constitutional in removing the SC justices? Yes –
Freedom Constitution
- Therefore, RIGHTS IS CONFERRED BY THE CONSTITUTION
 League of Justice case

Effectivity of Constitution
 De Leon vs Esguerra
- February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite, when the people ratified the
Constitution
- Brgy appointed as OIC before 1987 constitution and Brgy Official elected; the
latter is constitutional

 Rama vs Moses
- Charter of Cebu City is unconstitutional

 Yinlu Mining
- Rights was recognized

The constitution espouses the genuine local autonomy.

 Yin Lu Mining Corp. vs Trans Oil Mining Co.: Yin Lu previously granted mining
patent (1902); Art. 4 of CC-cannot impair vested right
 Rama case: no reservation in the constitution; Yin Lu case: with reservation,
without prejudice to the vested rights.

Landmark Case: decided under 1935 constitution ANGARA vs ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of
the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not
been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National
Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its
own resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner
sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied
his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time
as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have
been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Decision of electoral tribunal appealed to SC? 1935 – none, 1973 constitution-none

SC assumed jurisdiction under Art. VIII Sec. 1, line 2

The duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights, which are
legally demandable and enforceable (1935) and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government [1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec.
1(2)].

Everybody is supreme over their own sphere (Executive, Legislative, Judiciary)

Judiciary – not asserting the supremacy over the other branches of the
government, only assertive on the right of the people codified and textualize in
the constitution. - Constitutional Supremacy Clause
What is the difference between and Amendment and a Revision

Amendment vs revision

BASIS AMENDMENT REVISION

Definition An isolated or piecemeal change A revamp or rewriting of the whole
by adding, deleting, or reducing instrument, altering the
without altering the basic substantial entirety of the
principles involved. Constitution.

Tests to determine whether a proposed change is an amendment or a revision

1. Quantitative test – Asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions
as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions.

2. Qualitative test – Asks whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes
in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. (Lambino v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)

 Lambino vs COMELEC
qualitative test – not the number of provisions that may be changed, look into the
framework of the constitution that may be changed
quantitative test- substantial entirety threshold, number of words

Lambino vs COMELEC –
-bicameral to unicameral – by qualitative test, it is a revision

revision - falls outside the power of the people’s initiative; peoples initiative can only be
made if it is an amendment

SC: Lambino case is a gigantic fraud; the proposal was not presented to the people
although the people signed; it’s unconstitutional; It was asked if the proposal was
presented and was admitted; no issue of fact because it was already admitted; no need
for evidence

Javellana vs Exec Sec. –

Did the SC looked into the surrounding circumstances? No.
Carpio: the Lambino ruling in effect modifies the ruling in Javellana case

In Javellana, there is allegation of fraud but was not proved.

Peoples initiative on amendment of the constitution– 12% of the total registered voters
from 3% of the registered voted in the legislative district

Initiative applicable to legislation; enactment of law - 10% and 3%

-not self-executing
RA 6735, incomplete for the purpose of peoples initiative, but for purposes of enacting
an ordinance/law, it is complete

RA 6735 is INADEQUATE in covering the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution

(2014 Bar)
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to amend. The people are
not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." Secondly, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed" denotes that RA 6735 excludes initiative on the amendments of the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of
the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If RA 6735 were intended to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative
on national and local laws.

While RA 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local
laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Defensor-
Santiago v. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)

Log Rolling provision (log rolling hodgepodge) – proposed amendment has provision
that it could still be amended; violation of one title, one subject rule

Change of one word in the constitution: is it an amendment or revision? It depends. If

the change is a change of the basic principle of the constitution, it is a revision.

Voting requirement - MEMORIZE

BASIS CONSTITUENT CONSTITUTIONAL PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE

ASSEMBLY (ConAss) CONVENTION (ConCon)
How proposed By Congress, acting as 1. By Congress, upon a By the people, upon a
Constituent Assembly vote of 2/3 of ALL its petition thru a plebiscite
upon a vote of ¾ of ALL members (to call for a (at least 12% of the
its members (2014 Bar) ConCon); OR TOTAL number of
NOTE: Although the law is 2. By Congress, upon a registered voters, of which
silent on whether the majority vote of ALL its every legislative district
voting is done separately members to submit to the must be represented by
or jointly, the prevailingElectorate the question of 3% of the registered
view is for separate voting
calling a ConCon voters therein (1987
as the Congress is (+Plebiscite) (1987 Constitution, Art. XVII, Sec.
bicameral. Constitution, Art. XVII, Sec. 2) (+Full text of the
3) proposed amendments
NOTE: Although the law is attached in the petition)
silent on whether the NOTE: No amendment
voting is done separately shall be authorized more
or jointly, the prevailing than once every five years
view is for separate voting thereafter.
as the Congress is
bicameral.
Coverage Amendment or Revision Amendment ONLY
Legal Questions (Subject to 1. Manner of Proposal; or Propositions can be
Judicial Review) 2. Manner of calling ConCon declared null and void for
- This is a case where Congress, acting as a violation of the
ConAss, calls for a ConCon but does not Constitution.
provide details for the calling of such ConCon,
and Congress, in exercising its ordinary
legislative power, may supply such details.
Political Questions Substance of the proposal.
Whether ConAss or ConCon should initiate the amendment or revision.
Limits No amendment be authorized oftener than once every
5 years (1987 Constitution, Art. XVII, Sec. 2).

Ratification
Amendments or revisions to the Constitution by Constituent Assembly or Constitutional Convention shall
be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Amendments by People’s Initiative shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the certification by the
COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition.

Requisites for a valid Ratification

1. Held in a plebiscite conducted under the Election Law;
2. Supervised by COMELEC; and
3. Only registered voters take part.

Doctrine of Proper Submission

Under this doctrine, there should be no piece-meal submission to the people of proposed amendments to
the Constitution. This is to enable them to make an intelligent appraisal thereof. (Tolentino v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-34150, October16, 1971)

Initiative
It is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation.

Referendum
It is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for that purpose.

Initiative vs. INITIATIVE REFERENDUM

Referendum (2000 Bar)
BASIS
Extent 1. Propose amendments to the Approve or reject legislation
Constitution;
2. Propose and enact legislation.

MEMORIZE: Different classes of Votes

Determination or manner of voting – justiciable or political question?

Publication, voting and Quorum requirements – justiciable issues

Avelino vs Cuenco – quorum

Can the congress amend or revise the constitution? Art. XVII. NO, can only proposed
amendment or revision of the constitution
People initiative- sufficient and adequate for a people’s initiative

Art. XVII . Doctrine of proper submission (Gonzales vs COMELEC) – the constitution

itself prescribes the time frame within which the plebiscite is to be held –not earlier
than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or
the constitutional convention.

Tolentino vs COMELEC : no piece-meal amendment

What is the Power of Judicial Review? The power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution.

Judicial Power includes:

-Duty of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Expanded power of the Judiciary – Certiorari power of Supreme Court

Certiorari under Rule 65 – applies in court exercising quasi
Certiorari under Art. VIII –

Holy Spirit Homeowners vs Sec. Defensor case: IRR – petition for prohibition under Rule
65, Sec 2; court dismissed on procedural grounds because Rule 65 applies in the court
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

Jardaleza vs Sereno: integrity question – unanimity of votes is required

Facial Objection Test – objection is erroneous application of the law which

amounts to grave abuse of discretion

Certiorari – jurisdictional question; grave abuse of discretion

Error on the interpretation of law – error of judgement- certiorari will not lie, appeal
will lie

Who may exercise Judicial Power? SC and in such lower courts as may be established by
law

Family Court (designated) – RTC (court of general jurisdiction)– Garcia vs Drilon –

validity of RA 9262- may exercise judicial power

Can CTA exercise constitutional question on tax law?

CTA may entertain certiorari
Bu. Of Customs vs Vernadera –
Constitutionality of tax law – SOJ – certiorari in CTA – has full and complete jurisdiction

What is Political question? Outside the pale of judicial review; question of policy
 - It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government. Or any branch of the government.

Vinuya vs Executive Secretary: whether the Phil. Gov’t should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government (Japan)- a political question; the wisdom of such
a decision is not for the courts to question.

Constitution gave the power to executive or legislative – political question; full

discretionary authority; Only on grave abuse of discretion that same shall be judicial
question

Who determines the integrity of the nominees of the Judiciary? Judicial Bar Council

Does political question apply to JBC? political question protects separation of power-
supervision authority of the SC over JBC. (Sereno case)

CA vs CTA on its certiorari powers

Bu. Of Customs vs Devanadera: constitutionality of tax law; lgu expressly provides that
questioning constitutionality of local ordinance- jurisdiction SOJ; whom to file
certitiorari for the judgment SOJ decision? – CTA who has the appellate jurisdiction of
the whole case part and incident of the power is the issuance of certiorari; if filed to the
CA and issue interlocutory there is splitting of jurisdiction

Election protest- where to appeal? COMELEC Appellate jurisdiction; who has the
interlocutory jurisdiction- COMELEC division

Who can exercise the power of judicial review – the one who can issue WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

FACIAL OBJECTION TEST: (Lico vs COMELEC) error of the interpretation of rule;

where error of interpretation amount to grave abuse of discretion, CERTIORARI set in
What is Political Question?
-it looks on the wisdom of the law but not on the legality of the law

Avelino vs Cuenco: issue is the presence of quorum; justiciable controversy includes:

publication of house rule, voting requirement, quorum

EXAMPLES OF POLITICAL QUESTION:

(Chinese Machinery case): Immunity from suit- there must be an endorsement, who
endorsement the same? DFA shall issue,- there is political question – court shall not
intervene; in the case, certificate from OSG and the office of the corporate counsel that it
is immune from suit, the court is not bound to respect the certification. Political
question attaches only if DFA issued the certification.
In the Rep. vs Vinzon case: The court can still look on the validity or averments in the
Certification, the court is not precluded to look into the averments in the certification

There is no universality of concepts in political question, based it on the facts of the

case.

Who is the SOLE ARCHITECT of foreign relations – it is the President

(Political question) Who can be interned in the Libingan ng Bayani? Congressman,

statesmen, previous presidents and wives; excluded honourably discharge, convicted of
moral turpitude. Marcos issue-political question

When is the 1987 constitution ratified? When is the constitution effective? At the time
the plebiscite was conducted and not at the time it was declared (De Leon vs
Esguerra)

Amendment and Revision

Issue: whether the congress means the bicameral set-up or literally the lower house.

1935 – the congress in joint session… senate and house of representatives, voting
separately.. 3/4of the house of senate and congress

1973 – proposal by the Batasan Pambansa; basically unitary – no senate; only congress
(although the Pres also exercises legislative powers)

1987 – may be proposed by the Congress; Is the congress means the lower house and
the senate? Verba legis cannot be used; the intent of the framers of constitution –
Azcuna: define congress by looking at Art. VI; simple way of interpreting; Congress
consist of the lower house and the senate

- If congress (lower house) shall only be the one to propose then it will result to
dilute the power of the senate

On Declaration of Martial Law – convened jointly and vote separately

Casus omissus doctrine

- The doctrine of casus omissus outlines the circumstances where a court can supply
a clearly unintended omission by the legislature in drafting a particular provision.
- a situation omitted from or not provided for by statute or regulation and therefore
governed by the common law

Congress will be diluting the power of the senate, so the reasonable inference would be
¾ votes of the congress; ¾ votes of the senate
if there is no constitutional directive, the presumption is voting separately; XPN: unless
the constitution provides otherwise

MEMORIZE: quantitative and qualitative test

If the congress convened themselves (constitutional convention); subsequently enact a

law to implement the resolution convening themselves as constitutional convention,
what vote is required? ¾ votes or simple majority vote (majority of quorum)
- Imbong v Ferrer – requires satisfaction of the threshold vote; re-implement the
provision of the resolution, only simple majority; but in convening, it requires
¾ votes

Co-equal powers of the branches of the govt:

What is the status of constituent assembly/constitutional convention Vis-a vis-
congress/legislative, executive or judiciary – they are created by constitution, therefore
they are co-equal? What is strictly the sovereign status? (case test)

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Art VIII. Section 1. Who can exercise judicial review? Courts; how many courts do we
have? -2, Supreme Court and courts that may be created by law

Municipal trial court can exercise judicial review? No, limited jurisdiction

RTC – general jurisdiction (Drilon vs Garcia)

Court that is not part of the Judiciary but can exercise judicial review- Impeachment
Court – Francisco vs HOR

Even not expressly given the power to exercise judicial review as long as it has
jurisdiction, may exercise judicial review

Can executive branch exercise judicial power? No. recommendatory in nature only

Political Question Doctrine – discretionary power granted to legislative and executive

On Expanded power of judicial review (grave abuse of discretion) – weakens the

defense of political question

Taň ada vs House of Electoral Commission

Duty of the Court to settle a case if there is violation of the constitution

MEMORIZE: REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Actual case or controversy – Rep vs ABS-CBN = moot and academic; ultimate

relief sought- enjoin ABS to stop operation; In May, franchise already expired
 - There must be contrariety of legal rights; no right, no –actual case or controversy

Galicto vs Aquino – SC: no vested right in salary increase, therefore, no actual case; no
legal standi – not directly injured

IBP vs Zamora – right of the IBP as vanguard of the Constitution; SC: no right to be
adjudicated

Bill – premature, no sovereign legal effect

Art VIII – no right, is the SC precluded from entertaining alleged unconstitutionality

FACIAL CHALLENGE TEST – even the one who filed the petition does not have the
right; SC may entertain the petition, on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; first amendment right violation amounts to grave abuse of
discretion; cannot be used in criminal law

In facial challenge test – even if no personal interest is involved, the standing can be
sustained. Art. VIII, Sec. 1 par 2- to determine whether or not there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction…. EXPANDED POWER OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Errors of jurisdiction – 1)patently no jurisdiction; 2)lack of jurisdiction; 3)excess of

jurisdiction

Mistake in applying discretion – error in judgment

Ressa and Santos case – SC: is there any reversible error, error of jurisdiction
(certiorari), error of judgment (Appeal) – only grave abuse of discretion

FACIAL OBJECTION TEST - on the face of the pleading, there appears to be error of
judgment; LP vs COMELEC – erroneous application of the rules, certiorari power of the
SC

Facial Challenge Test vs Facial Objection Test

Facial challenge test - is the mode of attacking the constitutionality of law (it suppresses
the first amendment clause); free speech

= Similarity: Both are correctible by certiorari by the SC

Whether or not what courts can exercise judicial power? SC

Villaraso case: whether or not the congress may make another court, NO; but it does not
preclude the congress to create statutory courts

RTC possesses certiorari power

2016 Bar - Garcia vs Drilon – a statutory court (RTC/Family court) possesses power to
resolve constitutionality of the law

City of Manila vs Grecia-Cuerdo: the SC allowed CTA to resolve constitutional/legal

issue
CTA- quasi-judicial body (executive part); CTA was given the rank analogous to the CA

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing
an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. HELD:The CTA has
jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively
exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a
writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as
is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.

Extemporaneous Constructive Construction/Contemporaneous Construction Rule

- Contemporaneous-Construction Doctrine is a principle used in interpretation of
statutes. It says that an ambiguous statute made by an administrative agency or
lower court is entitled to great deference if the interpretation has been used over a
long period.
- In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous
construction of those who are called upon to act under the law, and were
appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.

WON the CTA entertain legal issue of interlocutory order

BOC vs Devanadera case = possibility of contradictory decision in the CTA and CA; avoid
splitting of jurisdiction; Incidental or interlocutory orders may be resolved by the court
who has the jurisdiction of the main issue

Ombudsman vs Binay, CA = Ombudsman issued dismissal to Binay; Binay filed

TRO/injunction to CA; ombudsman question jurisdiction of CA- the provisions of the
ombudsman law restrained any court the issuance of injunction against ombudsman,
except the SC. The court resolved: you cannot split the jurisdiction, once the court
possessed jurisdiction, all ancillary remedies shall be deemed written in that law. The
jurisdiction is complete, even interlocutory are covered in the jurisdiction.

Can the court resolved constitutional issue= court aquo (court subject to review)- if
there is appellate jurisdiction, then can decide constitutional issue

Southern Hemisphere case = constitutionality of tax law/ordinance- go to secretary of

justice; SC:

Republic vs Serreno – mistake of the agent does not bind the state
Gamboa vs Teves = for 83 years relied to SEC, SC: the mistake of the agent does not bind
the state
Republic vs Palawan (2018) – nat’l govt. acknowledge debt to Palawan, but pres. Arroyo
reverse, - the mistake of the agent does not bind the state

Is constitutional issue always considered a legal issue – Tanada model: drafting of

question must be legal – specific provision that was breached

READ: Gios-Simar vs DOTC – questions must entirely legal; even if transcendental

importance is invoked but the issue is factual, the Court shall not entertain the case.

Brandeis Doctrine – making to appear question of fact to question of law

Ocampo vs Enriquez (Political question) – authority to determine who will be interned

in the libingan ng bayani, the president to exercise discretion.

Osmeň a vs Pendatum – behaviour of senate member covered by the rules of senate

Avelino vs Cuenco – question of quorum = legal question

Publication, voting, quorum – constitutional limitations – from discretionary to

legal

Vinuya vs Exec Sec. – the Pres as the sole architect of foreign relations; executive’s
discretion

READ: Falcis vs Local Civil Registrar of QC = to declare unconstitutional the Family

Code; Falcis made himself a party in the case; no right asserted when asked during the
oral argument; SC: no legal standing; no actual case; cited in contempt

On Legal Standing: Are mammals with standing to file case of writ of kalikasan? In the
resident mammals case, it invokes epistolary jurisdiction=

SC to entertain a letter and adjudicate on the matter – Valeroso vs CA (2009)=

Philippine jurisdiction of epistolary- in the MR, letter was espoused by the
Solicitor General

Can the govt question the constitutionality of a certain law? The question is not
precluded of questioning such, has the right because it is the enforcing the law: PEOPLE
vs Vera case (Probation law)

Ople vs Torres – questioned the exec order that they espoused;- estopped; except for
Sen. Ople who questioned with a legislature standing; EO usurps the legislative function

- Today the national id system is in place

Nullity of Law – enforces no right

Araullo vs Aquino – operative fact doctrine – applicable to law, executive order issuance

NATIONAL TERRITORY

Treaties of the US & Spain – the Phils is the collateral of that subject (1935)

Art. 1 –
What is the archipelagic doctrine: MEMORIZE
… AND ALL OTHER TERRITORIES WHICH THE PHILIPPINES HAS JURISDICTION

The Rep of the Phils. vs the Rep of China

Magallona vs Ermita: KIG are already removed from the ambit of national territory
because we accept the baseline laws; SC: the scarborough shoal is beyond the national
territory; how can we claim the KIG, panatag and scarborough? - ALL OTHER
TERRITORIES WHICH THE PHILIPPINES HAS JURISDICTION

Attacking in International view – KIG, etc, - regime of islands

Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy = US vs California: US court sided with the national

govt; state law conflicting with federal state law, what should prevail? Federal state law.
The SC refused to accept the paramountcy doctrine, because if we do so, it is as if we
recognized a state within a state (Republic vs Palawan). UNCLOS grants exclusive
economic zone to a state. US cases: ownership of the area while the Phil case issue is on
jursidiction as to economic

Is sovereignty divisible? NO, sovereignty, territory is indivisible. Unity of state under

articled II

Province of North Cotabato case re MOA-AD: SC- alleged grave violations of the
constitution. Characterization Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) – accordingly it is
autonomous however the magistrates of the SC dissected the provisions of the MOA –
1)no need to conduct plebiscite issue – it brush aside the constitutional
2)(read Monteviado Convention) customary hallmark of statehood, recognition
theory: 4 elements are present, recognition of statehood and not to confer, political
theory – even it does not have the 4 requisites for a state, as long as other states,
recognized it as state, it could become a state (Holy See)by virtue of political will and
political recognition of other states.

The weakness of Political theory is very easy to circumvent; SC: BJE is an associate state,
a state within a state; relationship of BJE and the Phils is associative- in contradiction to
constitutional unity

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Ministrant functions-proprietary power

Discretionary functions- constituent function, function that accrues to sovereign power

Doctrine of Parens Patriae – Gov. of Phil. Islands vs Monte de Piedad

De Jure vs De Facto

Art. II, Sec. 2 = can the Philippines declare war? NO. The Phils cannot declare war, it only
declares the existence of war because of Sec 2 of Art II. Declaration of war is prohibited,
declaration of the existence of war is allowed

Sec 3 = Civilian authority is supreme over all the military – Case of Carpio vs Exec. Sec.

Sec. 4 = Prime duty of the govt is to serve and protect the people – duty of the people to
defend the state; exemption to art III on involuntary servitude

Sec. 5 = maintenance of peace and order

Distinction between principle and policy – principle is the objective and policy is the
means to attain the objective/principle

Separation of Powers: MEMORIZE

What is the basis of the separation of powers doctrine – to avoid consolidation of

powers to one specific part of the government

PRRD on lockdowns – act is reasonable (Zabal vs Duterte case)

Every branch of the government has its constitutional mandate. Every part is
clearly delineated.

Legislative – make a bill

Executive – can veto a bill
Judicial

Who declares martial law – president

Within 24-48 hour Who nullifies martial law – the congress
Extension of martial law – president
Concurrence - congress
SC- judicial restraint, separation of powers, respect to the co-equal branch

Collective Judgment Principle – stronger than political question; where one branch of
the government and another branch of the government

Cuyegkeng vs Cruz – Medial Board of Examiners; Pres appointed someone who is not
included in the recommendees. Kuyegkeg file quo warranto. SC: the term recommendee
is only directory not mandatory; SC dismissed on procedural ground

What if appointed in the SC is not screened/shortlisted by JBC? Will the ruling of

Cuyegkeng available? If the SC used the checks and balances principle, the Judicial
invoked the Villanueva case- appointment of RTC judge during the election ban,
appointment was nullified, the power of the Pres to appoint is not absolute.
Unfortunately in De Castro vs JBC – on alleged midnight appointment of Corona;
petition to nullify the appointment. SC: if the prohibition under art VII should have
appeared in art VIII, the judiciary is obliged to follow the prohibition; prohibition is in
Art VII and not in Art VIII. Accordingly, there is no prohibition in Art VIII but in Art. VII.

Separation of Powers – delimit the power; avoid abuse of power

Principle of Blending of Powers – platonic side of the separation of powers; harmony

between the check and balances and the separation of powers; example: president
entering into a treaty, needs the concurrence of the senate; two specific parts of the
government that needs to perform positive action

Eastern Shipping Line case

EDCA case (Saguisag vs Exec Sec. Ochoa) – SC gave power to the Pres. as the sole
architect of foreign relations; the Pres has the authority to determine if it is a treaty or
executive agreement

Principle of Checks and Balances: who can remove the criminal liability of one
person? the executive, the pardoning power of the Pres.

Is the pardoning power absolute? Yes, the discretion of the Pres to pardon one person
must be respected, it is a presidential prerogative

Former Pres convicted with plunder- reclusion perpetua, accessory penalty is

disqualification to run for public office; restored of civil and political rights (pardon
granted)
Can the pardoning power of the Pres amend the provision of the revised penal code???
SC what is the nature of the pardon, absolute or conditional?

Vidal vs COMELEC, intervenor Lim = liberal construction on the pardoning power of the
Pres

Can the Pres veto a resolution? In US, YES…. But in the Phils, NO. the pres can only veto a
certain bill but no a resolution
Angnars Party List vs Exec Sec Ochoa – the reso is not a bill and cannot be a law

RA 9173, SG of nurses is grade 15; When implemented, a resolution was certified by

Pres GMA and in a joint resolution (lower house and higher house) SG is grade 10-. Can
a resolution amend a law? SC 9Carpio) a resolution cannot be considered a law.
Can the Pres veto a Reso ? No. Only bill can be vetoed by the Pres. Constitution limits it
to a Bill

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa: there is no distinction between a Bill and Reso
US Constitution: no distinction on bill, reso, order, directives,; Veto power of the pres is
on Bill- catch all of the others

Resolution does not need to pass 3 separate reading rule; Caguioa: the Pres certified it
as urgent
DECLARATION OF STATE PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Delegation of Powers - -

What is the doctrine of Potestas delegata non delegari potest – What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. Unless, it falls under permissible delegation.

Test to determine delegation:

Completeness Test – the law is complete, administrative to enforce

Standard Sufficiency test – give the administrative the discretion and standards/guides
--- Discretion

Can be circumvented, to state in the law – not contrary to laws, public policy….

Belgica vs Ochoa (2013) (2019)

2013 doctrinal pronouncement from 2009 Abakada partylist case… both must be
satisfied

To whom it can be delegated? READ

Requisites of administrative rules: READ

Quasi-Judicial powers
Administrative powers

Legislature makes a law; delegate to executive, function it as administrative power or

judicial power?
Case filed to Fiscal – administrative

Filing a case against a public officer before the ombudsman –

Public officer maligns the reputation of one person – gross misconduct and libel; omb
released a joint reso, found person guilty of grave misconduct and guilty of libel =
criminal resolution finding probable cause – will they receive evidence, yes. Will they
adjudicate rights and obligations, if yes, its quasi-judicial

Distinction:
Similar- can receive evidence
Administrative/fact finding - no authority from the law to settle rights and obligations
Quasi-judicial - Authority from the law to settle rights and obligations

Biraogo vs Phil Truth Commission – EO. 1 = what is the nature of the Phil Truth
Commission? Not a quasi-judicial; it is a fact find body, no need of a law; but still
declared unconstitutional because it only go after the previous administration (singled
out only one administration not administrations, violative of equal protection)

Fact finding only –can invoked not strictly the right of due process; but if quasi- judicial
can invoke the 7 cardinal rights of due process as laid down in Ang Tibay vs CIR
Art. II: STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

Can the state be sued without its consent? Art. XVI. Sec. 3 the state cannot be sued
without its consent

On revolutionary govt. Lawyers league vs Rep of the Phils – questioned the government
of Pres Cory Aquino; the constitution is deemed abandoned/inoperative at that time.
Can you invoke the state immunity doctrine? The case will be dismissed, under Art. XVI,
Sec. 3 the state cannot be sued without its consent, not a constitutional conferment; it is
a recognition of a certain general principles of international law. It is deemed written in
the constitution because it is generally accepted principle of international law.

If Rep. of China sued Re. of Phils, can the latter contend that it is immune from suit?
- Determine first where it filed the case: if filed before the international tribunal; the
jurisdiction of the said tribunal came from the consent of the state

What if the Rep of China filed a case against the Phils in the RTC? No, Invoke state
immunity for domestic only, within the pHilippines

If Phils filed counterclaim against China, can China claim that it’s immune from suit? NO,
when you a case against any other state/entity/agent, impliedly you opened yourself to
a counter suit, already estopped when china submitted itself to domestic jurisdiction.

Is the doctrine of state immunity an absolute rule? NO; xpns: THERE IS A LAW THAT
WAIVES IMMUNITY (CA 375)

HOW CAN IT BE waived?

Phil Textile Research Institute vs CA, Ramirez - 223319 (J. Caguioa)

Contract between PTRI and Ramirez; Agent of PTRI made several changes in the
contract Ramirez billed PTRI; ptri refused to pay Ramirez; the latter filed breach of
contract; ptri filed motion to dismiss invoking state immunity as agent of the state; the
contract includes choice of venue of any action

Will you grant the motion to dismiss grounded on state immunity? KNOW THE NATURE
OF PTRI; it is a line agency which unincorporated, attached to the executive, the office of
the President, are they immune from suit? Yes
RTC grant, denied by CA, reversed by SC: NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT; .when entered into
a contract, you descended into the level of individual, therefore, waived the immunity;

Look into the nature of contract:

Contracts entered into by the state
- in jure imperii (sovereign acts)- immune from suit
-in jure gestionis (commercial or proprietary acts) – not immune from suit

when there is choice of venue or choice of jurisdiction, then you are already descending
to the level of private individual which now shed of the state of immunity
TO ACTUALLY DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS NOT
INCORPORATED IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE
THE NATURE OF THE FUNCTION IN WHICH THE AGENCY IS ENGAGE, SO AS TO HOLD
IT SUABLE IF THEY ARE PROPRIETARY AND NOT SUABLE IF THEY ARE
GOVERNMENTAL.

(Atty Rafa: the SC is wrong, one case cannot be abandoned, failed to recognized 2003
ruling)

Why in Republic vs Vinzon, IMMUNE FROM SUIT. THE CASE IS money claims-
In PTRI it is breach of contract. What is in PTRI and not in Vinzon – INJUSTICE (changes
of plan, causing the breach contract);
- (J. Azcuna) any and all acts that sheds of the sovereignty of the state must be
strictly construed; waiver of state immunity is strictly construed, must be
respected. Was there any evidence presented why they should not be IMMUNED
FROM SUIT? Choice of venue clause

Chinese Machinery (corporation of china) vs Sta. Maria: in the contract, there is

arbitration clause (descending into the level of private individual); can the chinese
machinery invoke state immunity? Attack on the content of contract- there is arbitration
clause; it is a waiver of immunity; not an agent of china; NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT;
GOCC- charter, a foreign law= must be pleaded and proven, otherwise, processual
presumption will take into play – corporation code- suppletory law, Sec 36 of the Corpo
Code, to sue and be sued
- An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit
waiver of immunity from suit.
FOREIGN LAW/ FOREIGN CHARTER MUST BE PLEADED AND PROVEN, otherwise
processual presumption or presumed identity will take into play… CNMEC not immune
from suit

Proper person to certify immunity from suit - DFA secretary –via endorsement

What if the DFA sec issued an endorsement in favour of 1 person, what is the effect of
the determination by the DFA? political question but already ruled that it is justiciable
question. The endorsement - it is persuasive but not totally binding with court

Arigo vs Swift (2014) – case against the captains, will it prosper? Grant the writ of
kalikasan; FVA- waiver of criminal jurisdiction; SC: not considered as waiver of
jurisdiction on the petition of writ of Kalikasan, a special proceeding. Political question=
immunity; people involved captains of warship, official discharge of function, may assert
state immunity; but if the question is remedial – the waiver of jurisdiction in on criminal
jurisdtion but not on special proceeding.
Drug enforcement agent as poseur buyer – can he invoke state immunity? Yes immune
from suit, it is in the discharge of official function

Sanders vs Veridiano – no clear evidence of the .defamatory remarks

Liang vs People –cannot invoke state immunity; manager of bank, slanderous remark
back up by evidence not in the discharge of official function

Is immunity from suit an assertable right which can also be waived? Yes it is
If you do not assert that it does not mean to say the you waivde that right
Can the court motu propio that this person is immune from suit? It depends
In Soliven vs Makasiar: SC: must invoke state immunity
Delima vs Duterte – delima was asking for habeas data; won notwithstanding the failure
to invoke state immunity, can the court still recognize the same: SC: Yes, so as not to
disturbed the function of the President

If doing official function, the court will recognize immunity from suit

How will you know if a suit is really against a state? If the suit requires a
positive/affirmative act from the state. Look at the reliefs prayed….. money claims
against the government thru the congress delegated to the COA

State of immunity can also be invoked by international organization

Southeast asia vs NLRC

IRRI vs Calleja – immune from suit – recognized as international organization but was
not created by treaty, it is created by law and its charter mentioned that its status is an
international organization.
International Organization if made by consent of states; in the IRRI case, it is made only
by the Phils..

READ: UP vs Dizon (2 case)

-the funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the
income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only
for the attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action
could not be validly made the subject of the RTCs writ of execution or garnishment. The
adverse judgment rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented
was not immediately enforceable by execution against the UP, because suability of the
state did not necessarily mean its liability

SUABILITY IS ONE THING, LIABILITY IS ANOTHER THING

City of Makati vs IAC – disbursement is discretionary but where there is already

judgment, ministerial; file mandamus

Art. II, Sec 2 – the Phils renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations.
Art VI, Sec 23, par 1 – the Congress by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately shall the sole power to declare the existence of a state of
war.

- We do not declare, we declare the existence of war

- No conflict with the provisions of the constitution; it only acknowledges the attack
- Doctrine of incorporation – adopts the generally

Sources of International Law

International treaty/agreemn
Customary international law
General accepted principles of international law (doctrine of incorporation)
Princiles pf jewuity,ustice and writing of highly qualified publicist

Pharmacetutiacal health and care assoc. vs sec – milk code, highly endorsed
breastfeeding. WHO issued resolution banning the use of formula milk; reso not an
international law

And Ladlad – invoke Yoga carpa principles; SC: did not accept it as generally accepted
principle

Jus Cogens – peremptory norm, standard that cannot derogate

International agreement – cannot be questioned its effect because the state gave its
consent
Customary international law – no need of consent; still bound; elements: subjective
element and objective element (state practice); example of generally accepted
principles of international law

Generally accepted principles of international law

Razon vs Tagitis case – writ of amparo; can we accept the definition of enforced
disappearance? Generally accepted principles

Poe-LLamnazares vs COMELEC – FOUNDLING binding as generally accepted principles

of international law

Treaty – with concurrence

Executive Agreement – without concurrence

Eastern Shipping Lines case

What should prevail if there is conflict bet international law and municipal law
-municipal law. Constitutional supremacy law – any and all acts of government which is
contrary to the constitution is null and void

Ichong vs Hernandez – permit for retail trade business, invoked treaty of amity; retail
trade law – exclusively granted to Filipinos, a police power; SC: police power shall
prevail; the supremacy clause shall prevail
In Re vs Garcia – SC: constitution shall prevail, it cannot bargained away by the
executive

Tanada vs Angara – treaty vs domestic law, SC: international law shall prevail; pacta
sunt servanda

Philip Morris case – tax incentives; CIR asks for req’t; SC: pacta sunt servanda

Gonzales vs Hechanova – rice importation; did not comply with statutory requirements;
SC nullify the action of the Pres; notwithstanding the previous agreement of the Repo of
China and Phils

Koroda vs Jalandoni – genocide committed during Japanese occupation; SC: generally

accepted principles of international law

Civilian authority is supreme over the military

kulayan vs Gov. Tan –gov calling out power; SC: calling out power falling exclusicvely
within the power of the Pres

The people may call upon the people… to render military service
- Involunatary clause of the constitution
- Mandatory service rule

Social Justice
Calalang case
Southern Luzon Drug Corp. vs DSWD (2017) – expanded senior citizens act, discount as
allowable deduction not tax credit; invoked as exercise of eminent domain; SC: police
power, giving due attention to vulnerables

The state values the dignity of human person and guarantees full respect of human
rights
Laude vs Ginez (2015)- Laude filed (litigated) motion not accompanied by notice of
hearing; (if non-litigated motion, i.e. ex parte no need for notice of hearing); SC: scrap of
paper; do not merit attention from the court; filed MR, denied – right to effective
remedy (international and civil right) J. Leonen – you cannot invoked an int’l. law to
eschew a very basic principle-3 day notice rule, no monopoly of human rights.

The state…. Equally protect the life of the mother and the unborn child
PMA vs ALFI – when does life exist
Imbong vs Ochoa – must resolve by the lower court being the recipient of evidence; life
begins at fertilization; SC: primary jurisdiction- for FDA to declare pill, iud as
abortifcacient
Continental Steel case –collective agreement, dependent to claim benefits for the death
of child died; SC: death is absence of life, not having civil personality

The state recognizes the role of woman in nation building

Garcia vs Drilon – RA 9262

Sec. 16 The state shall protect and advance the of right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology…. – self-executory right
Oposa vs Factoran – balance and healthful ecology is a pre-condition to a right to life
West Condominium – SC: stare decisis (oposa vs factoran)
BT Talong case – SC modified its ruling, moot and academic, cured by subsequent
enactment of circular

The state shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.

Gamboa vs Teves – MR filed by heirs of Gamboa

Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont Consolidated (2015)
Roy vs Herbosa (2017)

Can the NTC issue CDO motu propio without due notice?

Resident Mammals case – what is service contract; requisites of service contract

Shell Consortium case (Republic vs Palawan)

The state shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform
Read the law urban and development act – on professional squatter – can be summarily
evicted

The state recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private
enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
Cruz vs DENR Sec – filed for the unconstitutionality of IPRA law but was dismissed
-READ, in contrast to regalia doctrine

Who exercise Legislative Power? Art. VI Sec. 1 - - shall be vested in the CONGRESS
(senate and House of Representatives) except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum

ABS CBN denial of franchise – can the people in their sovereign capacity propose a form
of a law granting franchise to ABS CBN? (not yet settled by SC) RA 6735 already
complete for purposes of enacting a law. Art XII, Sec. 11, the congress may grant
franchise except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration,
or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.
- While it is true that Art VI, Sec 1. … vest legislative power to congress and the
people in their sovereign capacity, it is not the case in the grant of franchise …strict
construction, it’s the congress – emphasis more on the object/ the end result/the
law and not the actor

Usurpation of Legislative Power

OPle vs Torres – AO issued by Ramos; SC sustained locus standi of Ople- - law is needed
in recalibrating rights and not an AO

Sec 1, Art VI the question of action pertains to the shift of policy which should be
covered by a law duly enacted by congress – when there is shift; there is usurpation of
legislative power

What is covered in a law?

Is a review center considered a HEI? SC answered in negative, the shift of policy is a
legislative power, which needed a law

Caida vs COMELEC – automation of election; it does not mean that the latter law would
always amend the former law, it could be that the latter law could supplement the
provision of the former law

Shift of Policy – Congress

Amendment of Policy- Congress
Implementation of Policy – Executive or legislative or judiciary (kung nakatutok sa
judiciary yung function)

Who can amend a law? Congress and People in their sovereign capacity

League of Cities vs COMELEC –

Who controls the power to grant immunity? Legislative prerogative

Who exercises the grant of immunity? Essentially executive

Legislative Power:
David vs Arroyo – Gen. Order empowering arroyo; declaration of emergency; SC
debunked provision of GO in so far as decreeing laws
Javellana vs Exec Sec.
Aquino vs Enrile – PD is a law

Limitation of State – Bill of Rights; inherent limitation of all states including the plenary
power of Congress to enact laws

What is the essence of Legislative Veto? Whether IRR is in accord with law or
constitution
Macalintal vs COMELEC
BOCEA vs TEVES – IRR as unconstitutional by the legislative is a legislative veto
(separation of powers)
Abakada Partylist vs Purisima – questioning the lateral attrition law; SC:
unconstitutional

BELGICA VS EXEC SEC, 2013 (READ FOR EXAM) –UNCONSTITUTIONAL, no sufficient

standard, the law was not complete; was asked in the 2016, 2017 and 2019 bar exam.
When it is lumpsum? If there is no item in the law, no specific purpose but there is
budget. DOCTRINE OF SINGLE CORRESPONDENCE; there must be public funds
allocated for single purpose
READ 2019 CASE – CONSTITUTIONAL, contingent fund – giving executive the
flexibility; release of budget is legislative function; when the congress enacts GAA, this
law should be complete in itself and have sufficient standard

-Malampaya Funds? No standard and completeness… Sc: unconstitutional

Binay case – RA 6770, Section 14 (Ombudsman Law) ….no court shall hear any appeal
or application for remedy against the decision or finding of the Ombudsman except the
Supreme Court on pure question of Law… Correlate to Art. VIII Sec. 1 of the Constitution
- - the judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. SC: this is not a jurisdictional vesting law; judicial prerogative that
cannot be waived

Estipona vs Judge Lobrigo (2017) WON RA 9165 is unconstitutional because it prohibits

plea bargaining for sale of drugs. Plea bargaining –rule 118. SC: unconstitutional, it
usurps judicial prerogative

Judicial Over reach -

Prospective application of Law

Aldovino case (2019)

Is the House of Representatives considered a continuing body? NO, congress term is 3

years; not bound on the business tackled by the previous

Is Senate a continuing body?

- YES, For purposes of contempt, the senate is always a continuing body
(continuing body for limited purpose) Arnault vs Nasareno
- In any other purpose, senate is not a continuing body
- Law enacted increasing the salary of senators, already approved into a law, when
will it be implemented? SC: will be applicable on the next election

What Powers of Congress that is legislative in nature and non-legislative in nature?

- Declaration of the existence of war – not legislative in nature
- Declaration of national emergency – legislative function
- The congress has the sole power to initiate impeachment; SC is not the only who is
vested to try a case

Powers of Congress
Legislative power
The power or competence to propose, enact, ordain, amend/alter, modify, abrogate or repeal laws. It is
vested in the Congress which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Legislative powers of Congress
1. General plenary power (Art. VI, Sec. 1)
2. Specific power of appropriation
3. Taxation and expropriation
4. Legislative investigation
5. Question hour

Francisco vs HOR –it was considered

SC is not only the court vested by the constitution to try a case, there is also the
impeachment court

What is the nature of Congress; what is the nature of Senate? Is it continuing body?
-look into the nature of function: in a day to day business, will you consider the
resolution, bills that was filed by the previous binding to the present congress
Arnault vs Nasareno – for purposes other than contempt, senate is non continuing
body

League of Cities – SC En Banc – unconstitutional for violation of equal protection clause;

journal will not bind the present congress; for purposes of determining day to day
business- senate is not continuing body

Congress is not a continuing body

What if your client was cited in contempt during the first term of the House of Rep? (not
continuing) wait for the congress to expire… they will lose the authority to detain you;
but the client will be detained for 3 years… what if the senate cited it for contempt
where it is a continuing body?

Case Digest: Balag v. Senate GR 234608

JULY 3, 2018

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a
person cited in contempt during its inquiries

FACTS: Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after
senators ordered him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative in the probe
into the death of the UST Law Student Horacio "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate
inquiry, Balag repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he
headed the fraternity

DECISION: Denied for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment
under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation
should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court declared the case as moot and academic but the petition
presents a critical and decisive issue that must be resolved and capable of repetition.
This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt
without a definite period is capable of repetition,” it said, adding that “the indefinite
detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. The
Supreme Court has ruled that the Senate has no power to impose the indefinite
detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries.

 The senate is a continuing institution; however in the conduct of its day to day
business… (unfinished business) -wait for the senate to expire; wait for the
congress to expire (remedy)
 In the conduct of investigation in aid of legislation, there must be a proposed bill;
and after the inquiry it must be submitted to plenary and once submitted, the
legislative inquiry is terminated, thus termination of the power of contempt.
 Moved for the committee to submit report to plenary
 What if you are the lawyer of the congress- ask for congressman to propose a bill
 What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly

Sec. 3 Qualification of Senator: Objective Qualification –

Natural-born citizen
of the Philippines;
2. At least 35 years of
age on the day of
election;
3. Able to read and
write;
4. A registered voter;
5. Resident of the
Philippines for not
less than 2 years
immediately
preceding the day of
election. (Art. VI, Sec.
3)

NOTE: Enumeration
is exclusive.
if candidate is not qualified-file a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy
(OEC); within 25 days of filing (COMELEC in Division); material misrepresentation –
COC be cancelled, all votes will be considered astray; what if still declared; file petition
for quo warranto before the HRET if already
- Proclaimed?
- Take oath?
- Assumed office?

Limkaichong vs COMELEC

Sec 17, Article VI of the Constitution- Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an electoral tribunal which shall be the “sole” judge of all contests relating to
the election returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Each electoral
tribunals shall be composed of 9 members……

Facts: Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her
rival Olivia Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case against
Limkaichong. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because
when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino,
lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. During the
pendency of the case, election day came, and votes were cast. Results came in and
Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a
proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with
Resolution no. 8062 adopting the disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec.

Issue: WON the proclamation done by the Comelec is valid, and WON Comelec should
still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong is valid. the HRET must exercise jurisdiction
after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the House of
Rep., the Comelec’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and disqualification ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that
the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the Comelec of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET. The
use of the word “sole” in Sec.17 Art. VI of the Constitution and in Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the electoral tribunal’s
jurisdiction over election contest relating to its members.

- Citizenship must be questioned through direct petition questioning the same

- cannot be collaterally attacked – asking for a relief other than the main relief that
you have sought is not allowed
- citizenship is the conferment of civil and political rights and can be only removed
through direct petition primarily for that purpose
- SC: the qualification is continuing in character; can be questioned anytime

Macquiling v Arnado
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty
to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding
public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado
was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a
dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government
Code.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained
the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

Mercado vs Manzano
- Manzano is dual citizen; dual allegiance must be dealt with by law – RA 7160, must
not be dual citizenship; SC: what is proscribed in the constitution is dual allegiance
and not dual citizenship
- Decided before Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Law (RA 9225)= former fil
who was naturalized as alien may become a Filipino citizen by oath of allegiance
and become a dual citizen
- The dual citizenship of manzano is involuntary act

Japson vs COMELEC
- Make an oath of allegiance but disqualified; must hace perfected oath of
renunciation
- The dual citizenship is voluntary act

Grace Poe – oath of renunciation and oath of allegiance; but utilize US passport when
she came back to US; SC: still a natural born citizen grounded on COMELEC cannot
declare Grace to be not a natural born citizen, must be in a quo warranto; on

Nikolas-Lewis vs COMELEC:

RESIDENCE vs DOMICILE
Jalover vs Dela Pena – questioning the residency of Osmena; SC: considered as resident
considering that he served in that area

Election Law

Imelda Marcos vs COMELEC – evidence of going back to Tacloban

LImbona vs COMELEC– to provide proof that she is not staying with the spouse;
distinction with Marcos case was the evidence presented

Sec. 4
WON a public officer suspended by judgment but reinstated accordingly will that be
considered as interruption for purposes of determining compliance or defiance to the
3yr-term
Voluntary renunciation – shall not be considered interruption
 1. Element of title to the office
2. The exercise of the title to the Office

Sec 4 in relation to Sec 7(2) of Art. VI in relation to the terms of office under the LGC
- Noon of the 30th day of June next following their election (just like the President)….
Unless otherwise provided by law. Held second Monday of May; reapportioned
city, election was made 6 months after; COMELEC resolution moved the date of
election- general power clause of COMELEC; SC: the COMELEC have no authority
on the matter – Nograles vs COMELEC
- Only a law can move this specific date
- When the law moved for the election, the law should also move the date of
assumption

IV.1.3. Bañas-Nograles, v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246328, September

10, 2019, EN BANC, Justice Carandang
if We were to follow COMELEC's interpretation, an incongruity would result as the
winning candidate in COMELEC's special elections34 would serve a term less than that
provided for in Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Similar to Section 8, the
only exception is when another term is "otherwise provided by law." Again, R.A. 11243
did not provide for a term less than three years, as provided in the 1987 Constitution

Aldovino, Jr. vs COMELEC - Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as

the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected
during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of
his office during this period

Tallado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019, En Banc, CJ Bersamin.
(Note the dissents of Justice Jardeleza, Caguioa, Leonen, Carandang, Carpio)
The DILG's execution of the OMB decisions for the petitioner's dismissal clearly
constituted loss of the petitioner's title to the office. The dismissals were involuntary
interruptions in the petitioner's 2016-2019 term. As such, he cannot be considered to
have fully served a third successive term of office.

there is an involuntary interruption in the term of an elective local official when there is
a break in the term as a result of the official's loss of title to the office.

majority opinion – dismiss from office, there is interruption; the dismissal is executory
OMB decision is executory pending appeal
dissenting – reinstatement provision; nung bnalik may title at exercise sa ofis; no
interruption at all;

Preventive suspension is not an interruption of servie

Recall
- SC: serving the term of former incumbent, serving the unexpired term; analogous
to the ad interim appointment
Lanzonida – if term was served and opponent won

250 members , do you consider this permanent and cannot be amended? NO, the
moment that you apportioned number of HOR shall be

Banat vs COMELEC
The Court strikes down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the 2nd clause of Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941. The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Sec. 5(2), Art. VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
“broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
(BANAT v. COMELEC, Ibid.)
NOTE: The 2% threshold is constitutional only insofar as the determination of the guaranteed seat is
concerned

Paglaum vs COMELEC
(abandoned theBuhay aprtylist vs COMELEC)

Total number of votes of partylist; get individual percentage of partylist, example

partylist A got 3% of the total – pasok sa first round
2nd round 0 - even if less than 2%

To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the HoR. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. 203766, April 2, 2013)

Composition of the party-list system

1. National parties or organizations
2. Regional parties or organizations; and
3. Sectoral parties or organizations.

The party-list system is not solely for the benefit of sectoral parties
Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be “a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations,” had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated “national
and regional sectoral parties.” They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the
party-list system exclusively sectoral. National and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties and
need not be organized along sectoral lines nor represent any particular sector. (Atong Paglaum v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013)

Where to register partylist? COMELEC Division

Liberal Party of the Phils. COMELEC – filed registration in COMELEC en banc; there is
procedural lapse; the error amounts to grave abuse; will the procedural lapse amounts
to grave abuse discretion? Yes. Error of application of rules, - facial objection test –

Facial Challenge Test – on the face of the

Facial Objection Test – Art. VIII Sec. 1 (2) SC shall only come when there is grave abuse
of discretion
Objection Test – erroneous interpretation of the law that amounts to grave discretion

Is the denial or grant of registration of party list a ministerial or discretionary action of

COMELEC? discretionary

RA 7941 - - COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent
or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. This Court finds that the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for registration filed by
Magdalo.

RA 7941 – five nominees

Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens on term sharing agreement, void contract;

creates no obligation

On term sharing agreement that is attached to the application for registration, will you
deny or grant registration?

Lokin vs COMELEC – When can a nominee be substituted: nominee dies; nominee

withdraws in writing; nominee becomes incapacitated- COMELEC resolution added one
– nomination was withdrawn by party. The insertion of the new ground was INVALID. It
is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.

Nominee of party list group is 40 y/o but representing the Youth Party list - grant or
deny registration of party list?
- RA 7941mprescribes the qualification of party list nominees

Amores vs HRET

Nominee must be Bona fide member of party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent.

INHABITANTS

Legislative districts must be compact (solid), contiguous (in physical contact) and
adjacent (close by or near).

The Constitution does not require a plebiscite for the creation of a new legislative
district by a legislative reapportionment. It is required only for the creation of new local
government units. (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, 2008)

Sec. 10, Art. X – no province, cities shall be created, abolished without the plebiscite.

Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by
the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC)
 - Aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power
among districts

Reapportionment – only law is needed

Creation of political unit – law and plebiscite of those political units directly
affected

Q: Congress passed a law providing for the apportionment of a new legislative district in
CDO City. COMELEC subsequently issued a resolution implementing said law. Jovi now
assails the resolution, contending that rules for the conduct of a plebiscite must first be
laid down, as part of the requirements under the Constitution. According to Jovi, the
apportionment is a conversion and division of CDO City, falling under Sec. 10 Art. X of
the Constitution, which provides for the rule on creation, division, merger, and abolition
of LGUs. Decide.

A: There is no need for a plebiscite. CDO City politically remains a single unit and its
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains whole and
intact. Thus, Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution does not come into play.

No plebiscite is required for the apportionment or reapportionment of legislative

districts. A legislative district is not a political subdivision through which
functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described
as a representative unit that merely delineates the areas occupied by the people
who will choose a representative in their national affairs. A plebiscite is required
only for the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government units.
(Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008)

Umali vs COMELEC: the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453
to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the
voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

Privilge speech – in session

OSMEÑ A V. PENDATUN – doctrine of disorderly behaviour (political question);
legislator may be called to account for his remarks by his own colleagues
POBRE V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO – SC: privilege speech Defensor-Santiago; Still, the
Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament
or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it
should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good."
LIBAN V. GORDON: the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an
office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

Section 13 . Art. VI of the Constitution

Incompatible office - Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
 any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat

Forbidden Office - Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.

Is the provision an absolute provision? NO, because the constitution provides for its
exception. Chavez vs JBC ; ex-officio function

Civil Liberties – cannot classify the ex-officio function from any other office because
it is only an extension of the office that he is actually holding

In the case of Magdangal Elma- Ex-officio is an exception to the prohibition

Sec. 13 Art VI – prohibition directed to member of congress and senator

Sec. 13 Art VII – president, vice president and cabinet secretaries; Funa Cases
Sec. 2 Art IX – civil service commission (escape clause of the prohibition) – person and
function not specified

Liban vs Gordon – SC: Sen Gordon is not liable for Sec 13. Any other office – law-budget-
GAA.
Pichay vs ODESLA –

PNRC as private or GOCC; GOCC – must pass economic viability test and common good

PNRC as private – incorporate under corporation code not under by law-

unconstitutional;
GOCC – with special charter and passed the test

What is PNRC? SC declared the charter as void, therefore no GOCC, therefore not
affected by the prohibition

PNRC- (2011) – nature is sui generis; not a GOCC, not a private; cs law shall be used

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for
its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
The President may call a special session at any time.
- Special session, on martial law within 48 hours

SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members
- Tatad case
For purposes of determining QUORUM – coercive jurisdiction (in the hosp but not
outside the country)

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days
- expel - political question
Gwendoly Garcia vs Sandiganbayan – preventive suspension vs suspension as penalty

Enrolled bill doctrine – constitutional rule or not?

Mabanag vs Lopez case – enrolled bill prevails over bill on journal

Electoral Tribunal – is it a separate entity from Congress? Yes, it is a constitutional

creature with a separate constitutional mandate; Onsiangko Reyes v COMELEC – SC:
jurisdictional facts: proclamation; oath; assumption of office
Bondoc vs Pineda –

Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of
the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom
are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5
members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had
been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted
with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of
the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members
in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the
decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis
of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant

political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence
from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives
is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the
HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution.
Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not
be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty

Sec 19: who are those subjected to Commission on Appointments?

De Castro vs JBC – congress is represented
Chavez vs Gonzales – JBC composition- majority is SC justices
Matibag vs Benipayo – res judicata principle vs approval/rejection of appointment
- The decision of CA partakes the nature of res judicata
Congress not in session – appointment of Cabinet Secretary is ad interim; permanent if
subsequently approved by CA

Appointment of Acting Secretary – can any member of the CA file a petition for
mandamus asking the President to submit requirements of the appointee for
rejection/approval; Pimentel vs Ermita- SC: acting capacity cannot be compelled to
submit to CA
can be compelled by mandamus-ad interim
cannot be compelled by mandamus – acting

Matibag v. Benipayo (G.R. No. 149036)

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director
IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity.
Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively.
Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of
the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the
confirmation of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a

memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office
of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the
prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members.

Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission
on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can
assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This
is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every
provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments –
did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to do away with ad interim appointments because the plan was for
Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory
recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government
services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of
the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the
present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the
purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would
result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power
to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be
avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This
power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by
her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing officials who
are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress
is in session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending
consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume
office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim
appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad
interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the
Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the
choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has
not been shown in the instant case.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively,
do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.

(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides
as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by

law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn
or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee
does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of
appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three
independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill
the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess
of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

Section 21: conduct of inquiry in aid of legislation (broader); more of

investigation
-Is it indispensable provision? – does it confer rights to conduct inquiry? No, it
recognizes existing power – right to information of congress
-Arnault vs Nasareno – arnault cited in contempt; does the congress has the contempt
powers? Not an inherent power unlike the judicial; for executive – contempt power can
be exercise with an enabling law
-Exercise of Contempt power – if there is proposed bill; in aid of legislation

Calida vs Trillanes (2019) – case was dismissed on the ground of moot and academic;
congress is given broad scope of authority to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation

The power of self preservation (power of contempt) is co existent with the life to be
preserved

Balag case - remedy: submit committee report- bill done, no need to be cited in
contempt; remedy by congress- submission of report to congress plenary- not yet done

READ pp 333 – rights to be respected

Sub judice principle - Sub judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or
before a judge or court; or matters under judicial consideration. In essence, the
sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial
proceedings. The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in
general, and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench

Romero vs Estrada

Can the congress repeal a provision by subsequent rules of procedures – a rule cannot
amend a substantive right

Section 22 – Question Hour – invocable against the executive department; use for
scrutiny and investigation; more of scrutiny

Senate v Ermita
Neri vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - executive privilege was sustain; Sc modified
the former ruling that the president should invoke the claim; alter ego was utilized; Pres
as the sole architect of foreign relations

Can the congress declare war? No, can only declare the existence of war.

Section 23- unless sooner withdrawn by power of congress

Araneta vs Dinglasan – first emergency power case- questioned the acts of then Pres
Quirino; already exercised emergency power; congress passed law revoking the law
granting the Pres; what is the effect- constitutional issue- can the pres veto the bill; SC:
NO

Angnars Party List – resolution is not a law; internal rules of congress- resolution is a
law/bill; what can be vetoed by the Pres. is a bill.

Sec. 25:

Single Correspondence doctrine

Read Araullo vs Aquino

Sec 27

Do you consider GAA as self explanatory provision? NO, it needs another law for its
execution (joel Villanueva case- implementation of retirement plan in the GAA)

Power to Veto
Belgica vs Exec Sec (2019)

Section 29: creation of office needs a law (pichay vs odesla)

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec. 1 executive power is not shared with any political departments; vested solely to the
President; the nature is strong as to its constitutional power because of the residual
powers.
-legislative power is vested to the lower and upper house and to the people in their
sovereign capacity; judicial power is vested in one SC and other court that may be
established by law
Residual powers are implied from the grant of executive power; the powers of the
president are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article of the
Executive Department

Marcos vs Manglapus
SC: right to travel (return to the country) – determination is not on the legislative nor to
the judiciary but to the Executive who determines threat of security of the country.
 - To infringe right to travel, it needs a law; right to travel back (return) to one’s
country was removed to the constitutional right to be protected
- Segregated right to travel from right to return back

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos VS. Manglapus

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed,
has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening
events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to
issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions
Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the
President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety
and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property
without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives
them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual &
discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect
the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar
the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in
her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Cruz, Dissenting
As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a
right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal,
tyrant, etc.
Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to
national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not
expand.

EXTENT OF POWERS

Laurel vs Garcia: Roponggi Property- the property is part of the payment/reparation

during the US-Japanese and Philippines war;
-partakes the nature of government property (not A&D); SC: the act of disposing
property, requires shift of policy pursuant to a law; In Malabanan case, if it’s a govt
property, the remedy is to convert, classify the property pursuant to a law.

As compared to Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. vs Republic, the

control of disposition of the property is Executive on the residual powers; the property
is a state property but already patrimonial in nature and readily disposable (alienable
and disposable); there is a continuing authority of the President because there was
already a law at that time (EO 292)

CALLING OUT POWERS

Kulayan vs Tan: Governor had exercised calling out powers to the Armed Forces of the
Government because of incidence of kidnapping in the area
- Calling out power does not pertain to uniformed personnel; but to persons
implementing disaster management agencies
 - It is only the Pres who can exercise the same as Commander-in-Chief.

(must have invoked residual powers found in administrative code in relation to the LGC;
the attack should justify the actions via human made disasters-Atty Rafa)

Case Digest: Kulayan v. Tan

ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of President?

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter,
Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water and
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation
project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who
were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis
Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then
formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the
leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency
in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for
the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act
(R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests,
and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al.
contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra
vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers
and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of
the armed forces.

DECISION: Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI: It has already been established that there is one repository of
executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is
authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of
the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of
Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is
the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution
does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents,
but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given
the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even
if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Divinagracia vs Consolidated Broadcasting System

-the franchise was not yet expired; NTC has not authority to cancel license and permits;
unlike in ABS-CBN, the franchise was already expired and therefore, legislative has
every right to grant or deny franchise.

Pichay vs ODESLA
- What is the nature of the Office: Office of the President proper or Office of the
President
- OP Proper = President possesses the authority to reorganize and abolish the office;
there is a law that grants the President to (E.O. 292).
- OP (outside proper) = there is authority to reorganize but no authority to abolish.
Why? – the creation of the office is strictly the power of the legislature; abolition
must be covered with a law
 fices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office
Of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies
From the OP to Departments or Agencies and vice versa.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

-power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts and the
Congress
- although not expressly conferred upon him under the Constitution, has been
invariably acknowledged as essential to his exercise of his powers as the Chief
Executive, consistent with the principle of separation of powers.

Chavez vs PEA, AMARI

-when is executive privilege attach in a contract?
-when is executive privilege invocable relative to executive agreements and in
international agreement entered to by the Chief Architect of Foreign Relations, the
President?

whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going

negotiations before a final agreement.

PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to

information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does
not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
'exploratory stage'.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislation

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the

President and the public officers covered by this executive order (EO 464, 2005),
including:

(i) Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public officials
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);

(ii) Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23
May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);

(iii) Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties

and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

(iv) Discussion in closed-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential

Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

(v) Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).

G.R. No. 210858

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Petitioner,

vs.
BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondent.

Contrary to the RTC's ruling, there is nothing in our Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
ruling which states that once a "definite proposition" is reached by an agency, the
privileged character of a document no longer exists. On the other hand, we hold that
before a "definite proposition" is reached by an agency, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" yet which can be accessed by the public under the right to
information. Only when there is an official recommendation can a "definite proposition"
arise and, accordingly, the public's right to information attaches. However, this right to
information has certain limitations and does not cover privileged information to protect
the independence of decision-making by the government.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority expressly and unequivocally states that the right to
information "should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order." Clearly, Chavez v. Public Estates Authority expressly mandates that
"privileged information" should be outside the scope of the constitutional right to
information, just like military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order. In these exceptional cases, even the occurrence of a
"definite proposition" will not give rise to the public's right to information.

Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged information, which is within the
exceptions of the constitutional right to information.

The deliberative process privilege typically covers recommendations, advisory

opinions, draft documents, proposals, suggestions, and other subjective documents that
reflect the personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the agency.

"Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases: first, the privilege protects
candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public confusion from
premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy; and
third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the public should not judge
officials based on information they considered prior to issuing their final decisions.

We have held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority that:

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals

being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation,
there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this
moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all
the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.

-this ruling was exploited by BCA

-non sequitur - a conclusion or statement that does not logically follow from the previous
argument or statement.
- not a correct interpretation because even if there is already a definite proposition for
as long as it is within the ambit of executive privilege, it is still confidential.

The privileged character of the information does not end when an agency has adopted a
definite proposition or when a contract has been perfected or consummated; otherwise,
the purpose of the privilege will be defeated.

Traditionally, U.S. courts have established two fundamental requirements, both of which must be
met, for the deliberative process privilege to be invoked.  First, the communication must
43

be predecisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy." Second, the

communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in that it
makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters." It must reflect the
"give-and-take of the consultative process."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. The deliberative process
privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials.

Unlike the "deliberative process privilege," "the presidential communications privilege" applies to documents
in their entirety and covers final and post decisional matters, as well as pre-deliberative ones. The deliberative
process privilege includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, 549 SCRA77 [2008].)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic negotiations are privileged in order to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between
the parties by shielding the negotiations from the public view (Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino 558
SCRA 468).

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY

Reason: you cannot vex the sitting or incumbent president because he/she is the one
taking care of all administrative matters within the country (Estrada vs Desierto)

Is Presidential immunity be attached if the questioned acts pertains to acts done during
the president’s incumbency and no longer the incumbent president?
=Rubrico vs Arroyo – regardless of the nature of the crime committed, still the
Presidential Immunity can be invoked as long that she is the incumbent president

G.R. NO. 183871

Rubrico vs. Arroyo
February 18, 2010

FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the
301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her
daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp.
Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that
a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be
sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit
not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. 
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of
the petition to  allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

Estrada vs Desierto
The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

Why did the Court said that Estrada resigned from his post? Because of: Angara Diaries
where he wrote what Estrada said- under the strict rules of evidence, it is hearsay but still
recognized by the court as “adaptive admission” because of contemporaneous action, it
adapted the preposition of the hearsay evidence. Estrada said that during the oath of
Arroyo that “this is the start of national reconciliation”; this statement impliedly an
admission that he resigned from office.

De Lima vs Duterte – writ of habeas data

-it modified the ruling in Soliven vs Makasiar where you have to plead, assert that the right
to be immuned from suit being the President
-in Delima case, the SC: notwithstanding the fact that it was belatedly asserted, the same
cannot be ignored, why? Because Presidential Immunity remains to be a matter of public
policy

DOCTRINE OF ALTER EGO – Qualified Political Agency

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY / ALTER EGO DOCTRINE
Acts of the Secretaries of Executive departments when performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business or unless disapproved are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Villena v.
Secretary of the Interior).

Araneta vs Gatmaitan
- Empower to make the IRR is the Minister of Envt and Natural Res; the one who made
the IRR is the Pres through his Exec. Sec.; can the Pres make that IRR, considering that
the DENR sec was the one authorized by law
- The mere fact that the law authorized the denr sec is a minute detail, it’s because the
denr sec is the ALTER EGO of the pres, therefore the President is not precluded from
making the IRR, instead of the DENr Sec because of the doctrine of QPA
- The denr sec is the agent of the President

TIDCORP vs Demegillio
It would appear though that doctrine of qualified political agency would not be applicable to acts of cabinet secretaries
done in their capacity as ex-officio board directors of a GOCC of which they become a member not by appointment of the
President but by authority of law (See: Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-
Demigillo, G.R. Nos. 168613 & 185571).

OTHER POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE PRESIDENT

Emergency Power – declaration of emergency is one thing and the exercise of the
emergency power is another thing: which requires a law? It is the exercise of emergency
powers (David vs Arroyo)

David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006
FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers
the seven consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and
General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are
actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature,
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”.
To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call
the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only
order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

Bayanihan to Heal as One Act

Zabal vs Duterte

Tariff Power – limited by law - Customs Modernization and Tariffs Act

Veto Power –
What can be vetoed by the President?
In senate rules, a resolution and a bill has no difference
Can a Bill be vetoed by the president? Yes, verbal legis in the constitution
Can the President veto a Resolution/veto a joint resolution of the senate and the lower
house? NO, because the constitution only empowers the president to veto a bill, it did not
empower the pres to veto a resolution

In US constitution, a Pres can veto a bill, resolution, order and directive coming from the
lower and upper house
Why the Phils can’t not apply same jurisprudence of the US? US constitution provides those
that can be proposed by the lower house which includes resolution, order, etc. In the Phils.,
the constitution does not provides this, only Bill for purposes of exercising the veto power.

Araneta vs Dinglasan (resolution was mentioned) – Pres vetoed the Bil; 2/3 votes to override
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A pocket veto is when the President is considered to have rejected a bill submitted to him for his approval
when Congress adjourns during the period given to the President to approve or reject a bill.

On the other hand, an item veto, or partial veto, is the power of a President to nullify or cancel specific
provisions of a bill, usually a budget appropriations bill, without vetoing the entire legislative package.

Ang Nars Partylist vs Executive Secretary

Republic Act 9173, or the Philippine Nursing Act, Drilon explained, clearly provides that "the minimum base pay
of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower than salary grade 15."

However in 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 811, which reduced the
base pay of nurses from salary grade 15 to salary grade 11. Joint Resolution No. 4 adopted by Congress
authorized the President to modify the compensation and position classification system of civilian personnel and
the base pay schedule of military and uniformed personnel in the government.

This week, the High Court upheld the validity of RA 9173, but pointed out that it is up to Congress to provide for
funding.

Section 2: Pres qualifications: natural-born citizen of the phils, registered voter, able to
read and write, at least 40 y/o, resident of the the phils for at least 10 years

Section 3: VP same qualification, elected and with term of office and maybe removed with
that of the Pres… maybe allowed to hold another office (cabinet member) not requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment

GR: Pres appointing authority needing confirmation by the CA

XPN: VP appointed to cabinet sec

Section 4
Pormento vs Estrada

FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former

President Joseph Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010
elections. The petition was denied by COMELEC second division and
subsequently by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE:

Is Joseph Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections
according to the phrase in the Constitution which states: "[t]he President shall
not be eligible for any reelection"?

HELD: There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did

not win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the
phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person second election as
President.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a

President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is
no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private
respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It
will serve no useful or practical purpose.

Section 13- The Pres, Vp and Sec and their deputies and assistants shall not hold any other
office or employment….
-The provisions in Section 13 is exclusive

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 83896

194 SCRA 317
February 22, 1991

Petitioner: Civil Liberties Union

Respondent: Executive Secretary

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued
by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant
Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary
positions.

 Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other

appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the government and government
corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.
 Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank
but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his
primary position.

 Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in

direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the
petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may
be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary
of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8,
Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

 Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
directly or indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

 Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary

functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. 

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed.
The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government
officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which
is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the

express mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8,
Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over
any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest
law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As
a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH
Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to
immediately relinquish their offices and employment. 

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED.

Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

Public Interest Center vs. Elma

Facts: 

Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his
tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He
accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.

Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They
contend that the appointments contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding
incompatible offices.

Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive
departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public
officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.

He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be
applied in his case. This provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple
positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary
functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close
relation between the two positions and there is no incompatibility between them, the primary
functions of either position would allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both
positions. He further add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is
an accepted practice.

Issues:

1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of CPLC?

2. Is the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applicable to the
PCGG Chairman or to the CPLC?

3. Does the ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices, render both appointments void?

4.  Is there a need to refer the case to the Court en banc?

Held:

1. No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists between
the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving
independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive departments
and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to
the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on
his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions
on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in
imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.

2. The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to
the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor
an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.

Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable to
the present case, the defect in respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to the incompatible
offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the
more stringent requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision. The said section allows
the concurrent holding of positions only when: (1) provided for under the Constitution, such
as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised
in an ex-officio capacity [which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence
of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office].
Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the
primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC.

Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the
CPLC, and vice versa. The primary functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates,
the investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and
the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption. On the other hand, the primary
functions of the CPLC encompass a different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal
orders referred to him by the President. And while respondent Elma did not
receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he did not act as either
CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate appointment had to
be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is acting in an ex-
officio capacity.

In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to
respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo,
that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be
appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG appointments in question are not
covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still
prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials,
due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC.  (Public Interest Center vs. Elma, G. R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006)

3. The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices, does not render both appointments void.
Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect,
vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.

4. There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What
is in question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent
appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application
of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. (Public
Interest Center vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007)

Is Any other office considers ex-officio? In Civil Liberties, not any other office

Ex-officio is the main extension of the office

In other cases, Funa and Elma case- ex-officio is exception to the general rule of “any other
office”

Funa vs Ermita
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another
office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated
OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.

Betoy v BOD,NAPOCOR
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were designation by
Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were
designated as members of the Board of Directors.

Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person

already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail
payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the
salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee’s right to claim
the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and
not a mere designation.
This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-
officio members of the NPB, valid.

Lambino vs COMELEC
-OSG – on the side of the people in their sovereign capacity

DOJ could not be an ex-officio of OSG (independent body); even in an acting capacity
nepotism is grave misconduct

Power to reorganize – reason: economy and efficiency

Sec. 15 – 2 months immediately before the presidential election shall not make
appointments- election ban

(elements of style by strunk and white)

Aytona vs Castillo
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On
the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next
day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight
or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President
Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed,
thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered
void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President
Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to
prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It
was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that
had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The
filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before
the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as
an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort
to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Villanueva and Villacarta case

Prohibition does not apply to judiciary

Section 4, Article 8 – vacancy in the judiciary shall be filled up/appointed within 90 days
from vacancy

The mandatory duty imposed imposed upon the President to fill-in vacancy prevails over
executive provision prohibiting the same.

Cuyegkeng vs Cruz – Board of Examiner- nomination process- recommendation process-

appointment process; President appointed someone who is not a nominee; theories
offered: legal title of someone…. Recommendation is directory not mandatory; there is no
usurpation of power; no word of exclusivity in the constitution. – liberal power of the
president to appoint.

Another group adheres to the view that said portion of section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is
merely directory in nature. Indeed, in their respective pleadings, the petitioners, as well as the
intervenors, refer to the persons named in the list aforementioned as "recommendees". They are
identically referred to in the communication transmitting said list to the President of the
Philippines, which communication is, in turn, described in said pleadings as a letter of
"recommendation". By their very acts therefore, the intervenors have clearly expressed the belief,
which was shared by the President, that the function of the former under said section 13 is purely
recommendatory. Needless to say, a "recommendation", as such, implies merely an advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the
party to whom it is made. The members of the Court constituting this group feel, therefore, that,
although section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382 is constitutional, respondent herein has a valid title
to his office as member of the Board of Medical Examiners.

Thus, one who does not claim to be entitled to the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another cannot question his title thereto by quo warranto. In the case at bar,
petitioners do not claim to entitled to the office held by respondent herein. None of them has
been appointed thereto and none of them may, therefore, be placed in said office, regardless of
the alleged flaws in respondent's title thereto. They merely assert a right to be appointed to said
office. Considering, however, that there are seven (7) petitioners and that only one (1) office is
involved in this case, none of them can, or does, give an assurance that he will be the one
appointed by the President, should said office be declared vacant.

Sec. 9 Art VIII – vacancy in Judiciary; nominees prepared by Judicial and Bar Council

Calderon vs Carale- Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government
officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
Constitution.

Sarmiento vs Mison –
156 SCRA 548
FACTS:
In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President Corazon Aquino. Petitioners questioned the
appointment of Mison as it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to
the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under
the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of COA. Sarmiento
also seeks to enjoin Guillermo Carague, then Secretary of the Department of Budget
from disbursing salary payments for Mison.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed the confirmation
given by the Commission on Appointments

HELD:

The 1987 Constitution framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers
needing confirmation by COA. There are four groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint. These groups are: 1) heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution; 2) all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3) those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group
are the only public officers appointed by the president which requires the
confirmation of COA. The position of Mison does not belong to the first group,
hence, his appointment need not be confirmed by the COA.

Tarrosa vs Singson
Law that requires the confirmation? Is is unconstitutional? Yes, cannot add provisions in the
law. Is quo waranto proper remedy? NO

The instant petition is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it seeks the ouster of
respondent Singson and alleges that the latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of
Governor of the Bangko Sentral (Cf. Castro v. Del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196 [1967]). Such a special
civil action can only be commenced by the Solicitor General or by a "person claiming to be
entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 66, Sec. 6; Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 [1905]).

Garafil vs OP; Villanueva vs OP--

All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section
15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional. Villanueva and Rosquita,
petitioners in G.R. No. 209138, did not appeal the CA's ruling under Rule 45, but instead filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This procedural error alone warrants an outright dismissal of
G.R. No. 209138. Even if it were correctly filed under Rule 45, the petition should still be
dismissed for being filed out of time.  There was also no explanation as to why they did not file a
40

motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision. Midnight Appointments

This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that "none of the
petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued
(and released) before the ban."  The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the
41

only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President Macapagal-
Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent
both agree that all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

CSC – constitutional limitation to the power of the President to appoint; it’s CSC’s
constitutional mandate

CESB is an attached agency of the CSC; it is a constituent body; independent level of

judgment; purported appointees of the president are the coverage

Office of the Ombudsman vs CSC

-OMB has independent judgment; action of the CESB is ultra vires when it requires CES for
position under the OMB

CESB vs CSC (en banc 2017)

Lawyer in the PAO must be a CESE holder; CESE for managerial but lawyers are not all
manager; SC: the approval by the CSC is sufficient to constitute the legal requirement for
lawyers.

Permanent nature of appointment – appointee can only be removed from office for cause
Temporary

Regular – broad; screening; accept;

Ad interim – congress in recess; needs confirmation by the CA; president cannot be
withdrawn provided you possess the qualifications

OIC – do not possess authority on legal and personnel actions

Doctrine of necessary implication – the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove (must be expressly provided to apply the doctrine)

On 12 January 2011, the CESB issued Resolution No. 918  (CESB Resolution No, 918) denying
21

the PAO's request to declassify the subject positions. Citing the Position Classification
Study  submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in question "require
22

leadership and managerial competence"  and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the
23

appointment of persons without third-level eligibility for these posts cannot be considered
permanent

On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in
violation of R.A. 9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-
level eligibility - for purposes of permanent appointments to certain PAO positions.

HELD: we find that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and
reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level eligibility is not
required for the subject positions.
On the other hand, the CSC argues that nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas
Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a reference to third-level eligibility and CESO rank as
qualification requirements. It emphasizes that the CESB cannot add to the provisions of these
laws, which only require the practice of law for a certain period of time and presuppose a bar
license. The PAO, for its part, maintains that the posts concerned are highly technical in nature
because they primarily involve legal practice, and any managerial functions performed are
merely incidental to their principal roles. It also claims that the legislature could never have
intended to require third-level eligibility for occupants of the subject posts when it enacted R.A.
9406.

After a careful consideration of the relevant statutes and rules, this Court agrees with the
conclusion of the CSC. To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-
level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent.

CESB vs CSC (2018)

Is the dismissal of Lodevico as Director III, Recruitment and Career Development Services from
the CESB, proper?

HELD: We consider Lodevico's appointment as mere temporary. Such being the case, her
services may be terminated with or without cause as she merely serves at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. "[T]he temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he
shall surrender the office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority."  Consequently,
44

her removal from service based on MC Nos. 1 and 2, which discharged all non-CESO occupying
CES positions in all agencies, was proper.

Thus, petitioners are correct in stating that mere appointment of Lodevico as Director III and her
CES eligibility do not automatically mean that her appointment becomes a permanent one. It is
necessary that she be appointed in an appropriate CES rank to convert her temporary
appointment into a permanent one.

Republic vs Serreno
Can Chief Justice be removed by SolGen? Yes
Can Quo warranto be the proper remedy? (instead of impeachment) – could be used as a
remedy to remove: 1) constitution provides the qualification; 2) lawyer must possesses the
integrity, probity and independence;
Integrity – judicious submission of SALN
Defense of Serreno – Doblada doctrine applies
The law punishes lack of filing of SALN and not lack of record
Integrity is doing what is good when no one is watching (J. Tijam)

Simon vs CHR – SC: no quasi-judicial body; no law that grants the same
Carino vs CHR
Cudia vs PMA

Can only be removed impeachable officers through impeachment???

Gonzales vs OP – is there a right of the Pres to dismiss the deputy ombudsman?

Special Prosecutor – appointed by Pres; recommended by ombudsman
 - Power to appoint carries with it the power to remove
- In the MR, SC: so as not to cause any undue influence to the office of the ombudsman,
we have to respect the Ombudsman; the President cannot remove the deputy
ombudsman; Special Prosecutor – under the President

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a
48 

general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The
49 

exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to
remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some
cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to
appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme
Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section
2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue
of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The
Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the
Commission on Elections Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2),
Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be
appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment
(Section 2, Article XI).

(2014) MR

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 1
O-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered
REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation
in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the
continuation of OP-DC Case No. ll-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for
alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of
public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. 3

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,  the Court resolved to reverse its
108

September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We
declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the
President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7,  the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of
109

RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled
to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2)

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy
Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible
administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations.
Carandang – conduct investigation against Duterte and family; Pres issued Order
(presumption it is lawful); Ombudsman did not execute the decision because of the
Gonzales ruling

Section 17= President’s control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

-Power of Control – refers to the power of an officer to ALTER OR MODIFY OR NULLIFY or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done and to SUBSTITUTE THE JUDGMENT of the former
for that of the latter

Drilon vs Lim (1994)

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of
the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon
did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the
Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in
his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more
nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

-SUPERVISION – IS OVERSEEING, the power to see that subordinate; only when it exercise
beyond the norms that it is ultra vires; that the one being supervised exercised within the
norm

On National National to Local Government – it’s a general supervision, not control

LGU- controlled by law-LGC

Determination of Probable cause – executive function

On drug case – cannot be dismissed by the Fiscal unless there is imprimatur coming from
the Pres thru the Exec Sec.

Power of Control in relation to exhaustion of administrative remedies

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative remedies - Apply on quasi- judicial powers

Faithful Execution Clause – until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the
president has the duty to enforce it.

Biraogo vs Phil. Truth Commission – mandate is to go back after the past administration.
Issue= nature/function of PTC- fact finding body? Quasijudicial?- receive evidence and try to
make a conclusion of fact; quasi judicial – at the same time determine obligation and rights
of the parties and has to have jurisdiction conferred by law

Is there a law creating the PTC? None, it is executive; only a fact finding body- Sec. 17.
Faithfully execute the laws of the land. PTC was created to look into the ill gotten, the law is
RA 3019

Araneta vs Gatmaitan – authority to make IRR is the DENR sec but have been made by the
President; valid under the qualified political agency

On PDAF: J Jardaleza – moot and academic because the President said that it will not
implement the law; J. Carpio – can the Pres avoid the execution/implementation of the law?

Pangilinan v Cayetano – Pres Duterte withdrawal from Rome Statute, the International
Criminal Court; Can the Pres withdraw from the treaty without concurrence from the
congress, can the Pres do that? – J Leonen: the treaty and the executive agreement has the
force and effect of a law but is not a law; J Carpio: an executive agreement has a status of a
law;

Demegillo vs TIDCORP
- The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various
executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
President himself should disapprove such acts. BUT this doctrine could not be extended to the
acts of the BOD of TIDCORP, such cabinet members sat on the BOD of TIDCORP ex officio, or
by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to BOD by the
President. Evidently, it was the law that sat them and not the President.

Appointment from the Pres without a Law, is personal – Qualified Political Agency;
Exec Sec – best example of QPA

David vs Arroyo –
the assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature,
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives”.
To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call
the military to enforce or implement certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing
family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the like. She can only
order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

Ocampo vs Enriquez – libingan ng mga bayani

Notwithstanding the non-use of the law, the law does not become ineffectual; it simply
means not implemented; only a subsequent law can repeal a law

Associate Justice Arturo Brion, one of the justices who voted in favor of the hero’s
burial for the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, said President Rodrigo Duterte’s
position was a “political question” that the high tribunal did not have jurisdiction to
review. In his concurring opinion, Brion also noted that petitioners against the
President’s directive failed to cite a law prohibiting Marcos’ interment at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Here’s a summary of Brion’s concurring opinion, as released by the SC public
information office:

Judicial review, even under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, does not empower
the Court to review allegations involving violations of statutes;
The faithful execution clause cannot be made the basis for questioning the manner
by which the Executive implements the law;
The petitioners failed to point to a specific treaty obligation prohibiting the burial
at the LNMB;
The Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos administration, should not
be so interpreted as to prevent reconciliation and moving forward in the name of
national unity; and
The necessity of Marcos’s burial at the LNMB is a political question that had been
decided by the President, and not without support from the Filipino electorate.
The necessity of Marcos’s burial at the LNMB is a political question that had been
decided by the President, and not without support from the Filipino electorate.

Voting 9-5 with one abstention, the high court on Tuesday gave the green light for
Marcos’ burial at the heroes’ cemetery, noting that Duterte did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in exercising his prerogativ

President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos buried at the

Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) is a political question. This means that the
question is not whether it is legal to do so but whether it is the wise thing to
do. So if President Duterte thinks it will promote national healing and
forgiveness, even if the SC disagrees with that, it cannot stop him unless
he is doing an illegal act.

Preliminary rights of the President – Biraogo vs PTC

Gabo vs CA
Application of equipoise rule - the "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when
the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of
such evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused.

Fiscal – there is probable cause

Court – no probable cause
CA – can intervene that there is no probable cause?
Nature of the investigation- Preliminary investigation? Or adjudication of rights (quasi-
judicial)
- Should elevate to city state prosecutor (exhaustion of administrative remedies)

Estrada vs Ombudsman- invoked the right to examine the witnesses; ombudsman –

preliminary investigation; quantum of evidence is substantial likelihood
Ang Tibay vs CIR – applicable because there was a quasi judicial function exercise; quantum
of evidence is substantial evidence

Section 18= the President is the Commander-in-Chief

POWERS VESTED – military powers

- Calling out powers

- Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
- Declaration of martial law

Lagman vs Medialdea
Duterte declared martial in Mindanao – political or justiciable question

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.
2. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately.
3. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated
powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers,
(2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of
martial law.
4. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen.
He need not even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority
to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely
independent from Congress’ duty to review.

It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the
exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress
may revoke the proclamation or suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the
President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.”
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper
and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an
appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is
automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and
independently from, the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or
default on the part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the
Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.

The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order
which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not
dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,
the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the
time of the declaration.

The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the
facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.
The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual
bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there
is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the
internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and
are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth
of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along
with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely
than not, actual rebellion exists.

Calling out – political question (IBP vs Zamora) – pres Estrada called out the Navy
personnel; SC: political question and the limitation is grave abuse

Declaration of martial law – political question; can be justiciable question when there is
insufficiency of the factual basis

Lansang vs Garcia – SC sustained the right of a citizen to question the same

If the issue is the nature of the wisdom of the President – it is political

Fortun vs Arroyo
Declaration of martial law by arroyo was not yet acted by congress; SC: it’s premature to file
because the congress did not yet determine

Lagman vs Medialdea modified ruling of the Fortun vs Arroyo; independent= Congress and
SC : The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition
“in an appropriate proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism
is automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension was made.

Who extends martial law- congress upon initiative of the Pres

What is the time limit of the declaration? – 60 days; but in the extension – no limit

COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT RULE - Principle stronger than political question; judgment of two
branch of the government

It is the privilege and not the writ of habeas corpus that is suspended
The following are the constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the power of the President to proclaim
martial law:

a. There must be actual invasion or rebellion;

b. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty days;
c. Within forty-eight hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. If Congress is not in session,
it must convene within twenty-four hours;
d. Congress may by majority vote of all its members voting Jointly revoke the proclamation, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation;
e. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon Initiative of the President, Congress may extend the
proclamation If the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires the extension;
f. The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme Court must
decide the case within thirty days from the time it was filed;
g. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation
of the Constitution.
h. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts and of Congress. Military courts have no
Jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able to function (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed.,
pp. 213- 214).

Command Responsibility- the Pres is liable on the ground of command responsibility;

there must be superior-inferior relation and failure to punish

Mamba case = the pres cannot be held liable on the ground of command responsibility
alone, but on responsibility and accountability- by preventing and failure to punish

Habeas Corpus – is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to
produce the body of the prisoner to the court

Writ of Amparo – remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity.

Writ of Habeas Data – judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the
right to informational privacy of individuals

Sec. 19 = Except in cases of impeachment, or otherwise provided in the constitution, the

Pres may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons….

Pardoning power – absolute discretion

Constitutional limitation – art. IX.- if a person violated the Election Omnibus Code; the Pres
cannot give pardon without the Commission’s recommendation

SC: Estrada can be pardoned, in case of doubt, rule in favour of absolute pardon- in favour
of the accused

Monsanto vs Factoran
- Public officer, convicted and pardoned; pardon is prospective- conviction remains but
the effect is extinguished
- Not liable for the actuation; no vested right in the previously held position
Pelobello vs Palatino – was pardoned and gave back the position because did not actually
committed the act pardoned of.

Amnesty vs. Pardon

BASIS AMNESTY PARDON

Nature of the Addressed to Political offenses Addressed to Ordinary offenses
offense
As to whom granted Granted to a class of persons Granted to individuals
As to concurrence of Requires concurrence of Does not require concurrence of Congress
Congress majority of all members of
Congress
Nature of the act Public act which the court may Private act which must be pleaded and
take judicial notice of proved
As to perspective Looks backward and puts to Looks forward and relieves the pardonee of
oblivion the offense itself the consequence of the offense
When granted May be granted before or after Only granted after conviction by final
conviction judgment
As to acceptance Need not be accepted Must be accepted

Sec. 20 – Pres may contract or guarantee foreign loans

Neri case – successful in invoking executive privilege

Sec 21 – treaty or international agreement – concurred by at least 2/3 of all the member of
the senate

Pimentel vs Executive Secretary (p 577)

Ratify – executive prerogative
Concurrence – congress- SENATE

Treaty-making power is exclusive to the President.

Requisites of Executive Agreement:
-agreement must be between states
-it must be written
-it must be governed by international law

2018 CASE
LAGMAN VS PIMENTEL III
GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, 236155
February 6, 2018

TOPIC: martial law extension

FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole
of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by
members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives his written Report,
citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter,
the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives issued
House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the Proclamation and finding no
cause to revoke the same.

On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.

In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP Chief of Staff General
Guerrero, recommended the further extension of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January
1, 2018 “for compelling reasons based on current security assessment.”

On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a similar

recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired
Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist
Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and
their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and
reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic
development and prosperity in Mindanao.”

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December 8, 2017, asked
both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as
the Congress may determine.

On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint session,
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending the period of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year,
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.

ISSUE:

PROCEDURAL:
Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 fatal to
their petitions.
Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent.
Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated petitions.
Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment from
examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao.
Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking review of the
extension of Proclamation No. 216.
Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s request for
extension of martial law is subject to judicial review.
Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the period of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216.
Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner of the
President’s exercise of military powers.
Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for the issuance
of an injunctive writ.
HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ failure to attach Resolution of Both Houses No.
4 fatal to their petitions. NO.

The Court held that since Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an official act of Congress, the
they can take judicial notice thereof. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that
a court can take judicial notice of the official acts of the legislative department without the
introduction of evidence.

Moreover, the Court noted that respondents annexed a copy of the Resolution to their
Consolidated Comment.

SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the President should be dropped as party respondent. YES.

The Court held that the President should be dropped as party respondent considering that
he enjoys the presidential immunity from suit.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, to wit:

It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.

THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress was an indispensable party to the consolidated
petitions. YES.

The Court held that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of sufficient
factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto.

The Court further ruled that in these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the
constitutionality of a congressional act, specifically the approval of the President’s request
to extend martial law in Mindanao. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not
just its leadership, which has interest in the subject matter of these cases.

FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Court was barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment from examining the persistence of rebellion in Mindanao. NO.

The Court held that as to the second requirement, there was np identity of issues between
the Lagman and Padilla cases, on one hand, and the case at bar.

Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the re-litigation
of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits. In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is required.

The issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman case, which this Court already
settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion which would trigger the President’s
initial declaration of martial law, whereas the factual issue in the case at bar refers to the
persistence of the same rebellion in Mindanao which would justify the extension of martial
law.

The fact that petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the
rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of the
Court’s judgment on the sufficiency of the factual basis for a declaration of martial law.

Verily, the Court’s review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing factual
scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of rebellion or
invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be re-examined, in order to make a
justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify an
extension of a state of martial law.
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari)
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution in seeking
review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216. NO.

The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they emphasized that the
Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and specific,
different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed
therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is
tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency
powers.

Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5
of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for certiorari will
emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII, which was precisely
meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial law abuse and limit the
extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s expanded jurisdiction is
not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the Congress’
extension of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.

PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW

Congressional check on martial law

Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers thus consists of:

The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or suspension. The
review is “automatic in the sense that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time
after the proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke the
proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or suspension, upon the
President’s initiative, for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or rebellion
persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or suspension, as

described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a “joint executive and
legislative act” or a “collective judgment” between the President and the Congress.
SIXTH ISSUE: Whether or not the manner in which Congress deliberated on the President’s
request for extension of martial law is subject to judicial review. NO.

The Court ruled that they cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence
of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-quoted rules of
the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.

Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating its rules,
the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
et al. explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals only with the imperatives
of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that there must be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained.

In the instant case, the rules in question did not pertain to quorum, voting or publication.
Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the
consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such matter as
urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the factual
situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of Congress did not
review and study the President’s request based on a bare allegation that the time allotted
for deliberation was too short.

SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine the
period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many times
the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to
extend such proclamation or suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the
President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s review of
the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the proclamation and
suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on its duration;
thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period to be determined by
the Congress.”

Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was not adopted
by the majority of the Commission’s members. The framers evidently gave enough flexibility
on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual
reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension,
the determinative factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety
requires” such extension.

EIGHTH ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to
extend Proclamation No. 216. YES.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension
of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.

Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the
rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its
“remnants” have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying
on through the recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces and continued attacks.

AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the
DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that Foreign
Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah
Islamiyah.

Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the DAESH/ISIS-
inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the Congress’ Joint Session
on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in Marawi has substantially
changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to other places in Mindanao.

Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public

The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which the extension was
based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the general public.

The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate
from and are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, “the Court will have to
rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive
Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”

The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the· AFP gave its
“briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had been
vetted by the NICA, “based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from
personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified official
documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP, the same
presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it stands, the information thus
presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its reliability.

The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply establish that
rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is significantly endangered by it. The Court,
thus, holds that there exists sufficient factual basis for the further extension sought by the
President and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.

NINTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and manner
of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO.

The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the determination of which
among the Constitutionally given military powers should be exercised in a given set of
factual circumstances is a prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as
provided under Section 18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its
own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these military powers should be
exercised.

TENTH ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were able to comply with all the requisites for
the issuance of an injunctive writ. NO.

By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have the burden to

establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and
urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy,
and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on respondents’
gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the martial law in Mindanao
for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that petitioner Villarin, a Davao City
resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law in Mindanao “which would
spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner Villarin who is a steadfast
critic of the Duterte administration and of the brutalities committed by police and military
forces”.

The alleged violations of the petitioners’ civil liberties do not justify the grant of injunctive
relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged violations are directly attributable to
the imposition of martial law. They likewise failed to establish the nexus between the
President’s exercise of his martial law powers and their unfounded apprehension that the
imposition “will target civilians who have no participation at all in any armed uprising or
struggle”. Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the “civil liberties” specifically refer
to, and how the extension of martial law in Mindanao would threaten these “civil liberties”
in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently, petitioners’ right is doubtful or disputed, and can
hardly be considered a clear legal right, sufficient for the grant of an injunctive writ.

This Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon
competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances.
We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive writ cannot be properly resolved by
suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth
must have to be determined by the procedural rules of admissibility and proof.

Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports petitioners’
theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be utilized as ground either to enjoin
the President from exercising the power to declare martial law, or the Congress in extending
the same. To sanction petitioners’ plea would result into judicial activism, thereby going
against the principle of separation of powers.

As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such transgressions can
be addressed in a separate and independent court action. Hence, petitioners can lodge a
complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor’s office or file a direct complaint before the
appropriate courts against erring parties.