Week 1: Nature of Political Law and Constitution, In General

1.     Introduction to the Course

a.     Components of Political Law as Bar Subject

 POLITICAL LAW
 LABOR LAW
 TAXATION LAW
 CIVIL LAW
 MERCANTILE LAW
 CRIMINAL LAW
 REMEDIAL LAW
 LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS

b.     Coverage of Constitutional Law I under Law Curriculum

Constitutional Law I, which is the particular subject of this work, is a study of the structure and powers of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It also deals with certain basic concepts of Political
Law, such as nature of the State, supremacy of the constitution, the separation of powers, and the rule of
majority.

2.     Definition & Nature of Political Law

Definition: Political Law is that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of
the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its
territory.

Necessity for the study: every citizen, regardless of calling, should understand the mechanics and
motivations of his government. This must be so because “sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from the.” It is upon active involvement in public affairs of every Filipino
that the success of the Republic of the Philippines will depend.

Basis: Constitution of the Philippines – Feb 2, 1987

a.     Change in sovereignty

Case: Macariola vs Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Hon. Elias Asuncion presided the case at the Court of the First Instance of Leyte between Bernardita
Macariola and her siblings regarding the partition of the lands of their deceased father. The decision was
reached with no appeal by the parties. However, an agreement between the parties (unsigned by them)
was delivered by their respective lawyers to Judge Asuncion and was approved by the latter. It was
however assured by both the counsels of each party that they are authorized to sign the agreement and
that the Project of Partition had been made after the conference of the parties and therefore
knowledgeable about the full extent of the partition. Thereafter, Lot 1184-E, which was included on the
case mentioned before was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon on July 31, 1964; Proper documents was
executed to make a valid sale. A portion of this land was sold to Judge Asuncion and his wife. Both
parties transferred the said land to the “The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.” wherein
the Asuncions are stockholders.
ISSUE/S NOTED:

Macariola raised the following issues with the court:

That Judge Asuncion violated Art. 1491, Par. 5 of the New Civil Code regarding the acquisition of the land
involved in the case decided by him,

That he also violated Art. 14 of, Par. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce; Section 3, Par. H of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practice Act; Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; and the Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics by his association to the “The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc.” as a stockholder and as an officer of the same;

That the respondent was guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan (also a stockholder of Traders)
who claimed (although false) as a practicing attorney;

That the respondent was culpable from defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics.

The following are the basis for the decision of the court if the respondent was guilty on any grounds.

HELD/DECISION:

The court decided in favor of the respondent in each complains of Macariola for the following
explanations:

Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code, the prohibition to acquire certain properties applied to justices,
judges, prosecuting attorneys and other officers connected with the administration of justice and includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers with respect to the property and rights which
may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession on the grounds
that the following professionals occupy positions of trust and confidence and therefore imbued with their
position is public trust. However, the said limitation only applies to properties which are still under
litigation. Hence, since the acquired lot is part of a final judgment and no longer under any litigation, there
was no violation of Article 1491. The sale also was not made directly to Judge Asunsion and there are no
apparent evidence that Dr. Galapon acted only as a mediator between Judge Asuncion and the owners of
the land that will otherwise show that the sale is illegal and unethical.

14 of the Code of Commerce states that “justices, judges and officials of public prosecution on actual
services cannot engage in commerce, nor they can hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or
financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits on where they discharge their
duties.” To answer if the following provision was violated, we go back to People vs. Perfecto (G.R. No. L-
18463, see previous case digest) and the court argued that the Code of Commerce was adapted from the
Spanish Code of Commerce and therefore was abrogated due to the American sovereign over the
Philippines under the principle that when there is a change in sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless the contrary is provided by the new sovereign. With
regards to Section 3, Par. H of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, the court found no evidence to
support that Judge Asuncion used his influence and his position for Traders to gain undue advantage on
its business and on any litigation the company faced. Further, Judge Asuncion disposed his interest with
the corporation by selling his stocks 22 days after the incorporation, thus showing that Judge Asuncion’s
intention to uphold Canon 25 of the Judicial Ethics (“A judge should abstain from making personal
investment in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation of his court….”). Finally, the Civil
Service Act of 1959 does not apply to the members of the Judiciary, as the latter is under the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
Although Judge Asuncion was clearly friends with Tan, the former acted in good faith claiming that he did
not know Tan as an impostor, there is also no indication that Judge Asuncion was influenced with his
relation with Tan that may impair his obligation as a Judge to uphold justice and public interest. There is
also no evidence that will show that the respondent had given Tan any advantage on court, or any other
way that Tan may be benefitted.

Although the court therefore found no evidence that Judge Asuncion violated his duties, he is reminded to
be mindful regarding his private and business dealings, as the Judiciary holds a position of public trust
and confidence and must always uphold honesty and integrity in the public service.

b.     Principle of postliminy – political laws of the occupied territory are merely suspended,
subject to revival upon the end of occupation

Case: Peralta vs Director of Prisons, GR No. L-49, November 12, 1949

Facts:

Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision
and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other necessaries... was
prosecuted for the crime of robbery

He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced... to serve on August 21,
1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the
Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of... which are repugnant to those aims and political
purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America,
and therefore, null and void... that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve...
the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided
for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code."... he City Fisc

The City Fiscal of Manila... submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following
grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal

Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political
complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were
penalized heavily, in response to an urgent... necessity, according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7;
that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure
established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the

Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without... due process of law.

Issues:

The questions which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first,
the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the ...
summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imposes upon
the petitioner the penalty of life imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they
were then valid, the effect on... said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
Ruling:

"The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state
independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government
established by the belligerent occupant or the

Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission,
and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government.
As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation... of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been
already quoted, 'under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines"
was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the... peoples' will nor
the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence
to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty
of, the Filipino people,... before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an
absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the
law of nations."

(1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by
Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which
promulgated said law or ordinance. It is... well established in International Law that "The criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the
conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely from the law martial as denned in the... usages of
nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and
procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
authorities of the... occupied district."

A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and
in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may
nevertheless,... so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and
safety, temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is
administered as well as the laws regarding... procedure." (Oppenheim'si International Law, Vol. II, sixth
edition, 1944, p. 349.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and
valid, since it was within the admitted power or... competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate
the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.

We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon,
supra, that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be
valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that
doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or
liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas.

It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of
the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive
effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner under said
law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect.

We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the
military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto
upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.
In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that
the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

3.     Constitution, in General

a.     Nature, basic principles

1st Commonwealth constitution-1935

2nd Constitution of 1973- Marcos regime

3rd Freedom Constitution

4th Constitution – Feb 2 1987

Supremacy of the Constitution – constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform

State- community of persons permanently occupying a fixed territory, and possessed of an independent
government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.

Nation- nasci-to be borsn, relation of birth or origin and implies a common race.

Elements of state – people, territory, government and sovereignty(self-governing state, supreme power)

b.     Construction and interpretation

               i.     Self-executing and non-self- executing provisions

Self-executing – provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies as sufficient rule by means of which the right
it grants may be enjoyed and protected, is self-executing.

Non self-executing- a provision which lays down a general provision

c.     Amendment and Revision

ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS:

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention,
or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

Amendment – change only a few specific provisions

Revision – alteration of different portions of entire Constitution. It may result in rewriting whether the
whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important provisions.

d. RA 6735 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Approved, August 4, 1989. 15 days

SECTION 1. Title.—This Act shall be known as “The Initiative and Referendum Act.”

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy.—The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

4.     Cases: Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, (1997)

I.      THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its
stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
 Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the
  2.
Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3.    Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph
2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4.   Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a
Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III.   THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1.    YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
self-executing but simply for purposes of style.  But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
statute squares with the Constitution.  Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. The argument is flawed.  If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony.  A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement.  From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.  It is per se judicially enforceable.  When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred.  And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to
enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.  Where there is a right there
is a remedy.  Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2.    YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony
as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and  failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood.  Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.  For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel.  In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.   Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands.

3.    YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10,

paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval
of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.  [T]his fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.”  In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action”
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action.  It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.”  Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State.  After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and judicial.  Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the
State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government.  It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.

4.    YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder.  The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals.  Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder.  Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.   For
 in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
interested parties.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason  the Highest Bidder cannot
be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the
block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid.  In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.  And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm
the award should go to the Filipino.  It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.  For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded.  To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

           
Collector of Customs vs Villaluz (1976)
            
  MAKASIAR, J.:p

G.R. No. L-34038

On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint with respondent
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4713, (b) Central Bank Circular No. 265, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The Central Bank Act, and (c)
Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937, in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act, claiming that Cesar T.
Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously brought into the country FORTY (40)
cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary
permit from the proper authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. The
Customs Examiner assigned further asked him if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative. And in utter
disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars particularly C.B. Circular 265, as amended, the respondent brought into the country various
Philippine Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00) Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the pieces of baggage
examined by the assigned customs examiner, without any prior permit from the Central Bank authorities. ... " (p. 11, rec.).

Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation,
and on July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering
the return to private respondent the amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No.
B103813, and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty (40)
cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey"
(p. 13, rec.).

Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles
so stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of
seizure proceedings thereon." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for
"Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay
City.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order
dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary
investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with
prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without
authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.

In due time, respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and subsequently both parties
submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
JM Tuason Co. Inc. vs Land Tenure Adm., GR No. L-21064,                                               February
18, 1970

FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others.
Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of
equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included within its terms. Those adversely
affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no
support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that veterans
subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did
petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.

 Expropriation of tatalon estate

 this Court is called upon to inquire further into how far the power of Congress under the
constitution to authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of lands to
be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals
 this Court in passing upon the scope of the power of the President conferred by statute
"to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and
to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and
under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants"
 On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616 took effect without executive approval. It is
therein provided: "The expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City jointly owned by
the J. M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio
Deudor, et al., is hereby authorized."6 As noted in the appealed decision:
 The lands involved in this action, to which Republic Act No. 2616 refer and which constitute a
certain portion of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision, have a total area of about 109 hectares
and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 42774 and 49235 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal (Quezon City) registered in the name of petitioner. 7
 Thereafter, on November 15, 1960, respondent Land Tenure Administration was directed by the
then Executive Secretary to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate.
Not losing any time, petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed before the lower court on November
17, 1960 a special action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondents praying
that the above act be declared unconstitutional, seeking in the meanwhile a preliminary injunction
to restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation proceeding, thereafter to be made
permanent after trial. The next day, on November 18, 1960, the lower court granted the prayer for
the preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P20,000.00 bond. After trial, the lower court
promulgated its decision on January 10, 1963 holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as amended is
unconstitutional and granting the writ of prohibition prayed for.
 4. There need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is
without limit. As in the case of the more general provision on eminent domain, there is the
explicit requirement of the payment of just compensation. It is well-settled that just
compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity,
not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land
taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the
market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received for such property. There must be a consideration then of all the facts which make it
commercially valuable. The question is what would be obtained for it on the market from
 parties who want to buy and would give full value. Testimonies as to real estate transactions
in the vicinity are admissible. It must be shown though that the property as to use must be of
similar character to the one sought to be condemned. The transaction must likewise be
coeval as to time. To the market value must be added the consequential damages, if any,
minus the consequential benefits. The assessed value of real property while
constituting prima facie evidence of its value in case of condemnation proceedings is not
conclusive. 37
 Then, too, it is a prerequisite for the valid exercise of such a congressional power that the
taking be for the public use. To quote from the Guido decision: "It has been truly said that
the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of one citizen and
transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted
thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle and
fundamental maxim of a free government." 38 It is on that account that we granted prohibition to
restrain respondent Rural Progress Administration from proceeding with the expropriation of
petitioner's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial with a combined area of slightly more than
two hectares. As was stressed by Justice Tuason in his opinion: "No fixed line of demarcation
between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judged
according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the
case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or
public use." 39 Such is not the situation before us now. Nor are we disposed to dispute the
legislative appraisal of the matter.
 6. It is primarily the equal protection guaranty though that petitioner's case is made to rest.
The Constitution requires that no person be denied "the equal protection of the laws." 48 A
juridical being is included within its terms.
 The assumption underlying such a guaranty is that a legal norm, whether embodied in a rule,
principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against anarchy at one extreme and tyranny at
the other. Thereby, people living together in a community with its myriad and complex
problems can minimize the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a
peaceful ordering of existence. The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to
all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor
be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which
is of the very essence of the idea of law.
 The judiciary can look into the facts then, no conclusiveness being attached to a
determination of such character when reliance is had either to the due process clause which
is a barrier against arbitrariness and oppressiveness and the equal protection guaranty
which is an obstacle to invidious discrimination.