Wills&succession (Arts.840 - 923) 1

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WILLS&SUCCESSION

 
ATTY.RISEL  CASTILO-­‐TALEON  
ARTS.840-­‐856(INSTITUTION  OF  HEIR)  
ARTS.857-­‐870(SUBSTITUTION  OF  HEIR)  
ARTS.871-­‐885(CONDITIONAL  TESTAMENTARY  DIPOSITION  &  
TESTAMENTARY  DISPOSITON  WITH  A  TERM)  
 
1.  RABADILLA  v.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  
 G.R.  No.  113725  29  June  2000  
 
FACTS:  
Testator  Aleja  Belleza  appended  a  codicil  to  his  last  will  and  testament  wherein  he  
instituted   Dr.   Jorge   Rabadilla   as   a   devisee   of   a   parcel   of   land   in   Bacolod.   Devisee  
herein   is   the   predecessor-­‐in-­‐   interest   of   the   petitioner.   The   codicil   was   duly  
probated  and  admitted  before  the  CFI  of  Negros  Occidental.  The  codicil  stated  that  
should   the   devisee   die   ahead   of   the   testator,   the   property   and   rights   shall   be  
inherited  by  his  children  and  spouse.  The  codicil  also  required  Rabadilla  to  deliver  
75   piculs   of   export   sugar   and   25   piculs   of   domestic   sugar   to   Maria   Marlina  
Cosculuella   y   Belleza,   and   should   he   die,   his   heir   shall   have   the   same   obligation.  
Lastly,   in   the   event   that   the   devisee   or   his   heir   shall   later   sell,   lease,   mortgage   the  
said   lot,   the   buyer,   lessee,   mortgagee   shall   also   have   the   obligation   to   deliver   the  
piculs.  Dr.  Rabadilla  died  in  1983  and  was  survived  by  his  wife  and  children  (pet).In  
1989,  Maria  Marlena  brought  a  complaint  against  the  heirs  to  enforce  the  provisions  
of   the   codicil   and   to   revert   the   ownership   to   the   heirs   of   the   testator.   The   RTC  
dismissed  the  complaint.  The  appellate  court  reversed  the  decision  of  the  trial  court.  
 
ISSUES:  
1.  DID  THE  HEIRS  OF  JORGE  RABADILLA  INHERITED  HIS  OBLIGATIONS  UNDER  
THE  CODICIL    
2.  WAS  THERE  A  SUBSTITUTION?  
 
RULING:  
1.   YES.   Under   Article   776   of   the   New   Civil   Code,   inheritance   includes   all   the  
property,   rights   and   obligations   of   a   person,   not   extinguished   by   his   death.  
Conformably,   whatever   rights   Dr.   Jorge   Rabadilla   had   by   virtue   of   subject   Codicil  
were  transmitted  to  his  forced  heirs,  at  the  time  of  his  death.  And  since  obligations  
not   extinguished   by   death   also   form   part   of   the   estate   of   the   decedent;   corollarily,  
the   obligations   imposed   by   the   Codicil   on   the   deceased   Dr.   Jorge   Rabadilla,   were  
likewise  transmitted  to  his  compulsory  heirs  upon  his  death.  
2.   NONE.   Substitution   is   the   designation   by   the   testator   of   a   person   or   persons   to  
take  the  place  of  the  heir  or  heirs  first  instituted.  Under  substitutions  in  general,  the  
testator   may   either   (1)   provide   for   the   designation   of   another   heir   to   whom   the  
property  shall  pass  in  case  the  original  heir  should  die  before  him/her,  renounce  the  
inheritance   or   be   incapacitated   to   inherit,   as   in   a   simple   substitution,   or   (2)   leave  
his/her   property   to   one   person   with   the   express   charge   that   it   be   transmitted  
subsequently   to   another   or   others,   as   in   a   fideicommissary   substitution.   The   Codicil  
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   1  
 
sued  upon  contemplates  neither  of  the  two.  In  simple  substitutions,  the  second  heir  
takes  the  inheritance  in  default  of  the  first  heir  by  reason  of  incapacity,  predecease  
or  renunciation.  In  the  case  under  consideration,  the  provisions  of  subject  Codicil  do  
not  provide  that  should  Dr.  Jorge  Rabadilla  default  due  to  predecease,  incapacity  or  
renunciation,   the   testatrix's   near   descendants   would   substitute   him.   What   the  
Codicil   provides   is   that,   should   Dr.   Jorge   Rabadilla   or   his   heirs   not   fulfill   the  
conditions   imposed   in   the   Codicil,   the   property   referred   to   shall   be   seized   and  
turned  over  to  the  testatrix's  near  descendants.  Neither  is  there  a  fideicommissary  
substitution.  In  a  fideicommissary  substitution,  the  first  heir  is  strictly  mandated  to  
preserve  the  property  and  to  transmit  the  same  later  to  the  second  heir.  In  the  case  
under   consideration,   the   instituted   heir   is   in   fact   allowed   under   the   Codicil   to  
alienate  the  property  provided  the  negotiation  is  with  the  near  descendants  or  the  
sister   of   the   testatrix.   Thus,   a   very   important   element   of   a   fideicommissary  
substitution   is   lacking;   the   obligation   clearly   imposing   upon   the   first   heir   the  
preservation  of  the  property  and  its  transmission  to  the  second  heir.  "Without  this  
obligation   to   preserve   clearly   imposed   by   the   testator   in   his   will,   there   is   no  
fideicommissary  substitution."  Also,  the  near  descendants'  right  to  inherit  from  the  
testatrix   is   not   definite.   The   property   will   only   pass   to   them   should   Dr.   Jorge  
Rabadilla   or   his   heirs   not   fulfill   the   obligation   to   deliver   part   of   the   usufruct   to  
private  respondent.  
Another   important   element   of   a   fideicommissary   substitution   is   also   missing.   Under  
Article   863,   the   second   heir   or   the   fideicommissary   to   whom   the   property   is  
transmitted   must   not   be   beyond   one   degree   from   the   first   heir   or   the   fiduciary.   A  
fideicommissary  substitution  is  therefore,  void  if  the  first  heir  is  not  related  by  first  
degree  to  the  second  heir.  In  the  case  under  scrutiny,  the  near  descendants  are  not  
at  all  related  to  the  instituted  heir,  Dr.  Jorge  Rabadilla.  
 
2.  BORADALBA  VS.  CA  
374  SCRA  522  
 
DOCTRINE:  
A   judicial   declaration   of   heirship   is   not   a   condition   precedent   in   order   that   an  
heir  may  validly  file  his/her  claim  in  the  estate  of  the  decedent  or  the  testator.  
Issue:   Whether   or   not   an   heir   should   show   judicial   declaration   of   heirship  
before  she/he  can  file  a  claim  to  the  estate  of  the  decedent  
 
FACTS:  
 
A  land  known  as  Lot  No.  1242  (Lot  No.  799-­‐C)  with  an  area  of  1,853  square  meters  
and  located  at  Barrio  Looc,  Mandaue  City,  is  the  subject  of  the  controversy.  This  lot  
is   part   of   a   parcel   of   land   situated   on   the   corner   of   Mabini   and   Plaridel   Streets   in  
Mandaue   City,   and   originally   owned   by   the   late   spouses   Carmeno   Jayme   and  
Margarita  Espina  de  Jayme.In  1947,  an  extra-­‐judicial  partition:  
 
1)1/3  in  favor  of  -­‐(a)  their  grandchild  Nicanor  Jayme,  the  deceased  spouse  of  private  
respondent  Candida  Flores  and  the  father  of  private  respondents  Emmanuel,  Dina,  
2   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
Evelia   and   Gesila,   all   surnamed   Jayme;   and   (b)   their   grandchild   Asuncion   Jayme-­‐
Baclay,   whose   heirs   are   private   respondents   Angelo   Baclay,   Elnora   Baclay   and  
Carmen  Jayme-­‐Daclan;  
 
2)1/3  to  their  daughter  Elena  Jayme  Vda.  de  Perez,  mother  of  petitioner  Teresita  P.  
Bordalba;  and  
 
3)1/3  to  an  unidentified  party.  
 
Built  on  the  land  adjudicated  to  the  heirs  of  the  spouses  is  Nicanor  Jayme’s  house,  
which  his  family  occupied  since  1945.  
Elena  Jayme  Vda.  de  Perez  alleged  that  the  lot  sought  to  be  registered  was  originally  
a   part   of   a   land   owned   by   her   late   parents,   the   spouses   Carmeno   Jayme   and  
Margarita  Espina  de  Jayme;  and  that  1/3  of  said  land  was  adjudicated  to  her  in  an  
extra-­‐judicial  partition.She  further   stated   that   a   portion   of   the   lot   for   which   title   is  
applied  for  is  occupied  by  Nicanor  Jayme  with  her  permission.  
Nicanor  opposed  stating  that  the  land  sought  to  be  registered  also  covers  the  land  
adjudicated  to  him  by  way  of  extra  judicial  partition.  
petitioner   was   successfully   granted   Free   Patent   No.   (VII-­‐I)   11421   and   Original  
Certificate   of   Title   No.   0-­‐571   (FP)   over   said   lot.   private   respondents   filed   with   the  
Regional   Trial   Court   of   Mandaue   City,   Branch   28,   the   instant   complaintagainst  
petitioner   Teresita   Bordalba,   spouses   Genaro   U.   Cabahug,   and   Rita   Capala,   Rural  
Bank  of  Mandaue  and  the  Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Lands.  
Petitioner,   on   the   other   hand,   averred   that   Lot   No.   1242   (799-­‐C)   was   acquired   by  
her  through  purchase  from  her  mother  who  was  in  possession  since  1947.  
the   trial   court,   finding   that   fraud   was   employed   by   petitioner   in   obtaining   Free  
Patent   No.   (VII-­‐I)   11421   and   OCT   No.   0-­‐571   (FP),   declared   said   patent   and   title   void  
and  ordered  its  cancellation.  However,  it  declared  that  spouses  Genaro  U.  Cabahug  
and  Rita  Capala  as  well  as  the  Rural  Bank  of  Mandaue  are  purchasers  and  mortgagee  
in  good  faith,  respectively;  and  consequently  upheld  as  valid  the  sale.  
Appealed   to   CA.   affirmed   with   modification   the   decision   of   the   trial  court.It  ruled  
that  since  private  respondents  are  entitled  only  to  1/3  portion  of  Lot  No.  1242  (799-­‐
C),   petitioner   should   be   ordered   to   reconvey   1/3   of   Lot   No.   1242   (799-­‐C)   to   private  
respondents.  
 
 
ISSUE:  
WHETHER   OR   NOT   AN   HEIR   SHOULD   SHOW   JUDICIAL   DECLARATION   OF  
HEIRSHIP   BEFORE   SHE/HE   CAN   FILE   A   CLAIM   TO   THE   ESTATE   OF   THE  
DECEDENT  
 
RULING:  
No.  Untenable  is  the  claim  of  petitioner  that  private  respondents  are  not  legal  heirs  
of   Nicanor   Jayme   and   Asuncion   Jayme-­‐Baclay.   Other   than   their   bare   allegations   to  
dispute   their   heirship,   no   hard   evidence   was   presented   by   them   to   substantiate  
their  allegations.  Besides,  in  order  that  an  heir  may  assert  his  right  to  the  property  
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   3  
 
of  a  deceased,  no  previous  judicial  declaration  of  heirship  is  necessary.  Considering  
that  Lot  No.1242  (799-­‐C),  the  subject  land  in  the  case  at  bar,  is  part  of  the  parcel  of  
land   over   which   private   respondents’   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest   is   entitled   to   1/3  
pro-­‐indiviso   share,   which   was   disregarded   by   petitioner   when   she   secured   a   Free  
Patent   and   Original   Certificate   of   Title   in   her   name,   to   the   exclusion   of   private  
respondents’   predecessors-­‐in-­‐interest,   the   trial   court   and   the   Court   of   Appeals,  
therefore,   did   not   err   in   upholding   the   right   of   private   respondents   as   co-­‐owners,  
and  ordering  the  petitioner  to  reconvey  1/3  of  the  lot  in  question  to  them.  
 
3.  HILARION,  JR.  and  ENRICO  ORENDAIN,  represented  by  FE  D.  ORENDAIN,  
Petitioners,-­‐  versus  -­‐  
TRUSTEESHIP  OF  THE  ESTATE  OF  DOÑA  MARGARITA  RODRIGUEZ,  
Respondent.  
NACHURA,  J.:  
 
FACTS:    
On   July   19,   1960,   the   decedent,   Doña   Margarita   Rodriguez,   died   without   issues   in  
Manila,  leaving  a  last  will  and  testament.  The  will  was  admitted  to  probate  by  virtue  
of   the   order   of   the   CFI   Manila   and   said   court   approved   the   project   of   partition  
presented   by   the   executor   of   Doña   Margarita   Rodriguez‘s   will.   As   provided   in   her  
will   Doña   Margarita   Rodriguez‘s   testamentary   dispositions   contemplated   the  
creation   of   a   trust   to   manage   the   income   from   her   properties   for   distribution   to  
beneficiaries   specified   in   the   will.After   almost   40   years   later,   herein   petitioners  
Hilarion,  Jr.  and  Enrico  Orendain,  heirs  of  Hilarion  Orendain,  Sr.  who  was  mentioned  
in   Clause   24   of   the   decedent‘s   will,   moved   to   dissolve   the   trust   on   the   decedent‘s  
estate,   which   they   argued   had   been   in   existence   for   more   than   twenty   years,   in  
violation  of  the  the  law.  
 
ISSUE:  WHETHER  OR  NOT  THE  TRUSTEESHIP  OVER  THE  PROPERTIES  LEFT  BY  
DOÑA  MARGARITA  RODRIGUEZ  CAN  BE  DISSOLVED  .  
 
RULING:  YES.  The  will  of  the  decedent  provides  for  the  creation  of  a  perpetual  trust  
for   the   administration   of   her   properties   and   the   income   accruing   therefrom,   for  
specified   beneficiaries.   The   trust,   only   insofar   as   the   first   twenty-­‐year   period   is  
concerned   should   be   upheld   however   after   20   years   the   trust   must   be   dissolved.  
Petitioners  were  correct  in  moving  for  the  dissolution  of  the  trust  after  the  twenty-­‐
year  period,but  they  are  not  necessarily  declared  as  intestate  heirs  of  the  decedent.  
The   last   will   and   testament   of   the   decedent   did   not   institute   heirs   to   inherit   the  
properties  under  the  void  clause.Hence  the  case  is  remanded  to  the  lower  court  for  
the   determination   of   the   heirship   of   the   intestate   heirs   of   the   decedent   where  
petitioners,  and  all  others  claiming  to  be  heirs  of  the  decedent,  should  establish  their  
status.  
WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   the   petition   is   GRANTED.   The   Order   of   the  
Regional  Trial  Court  of  Manila,  Branch  4  in  SP.  PROC.  No.  51872  is  REVERSED  and  
SET  ASIDE.  The  trust  approved  by  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  Manila,  Branch  4  in  SP.  

4   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
PROC.   No.   51872   is   DISSOLVED.   We   ORDER   the   Regional   Trial   Court   of   Manila,  
Branch  4  in  SP.  PROC.  No.  51872  to  determine  the  following:  
1.   the   properties   listed   in   Clause   10   of   Doña   Margarita   Rodriguez‘s   will,   constituting  
the   perpetual   trust,   which   are   still   within   reach   and   have   not   been   disposed   of   as  
yet;  and  
2.  the  intestate  heirs  of  Doña  Margarita  Rodriguez,  with  the  nearest  relative  of  the  
decedent  entitled  to  inherit  the  remaining  properties.  
 
4.  HEIRS  OF  CONTI  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS    
G.R.  No.  118464  December  21,  1998  
Bellosillo,  J:  
 
DOCTRINE:  
Art.   862.   The   Substitute   shall   be   subject   to   the   same   charges   and   conditions  
imposed   upon   the   instituted   heir,   unless   the   testator   has   expressly   provided  
the   contrary,   or   the   charges   or   conditions   are   personally   applicable   only   to  
the  heir  instituted.  
 
SPECIFIC  ISSUE:  
WHETHER   OR   NOT   PRIVATE   RESPONDENTS   WERE   THE   HEIRS   OF   LOURDES  
SAMPAYO  AND  THAT  THEY  WERE  ENTITLED  TO  THE  PARTITION  OF  THE  LOT  
AND  THE  IMPROVEMENTS  THEREON  
 
RULING:  
In   the   instant   case,   plaintiffs   [now   private   respondents]   were   able   to   prove   and  
establish  by  preponderance  of  evidence  that  they  are  the  collateral  heirs  of  deceased  
Lourdes   Sampayo   and   therefore   the   lower   court   did   not   err   in   ordering   herein  
plaintiffs   [now   private   respondents]   and   defendants   [now   petitioners]   to   submit   a  
project   of   partition   of   the   residential   house   and   lot   owned   in   common   by   the  
deceased   Lourdes   Sampayo   and   defendant   spouses   Conti   for   confirmation   by   the  
court   xxxx   Considering   our   earlier   finding   that   the   lower   court   did   not   err   in  
declaring  herein  plaintiffs  [now  private  respondents]  as  heirs  of  deceased  Sampayo  
and  therefore  entitled  to  inherit  her  property,  the  argument  of  the  appellants  [now  
petitioners]   that   the   plaintiffs   [now   private   respondents]   are   not   entitled   to  
partition  is  devoid  of  merit  (insertions  in  [  ]  supplied).  
Respondent  court  also  ruled,  citing  Hernandez  v.  Padua  and  Marabilles  v.  Quito,  that  
a   prior   and   separate   judicial   declaration   of   heirship   was   not   necessary   and   that  
private   respondents   became   the   co-­‐owners   of   the   portion   of   the   property   owned  
and  registered  in  the  name  of  Lourdes  Sampayo  upon  her  death  and,  consequently,  
entitled   to   the   immediate   possession   thereof   and   all   other   incidents/rights   of  
ownership  as  provided  for  by  law  including  the  right  to  demand  partition  under  Art.  
777   of   the   Civil   Code,   and   Ilustre   v.   Alaras   Frondosa   holding   that   the   property  
belongs  to  the  heirs  at  the  moment  of  death  of  the  decedent,  as  completely  as  if  he  
had  executed  and  delivered  to  them  a  deed  for  the  same  before  his  death.  
The  appellate  court  subsequently  denying  a  motion  for  reconsideration  upheld  the  
probative   value   of   the   documentary   and   testimonial   evidence   of   private  
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   5  
 
respondents   and   faulted   petitioners   for   not   having   subpoenaed   Josefina   if   they  
believed   that   she   was   a   vital   witness   in   the   case.   Hence,   petitioners   pursued   this  
case   arguing   that   a   complaint   for   partition   to   claim   a   supposed   share   of   the  
deceased   co-­‐owner   cannot   prosper   without   prior   settlement   of   the   latter's   estate  
and   compliance   with   all   legal   requirements,   especially   publication,   and   private  
respondents  were  not  able  to  prove  by  competent  evidence  their  relationship  with  
the  deceased.  
There   is   no   merit   in   the   petition.   A   prior   settlement   of   the   estate   is   not   essential  
before  the  heirs  can  commence  any  action  originally  pertaining  to  the  deceased  as  
we  explained  in  Quison  v.  Salud.  
Claro  Quison  died  in  1902.  It  was  proven  at  the  trial  that  the  present  plaintiffs  are  
next   of   kin   and   heirs,   but   it   is   said   by   the   appellants   that   they   are   not   entitled   to  
maintain   this   action   because   there   is   no   evidence   that   any   proceedings   have   been  
taken  in  court  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  Claro  Quison,  and  that  without  such  
settlement,  the  heirs  cannot  maintain  this  action.  There  is  nothing  in  this  point.  As  
well   by   the   Civil   Code   as   by   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   the   title   to   the   property  
owned  by  a  person  who  dies  intestate  passes  at  once  to  his  heirs.  Such  transmission  
is,  under  the  present  law,  subject  to  the  claims  of  administration  and  the  property  
may  be  taken  from  the  heirs  for  the  purpose  of  paying  debts  and  expenses,  but  this  
does  not  prevent  an  immediate  passage  of  the  title,  upon  the  death  of  the  intestate,  
from   himself   to   his   heirs.   Without   some   showing   that   a   judicial   administrator   had  
been  appointed  in  proceedings  to  settle  the  estate  of  Claro  Quison,  the  right  of  the  
plaintiffs  to  maintain  this  action  is  established.  
Conformably  with  the  foregoing  and  taken  in  conjunction  with  Arts.  777  and  494  of  
the   Civil   Code,   from   the   death   of   Lourdes   Sampayo   her   rights   as   a   co-­‐owner,  
incidental  to  which  is  the  right  to  ask  for  partition  at  any  time  or  to  terminate  the  co-­‐
ownership,  were  transmitted  to  her  rightful  heirs.  In  so  demanding  partition  private  
respondents  merely  exercised  the  right  originally  pertaining  to  the  decedent,  their  
predecessor-­‐in-­‐interest.  
Petitioners'   theory   as   to   the   requirement   of   publication   would   have   been   correct  
had  the  action  been  for  the  partition  of  the  estate  of  Lourdes  Sampayo,  or  if  we  were  
dealing   with   extrajudicial   settlement   by   agreement   between   heirs   and   the   summary  
settlement   of   estates   of   small   value.But   what   private   respondents   are   pursuing   is  
the   mere   segregation   of   Lourdes'   one-­‐half   share   which   they   inherited   from   her  
through  intestate  succession.  This  is  a  simple  case  of  ordinary  partition  between  co-­‐
owners.  
 
ARTS.  886-­‐914(LEGITIME)  
 
1.  MENDOZA  V.  DE  LOS  SANTOS  
G.R.  No.  176422  |March  20,  2013  
 
Topic:   Applicability   of   Reserva   Troncal;   First   cousins   of   the   descendant/  
prepositus   are   fourth   degree   relatives   and   cannot   be   considered   reservees/  
reservatarios    
 
6   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
Facts:    
The  subject  parcel  of  land  in  this  case  was  in  the  name  of  respondent  but  co-­‐  owned  
by   Victoria   Pantaleon,   who   bought   one-­‐half   of   the   property   from   petitioner   Maria  
Mendoza   and   her   siblings.   Petitioners   who   are   grandchildren   of   Placido   Mendoza  
(Placido)  and  Dominga  Mendoza  (Dominga)  alleged  that  the  properties  were  part  of  
Placido   and   Dominga’s   properties   that   were   subject   of   an   oral   partition   and  
subsequently   adjudicated   to   Exequiel.   After   Exequiel’s   death,   it   passed   on   to   his  
spouse   Leonor   and   only   daughter,   Gregoria;   but   thereafter   went   to   Gregoria   when  
Leonor   died   after.   Gregoria   died   intestate,   and   thereafter,   respondent,   who   is  
Leonor’s   sister,   adjudicated   unto   herself   all   these   properties   as   the   sole   surviving  
heir  of  Leonor  and  Gregoria.    
 
Hence,   petitioners   claim   that   the   properties   should   have   been   reserved   by  
respondent  in  their  behalf  and  must  now  revert  back  to  them,  applying  Article  891  
of   the   Civil   Code   on   reserva   troncal.   The   RTC   granted   their   action   for   Recovery   of  
Possession   by   Reserva   Troncal,   Cancellation   of   TCT   and   Reconveyance   but   on  
appeal  to  the  CA,  however,  reversed  and  set  aside  the  RTC  decision  and  dismissed  
the  complaint  filed  by  petitioners  and  also  denied  their  motion  for  reconsideration.    
 
ISSUE:  
 
1.   WON   THE   CA   GRIEVOUSLY   ERRED   IN   HOLDING   THAT   THE   SUBJECT  
PROPERTIES   ARE   NOT   RESERVABLE   PROPERTIES,   COMING   AS   THEY   DO   FROM  
THE  FAMILY  LINE  OF  THE  PETITIONERS  MENDOZAS.  -­‐  NO  
 
2.   WON   CA   GRIEVOUSLY   ERRED   IN   HOLDING   THAT   THE   PETITIONERS  
MENDOZAS  DO  NOT  HAVE  A  RIGHT  TO  THE  SUBJECT  PROPERTIES  BY  VIRTUE  
OF  THE  LAW  ON  RESERVA  TRONCAL.  -­‐  NO  
 
HELD:  
 
1.   The   CA   is   correct.   Based  on  the  circumstances  of  the  present  case,  Article  891  on  
Reserva  Troncal  is  not  applicable.  The  persons  involved  in  reserva  troncal  are:  (1)  
The   ascendant   or   brother   or   sister   from   whom   the   property   was   received   by   the  
descendant   by   lucrative   or   gratuitous   title;   (2)   The   descendant   or   prepositus  
(propositus)   who   received   the   property;   (3)   The   reservor   (reservista),   the   other  
ascendant  who  obtained  the  property  from  the  prepositus  by  operation  of  law;  and  
(4)  The  reservee  (reservatario)  who  is  within  the  third  degree  from  the  prepositus  
and   who   belongs   to   the   (linea   o   tronco)   from   which   the   property   came   and   for  
whom  the  property  should  be  reserved  by  the  reservor.  
 
It   should   be   pointed   out   that   the   ownership   of   the   properties   should   be   reckoned  
only   from   Exequiel’s   as   he   is   the   ascendant   from   where   the   first   transmission  
occurred,  or  from  whom  Gregoria  inherited  the  properties  in  dispute.  The  law  does  
not   go   farther   than   such   ascendant/brother/sister   in   determining   the   lineal  
character   of   the   property.   It   was   also   immaterial   for   the   CA   to   determine   whether  
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   7  
 
Exequiel   predeceased   Placido   and   Dominga   or   whether   Gregoria   predeceased  
Exequiel.   What   is   pertinent   is   that   Exequiel   owned   the   properties   and   he   is   the  
ascendant   from   whom   the   properties   in   dispute   originally   came.   Gregoria,   on   the  
other   hand,   is   the   descendant   who   received   the   properties   from   Exequiel   by  
gratuitous  title.  
 
Moreover,  Article  891  simply  requires  that  the  property  should  have  been  acquired  
by  the  descendant  or  prepositus  from  an  ascendant  by  gratuitous  or  lucrative  title.  A  
transmission   is   gratuitous   or   by   gratuitous   title   when   the   recipient   does   not   give  
anything  in  return.  At  risk  of  being  repetitious,  what  was  clearly  established  in  this  
case   is   that   the   properties   in   dispute   were   owned   by   Exequiel   (ascendant).   After   his  
death,  Gregoria  (descendant/prepositus)  acquired  the  properties  as  inheritance.  
 
2.  Petitioners,  Mendoza  et  al  cannot  be  considered  reservees/  reservatarios  as  they  
are   not   relatives   within   the   third   degree   of   Gregoria   from   whom   the   properties  
came.   The   person   from   whom   the   degree   should   be   reckoned   is   the  
descendant/prepositus―the   one   at   the   end   of   the   line   from   which   the   property  
came   and   upon   whom   the   property   last   revolved   by   descent.   It   is   Gregoria   in   this  
case.  Petitioners  are  Gregoria’s  fourth  degree  relatives,  being  her  first  cousins.  First  
cousins   of   the   prepositus   are   fourth   degree   relatives   and   are   not   reservees   or  
reservatarios.    
 
They  cannot  even  claim  representation  of  their  predecessors  Antonio  and  Valentin  
as  Article  891  grants  a  personal  right  of  reservation  only  to  the  relatives  up  to  the  
third   degree   from   whom   the   reservable   properties   came.   The   only   recognized  
exemption  is  in  the  case  of  nephews  and  nieces  of  the  prepositus,  who  have  the  right  
to  represent  their  ascendants  (fathers  and  mothers)  who  are  the  brothers/sisters  of  
the  prepositus  and  relatives  within  the  third  degree.  
 
2.  BERNARDINA   P.   BARTOLOME,   vs.SOCIAL   SECURITY   SYSTEM   and   SCANMAR  
MARITIME  SERVICES,  INC  
G.R.  No.  192531;  November  12,  2014  
Velasco,  Jr.  
 
TOPIC:   Civil   status   of   adopted   upon   death   of   adopter,   biological   parent   of  
adoptee  as  beneficiary  
 
   
FACTS:  
 
                               John   Colcol   was   employed   as   electrician   by   Scanmar   Maritime   Services,   Inc.  
He   was   enrolled   under   the   government’s   Employees’   Compensation   Program   (ECP).  
He   died   due   to   an   accident   while   on   board   the   vessel.   John   was,   at   the   time   of   his  
death,   childless   and   unmarried.   Thus,   petitioner   Bernardina   P.   Bartolome,   John’s  
biological  mother  and,  allegedly,  sole  remaining  beneficiary,  filed  a  claim  for  death  
benefits.  
8   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
 
                               SSS   denied   the   claim   on   the   ground   that   Bernardina   was   no   longer  
considered   as   the   parent   of   John   since   the   latter   was   legally   adopted   by   Cornelio  
Colcol.   As   such,   it   is   Cornelio   who   qualifies   as   John’s   primary   beneficiary,   not  
petitioner.  
 
                               According  to  the  records,  Cornelio  died  during  John’s  minority.  
 
ISSUES:  
 
1.WHETHER  OR  NOT  THE  DEATH  OF  THE  ADOPTER  DURING  THE  ADOPTEE’S  
MINORITY   RESULTS   TO   THE   RESTORATION   OF   THE   PARENTAL   AUTHORITY  
TO  THE  BIOLOGICAL  PARENTS  OF  THE  LATTER.  
 
2.WHETHER  OR  NOT  BERNARDINA  IS  CONSIDERED  AS  A  LEGAL  BENEFICIARY  
OF  JOHN.  
   
 
HELD:  
 
   
 
FIRST  ISSUE:  Yes.  
 
                               The  Court  ruled  that  John’s  minority  at  the  time  of  his  adopter’s  death  is  a  
significant   factor   in   the   case   at   bar.   Under   such   circumstance,   parental   authority  
should   be   deemed   to   have   reverted   in   favor   of   the   biological   parents.   Otherwise,  
taking   into   account   Our   consistent   ruling   that   adoption   is   a   personal   relationship  
and   that   there   are   no   collateral   relatives   by   virtue   of   adoption,   who   was   then   left   to  
care  for  the  minor  adopted  child  if  the  adopter  passed  away?  
 
                               The  Court  also  applied  by  analogy,    insofar  as  the  restoration  of  custody  is  
concerned,  the  provisions  of  law  on  rescission  of  adoption  wherein  if  said  petition  is  
granted,  the  parental  authority  of  the  adoptee’s  biological  parents  shall  be  restored  
if  the  adoptee  is  still  a  minor  or  incapacitated.  
 
                               The   manner   herein   of   terminating   the   adopter’s   parental   authority,   unlike  
the   grounds   for   rescission,   justifies   the   retention   of   vested   rights   and   obligations  
between  the  adopter  and  the  adoptee,  while  the  consequent  restoration  of  parental  
authority   in   favor   of   the   biological   parents,   simultaneously,   ensures   that   the  
adoptee,  who  is  still  a  minor,  is  not  left  to  fend  for  himself  at  such  a  tender  age.  
 
                               From   the   foregoing,   it   is   apparent   that   the   biological   parents   retain   their  
rights   of   succession   tothe   estate   of   their   child   who   was   the   subject   of   adoption.  
While  the  benefits  arising  from  the  death  of  an  SSS  covered  employee  do  not  form  
part  of  the  estate  of  the  adopted  child,  the  pertinent  provision  on  legal  or  intestate  
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   9  
 
succession   at   least   reveals   the   policy   on   the   rights   of   the   biological   parents   and  
those   by   adoption   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the   right   to   receive   benefits   from   the   adopted.   In   the  
same  way  that  certain  rights  still  attach  by  virtue  of  the  blood  relation,  so  too  should  
certain   obligations,   which,   the   Court   ruled,   include   the   exercise   of   parental  
authority,   in   the   event   of   the   untimely   passing   of   their   minor   offspring’s   adoptive  
parent.  
 
SECOND  ISSUE:  Yes.  
 
                               The   Court   held   that   Cornelio’s   adoption   of   John,   without   more,   does   not  
deprive  petitioner  of  the  right  to  receive  the  benefits  stemming  from  John’s  death  as  
a  dependent  parent  given  Cornelio’s  untimely  demise  during  John’s  minority.  Since  
the  parent  by  adoption  already  died,  then  the  death  benefits  under  the  Employees’  
Compensation   Program   shall   accrue   solely   to   herein   petitioner,   John’s   sole  
remaining  beneficiary.  
 
3.   GALA   vs.   ELLICE   AGRO-­‐INDUSTRIAL   CORPORATION   GR   No.   156819  
December  11,  2003  
Ynares-­‐Santiago,  J:  
 
DOCTRINE:  
Article  906.  Any  compulsory  heir  to  whom  a  testator  has  left  by  any  title  less  
than  the  
legitime  belonging  to  him  may  demand  that  the  same  be  fully  satisfied.  
 
FACTS:  
On   March   28,   1979,   the   spouses   Manuel   and   Alicia   Gala,   their   children   Guia  
Domingo,   Ofelia   Gala,   Raul   Gala,   and   Rita   Benson,   and   their   encargados   Virgilio  
Galeon   and   Julian   Jader   formed   and   organized   the   Ellice   Agro-­‐Industrial  
Corporation.  
 
As  payment  for  their  subscriptions,  the  Gala  spouses  transferred  several  parcels  of  
land  located  in  the  provinces  of  Quezon  and  Laguna  to  Ellice.  
 
 
SPECIFIC  ISSUE:  
WHETHER   OR   NOT   THE   ORGANIZATION   OR   CREATION   OF   RESPONDENT  
CORPORATIONS   ARE   ILLEGAL   FOR   DEPRIVING   PETITIONER   RITA   G.   BENZON  
OF  HER  LEGITIME.  
 
RULING:  
“The   reliefs   sought   by   petitioners   should   have   been   raised   in   a   proceeding   for  
settlement  of  estate,  rather  than  in  the  present  intra-­‐corporate  controversy.  If  they  
are   genuinely   interested   in   securing   that   part   of   their   late   father’s   property   which  
has  been  reserved  for  them  in  their  capacity  as  compulsory  heirs,  then  they  should  
simply  exercise  their  actio  ad  supplendamlegitimam,  or  their  right  of  completion  of  
10   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
legitime.  Such  relief  must  be  sought  during  the  distribution  and  partition  stage  of  a  
case  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  Manuel  Gala,  filed  before  a  court  which  has  
taken  jurisdiction  over  the  settlement  of  said  estate.“  
 
4.  HACBANG  VS  ALO  
G.R.  No.  191031|October  05,  2015  
Topic:  Transmission  of  Successional  Right;  Testate  succession  over  Intestate    
 
FACTS:      
 
A  petition  for  the  probate  of  Bishop  Sofronio's  will  and  the  settlement  of  his  estate  
was  filed  and  was  admitted  thereafter  to  probate.  Petitioner  however  filed  a  petition  
to   cancel   the   registration   of   the   subject   lot   of   the   case   because   it   was   found   out   that  
it  was  registered  in  the  name  of  respondent.    
 
The   RTC   dismissed   the   petition   because   the   petitioners   had   no   right   to   prosecute  
the   case   on   the   subject   lot   and   noted   that   Bishop   Sofronio's   will   had   already   been  
admitted  into  probate;  thus,  the  intrinsic  validity  of  the  will  is  no  longer  in  question.  
Though   the   settlement   proceedings   were   archived,   Bishop   Sofronio   already  
designated   his   heirs;   thus,   the   petitioners,   who   are   neither   compulsory   nor  
testamentary  heirs,  are  not  real  parties  in  interest.    
 
The   CA   in   turn,   affirmed   the   RTC's   order   of   dismissal   and   held   that   the   admission   of  
Bishop   Sofronio's   will   to   probate   precluded   intestate   succession   unless   the   will   was  
intrinsically   invalid   or   failed   to   completely   dispose   of   his   estate.   Contrary   to   the  
petitioners'   contention,   the   settlement   proceedings   were   not   dismissed   but  
archived;   the   will   did   not   lose   its   validity   merely   because   the   proceedings   were  
archived,   undoubtedly,   Bishop   Sofronio   did   not   die   intestate.   The   CA   denied   the  
petitioners'  claim  to  a  right  of  inheritance  by  representation  and  cannot  represent  
those   who   are   hot   entitled   to   succeed,   thus,   the   denial   paved   the   way   for   the  
petitioners  to  file  the  present  petition  for  review  on  certiorari.  
 
ISSUE:  
 
1.  WON  THE  LOWER  COURT  ERRONEOUSLY  APPLIED  THE  PROVISION  OF  THE  
PRESENT  CIVIL  CODE  TO  THE  WILL  AND  ESTATE  OF  BISHOP  SOFRONIO.  -­‐  YES  
 
2.  WON  BISHOP  SOFRONIO  DIED  INTESTATE.  -­‐  NO  
 
HELD:  
 
1.   At   the   outset,   this   Court   observes   that   the   parties   and   even   the   lower   courts  
erroneously   applied   the   provisions   of   the   present   Civil   Code   to   the   will   and   the  
estate   of   Bishop   Sofronio.   The   law   in   force   at   the   time   of   the   decedent's   death  
determines   the   applicable   law   over   the   settlement   of   his   estate.   Bishop   Sofronio  
died  in  1937  before  the  enactment  of  the  Civil  Code  in  1949.  Therefore,  the  correct  
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   1
  1  
applicable  laws  to  the  settlement  of  his  estate  are  the  1889  Spanish  Civil  Code  and  
the  1901  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.  
 
In   any   case,   under   both   the   Spanish   Code   and   our   Civil   Code,   successional   rights   are  
vested  at  the  precise  moment  of  the  death  of  the  decedent.  In  any  case,  under  both  
the   Spanish   Code   and   our   Civil   Code,   successional   rights   are   vested   at   the   precise  
moment  of  the  death  of  the  decedent.  Section  657  of  the  Spanish  code  provides:    
 
Art.   657.   Los   derechos   a   la   sucesion   de   una   persona   se   transmiten   desde   el  
momento  de  su  muerte.  (Rights  to  the  estate  of  a  person  are  transmitted  from  the  
time  of  his  death.)  
 
The   inheritance   vests   immediately   upon   the   decedent's   death   without   a   moment's  
interruption.   This   provision   was   later   on   translated   and   adopted   as   Article   777   of  
our  Civil  Code.  
 
As   a   consequence   of   this   principle,   ownership   over   the   inheritance   passes   to   the  
heirs  at  the  precise  moment  of  death  -­‐  not  at  the  time  the  heirs  are  declared,  nor  at  
the   time   of   the   partition,   nor   at   the   distribution   of   the   properties.   There   is   no  
interruption   between   the   end   of   the   decedent's   ownership   and   the   start   of   the  
heir/legatee/devisee's  ownership.  
 
2.   Undoubtedly,   Bishop   Sofronio   did   not   die   intestate.   He   left   a   will   that   was  
probated  in  1937.  He  left  half  of  his  properties  to  his  parents  and  the  remaining  half  
to   his   sister   Dolores   Hacbang   Alo.   The   admission   of   his   will   to   probate   is   conclusive  
with  respect  to  its  due  execution  and  extrinsic  validity.  
 
Our   jurisdiction   has   always   respected   a   decedent's   freedom   to   dispose   of   his   estate,  
whether  under  the  Spanish  Civil  Code  or  under  the  present  Civil  Code.    
 
This   provision   states   that   a   person   without   compulsory   heirs   may   dispose   of   his  
estate,  either  in  part  or  in  its  entirety,  in  favor  of  anyone  capacitated  to  succeed  him;  
if  the  testator  has  compulsory  heirs,  he  can  dispose  of  his  property  provided  he  does  
not  impair  their  legitimes.  This  provision  was  later  translated  and  adopted  as  Article  
842  of  our  Civil  Code.  
 
Our   jurisdiction   accords   great   respect   to   the   testator's   freedom   of   disposition.  
Hence,   testate   succession   has   always   been   preferred   over   intestacy.   As   much   as  
possible,  a  testator's  will  is  treated  and  interpreted  in  a  way  that  would  render  all  of  
its  provisions  operative.  Hence,  there  is  no  basis  to  apply  the  provisions  on  intestacy  
when  testate  succession  evidently  applies.  
 
5.ELENA,   OSCAR,   CELIA,   TERESITA   and   VIRGILIO,   all   surnamed   LINDAIN   vs.  
THE   HON.   COURT   OF   APPEALS,   SPOUSES   APOLINIA   VALIENTE   and   FEDERICO  
ILA,  respondents.  
G.R.  No.  95305;August  20,  1992  
12   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
GRIÑO-­‐AQUINO,  J.:  
 
FACTS:  
 
When  the  plaintiffs  were  still  minors,  they  were  already  the  registered  owners  of  a  
parcel  of  land  covered  by  Transfer  Certificate  of  Title  No.  NT-­‐63540  (Exh.  D-­‐1).  On  
November   7,   1966,   their   mother,   Dolores   Luluquisin,   then   already   a   widow   and  
acting  as  guardian  of  her  minor  children,  sold  the  land  for  P2,000  under  a  Deed  of  
Absolute   Sale   of   Registered   Land   (Exh.   2)   to   the   defendants   spouses   Apolonia  
Valiente  and  Federico  Ila.  The  Deed  of  Absolute  Sale  was  registered  in  the  office  of  
the  Register  of  Deeds  for  the  Province  of  Nueva  Ecija.  TCT  No.  NT-­‐66311  was  issued  
to  the  vendees,  Apolonia  Valiente  and  Federico  Ila.  
 
The   defendants   admitted   that   the   property   in   question   was   sold   to   them   by   the  
mother   of   the   minors   as   evidenced   by   a   Deed   of   Sale   (Exh.   B   for   the   plaintiffs   and  
Exh.   2   for   the   defendants)   and   although   at   first   they   were   reluctant   to   buy   the  
property   as   the   sale   would   not   be   legal,   the   registered   owners   thereof   being   all  
minors,   upon   advice   of   their   counsel,   the   late   Atty.   Arturo   B.   Pascual,   and   the  
counsel   of   Dolores   Luluquisin,   Atty.   Eustaquio   Ramos,   who   notarized   the  
documents,   that   the   property   could   be   sold   without   the   written   authority   of   the  
court,   considering   that   its   value   was   less   than   P2,000,   they   bought   the   property   and  
had   it   registered   in   their   names   under   Certificate   of   Title   No.   66311   (Exhibit   C   for  
the  plaintiffs).  
 
Plaintiffs  contend,  however,  that  the  sale  of  the  lot  by  their  mother  to  the  defendants  
is   null   and   void   because   it   was   made   without   judicial   authority   and/or   court  
approval.  
 
The  defendants,  on  the  other  hand,  contend  that  the  sale  was  valid,  as  the  value  of  
the   property   was   less   than   P2,000,   and,   considering   the   ages   of   plaintiffs   now,   the  
youngest  being  31  years  old  at  the  time  of  the  filing  of  the  complaint,  their  right  to  
rescind   the   contract   which   should   have   been   exercised   four   (4)   years   after   reaching  
the  age  of  majority,  has  already  prescribed.  
 
ISSUE:   WHETHER   JUDICIAL   APPROVAL   WAS   NECESSARY   FOR   THE   SALE   OF  
THE  MINORS'  PROPERTY  BY  THEIR  MOTHER.  
HELD:  
Art.  320  of  the  New  Civil  Code,  which  was  already  in  force  when  the  assailed  
transaction  occurred,  provides:  
 
Art.   320.—   The   father,   or   in   his   absence   the   mother,   is   the   legal   administrator  
of   the   property   pertaining   to   the   child   under   parental   authority.   If   the  
property   is   worth   more   than   two   thousand   pesos,   the   father   or   mother   shall  
give  a  bond  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance.  
 

WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   1
  3  
Under  the  law,  a  parent,  acting  merely  as  the  legal  (as  distinguished  from  judicial)  
administrator  of  the  property  of  his/her  minor  children,  does  not  have  the  power  to  
dispose  of,  or  alienate,  the  property  of  said  children  without  judicial  approval.  The  
powers   and   duties   of   the   widow   as   legal   administrator   of   her   minor   children's  
property  as  provided  in  Rule  84  by  the  Rules  of  Court  entitled,  "General  Powers  and  
Duties   of   Executors   and   Administrators"   are   only   powers   of   possession   and  
management.   Her   power   to   sell,   mortgage,   encumber   or   otherwise   dispose   of   the  
property   of   her   minor   children   must   proceed   from   the   court,   as   provided   in   Rule   89  
which  requires  court  authority  and  approval.  
 
The   private   respondents'   allegation   that   they   are   purchasers   in   good   faith   is   not  
credible   for   they   knew   from   the   very   beginning   that   their   vendor,   the   petitioners'  
mother,  without  court  approval  could  not  validly  convey  to  them  the  property  of  her  
minor  children.  Knowing  her  lack  of  judicial  authority  to  enter  into  the  transaction,  
the   private   respondents   acted   in   bad   faith   when   they   went   ahead   and   bought   the  
land  from  her  anyway.  
One   who   acquires   or   purchases   real   property   with   knowledge   of   a   defect   in   the   title  
of   his   vendor   cannot   claim  that  he  acquired  title  thereto  in  good  faith  as  against  the  
owner  of  the  property  or  for  an  interest  therein  (Gatioan  vs.  Gaffud,  27  SCRA  706).  
The   minors'   action   for   reconveyance   has   not   yet   prescribed   for   "real   actions   over  
immovables  prescribe  after  thirty  years"  (Art.  1141,  Civil  Code).  Since  the  sale  took  
place  in  1966,  the  action  to  recover  the  property  had  not  yet  prescribed  when  the  
petitioners  sued  in  1987.  
 
6.HEIRS   OF   GREGORIO   LOPEZ,   represented   by   Rogelia   Lopez,   et   al   vs.  
DEVELOPMENT   BANK   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES   [Now   substituted   by   Philippine  
Investment  Two  (SPVAMC),  Inc.  
G.R.  No.  193551;  November  19,  2014  
LEONEN,  J.:  
 
FACTS:  
Gregoria  Lopez  owned  a  2,734-­‐square-­‐meter  property  in  Bustos,  Bulacan.5  She  died  
on  March  19,  19226  and  was  survived  by  her  three  sons:  Teodoro  Lopez,  Francisco  
Lopez,   and   Carlos   Lopez.7  Tax   Declaration   No.   613   was   issued   under   the   names   of  
Teodoro,  Francisco,  and  Carlos.8  
Teodoro,   Francisco,   and   Carlos   died.9  Only   Teodoro   was   survived   by   children:  
Gregorio,  Enrique,  Simplicio,  and  Severino.10  
Petitioners   in   this   case   are   Simplicio   substituted   by   his   daughter   Eliza   Lopez,   and  
the  heirs  of  Gregorio  and  Severino.11  Enrique  is  deceased.12  
Petitioners  discovered   that  on  November  29,  1990,  Enrique  executed  an  affidavit  of  
self-­‐adjudication   declaring   himself   to   be   Gregoria   Lopez’s   only   surviving   heir,  
thereby   adjudicating   upon   himself   the   land   in   Bulacan.13  He   sold   the   property   to  
Marietta  Yabut.14  
Petitioners   demanded   from   Marietta   the   nullification   of   Enrique’s   affidavit   of   self-­‐
adjudication  and  the  deed  of  absolute  sale.15  They  also  sought  to  redeem  Enrique’s  

14   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
one-­‐fourth   share.16  Marietta,   who   was   already   in   possession   of   the   property,  
refused.17  
Sometime   in   1993,   Marietta   obtained   a   loan   from   Development   Bank   of   the  
Philippines  (DBP)  and  mortgaged  the  property  to  DBP  as  security.18  At  the  time  of  
the   loan,   the   property   was   covered   by   Tax   Declaration   No.   18727,   with   the  
agreement   that   the   land   shall   be   brought   under   the   Torrens   system.19  On   July   26,  
1993,   an   original   certificate   of   title   was   issued   in   Marietta’s   name.20  Marietta   and  
DBP   "executed   a   supplemental   document   dated   28   February   1995   placing   the  
subject   [property]within   the   coverage   of   the   mortgage."21  The   mortgage   was  
annotated  to  the  title.22  
Sometime  between  1993  and  1994,  petitioners  filed  a  complaint23  and  an  amended  
complaint24  with  the  Regional  Trial  Court  for  the  annulment  of  document,  recovery  
of   possession,   and   reconveyance   of   the   property.   They   prayed   that   judgment   be  
rendered,   ordering   the   annulment   of   Enrique’s   affidavit   of   self-­‐adjudication,   the  
deed  of  sale  executed  by  Enrique  and  Marietta,  and  the  deed  of  real  estate  mortgage  
executed   by   Marietta   in   favor   of   DBP.25Petitioners   also   prayed   for   the   reconveyance  
of   their   three-­‐fourth   share   in   the   property,   their   exercise   of   their   right   of  
redemption   of   Enrique’s   one-­‐fourth   share,   as   well   as   attorney’s   fees   and   costs   of  
suit.26  
Petitioners   caused   the   annotation   of   a   notice   of   lis   pendens   at   the   back   of   the  
original  certificate  of  title.27  The  annotation  was  inscribed  on  June  27,  1994.28  
Marietta   failed   to   pay   her   loan   to   DBP.29  "DBP   instituted   foreclosure   proceedings   on  
the   .   .   .   land."30  It   was   "awarded   the   sale   of   the   [property]   as   the   highest  
bidder."31  "The  Certificate  of  Sale  was  registered  with  the  Register  of  Deeds  .  .  .  on  11  
September   1996."32  Marietta   failed   to   redeem   the   property.33  The   title   to   the  
property  was  "consolidated  in  favor  of  DBP."34  
 
RTC:  ordered  the  nullification  of  Enrique’s  affidavit  of  self-­‐adjudication,  the  sale  of  
the   three-­‐fourth   portion   of   the   subject   property   in   favor   of   Marietta,   the  
reconveyance   of   the   three-­‐fourth   share   of   the   property   in   favor   of   petitioners,   the  
nullification   of   the   real   estate   mortgage   executed   in   favor   of   DBP,   and   the   surrender  
of  possession  of  the  property  to  petitioners.46  The  trial  court  also  ordered  DBP  to  
pay  attorney’s  fees.  
 
CA:  DENIED  MR  
 
ISSUE:  WHETHER  THE  PROPERTY  WAS  VALIDLY  TRANSFERRED  TO  MARIETTA  
AND,  EVENTUALLY,  TO  DBP.  
 
HELD:NO  
 
We  have  consistently  upheld  the  principle  that  "no  one  can  give  what  one  does  not  
have."61  A  seller  can  only  sell  what  he  or  she  owns,  or  that  which  he  or  she  does  not  
own  but  has  authority  to  transfer,  and  a  buyer  can  only  acquire  what  the  seller  can  
legally  transfer.62  
 
WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   1
  5  
This  principle  is  incorporated  in  our  Civil  Code.  It  provides  that  in  a  contract  of  sale,  
the  seller  binds  himself  to  transfer  the  ownership  of  the  thing  sold,  thus:  
 
Art.   1458.   By   the   contract   of   sale,   one   of   the   contracting   parties   obligates  
himself   to   transfer   the   ownership   of   and   to   deliver   a   determinate   thing,   and  
the  other  to  pay  therefor  a  price  certain  in  money  or  its  equivalent.  
 
The  seller  cannot  perform  this  obligation  if  he  or  she  does  not  have  a  right  to  
convey  ownership  of  the  thing.  Hence,  Article  1459  of  the  Civil  Code  provides:  
 
Art.   1459.   The   thing   must   be   licit   and   the   vendor   must   have   a   right   to   transfer  
the  ownership  thereof  at  the  time  it  is  delivered.  
 
Title   or   rights   to   a   deceased   person’s   property   are   immediately   passed   to   his   or   her  
heirs   upon   death.63   The   heirs’   rights   become   vested   without   need   for   them   to   be  
declared  "heirs."64  Before  the  property  is  partitioned,  the  heirs  are  co-­‐owners  of  the  
property.65  
 
In   this   case,   the   rights   to   Gregoria   Lopez’s   property   were   automatically   passed   to  
her  sons  —  Teodoro,  Francisco,  and  Carlos  —  when  she  died  in  1922.66  Since  only  
Teodoro   was   survived   by   children,   the   rights   to   the   property   ultimately   passed   to  
them   when   Gregoria   Lopez’s   sons   died.67   The   children   entitled   to   the   property  
were  Gregorio,  Simplicio,  Severino,  and  Enrique.  
 
Gregorio,  Simplicio,  Severino,  and  Enrique  became  co-­‐owners  of  the  property,  with  
each  of  them  entitled  toan  undivided  portion  of  only  a  quarter  of  the  property.  Upon  
their   deaths,   their   children   became   the   co-­‐owners   of   the   property,   who   were  
entitled  to  their  respective  shares,  such  that  the  heirs  of  Gregorio  became  entitled  to  
Gregorio’s   one-­‐fourth   share,   and   Simplicio’s   and   Severino’s   respective   heirs   became  
entitled   to   their   corresponding   onefourth   shares   in   the   property.68   The   heirs  
cannot  alienate  the  shares  that  do  not  belong  to  them.  
 
Since  Enrique’s  right  to  the  property  was  limited  to  his  one-­‐fourth  share,  he  had  no  
right  to  sell  the  undivided  portions  that  belonged  to  his  siblings  or  their  respective  
heirs.   Any   sale   by   one   heir   of   the   rest   of   the   property   will   not   affect   the   rights   of   the  
other   heirs   who   did   not   consent   to   the   sale.   Such   sale   is   void   with   respect   to   the  
shares  of  the  other  heirs.  
Regardless   of   their   agreement,   Enrique   could   only   convey   to   Marietta   his   undivided  
one-­‐fourth   share   of   the   property,   and   Marietta   could   only   acquire   that   share.   This   is  
because   Marietta   obtained   her   rights   from   Enrique   who,   in   the   first   place,   had   no  
title  or  interest  over  the  rest  of  the  property  that  he  could  convey.  
This   is   despite   Enrique’s   execution   of   the   affidavit   of   self-­‐adjudication   wherein   he  
declared  himself  to  be  the  only  surviving  heir  of  Gregoria  Lopez.  The  affidavit  of  self-­‐
adjudication   is   invalid   for   the   simple   reason   that   it   was   false.   At   the   time   of   its  
execution,   Enrique’s   siblings   were   still   alive   and   entitled   to   the   three-­‐fourth  

16   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 
undivided  share  of  the  property.  The  affidavit  of  self-­‐adjudication  did  not  have  the  
effect  of  vesting  upon  Enrique  ownership  or  rights  to  the  property.  
The   issuance   of   the   original   certificate   of   title   in   favor   of   Marietta   does   not   cure  
Enrique’s  lack  of  title  or  authority  to  convey  his  co-­‐owners’  portions  of  the  property.  
Issuance   of   a   certificate   of   title   is   not   a   grant   of   title   over   petitioners’   undivided  
portions  of  the  property.69  The  physical  certificate  of  title  does  not  vest  in  a  person  
ownership  or  right  over  a  property.70  It  is  merely  an  evidence  of  such  ownership  or  
right.71  
Marietta   could   acquire   valid   title   over   the   whole   property   if   she   were   an   innocent  
purchaser  for  value.  An  innocent  purchaser  for  value  purchases  a  property  without  
any  notice  of  defect  or  irregularity  as  to  the  right  or  interest  of  the  seller.72  He  or  she  
is  without  notice  that  another  person  holds  claim  to  the  property  being  purchased.73  
As   a   rule,   an   ordinary   buyer   may   rely   on   the   certificate   of   title   issued   in   the   name   of  
the   seller.74  He   or   she   need   not   look   "beyond   what   appears   on   the   face   [of   the  
certificate   of   title]."75  However,   the   ordinary   buyer   will   not   be   considered   an  
innocent   purchaser   for   value   if   there   is   anything   on   the   certificate   of   title   that  
arouses  suspicion,  and  the  buyer  failed  to  inquire  or  take  steps  to  ensure  that  there  
is  no  cloud  on  the  title,  right,  or  ownership  of  the  property  being  sold.  
Marietta   cannot   claim   the   protection   accorded   by   law   to   innocent   purchasers   for  
value  because  the  circumstances  do  not  make  this  available  to  her.  
In   this   case,   there   was   no   certificate   of   title   to   rely   on   when   she   purchased   the  
property  from  Enrique.  At  the  time  of  the  sale,  the  property  was  still  unregistered.  
What   was   available   was   only   a   tax   declaration   issued   under   the   name   of   "Heirs   of  
Lopez."  
"The  defense  of  having  purchased  the  property  in  good  faith  may  be  availed  of  only  
where  registered  land  is  involved  and  the  buyer  had  relied  in  good  faith  on  the  clear  
title  of  the  registered  owner."76  It  does  not  apply  when  the  land  is  not  yet  registered  
with  the  Registry  of  Deeds.  
At   the   very   least,   the   unregistered   status   of   the   property   should   have   prompted  
Marietta   to   inquire   further   as   to   Enrique’s   right   over   the   property.   She   did   not.  
Hence,   she   was   not   an   innocent   purchaser   for   value.   She   acquired   no   title   over  
petitioners’  portions  of  the  property.  
 
ARTS.  915-­‐923(DISINHERITANCE)  
 
1.  SEANGIO  v.  REYES  
G.R.  Nos.  140371-­‐72  27  November  2006  
 
FACTS:  
Private  respondents  filed  a  petition  for  the  settlement  of  the  intestate  estate  of  the  
late   Segundo   Seangio.   This   petition   was   opposed   by   the   petitioners   on   the   ground  
that   Segundo   left   a   holographic   will,   disinheriting   one   of   the   private   respondents,  
Alfredo   Seangio,   for   cause,   among   others.   In   view   of   the   purported   holographic   will,  
petitioners   averred   that   in   the   event   the   decedent   is   found   to   have   left   a   will,   the  
intestate   proceedings   are   to   be   automatically   suspended   and   replaced   by   the  

WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)   1
  7  
proceedings   for   the   probate   of   the   will.   The   petitioners   instead   filed   a   petition   for  
the  probate  of  the  holographic  will.  
Then   private   respondents   moved   for   the   dismissal   of   the   probate   proceedings  
primarily  on  the  ground  that  the  document  purporting  to  be  the  holographic  will  of  
Segundo   does   not   contain   any   disposition   of   the   estate   of   the   deceased   and   thus  
does  not  meet  the  definition  of  a  will  under  Article  783  of  the  Civil  Code.  
 
ISSUE:   CAN   THE   DOCUMENT   EXECUTED   BY   SEGUNDO   BE   CONSIDERED   A  
HOLOGRAPHIC  WILL  
 
RULING:  
YES.   A   holographic   will,   as   provided   under   Article   810   of   the   Civil   Code,   must   be  
entirely  written,  dated,  and  signed  by  the  hand  of  the  testator  himself.  It  is  subject  to  
no   other   form,   and   may   be   made   in   or   out   of   the   Philippines,   and   need   not   be  
witnessed.   Segundo’s   document,   although   it   may   initially   come   across   as   a   mere  
disinheritance   instrument,   conforms   to   the   formalities   of   a   holographic   will  
prescribed  by  law.  It  is  written,  dated  and  signed  by  the  hand  of  Segundo  himself.  An  
intent   to   dispose   mortis   causa   can   be   clearly   deduced   from   the   terms   of   the  
instrument,   and   while   it   does   not   make   an   affirmative   disposition   of   the   latter’s  
property,   the   disinheritance   of   Alfredo,   nonetheless,   is   an   act   of   disposition   in   itself.  
In   other   words,   the   disinheritance   results   in   the   disposition   of   the   property   of   the  
testator   Segundo   in   favor   of   those   who   would   succeed   in   the   absence   of   Alfredo.  
Moreover,   it   is   a   fundamental   principle   that   the   intent   or   the   will   of   the   testator,  
expressed  in  the  form  and  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  law,  must  be  recognized  
as  the  supreme  law  in  succession.  All  rules  of  construction  are  designed  to  ascertain  
and   give   effect   to   that   intention.   It   is   only   when   the   intention   of   the   testator   is  
contrary  to  law,  morals,  or  public  policy  that  it  cannot  be  given  effect.  In  this  regard,  
the   Court   is   convinced   that   the   document,   even   if   captioned   as   Kasulatan   ng   Pag-­‐
Aalis   ng   Mana,   was   intended   by   Segundo   to   be   his   last   testamentary   act   and   was  
executed  by  him  in  accordance  with  law  in  the  form  of  a  holographic  will.  Unless  the  
will  is  probated,  the  disinheritance  cannot  be  given  effect.  

18   WILLS&SUCCESSION  (ARTS.840-­‐923)  
 

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