1.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
January 9, 2017        G.R. No.  187448
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO R. DE BORJA

CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS: Complaint for the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly amassed by Velasco was filed by the
Petitioner Republic. Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected these address commissions in
behalf of Velasco. Trial on the merits ensued.

As stressed by respondent De Borja, the only evidence presented with respect to his liability is the
testimony of Verano. Moreover, during Verano' s cross-examination, it was revealed that he was not
knowledgeable of the contents of the envelopes and that he also never confirmed whether respondent De
Borja had actually received them. Respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence.

The Sandiganbayan found that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a claim for damages
against De Borja, thereby granting respondent De Borja's Demurrer to Evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting respondent De Borja's Demurrer to
Evidence.

HELD:

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy

available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer to evidence
is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case. In the face
of the foregoing testimony, the insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can best be
described as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano
reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of
Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.

The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of knowledge with
respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to respondent De Borja's office, which
remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano' s possession. As admitted by Verano himself, he did not
and could not have known what was inside the envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted to him
for delivery. In the same vein, Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the
envelopes, despite numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was further revealed during the cross-
examination of Verano that in the first place, Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers. All told, the
Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations of the Complaint
before the SB.

Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to show any right to the relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in
granting the Demurrer to Evidence.

2. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS and SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ILOILO JAR CORPORATION vs. COMGLASCO CORPORATION AGUILA GLASS

 G.R. No. 219509

January 18, 2017

Mendoza, J.;

Facts:

        On August 16, 2000, petitioner as lessor and respondent as lessee, entered into a lease contract
over a portion of a warehouse building located at Barangay Lapuz, La Paz District, Iloilo City, for a period
of 3 years or until August 15, 2003. However, on December 01, 2001, respondent requested for the pre-
termination of the lease, but said request was rejected by the petitioner on the ground that the pre-
termination of the lease was not stipulated in the contract. Despite the rejected, respondent still removed
its stock, merchandise and equipment from the leased premises and it longer paid the rentals accruing
from the date of the withdrawal of the equipment.Iloilo filed a civil action for breach of contract against
Comglasco before the RTC where Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that
Comglasco admitted all the material allegations in the compliant. The RTC granted the motion, but on
appeal, the CA reversed the order of the RTC and remanded the case back to it for further proceedings.

Issues:

        1. Whether or not judgment on the pleadings is appropriate and valid when the defense
interposed by the defendant in the answer is not applicable as a defense to the cause of action as stated
in the complaint.

        2. Whether or not the CA is correct in remanding the case back to RTC.

Ruling:

First Issue:

        NO. In Basbas v. Sayson,  the Court differentiated judgment on the pleadings from summary
judgment in that the former is appropriate if the answer failed to tender an issue and the latter may be
resorted to if there are no genuine issues raised, to wit:
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the
presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is,
if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the
adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a
judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the
material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a
summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious
or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."
In the case at bench, Comglasco interposed an affirmative defense in its answer. While it admitted that it
had removed its stocks from the leased premises and had received the demand letter for rental
payments, it argued that the lease contract had been pre-terminated because the consideration thereof
had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic crisis then existing. Thus, judgment on the
pleadings was improper considering that Comglasco's Answer raised an affirmative defense.

Second Issue:

        NO. Although resort to judgment on the pleadings might have been improper, there was still no
need to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. In Wood Technology Corporation v.
Equitable Banking Corporation (Wood Technology), the Court ruled that summary judgment may be
27

availed if no genuine issue for trial is raised, viz:

Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of
the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by
petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial
question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment? A
"genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a
genuine issue for trial. [Emphasis supplied]
28

It bears noting that in Wood Technology, the RTC originally rendered a judgment on the pleadings but
was corrected by the Court to be a summary judgment because of the issue presented by the affirmative
defense raised therein. In the said case, the Court, nonetheless, ruled in favor of the complainant therein
because there was no genuine issue raised.
Similar to Wood Technology, the judgment rendered by the RTC in this case was a summary judgment,
not a judgment on the pleadings, because Comglasco' s answer raised an affirmative defense.
Nevertheless, no genuine issue was raised because there is no issue of fact which needs presentation of
evidence, and the affirmative defense Comglasco invoked is inapplicable in the case at bench.
A full blown trial would needlessly prolong the proceedings where a summary judgment would suffice. It is
undisputed that Comglasco removed its merchandise from the leased premises and stopped paying
rentals thereafter. Thus, there remains no question of fact which must be resolved in trial. What is to be
resolved is whether Comglasco was justified in treating the lease contract terminated due to the economic
circumstances then prevalent.

3. Cause of Action

Butuan Dev. Corp. v. 21 Div., CA, et al., G.R. No.197358

st

April 5, 2017, J. Reyes

FACTS:

In 1966, BDC, through its president, while still in the process of incorporation, purchased a parcel of land
from Sps. Sering. In 1998, Max Arriola, representing himself as Chairman of BDC armed with the TCT of
the parcel land named after him, mortgaged the said property to De Oro Sources Inc (DORI) through its
president. In 2002, BDC executed its Articles of Incorporation. SEC then approved it.

In 2005, BDC filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the REM against Arriola Jr and DORI alleging
that Arriola misrepresented himself as chairman of BDC.

DORI claimed that the complaint filed by BDC should be dismissed outright for failing to state a cause of
action since at the time of the execution of the REM on 1998, BDC did not yet exist, having been
incorporated only on 2002, and, hence, could not have claimed ownership of the subject property.

RTC ruled in favour of BDC stating that affirming DORI’s allegations shall give rise to violation of BDC's
rights. CA reversed the ruling of RTC and, thus, dismissed the complaint. It ruled that corporate existence
begins only from the moment a certificate of incorporation is issued, and, thus, BDC had no corporate
existence and juridical personality when it purchased the subject property. Thus, the CA held that, having
no right over the subject property, no cause of action could have accrued in favor of BDC when the
subject property was mortgaged to DORI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the case since BDC's complaint failed to state a cause of
action.

RULING:

NO.

Failure to state a cause of action is different from lack of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged in the pleading. The remedy in the first is to move for the dismissal of the
pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence.

In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint
are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the
facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are
considered for purposes of applying the test. BDC's complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of the REM.

In account of the CA's unwarranted dismissal of its complaint, BDC was effectively denied due process as
it was unduly prevented from presenting evidence to prove its claim. The CA arbitrarily directed the
dismissal of BDC's complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated January 14, 2011 and Resolution dated May 24, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated August 11, 2006 and November 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 5, in SP Civil Case No.
1259 are REINSTATED. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
4. Writ of preliminary injunction

Marcelo-Mendoza v. Peroxide Phils. Inc.,

G.R. No. 203492, April 24, 2017

REYES, J.

Facts:

MeTC of Valenzuela City

1) In an ejectment case against Peroxide Phils., Inc. (lessee in the contract of lease), Pablo Marcelo
(Pablo) and Pablina Marcelo-Mendoza[Petitioners] were able to obtain a favorable decision. Thereafter,
the sheriff conducted a public auction and sold to Pablo, as the highest bidder, the levied properties of
PPI that were found inside the subject property.

RTC of Quezon City

2) Aggrieved, third-party claimants (United Energy Corporation and Springfield International, Inc.) filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City to declare void the sheriffs sale and Certificate of Sale with prayer
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI). [The third-party
claimants added PPI as a party-plaintiff and prayed further for the declaration of PPI's ownership over the
improvements erected and/or introduced on the subject property.] The WPI was issued.

3) Pablo challenged the issuance of the WPI by petition for certiorari before the CA and later before the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 127271, where the Court upheld the validity of the WPI. [By virtue of the
court’s order, the gate of the subject property was padlocked. However, Pablo (on several occasions)
forcibly opened the gate and brought out dismantled machineries of PPI, and occupied and took
possession of the entire subject property.]

4) Pablo consistently refused to obey the orders of the court.

5) The RTC issued an Omnibus Order granting Pablo's motion to remove padlock on the gate of the
subject property. Aggrieved PPI filed a motion for reconsideration. However, considering that no
resolution has yet been promulgated by the presiding judge after the lapse of a considerable period of five
months, PPI elevated the case before the CA attributing grave abuse of discretion and abuse of authority
on the part of the Judge. CA granted the petition for certiorari and ordered that the Omnibus Order be
revoked and vacated.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioners' motion to remove the padlock of the subject property

(propriety of the issuance of the WPI)

Ruling:

The Court finds the grant of injunction, as well as the order to padlock and re-padlock the subject
property, to be in order.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment
or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is
the 'strong arm of equity,' an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution,
affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties. The sole purpose of which is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the main case can be heard. It is usually granted to prevent a party from committing
an act, or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the
status quo.
Before a WPI may be issued, the concurrence of the following essential requisites must be present,
namely: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that
he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
Under the factual setting of this case, PPI was able to sufficiently establish that it had a right over the
properties which should be protected while being litigated. PPI’s claimed ownership over the
improvements erected and/or introduced in the subject property was then being violated by the petitioners
who had started entering the premises and started dismantling the improvements and machineries
thereon. Worse, the petitioners even opened the subject property as a resort with swimming pools to the
public for a fee and had portions of the buildings inside the premises rented to several businesses. If not
lawfully stopped, such acts of the petitioners would certainly cause irreparable damage to PPI and other
claimants. As owner of the improvements and machineries inside the subject property, PPI has the right
to be protected. Hence, the issuance by the lower courts of the WPI and the order to padlock and re-
padlock the subject property to enjoin the petitioners from disposing the properties of PPI was warranted.

[At the outset, the Court noted that Pablo had already challenged the WPI before the CA and later before
this Court in G.R. No. 127271, where the Court sustained the validity of the WPI. The Court also noted
that the issue of possession of the subject property pending litigation has been resolved by the lower
court under different judges in the Orders dated October 4, 2000, February 8, 2001, February 20, 2006,
August 24, 2007 and June 19, 2009, all categorically commanding that the gates of the subject property
be padlocked. Hence, the Court is convinced that a special reason, supported by facts borne by the
records of this case, exists to justify the injunction and its subsequent orders in relation thereto.]

5. Writ of Replivin; Claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or is entitled to
the possession of the thing sought to be recovered

William Siy vs. Alvin Tomlin

G.R. No. 205998   April 24, 2017
Del Castillo, J.;

Facts: Siy entrusted his 2007 Ford Range Rover to Mr. Ong who owned a second-hand car selling
business, as the latter promised a prospective buyer to the said vehicle. Since Mr. Ong failed to remit the
proceeds of the sale and the vehicle has been transferred to Mr. Chua then to Tomlin, Siy filed for the
issuance of a writ of replivin in the RTC of Quezon City. The writ was granted but was revoked by the
Court of Appeals. Tomlin argued that he is already the registered owner of the said vehicle and caused
the registration of the sale. Siy contended that he is still entitled to both the possession and ownership of
the vehicle.

Issue: Whether or not Siy is entitled to the relief granted by the Writ of Replivin.

Held: No, he is not entitled anymore. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that
he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that
the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.  In this case, Siy
admitted having executed a blank deed of sale and gave it to Mr. Ong. As Mr. Ong served as Siy’s agent
in the transaction, Mr. Ong validly transferred and effected the sale of the vehicle to Mr. Chua, and
thereafter to Tomlin. Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be
the owner thereof at the time the writ was applied. He is not anymore entitled to the possession of the
vehicle. Together with his ownership, petitioner also lost his right of possession over the vehicle.

6 – ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT

G.R. No. 189881 April 19, 2017

BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.

FERNANDO C. NIEVA and MAMERTO SIBULO, JR., Respondents

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:
The case is one for damages arising from a vehicular collision in Taytay, Rizal between a truck owned by
BMC and driven by its employee Mendoza and a car owned and driven by Sibulo. The Antipolo Court
ruled in favor of BMC and CA reversed and held that Mendoza's negligence caused the collision and the
decision became final and executory. A writ for execution was issued and the sheriff levied properties of
BMC and sold it at public auction, Nieva emerged as the highest bidder. BMC then filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment on the ground of gross and inexcusable negligence of its counsel, however, CA
dismissed it.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment

Held:

Yes.

In Guiang v. Co, we declared that an auction sale and a writ of execution are not final orders. Thus, they
43

cannot be nullified through an action for annulment of judgment. It bears stressing that Rule 47 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure applies only to a petition to annul a judgment or final order and resolution in civil
actions, on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction or due process. A final order or resolution is
one which is issued by a court which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court. The rule does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public
auction of petitioner's properties or the certificate of sale executed by the deputy sheriff over said
properties. Neither does it apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because a writ of execution is
not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a
final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing
party.

7. Cause of Action
Asia Brewery Inc. v. Equitable Bank
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017

Sereno, C.J.:
On 23 March 2004, Asia Brewery, Inc. filed a Complaint for payment, reimbursement, or restitution
against Equitable Bank before the RTC. On 7 May 2004, the latter filed its Answer (with Counterclaims),
in which it also raised the special and/or affirmative defense of lack of cause of action, among others.

After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, the RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause
of action, and also denied respondent's counterclaims without proceeding to trial. Respondent did not
appeal from that ruling. Only petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was likewise denied.

Issue:
Whether or not lack or absence of cause of action is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint

Ruling:
No.  The Court had already emphasized that lack or absence of cause of action is not a ground for the
dismissal of a complaint; and that the issue may only be raised after questions of fact have been resolved
on the basis of stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.

Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may be
raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of
cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33.

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory
pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed
after the plaintiff has rested its case. Hence, in order to resolve whether the Complaint lacked a cause of
action, respondent must have presented evidence to dispute the presumption that the signatories validly
and intentionally delivered the instrument.

A cause of action has three elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant not to violate the right; and 3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that legal right.
[41] In the case at bar, petitioners alleged in their Complaint as follows: 1) They have a legal right to be
paid for the value of the instruments; 2) Respondent has a correlative obligation to pay, having
guaranteed all prior endorsements; 3) Respondent refused to pay despite demand.

8. Topic: UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUIT

TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA, Petitioner vs. ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS, INC., Respondent

G.R. No. 224022 June 28, 2017

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts:  Petitioner bought a parcel of land from his parents but unknown to him, his father leased the
subject land to respondent for a period of 8 years. Petitioner allowed the lease to subsist while
respondent paid the rent diligently however, respondent stopped paying the lease when petitioner’s father
died. Respondent alleged that it was willing to pay but was confused to whom the payment should be
given as several heirs of the deceased demand the lease payment and cosigned an aggregate amount
with the RTC. Notwithstanding, petitioner demanded the respondent to pay its obligation, claiming that the
cosigned amount was insufficient to cover the obligation plus interest and to vacate the premises. The
MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner which was reversed and set aside by the RTC as affirmed by the
CA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner could eject respondent from the subject land as the latter fully complied
with its obligation to pay monthly rent thru consignation.
Ruling: Yes. For an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first, initially, the
defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease contract; second,
such possession eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation of the provisions of the said
lease contract or the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in possession of the
leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there must
be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the suit is brought within one (1) year from the
last demand. In this case all the first, third ad fourth requisite were clearly satisfied. As to the second
requisite, the respondent's consignation covers monthly rentals only for the period of February 2007 to
March 2011 which is two (2) whole months short of what was being demanded by petitioner (February
2007 to May 2011). It clearly shows that the second requisite was also satisfied.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 22, 2015 and the Resolution
dated April 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 07839 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 29, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Iloilo City, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. 32-11 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that the
rental arrearages due to petitioner Teodorico A. Zaragoza shall earn legal interest of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, computed from first demand on May 24, 2011 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%)
per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction. The other amounts awarded in favor of petitioner
Teodorico A. Zaragoza, such as the ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees, ₱50,000.00 as litigation expenses,
and the costs of suit shall also earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the
decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

9. TOPIC: JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PARTIES

KT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, INC., represented by WILLIAM GO

vs.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 228435, June 21, 2017

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:          Petitioner obtained a P2.5M Loan from respondent which was evidenced by a Promissory
Note signed by William K. Go and Nancy Go-Tan (in their own personal capacities) as the petitioner’s
Vice President/General Manager and Secretary/Treasurer, respectively. The loan became due and
demandable when petitioner failed to pay an installment. Respondent then filed a complaint for sum of
money when petitioner failed to pay despite demand. The RTC and the Court of Appeals decided in favor
of the respondent bank holding William Go and Nancy Go Tan jointly and severally liable with petitioner.

ISSUE:            Whether or not the courts acquired jurisdiction over the persons of William Go and Nancy
Go Tan to hold them jointly and severally liable with petitioner

RULING:        No. The Supreme Court held in Guy v. Gacott that a judgment binds only those who were
made parties in the case, to wit:
In relation to the rules of civil procedure, it is elementary that a judgment
of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and their
successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court. A
decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not
bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be
adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he
is not a party. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling
 rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party
conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
In short, jurisdiction over the person of the parties must be acquired so that the decision of the court
would be binding upon them. It is a fundamental rule that jurisdiction over a defendant is acquired in a
civil case either through service of summons or voluntary appearance in court and submission to its
authority.
In the case at bench, Go and Go-Tan were neither impleaded in the Civil case nor served with summons.
They merely acted as representatives of KT Construction, which was impleaded as the defendant in the
complaint. It is for this reason that only KT Construction filed an answer to the complaint. Thus, it is clear
that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Go and Go-Tan.

10. Topic: IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENT – SOLIDARY LIABILITY

SANTOS-YLLANA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner vs.

SPOUSES RICARDO DEANG and FLORENTINA DEANG, Respondents

G.R. No. 190043 June 21, 2017

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts:  Petitioner is the winning party in an ejectment case against respondent where the court ruled
based on a Compromised Agreement executed by the parties.Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of
the Decision due to Florentina' s failure to comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement.
Respondents objected claiming that the amount due to petitioner had already been paid in full but the
MTC uphold the Writ of Execution, hence the sherriff implemented the writ and padlocked respondents'
stall. Aggrieved by the implementation of the Writ of Execution, respondents filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for Injunctive Relief against petitioner and Sheriffs Sicat and Pangan before the
RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents which was upheld by the CA with modifications.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is joint and solidary liable with the sheriffs for having enforced the writ of
execution with undue haste and without giving respondents the required prior notice and reasonable time
to vacate the subject stall.

Ruling: No. The joint and solidary liability of petitioner has no factual and legal basis. A civil complaint for
damages necessarily alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would serve
as basis for the award of damages. It is undisputed that petitioner succeeded in securing a favorable
judgment in the ejectment case; therefore, it was well within its right to move for the execution of the
MTC's Decision pursuant to Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The rule allows for the immediate
execution of judgment in the event that judgment is rendered against the defendant in an unlawful
detainer or forcible entry case, provided that certain conditions are met. Upon electing to exercise its right
under Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, petitioner’s move to execute the MTC judgment enjoys the
disputable presumption under Sec. 3(ff), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence that it obeyed the
applicable law and rules in doing so. As such it is incumbent upon the respondent to overcome
presumption and to prove that petitioner abused its rights and willfully intended to inflict damage upon
them before they can claim damages from the former.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 2009 Decision and October 13,
2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65768 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The joint and solidary liability of petitioner Santos-Yllana Realty Corporation is hereby
DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED

JURISDICTION – SERVICE OF SUMMONS

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, Petitioner

vs.

ANA KARI CARMENCITA NUSTAD, as represented by ATTY. MARGUERITE THERESE L. LUCILA,

Respondent

G.R. No. 209518; June 19, 2017

Tijam, J.;

Facts:

Respondent Nustad filed a petition before the RTC praying that petitioner Tujan-Militante be ordered to
surrender duplicate copy of TCT’s which were all issued in Nustad’s name and which have been withheld
by petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and averred that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons. Also,
petitioner argued that the Order already ruled with certainty that she is in possession of the titles.

       

Issue:

Did the Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner?

Ruling:

YES. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However,
it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.

In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the
ground of improper service of summons, the ·subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which
sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to · the authority of
such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been
made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s
jurisdiction.

12. FORCIBLE ENTRY &UNLAWFUL DETAINER; RESOLVING DEFENSEOF OWNERSHIP

MENDIOLA VS. SANGALANG

G.R. No. 205283     June 7, 2017

Tijam, J.

Facts: Petitioners and respondents are children of two sisters who predeceased their sister Honorata,
who died intestate. The subject lot was originally registered in the name of Honorata G. Sangalang.
Respondents discovered that the title over the property had been transferred in favor of petitioner and
Vilma by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 29, 1996 purportedly executed by Honorata in their favor.
Respondent, allegedly without asking permission from the petitioner or Vilma and with the use of force
and violence upon things, broke open the door of the unit and had since detained the same. Petitioner
and Vilma commenced their complaint 15 for accion publiciana against respondent for the latter to return
the illegally occupied unit and to pay reasonable rental therefor.

Issue: Whether the petitioner has the better right of possession over the subject property as to
successfully evict respondent.

Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit.

In arriving at its identical pronouncement that petitioner failed to prove her better right of possession, the
RTC and the CA passed upon the parties' respective claim of ownership, a procedure that is sanctioned
under Section 16, 26 Rule 70. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.

It is obvious that Honorata could not have signed the Deed of Sale as she passed away as early as 1994.
The Court cannot simply close its eyes against such patent defect on the argument that registered owners
of a property are entitled to its possession.

Ratio: Denied.
SPOUSES ROSARIO VS PRISCILLA ALVAR

GR  212731

Sept. 6 2017

Del Castillo J,

Facts: Spouses Rosario was questioning the validity of the existence of a loan on a foreclosure case
against them. The existence of the loan has already been settled in a prior case on an action for recovery
of possession between the same parties.

Issue:  Whether or not there is conclusiveness of judgment as to the issues pertaining to the existence of
the loan

Held: Yes, there is identity of parties and subject matter. The binding effect and enforceability of that
earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been resolved and
finally laid to rest in the earlier case.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS

EXPRESS PADALA S.P.A. v. HELEN M. OCAMPO

[ GR No. 202505, Sep 06, 2017 ]

Jardeleza, J.

Facts:
Helen Ocampo was hired as remittance processor by BDO Remittance, a corporation with principal office
in Italy. BDO dismissed Ocampo and filed a criminal complaint against her for falsifying invoices of money
payments before the Court of Turin, Italy.

        BDO Remittance filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment with the RTC of Mandaluyong
City praying for the Court of Turin Decision and the cancellation or restriction of Ocampo's Philippine
passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The sheriff failed to personally serve the summons
to Ocampo in San Bernardo Village, Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas because she was already living in Italy.
Therefore the sheriff proceeded to serve the same to Victor Macahia, the caretaker of Ocampo’s house.
The RTC then recognized and ordered the enforcement of the Court of Turin Decision.

Issue:

Whether or not service of summons was validly effected upon Ocampo, who lives in Italy, through
substituted service

Ruling:

        No. The general rule is that summons must be served personally on the defendant. Section 6,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

For justifiable reasons, however, other modes of serving summons may be resorted to. When the
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time after efforts to locate him have failed, the
rules allow summons to be served by substituted service, which can be effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.

However, when the defendant's whereabouts are not only unknown, but cannot be also ascertained by
diligent inquiry, the rules allow service of summons by publication. It means that prior resort to personal
and substituted service was found to be ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed.

In the present case, it was clearly shown that Ocampo no longer resides in San Bernardo Village, Darasa,
Tanauan, Batangas. Not being a resident of the address where the summons was served, the substituted
service of summons is ineffective. Accordingly, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
Ocampo. Modes of service of summons must be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The purpose of this is to afford the defendant an opportunity
to be heard on the claim against him.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of a defendant's constitutional right to due
process. As a rule, if a defendant has not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over
his person, and a judgment rendered against him is void.

Certification against forum shopping and Reglementary Period

Societe de Products, Nestle SA v. Puregold Price Club

G.R. No. 217194

September 6, 2017
Facts: Puregold filed an application for registration of the trademark “Coffee-Match” with IPO which was
opposed by Nestle contending that it would create a connection with the goods of Nestle’s Coffee Mate
mark because of its distinct similarity. The Bureau of Legal Affairs of IPO dismissed the opposition for
being defective because verification and certification against forum shopping attached to Nestle's
opposition did not include a board of directors' resolution or secretary's certificate stating Mr. Dennis Jose
R. Barot's (Barot) authority to act on behalf of Nestle and that the word "COFFEE" as a mark, or as part of
a trademark, which is used on coffee and similar or closely related goods, is not unique or highly
distinctive. Appeal with the ODG-IPO was dismissed. The petition for review with the CA was also
dismissed on the ground that it was filed after the 15 day reglementary period.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for certiorari was valid based on the procedural
grounds: a) Failure to file its petition within the 15 day reglementary period; and b)Failure to properly
execute a certification against forum shopping.

Held: a) No. Nestle filed its petition for review within the period granted by the Court of Appeals. The CA
dismissed Nestle's petition for review on the ground that Nestle filed its petition for review after the 15-day
reglementary period required by Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA is wrong. During the
proceedings in the ODG-IPO, Nestle substituted its counsel and entered its appearance on September
20, 2013. ODG-IPO noted such appearance on October 1, 2013. The Decision of the ODG-IPO was
received by Nestle's substituted counsel on 14 March 2014. On 27 March 2014, within the 15-day
reglementary period provided for by Section 4 of Rule 43, Nestle filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
file Verified Petition for Review30 (motion for extension) with the CA. In a Resolution31 dated 3 April
2014, the CA granted Nestle's motion for extension and gave Nestle until 13 April 2014 to file its petition
for review. Since 13 April 2014 fell on a Sunday, Nestle had until 14 April 2014, which was the next
working day, within which to file the petition for review. Nestle did file the petition for review with the CA
on 14 April 2014. Accordingly, the CA committed a grave error when it ruled that Nestle's petition for
review was filed beyond the prescribed period.

b) Yes. Nestle failed to properly execute a certification against forum shopping as required by Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In Fuentebella v. Castro, this Court held that the certification against forum
shopping must be signed by the principal party. In case the principal party cannot sign, the one signing on
his or her behalf must have been duly authorized, to wit: "the petitioner or the principal party must execute
the certification against forum shopping. The reason for this is that the principal party has actual
knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must
have been duly authorized.

Juridical persons, including corporations, that cannot personally sign the certification against forum
shopping, must act through an authorized representative. The exercise of corporate powers including the
power to sue is lodged with the board of directors which acts as a body representing the stockholders. For
corporations, the authorized representative to sign the certification against forum shopping must be
selected or authorized collectively by the board of directors.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 15 May

2014 Resolution and the 14 October 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134592.
SO ORDERED.
 ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN TORRES, and JUSTO
TORRES, JR. vs. ANTONIA F. ARUEGO

G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 2017

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: In a decision by the RTC, respondent Antonia Aruego was found to be an illegitimate child of
Jose Aruego and entitled to ½ portion of share of the latter’s legitimate children. Several appeals were
filed by the petitioners; However, all were denied for lack of merit. Then, the same RTC issued a writ of
execution to execute its Decision dated June 15, 1992. Thus, respondent sought the partition of the
estate of Jose Aruego alleging that June 15, 1992 Decision became final and executory because of the
denial of the appeals taken by the petitioners. The partition was granted but petitioners later opposed
alleging that the June 15, 1992 Decision is an exception to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments
because it is unclear as it admits of different interpretations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo, which attained finality more than
20 years ago, may still be subject to review and modification by the Court.

RULING: NO. The doctrine on immutability of final judgments admits of exceptions such as the correction
of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to
any party, and where the judgment is void. These exceptions, however, are not obtaining at bench.
Hence, there is no ground to justify the modification of the Respondent RTC's June 15, 1992 Decision.

To stress, the Court found, after a thorough review of the records, no compelling circumstance extant in
this case that would warrant a departure from the doctrine of immutability of judgments. Petitioners had
ample opportunity to present their countervailing evidence during trial and it is now much too late in the
day to present the evidence that they should have presented way back then. It is settled that the active
participation of a party before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and
willingness to abide by the court's resolution of the case.