Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In a letter1 to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof furnished all the Associate
Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S.
Sorreda, who identified himself as "member, Philippine Bar", expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable
outcome of and the manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:

1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,

2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections

3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.

10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.

In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the dismissal on February 7, 2000 2of
the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK-12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter 3 dated April 2, 2001
addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:

Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally execrable
and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action
not of men of reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom
"might is right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor’s throat a ruling which,
from all appearances, it could not justify.

Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001, 4 required Atty. Sorreda to show
cause why he should not be properly disciplined "for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by
using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it".

In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to the Court dated December 2,
20015 and June 16, 2002,6 arguing for the propriety of his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts
of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15, 2002 7 and August 27, 20028,
the Court merely noted said two letters.

Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty. Sorreda disparaging the Court with
intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory language, to wit:

"SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH THE COUNTRY’S JUSTICE
SYSTEM"9

"WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE?
xxx xxx xxx

I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations as the Honorable Court has
displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship or authoritarian regime." 10

Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again went on a
rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably meritorious cases that have ever
been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for
the Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least some of these ten cases would have
met with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to any reasonable and impartial mind.

In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it personally against me. To the
detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.

Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my
own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one communication-

[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Court’s position, it is that x x x if indeed I had wronged the Court in the
way it had described, and if indeed my explanations and arguments "lack merit," I should indeed be disciplined; and
surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of the
charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked. Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002,
the Court has resolved to deny to the undersigned the "full opportunity" for self-defense that he request … therefore
he is now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction has come down until the present time.

Might it be because I had continued, "Of course, I shall also only expect that such judgment, when it does come, will
be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed perhaps as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the proper
guidance of all concerned"- and the Court knows that it is not able to give such a "fully-reasoned judgment" as I
ask? But rather than admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it would rather "get back" at me by means of
unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to it- let the innocent litigants, whose only mistake was to hire me as their
counsel, and the cause of justice suffer as they may.

Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with an adversary like that. It is
not something I would have expected from the supreme judges of the land.

I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same verifications that were previously
unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal. What other interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run
out of excuses to dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged "shortcomings"; and was now
scrounging every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get my "comeuppance."

That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to the Second Division, then
chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief
Justice, to whom I have directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely explanation
that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get favorable ruling? Especially when it is
considered that, following Justice Bellosillo’s retirement on November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the
nation’s judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way beyond the constitutionally prescribed period of
90 days- and after so much mystery and intrigue has surrounded the appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V.
Chico-Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new retirement took
place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this latest retirement, that for the first time this counsel
had a case assigned to other than the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of
the Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable
reputations for independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in the court exercised their utmost influence to at
least prevent the both of them sitting in the bench at the same time, lest together they should "buck the system" and
divide the Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably rule on the undersigned counsel’s cases before it?

xxx xxx xxx

But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the court is in the wrong. I cannot but
thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization
that the high institution of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that the
public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find justice, should instead give judgments that
so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity.

Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days, and
not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the land, would
miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the actions of an agency that directly contravened numerous laws and
rules all at once? How could democracy’s vaunted "last bulwark" suffer a widow and her children to thereafter live in
their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and illegal demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the court
pause for even three minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept locked up for three years
now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its "discretion" not to entertain his
appeal at all? Where did the Court get such brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the
ground that the docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact were? What
manner of men are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt, and the bar to become like
"Frodo" in the fight against society’s evils in your public speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves
committing the same evils when hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the
clearest manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the ‘What-are-we-in-power-for’
mentality? (Underscoring ours)

Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorreda’s aforesaid letter of 21 February 2005 was included in the
March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.

In an en banc Resolution11 dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.

By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of May 10, 2005 12, again with
copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers thereunder listed, states that he "does not see the need to
say any more" because the "cause" has "already been shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter of 21 February
2005, adding that "[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and decisively". While
admitting "the great seriousness of the statements and imputations I have leveled against the Court", he dared the
Court whether "it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the ‘Supreme Judge’".

After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court of being unfair in the resolution
thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty. Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does not know how to
count when it dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of failure to file the petition therein within the reglementary
period. For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition in Sollegue not only for failure to
have it filed within the period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or certified
true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule
65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56. 13 In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda
claimed that said case was dismissed on the mere ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be
reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective verification but more so because the petition was
evidently used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. 14 We see no need to belabor the grounds for the dismissal
of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions
which were plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even to those who do not have a formal
education in law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation
among members of this Court.

Atty. Sorreda’s imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is utterly baseless and at best a
mere figment of his imagination.

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no
place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of
court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In Ang vs. Castro15, this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is
submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is
to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.16

Atty Sorreda’s conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically -

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality to
the case.

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his client’s genuine interest and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, 17 he must do so only within the bounds of the law.18 A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the
context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every
right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly
administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. 19

Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out
where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to
insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound "to act to
preserve its honor and dignity … and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession". 20

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer21 are
enlightening:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out
one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is
the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be "with all good fidelity xxx to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
"can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold."

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,22 Justice Sanchez further elucidated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."

Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,23 we held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right,
least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirement of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests
is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antimony
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance
of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, with the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community.

As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice.24 No less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the
country’s highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy

Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, to which his
client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time
be lost to it.25

Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to the
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy
one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. 26

We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity,
puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice
of law.27

In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile, 28 we imposed on the respondent therein the
penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a
fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is imperative
to instill in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect courts of justice, especially this
Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to which he will be
allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds. 29
WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is
hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until
otherwise ordered by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed to all courts for their information.
This Resolution shall be spread in his personal record and is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6192               June 23, 2005

(formerly CBD 02-947)

Heirs of the Late HERMAN REY ROMERO, Represented by ARACELI Vda. DE ROMERO, Complainants, 
vs.
Atty. VENANCIO REYES JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their professional oath, they become
guardians of truth and the rule of law.1 Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as
representatives of a party but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. 2 Thus, their duty to protect their clients’
interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. While they are
obliged to present every available legal remedy or defense; their fidelity to their clients must always be made within
the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense of truth, the law, and the fair administration of justice.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case originates from a Complaint3 filed by the heirs of Herman Rey Romero. They charged Atty.
Venancio Reyes Jr. with willful and intentional falsehood, in violation of his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) in this wise:

"The complainants charge respondent with committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, as a result of which the complainants have been denied justice in Civil Case No. 906-M-94.

"Records show that complainants were intervenors in Civil Case No. 906-M-94, a civil case filed on November 7,
1994 in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, by Elizabeth Reyes, assisted by her husband, Jerry Reyes, against,
Antonio Gonzales, Veronica Gonzales on her own behalf, and as representative of V.R. Gonzales Credit
Enterprises, Inc., and the Register of Deeds for Bulacan. Antonio Gonzales, Veronica Gonzales and V.R. Gonzales
Credit Enterprises, Inc. were represented by respondent, Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr.

"The subject matter is a property subject of multiple sale, in fact, sold thrice over: first to the complainants, second to
Elizabeth Reyes, and third, to V.R. Gonzales Credit Enterprises, Inc. The latter party was able to have its deed of
sale registered first, and a new transfer of Certificate of Title over the property was issued in its name.

"On March 19, 1996, Hon. Fe Torres Arcilla, the trial judge, rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 906-M-94 based on
a Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties to the Court.

"Essentially, the Compromise Agreement ceded possession of the subject property to V.R. Gonzales Credit
Enterprises, Inc., for it to develop the property into a middle class subdivision upon the infusion of capital by Antonio
Gonzales and a certain Teresa Dela Cruz, in exchange for which complainants and Elizabeth Reyes would receive
certain sums of money after two years.

"The Compromise Agreement, dated June 16, 1995, was signed in three stages, first by Elizabeth Reyes and her
husband, then by complainants and their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte Jr., and last, by Antonio Gonzales,
Veronica Gonzales for and on behalf of V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. and by herein respondent.

"In a related case filed by complainants against V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. for forcible entry, herein respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 906-M-94, whereby complainants
had ceded possession of the subject lot to V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc[.] thus rendering the case for forcible entry
moot and academic. The motion was granted.

"On October 14, 1996, the building housing the branch of the RTC of Bulacan which heard the case was gutted by
fire. Thus, the case records were burned. The complainants filed a motion for reconstitution of the records of the
case, which was granted by the RTC of Bulacan. The documents attached to the motion were the basis for the
reconstituted records. Because of the circumstances of signing of the Compromise Agreement, the copy submitted
to the RTC bore only the signatures of Elizabeth Reyes, her husband, complainants, and that of their counsel, Atty.
Renato Samonte.

"After a lapse of two (2) years from the date of the Compromise Agreement, V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. still has
not complied with its obligation toward x x x complainants. Hence, complainants filed a motion for issuance of writ of
execution against V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. for such failure. 1awphi1

"Respondent, as counsel for V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc., moved to dismiss the motion on the ground that the same
was premature, and that the period of two (2) years should be counted from the date of approval of the same by the
RTC of Bulacan.

"Later, after a protracted series of pleadings, respondent raised the issue that Veronica Gonzales had not signed
the Compromise Agreement, and that she had not been duly authorized to bind V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. to the
Compromise Agreement.

"As a result of the objections raised by respondent in the RTC of Bulacan, the presiding judge, Wilfredo T. Nieves,
ruled to deny the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution filed by herein complainants in an Order dated
September 18, 2000. The trial court likewise declared the Compromise Agreement to be unenforceable and without
legal effect."4

In his Answer5 dated August 1, 2002, respondent denied the charge against him. He averred that by moving to
annul the Compromise Agreement, he was merely raising a defense available to his client. He explained thus:

"x x x. The compromise agreement was sent by the respondent through his messenger in the office after he has
affixed his signature thereto to Veronica Gonzales for her signature. Veronica Gonzales instructed respondent’s
messenger to just leave the copy of the compromise agreement to her and she would take charge of filing the same
in court. It was not surprising to the respondent knowing the practice of Veronica Gonzales to consult [her] other
lawyers on the work of the respondent before affixing her signature on the pleading similar to the subject
compromise agreement. In fact, this practice has caused the termination of his professional relation with Veronica
Gonzales. Although it was respondent[’s] natural expectation that the compromise agreement was signed by
Veronica Gonzales especially so when he received a copy of the court’s decision approving the same, yet he cannot
by personal knowledge assert that indeed the compromise agreement was actually signed by Veronica Gonzales for
not being personally present when the actual signing was supposed to have been done. Thus, when his attention
was called by Veronica Gonzales on the absence of her signature on the compromise agreement after the writ of
execution was issued in the case, he could not help but to raise the said absence in his pleading intended to avoid
the effect of the writ of execution. He could not do otherwise lest his client may doubt his sincerity and fidelity in
representing her in the case."6

On September 2, 2002, both parties appeared at a hearing before IBP-CBD Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe, who
thereafter directed them to submit their respective memoranda. Only complainants complied, however.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In his June 16, 2003 Report, 7 the IBP investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violating the attorney’s
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The investigator opined that respondent had "purposely deceived
the parties and the trial court" by claiming that "Veronica Gonzales did not sign the Compromise Agreement and that
she was not suitably authorized to sign it, despite earlier actions indicating the contrary." As a result, respondent
succeeded in misleading Presiding Judge Wilfredo T. Nieves, thereby causing the latter to declare the Compromise
Agreement as unenforceable and devoid of legal effect. Thus, Commissioner Bernabe recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

In Resolution No. XVI-2003-67,8 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the
commissioner.

The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was then transmitted to this Court for final action, 9pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace.  Upon taking their professional oath, they become
lawphil.net

guardians of truth and the rule of law.10 Verily, when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as the parties’
representatives but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. 11 Thus, their duty to protect their clients’ interests is
secondary to their obligation to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
We stress that as officers of the court, lawyers are expected to act with complete candor. In all their dealings, they
may not resort to the use of deception and the pretentions of wolves. The Code of Professional Responsibility bars
them from committing or consenting to any falsehood, or from misleading or allowing the court to be misled by any
artifice or guile in finding the truth. 12 They are mandated to observe the rules of procedure properly, not misuse such
rules to defeat the ends of justice.13 For these reasons, complete and absolute honesty when they appear and plead
before the courts is expected by judges.14 Any act that obstructs or impedes the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against lawyers. In the present case, respondent dismally failed to live up
to these exacting standards of candor and nobility required by the legal profession.

In assailing the legality of the Compromise Agreement, he claims good faith. He maintains that he should not be
faulted for raising an allegedly valid defense to protect his client’s interests. The records show, however, that his
actions bear hallmarks of dishonesty and doublespeak.

Undeniably, respondent actively participated in the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. On
several occasions, he necessarily had to vouch for its existence and validity.

First, he used it as a ground to support his Motion for the dismissal of the forcible entry case against his
clients.15 He specifically alleged that the Compromise Agreement had been duly ratified by RTC Branch 84
of Bulacan. By invoking its provisions, he was able to demonstrate his clients’ ownership of the disputed
property and thus obtain his desired relief from the court.

Second, when complainants submitted a copy of the Agreement as a part of their Petition for the
Reconstitution of the Records of Civil Case No. 906-M-94, respondent never raised any objection as to its
due execution. The Order16 granting the Petition clearly stated that he had "interposed no objection and
admitted all the documents presented."

Third, after the reconstitution of the records of Civil Case No. 906-M-94, complainants moved for the
execution of the Compromise Agreement against the clients of respondent. He opposed the Motion,
however, alleging that it was premature. Relying again on the provisions of the Agreement, he argued that
the period within which his clients should comply with their contractual obligations be reckoned from the
court’s ratification of it, not from its execution by the parties.

Through the foregoing representations, respondent impressed upon the parties and the trial judge that his clients
were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then, suddenly and conveniently, he repudiated it by falsely alleging
that one of his clients had never signed it. Obviously, he was anticipating a dead end in shielding them from the
court’s Order of Execution. Suspiciously, he raised the issue only after they had no other recourse but to comply
with their obligation under the Agreement. His subterfuge was undoubtedly a ruse to mislead the court because, as
later proven by complainants during the proceedings before the IBP, the Compromise Agreement had in fact been
duly signed by the said client.17

True, lawyers are obliged to present every available remedy or defense to support the cause of their clients.
However, their fidelity to their causes must always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the
expense of truth and justice.18 In Choa v. Chiongson this principle was explained thus:

"While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do
so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results
of his client’s case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or
maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar
that he ‘will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to
the same’; and that he ‘will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.’ Needless to state, the lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of
reason and common sense. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party." 19

Deception and other forms of moral flaw will never be countenanced by this Court. 20 Respondent failed to live up to
the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Venancio Reyes Jr. is found guilty as charged. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1)
year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as on
the bar confidant who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1313             April 27, 2005

VIRGILIO P. ALCONERA, Complainant, 
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law or procedure and/or grave misconduct against Judge Jose S.
Majaducon, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, General Santos City filed by
Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera.1

This complaint originated from a case for forcible entry with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, damages and attorney’s fees filed by complainant on March 13, 1997
on behalf of Dioscoro Bactol and Elizabeth Bactol Viquiera against Faustino Labao with the MTCC of General
Santos City.2 The case was subsequently assigned to the sala of the respondent.  Summons was served upon the
defendant on April 4, 1997. 3

On April 19, 1997, defendant Labao filed his unverified answer, well beyond the ten-day period provided by the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.4 Nevertheless, respondent admitted defendant’s answer and set the
case for preliminary conference. 5 Shortly after receiving the order for preliminary conference, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, contending that, having filed his answer out of time and
without verification, defendant in effect failed to file his answer and that, in any event, his answer failed to tender an
issue.6 Respondent never acted on the said motion.  Three preliminary conferences were held on April 28, May 21
and May 26, 1997.

On May 26, 1997, Labao was absent but still the conference proceeded, after which respondent, in an order given in
open court, gave the parties a non-extendible period of 15 days to submit their position papers with their evidence. 
In the same hearing, he also ordered that because defendant Labao did not appear at the conference despite
notice, he was given "a chance to move for reconsideration within ten (10) days from notice hereof whether or not
he intend[ed] still to present more documentary evidence for marking..." 7

On June 9, 1997, plaintiffs filed their position paper. 8 Thereafter, defendant Labao, through counsel, filed a "Motion
to File Answer through Counsel." 9 Respondent granted said motion and also directed defendant Labao to file his
position paper.10 Defendant Labao never filed either his position paper or his answer.

On October 9, 1997, respondent declared the case submitted for decision. 11  On November 3, 1997, he rendered a
decision in favor of Labao and dismissed the complaint. 12 A little over a month later, complainant filed this case
against respondent for gross ignorance of the law and/or grave misconduct for manifest bias toward a litigant,
specifically for ignoring the rule on summary procedure and favoring the other party.

On May 7, 1998 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified complaint to respondent, directing
him to answer within ten days.13

In his answer,14 respondent refuted the charge of bias, claiming that he rendered his decision based on defendant’s
evidence that he was in prior possession of the land. He likewise explained his failure to act on complainant’s
motion, saying that he had not done so because "during the initial stages, a certain Atty. Johnny Landero filed a
motion to allow Faustino Labao to file an amended answer.  Atty. Alconera himself did not object to this motion."15 
However, he did not at all address the complaint that he violated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

After evaluating the case, the OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and that respondent be fined P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law.16 We referred the complaint to Executive
Judge Abednego O. Adre17 of General Santos City for investigation, report and recommendation. 18

However, it turned out that Judge Adre had been appointed to the RTC of Quezon City. 19 On top of that, respondent
submitted a manifestation to the Court dated October 20, 2000 that, not only was there no Executive Judge in
General Santos City but also that he was the Vice-Executive Judge and therefore the acting Executive
Judge.20 Respondent also prayed that his counter-charge against complainant be given due course.
Furthermore, due to the fact that the respondent had in the meantime been promoted to RTC judge, the OCA
recommended that the case be referred to an associate justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.21 The case was subsequently assigned to Associate Justice Juan Enriquez who set the case for
preliminary conference.

In a strange turn of events, however, complainant informed the Court that he was withdrawing his complaint and
moving for the dismissal of the case.22 Justice Enriquez informed complainant that his letter-request could not be
favorably acted upon owing to the sui generis nature of an administrative case. He reset the preliminary
conference.23

Because no one appeared at the preliminary conference, Justice Enriquez issued an order giving the parties five
days to manifest whether they were amenable to have the case submitted for decision based on the pleadings on
record.

Complainant submitted a manifestation in which he prayed for the dismissal of the case. 24 He later submitted
another manifestation, this time in response to Justice Enriquez’s order, reiterating the said prayer and stating that
he was not, in fact, amenable to have the case submitted for decision based on the pleadings. 25

On February 24, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 70.

On July 8, 2002, the Third Division of this Court, in Administrative Matter No. 10874-Ret., concerning the
compulsory retirement of respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside P100,000 thereof in
view of  several administrative cases still pending against him.

On October 10, 2003, Justice Enriquez finally submitted his report and recommendation. He found respondent guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be fined  P20,000 considering that the same was a serious
charge under Section 3 (actually Section 8) of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and punishable under Section
11(A)(3) of the same Rule.26

The main issue here is whether respondent was in fact guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure.  A
secondary issue is whether the withdrawal of charges by the complainant was a valid ground for the dismissal of the
case.

We will first dispose of the ancillary issue.

In the recent case of Gamboa v. Gamboa,27 we suspended court employee Pedro S. Gamboa for six months and
one day without pay for disgraceful and immoral conduct, even though the complainant (his wife) had filed an
"Affidavit of Forgiveness, Pardon and Desistance." We reiterated the rule that an administrative case against an
official or employee of the judiciary, once filed, ceases to be dependent on the interest of the complainant to pursue
the case. Quoting Rizon v. Zerna,28 we said:

Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his
own, condone what may be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the
complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary power…Desistance cannot divest the Court of its
jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against the respondent. To be sure, public interest is at
stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary. And the program and efforts
of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by
private arrangements between the parties.

In short, complainant’s manifestation to the effect that he was no longer interested in prosecuting this case was of
no moment, as were his attempts to persuade us that respondent was, lo and behold, objective and professional
after all. Respondent’s infraction, manifest from the records, should be the proper basis of our decision.

We adopt most of Justice Enriquez’s recommendations which actually echo those of OCA three years earlier.

Sections 5 and 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provide in no uncertain terms the period within
which a defendant must file his answer, and the consequences of failure to file the same:

SEC. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer
to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.  Affirmative and negative defenses not
pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims
and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to
counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded.

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein:Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
 attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants. (emphasis
ours)

The rules are unequivocal as to what a judge who is hearing a summary proceeding is supposed to do when the
defendant fails to file his answer within the reglementary period. The word "shall" indicates that the act of rendering
judgment is mandatory and not discretionary upon him. The same specific requirement can be found in the rule on
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer proceedings. 29 Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that in the
proviso, the judge is given discretion as to the amount of damages he is allowed to impose. It was therefore not
within respondent’s authority to accept defendant Labao’s late answer.

In addition, by granting Labao’s "Motion for Time to File Answer," respondent, in effect, violated Section 19(e) of the
Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting motions for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
By granting it, he defeated the summary nature of the case.

Regarding respondent’s alleged bias in favor of Labao, it is clear from the records that respondent bent over
backwards several times by admitting late and even unauthorized pleadings, and by blithely offering him several
extensions to submit evidence as he pleased. Whether or not such actions were motivated by bias was actually
irrelevant because they violated not only the letter but also the spirit of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The fact
that the Rule sets such a stringent time limit on filing an answer and excludes a multitude of pleadings allowed in
ordinary proceedings can only point to a specific intent: the efficient and expeditious disposal of cases covered by
the Rule. What happened in respondent’s sala, with all the extensions of time and undue granting of the defendant’s
motions, was the exact opposite.

We likewise adopt Justice Enriquez’s finding that respondent’s alleged closeness to defendant was without sufficient
basis.

Respondent’s counter-charge against complainant is dismissed, given the merit of the complaint against him for
ignorance of law or procedure.

As a member of the judiciary, respondent is supposed to know his law. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that
"A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." 30 Respondent was sorely remiss in that
obligation in at least one instance. His ignorance of procedure, manifest from the records, properly fell under
Section 8 of the Rule on Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts, specifically gross ignorance of the law
or procedure.31

OCA’s records disclose that respondent, while still in the service, was the subject of several administrative cases, at
least two of which resulted in his being fined.  In one case, he was fined P10,000. Under these circumstances, we
disagree with Justice Enriquez’s recommended penalty of P20,000 which is the lightest possible penalty for
respondent’s offense.

The penalty for gross ignorance of law or procedure as provided in Section 11 of the Rules on Discipline ranges
from  fine to dismissal. Since this is not respondent’s first offense, we impose the maximum fine of P40,000 and not
just P20,000 as originally recommended by the OCA, to be deducted from the P100,000 set aside from
respondent’s retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

WHEREFORE, Judge JOSE S. MAJADUCON is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of procedure and is
hereby FINED in the amount of P40,000, the amount to be deducted from the P100,000 set aside from his
retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

Furthermore, let a copy of this decision be furnished the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, for the investigation of complainant Atty. Virgilio P. Alconera for trifling with the time and resources of
the Court.  Members of the bar, being officers of the court, should not use administrative complaints as instruments
of vindictiveness.  When they file a complaint, they are presumed to be motivated by a noble desire to rid the
judiciary of misfits. Vengeance ought to be totally out of the picture.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 165835               June 22, 2005

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner, 

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set
aside public respondent Sandiganbayan’s Resolution1 dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary
Attachment2 dated 2 November 2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and Office of the
Ombudsman from further proceeding with any action relating to the enforcement of the assailed issuances.

On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713,3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil
Service Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of R.A. No. 1379, 4 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
and Sec. 8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as Case

No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against petitioner. 5 Petitioner’s wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and their three
sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for violation of
R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving,
accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.

On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment 6 against petitioner, his wife, and three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, et al." It was alleged that the Office of the
Ombudsman, after conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation in criminal cases, has determined that
a prima facie case exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents therein who hold such properties for,
with, or on behalf of, Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge
amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful
income, if any.7

Acting on the Republic’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the
questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was
subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of a bond by the Republic. On 17 November 2004,
petitioner (as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss8 in Civil Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed the
present Petition, raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction over the "civil action" for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379, maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the
Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil
actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos, his
family, and cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, 10 as amended, and
Executive Orders (E.O.) Nos. 1411 and 14-A.12

Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or the law creating it, was intended principally as a
criminal court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions, petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquino’s
issuances after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and
cronies, (2) E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by transferring to the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil
Code and other existing laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A.
No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal action.
Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over
the separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil
actions were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of
damages or indemnification for consequential damages or other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing
laws. According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that
the Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction over separate civil actions other than those filed against President
Marcos, his family and cronies.13 Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over any separate civil action
against him, even if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under R.A. No. 1379.

Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution arm of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor
General that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has been violation of the said law and that respondent
is guilty thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. 15 He
argues that only informations for perjury were filed and there has been no information filed against him for violation
of R.A. No. 1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the Office of the Ombudsman to certify that there
is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been committed and that he is guilty thereof. The
petition is also supposedly bereft of the required certification which should be made by the investigating City or
Provincial Fiscal (now Prosecutor) to the Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines that it should have been the
Office of the Solicitor General which filed the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman as in this case. The
petition being fatally defective, the same should have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.

In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary, noting that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as
these have been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan17 which categorically ruled that "there is no issue that
jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan." 18 Respondents argue
that under the Constitution19 and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is vested with authority and jurisdiction over
the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner. Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D.
1606, as amended, as the prevailing law on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade ‘27’ and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

….

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks;

….

As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for
forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioner’s argument that the petition for forfeiture is "civil" in nature
and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the
petition, since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of
whether these cases are civil or criminal in nature. The petition for forfeiture should not be confused with the cases
initiated and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-A, as these are dealt with under a separate
subparagraph of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in particular Sec. 4.c thereof. 20 Further, respondents stress that E.O.
Nos. 14 and 14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property against President Marcos,
his family, and cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition for forfeiture as a "civil case," since it has
been held that petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and that it is only the proceeding for its
prosecution which is civil in nature.21

The Office of the Ombudsman filed a separate Comment,22 likewise relying on Republic v. Sandiganbayan to argue
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed against petitioner. The Ombudsman
explains that the grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379 did not change even
under the amendments of

R.A. No. 797523 and R.A. No. 829424, although it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as
enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of higher
rank, to which petitioner belongs.25
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the
Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution26 and R.A. No. 6770.27 The constitutional power of investigation of the
Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee
which appears to be "illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient" covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public
officials as defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15 (11) 28 of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the
Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan. 29

The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioner’s allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him
failed to comply with the procedural and formal requirements under the law. It asserts that all the requirements of
R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied with. An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was conducted by a
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor General, claimed
by petitioner to be necessary, is actually no longer required since the Office of the Ombudsman is endowed with the
authority to investigate and prosecute the case as discussed above. 30

In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-
shopping. Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil
Case No. 0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the Sandiganbayan’s alleged lack of jurisdiction, he
filed the instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, even though the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is
still pending resolution.  Worse, it appears that the Motion to Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same
1avvphi1

day, 17 November 2004.

Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and enunciates that the Sandiganbayan’s criminal jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had
been removed without subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No.
1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial in nature, the clear intent of which is to separate theprima
facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the litigation of the civil action. This intent is further demonstrated
by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation being
done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor General.

Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of the Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase
"violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are
principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept of "violation" of certain laws necessarily carries with it the
concept of imposition of penalties for such violation. Hence, when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos.
3019 and 1379," the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction,
thereby highlighting respondent Sandiganbayan’s lack of jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture of ill-gotten
wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where the crime carries with it the corresponding civil liability
such that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly
instituted with it, and the court having jurisdiction over the criminal action also acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary
civil action. However, petitioner argues that the action for forfeiture subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the petition for forfeiture is an independent civil action over which
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Petitioner points to P.D. No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent
civil actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:

Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined
in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had
heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or
the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.

Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the charge of forum-shopping.

The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under R.A.
No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such
petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.

The petition is patently without merit. It should be dismissed.

The seminal decision of Republic v. Sandiganbayan33 squarely rules on the issues raised by petitioner concerning
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After reviewing the
legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the question
of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it was the
Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First Instance of the
city or province where the public officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, 34 original and exclusive jurisdiction over
such violations was vested in the said court.35 P.D. No. 160636 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486,
as well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in
connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of said court.37 Such civil actions removed from the
jurisdiction of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and
effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for
under R.A. No. 1379.38

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12939 abolished the concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
regular courts and expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated
in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this change
resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is punishable
by a penalty not higher than prision correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a serious nature,
P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No. 1860 40 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.41

On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations
of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the Sandiganbayan. 42 It could not have taken into consideration R.A. No.
797543 and R.A. No. 824944 since both statutes which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not
yet enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan
indeed has jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379.

Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e)
Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations; (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. 45

In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s argument—that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture it
being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actions—collapses
completely.

The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: "[T]he rule is
settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and, therefore, civil in nature." 46 Then, Almeda, Sr.

v. Perez,47 followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A. No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty
but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. It noted that the

procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. 48

However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a
penalty. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court cited voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the criminal
or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz:

In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence of a default or

an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of
punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of
conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in
the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the
owner to the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)

"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as
the consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' It
may be said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)

….
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against
any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that
where the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the
nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature of

criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several counts in an information is upheld if one count is good.
According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and to prevent the
compulsory production of his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am. Jur. 612)

….

"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute
providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want
of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal
nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be
proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am. Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368) 50

Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez.51 The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid
down in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of the forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the
substantial rights of respondents, particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination. 52 This was
reaffirmed and reiterated in

Republic v. Agoncillo53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General. 54

The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture
In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing For the Proceedings Therefor." What acts would constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A.
No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate the
imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. 55 Section
1256 of the law provides a penalty but it is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who transfers or
conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it does not penalize the officer or employee for making the unlawful
acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v. Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties
unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or employee. 57

It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoning becomes even more obvious when we consider that the
respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was
committed during the respondent officer or employee’s incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with
the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court—to address the urgent problem of
dishonesty in public service.58

Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies.

We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate, file and

prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This was the main issue resolved in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.59

Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
before the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief
Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases. This may be taken as an implied repeal by
P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to
file a petition for forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively. 60 An implied repeal is one which takes place when a
new law contains some provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal those of a former law. 61 As a
rule, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so
intended. Before such repeal is deemed to exist, it must be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with
the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. The language used in the latter statute
must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of
that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. 62
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides that "[A]ny provision of law, order, rule or regulation
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby repealed or modified accordingly." 63 This is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing
and prior laws.64

The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and
the authority to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486 grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot
exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are
inconsistent with each other and the former should be deemed to have repealed the latter. lawphil.net

On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was enacted, P.D. No. 1487 65 creating the Office of the
Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed. The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction
being vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier mentioned.

On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same date
was P.D. No. 160766 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative complaints 67and
created the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. 68 P.D. No. 1607 provided said Office of the Chief Special
Prosecutor with exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said cases. 69 P.D. No. 1607 also
removed from the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. 70

The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided. From this it may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force
where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides
otherwise.71 Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor
General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance
over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary
investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special
Prosecutor.72

The Tanodbayan’s authority was further expanded by P.D. No. 1630 73 issued on 18 July 1990. Among other things,
the Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases. 74 The power to
conduct the necessary investigation and to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative cases
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or administrative agency against any public personnel who has acted
in a manner warranting criminal and disciplinary action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief Special
Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.75

Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860 and 1861 76 which granted the Tanodbayan the same
authority. The present Constitution was subsequently ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the Office
of the Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise its powers except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the Constitution. 77 The Office of the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No.
6770.78

At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A. No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the
Constitution, include the authority, among others, to:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction,
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; 79

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after
25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. 80

Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the
Ombudsman’s exercise of the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards such wealth accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is
without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan such forfeiture action—since the authority to file forfeiture
proceedings on or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the Solicitor General—although he has the authority to
investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant to the Ombudsman’s
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770. 82
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted well within its authority in conducting the
investigation of petitioner’s illegally acquired assets and in filing the petition for forfeiture against him. The contention
that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 were not complied with no longer deserve
consideration in view of the foregoing discussion.

Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party
"repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court." 83 It has also been defined as "an
act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition."84 Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient administration
of justice since it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and
trifles with and mocks judicial processes.85 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal
of the complaint or initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of court, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the same case where the forum-shopping is
found.86

There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. The present petition was filed accompanied
by the requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping87 in which petitioner made the following
representation:

….

3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, involving the same issues as that in the above-captioned case.

4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.

5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been commenced or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within
five (5) days from knowledge thereof.

However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by
respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner
raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact,
the Arguments and Discussion89 in the Petition of petitioner’s thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to
Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the
petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the
annulment of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2
November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. BothPetition and Motion to Dismiss have the
same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that
petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to
dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party
concerned.90 The brazenness of this attempt at forum-shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same day, 17 November 2004. Petitioner should have waited
for the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to the petition at hand.

Petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus, needs to be reminded that his primary duty is to assist
the courts in the administration of justice. As an officer of the court, his duties to the court are more significant and
important than his obligations to his clients. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration
thereof contravenes his oath of office.91 Atty. De Jesus failed to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the
legal profession and the mission of our courts of justice. For this, he should be penalized. Penalties imposed upon
lawyers who engaged in forum-shopping range from severe censure to suspension from the practice of law. 92 In the
instant case, we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of P20,000.00 to be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus
realize the seriousness of his naked abuse of the judicial process.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in
CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days
from the finality of this D E C I S I O N. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice