Remedial Law Case Digests - Covered Cases (4C1920)

CASE DIGESTS IN REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW
DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO

4C 2019-2020
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS DETERMINED FROM ALLEGATIONS IN THE

COMPLAINT
1. Malabanan vs. Republic

G.R. No. 201821, September 19, 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The Republic commenced a case against Angelo B. Malabanan, et. al, the registered owners of various
parcels of land. The Republic alleged that their title had emanated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 0-17421 of the Registry of Deeds of Batangas, which was purportedly issued pursuant to Decree No.
589383 in L.R.A. Record No. 50573; copy of the decision in L.R.C. Record No. 50573 could not be found
in the files of the Land Registration Authority and that the tract of land remained part of the public domain
and could not be the subject of disposition or registration.
In response, the petitioner moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action because it sought the annulment of the judgment and the decree issued in LRC Record No. 50573
by the Court of First Instance the jurisdiction over which pertained to the Court of Appeals (CA).
RTC granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that CA has jurisdiction because the case involves annulment
of judgment of the RTC. After the Republic filed its Notice of Appeal, both parties moved that the RTC
deny due course the appeal on ground that the mode of appeal was improper because the issue of
jurisdiction, being a question of law was cognizable by the SC on appeal by Petition for review on
certiorari. RTC consequently denied the appeal. The Republic filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled that the RTC should have given due course to the
appeal and transmitted the original records to the CA because the issue involved a pure question of law
which it has exclusive jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Should the case be considered an action to annul the judgment of the RTC as Land Registration Court
HELD:
NO, the case is not considered as an action to annul the judgment of the Land Registration Court.
The basic rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations
in the complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.
The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment
of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of title and reversion, like the
present case, belong to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein" and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
The rulings in Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, Collado v. Court of Appeals and Republic
v. Court of Appeals the petitioner cited and relied upon have no relevance herein. Therein, the Republic
had instituted actions for the annulment of judgment, not actions for the cancellation and reversion of title,
like what happened herein. The Republic recognized therein that the land titles subject of each action had
been issued pursuant to final judgments rendered by the Land Registration Court, and that such
judgments must necessarily be first invalidated before the lands involved could revert to the public
domain. In contrast, the Republic alleges herein that no judgment had ever existed.
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4C 2019-2020
WHERE THERE IS JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON AND THE SUBJECT MATTER, THE
DECISION ON ALL OTHER QUESTIONS ARISING IN THE CASE IS BUT AN EXERCISE OF THE
JURISDICTION.
2. Sanchez vs. Vda. De Aguilar

G.R.No. 228680 September 17,2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma Sanchez (Spouses Sanchez) a 600-
square-meter portion of his 33,600-square meter lot. This land is abutting Lake Sebu.
On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely, respondents Esther Divinagracia V da. de
Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their children, fenced the boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot
of the spouses and the alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of the land by the lake Sebu.
The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of fencing because they assert that they are the owners of the
alluvium which enlarged their 600 sq m lot. As a result, they filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against
the heirs of Aguilar before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of
South Cotabato.
The MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents reasoning that the petitioners failed to controvert the
respondents’ prior actual possession of the area in question as evidenced by the improvements they
made thereon. The MCTC then issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to fix the boundaries of the
respective properties of the parties.
On the day of measuring the properties, the respondents said the sheriff should measure the 600 sq.m.
lot from the width of the national highway allegedly to be 30 meters only. The petitioners argued that the
width is actually 60 m. The sheriff then asked the district engineer for the proper measurement. And the
district engineer found that the width of the national highway was 58.53 meters or 60 meters. As it
resulted, the 600 square meter lot measured from the national highway extended until the edge of the
lake Sebu and therefore the alleged alluvium is actually inexistent.
The spouses then filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Damages before the RTC seeking to annul
the June 7, 2006 Decision of the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for rendering
judgment over a non-existent parcel of land since there is no excess of the 600-square-meter portion to
speak of.
ISSUE:
Did the MCTC have jurisdiction over the forcible entry suit?
HELD:
Yes, the MCTC had jurisdiction over the forcible entry suit. Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court
that the MCTC had both jurisdictions over the person of the defendant or respondent and over the subject
matter of the claim. On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the
latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry. The Court has consistently ruled
that jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where
there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint, ruling that the heirs
of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over the subject property should have been raised by the
Spouses Sanchez in an appeal before the RTC.
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4C 2019-2020
FOR PRACTICALITY, THE NEED TO ISSUE A SEPARATE PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE

HEIRSHIP MAY BE DISPENSED WITH
3. Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar vs. Miguel M. Paller

G.R. No. 231459: January 21, 2019
J. Reyes Jr. J.,
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Amended Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, and
Damages filed by respondents against Spouses Custodio and Paula (collectively, the Custodios), before
the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Giporlos-Quinapondan, Eastern Samar (MCTC)
Respondents claimed that the subject land was a portion of a bigger parcel of land originally owned by
their grandfather, Marcelino Paller (Marcelino). After the latter's death, or sometime in 1929 or 1932, his
children, Ambrosio Paller (Ambrosio), Isidra Paller (Isidra), and Ignacia Paller (Ignacia), along several
others, orally partitioned his properties and took possession of their respective shares. From Marcelino's
estate, respondents' father, Ambrosio, was given about one (1) hectare of the subject land. In 1995,
respondent Demetria, daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix R. Aide with right to
repurchase. Upon her return from Manila in 2000, she redeemed the same but discovered that the
Custodios took possession of the land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands; hence, the
complaint.
In their answer, the Custodios claimed that Ambrosio is not a child of Marcelino and such his heirs had no
right to claim the subject land.
The MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents reasoning that the pieces of evidence showed that Ambrosio
is a child of Marcelino. The RTC affirmed said ruling.
While the case is before the CA, petitioners raised the defense of failure to state a cause of action for
failure to declare heirship prior to the institution of the complaint in accordance with the case of Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario.
ISSUE:
Did the MCTC have jurisdiction to rule on the issue of heirship in an action for recovery of possession?
HELD:
Yes, the MCTC had jurisdiction to rule on the issue of heirship in an action fir recovery of possession.
Although the principal action in this case was for the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject
land, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of Ambrosio to Marcelino for the purpose of determining
what legal rights he may have in the subject land which he can pass to his heirs, petitioners herein.
Notably, the issue of whether or not Ambrosio is one of the children of Marcelino was squarely raised
by both parties in their respective pre-trial briefs. Hence, insofar as the parties in this case are concerned,
the trial court is empowered to make a declaration of heirship, if only to resolve the issue of ownership.
To be sure, while the Court, in Yaptinchay, ruled that a declaration of heirship can only be made in a
special proceeding inasmuch as what is sought is the establishment of a status or right, by way of
exception, the Court, in Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, declared that "the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship," and "the [trial court]
had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial," as in this
case. Indeed, recourse to administration proceedings to determine who the heirs are is sanctioned only if
there are good and compelling reasons for such recourse, which is absent herein, as both parties
voluntarily submitted the issue of Ambrosio's heirship with Marcelino before the trial court and presented
their respective evidence thereon. Thus, the case falls under the exception, and there is no need to
institute a separate special proceeding for the declaration of Ambrosio's heirship.
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4C 2019-2020
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE

COMPLAINT NOT BY THE AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE COURT
4. Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Rogelio Ang

G.R. No. 218516: March 27, 2019
Caguioa J.,
FACTS:
Tanio, employee of petitioner, bumped a Mitsubishi sedan driven by one Leo B. Delgara causing damage
to the said vehicle and inflicting serious physical injuries upon its passenger, herein respondent Ang. Trial
ensued and eventually, Tanio was held liable and ordered to pay damages amounting to P900,000 by the
MTCC.
Then, ACF filed a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court based solely on the
alleged erroneous awarding of damages.
The RTC and the CA denied the petition.
ACF’s arguments: 1) grave abuse of discretion when MTCC erroneously awarded damages to Ang, and
2) grave abuse of discretion when MTCC awarded an aggregate amount of P900,000 as damages
because the amount is beyond the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
ISSUE:
1. Was certiorari the proper remedy?
2. Did the MTCC have the jurisdiction to award P900,000?
HELD:
1)No. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a court
would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.

In the instant case, the primary argument of ACF is centered on the supposed erroneous award of
damages against the ACF's employee, accused Tanio, made by the MTCC in its Judgment dated
December 27, 2005 convicting the latter. But as amply explained by the court a quo, such supposed
errors merely pertain only to mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them beyond the ambit
of certiorari.
2) Yes. It is an established principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, it is an established principle that jurisdiction is not determined by the amount
ultimately substantiated and awarded by the trial court.
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4C 2019-2020
THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE VENUE OF APPEALS AND PROPER

FORUM FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
5. Dr. Fe Lasam vs. Philippine National Bank

G.R.No. 207433; December 5, 2018
J. Reyes Jr. J.,
FACTS:
Lasam filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, or Other Proceedings before the RTC on the
ground that she has been seriously deprived of her right to present her case due to the gross negligence
and ignorance of her former counsel in a case for annulment of mortgage she filed against PNB.
The RTC denied the petition having been filed out of time. So, Lasam filed directly a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 to the Supreme Court, assailing the order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Is direct recourse to the SC through a Petition for Certiorari proper?
HELD:
No, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper.
Although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
There is nothing in the instant petition which would justify direct recourse to this Court. Thus, dismissal of
the same is in order.
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS ARE MORE TAILORED TO THE

SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS AND DISCRETION OF THE SUPREME COURT BUT COURT OF APPEALS IS
WITH DISCRETION WHETHER TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO ANY PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DIRECTLY FILED BEFORE IT
6. MWSS vs. LGU of Quezon City

G.R. No. 194388, November 7, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1971, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6234, creating the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System. MWSS received several Final Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency from the
LGU of Quezon City on the real properties owned by MWSS in Quezon City. The LGU of Quezon City
warned it that failure to pay would result in the issuance of warrants of levy against its properties.
The LGU of Quezon City had a Notice of Sale of Delinquent Real Properties published, which stated that
the real properties would be sold at a public auction on September 27, 2007. The list included properties
owned by MWSS.
MWSS then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It argued that its real
properties in Quezon City were exclusively devoted to public use, and thus, were exempt from real
property tax. The Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order.
According to the Court of Appeals, MWSS need not exhaust administrative remedies since the issue
involved a purely legal question. It noted, however, that the Petition should have been first filed before the
Regional Trial Court, which shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals over petitions for
certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioner maintains that it is a government instrumentality exempt from real property taxation under
Section 133(o)36 of the Local Government Code. Respondents, on the other hand, point out that
petitioner failed to observe the principle of the hierarchy of courts when it filed the case directly before the
Court of Appeals, instead of the Regional Trial Court, which exercises concurrent jurisdiction in petitions
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
May the Petitioner directly file a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, without
observing the principle of the hierarchy of courts?
HELD:
YES, as an exception, Petitioner can directly file a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, without observing the principle of the hierarchy of courts.
As discussed, however, the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts is often invoked in direct resorts to the
Supreme Court. Hence, the exceptions to the rule are more tailored to the specific functions and
discretion of the Court:
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when
genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case
involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised
are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves
acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy.
It is doubtful whether the Court of Appeals could apply the same rationale when the doctrine of the
hierarchy of courts is invoked. In any case, it has full discretion on whether to give due course to any
petition for certiorari directly filed before it. In this case, it allowed petitioner's direct resort to it on the
ground that the issue presented was a pure question of law. No error can be ascribed to it for passing
upon the issue.
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4C 2019-2020
JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT, TYPE OF

RELIEF PRAYED, AND THE LAW IN EFFECT WHEN FILED
7. Heirs of Ramiro vs. Sps. Bacaron

G.R. No. 196874, February 06, 2019
Jardelaza, J.
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Bacaron filed a civil case before the RTC against petitioners. In their amended
complaint, spouses Bacaron claimed that the father of petitioners, the late Alejandro Ramiro (Alejandro),
was the registered owner of property; that Sps. Ramiro sold the property to spouses Bacaron, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale; that spouses Bacaron took possession of the property after the sale; that
the property, however, was earlier mortgaged by spouses Ramiro to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP); that spouses Bacaron paid the DBP P430,150.00 for the redemption of the property;
and that in June 1998, petitioners forcibly dispossessed spouses Bacaron of the property.
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the amended complaint, raising the
affirmative defense, among others: the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case considering that it
involves recovery of possession of the property;
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision on July 13, 2007 in favor of spouses Bacaron.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court's Decision to the CA. In their appeal, petitioners argued that
the main thrust of the complaint was to recover the property; yet, spouses Bacaron failed to allege its
assessed value. Petitioners, thus, asserted that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case pursuant to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended.
ISSUE:
Does the RTC lack jurisdiction because the complaint did not allege the assessed value of the lands?
HELD:
YES, complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint did not allege the
assessed value of the lands.
Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein.
The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery of the property through the enforcement of
its sale in their favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of action for the cancellation of the
original title and the issuance of a new one in their name, as well as 'for injunction and damages, are
merely incidental to the recovery of the property. Before any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in
their complaint can be granted, the issue of who between them and petitioners has the valid title to the lot
must first be determined.
Here, respondents did not allege the assessed value of the property. The Court cannot take judicial notice
of the assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or the Municipal Trial Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over respondents' action. Consequently, the complaint filed before the
RTC should be dismissed.
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4C 2019-2020
QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES ONLY POSSESS JURISDICTION OVER MATTERS THAT ARE

CONFERRED UPON THEM BY THEIR ENABLING STATUTES;
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL FINDS APPLICATION ONLY WHERE THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IS
SO BELATEDLY RAISED THAT IT MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN WAIVED BY THE
INVOKING PARTY
8. VICTORIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION VS. VICTORIA

MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 234446, July 24, 2019
A. Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
VMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the textile business. On the other hand, VMCEU is the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the permanent and regular rank-and-file employees within the pertinent
bargaining unit of VMC.
Through a letter dated March 14, 2014, VMC sought the opinion of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
on the tax implications of the wage structure that was stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between the company and VMCEU. In response to VCM's letter, the BIR opined that VMCEU's
members were not exempt from income tax. As a result, VMC withheld the income tax due on the wages
of VMCEU's members.
VMC and VMCEU held a grievance meeting to settle various issues, including the company's decision to
withhold income tax from the wages of the union members who were earning the statutory minimum
wage. Unfortunately, the parties failed to resolve the issue. After failing to reach an amicable settlement
before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. VMC and VMCEU executed a Submission
Agreement, designating VA Renato Q. Bello to resolve whether the company properly withheld the
income tax due from the union's members, among other issues. After VMC and VMCEU submitted their
respective position papers and replies, the case was submitted for decision.
The VA rendered a Decision in favor of VMCEU, ruling that VMC erroneously withheld income tax from
the wages of the union's members.
Aggrieved, VMC sought relief before the CA through a petition for certiorari. The appellate court, after
brushing aside VMC's resort to the wrong remedy, held that the jurisdiction of VAs is limited to labor
disputes. As such, the VA could not validly rule on the propriety of VMC's decision to withhold the income
taxes of VMCEU's members, a matter properly within the competence of the BIR.
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, VMCEU filed the instant petition, arguing that the CA
should not have allowed VMC to question the VA's jurisdiction because the company: (1) actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings and, at the time, never raised lack of jurisdiction; and (2)
voluntarily bound itself, through the Submission Agreement, to abide by the VA's decision. Essentially, the
union contends that the company was estopped from challenging the VA's jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. Does the Voluntary Arbiter has jurisdiction to rule on the legality of VMC's act of withholding income tax
from the salaries of VMCEU' s members?
2. Does VMC's execution of the Submission Agreement and active participation in the arbitration
proceedings operate to rectify the VA' s lack of jurisdiction?
HELD:
1. NO, the Voluntary Arbiter does not have jurisdiction to rule on the legality of VMC’s act of withholding
income tax from the salaries of VMCEU’s members.
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Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The jurisdiction of an administrative body must be confined to matters
within its specialized competence. Since the withholding of tax from employees' salaries is governed by
the Tax Code, disputes involving the propriety or legality of withholding should be submitted to the CIR,
the administrative body vested with the power to interpret tax laws, and not the VA, whose jurisdiction is
limited to labor disputes. After all, quasi-judicial bodies only possess jurisdiction over matters that are
conferred upon them by their enabling statutes.
As a result, absent a statutory grant, the actions, representations, declarations, or omissions of a party
will not serve to vest jurisdiction over the subject matter in a court, board, or officer. Simply put, "judicial or
quasi-judicial jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a tribunal by the parties alone."
2. NO, VMC’s execution and active participation does not rectify the VA’s lack of jurisdiction.
It is clear that estoppel will not operate to confer jurisdiction upon a court, save in the most exceptional of
cases. Without a law that grants the power to hear, try, and decide a particular type of action, a court
may not, regardless of what the parties do or fail to do, afford any sort of relief in any such action filed
before it. It follows then that, in those cases, any judgment or order other than one of dismissal is void for
lack of jurisdiction. This must be the rule since no less than the Constitution provides that it is a function of
the Congress to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of courts. Nevertheless, jurisprudence
has recognized that situations may arise where parties, as a matter of public policy, must be bound by
judgments rendered even without jurisdiction. Such situations, however, are exceptional, and courts must
exercise the highest degree of caution in their application of estoppel to bar jurisdictional challenges.
Here, the Court cannot conclude that VMC was estopped from assailing the V A's jurisdiction. First, lack
of jurisdiction was timely raised. As soon as the VA rendered his Decision on May 26, 2016,58 the
company, through a petition for certiorari dated July 18, 2016,59 immediately raised the jurisdictional
issue before the CA. Second, VMC never prayed for affirmative relief. VMC, in the position paper that it
filed before the VA, merely prayed that "the complaint of [VMCEU] be dismissed with prejudice for utter
lack of merit."
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JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED BY THE COMPLAINT AND RELIEF SOUGHT
A PARTY CANNOT ASK FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEN REPUDIATE SAME JURISDICTION
AFTER FAILING TO OBTAIN SUCH RELIEF
9. Berbano vs. Heirs of Tapulao

G.R. No. 227482, July 1, 2019
Lazaro-Javier, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Heirs of Roman Tapulao filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioners Berbano. In their Complaint, respondents averred that their father Roman Tapulao was
the registered owner of a lot. They paid the realty taxes thereon. After the death of Roman Tapulao and
his wife, respondents caused the relocation survey of the lot. It revealed that petitioners occupied portions
of the lot. Despite several demands, however, petitioners refused to vacate and return the lot to
respondents. In their Answer, petitioners argued that the original owner of the lot was Felipe Pefia.
Sometime in 1954, Felipe Pefia ceded his possession over half hectare of the lot in favor of Joaquin
Berbano. From that time on, Joaquin had been in open and exclusive possession of the lot.
Subsequently, Felipe Pefia sold the adjacent lot to Roman Tapulao. When Roman Tapulao caused its
registration, the survey mistakenly included therein the adjacent lot belonging to Joaquin. As a result,
OCT No. P-93 31 (in the name of Roman Tapulao) also covered Joaquin's lot. Roman and Catalina
Tapulao acknowledged this error through their Affidavit dated April 2, 1976. They promised to respect
Joaquin's ownership of that specific portion.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its Judgment dated August 1, 2014 in respondents' favour.
In their motion for reconsideration, for the first time, petitioners raised the issue of jurisdiction. They
asserted that since the value of the lot (less than P20,000.00), the case fell within the jurisdiction of the
first level courts. Under Resolution dated January 5, 2015, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in view of the clear allegation in the complaint itself that the lot had an assessed value of
P22,070.00, hence, within the court's jurisdiction.
Petitioners also insisted that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. According to them, the assessed
value of the whole lot should not be taken into consideration considering that only a portion thereof was in
dispute. Hence, only the value of the specific portion they were occupying must be the determining
jurisdictional factor.
ISSUE:
1. Does the jurisdiction correctly fall within the RTC?
2. May the Petitioners repudiate the jurisdiction of the court after it prayed for affirmative relief?
HELD:
1. YES, RTC has jurisdiction in this case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or
all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. The Court has repeatedly held that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by examining the material allegations of the complaint
and the relief sought.
Indeed, the Complaint clearly alleged that the assessed value of the lot subject of the case is P22,070.00.
In accordance with BP 129, as amended by RA 7691, since the value of the subject matter exceeds
P20,000.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. Too, petitioners' claim that the property in dispute is only a specific portion of
the lot or only 6,804 square meters, which supposedly carries the proportional assessed value of P8, 111.
72, is irrelevant. It does not alter what is actually alleged in the complaint. Besides, it is not for petitioners
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to define the allegations in their adversaries' complaint. That is the respondents' prerogative as plaintiffs
below. Additionally, petitioners cannot limit the dispute to the alleged area actually being contested. This
is because the rest of the contiguous portion of the lot could be relevant to the remedy or remedies
flowing therefrom.
2. NO, Petitioners now cannot repudiate the jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioners never questioned the trial court's jurisdiction in the proceedings before it. In fact, petitioners
even filed their Answer and sought affirmative relief therein. Also, it is only after the case was decided
against them that they challenged it for the first time via their motion for reconsideration. In Tijam, et al. v.
Sibonghanoy, et al., the Court held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court and ask for
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. So must it be.
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PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT AMOUNT OF FILING FEES SHOULD NOT BE MADE CONTINGENT
ON THE RESULT OF A CASE
10. Heirs of Renato Dragon vs. Manila Banking Corp.

G.R. No. 205068, March 06, 2019
FACTS:
Dragon obtained several loans from Manila Banking. The total principal amount of his loans was
P6,945,642.00. Each Promissory Note stipulated a rate of interest, penalty interest in case of default, and
attorney's fees, and due dates from 1976 to 1983.
In 1987, Manila Banking was placed under receivership by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The bank's
receiver sent Dragon several demand letters requiring him to pay his outstanding loans, the final letter
being dated August 12, 1998. In a Statement of Account attached to the final letter, Manila Banking
computed the amount Dragon owed as P44,038,995.00, consisting of the principal amount of
P6,945,642.00, plus accrued interest, penalties, and attorney's fees as of July 31, 1998.
Dragon failed to pay his outstanding obligation. Thus, on January 7, 1999, Manila Banking filed before the
RTC a Complaint for collection of sum of money. The RTC issued its Decision in favor of Manila Banking.
Nonetheless, the RTC held that it could only order Dragon to pay the amount of P6,945.642.00,
representing his principal obligation, plus the interest and penalty charges, as stipulated in the Promissory
Notes, and not P48,028,268.98, per the Statement of Account submitted by Manila Banking. During trial,
Manila Banking failed to submit documents to justify or support the computation in the Statement of
Account.
Dragon raised for the first time the issue of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the Complaint. He
alleged that Manila Banking wilfully and deliberately evaded payment of the correct docket fees for the
amounts it claimed.
ISSUE:
Does the RTC had jurisdiction over Manila Banking's claims for interests, penalties, and attorney's fees
despite its failure to pay the correct docket fees?
HELD:
NO, RTC has no jurisdiction because of the failure to pay the correct docket fees. Under Rule 141,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing fees must be paid in full at the time an initiatory pleading or
application is filed. Payment is indispensable for jurisdiction to vest in a court. The amount must be paid in
full. For actions involving recovery of money or damages, the aggregate amount claimed should be the
basis for assessment of docket fees. Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages,
the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests
and costs.
The basis for the assessment of the filing fees for respondent's Complaint should not have been only the
principal amounts due on the loans, but also the accrued interests, penalties, and attorney's fees. These
amounts should have all been specified in both the Complaint's body and prayer. Respondent is perfectly
capable of estimating the accrued interests, penalties, and charges it demanded as of the date it filed its
Complaint. But despite respondent's demand letters containing computations of accrued interests,
penalties, and attorney's fees, none of these computations were mentioned in the Complaint, either in its
body or prayer.
Here, the amount of unremitted filing fees is substantial. Respondent paid only P34,975.75 in filing fees
based on its P6,945,642.00 claim alleged in its Complaint. If respondent had properly stated the total sum
it claimed in its prayer, including the interests, penalties, and charges, it should have paid P222,300.43,
as computed by the clerk of court. In effect, respondent only paid 15.7% of the docket fees it owes the
court.
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Absolutely no filing fees were paid by respondent for the accrued interest it claimed. In multiple pleadings,
respondent reasons that it has not defrauded the government because the court may simply recoup the
filing fees in the form of a lien over the judgment award in the event that it be awarded all the amounts it is
allegedly owed.
Concededly, Rule 141, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 2. Fees in lien. — Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees
which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess
and collect the corresponding fees.
What respondent forgets is that the payment of correct docket fees cannot be made contingent on the
result of the case. Otherwise, the government and the judiciary would sustain tremendous losses, as
these fees "take care of court expenses in the handling of cases…” The rule on after-judgment liens
applies to instances of incorrectly assessed or paid filing fees, or where the court has discretion to fix the
amount to be awarded.
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FAILURE TO PAY CORRESPONDING DOCKET FEES FOR AN INCREASED AMOUNT PRAYED FOR
DOES PREVENT THE COURT FROM ACQUIRING JURISDICTION
11. International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. City of Manila, et al.
G.R. No. 185622; October 17, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
When petitioner renewed its business license for 1999, it was assessed for two business taxes. It paid the
additional assessment, but it filed a protest letter. When the City Treasurer failed to decide on the protest
within 60 days, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Treasurer and
Resident Auditor of Manila. The RTC dismissed the petition, but the petitioner appealed the dismissal to
the CA, which reversed the dismissal and ordered it to be remanded to the RTC. While the petition was
pending, the City of Manila continued to impose the business taxes on petitioner so that it would be
issued business permits.
International Container filed an Amended and Supplemental Petition, alleging, among others, that since
the payment of both business taxes was a pre-condition to the renewal of International Container's
business permit, it was compelled to pay, and had been paying under protest. It amended its prayer to
include not only the refund of business taxes paid for the first three (3) quarters of 1999, but also the
taxes continuously paid afterwards. The RTC dismissed the amended and supplemental petition. A
petition for review was then filed before the CTA.
The CTA Second Division found that the City of Manila committed direct double taxation when it imposed
a local business tax under Section 21 (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794, in addition to the business tax
already imposed under Section 18 of Manila Ordinance No. 7794. It ordered a partial refund of
P6,224,250.00, representing the erroneously paid business taxes for the third quarter of taxable year
1999. However, it did not order the City of Manila to refund the business taxes paid by the petitioner
International Container subsequent to the first three (3) quarters of 1999. The claims corresponding to the
subsequent periods were denied since the petitioner failed to substantiate its claims. The CTA en banc
then dismissed the petition for review filed by the petitioner. In one of its resolutions, it ruled that the CTA
had no jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claim from the fourth quarter of 1999 onwards due to non-payment
of docket fees before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims for refund from the fourth quarter of 1999
onwards, despite its non-payment of additional docket fees to the RTC?
HELD:
Yes, the RTC have jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims for refund.
It is an established rule that the payment of the prescribed docket fees is essential for a court to acquire
jurisdiction over a case. Should the docket fees paid be found insufficient considering the value of the
claim, the filing party shall be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. The
clerk of court involved, or his or her duly authorized deputy, is responsible for making the deficiency
assessment.
If a party pays the correct amount of docket fees for its original initiatory pleading, but later amends the
pleading and increases the amount prayed for, the failure to pay the corresponding docket fees for the
increased amount should not be deemed to have curtailed the court's jurisdiction. When it is not shown
that the party deliberately intended to defraud the court of the full payment of docket fees, the principles
enumerated in Sun Insurance should apply.
In this case, Sun Insurance applies. First, it is undisputed that petitioner paid the correct amount of docket
fees when it filed its original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the RTC. It was when it filed its
Amended and Supplemental Petition, where it prayed for refund of all the tax payments it had made and
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would make after the first three (3) quarters of 1999, that the issue of deficient payment of docket fees
arose. Second, it is clear that respondents never assailed petitioner's insufficient payment of docket fees
before the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division. They only raised this issue
in their October 25, 2008 Comment to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the September 5, 2008
Decision of the CTA en banc. Finally, there is no showing that petitioner intended to deliberately defraud
the court when it did not pay the correct docket fees for its Amended and Supplemental Petition.
Respondents have not provided any proof to substantiate their allegation that petitioner purposely
avoided the payment of the docket fees for its additional claims. On the contrary, petitioner has been
consistent in its assertion that it will undertake to pay any additional docket fees that may be found due by
this Court. Further, it is well settled that any additional docket fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
that may be awarded.
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INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT ACT DOES NOT REMOVE COURT’S JURISDICTION OVER
CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
12. Ha Datu Tawahig (Roderick Sumatra) vs. Cebu City Prosecutor Lineth Lapinid, et al.
G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
In 2007, Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape. A warrant of arrest was issued, but he would not
be arrested until July 2013. Following his arrest, petitioner filed a motion to quash a supplemental motion
to quash. These motions cited provisions of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA). The motions were
denied on the ground that IPRA does not apply to the prosecution of a dispute such as that of his case.
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus. He claimed that Dadantulan tribal court issued a resolution
clearing him and declaring that he should be spared from criminal, civil and administrative liability. Relying
on the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and "other related laws concerning cases involving indigenous
peoples," petitioner maintains that a writ of mandamus must be issued to compel respondents to "uphold
and respect" the Dadantulan Tribal Court Resolution, and "thereby release Sumatra from jail to stop his
continued arbitrary detention.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for mandamus to order the respondents to desist from proceeding with the rape case
against the petitioner proper?
HELD:
No. A petition for mandamus is not proper for this case.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy. Applying this
doctrine is not merely for practicality; it also ensures that courts at varying levels act in accord with their
respective competencies. It does not escape this Court's attention that an equally effective avenue for
relief was available to petitioner through recourse to the Court of Appeals. The SC, however, takes
cognizance of the Petition, in the interest of addressing the novel issue of whether the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act works to remove from courts of law jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
indigenous peoples. It does not.
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance of
criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative rights and duties in support of
petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
In this case, petitioner derives no right from the Dadantulan Tribal Court to be spared from criminal
liability. The RTC is under no obligation to defer to the exculpatory pronouncements made by the
Dadantulan Tribal Court. Instead, it must proceed to rule on petitioner's alleged liability with all prudence
and erudition.
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THE JOINDER OF COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY AND ACTION FOR EJECTMENT IS

ENJOINED BY SECTION 5, RULE 2 OF THE RULES OF COURT
13. Lavaje Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. vs. Spouses Apilis-
Javellana
G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Lajave entered into a Contract of Lease with Agustin for the lease of the latter's portion of the
property in Hacienda San Isidro, Silay City for a period of ten (10) years for the purpose of planting
sugarcane and other agricultural crops. It was agreed therein that upon the expiration of the term of the
lease or any extension and renewals thereof, Lajave would peaceably and voluntarily surrender to
Agustin the land leased without need of demand. The coverage of the lease expanded to include the
other shares of Agustin in other properties he inherited from his father. No new contract of lease was
executed for these additional areas. When the contract of lease expired, Lajave continued to use and
occupy the sugar farms in Hacienda San Isidro in Silay City without any renewal or extension of the
contract. Respondent alleged that Lajave's occupancy was merely tolerated. Lajave paid Agustin the
annual compensation for the use and occupancy of the said properties, but the latter alleged that they
were never apprised of how the annual rental was determined and the payment of lease rentals was more
often delayed. Thus, respondent sent several demand letters to Lajave to vacate the property in Silay
City. However, despite demands to vacate the subject properties, Lajave continued to occupy the latter.
Thereafter, respondent spouses filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer involving the property in Hacienda
San Isidro, Silay City. Another complaint for unlawful detainer was filed, pertaining to the property in
Hacienda Sta. Maria, Talisay City. Both cases were dismissed. Agustin also claimed that Lajave owed
him of P324,494.88 for an unpaid rental balance. Consequently, albeit the pendency of the unlawful
detainer cases, Agustin and his wife also filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money, docketed
representing the deficiency in rentals paid for Lajave's use and occupancy of the properties. Laveje filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of splitting of cause of action and litis pendentia.
ISSUE:
Did respondent commit violation of the rules on forum shopping, on splitting of a single cause of action,
and on litis pendentia when he filed the complaint for collection of sum of money during the pendency of
the unlawful detainer cases?
HELD:
No. The respondent did not commit any violation of the rules on forum shopping, on splitting of a single
cause of action, and on litis pendentia. Splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of
dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be). An action for collection of sum of money
may not be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a
full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary
procedure. The joinder of the two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court. In the present case, Augustin's filing of a complaint for collection of sum of money other than those
sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of
their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action. The cause of action is
different. There is no splitting of action because the complaint for collection of money prays for the
payment of the differential amount representing the unpaid balance in rental fees after the deduction of
the actual payment made by Lajave. Since the damages prayed for in the collection case before the
MeTC pertain to deficiency in the rental payments for the contested period before the dispossession, the
claims have no direct relation to the loss of possession of the premises. Insofar as the collection case is
concerned, Agustin's claim had to do with Lajave's deficiency in the payment of rentals only, without
regard to the unlawfulness of the occupancy. This cannot be litigated in the ejectment suits before the
MeTC by reason of misjoinder of causes of action.
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IN LOAN SECURED BY A MORTGAGE THE CREDITOR HAS SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
THE DEBTOR
14. Central Visayas Finance Corporation vs. Sps. Adlawan

G.R. No. 212674; March 25, 2019
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Respondent spouses obtained a Php3,669,685.00 loan from petitioner covered by a promissory note,
chattel mortgage, and a continuing guaranty. They failed to pay the loan, prompting petitioner to file an
action against respondents for replevin. The RTC ruled in petitioner’s favor, and respondents were
ordered to deliver possession of the dump truck to petitioner. Petitioner then foreclosed on the chattel
mortgage and caused the sale at public auction of the dump truck, which was then sold to it as the
highest bidder for Php500,000.00.
Petitioner then commenced a second case for collection of sum of money and/or deficiency judgment
relative to respondents’ supposed unpaid balance on their loan. Moreover, it sought to hold the
respondent guarantors liable for their continuing guaranty. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Was the dismissal of the second case on the ground of res judicata proper?
HELD:
YES. The dismissal of the second case is proper.
In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor —
the recovery of the credit with execution upon the security. The creditor cannot split his single cause of
action by filing a complaint on the loan, and thereafter another separate complaint for foreclosure of the
mortgage.
Petitioner's prayer for relief in its first complaint was in the alternative, and not cumulative or successive,
to wit: recover possession of the dump truck, or, if recovery is no longer feasible, a money judgment for
the outstanding loan amount. Petitioner did not pray for both reliefs cumulatively or successively. "The
rule is that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with and limited to that sought by the pleadings
or incidental thereto. A trial court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief to a party beyond
the scope of the pleadings.
By praying for recovery of possession with a money judgment as a mere alternative relief, and when it did
not pursue a claim for deficiency at any time during the proceedings in said case, including appeal,
petitioner led the courts to believe that it was not interested in suing for a deficiency so long as it
recovered possession of the dump truck; after all, the basis of its alternative relief for collection of the
outstanding loan is the same as that of its prayer for replevin. Petitioner is barred from instituting another
action for such deficiency. Pursuant to Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on the
effect of judgments or final orders, the judgment in first Civil Case is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
petitioner and respondents.
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JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS MANDATORY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF

IMPLEADING ALL THE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES RESTS ON THE PLAINTIFF
15. Tumagan, Halil, and Padilla vs. Kairuz

G.R. No. 198124; September 12, 2018
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS:
Respondent filed an ejectment complaint against petitioners. She alleged that petitioners conspired with
each other and took possession of the disputed property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threat,
and stealth with the aid of armed men. After forcibly gaining entry into the property, petitioners then
padlocked its three gates, posted armed men, and excluded her from the property.
In their answer, petitioners averred that petitioner could not bring the present action for forcible entry
because she was never the sole owner or possessor of the property. They alleged that she is the spouse
of the late Laurence Ramzy Kairuz, who co-owned the property with his sisters. Petitioners claimed that
the property is a good source of potable water and is publicly known as Kairuz Spring. During his lifetime,
Laurence, in his own capacity and as attorney-in-fact for his sisters, entered into a MOA with Balibago
Waterworks System Incorporated (BWSI) and its affiliate company, PASUDECO, to establish a new
corporation, Bali Irisan Resources, Inc. (BIRI). BIRI took full possession over the property and caused
new certificates of title to be issued. BIRI is 30% owned by the Kairuz family and 70% owned by BWSI
and its allied company, PASUDECO.
The MCTC dismissed the case due to petitioner’s failure to implead BIRI, an indispensable party. It ruled
that the joinder of all indispensable parties must be made under any and all conditions, their presence
being sine qua non to the exercise of judicial power. On appeal, the RTC upheld the MCTC’s dismissal of
the case. However, the CA then reversed the RTC decision and ruled that the lower courts should have
limited the issue to who had prior physical possession of the disputed land.
ISSUE:
Is BIRI an indispensable party that must also be impleaded?
HELD:
YES, BIRI an indispensable party that must also be impleaded. An indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction. Here, as correctly held by the MCTC and the RTC, it is indisputable that BIRI is an
indispensable party, being the registered owner of the property and at whose behest the petitioner-
employees acted. Thus, without the participation of BIRI, there could be no full determination of the issues
in this case considering that it was sufficiently established that petitioners did not take possession of the
property for their own use but for that of BIRI's. Contrary to the CA's opinion, the joinder of indispensable
parties is not a mere technicality. The SC have ruled that the joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory and the responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff. Without
the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
Otherwise stated, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act not only as to the absent party but even as to those present. While
the CA correctly pointed out that under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, failure to implead an
indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, it failed to take into account that it
remains essential that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders
judgment. Here, the CA simply proceeded to discuss the merits of the case and rule in petitioner's favor,
recognizing her prior physical possession of the subject property. This is not correct. The Decision and
Resolution of the CA in this case is, therefore, null and void for want of jurisdiction, having been rendered
in the absence of an indispensable party, BIRI.
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IF THE PRINCIPAL PARTY CANNOT SIGN THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING THE
ONE SIGNING ON HIS BEHALF MUST HAVE BEEN DULY AUTHORIZED
16. Heirs of Gabriel vs Cebrero

GR No. 222737. November 12, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Segundina Cebrero (Cebrero), through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot, executed a real estate
mortgage over the subject property located in Sampaloc, Manila, registered under the name of Cebrero's
late husband Virgilio Cebrero as security for the payment of the amount of Eight Million Pesos
P8,000,000.00. Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension, Gabriel
foreclosured the real estate mortgage but failed to register the Final Deed of Sale. Gabriel discovered the
registration of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by respondent Celso Laviña(Laviña), Cebrero's
attorney-in-fact, purportedly conveying the entire property in favor of Progressive Trade & Services
Enterprises(Progressive).
Eduardo Cañiza (Cañiza), allegedly on behalf of Gabriel, instituted a Complaint for declaration of nullity of
sale and of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the subject property registered under Progressive, a single
proprietorship represented by its President and Chairman, respondent Manuel C. Chua (Chua).
Respondents alleged that the complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and of the TCT be dismissed
because Caniza signed the verification and certification without the proper authority.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners on the ground that Chua cannot be considered a purchaser in good
faith because the mortgage was annotated in the TCT. CA ruled in favor of the respondents stating that
there was no Special Power of Attorney (SPA) attached to the complaint to substantiate Cañiza's
authority to sign the complaint and its verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUE
Can Caniza validly sign the certification of non-forum shopping despite the absence of a written authority
from Gabriel?
HELD
NO. Caniza cannot validly sign the certification of non-forum shopping due to the absence of written of a
authority from Gabriel
Every action must be presented in the name of the real party-in-interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless,
otherwise, authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in- interest.
Here, Gabriel emerged as the highest bidder when a portion of the subject property was sold on a public
auction sale after she foreclosed the real estate mortgage over the said property. As the one claiming
ownership of the said property, she is the real party-in-interest in the instant case.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non- compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification
against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
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attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that
the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non- compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike
in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is
a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances
or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or
justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and
invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against
forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by
his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the plaintiff or principal party. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or the principal knows
better than anyone, whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially
the same issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his
behalf must have been duly authorized. When an SPA was constituted precisely to authorize the agent
to 􏰀le and prosecute suits on behalf of the principal, then it is such agent who has actual and personal
knowledge whether he or she has initiated similar actions or proceedings before various courts on the
same issue on the principal's behalf, thus, satisfying the requirements for a valid certification against
forum shopping. However, there was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to prove Cañiza's
supposed authority to file and prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel.
Hence, Caniza cannot validly sign the certification of non-forum shopping due to the absence of written of
authority from Gabriel
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FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY DOES NOT MERIT THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE
17. PNCC vs Superlines

GR 216569. June 3, 2019
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS
One of Superlines Transportation Co., Inc.'s (Superlines) buses crashed into the radio room of Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), while traveling north and approaching the Alabang
northbound exit lane. Said bus was then turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for the conduct of its
investigation of the incident. As there was lack of adequate space, the bus was towed by the PNCC patrol
to its compound, on request of traffic investigator Patrolman Cesar Lopera (Lopera). While the bus was
stored inside the compound of PNCC, Superlines made several requests for PNCC to release the same,
but its head of traffic control and security department Pedro Balubal (Balubal) denied the same. As a
result, Superlines filed a complaint for replevin with damages against PNCC and Balubal with the RTC
RTC dismissed the complaint CA ruled that the case should have been brought against the police
authorities instead of PNCC because it was Lopera who ordered its storage. SC ruled that Lopera should
be included in the complaint and remanded the case to RTC.
Upon the remand of the case the RTC granted PNCC’s motion to drop Lopera as party defendant and
ruled in favor of Superlines. CA affirmed. PNCC is now alleging that the dropping of Lopera in the case is
violative of the SC’s prior decision.
ISSUE
1. Was RTC correct in allowing the dropping of Lopera?
2. Is Lopera an indispensable party?
HELD
YES. The RTC was correct in allowing the dropping of Lopera
YES. Lopera is an indispensable party
As a general rule, failure to implead an indispensable party does not merit the dismissal of the case.
However, if the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with a
lawful court order. The operative act that would lead to the dismissal of the case would be the refusal to
comply with the directive of the court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case
As this Court categorically stated, it was Lopera who requested the turnover of the subject bus to PNCC.
Hence, as they orchestrated the illegal seizure and detention of the bus, which is violative of the
Constitution, this Court found that they should be included as indispensable parties in Superlines' claim
for damages, if the latter would pursue the same. However, such declaration is not tantamount to
adjudication of Lopera and other police officers' actual liability, especially so when they were not
impleaded in said case as they are not bound by the same. Their liability, if any, would ultimately depend
on the findings of the RTC. Records reveal that the exclusion of Lopera in the complaint is actually not in
defiance with this Court's ruling. Lopera's exclusion therein resulted from the trial court's findings that
Lopera has no liability after due hearing and submission of evidence.
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ABSENCE OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY RENDERS ALL SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS OF THE

COURT NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF AUTHORITY TO ACT

18. Heirs of Dinglasan vs Ayala Corporation
GR 204378, August 5, 2019
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Petitioners filed an Application for Registration of Title over a parcel of land, subdivided into three portions
located in Tabangao, Batangas City. Ayala Corporation, Omniport Economic Center and Pilipinas Shell
Corporation filed their respective opposition. Ayala and Omniport alleged that they are the owners of the
lots as evidenced by a TCT while Shell alleged that they have a leasing contract over one of the portion
under the name of Ayala. RTC ruled in favor of the oppositors. Petitioner alleged that the title of Ayala and
Omniport are null and void because the title of Severina Orosa, from which Ayala and Omniport’s TCT
were ultimately derived were fake and spurious. Petitioners then filed a complaint for nullification of title
against Ayala, Shell, Omniport and the Register of Deeds of Batangas City.
RTC ruled in favor of the defendants on the ground that Orosa was not impleaded as an indispensable
party. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
Is Orosa an indispensable party who should also be impleaded?
HELD
YES. Orosa is an indispensable party who should also be impleaded
An indispensable party is one who stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He
has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the
courts cannot proceed without his presence. It is settled that the joinder of all indispensable parties is
required under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial
power. Stated differently, the joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed
without their presence. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.Thus, without
the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real
finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
Severina Luna Orosa is an indispensable party because the main issue in the instant case is whether or
not the issuance of OCT 18989, which was alleged to be registered under Orosa's name, was
fraudulently obtained. It is clear that Orosa's rights are directly affected by the present controversy and
that she stands to be injured by the outcome of the Complaints filed by petitioners. The absence of Orosa
in the Complaints filed by petitioners renders all subsequent actions of both the RTC and the CA null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.
As to whether or not the subject Complaints should be dismissed, the settled rule is that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just.
Hence, Orosa is an indispensable party who should also be impleaded.
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THE RESIDENCE OF A CORPORATION IS CONSIDERED AS THE PLACE WHERE ITS PRINCIPAL

OFFICE IS LOCATED AS STATED IN THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
19. Hygienic Packaging vs Nutri-Asia

G.R. No. 201302. January 23, 2019
Leonen, J.
FACTS
Hygienic Packaging Corporation (Hygienic) is a domestic corporation that manufactures, markets, and
sells packaging materials such as plastic bottles and ratchet caps. Meanwhile, Nutri-Asia is a domestic
corporation that manufactures, sells, and distributes food products such as banana-based and tomato-
based condiments, fish sauce, vinegar, soy sauce, and other sauces. Hygienic supplied Nutri-Asia with
KG Orange Bottles and Ratchet Caps with Liners (plastic containers) for its banana catsup products.
Every transaction was covered by a Purchase Order issued by Nutri-Asia and a Sales Invoice. The
purchase order provides that all disputes arising from the contract should be referred to an Arbitration
Committee. The Sales Invoice provides that any action shall be filed with the Courts of the City of Manila.
A complaint for sum of money was filed by Hygienic against Nutri-Asia before the RTC of Manila. Nutri-
Asia alleged that the venue was also improperly laid since the Regional Trial Court of Manila was not the
proper venue for the institution of Hygienic's personal action. The Complaint should have been filed either
before the trial courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City, where the principal places of business of
Hygienic and Nutri-Asia are located, respectively. The venue of actions as stated in the Sales Invoices
could not bind Nutri-Asia since it did not give its express conformity to that stipulation. RTC ruled that the
venue was properly laid. It considered that signatures of Nutri-Asia's representatives in the Sales Invoices
as the company's concurrence that any dispute would be raised before the courts of Manila. CA ruled in
favor of Nutri-Asia. It held that since the signature of Nutri-Asia's employee in the Sales Invoices was only
for the receipt of goods, Nutri-Asia did not agree to be bound by the venue stipulation in the Sales
Invoices.
ISSUE
Should the case be filed in the Manila Courts based on the provision in the Sales Invoice?
HELD
NO. The case should be filed courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City. The records lack any written
contract of sale containing the specific terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties. The parties failed
to provide evidence of any contract, which could have contained stipulations on the venue of dispute
resolution. The Purchase Orders issued by respondent also reveals that above the signature of
petitioner's representative is the phrase "Acknowledged by (Supplier). Since the Purchase Orders
indicated how many pieces of plastic containers respondent wanted to order from petitioner, the signatory
merely affixed his or her signature to acknowledge respondent's order. Moreover, the Purchase Orders
included a note stating that the "[Purchase Order] must be DULY acknowledged to facilitate payment.
Thus, it was necessary for petitioner's representative to sign the document for the processing of payment.
The act of signing the Purchase Orders, then, was limited to acknowledging respondent's order and
facilitating the payment of the goods to be delivered. It did not bind petitioner to the terms and conditions
in the Purchase Orders, which included the arbitration clause. The Sales Invoices issued by petitioner
reveals that above the signature of respondent's representative is the phrase, "Received the above goods
in good order and condition. Clearly, the purpose of respondent's representative in signing the Sales
Invoices is merely to acknowledge that he or she has received the plastic containers in good condition.
He or she did not a􏰃x his or her signature in any other capacity except as the recipient of the goods. To
extend the effect of the signature by including the venue stipulation would be to stretch the intention of the
signatory beyond his or her objective. This Court, then, cannot bind respondent to the other stipulations in
the Sales Invoices. Taking into account that no exception can be applied in this case, the venue, then, is
"where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, . . . at the election of the plaintiff." For a corporation, its residence is considered "the
place where its principal office is located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation. Hence, the case should
be filed courts of San Pedro, Laguna or Pasig City.
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ABSENT A VALID STIPULATION, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FOR THE FILING OF THE CASE
DETERMINES THE VENUE
20. Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh

GR. No. 234499, June 6, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rudy Racpan filed a Complaint "For Declaration for Nullity of Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase & Attorney's Fees" before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11 (RTC-Davao).
In his Complaint, , petitioner alleged that after his wife's death on November 12, 2011, he instructed their
daughter to arrange his wife's important documents. In so doing, their daughter discovered a Deed of
Sale with Right to Purchase dated March 29, 2011. The Deed of Sale was purportedly signed by him and
his late wife and appeared to convey to respondent Sharon Barroga-Haigh a real property registered in
his name under and located in Bo. Tuganay, Municipality of Carmen, Province of Davao del Norte.
Petitioner maintained that the Deed of Sale was falsified and fictitious as he never signed any contract,
not even any special power of attorney, for the sale or conveyance of the property which is still in his
possession. Thus, he prayed for the declaration of the Deed of Sale's nullity.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent contended, by way of affirmative defense, that
the venue of the Complaint was improperly laid because the property is in the province of Davao del
Norte then it should be filed in RTC- Davao del Norte and not RTC- Davao City, and that the filing of the
case lacks the mandatory requirement of Barangay Clearance. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion
for preliminary hearing on her affirmative defenses.
RTC: The present case is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED for being improperly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City and for failure to comply with a condition precedent prior to its filing.
CA: Affirmed RTC's decision.

The CA explained that petitioner's Complaint is a real action as it wants the court to abrogate and nullify
whatever right or claim the respondent might have on the property subject of the Deed of Sale. Hence, for
the appellate court, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court is applicable. Under this Rule, real actions
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved is situated. As the property involved is located in Province of Davao del Norte, the
appellate court held that the Complaint should have been lodged with the RTC of Davao del Norte and
not the RTC-Davao.
Further, the CA found that the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a
mere ploy to avoid the requirement of a barangay conciliation, as a mere annotation of a notice of lis
pendens would achieve the same effect without having to undergo trial or post a bond.
ISSUE/S:
Is the venue properly laid?
Is the Barangay Conciliation Proceeding mandatory?
HELD:
The venue was properly laid as the complaint was a personal action.
By weight of jurisprudence, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In
turn, the nature of the action determines its proper venue. In the Complaint filed with the court a quo,
petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase on the strength of this
claim: he did not sign the same nor did he execute any special power of attorney in favor of his late wife
to do so in his behalf. But, as there was no allegation that the possession and title to the property have
been transferred to respondent, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege or pray for the recovery or
reconveyance of the real property.
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The Complaint was exempted from Barangay Conciliation Proceedings
As for petitioner's failure to resort to barangay conciliation, Section 412 of the Local Government Code
(LGC)provides that parties may go directly to court where the action is coupled with provisional remedies.
While there is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation before petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 34, 742-2012, there is likewise no quibbling that his
Complaint was coupled with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Hence, it falls among
the exceptions to the rule requiring the referral to barangay conciliation.
As good faith is always presumed, in the absence of proof of improper motive on the part of the
petitioner, the Court cannot countenance the appellate court's assumption that petitioner was solely intent
on evading the requirements of the LGC in applying for a preliminary injunction. This Court cannot sustain
a dismissal of an action on account of an unproven assertion of bad faith.
Page 26 of 135
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EVEN IF IT APPEARS THAT VENUE HAS BEEN IMPROPERLY LAID, WITHOUT OBJECTION IN THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED
21. Radiowealth Finance Corp vs. Pineda, Jr.

GR. No. 22714, July 30, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
In its Complaint dated October 12, 2015, petitioner alleged that on October 23, 2014, it extended a loan to
respondents, as evidenced by a Promissory Note, in the amount of P557,808.00 payable in 24 equal
monthly installments of P23,242.00, which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage constituted on a vehicle
owned by respondents. Notably, the Promissory Note states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of
any sums due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the]
National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has a
branch/office, a[t] its sole option." Due to respondents' default, petitioner demanded payment of the
whole remaining balance of the loan. As the demand went unheeded, petitioner filed the instant suit for
sum of money and damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC-San Mateo, Rizal,
further alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal.
RTC: At first issued Writ of Replevin however, it recalled the Writ of Replevin and ordered the dismissal
of petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that since: (a) petitioner's
principal place of business is in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in
Porac, Pampanga, it has no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants, warranting the dismissal of the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC correctly dismissed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?
HELD:
No. In this case, petitioner filed a complaint for, inter alia, sum of money involving the amount of
P510,132.00. Pursuant to Section 19 (8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended by Section 5 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the RTC irrefragably has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. Thus, it
erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint on the ground of its purported lack of jurisdiction.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of
action at this stage of the proceeding, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the Courts of
First Instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where defendant fails to challenge
timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and
allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to challenge belatedly the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Clearly, the RTC confused the concepts of jurisdiction and venue which, as already discussed, are not
synonymous with each other. Even assuming arguendo that the RTC correctly pertained to venue, it still
committed grave error in dismissing petitioner's complaint. Even if it appears that venue has been
improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue. Without any objection at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, it is deemed waived.
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A PARTY MAY BE BARRED FROM RAISING LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER ON THE GROUND OF ESTOPPEL
22. Sps. Rebamonte vs. Sps. Lucero

G.R. No. 237812, October 2, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Guillermo’s parents, Marcos and Tomasa, obtained a loan Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Lot No. 1305-A was mortgaged. For their failure to pay the
loan obligation, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the lot, DBP purchased the lot in the public auction
conducted. DBP entered into a repurchase agreement with Marcos and Tomasa. The latter were able to
repurchase the said lot. Thereafter, Marcos and Tomasa sold the lot to respondent Guillermo. However,
prior to the said sale, three separate unregistered sales in favor of petitioner Lino Rebamonte allegedly
took place covering certain portions of the subject land. As petitioner took possession of the portions of
the lot, respondent was unable to possess the entire lot. Respondent repeatedly made demands for
petitioner to vacate but petitioner refused to do so. Respondent Guillermo together with his wife instituted
a Complaint for Recovery of the Real Estate Property, Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title,
Damages, and Attorney’s fees against petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The respondents alleged that the
Deed of Absolute Sale entered into between petitioner Lino and Guillermo’s sisters are invalid and have
no legal effect as they had absolutely no right to convey the subject portions as the lot was owned by their
parents. On the other hand, the petitioners in their Answer and subsequent Amended Answer argued that
Tomasa already granted the sisters of Guillermo rights over the two portions of the subject lot. The RTC
declared void the Deeds of Absolute Sale entered into between petitioner Lino and Guillermo’s sisters.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari where
they raised for the first time that the RTC’s judgment should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Are petitioners barred from raising lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the ground of estoppel as
they raised it for the first time on appeal to this Court?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are barred from raising lack of jurisdcition over the subject matter for the first time on
appeal. While it is true that the Court has held that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any
stage of the proceedings, the Court has likewise pronounced that this general rule is not absolute. It is
settled that, upon the existence of certain exceptional circumstances, a party may be barred from raising
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel. In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, the Court barred
the belated objections raised by a party with respect to the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court because
the said party raised the objection only when the adverse decision was already rendered by the lower
court and that the said party had already sought affirmative relief from the lower court and had actively
particpated in all the stages of the proceedings. It was also held that allowing the party to raise the ground
of lack of jurisdiction after a long delay of 15 years is unfair to the opposing party. Hence, the party raising
such ground is barred from doing so due to the doctrine of estoppel by laches. It is only when the
circumstances of Tijam are present that a waiver or an estoppel in questioning jurisdiction is appreciated.
The court finds that the circumstances attendant in this case are actually more grave than those present
in Tijam. Petitioners Sps. Rebamonte filed an Answer and Amended Answer in response to the
categorical allegations in the complaint. Yet, petitioners totally ignored the issue on jurisdiction in their
responsive pleadings. Not even a whimper on lack of jurisdiction was made. As well, petitioners
participated in every stage of the proceedings before the RTC and CA. They even sought affirmative relief
by filing a counterclaim against respondents. A Motion for Reconsideration was likewise filed by the
petitioners before the RTC. Lastly, reckoned from the date of the receipt of respondents’ Complaint in
1990 to the filing of the instant Petition in 2018, which was the first time the ground for lack of jurisdiction
was invoked by petitioners, an outstanding long period of 28 years has passed. Therefore, petitioners
Sps. Rebamonte are estopped from invoking the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
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OMISSION IN THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING THAT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE

RES JUDICATA AND LITIS PENDENTIA IS NOT FATAL TO MERIT OUTRIGHT CASE DISMISSAL
23. BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. Vs. Great Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 205286. June 19, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Respondent spouses Kiddy Lim Chao and Emily Rose Go Ko (respondents Sps. Chao) obtained loans
from petitioner BDO. As security for the payment of these loans, respondents Sps. Chao executed in
favor of petitioner BDO a Chattel Mortgage covering 40 motor vehicles and personal properties. Due to
failure of the respondents to meet their obligation, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Personal
Property, with an application for the issuance of a writ of replevin (Complaint) was filed by petitioner BDO
before the RTC against respondents Sps. Chao. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24769.
Respondents filed Civil Case No. CEB-24675 pending before the RTC for nullification of chattel mortgage
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. In Civil
Case No. CEB-24769, Petitioner BDO, still as PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc., filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Certiorari Petition) before the CA Special 18th Division, arguing that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondent Great Domestic's liability on the
counter-bond is only P5,000,000. In dismissing the Certiorari Petition outright, the CA Special 18th
Division held that petitioner BDO failed to satisfy the rule on filing the proper certification against forum
shopping, as the latter failed to disclose and mention the pendency of another case involving petitioner
BDO and respondents Sps. Chao, i.e., Civil Case No. CEB-24675 pending before the RTC, for
nullification of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance TRO and/or WPI. In the Certiorari Petition,
which is now being assailed, the matter in focus is the execution upon the counter-bond filed in lieu of the
final and executory Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-24769.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner BDO's failure to disclose Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in the Verification/Certification
accompanying the Certiorari Petition merits the outright dismissal of the said Petition.
HELD:
No. The CA Special 18th Division committed an error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. According to
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
The plaintiff or principal party shall certify in a sworn certification: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
While it is not disputed that petitioner BDO failed to disclose the status of Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in its
Verification/Certification, it must be stressed that, despite involving the same parties, the aforesaid case
and the instant case involve two completely different issues. In Civil Case No. CEB-24675, the issue was
on the validity of the chattel mortgage executed by petitioner BDO and respondents Sps. Chao that
accompanied the loan transactions entered into by the parties. On the other hand, in the Certiorari
Petition, the matter in focus is the execution upon the counter-bond filed in lieu of the final and executory
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-24769. Either decision will not have any bearing as to the
other. An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res
judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings,
given that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certification are not present. Therefore, the CA
Special 18th Division was in error when it dismissed outright petitioner BDO's Certiorari Petition without
holding any discussion as to the substantive merits of the said Petition.
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4C 2019-2020
FOR A PARTY TO BE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS

WHETHER THE REQUIREMENTS OF LITIS PENDENTIA CONCUR
24. Lajave Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. vs. Spouses Javellana
G.R. No. 223785, November 7, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Agustin and his siblings inherited from their father, the late Justice Luis Javellana, the subject properties
in Silay City, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Matab-ang, Talisay City. On 1998, petitioner (Lajave) and
Agustin entered into a Contract of Lease for the latter’s portion of the properties for the purpose of
planting sugarcane and other agricultural crops. Lajave continued to occupy the subject properties even
after the contract of lease expired after the crop year 1997-1998, which Agustin alleged that Lajave’s
occupancy was merely tolerated. On March 1, 2010, Agustin sent a demand letter to Lajave to vacate the
subject property in Silay City and another demand letter to vacate on March 5, 2010 for the subject
property in Talisay City. Despite demands, Lajave continued to occupy the properties. On March 26 and
July 16 2012, respectively, sps. Javellana filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Lajave for the
properties in Silay and Talisay City. Consequently sps. Javellana filed a complaint for collection of sum of
money representing the deficiency in rentals paid for Lajave’s occupancy of the properties covering the
period 2000-2001 up to 2009. Lajave filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that sps. Javellana is guilty
of splitting of causes of action and of forum shopping. Lajave argued that the complaint for collection of
sum of money should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia, stating that the rights asserted and
reliefs sought are one and the same with the unlawful detainer cases. On their comment, sps. Javellana
asserts that there is no splitting of causes of action and no violation of litis pendentia, since the damage
sought to be recovered in the collection case differs that those in the cases for unlawful detainer. The
MeTC of Quezon City granted Lajave’s motion to dismiss ruling that the deficiency should be recovered in
the unlawful detainer case. On appeal, the RTC of QC affirmed with modification the trial court’s ruling
ordering that the dismissal be without prejudice. Sps. Javellana then went to the CA under rule 42. The
CA set aside the trial court decision and ordered the MeTC to conduct further proceedings. Hence the
present appeal by petitioner Lajave.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sps. Javellana committed violation on the rules on splitting causes of action, forum
shopping, and litis pendentia in filing the collection case during the pendency of the unlawful detainer
cases.
HELD:
NO, the causes of action in the subject cases are not the same; the rights violated are different; and the
reliefs sought are also different. In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping,
the most important factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, to reiterate: "(a)
identity of parties, or at least, such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered
in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case." In the instant case, the second and third requirements are lacking. In the unlawful detainer cases
filed by Agustin, his cause of action stemmed from the prejudice he suffered due to the loss of possession
of his properties and the damages incurred after the dispossession. Meanwhile, in the complaint for
collection case, the same was founded upon alleged violation of Lajave, as lessee, of certain stipulations
with regard to payment of the lease, i.e., whether' Lajave correctly paid the rental fees for the subject
period as stipulated in the lease agreement. The Court also emphasized that an action for collection of
sum of money may not be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former being an ordinary civil
action requiring a full-blown trial, while the latter is a special civil action which requires summary
procedure. Section 5, Rule 2 of the ROC specifically provides that “(b) The joinder shall not include
special civil actions or actions governed by special rules”
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IT IS THE PARTY-PLEADER WHO MUST SIGN THE SWORN CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
SHOPPING
25. Leriou vs. Longa

GR No. 203923, October 08, 2018
Leonardo - De Castro, J.
FACTS:
Respondent-minors Yohanna Frenesi S. Longa and Victoria Ponciana S. Longa, represented by their
mother, Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz, instituted a special proceeding entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Enrique T. Longa Petition for Letters of Administration," Respondents alleged that Enrique died
intestate, survived by petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen and respondents Yohanna and Victoria, his
legitimate and illegitimate children, respectively; and that Enrique left several properties with no creditors.
In the meantime, respondents were deemed as pauper litigants and exempt from paying the filing fee,
subject to the payment thereof once a final judgment is rendered in their favor.
Thereafter, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to: 1. Remove Jane Sta. Cruz as Administratrix; and 2.
Appoint Eleptherios L. Longa or His Nominee as Administrator. Petitioners alleged that they were denied
due process of law because they did not receive any notice about respondents' Petition for Letters
Administration. Respondent-administratrix filed her Opposition to the Omnibus Motion alleging that she
mailed the Petition for Letters of Administration and the RTC Order to petitioners in the addresses that the
latter gave her, and that she coordinated with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) for the service of
the Petition. Respondent-administratrix also exchanged correspondences with petitioners and their
counsels about her decision to let the court settle Enrique's estate, and her electronic mails (e-mails) with
petitioner Eleptherios.
RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioners' Omnibus Motion. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC denied. Petitioners thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals which
also affirmed the ruling of the lower court. Hence, this petition for review.
The petitioners submitted a certification against forum shopping, as part of their pleading, which was
signed by their counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition suffers a technical infirmity since the signatory in the certificate of forum
shopping is the counsel who does not have an Special Power of Attorney.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition suffers a technical Infirmity. Rule 45, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires the petition to contain a sworn certification against forum shopping. Item
(e) Section 4 provides that the petitioner shall (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42.
It should be emphasized that it is the party-pleader who must sign the sworn certification against forum
shopping for the reason that he/she has personal knowledge of whether or not another action or
proceeding was commenced involving the same parties and causes of action. If the party-pleader is
unable to personally sign the certification, he/she must execute a special power of attorney (SPA)
authorizing his/her counsel to sign in his/her behalf.
In the instant case, it was not petitioners but Atty. Joseph Lemuel B. Baquiran (Baquiran) of Sianghio
Lozada and Cabantac Law Offices who signed the certification against forum shopping despite the
absence of any showing that petitioners executed an SPA authorizing Atty. Baquiran to sign in their
behalf. By Atty. Baquiran's own revelation, their law firm had lost communication and they could not
locate any of the petitioners who are apparently residing in the United States of America (USA).
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THE TEST TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF FORUM SHOPPING IS WHETHER IN THE TWO OR
MORE CASES PENDING, THERE IS IDENTITY OF PARTIES, RIGHTS OR CAUSES OF ACTION,
AND RELIEFS SOUGHT
26. BF Citiland Corporation vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

G.R. No. 224912, October 19, 2019
J. Reyes Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner BF Citiland executed a deed of conveyance over its real property in favor of Banco Filipino as
payment for subscription of shares of stocks amounting to P130M which was used by the latter as
collateral to secure its Special Liquidity Facilities (SLF) Loan from Respondent BSP, without the title to
the property being transferred to Banco Filipino pending the SEC’s approval of the investment and the
BSP’s favorable endorsement prompting Banco Filipino to ask petitioner a third-party mortgage in favor of
BSP which petitioner conceded to. Petitioner executed another real estate deed of REM over the same
property as accommodation mortgagor to secure Banco Filipino’s SLF loan from Respondent amounting
to P10M. BF Citiland, however, rescinded the deed because BSP disapproved the conveyance of the
property in exchange of Banco Filipino stocks. Banco Filipino was subsequently placed under
receivership of the PDIC.
Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM against Petitioner to which the latter
countered by filing a declaratory relief case against BSP and the Makati RTC Clerk of Court to
determine BSP’s right to foreclosure an prevent them from conducting the public auction and was raffled
to Makati RTC Branch 143, but to no avail as the Clerk proceeded with the auction sale in which the
Respondent was the highest bidder prompting the Petitioner to file an annulment case for the mortgage
and the foreclosure sale against Banco Filipino, BSP, Makati RTC Clerk of Clerk and Ex-Officio Sherrif to
annul the deeds of REM, the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the annotation on Banco Filipino’s
certificate of title, and was raffled at Makati RTC Branch 141.
BSP then filed individual motions to dismiss in both Branches 141 and 143 due to forum shopping which
the former denied in the annulment case, but the latter granted in the declaratory relief case, respectively.
BSP moved for reconsideration of Branch 141’s denial of the former’s omnibus motion to take judicial
notice of Branch 143’s Decision, but said MR was also denied, prompting BSP to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, which the appellate court granted due to identity of parties and
causes in both actions for declaratory relief and the annulment case. The CA also found Branch 141 guilty
of grave abuse of discretion for failing to apply the rule against forum shopping despite knowing that
Petitioner had previously filed a case and further ruled that the penalty is dismissal of both cases as a
punitive measure to trifle with the orderly administration of justice where forum shopping is present, and
the same is willful and deliberate. In this case, however, the CA dismissed the case without prejudice due
to absence of willful and deliberate intent to violate the rule against forum shopping on the part of the
Petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 with the SC when the CA denied Petitioner’s MR.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not BF Citiland committed forum shopping.
2. Whether or not either of the declaratory relief case or the annulment case would result to litis
pendentia or res judicata.
HELD:
1. Yes, petitioner committed forum shopping.
Forum shopping is present whenever a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
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essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues. The test to determine the
existence of forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue
of a party’s commencement of a judicial remedy identical to the one which already exist, either pending or
already resolved, then a forum shopping infraction is committed.
Here, the elements of forum shopping are present. First, the petitioner/complainant in the declaratory
relief case and the annulment case is the same, BF Citiland. The respondents in both cases are the same
with the exception of Banco Filipino which was impleaded in the annulment case, but not in the
declaratory relief case. With this identity of the parties in both cases, one of the elements of forum
shopping is present. Second, both cases were filed after BSP foreclosed the mortgages on Petitioner’s
property.
In short, the two actions have a common set of facts and transactions – the foreclosure of mortgages – in
order to protect the Petitioner’s right to retain the title and ownership over the mortgaged property. Both
actions asked the respective courts (Branch 141 and Branch 143) to stop and/or invalidate the foreclosure
proceedings and its subsequent proceedings, and were both based on the same theory – that Banco
Filipino cannot be forced to perform its principal loan obligation to BSP because of the prohibition to pay
while it is under PDIC Receivership. Consequently, the accessory mortgage obligation cannot be
enforced as well.
2. Yes, a resolution in either the declaratory relief case or the annulment case would result to either
litis pendencia or res judicata on the remaining case.
Litis pendencia is a ground for the dismissal of action when there is another action pending between the
same parties involving the same cause of action, therefore, rendering the the second action unnecessary
and vexatious. It exists when there is identity of parties or of representation in both cases; when there is
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for; the reliefs are founded on the same facts and on the same
basis; and the identity in the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata on the
action under consideration.
Res judicata, on the other hand, exists if the former judgment or order is final; said judgement or order
must be on the merits; the same having been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and there must be, between the first and second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action.
It was established that the two actions have identity of parties, right or cause of action, and reliefs sought.
A decision on the merit in one action is, in theory, also a decision on the other remaining action. However,
since the two actions were filed in different courts/for a, the complainant/petitioner is considered to be
shopping for a favorable result. Having determined the presence of the elements of forum shopping, we
deny the petition.
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GENERAL DENIAL AMOUNTS TO AN ADMISSION OF THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION

OF THE DOCUMENT
27. Lara's Gift & Decors Inc vs. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc
GR. No. 225433, August 28, 2019
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Respondent alleged that from January 2007 up to December 2007, petitioner purchased from respondent
various industrial and construction materials in the total amount of P1,263,104.22. The purchases were
on a sixty (60)-day credit term, with the condition that 24% interest per annum would be charged on all
accounts overdue, as stated in the sales invoices. Petitioner paid for its purchases by issuing several
Chinabank postdated checks in favor of respondent. However, when respondent deposited the
Chinabank checks on their maturity dates, the checks bounced. After repeated demands from
respondent, petitioner replaced the bounced checks with new postdated Export and Industry Bank
checks. However, when respondent deposited the replacement checks on their maturity dates, the checks
were likewise dishonored for being "Drawn against Insufficient Funds," and subsequently, for "Account
Closed." Respondent sent a demand letter informing petitioner of the bounced checks and demanding
that petitioner settle its accounts. Still petitioner failed to pay, prompting respondent to file a Complaint for
Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment against petitioner.
In its Answer, Petitioner claimed that most of the deliveries made were substandard and of poor quality.
Petitioner alleged that the checks it issued for payment were not for value because not all of the materials
delivered by respondent were received in good order and condition.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the respondent.
CA: Affirmed
Petitioner argues in this Court that the sales invoices on the alleged purchases have no probative value
because their genuineness, due execution, and authenticity have not been established. Petitioner
stresses that in paragraph 2 of its Answer, it only admitted the existence of the sales invoices but not
their due execution.
ISSUE:
Do Midtown's sales invoices have probative value, considering that their genuineness, due execution and
authenticity are denied by the petitioner.
HELD:
It should be stressed that petitioner admitted in its Answer that from January 2007 to December 2007, it
purchased from respondent various industrial and construction materials in the total amount of
P1,263,104.22. Petitioner likewise admitted the existence of the sales invoices covering the said
purchases, which were attached as annexes to the Complaint. Although petitioner stated that it is not
admitting the due execution of the sales invoices, petitioner's Answer failed to specifically deny or
contest under oath the genuineness or due execution of any of the sales invoices or any of the
signatures of petitioner's representatives or employees appearing therein. Furthermore, petitioner
failed to specify which of the sales invoices pertain to materials delivered which were allegedly
substandard and of poor quality.
In this case, petitioner did not state the facts or substance of the matters relied upon to support its denial
of the due execution of the sales invoices. Petitioner's general denial amounts to an admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the sales invoices.
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NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE EARNEST EFFORT REQUIREMENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE
FAMILY CODE IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT WARRANTING A MOTU PROPRIO DISMISSAL
BY THE COURTS;
ONCE A STRANGER BECOMES A PARTY TO A SUIT, THE EARNEST EFFORT REQUIREMENT IS
NO LONGER A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE ACTION CAN PROSPER
28. Moreno v. Kahn

G.R. No. 217744, July 30, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Jose Moreno (herein petitioner) and his family, as lessees, have been occupying 2 parcels of land co-
owned by respondents: his full-blooded sister Consuelo Moreno Kahn-Haire and his nephews and nieces
(Consuelo’s children) Rene Kahn, Rene Luis Pierre Kahn, Philippe Kahn, and Ma. Claudine Kahn
McMahon. Respondents, through numerous emails and letters, offered to sell to petitioner the parcels of
lands for US$200,000. Jose accepted said offer. Notably, the agreement was made verbally and was not
immediately reduced into writing, but the parties had the intention to eventually memorialize the same via
a written document. Over the next few years, Jose made partial payments to respondents by paying off
the shares of his nephews and nieces, leaving a remaining balance of US$120,000 payable to Consuelo.
However, Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter, informed Jose of her intent to
convert the earlier partial payments as rental payments instead. Jose insisted on the sale but his
demands were ignored. Without petitioner’s consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe and Claudine sold their
shares to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of the subject lands to him. Jose’s demands to
pursue the sale were once again unheeded. Jose brought the matter to the barangay lupon for
conciliation proceedings between him and Rene only, since Consuelo et al. are all living abroad. As no
settlement was agreed upon, Jose was constrained to file the subject Complaint for Specific Performance
and Cancellation of Titles with Damages and application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
The RTC motu proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance with the
provision of Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be made first before suits
may be tiled between family members. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the motu proprio dismissal of the case, due to non-compliance with the “earnest efforts”
requirement provided under Article 151 of the Family Code, is proper?
2. W/N Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD:
1. No, it is not proper. The records of this case show that the RTC ordered the dismissal of Jose's
complaint against respondents for his alleged failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family
Code – even before respondents have filed a motion or a responsive pleading invoking such non-
compliance. As such ground is not a jurisdictional defect but is a mere condition precedent, the
courts a quo clearly erred in finding that a motu proprio dismissal was warranted under the given
circumstances. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be
distinguished from the grounds provided under Section l, Rule 9 which specifically deals with
dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances
when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) litis pendentia: (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
2. No. Family relations, as enumerated under Article 150 of the Family Code, include those: (1)
Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and
descendants: and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. Article 151 of
the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, any
person having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff other than what is enumerated in
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Article 150 of the Family Code is considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and
among family members, would render unnecessary the earnest efforts requirement under Article
151. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are
full-blooded siblings; and (b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which
make them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine are considered "strangers'' to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is
concerned. In this relation, it is apt to clarify that whi1e it was the disagreement between Jose
and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that Rene, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s complaint as they are
co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion “strangers" to the suit between
Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded siblings, the Court concludes that the suit is beyond the
ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing
Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement therein.
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THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE INSTRUMENT SHALL BE DEEMED ADMITTED
UNLESS THE ADVERSE PARTY, UNDER OATH SPECIFICALLY DENIES THEM, AND SETS FORTH
WHAT HE CLAIMS TO BE FACTS
29. Francisco Delgado v. GQ Realty Development Corp., et. al

G.R. No. 241774, September 25, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco was married to Carmencita Chuidian-Delgado. On January 15, 1983, Carmencita
passed away. While Victoria was married to Luis Gonzales who passed away in 1984. Together with her
children with Luis, Victoria started a corporation, respondent GQ Realty.
Petitioner alleged that despite respondent GQ Realty’s decent capitalization, the same would not be
enough for respondent to successfully engage in the realty business. Hence, petitioner offered to help
Victoria by supposedly buying real properties using his own money, but the naked title would be named
after respondent. Respondent GQ, alleged that the corporation was a family corporation established in
1984 after the death of Victoria’s former husband, Luis, for the sole purpose of holding Victoria’s
properties.
Petitioner Francisco and Victoria met and got married. Before Petitioner Francisco and Victoria’s marriage
on June 15, 1987, the two executed an Ante-Nuptial Agreement, which states, among other stipulations,
that their properties would be governed by complete separation of properties. The Ante-Nuptial
Agreement was allegedly drafted by petitioner’s own counsel, Romulo Mabanta Law Offices.
After the death of Victoria in 2006, the children of Francisco and the children of Victoria started falling
apart and the former allegedly started filing cases against the latter. It was further alleged by the
respondents that since the death of Victoria, respondent Rosario and her siblings were prohibited to enter
the subject property.
Petitioner, then, filed a Complaint for Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages against
Respondents before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner asserted his right over the subject property based
on implied trust. According to petitioner, the subject property was actually purchased by him using his
own funds and the said property was registered in the name of respondent GQ Realty for the sole
purpose of aiding Victoria attract potential investors in the company. Respondents then filed a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses, wherein they argued that petitioner’s claim was deemed
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by virtue of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement executed by
Francisco and Victoria.
RTC granted respondent’s motion, and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA
denied the appeal. Hence, the petition for review on Certiorari (Rule 45).
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner’s claim deemed waived by virtue of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Francisco executed the Ante-Nuptial Agreement and waived any and all rights and
interests over the properties of Victoria, the subject property was deemed included therein.
Petitioner argues that “whether or not there was indeed a waiver of rights by petitioner is an issue
involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere
motion to dismiss.”
However, it must be stressed that the RTC’s finding that established Francisco’s waiver of his alleged
rights over the subject property was based on evidence actually presented. As revealed by the records of
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the instant case, the RTC set a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses raised by the
respondents. The preliminary hearing was held before the RTC. Nevertheless, during the preliminary
hearing, only the respondents appeared. Petitioner failed to participate in the preliminary hearing despite
due notice. Hence, petitioner cannot use his own act of not appearing and presenting evidence in the
preliminary hearing as a basis to argue that he was deprived the opportunity to produce evidence.
With respect to the existence, genuineness, and due execution of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, no further
evidence is needed to establish the same. Under Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, whenever a
defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument shall be set
forth in the pleading and the original or copy thereof shall be attached in the pleading, which shall be
deemed part of the pleading. According to the succeeding section, the genuineness and due execution of
the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them,
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. The existence of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement was never
questioned by petitioner. Hence, a full-blown trial in the merits is necessary to settle the question of
petitioner supposed waiver of rights over the subject property under the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.
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THE POWER OF CONTEMPT HAS A TWO-FOLD ASPECT, NAMELY: “(1) THE PROPER
PUNISHMENT OF THE GUILTY PARTY FOR HIS DISRESPECT TO THE COURT OR ITS ORDER;
AND (2) TO COMPEL HIS PERFORMANCE OF SOME ACT OR DUTY REQUIRED OF HIM BY THE
COURT WHICH HE REFUSES TO PERFORM.” DUE TO THIS TWO-FOLD ASPECT, CONTEMPT
MAY BE CLASSIFIED AS CIVIL OR CRIMINAL.
30. Webb vs. NBI Director Gatdula, et.al.

G.R. No. 194469, September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
In the rape-homicide case of Lejano v. People, Webb was one of the accused in raping Carmela
Vizconde then killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991—an incident known to the public as the
“Vizconde Massacre”. While the criminal case was pending before RTC, Webb filed a Motion to
Direct the NBI to Submit Semen Specimen for DNA Analysis. Webb sought to establish innocence, as
results would show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong to him. Motion denied, Webb filed
Petition for Certiorari assailing the denial.
In an April 20, 2010 Resolution, SC granted Webb’s request to order a testing on the semen specimen
found in Carmela’s cadaver, in view of the Rules on DNA Evidence. NBI was ordered to assist in the
submission of semen specimen to the UP Natural Science Research Institute.
NBI, in its Compliance and Manifestation, claimed that the semen specimen was no longer in its custody
and the same was submitted as evidence before the RTC when its Medico-Legal Chief, Dr. Cabanayan,
testified in 1996. RTC refuted this claim. Branch Clerk of Court explained that what were marked in
evidence were photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear, not the slides themselves.
However, Dr. Bautista of the NBI Medico-Legal Division issued a contrary Certification confirming that the
specimen is still under NBI custody. Due to the missing semen specimen, Webb filed this present
Petition for Indirect Contempt under Rule 71, impleading various NBI officers for “impeding,
degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice and for disobeying the April 20, 2010 SC
Resolution”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of indirect contempt; particularly: (1) disobedience or resistance to
a lawful order of the court; and (2) improper conduct tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.
HELD:
The power of contempt has a two-fold aspect, namely: “(1) the proper punishment of the guilty
party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of some act or
duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform.” Due to this two-fold aspect,
contempt may be classified as civil or criminal.
Criminal contempt is a “conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.” On the other hand, civil contempt is one’s failure to fulfill a court order in a civil
action that would benefit the opposing party. It is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf
the violated order was made. The primary consideration in determining whether a contempt is civil or
criminal is the purpose for which the power of contempt is exercised.
A proceeding is criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment. Criminal contempt is directed against
the power and dignity of the court with no element of personal injury involved. Strictly speaking, however,
they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, but characterized as sui generis. In general, criminal
contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to
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criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings. In criminal contempt, the contemnor is presumed innocent and the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the contemnor is guilty of contempt lies with the petitioner
In contrast, a proceeding is civil when the purpose is compensatory or remedial. In such case, contempt
“consists in the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the benefit or
advantage of a party to an action pending before the court” Thus, in civil contempt, the party in whose
favor that judgment was rendered is the real party-in-interest in the proceedings.
To be held liable for contempt, a person’s act must be done willfully or for an illegitimate or
improper purpose. Thus, the good faith, or lack thereof, of the person being cited in contempt
should be considered. However, intent is a necessary element only in criminal contempt cases.
Because the purpose of civil contempt proceeding is remedial and not punitive, intent is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or lack of intent to violate the court’s order is not a defense in civil
contempt.
Based on evidence, SC held five out of the seven impleaded NBI officials guilty of indirect contempt, and
was each order to pay a fine of Php20,000 each.
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A PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT DOES NOT SUGGEST A LOSS OF ALL HIS RIGHTS IN
STAGES OF THE CASE AFTER THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
31. Royal Plains View Inc. vs. Mejia

GR No. 230832, November 12, 2018
J. Reyes Jr., J.
FACTS:
On October 12, 2011, petitioners filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Instrument
denominated as Rescission of Conditional Sale, Specific Performance, Sums of Money, etc. against
respondent Nestor and the heirs of the spouses Ramones, represented by Remedios Ramones-
Emperado, docketed with the RTC as Civil Case No. 4263. Nestor did not file an Answer. Hence, he was
declared in default in an Order 35 dated May 31, 2012.
On November 20, 2012, the RTC issued an Order dropping the heirs of the spouses Ramones as
defendants in Civil Case No. 4263. Petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex parte.
CA: Ordered to file and thereafter admitted Nestor's appellee's brief.
ISSUE:
Did the CA erred in ordering to file and thereafter admitting Nestor's appellee's brief despite being
declared in default?
HELD:
No. Preliminarily, we found nothing irregular when the CA required respondent Nestor, who has been
declared in default in the trial court, to submit his appellee's brief.
While, concededly, a defending party declared in default loses his standing in the trial court and his right
to adduce evidence and to present his defense, this, however, does not impliedly suggest a loss of all
his/her rights in the stages of the case after the default judgment. This can be clearly inferred from the
wordings of Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Thus:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor,
the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such
failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment
granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires
the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but
not to take part in the trial.
It is evident from the foregoing rule that even when a defendant is already declared in default, he is
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
Default, therefore, is not meant to punish the defendant, but to enforce the prompt filing of the answer to
the complaint. Its existence is justified on the ground that it is the one final expedient to induce defendant
to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so without unnecessary delay.
The provision that the defaulting party cannot take part in the trial only meant that he/she has already lost
his/her standing in the trial court. In other words, the effect of the judgment of default is limited only to
those stages in the prosecution of the case which terminated with and included in the judgment of the trial
court on the merits.
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THE TRIAL COURT MAY ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF IN ACTION TO PAY PROPER DOCKET FEES
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
32. Rebadulla vs. Republic

GR No. 222159, January 31, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
On March 17, 1997, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took parcels of land
belonging to the Rebadullas for its Small Water Impounding Management Project (SWIM Project) in
Macagtas, Catarman, Northern Samar. The Rebadullas rejected the price offered by the DPWH, at P2.50
per square meter, based on the valuation of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC). No expropriation
proceedings were instituted by the DPWH.
Subsequently, they filed a Complaint for mandamus and damages before the RTC, against the Republic,
the Secretary of Public Works and Highways and Engr. Buen (collectively, the "Government"), praying
that the Republic and/or DPWH pay just compensation, in the amount to be determined as the fair market
value by the RTC, for the taking and use of the following properties located in Catarman, Northern Samar.
RTC: Ordered payment of just compensation at fair value based on BIR zonal valuation.
CA: Affirmed.
The Government argues that even if the action were to be deemed as one for sum of money, it must still
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Rebadullas' alleged failure to pay the required docket fees.
This issue, however, appears to have been belatedly raised before this Court.
ISSUE:
Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to failure to pay the required
docket fees.
HELD:
No. Time and again, the Court held: "It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal
unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic
considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised for the first time on appeal is
barred by estoppel." Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
The Court has also held that:
Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow
the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant
should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case,
the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be
considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor.
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SERVICE SHAL BE MADE UPON THE COUNSEL, UNLESS SERVICE UPON THE PARTY IS
ORDERED
33. Villalongha vs. Court Of Appeals

G.R. No. 227222, August 20,2019
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from a complaint for annulment of sale and TCTs filed by plaintiffs against their
mother Felipa and other siblings, herein respondents together with Bolton Bridge Homeowner’s
Association, Inc. (BBHAI). Plaintiffs claimed that they are co-owners of the properties that used to be
conjugal properties of Felipa and her late husband, Mauricio Villalongha, who passed away. That in a
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate with a deed of donation, Felipe waived her rights over her share
on the lands. Despite having lost all right and interests, Felipe subsequently sold to BBHAI the lands.
Felipa denied the conjugal nature of the lands and claimed that she is the sole owner of the lands and
therefore had the right to sell it.
RTC dismissed the complaint and adjudged Felipa as the sole owner of the lands. In a decision dated
March 22, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling adjuging Flipa as the sole owner of the lands and
declared her sale to BBHAI as valid and binding. A copy of the March 22, 2013 Decision was sent to
Plaintiffs Villalongha’s counsel, Atty. Victorio Advincula, Jr. and was received by a certain Ariel Hernandez
on May 8, 2013. However in a manifestation dated March 11, 2014, Atty. Advincula, Jr. informed the CA
that he did not receive said notice and Ariel Hernandez is not his staff or employee and not personally
known to him or to his associate.
Atty. Advincula, Jr filed a motion to withdraw as counsel dated March 11, 2014. In a resolution dated
March 23, 2015, CA granted the motion to withdraw. Virgilio received a copy of the said resolution on
July 15, 2015, and filed a notice of receipt, requesting for time to engage the services of a new counsel.
On August 17, 2015, he also received notice of BBHAI’s Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment in the
case. Thereafter Atty. Abejaron filed a formal entry of appearance and opposed BBHAI’s motion on the
ground of prematurity, averring that there was no proper notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision on their
former counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the March 22, 2013 Decision had become final and executory despite improper
service of the same
HELD:
NO. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 is not yet final and executory for want of proper service.
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "if any party has appeared by counsel, service
upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party represented by counsel has been actually notified, said notice
is not considered notice in law. "The reason is simple — the parties, generally, have no formal education
or knowledge of the rules of procedure, specifically, the mechanics of an appeal or availment of legal
remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the rights and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of the
decision. More importantly, it is best for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly
procedure- either the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself if he/she does not intend to hire
a lawyer
As to service of judgments and proof thereof, Sections 7 and 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court pertinently
provide:
Section 7. Service by mail. - Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in
the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if
known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to
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the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry
service is available in the locality of either the senders or the addressee, service may be done by
ordinary mail. xxxx
Section 13. Proof of service. - x x x If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of this Rule. If
service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt
issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at bar, the registry return card pertaining to Atty. Advincula, Jr.'s copy of the notice was not
returned to the CA. However, the CA concluded that the notice was received by Atty. Advincula, Jr. on
the basis of the reply to tracer of William H. Olmoguez, Postmaster of Davao City, that a certain Ariel
Hernandez received the notice on May 8, 2013. But in his request manifestation, Atty. Advincula, Jr.
denied having received such notice and knowing Ariel Hernandez, which was not refuted by respondents.
It must be stressed that the mail matter must be received by the addressee or his duly authorized
representative since service on a person who was not a clerk, employee or one in charge of the attorney's
office, is invalid. "Service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not
legally effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding reglementary period for the
subsequent procedural steps that may be taken by the attorney." Since Ariel Hernandez was not an
employee and, thus, not authorized to receive court notices in behalf of Atty. Advincula, Jr., his alleged
receipt of the notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision on May 8, 2013 is without any effect in law, and
cannot start the running of the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal.
An entry of judgment merely records the fact that a judgment, order or resolution has become final and
executory; but it is not the operative act that makes such judgment, order or resolution final and
executory. In the case at bar, the Entry of Judgment did not make the March 22, 2013 Decision final and
executory considering that as of the date of entry, notice of said Decision has not yet been served on
plaintiffs Villalongha/petitioners.
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SERVICE BY ORDINARY MAIL IS ALLOWED ONLY IN INSTANCES WHERE NO REGISTRY

SERVICE EXISTS EITHER IN THE LOCALITY OF THE SENDER OR THE ADDRESSEE
34. Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) vs. Papa

G.R. No., 200469 January 15, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari to reverse CA decision
PSB filed a collection of sum of money against Papa arising from a loan. Respondent failed to pay despite
repetitive attempts, she alleged that PSB had no cause of action against her since her liability has been
extinguished due to her several staggered payments. PSB introduced photocopy evidence admitted by
the MTC and ruled in favor of it based on preponderance of evidence. RTC reversed the latter.
PSB failed to prove its cause of action due to its failure to prove the existence and due execution of the
PN
Papa countered that the RTC decision has already attained finality that although PSB filed an MR, it
appears that the service was made 2 days late as PSB availed a private courier service instead of modes
of service prescribed under the RoC
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MR was served out of time
HELD:
Yes. PSB is correct that filing and service are distinct from each other. Filing is the act of presenting the
pleading to the clerk of court; whereas, service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading
or paper concerned.
Service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no registry service exists either in the locality
of the sender or the addressee – this is the only credible justification why resort to service by ordinary
mail or private courier may be allowed.
Filing and service go hand-in-hand and must be considered together when determining whether the
pleading, motion, or any other paper was filed with the applicable reglementary peiod. Rules require every
motion set for hearing to be accompanied by proof of service thereof to the other parties concerned;
otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it, effectively making such motion as not filed.
Thus, PSB failed to comply with Rule 13, Section 17 for an effective service by ordinary mail. The reason
that personal service was effected due to lack of time and personnel constraints is not an acceptable
reason why it resorted to “private registered mail”. Thereby the RTC is correct in denying PSB’s MR
which is considered as not filed.
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JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON MAY BE ACQUIRED THROUGH 1) SERVICE OF SUMMONS

AND 2) VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN COURT
35. UCPB vs. Spouses Ang Sy

G.R. No. 204753, March 27,2019
Caguio, J.
FACTS:
UCPB filed a Complaint for sum of money and/or damages with prayer for the ex parte issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against Nation Granary, Inc. (NGI), the Spouses Alison Ang-Sy, et al., and
Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. (NPGI). The Complaint was filed before the RTC. The Complaint alleged that
UCPB granted NGI a credit accommodation, in the form of an Import Letter of Credit/Trust Receipt. Both
NPGI and the spouses Sy executed Surety Agreements securing the credit accommodations. Demands
for payment remained unheeded. The Complaint prayed that the RTC order therein defendants to pay
UCPB. RTC granted UCPB's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Summonses and copies of the
order granting the writ were served on the defendants on 4 December 2006. On the same day, the Sheriff
levied a Toyota Land Cruiser allegedly owned by the defendants. The following day, defendants' interests
in stocks and shares and other assets in NPGI and NGI were garnished.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss with Manifestation alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons. Where a defendant is a corporation, service of summons may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary or in-house counsel. This list is
exclusive and does not include a mere employee like Charlotte Magpayo, NPGI's Property Supply
Custodian (OIC). The RTC did not also acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the spouses Allyson Ang-
Sy et al. as personal service of summons was not first resorted to before substituted service was effected.
Defendants thus prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the discharge of the writ
of attachment on their properties, and the suspension of further proceedings because a Stay Order had
been issued against NGI and NPGI. UCPB opposed the motion insisting that there was a valid service of
summons or at the very least substantial compliance of the rules. If not, defendants are deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it prayed for an alternative relief other that
dismissal in its motion to dismiss.
RTC granted the suspension of proceedings with respect to defendants NGI and NPI but denied
defendants Motion to Dismiss. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 with the CA. CA held that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants due to improper service of summons. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendants despite improper
service of summons

HELD:
NO. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Jurisdiction refers to the power and authority of the court to hear, try, and decide a case. One of the
aspects of jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the parties. This refers to the fundamental rule that jurisdiction
over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through: (1) service of summons or through
(2) voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority

According to the Rules of Court, upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal
fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants. The summons
shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person. Only in instances wherein, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, may summons be effected
through substituted service, i.e., (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. With
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respect to parties that are domestic private juridical entities, service may be made only upon the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. In the
absence of service of summons or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is
defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and the proceedings and any
judgment rendered are null and void.

The evidence on record, specifically the Sheriff's Report, indubitably shows that the established
jurisprudential doctrine on the prerequisites for valid substituted service was not observed, i.e., for
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff, which
means at least three tries, preferably on at least two different dates. It is crystal clear that there were no
several attempts made to effect personal service in the instant case; as correctly found by the court a
quo, there was only a single day's effort to personally serve summons upon the therein defendants.

Further, as also correctly found by the CA, the Sheriff's Report miserably failed to indicate that the person
who received the summons was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in the residence of the
therein defendants. Nor is there a statement that validates that such person understood the significance
of the receipt of the summons and the correlative duty to immediately deliver the same to the therein
defendants or, at the very least, to notify the said persons immediately.

As regards the service of summons undertaken with respect to the therein defendant corporations, i.e.,
NGI and NPGI, the CA was also not mistaken in holding that since the summons were served on a mere
OIC property supply custodian, the services of summons undertaken were defective.

Indeed, despite lack of valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance. According to the Rules of Court, the
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. However, the
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. While it is true that respondents Sps. Sy, et al. did pray in their Motion to Dismiss for a
suspension of the proceedings due to a Stay Order issued by a different court, which is an affirmative
relief, such was not tantamount to a voluntary appearance as respondents Sps. Sy, et al., in
an explicit and unequivocal manner, posed vehement objections to the jurisdiction of the RTC
over their persons due to improper service of summons.
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IF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS ABSENT OR IS DEFECTIVE, COURT ACQUIRED NO

JURISDICTION AND JUDGEMENT RENDERED THEREIN IS NULL AND VOID
36. People’s General Insurance Corp vs. Guanzing And Lizaso

G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
Lizaso, Guansing's employee, was driving Guansing's truck along Legarda Street, Sampaloc, Manila
when he hit the rear portion of Andrea Yokohama's (Yokohama) Isuzu Crosswind. The strong impact
caused the Isuzu Crosswind to hit other vehicles, rendering it beyond repair. Yokohama's Isuzu
Crosswind was insured with People's General Insurance Corporation. Yokohama filed a total loss claim
under her insurance policy, which paid the full amount as settlement. Thus, People's General Insurance
Corporation claimed to have been subrogated to all the rights and interests of Yokohama against
Guansing. People's General Insurance Corporation sought from Guansing reimbursement of the total
amount paid to Yokohama, less the salvage value. Despite repeated demands, Guansing failed to
reimburse the amount claimed.
People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Complaint for a sum of money and damages against
Guansing and Lizaso with the RTC. The sheriff served the summons on Guansing's brother, Reynaldo
Guansing. The sheriff's return did not explain why summons was served on his brother instead of
Guansing. Guansing filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He
alleged that he did not personally receive the summons. People's General Insurance Corporation argued
that summons was properly served since substituted service was an alternative mode of service.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Guansing filed a 1 page answer containing a general denial of the
material allegations and causes of action the complaint reiterating that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
his person. The case was then set for pre-trial conference. Guansing filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Postponement. After several postponements, Guansing submitted his pre-trial brief where he again raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. People's General Insurance Corporation filed a Motion to
Render Judgment on the Pleadings, which was granted by the RTC. RTC ruled against Guansing.
Guansing filed his Motion for Reconsideration where he reiterated his contention that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person due to invalid service of summons. In its order the RTC denied
Guansing's Motion for Reconsideration.
Guansing filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in Guansing's favor
and held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over him because summons was improperly served on
his brother.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Guansing through
service of summons on Guansing’s brother hence defective
2. Whether or not respondent, in filing his answer and other subsequent pleadings, defendant
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
HELD:
1. NO. RTC did not acquire jurisdiction when summons were served upon the brother of the
defendant
It is settled that resort to substituted service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases, substituted service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with a competent person in charge. Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service, and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not
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have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. In this case, the basis for resorting to
substituted service on respondent Guansing's brother is not provided for in the Sheriffs Return
To enjoy the presumption of regularity, a sheriffs return must contain: (1) detailed circumstances
surrounding the sheriffs attempt to serve the summons on the defendant; and (2) the specifics showing
impossibility of service within a reasonable time. Based on these requirements, a sheriffs return is merely
pro forma.
The sheriff should have established the impossibility of prompt personal service before he resorted to
substituted service. Impossibility of prompt personal service is established by a sheriffs failure to
personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this period, he or she must have
had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he
or she must cite in the sheriffs return why these attempts are unsuccessful.
2. YES. By filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent Guansing is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction when they participate in the
proceedings despite improper service of summons. Respondent Guansing filed his: (1) Answer dated
January 28, 2007; (2) Pre-trial Brief dated February 27, 2007; (3) Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Postponement dated February 2, 2008; (4) Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2010; and (5)
Notice of Appeal dated March 8, 2011. His filing of these pleadings amounts to voluntary appearance. He
is considered to have submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction, which is equivalent to a valid service of
summons. By filing numerous pleadings, he has confirmed that notice has been effected, and that he has
been adequately notified of the proceedings for him to sufficiently defend his interests.
In this case, not only did respondent Guansing file his answer and pre trial brief, but he also filed
pleadings seeking affirmative reliefs such as the February 2, 2008 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Postponement and March 8, 2011 Notice of Appeal. Clearly, he cannot negate that affirmative reliefs
were sought.
Moreover, respondent Guansing revealed that he was properly informed of the contents of petitioner's
action against him when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration and Notice of Appeal.
Respondent Guansing, who actively participated in the proceedings, cannot impugn the court's
jurisdiction. To reiterate, a long line of cases has established that the filing of an answer, among other
pleadings, is considered voluntary appearance and vests the court with jurisdiction over the person. The
rules are clear: the filing of an answer and other pleadings is considered voluntary appearance.
Respondent Guansing's actions lead to no other conclusion other than he voluntarily appeared and
submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction.
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FILING VIA PRIVATE COURIER IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER PRESENT RULES;

PARTY MAY FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ONLY WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM NOTICE OF
JUDGEMENT
37. Heirs of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

GR. No. 215599, November 28, 2018
Caguiao, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance of Real Property and Damages with a
prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or TRO before the RTC against Velasco and Torralba. The
petitioners allege, among other things, that they are the heirs of the late Jaime Francisco, who, they
claim, is the original occupant and owner of the subject property since 1918 up to the time of his death in
1957 or for a period of more than thirty (30) years. Velasco filed an Answer with counterclaim before the
RTC stating, among other things, that he is the true, lawful and absolute owner in fee simple of the
subject property. He claims that his possession over the same was unlawfully and wantonly disturbed by
the petitioners. Private respondents filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence which the RTC granted. CA
dismissed the petitioners Heirs of Francisco's appeal for lack of merit. As claimed by the petitioners, Heirs
of Francisco, they received a copy of the CA's Decision dated August 19, 2013 on September 30, 2013.
The petitioners Heirs of Francisco admit that they only had until October 16, 2013 to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioners Heirs of Francisco maintain that they were able to serve and file their
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 15, 2013 via courier service on October 16, 2013. However,
in the assailed Resolution, the CA found that petitioners Heirs of Francisco's Motion for Reconsideration
was filed only on December 6, 2013. Hence, the CA denied outright the petitioners Heirs of Francisco's
Motion for Reconsideration, "considering that the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not
extendible. CA directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue "an Entry of Judgment for the above entitled
case.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution denying
outright the petitioners Heirs of Francisco's Motion for Reconsideration and ordering Entry of Judgment
due to the failure of petitioners Heirs of Francisco to timely file a Motion for Reconsideration.
HELD:
NO. First and foremost, the Court stresses at the outset that under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, there are only two (2) modes by which a party may file a pleading before the courts: (1)
by personal filing - presenting the original copies thereof personally to the clerk of court, or (2)
by registered mail. The petitioners Heirs of Francisco admit that they did not file their Motion for
Reconsideration through personal filing, but by or through private courier/courier service.
Filing via private courier or courier service is NOT a manner of filing allowed or recognized by the
Rules of Court. On this point alone, the instant Petition merits dismissal. Moreover, even
assuming arguendo that the Court could accept the petitioners Heirs of Francisco's act of filing by private
courier as an alternative mode of filing, it must be stressed that according to Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court, as well as Rule 7 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution issued by the appellate court only within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party. CA found that the petitioners Heirs
of Francisco only filed their Motion for Reconsideration almost two (2) months after October 16, 2013,
or on December 6, 2013.Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts
it. Hence, the petitioners Heirs of Francisco had the burden to refute the CA's finding that the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed out of time on December 6, 2013 and substantiate their claim that the said
pleading was filed on October 16, 2013. However, in the instant Petition itself, the petitioners Heirs of
Francisco failed to present even a shred of evidence, aside from their own self-serving allegation,
to prove that they indeed couriered their Motion for Reconsideration on October 16, 2013. The Court
cannot rely on the mere say-so of the petitioners Heirs of Francisco to repudiate the clear and
unequivocal finding of the CA that the Motion for Reconsideration was filed only on December 6, 2013.
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DUE PROCESS DICTATES THAT JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF A DEFENDANT CAN
ONLY BE ACQUIRED BY THE COURTS AFTER A STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES ON
THE PROPER SERVICE OF SUMMONS;
A PARTY WHO MAKES A SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO CHALLENGE, AMONG OTHERS, THE
COURT’S JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE SUBMITTED
TO ITS AUTHORITY
38. Frias vs. Alcayde

G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Frias as lessor, and respondent Alcayde, as lessee, entered into a Contract of Lease involving
a residential house and lot. For non-payment of any of the rentals, Frias filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer with the MeTC of Muntinlupa. The MeTC ruled in favor of the Frias ordering Alcayde to vacate
the premises and to pay the accrued rentals.
Alcayde filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction with
the RTC. A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the Frias. Based on the
Officer’s Return, Sheriff Tolentino caused the service of summons to Frias, through Ms. Gonzales, the
secretary of petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Frias.
When the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the MeTC Decision on the Unlawful Detainer
case, Frias filed a Preliminary Submission to Dismiss the Petition – Special Appearance Raising
Jurisdictional Issues on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. She argued that the defect in
the service of summons is immediately apparent on the Officer’s Return since it did not indicate the
impossibility of a personal service within a reasonable time; it did not specify the efforts exerted by the
Sheriff to locate the petitioner; and it did not certify that the person in the office who received the
summons in her behalf was one with whom she had a relation of confidence ensuring that the she would
receive or would be notified of the summons issued in her name.
The RTC issued an Order granting respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
holding that although Atty. Frias maintained his special appearance, he actively participated in the
proceedings by attending the summary hearing in the prayer for the issuance of the TRO. Petitioner
moved to reconsider the Order. The RTC granted petitioner’s Preliminary Submission, ruling that
summons was not duly served upon the petitioner either personally or through substituted service of
summons strictly in accordance with the Rules, and since the face of the Officer’s Return is patently
defective, the presumption of regularity of performance of duty under the Rules does not apply.
Alcayde moved for reconsideration, which the RTC granted. It emphasized that the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction was denied, and ordered Frias to file his Answer. Frias filed a motion for
reconsideration. The same having been denied, Frias filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, but the
same was also denied. Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES:
1) Was there a valid service of summons upon petitioner Frias when service was made through the
secretary of her counsel?
2) Was there voluntary submission by Atty. Frias when he participated in the hearing for the issuance of
the TRO?
HELD:
1) No, there was no valid service of summons upon petitioner Frias, hence, jurisdiction was not acquired
over his person.
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Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person. Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly made, both the trial and the
judgment, being in violation of due process are null and void, unless the defendant waives the service of
summons by voluntarily appearing and answering the suit.
A petition for annulment of judgment is an action in personam. Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service
as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court. The preferred mode of service of summons is
personal service. To warrant the substituted service, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the
same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become impossible
within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service.
The requisites of substituted service are the following: (a) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Sevice within a
reasonable time of 1 month, after at least 3 attempts on at least 2 different dates; (b) Specific Details in
the Return of the efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure thereof; (c) A
Person of Suitable Age and Discretion, that is, at least 18 years old, and has sufficient discretion and a
relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the
receipt of the summons; and (d) A Competent Person in Charge – one who is managing the office or
business of the defendant, with sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
A perusal of the Officer’s Return discloses that the requisites were not clearly established. It revealed that
no diligent effort was exerted and no positive step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally
on Frias. Upon having been satisfied that Frias was not present at her given address, Sheriff Tolentino
immediately resorted to substituted service of summons by proceeding to the office of petitioner’s
counsel. Evidently, the sheriff failed to show that she made several attempts to effect personal service for
at least 3 times on 2 different dates. Likewise, the summons was simply left with the secretary of
petitioner’s counsel, without showing the competence of the secretary to receive such summons. Indeed,
a general statement that efforts were exerted to serve the summons will not suffice for the purpose of
complying the rules of substituted summons. This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual mode of service.
Since the sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service, the same is rendered
ineffective, and the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner Frias.
2) No, there was no voluntary submission by Atty. Frias when he participated in the hearing for the
issuance of the TRO.
A party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Since special appearance is an exception
to the general rule on voluntary appearance, objections to the jurisdiction of the court must be explicitly
made. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The records show
that petitioner Frias never received any copy of the respondent’s petition to annul the MeTC Decision in
the Unlawful Detainer case. In order to question the trial court’s jurisdiction, petitioner filed several
pleadings and motions, and in all such pleadings and motions, petitioner never faltered in declaring that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person due to invalid and improper service of summons.
When the petitioner filed those pleadings and motions, it was only in a special character, conveying the
fact that her appearance before the court was with a qualification. The fact the Atty. Frias attended the
summary hearing on the respondent’s prayer for the issuance of the TRO cannot be construed as
voluntary appearance. There was no clear intention on the part of Atty. Frias to be bound by the
proceedings. Precisely, his special appearance in the hearing was to challenge the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction over his client. While it is true that an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, the appearance must constitute a positive act on the part of the litigant manifesting an intention to
submit to the court’s jurisdiction.
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SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CORPORATION IS

NOT SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO A JURIDICAL
ENTITY
39. Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018
Martires, J.
FACTS:
A complaint for sum of money and damages was filed by petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. against
respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc., and ITS president, Lim Bon Huan for the recovery of the
latter's unpaid rentals resulting from its alleged breach of their lease contract.
In the Sheriff's Return, summons and copy of the complaint were served on the respondents at the office
of the defendant company's president through a certain Jonalyn Liwanan, who undertook to forward the
said documents to her superior. Interlink filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their
failure to file their answer. Respondents entered a special appearance through Atty. Generosa
Jacinto alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over them. Then, RTC ordered the issuance and service of summonses to the respondents.
Second service of summon was made on Expressions at the office of its president, Bon Huan, through a
certain Amee Ochotorina, a person of suitable age and discretion, who introduced herself as one of the
secretaries of Bon Huan. Interlink filed another motion to declare defendants in default.10 To this motion,
respondent again entered a special appearance alleging that summons was still defective.
RTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default, allowed Interlink to present evidence ex parte,
and decided in favor of Interlink. CA annulled the RTC decision. Hence, petitioner Interlink filed this
petition for review on certiorari seeking to reinstate the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Does service of summons to the secretary of the president of the corporation constitute sufficient
compliance with the rules on service of summons to a juridical entity?
HELD:
No, service of summons to the secretary of the president of the corporation does not constitute sufficient
compliance with the rules on service of summons to a juridical entity.
In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. If the
defendant is a domestic private juridical entity, service may be made on its president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It has been held that this
enumeration is exclusive. Service on a domestic private juridical entity must, therefore, be made only on
the person expressly listed in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

For the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, service of summons to it must be made to its president, Bon
Huan, or to its managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. It
is further undisputed that the questioned second service of summons was made upon Ochotorina, who
was merely one of the secretaries of Bon Huan, and clearly, not among those officers enumerated under
Section 11 of Rule 14. The service of summons upon Ochotorina is thus void and, therefore, does not
vest upon the trial court jurisdiction over Expressions.
Therefore, service of summons to the secretary of the president of the corporation does not constitute
sufficient compliance with the rules on service of summons to a juridical entity.
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EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE IS USED WHEN PARTY IS NOT FOUND IN THE COUNTRY OR

TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY
40. Arrieta vs. Arrieta

G.R. No. 234808, November 19, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cris and Respondent Melania Arrieta were married in a civil wedding in August 1973, and in a
church wedding ceremony on January 1, 1974. However, in November 1991, Melania left for the United
States due to alleged irreconcilable differences with Cris. She later on obtained a divorce decree and
married a certain Zenon Parnawski in San Diego, California.
Cris Arrieta filed a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Melania on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. He claimed that Melania left for
the United States because she was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations
since she abandoned and refused to support her family. During the proceedings, Cris filed a Motion for
Issuance of Summons by Publication because Respondent Melania could not be personally served with
summons. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion and ordered the summons to be served upon
Melania by publication. The summons and the copy of the petition were published in the San Pedro
Express. There was no answer filed by Respondent Melania. The Regional Trial Court granted the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, declaring the marriage void ab initio on the ground of
Melania’s psychological incapacity. A certificate of finality was issued by the Court.
After 7 years, Melania filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals claiming
that the Regional Trial Court’s decision was rendered without jurisdiction and tainted with extrinsic fraud.
The petition for annulment of judgment was granted by the Court of Appeals and it also declared the
Regional Trial Court’s decision null and void. According to the Court of Appeals, there was denial of due
process, since the service of summons suffered from fatal defects because the San Pedro Express was
not a newspaper of general circulation, and that Cris did not send a copy of the said summons to the last
known address of Melania as required by the Rules. Cris filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
subsequently denied so he elevated the matter to the Court.
ISSUE:
Was there a proper service of summons to Respondent Melania Arrieta?
HELD:
Yes. There was a proper service of summons to the Respondent.
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules authorizes a court to effect extraterritorial service of summons “in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient.” This mode of service is separate and distinct from the
second mode of service under the same rule which prescribes publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Regional Trial Court did not intend to direct extraterritorial service of summons be
complemented by sending a copy thereof to the last known address of Respondent Melania Arrieta.
Publishing a copy of the summons does not necessarily mean that the trial court intended to direct
extraterritorial summons under the second mode of service. The Regional Trial Court’s call not to have a
copy of the summons sent to Melania’s last known address in addition to the publication of the summons
is justified since it would have been futile or improbable to have the summons sent to Melania’s last
known address because she did not inform Cris of her foreign address, and it has to be remembered that
they had been estranged since 1991. Due to this circumstance, the publication of summons was in
substantial compliance with the rules on service. Since the publication was effected in a manner the court
deemed sufficient, there was a proper service of summons, hence, the petition is granted.
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MOTION WITH A DEFECTIVE NOTICE IS A USELESS SCRAP OF PAPER AND COURT HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO ACT THEREON
41. Zosa vs. Consilium Inc.

GR. No. 196765, September 19, 2018
Leonardo- De Castro, C.J.
FACTS:
A complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and TCT and Quieting of title was filed before RTC
by petitioners Zosa against Paypas. During the pendency of the case, Consilium Inc. was allowed to
intervene on the ground that it had purchased the subject property in good faith from the Paypas. RTC
ruled infavor of the Zosas. Consilium filed a Notice of Appeal alleging to have received the Decision of the
RTC on October 10, 2007. Note, however, that the corresponding appeal fee was paid only on October
31, 2007, or six days from October 25, 2007, the last day to perfect an appeal.
The Zosas opposed the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the appeal was "filed out of time x x x while
the Notice of Appeal was filed on October 17, 2007, the docket/appeal fee was paid only on October 31,
2007 which was beyond the period x x x to file the Notice of Appeal." Acting on the Notice of Appeal, the
RTC resolved to deny due course thereto in an Order dated January 15, 2007.
On February 7, 2008, Consilium moved for the reconsideration of the above-mentioned Order, and
prayed for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. The motion was set for hearing on February 22, 2008
per the Notice of Hearing stated in the said motion.
The Zosas, however, sought the outright denial of Consilium's motion for reconsideration on the ground
that it was set for hearing beyond the 10-day period prescribed in Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
The RTC, for its part, set the hearing of Consilium's motion for reconsideration on March 3, 2008. And in
an Order dated March 3, 2008, the RTC treated the motion as a mere scrap of paper.
RTC issued an Order dated April 2, 2008, to wit:
Under established jurisprudence, any motion that does not comply with Sec. 5 of Rule 16 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is a mere scrap of paper. In this case, the scheduled hearing of the said motion
for reconsideration was beyond the period specified by the rules which must not be later than ten (10)
days after the filing of the motion. Furthermore, a motion that fails to comply with the mandatory provision
of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma which do not merit the attention of the court. The subsequent action of
the court did not cure the procedural defect for a motion with a notice fatally defective is a "useless piece
of paper." And finally, the motion for reconsideration aside from being a mere scrap of paper is also pro
forma as the motion reiterates issues already passed upon by the court.
Consilium elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA granted the petition.
CA held that the liberal application of the rules is warranted since the rights of the parties were not
affected even if the hearing of said motion for reconsideration was originally set by the petitioner beyond
the 10-dy period required by the rules.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not acting on respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration for being filed in violation of Section 5 of Rule 15.
2. Whether or not RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course to respondent’s
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the Docket fee for the appeal was paid only 6 day after the expiration
of the reglementary period to file the appeal
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HELD:
1. NO. RTC is correctly treated the motion as a mere scrap of paper for violating Section 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court.
The Rules of Court, as amended, require every written motion, except those that the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of an adverse party, to be set for hearing by its proponent. The substance of
a notice of hearing is laid out in Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended. It reads:
Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has been categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid notice of hearing as a mere
scrap of paper. And the subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the flaw, for a
motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and the court has no authority to act
thereon.
To extricate Consilium from the effects of the mandatory application of the Rules of Court, as amended,
would, again, give premium to the unbridled disregard by Atty. Gaviola of the most basic of procedural
rules. Indeed, Consilium erred not once, but twice during the course of the proceedings. The negligence
is anything but excusable.
2. NO. Court has consistently upheld the dismissal of an appeal or notice of appeal for failure to pay
the full docket fees within the period for taking the appeal.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory. Admittedly, there are exceptions to the aforecited general rule on the timely
payment of appellate docket fees.
If the Court were to admit the tendered excuse, i.e., the negligence of the counsel's clerk as compelling or
sufficient explanation for the belated payment of the appeal fee, we would be putting a premium on such
lackadaisical attitude and negating a considerable sum of our jurisprudence that affirmed dismissals of
appeals or notices of appeal for nonpayment of the full appellate docket fees. We will not do that.
Moreover, categorizing the "lapse in memory" as compelling reason would set a bad precedent wherein
such negligence of an appellant's counsel or his clerk is sufficient to relax the jurisdictional requirements
for the perfection of an appeal.
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WHEN A PARTY FILES A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, IT MUST ALSO ATTACH A NOTICE
OF HEARING
42. B.E. San Diego, Inc. vs. Bernardo

GR. No. 233135, December 05, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner sold an 8,773-square meter parcel of land located in Arkong Bato, Valenzuela City, on
installment to Manuel A.S. Bernardo (respondent) for a total purchase price of P9,650,300.00.
Respondent paid an initial amount of P3,000,000.00 to petitioner, and the remaining balance of
P6,650,300.00 to be paid in 36 monthly installments. Respondent paid an aggregate amount of
P2,054,500.00 but failed to pay the remainder of the purchase price balance as they become due.
Petitioner advised respondent of its intent to cancel their agreement of sale and demanded respondent to
vacate the subject property. Petitioner's demand remained unheeded, it then filed an action for
Cancellation of Contract and Restitution of the Premises before the RTC.
RTC dismissed the complaint because the petitioner failed to provide respondent a grace period of 60
days to pay the installments due as governed by sales on installment of the Maceda Law. The said RTC
Decision was received by petitioner's counsel on record on September 30, 2010. On October 4, 2010,
petitioner, through a new collaborating counsel - Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law Office filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision without a Notice of Hearing. On October 15, 2010 or 11 days
thereafter, petitioner's new collaborating counsel sent via registered mail a Notice of Hearing, which
stated that the date of hearing was set on October 29, 2010 at 8:30a.m. Order of the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner's new collaborating counsel and considered the same as a
mere scrap of paper. The RTC found that there was antedating in the Notice of Hearing filed to make it
appear that the same was filed within the 15 day reglementary period, and that there was dishonesty and
scheme employed on the part of the petitioner's new collaborating counsel in the separate filing of the
Notice of Hearing. Notice of Appeal was filed but the RTC denied the same for having been filed beyond
the reglementary period. Meanwhile, the RTC Decision dated August 13, 2010 lapsed into finality.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief and asseverated that the gross and palpable negligence of its new
collaborating counsel should not bind and prejudice the petitioner. Trial on the merits ensued and
thereafter, the RTC issued a Decision denying the Petition for Relief for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the RTC in an Order. Then, petitioner duly filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The Affirmed the RTC's denial of petitioner's petition for relief.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a CA. Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari should be granted.
HELD:
YES. The petition for review on certiorari should be granted.
A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper; it presents no question which
merits the attention of the court. The general rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client, even
mistakes in the application of procedural rules, an exception to this doctrine is when the negligence of
counsel is so gross that the due process rights of the client were violated.
In this case, the manner with which the Law Office of Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law handled the case
of petitioner, as a collaborating counsel shows gross negligence and utter incompetence, when it failed to
attach a Notice of Hearing when it filed the motion for reconsideration before the RTC on October 4,
2010, and antedated the filing thereof to make it appear that it was filed on time. As a result thereof, the
RTC in an Order denied the motion for reconsideration and considered the same as a mere scrap of
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paper. Worst, the August 13, 2010 Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. Thus, petitioner lost its right to
appeal the Decision and petitioner's petition for relief was denied. Clearly, the rights of petitioner were
deprived due to its collaborating counsel's palpable negligence and thereof is not bound by it. Also,
contrary to findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner exercised due diligence in monitoring the case it
filed. Petitioner even inquired with the Law Office of Ramirez Lazaro & Associates Law and informed it
that the motion for reconsideration was duly filed. As far as petitioner is concerned and in respect of its
interest, its duty to be vigilant to the status of the case was complied with by being updated on the
progress of the case.
It is settled in Our jurisprudence that procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a
stringent application of the procedural rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial
justice, the former must yield to the latter. "The rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the
client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires." Hence, the petition is GRANTED.
The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, for proper resolution of
the case on its merits
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A MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT MAY BE BASED ON FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF

ACTION, BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND LITIS PENDENTIA
43. Casa Milan Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. The Roman Catholic Archbishop Of Manila
GR. No. 220042, September 05, 2018
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
B.C. Regalado & Co., Inc. (Regalado) is the owner of the lots of Casa Milan Subdivision in North Fairview,
Quezon City. The approved subdivision plan of Casa Milan designated Lot 34, Block 143, consisting of
6,083 square meters, as an open space or park/playground under TCT No. RT-78112 in the name of
Regalado. In 1995, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) started constructing a church on a
portion of Lot 34, Block 143. According to petitioner, in June 1995, RCAM applied with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for the segregation of a 4,000-square meter portion of Lot 34, Block
143 to be used as a parish church in Casa Milan. The HLURB, through its Executive Brief, stated that the
party requesting for the segregation/conversion of the lot was not RCAM, but New North Fairview Realty
and Development, Inc. (developer). The Executive Brief further stated that the request was supported by
a letter from the residents. The letter requested that the said lot be apportioned for the construction of a
multipurpose center. The request was recommended for approval. The Executive Brief and request were
accompanied by a letter from the residents and not a written permission from the homeowners
association because the petitioner, Casa Milan Homeowners Association, Inc., was only incorporated in
1999, as shown by the Articles of Incorporation attached to the complaint. The application for the
segregation and the letter from the residents were sent in 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the HLURB's approval was "suspicious, to say the least" because the request was
purportedly without the written consent of the then non-existent homeowners association or of a majority
of the residents of Casa Milan. During the pendency of the petition for conversion, Regalado executed a
Deed of Donation over the 4,000-square meter portion of Lot 34, Block 143 in favor of RCAM. On March
5, 2007, the application for the segregation was approved in a Resolution by the City Council of Quezon
City, signed by then Vice-Mayor Herbert Bautista. The Resolution also authorized the partial alteration
and subsequent conversion of the lot into a multipurpose center. The 4,000-square meter lot is covered
by TCT No. N-305323. The remaining 2,083-square meter portion, issued in favor of Regalado, is
covered by TCT No. N-305324.
Petitioner filed a complaint against RCAM, Regalado, the developer, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. The complaint had two main allegations: (1) the Deed of Donation covering a part of the
open space is invalid because it was done without petitioner's written consent; and (2) RCAM was in bad
faith when it built a parish church on the property without color of title.
RCAM filed a Motion to Dismiss, based on the following grounds:(1) The filing of the instant complaint
violates the rule on forum shopping; (2) There is another action pending between the petitioner and herein
respondent for the same cause; (3) The cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (4) The
complaint states no cause of action against herein respondent.
The RTC dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action. The CA affirmed the dismissal based
on failure to state cause of action, barred by prior judgment and litis pendentia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the complaint based on (a) failure to state cause of action, (b)
barred by prior judgment and (c) litis pendentia.
HELD:
No. The CA did not err in dismissing the complaint based on based on failure to state cause of action,
barred by prior judgment and litis pendentia. Hence, the petition is denied.
Complaint states no cause of action.
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a. Complaint states no cause of action.

Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,22 a motion to dismiss may be made on the ground that
the pleading states no cause of action.
The case of Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran23 explains that a complaint states a cause of action if it
sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right
in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
If the allegations of the complaint do not state the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Despite these causes of action alleged by the petitioner, it however failed to allege legal and factual
bases of its asserted right over the open space. It is established that the title over the subject land was
initially in the name of Regalado. Subsequently, on October 29, 2002, Regalado donated the subject land
to RCAM; thus, a new title was issued in RCAM's name. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Donation
executed by Regalado in favor of RCAM is null and void, and did not produce any legal effect because
the subject land, denominated as an "open space" under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1216, is
inalienable. Petitioner cited a whereas clause of P.D. No. 1216 in defining an "open space" as "beyond
the commerce of men." The court disagrees. Petitioner's mere reliance on a whereas clause of P.D. No.
1216 to nullify a donation is unacceptable. Section 31 of P.D. No. 957,26 as amended by Section 2 of
P.D. No. 1216, is the basis for the definition of "open spaces" in residential subdivisions provides for
“Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open spaces. The owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide
adequate roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner or
developer shall reserve the thirty percent (30%) of the gross area for open space. Such open space shall
have the following standards allocated exclusively for parks, playgrounds and recreational use”
The Court ruled in the 1998 White Plains Decision that open spaces belong to the subdivision owners and
developers primarily, meaning they have the freedom to retain or dispose of the open space in whatever
manner they desire. In this case, petitioner's allegation that the Deed of Donation is invalid must have
been based on the confusing wording of Section 31. However, jurisprudential law is clear. The transfer of
ownership from the subdivision owner or developer to the local government is not automatic, but requires
a positive act from the owner or developer before the city, municipality, or homeowners association can
acquire dominion over the subdivision open spaces. Therefore, the donation made by Regalado in favor
of RCAM is valid and legal because no positive act of donation has yet been made in favor of the local
government or the homeowners association. The title to the open space is validly registered in the name
of RCAM; thus, the disputed lot remains privately-owned by RCAM. RCAM was not in bad faith when it
built a parish church on the open space because of its valid title over the subject property.
Despite this established fact, however, Regalado and the developer still obtained a letter from the
residents of the subdivision to satisfy the requirement under Section 22 of P.D. No. 957. Only a letter from
the residents was obtained at that time because petitioner Casa Milan Homeowners Association, Inc. was
incorporated only in 1999, four years after the HLURB's Resolution to accept and approve the residents'
petition for conversion of the open space into a parish church. Thus, petitioner could not have consented
to the developer's request in 1995 because the association was still inexistent.
The Court agrees with the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals in holding that "nowhere in the
complaint does it appear that [petitioner] Association ever acquired a legal right over the subject open
space as would obligate defendants to secure its written consent to the construction of the subject parish
church and to the donation by Regalado of the 4,000-square meter portion to the RCAM." The Court of
Appeals did not commit grave reversible error in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action.
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b. The action is barred by prior judgment.

Petitioner contends that not all the elements of res judicata were present; there was no identity of parties
and no identity in the causes of action. The Court disagree. The two cases, although involving different
parties and different causes of action, have the same underlying issue, that is, whether or not RCAM
validly owns the subject property. The doctrine of res judicata is embodied in Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. The determination of RCAM's right over the subject open space and RCAM's right to
construct a parish church on the subject open space hinges on the validity of the Deed of Donation
executed by Regalado to RCAM. Since the issue of ownership had been resolved in the case for the
approval of the Deed of Donation, it cannot again be litigated in the instant case without virtually
impeaching the correctness of the decision in the former case. Hence, RCAM, as the lawful owner of the
subject open space by virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Regalado, has a better right to
possess and own the lot in question as against petitioner whose claim of ownership has been rejected
with finality in LRC Case No. 07-61570.
c. The action is barred by litis pendentia.

Litis pendentia, "a pending suit," is interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in
court. For litis pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a)
identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.
Contrary to petitioner's contention that the reliefs prayed for in this petition are different from the reliefs
prayed for by RCAM in another case and that the action is not barred by litis pendentia, there is identity in
the reliefs prayed for and the facts upon which these reliefs were based. A perusal of both petitions
reveals that both parties similarly pray to be recognized as the legal owner of the subject lot and to be
allowed to conduct activities on the lot. It is hornbook rule that identity of causes of action does not mean
absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the
form of the action or relief sought. One test in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common
cause of action is whether the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions in that the judgment in
the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
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JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW AND DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE

PLEADINGS, AND IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
44. Carniyan vs. Home Guaranty Corporation

GR. No. 228516, August 14, 2019
A. Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) filed before the Quezon City RTC a complaint for recovery of
possession against Edilberto P. Carniyan, Ricardo P. Camiyan, and Sherly R. Carniyan (the petitioners),
seeking their eviction from a portion of a 7, 113-square meter parcel of land situated in Constitution Hills,
Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 262715. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss dated October 8, 2010 and, subsequently, a Motion to Archive the Case as May Be Possible in
Lieu of Dismissal dated December 10, 2010. In the former, the petitioners argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to resolve the complaint (1) due to the fact that HGC has not yet acquired ownership over the
contested property; and (2) because the assessed value thereof fell below P400,000.00, the alleged
jurisdictional amount of civil actions filed in Metro Manila. On the other hand, in the latter motion, they
essentially sought to hold in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case until HGC submitted a certified true
copy of TCT No. 262715, among other things.
On March 18, 2011, Judge Villordon issued the first of the challenged trial court orders denying petitioners
motion to dismiss. Judge ruled that the petitioners' contention as to the jurisdictional amount was
misplaced. Since the case was an action involving title to or possession of real property, and because the
subject property had an assessed value of P50,000.00, it was held that the trial court was possessed of
the requisite jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint. Next, she likewise denied the motion to
archive the case on the ground that the said motion was merely dilatory.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Expunge/Rescind the Interlocutory Order Dated March 18, 2011 with
Motion for Inhibition. On February 8, 2012, Judge Villordon issued the second challenged order. In
denying the petitioners' motion to expunge, she ruled that the same was essentially a motion for
reconsideration of the March 18, 2011 order, the merits of which had already been thoroughly passed
upon. Anent the motion for inhibition, she simply reiterated her position in the said August 2, 2010 order.
She then disposed of the motions and directed the petitioners to file their answer within a non-extendable
period often 10 days. Despite Judge Villordon's directive, the petitioners failed to file an answer within the
allotted period. Consequently, on August 23, 2012, HGC moved to declare the petitioners in default.
Judge Villordon issued the third challenged order, denying the petitioners' motion and declaring them in
default. She ruled that the said motion partook of the nature of a second motion for inhibition, which is
proscribed under A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC. Hence, the same was held to be a mere scrap of paper, and was
stricken from the records. On the other hand, HGC' s motion was held to be impressed with merit. Despite
proper service of summons and the trial court's earlier order, the petitioners never filed an answer in due
time. For this reason, HOC was allowed to present its evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court.
On November 21, 2012 Judge issued the last challenged trial court orders, rescheduling the ex parte
presentation of evidence from December 9 to December 14, 2012.
Aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the four aforesaid trial court orders before the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, arguing that Judge Villordon had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the same. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground of inappropriate
or improper remedy. It ruled that the petitioners should have instead filed a motion under oath to set aside
the order of default and shown that they had a meritorious defense through an affidavit of merit.
Moreover, the CA held that the petitioners' failure to file an answer was attributable solely to their own
negligence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint should be granted on the ground that RTC
had no jurisdiction to resolve the complaint.
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HELD:
No. According to the petitioners, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that
HOC never submitted a copy of TCT No. 262715. They contended that, in actions for recovery of
possession, the identity of the subject land must be established through the presentation of a certificate of
title. They, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and, later, that the same be held in
abeyance until HGC presented a certified true copy of TCT No. 262715. Contrary to the petitioners'
stance, the submission of a certified true copy of TCT No. 262715 was not a condition precedent to vest
the Quezon City RTC with jurisdiction over HGC's complaint.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the pleadings. In arguing that it is
dependent on the presentation of evidence, the petitioners seem to have overlooked a rudiment of civil
procedure – a motion to dismiss is filed before the parties have an opportunity to offer and present their
evidence. Under the rules, the defendant in a civil case is allowed to file such a motion before responding
to the complaint. Assuming that the motion is denied, the defendant is then given the opportunity to file an
answer within the remainder of the prescribed reglementary period, but in no case less than five days,
computed from notice of the motion's denial. Then, after the defendant files an answer and the parties
serve on each other their respective pleadings, the case may proceed to pre-trial. Upon the termination of
the pre-trial, the clerk of court enters the case in the trial calendar. It is only when the case reaches trial
that the parties have an opportunity to substantiate their claims and defenses through evidence duly
presented.
Therefore, the petitioners' argument that the trial court had no jurisdiction over HGC's complaint sans a
certified true copy of TCT No. 262715 has no legal leg to stand on, and, for the same reason, no grave
abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge Villordon in denying the motion to archive the case. Clearly,
the presentation of a Torrens title was not a condition precedent to the vesting of jurisdiction in the
Quezon City RTC. Couched in general terms, a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction is not
dependent on the evidence (or the lack thereof) of the parties.
A cursory reading of Section 3 (b) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court will reveal that one of the defending
party's remedies against an order of default is to file a motion under oath to set it aside on the ground of
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Additionally, the defending party must append to the
said motion an affidavit showing that he or she has a meritorious defense. Verily, so that an order of
default may be lifted, the following requisites must be met: (a) that a motion be filed under oath by one
who has knowledge of the facts; (b) that the defending party's failure to file answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (c) that the defending party shows the existence of a
meritorious defense through an affidavit of merit.
Aside from their bare allegation, the petitioners miserably failed to show any circumstance indicative of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Villordon. It is well-settled that a petition for certiorari will
prosper only if the act or omission constituting grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved. Hence,
the petitioners were duty-bound to show that the presiding judge exercised her official power in an
"arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility" when she rescheduled
HGC's ex parte presentation of evidence. Without such a showing, the Court is left with no alternative
other than to uphold the CA's denial of their petition for certiorari.
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AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IS AN ALLEGATION OF A NEW MATTER WHICH, WHILE

HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTING THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADING OF THE
CLAIMANT, WOULD NEVERTHELESS PREVENT OR BAR RECOVERY BY HIM
45. Francisco C. Delgado vs. GQ Realty Development Corp., et al.

G.R. No. 241774. September 25, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco was a widower when he met Victoria Quirino Gonzales (Victoria) Despite their
advanced age, the two took another shot at love and entered into a special relationship. In their time
together, petitioner Francisco learned that Victoria was formerly married to Luis Gonzales (Luis), who
passed away in 1984. Luis and Victoria produced four children: respondent Rosario Gonzales-Meyer
(respondent Rosario), Ma. Victoria Gonzales, Ma. Luisa Gonzales, and Luis Gonzales. Together with her
children with Luis, Victoria started a corporation, i.e., respondent GQ Realty Development Corporation
(respondent GQ Realty).
Petitioner Francisco alleged that despite respondent GQ Realty's decent capitalization, the same would
not be enough for respondent GQ Realty to successfully engage in the realty business. Hence, petitioner
Francisco offered to help Victoria by supposedly buying real properties using his own money, but the
naked title would be named after respondent GQ Realty.
Victoria supposedly agreed and suggested that petitioner Francisco buy a condominium apartment,
specifically addressed at Unit 12-C, Urdaneta Apartments Condominium, 6735 Ayala Avenue, Makati City
(subject property).
On June 20, 1987, petitioner Francisco (then at the age of 76) and Victoria ( then at the age of 5 6) got
married. After almost 20 years of marriage, Victoria passed away on November 29, 2006 Following
Victoria's death, petitioner Francisco learned that Victoria's children with Luis distributed among
themselves the properties held in trust by Victoria's corporations, including respondent GQ Realty.
Petitioner Francisco discovered that the subject property was transferred from respondent GQ Realty to
respondent Rosario.
On their part, the respondents alleged that respondent GQ Realty was a family corporation established
in 1984 after the death of Victoria's former husband, Luis, for the sole purpose of holding Victoria's
properties.
Before Victoria and petitioner Francisco's marriage on June 20, 1987, the two executed an Ante-Nuptial
Agreement11 dated June 15, 1987 (Ante-Nuptial Agreement), which states, among other stipulations, that
their properties would be governed by complete separation of properties. The Ante-Nuptial Agreement
was allegedly drafted by petitioner Francisco's own counsel, Romulo Mabanta Law Offices.12 After
Victoria and petitioner Francisco's wedding, the latter moved in with Victoria at the subject property as
Victoria felt more comfortable living there than in petitioner Francisco's house.13 Respondent Rosario
averred that they maintained a close, happy, and harmonious relationship with petitioner Francisco
because they accepted him as their step-father. However, when Victoria fell ill, she started to transfer or
assign her properties to her children with Luis to ensure that the latter would receive her assets. Victoria
allegedly decided to transfer the subject property to respondent Rosario.
Several months after the death of Victoria, on July 12, 2007, petitioner Francisco, through petitioner Jose
Mari, filed a Verified Complaint for Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Sale, and Damages. Francisco
asserted his right over the subject property based on implied trust. According to petitioner Francisco, the
subject property was actually purchased by him using his own funds and the said property was registered
in the name of respondent GQ Realty for the sole purpose of aiding Victoria attract potential investors in
the company. He alleged that it was the intention of the parties that the subject property was to be held by
respondent GQ Realty merely in the concept of an implied trust for the benefit of petitioner Francisco.
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The respondents then filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses20 dated August
11, 2009, wherein they argued that petitioner Francisco's claim had already been deemed waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by virtue of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement executed by petitioner
Francisco and Victoria. It was argued that in the said document, petitioner Francisco acknowledged and
declared that all the properties of the parties would be respectively owned by each of them and that
neither of them would have an interest over the properties of the other. More so, the respondents argued
that the Complaint had already prescribed since 20 years have already passed from the time the subject
property was acquired by respondent GQ Realty.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Francisco, in executing the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished his alleged interest over the subject property.
HELD:
YES. According to Rule 6, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court, an affirmative defense is an allegation of a
new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant,
would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in
bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and avoidance.
Under Rule 16, Section 6, if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer and, in the discretion of
the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
In the instant case, the respondents did not file any Motion to Dismiss. Instead, they filed a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing so that the RTC could receive evidence and thereafter decide whether the affirmative
defenses raised by the respondents are meritorious. According to the RTC, and as affirmed by the CA,
after the preliminary hearing, the respondents were able to prove their affirmative defense that, while
hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the Complaint, the alleged claim of petitioner Francisco
over the subject property has been deemed waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished when
petitioner Francisco and Victoria executed the Ante-Nuptial Agreement. In this regard, the Court finds that
the RTC and CA did not err. Hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the Complaint, the Court
holds that petitioner Francisco indeed waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished his alleged rights
over the subject property.
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ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA
46. Webb v. Gatdula

G.R. No. 194469, September 18, 2019
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
This Petition is an offshoot of the rape-homicide case of Lejano v. People. In that case, Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb (Webb), among others, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for allegedly raping
Carmela Vizconde (Carmela), then killing her, her mother, and her sister in 1991— the events of which
had been infamously called the Vizconde Massacre.
While the criminal case was pending before the trial court, Webb filed a Motion to Direct the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis. This was granted. However,
the NBI manifested that the semen specimen was no longer in their custody, and was already submitted
as evidence before the trial court. The trial court denied the same, stating that what were marked in
evidence were photographs of the slides. Dr. Bautista of the NBI, confirmed that the slides were in the
NBI’s custody, but later on denied responsibility, stating that the got the information from a medical
technologist of the Bureau.
Due to the missing specimen, Webb filed a petition for indirect contempt against the respondents for
impeding, degrading, and obstructing the administration of justice. About 2 weeks after the filing of this
Petition for Indirect Contempt, this Court ruled on Lejano v. People. In finding that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner and his co-accused were acquitted of the crime
charged. The Office of the Solicitor General argues that the Petition is rendered moot upon the
promulgation of Lejano. Since the non-production of the specimen is merely incidental to the
determination of petitioner’s innocence, his acquittal has rendered the issue moot as no useful purpose
can be served by its resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the present petition for indirect contempt is barred by the ruling in Lejano v. People.
HELD:
No. To properly invoke res judicata, the following elements must concur: (1) the judgment sought to bar
the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.
In this case, this Court’s ruling in Lejano cannot preclude petitioner’s filing of the contempt action.
Between Lejano and this contempt case, only the first three (3) elements of res judicata are present: (1)
the judgment in Lejano is final; (2) it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3) it was a
judgment on the merits. The last element is absent: there is no identity of parties, issues, and cause of
action in the two (2) cases.
Clearly, respondents in this contempt action are not parties in the criminal case. Moreover, the issue and
the cause of action here are different from the criminal case. Here, the action seeks to cite respondents in
contempt, while in the criminal case, the accused sought to reverse his conviction. Moreover, in Lejano,
this Court answered the question of whether the loss of the specimen entitles the accused to acquittal. In
this contempt case, it only resolves if there was willful disregard or disobedience of this Court’s order,
regardless of its underlying purpose or value to this Court or to the parties.
In sum, there is a lack of identity of parties, issues, and cause of action between the criminal case and the
contempt action. As such, the judgment in the criminal case will not preclude this case’s resolution.
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DISMISSAL BASED ON FAILURE TO PROSECUTE IS A MATTER ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND

DISCRETION OF THE COURT. THE JUDGEMUST WEIGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MERITS OF
THE CASE AND THE REASON PROFFERED FOR THE NON-COMPLIANCE; ADDITIONALLY, HE
MUST DELIBERATE WHETHER RELAXATION OF THE RULES IS NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST
OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
47. Ng Ching Ting vs. Philippine Business Bank, Inc.

GR. No. 224972, July 9, 2019
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Philippine Business Bank, Inc. filed a Complaint for Recovery of Sum of Money against Jonathan Lim
(Jonathan), Carolina Lim (Carolina) and Ng Ching Ting (petitioner) also known as Richard Ng. It appears
that Jonathan, owner of Teen's Wear Fashion, obtained several loans from the respondent, which were
all covered by promissory notes. As of December 17, 2007, the total outstanding obligation of Jonathan
and/or Teen's Wear Fashion amounted to P5,183,416.40. As security thereto, a continuing suretyship
agreement was executed by Carolina and the petitioner, both ensuring the prompt payment of the loans
contracted by Jonathan from the respondent. To further secure the loans, Jonathan and Carolina
executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land situated in Dasmariñas, Cavite, covered by TCT
No. 891918, which was registered under their names. Jonathan defaulted in the payment of his monthly
amortizations and failed to settle the same despite repeated demands. Thus, the respondent bank filed a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. Subject property was awarded to the
highest bidder in the amount of P915,600.00. Since the amount realized from the auction sale was way
below the amount of the obligation, the respondent, through counsel, sent a demand letter to Jonathan,
Carolina and the petitioner to settle the deficiency in the amount of P4,267,816.40, within 5 days from
receipt thereof, but they refused to heed. By reason of said refusal to pay, the respondent filed a
collection suit against Jonathan, Carolina and the petitioner. The petitioner, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Dismiss, alleging the following grounds: (1) that the complaint was filed with a defective
certification of non-forum shopping; (2) that the complaint was based on a falsified continuing suretyship
agreement, and; (3) that no summons was served upon the principal debtor. The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss. On August 11, 2011, the RTC issued an Order motu proprio dismissing the case by reason of
inaction of both parties. Subsequently, a Motion for Reconsideration dated October 17, 2011 was filed by
the respondent bank, asseverating that they are still interested in pursuing the case and explained that
the reason for their inaction was due to the resignation of its 2 in-house counsels.The petitioner filed an
Opposition to the motion for reconsideration. Shortly thereafter, he filed an Urgent Manifestation and
attached thereon 2 certifications both dated February 24, 2012, which states that the respondent and its
counsel received the Order dated August 11, 2011 on September 23, 2011. This being the case, it only
had fifteen (15) days from September 23, 2011 or until October 8, 2011 within which to file its motion for
reconsideration. Thus, when the motion for reconsideration was filed on October 17, 2011, it was already
filed out of time and the order of dismissal had already become final and executory. The RTC granted the
respondent's motion for reconsideration stating that right after the issuance of the Order dated September
20, 2010 issued by the Court, the previous handling lawyers for the plaintiff, Attys. Dencio Somera and
Noel Aperocho, resigned from their position as in-house counsels without informing the plaintiff and its
new in-house counsels of the status of the instant case. Hence, the plaintiff and its in-house counsels
were surprised to receive the questioned Order dated August 11, 2011. The argument of the oppositor Ng
Ching Ting that the Order dated August 11, 2011 was received by the plaintiff and its in-house counsels
on September 23, 2011 could not be given credence because the person who received the said Order
was not an employee of the plaintiff. Unyielding, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for reconsideration
despite being filed out of time. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but in a Resolution the CA denied the same. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute, since there was no
excusable neglect on the part of the respondent, and the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
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HELD:
Yes, the case should be dismissed. Hence, the petition is granted.
Apparently, in the present case, the respondent overlooked procedural rules more than once. First, it
reneged on its duty to prosecute its case diligently and, second, it failed to file its motion for
reconsideration on time. The records bear out that the respondent went into unexplained inaction for
almost a year from the time the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner was denied by the RTC in its
Order dated September 20, 2010. Despite receipt of the copy of the order, it failed to actively pursue its
case or take the proper steps until the case reaches conclusion. This prompted the RTC to dismiss the
complaint in its Order dated August 11, 2011, on the basis of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court,
which reads as follows:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the
date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
The Court can no less agree that the full presentation of the parties' case should be favored over
termination of the proceedings on technical grounds. Ideally, "technicalities should not be permitted to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the
ends of substantial justice would be better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed." It must be emphasized, however, that the "invocation of substantial justice is not a magical
incantation that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party's substantive rights." Moreover, that "resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application
of procedural rules remains the exception to the well-settled principle that rules must be complied with for
the orderly administration of justice." It can only be upheld "in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances." It is in the abovementioned occasion that the exercise of sound discretion is required
of the judge. In doing so, he must weigh the circumstances, the merits of the case and the reason
proffered for the non-compliance. He must deliberate whether relaxation of the rules is necessary in the
interest of substantial justice.
In this case, the respondent cannot simply lay the blame on the resignation of its in-house counsels since
it is incumbent upon it, as the complainant, to promptly hire new lawyers to represent it in the
proceedings. Much vigilance and diligence are expected of it considering that it is the one who initiated
the action. Upon the resignation of its in house counsels, it should have taken immediate steps to hire
replacements so it may be able to keep up with the pending incidents in the case. Surely, it cannot expect
the court to wait until it has settled its predicament. It must take prompt action to keep pace with the
proceedings. As it was, however, the respondent dilly-dallied for almost a year until the court, motu
proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute.
Also, to stress, the finality of the decision comes by operation of law and there is no need for any judicial
declaration or performance of an act before such takes effect. That the judgment or order becomes final
by operation of law means that no positive act is required before this consequence takes place. It can
only be stalled if the proper legal remedy is taken with the prescriptive period. After this period, "the court
loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the power to review a
judgment that has acquired finality." In the instant case, there are two (2) Certifications issued by the
Caloocan Central Post Office, confirming that the registered mails which contained copies of the order of
dismissal were sent to the respondent and its counsel and were duly received by Bilan on September 23,
2011. Thus, when respondent filed its motion for reconsideration twenty-four days after receipt, the order
of dismissal dated August 11, 2011 had already attained finality and therefore the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in setting it aside. The CA should not have upheld the RTC's reversal of its earlier order of
dismissal which had already become final and executory. At that point, it is no longer subject to the
disposal or discretion of any court and may not be set aside on mere plea for liberality of the rules.
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FAILURE TO FILE THE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF SHALL HAVE THE SAME EFFECT AS FAILURE TO
APPEAR AT THE PRE-TRIAL. HOWEVER, LITIGATION IS NOT MERELY A GAME OF
TECHNICALITIES. SUITS SHOULD AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS. THUS,
THE COURT IS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND ITS OPERATION WHEN THE RIGID APPLICATION
THEREOF TENDS TO FRUSTRATE RATHER THAN PROMOTE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.
48. Pimentel vs. Adiao

GR. No. 222678, October 17, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Joanne Kristine Pimentel filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against respondents Reynaldo
Adiao (Reynaldo), Christian Adiao (Christian) and Cristy Adiao-Nierves (Cristy). Joanne entered into a
Construction Agreement with Reynaldo and Christian whereby Reynaldo, as contractor, agreed to
undertake the renovation of Joanne's bungalow house situated at BF Resort Village, Pamplona, Las
Piñas City for the consideration of P1,150,000.00 with a completion period of 180 working days. In the
event that Reynaldo would be rendered incapable to perform his responsibilities under the contract,
Christian was designated as the successor with the obligation to finish the renovation. Joanna paid to
Reynaldo and Christian a total amount of P1,200,000.00 with a down payment of P345,000.00 made in
December 2011. On April 6, 2012, Joanna paid an additional amount of P30,000.00 for the repair of her
other house situated at Mataas na Kahoy. Cristy allegedly conformed with the obligations of Reynaldo
and Christian with respect to the renovation and repair of the two houses by signing her name in the
acknowledgment receipt of the P30,000.00. The complaint alleged that Reynaldo, in violation of their
agreement, did not complete the renovation of Joanna's house and left the project unfinished. Joanna
wrote a demand letter to Reynaldo to complete the work but the latter refused to do so. She also made
verbal demands upon Cristy and Christian to comply with their obligation but they did not heed her
demands. Joanna took the position that their failure to complete the renovation and repair of her houses
constitutes a breach of the construction agreement, and having incurred in delay, Reynaldo, Christian and
Cristy are to indemnify her P1,000.00 per day and other damages for the breach of contract. On January
29, 2014, the RTC issued a Notice of Preliminary Conference (Notice of PC) which set the case for
preliminary conference (PC) on February 14, 2014 and required the parties to file their respective pre-trial
(PT) briefs and serve the same on the adverse party in such manner as to ensure the latter's receipt
thereof at least three days before the scheduled date. A Notice of Pre-Trial (Notice of PT) was also issued
on January 30, 2014 setting the case for PT on March 17, 2014 and the directive anent the filing of the PT
brief was reiterated. On February 12, 2014, Cristy filed her PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof
by registered mail. During the PC held on February 14, 2014, all the parties and their counsels appeared.
Reynaldo and Christian filed their PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof on the said date. The
parties pre-marked their respective exhibits. On March 17, 2014, the PT hearing was held and attended
by the parties and their respective counsels. Joanna filed her PT brief, which was objected to by the
counsels of the other parties for being filed late. Atty. Edwin V. Patricio (Atty. Patricio), Joanna's counsel,
explained that the pre-marking of exhibits was done only on February 14, 2014 and was of the belief that
the pre-marking of exhibits was not yet terminated. He also said that he planned to file a motion for
extension of time to submit the PT brief. The RTC in its Order dated March 17, 2014 dismissed the case
because Atty. Patricio violated the mandate found in Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules in relation to Section
5 of the same Rule, and in view of the manifestations by the other counsels that they would no longer
pursue the counterclaims of their clients. Joanna filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that her
counsel received on February 12, 2014 a copy of the Notice of PC and the Notice of PT and it was
improbable for Joanna's counsel to submit the PT brief at least three days prior to February 14, 2014.
While Joanna was unable to file her PT brief on the said date, she and her counsel were present and
actively participated therein with her counsel provisionally marking the photographs to be presented as
evidence subject to her counsel's request to mark the originals thereof on March 17, 2014. Given the
circumstances, Joanna's counsel honestly believed that the pre-marking of exhibits or the PC was not yet
terminated and planned to submit a motion for extension of time to file the PT brief. On March 17, 2014,
Joanna filed with the RTC her PT brief and furnished the other parties copies thereof. Joanna claimed
that given the foregoing series of events, she did not willfully commit an act that constituted an utter
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disregard of the Rules or orders of the RTC. Joanna pleaded that the rule on the timely submission of the
PT brief be interpreted liberally in her favor and that the adverse parties also violated Section 6, Rule 18
in that they failed to attach relevant documents thereto and were late in filing their PT briefs. The RTC
denied Joanna's motion for reconsideration. Joanna appealed the dismissal of the case to the CA which
also denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Joanna's failure to file her PT brief on time, given
that respondents also violated Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18.
HELD:
YES. The Complaint filed by petitioner Joanne Pimentel is reinstated and the RTC of Las Piñas City
directed to continue with the hearing of Civil Case until its termination.
Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 on Pre-Trial of the Rules provide:
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the
next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to
allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. -The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such
manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their
respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute
resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;
(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;
(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or
referral to commissioners; and
(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. The Court is
fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed
procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation
is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile
both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard. Suits
should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. In this regard, we have
often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned
upon and not looked upon with favor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the
defendant and the possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful examination of the
grounds upon which the defendant asks that it be set aside. Since rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to
suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof
tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. We are not unmindful of the fact that during the
pendency of the instant petition, the trial court has rendered judgment against petitioners. However, being
the court of last resort, we deem it in the best interest that liberality and relaxation of the Rules be
extended to petitioners by setting aside the order of default issued by the trial court and the consequent
default judgment; otherwise, great injustice would result if petitioners are not afforded an opportunity to
prove their claims. The Court is convinced with the explanations of Joanna for her plea to relax the
application of the Rules in her case. The Court notes that the untimely filing of her PT brief was so far the
only procedural lapse that she committed. She had been diligent in the prosecution of her cause against
respondents, and had not demonstrated a proclivity to delay the proceedings. As she pointed out, several
matters that would be taken up in the PT hearing had actually already been accomplished in the PC. In
fact, even the trial dates had been agreed upon by the parties. In turn, as Joanna correctly observes,
respondents were themselves not fully compliant with the Rules as observed by the RTC, and to the
Court's mind, they will not suffer substantial prejudice if the case is litigated on the merits.
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ALL ERRORS AND IRREGULARITIES IN THE NOTICE FOR TAKING A DEPOSITION ARE WAIVED
UNLESS WRITTEN OBJECTION IS PROMPTLY SERVED UPON THE PARTY GIVING THE NOTICE
49. Roberto C. Martires v. Heirs of Avelina Somera

G.R. No. 210789, December 03, 2018
J. Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Avelina S. Somera (Avelina) alleged that she was the rightful owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon
City, which was unlawfully transferred in the name of petitioner Roberto C. Martires (petitioner). Thus, she
instituted a complaint for accion reivindicatoria and accion publiciana against petitioner, Cecilia Gauna,
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the RTC. Avelina filed a Motion to Conduct Deposition
Upon Oral Examination praying that the RTC issue an order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) to assist her in the taking of her deposition and those of her two witnesses at the Philippine
Consular Office in New York City, USA which was granted by the trial court. Avelina filed a
Manifestation before the RTC informing the said court that the deposition-taking would take place on
September 27 and 28, 2007. Then, on September 27, 2007, Avelina and her two witnesses were deposed
before the Vice-Consul of the Philippine Consulate in New York City. Petitioner, however, received the
Manifestation on October 3, 2007. Thereafter, trial ensued. Avelina filed a Motion for Marking Additional
Documentary Evidence as the transcripts of her depositions, as well as those of her witnesses, had finally
arrived. Petitioner opposed the Motion on the ground that he was notified of the deposition-taking after the
same had already taken place. The heirs of Avelina (respondents) filed their Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence, which included Avelina's depositions and those of her witnesses (marked as Exhibits "Q," "R,"
and "S"). RTC admitted Exhibits "Q," "R," and "S" over petitioner's objections thereto. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which affirmed the RTC even in the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Was the deposition invalid and should not be admitted as evidence due to insufficient notice to
the other party?
HELD:
No, the trial court did not commit any error in allowing Avelina to take her deposition and those of her
witnesses and in subsequently admitting the same in evidence considering the allegations in the Motion
that she and her witnesses were residing in the United States. This situation is one of the exceptions for
its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, there is no merit in
petitioner's contention that the deposition-taking is invalid on account of a defective notice. While it is true
that Avelina's Motion indicated that the deposition-taking would be initially scheduled in July 2007, and
the proceeding was actually conducted on September 27, 2007, it could not be said that petitioner was
caught off guard by the belated conduct of the deposition. On September 24, 2007, Avelina's counsel
manifested that the deposition would be held on September 27 to 28, 2007. Further, it was shown that on
September 3, 2007, during the hearing of petitioner's motion with regard to the taking of deposition,
petitioner, through counsel, was sufficiently informed that the deposition would be taken on September
27, 2007. Also, Section 29(a), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court states that "all errors and irregularities in the
notice for taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving
the notice." Contrary to petitioner's contention that the right to object came into being only when
respondents sought to introduce the transcripts in evidence, petitioner should have objected to the
perceived irregularity of the notice immediately upon receipt thereof. It must be emphasized that Section
29(a) refers to errors and irregularities in the notice without any reference to the depositions taken by
virtue of such notice. Hence, possession of the transcripts of the depositions is not a condition precedent
for challenging the validity of the notice for taking a deposition. Consequently, petitioner's objections to
the notice are already deemed waived considering that more than three years have already elapsed from
petitioner's receipt thereof. Finally, it has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment and should not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are
otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.
Therefore, petitioner's objection to the notice deserves scant consideration for he was sufficiently
informed that the deposition would be conducted on September 27, 2007.
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A PROSECUTION WITNESS IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS MAY TESTIFY BY WAY OF A

DEPOSITION UNDER RULE 23 OF THE RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE AS LONG AS THERE IS A
COMPELLING REASON
50. People vs. Sergio

G.R. No. 240053. October 9, 2019
Hernando, J.:
FACTS:
Mary Jane, Maria Cristina P. Sergio, and Julius Lacanilao were friends and neighbours in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia. On April 21,
2010, Mary Jane, together with Cristina, left the Philippines for Malaysia. However, Mary Jane was
informed by Cristina upon their arrival in Malaysia that the job intended for her was no longer available.
After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-day holiday with
a promise that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Upon Mary Jane's arrival at the Adisucipto
International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly
carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. The District Court of Sleman, Yogyakarta, Indonesia,
convicted Mary Jane of drug trafficking and sentenced her to death by firing squad. Meanwhile, in the
Philippines, Cristina and Julius were arrested by the operatives of the Anti-Human Trafficking Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation. Thereafter, they were charged with qualified trafficking, illegal
recruitment, and Estafa. Representatives from PDEA, PNP Crime Laboratory, and DFA went to
Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She executed a document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni
Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso.”
On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to
suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that Mary
Janes’s statement is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius. Hence, pursuant to its obligations
under the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into by Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty), the Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of
Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to present her case A few hours before the scheduled execution of
Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia granted her an indefinite reprieve. The Indonesian authorities
however imposed the following conditions relative to the taking of Mary Jane's testimony: (1) Mary Jane
shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia; and (2) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane
shall be in writing.
Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane
Veloso by Deposition Upon Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony
through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules
of Court because she is out of the country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to
her imprisonment. The prosecution also pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily
in criminal proceedings and the use of deposition upon written interrogatories in criminal cases is not
expressly prohibited under the Rules of Court. Further, it pointed out that the Supreme Court has allowed
dispensation of direct testimony in open court under the Rules of Environmental Cases and the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the deposition should be made
before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not
designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use thereof is confined only
in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the
witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
The RTC granted the prosecutions motion. CA reversed the decision. It held that, contrary to the RTC's
findings, the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are primarily governed by Rule
119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to CA , the State failed to establish compelling reason
to depart from such rule and to apply instead Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure which only applies
in civil cases. Thus, pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or her conditional
examination must be made not in Indonesia but before the court where the case is pending.
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ISSUE:
May a prosecution witness, like Mary Jane, who was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to death
by the Indonesian Government and who is presently confined in a prison facility in Indonesia, testify by
way of deposition without violating the constitutional right to confrontation of a witness by the accused?
HELD:
YES. A prosecution witness in a criminal proceedings may testify by way of a deposition under Rule 23 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure as long as there is a compelling reason.
Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a
prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules,
in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in open court
because he is imprisoned in another country. Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the
said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is
compelling reason.
A strict application of the procedural rules will defeat the very purpose for the grant of reprieve by the
Indonesian authorities to Mary Jane. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim, is vital in the prosecution of
the pending criminal cases that were filed against Cristina and Julius. This has been recognized by no
less than the Indonesian President, His Excellency Joko Widodo, who granted the reprieve precisely to
afford Mary Jane the opportunity to participate in the legal proceedings obtaining in the Philippines.
Besides, the disallowance of the written interrogatories is not in congruence with the aim of ASEAN
MLAT, that is to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters among signatory states including the
Philippines.
Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process. The
benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have their day in
court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a fair process of decision-making when it
acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so
is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to
present its evidence in support of a charge.
The deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to confrontation of a
witness of Cristina and Julius. True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to
face in light of the prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court
ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the trial court
requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise objections to the
proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution. The trial court judge shall
promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final questions would be asked by the Consul of the
Philippines in Indonesia or his designated representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded
questions must be written verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of
the accused who would, in tum, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution.
Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized exceptions to the right to
confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary Jane's deposition through written
interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration.
Therefore, the testimony of Mary Jane may be taken by way of a deposition under Rule 23 of the Rules
on Civil Procedure.
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DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE CHALLENGES THE SUFFICIENCY OF PLAINTIFF’S EVIDENCE
51. Mary Christina Go-Yu v. Romeo Yu

G.R. No. 230443, April 3, 2019
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Go-Yu filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute
Community of Property against respondent Yu. She alleged that she is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the ordinary duties and responsibilities of a married woman, as illustrated by how they grew apart
as a married couple which led them to led separate lives even though they were under the same roof.
She was eventually diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist even
before the parties’ marriage. For his part, respondent alleged that petitioner is not suffering from
psychological disorder and personality disorder, instead her problem is behavioral since she has difficulty
adjusting to married life and in dealing with his relatives, especially his mother.
After petitioner rested her case, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence, claiming that the alleged
Narcissistic Personality Disorder of the former is not supported by clear evidence. The RTC denied the
same and ruled that the petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show that she was indeed
suffering from a personality disorder. The CA then reversed the same, thereby dismissing the petition filed
by the petitioner. The CA ruled that the evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish any proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitate her from complying with her essential
marital obligations; hence, the RTC erred in denying the demurrer to evidence.
The petitioner alleged that the totality of evidence she presented was not patently lacking but has
satisfactorily supported the case for declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage. Further, she insisted
that the issue of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity on the part of the petition is a
factual matter which requires the examination and determination of the totality of evidence presented and
as such, the RTC should have primacy in the determination thereof.
ISSUE:
Did the CA erred in ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the respondent’s
Demurrer to Evidence?
HELD:
No, the CA did not err in ruling as such because petitioner was unable to present sufficient evidence to
show that she has the right to the relief she seeks.
Demurrer to evidence is an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make
out his case or sustain the issue. The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence to
sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support
a verdict of guilt. Moreover, the grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion.
In the present case, the SC agreed with the CA that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence because petitioner was unable to present sufficient evidence
to show that she has the right to the relief she seeks. Contrary to petitioner’s claim that she is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a married woman, the pieces of evidence prove
otherwise. The fact that she gradually became overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or
disillusionment toward her husband and their marriage is not a sufficient ground to have such marriage
declared null and void. Hence, the CA is correct in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC when it denied respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
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DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE OR A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE THE SAME MUST BE FILED
AFTER THE PROSECUTION RESTS ITS CASE
52. BDO Unibank vs. Antonio Choa

G.R. No. 237533, July 10, 2019
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
That, on or about and during the period beginning March 12, 1999 until May 20, 1999, in the then
Municipality of San Juan, now City of San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, being then the President and General Manager of Camden Industries, Inc.,
execute several Trust Receipt Agreements with Nos. 0006, 0007, 0008, 0009, 0024, 0025, 0046 and
0047 in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (now Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc.), herein represented by its Senior
Manager Danilo M. De Dios, in consideration of the receipt by the said accused of . . . for which there is
now due the sum of Php 7,875,904.96 under the terms of which the accused agreed to sell the same with
express obligation to remit to the complainant bank proceeds of the sale and/or turn over the same if not
sold or disposed of in accordance with the said Trust Receipt Agreements on demand, but the accused
once in possession of the said good, far from complying with his obligation and with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and
despite repeated demands, failed and refused to account for and/or remit the proceeds of the sale
thereof, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant bank in the aforementioned amount of
Php7,875,904.96.
Petitioner insists that the Motion for Leave was not timely filed. It avers that under Rule 119, Section 23 of
the Rules of Court, respondent should have filed his Motion for Leave within five (5) days from September
12, 2014, when the prosecution supposedly rested its case after its documentary evidence had been
admitted by the trial court judge. It claims that if, according to the Court of Appeals, the prosecution did
not rest its case at the time of the filing of the Motion for Leave, then the trial court's judgment granting the
Demurrer to Evidence was premature, and therefore, void.
Respondent also insists that his Motion for Leave was not belatedly filed. Contrary to petitioner's claim,
the period of his Motion's filing did not start on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted the
prosecution's exhibits. Respondent asserts that since the trial court directed him to comment on the
evidence in the same Order, the trial court did not yet rule on the evidence's admissibility. If the trial court
indeed made a ruling on September 12, 2014, respondent asserts that petitioner should have moved for
reconsideration or clarification of the Order, or it could have raised the alleged prematurity of the Motion
for Leave earlier in its Opposition—but it did not do either.
On August 20, 2014, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, 12 which the trial
court admitted in its September 12, 2014 Order. In the same Order, the trial court gave Choa 10 days to
comment on the prosecution's evidence.
On September 25, 2014, Choa filed his Comment.
Later, on October 13, 2014, Choa filed a Motion for Leave (To file Demurrer to Evidence), attached to
which was his Demurrer to Evidence.
On November 26, 2014, the trial court issued an Order granting Choa's Demurrer to Evidence. Based on
the records and the witnesses' testimonies, it found that the prosecution failed to establish Choa's guilt.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its February 12, 2015
Order.
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Thus, BDO filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.
Affirming the trial court's Orders, the Court of Appeals issued its October 24, 2017 Decision denying
BDO's Petition. It found that Choa filed his Motion for Leave within the prescriptive period since the
prosecution could not "yet be deemed to have rested its case." It explained that the trial court only
"physically 'admitted'" in its September 12, 2014 Order the prosecution's Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence, but had yet to rule on its admissibility. This was shown, the Court of Appeals explained, when
Choa was also directed to submit his Comment.
BDO moved for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the Motion in its February 13, 2018
Resolution. Hence, BDO filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when he issued the Order granting respondent Antonio Choa's Demurrer to Evidence.
HELD:
Yes the CA erred. A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be filed after the
prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that the same be
formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence
concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to
evidence. A review of the case records reveals that when the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence85 on August 20, 2014, it included a reservation in its Prayer. The prayer itself
indicates that the prosecution would rest its case depending on whether the trial court admitted its
evidence. If the trial court did not admit its evidence, the prosecution would present additional evidence;
otherwise, it would rest its case. Due to this reservation, the five (5)-day period for the filing of a Motion for
Leave had not yet started when petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence.
The prosecution is deemed to have rested its case on September 12, 2014, when the trial court admitted
its documentary evidence. However, the counting of the five (5)-day period did not commence on August
20, 2014, when the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; or on September 12,
2014, when the trial court admitted the evidence. Instead, it started upon respondent's receipt of the
September 12, 2014 Order, for only then was he notified that the prosecution had rested its case.
Nonetheless, respondent filed his Motion for Leave and Demurrer to Evidence on October 13, 2014. To
recall, the September 12, 2014 Order had also directed respondent to submit his comment/opposition,
which he then submitted on September 25, 2014. Even if there is no record of when respondent received
a copy of the Order, it can be surmised that he received it before September 25, 2014. It follows that the
Motion for Leave and the Demurrer to Evidence were filed beyond the five (5)-day period under Rule 119,
Section 23 of the Rules of Court. The trial court, then, should have denied these pleadings outright.
In short, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs' evidence retain the right to present their own
evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if it agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the
merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations. Based on the prosecution's
evidence, this Court cannot grant petitioner's Complaint. Although these pieces of evidence show that
respondent signed the Trust Receipt Agreements, they do not show that he signed them in his personal
capacity. On the bottom right corner of the agreements are two (2) lines: one for the "NAME OF
CORPORATION," and the other for "AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE." In all agreements, "Camden Inds."
was handwritten as the name of the corporation, while respondent's signature appeared as the authorized
signature. Clearly, respondent affixed his signature only as Camden's representative. Moreover, there
was no guaranty clause or a similar clause on the page that he signed that would have made him
personally liable in case of default of the company. A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only
through its directors, officers, and employees. Debts incurred by these individuals, acting as such
corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct liability of the corporation they represent. As an exception,
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directors or officers are personally liable for the corporation's debts only if they so contractually agree or
stipulate. Without any evidence that respondent personally bound himself to the debts of the company he
represented, this Court cannot hold him civilly liable under the Trust Receipt Agreements.
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A SUMMARY JUDGEMENT IS PERMITTED ONLY IF THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY

MATERIAL FACT
53. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp. v. Union Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 229339, July 29, 2019
Reyes, J. Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Globe Asiatique, through its President and/or Vice-President, executed 10 Deeds of Assignments (DAs)
and 11 copies of Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) in favor of Union Bank covering 10 condominium
units located at GA Tower 1, Condominium Project situated along EDSA, Mandaluyong City. A common
provision of the DAs provides that Globe Asiatique absolutely transferred, assigned, and conveyed to
Union Bank, its successors and assigns, all its rights, title, interests and participation "on that parcel of
land, and subsequent improvements thereon" located at the specific subject units of GA Tower 1. Globe
Asiatique sent Union Bank a letter requesting the reformation of the DAs and the SPAs alleging that some
of their provisions do not conform to their real agreement. However, Globe Asiatique's request remained
unheeded. Thus it filed a Complaint for reformation of the DAs and SPAs. Globe Asiatique claimed that
the parties only intended the sale or assignment of rights, title, and interests over the receivables, and not
the parcels of land themselves. It asserted that the DAs are the result of a mutual mistake. Hence, it
prayed that the DAs and SPAs be reformed for failing to express the parties' real intent and agreement.
Globe Asiatique insists that it is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. It asserts that Union
Bank, in its Answer and during the Pre-Trial Conference, admitted all the material allegations in the
complaint for reformation. Union Bank denied that the subject DAs failed to express the true intent or
agreement between the parties or that they were the result of mutual mistake.
ISSUE:
Is Motion for Summary Judgement proper in thisf case?
HELD:
NO. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In relation to this, a "genuine issue" means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious
or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial. "The court can determine this on
the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the
parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial."
For summary judgment to proceed in lieu of a full-blown trial, the party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is
patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.
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WHEN THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE RAISED AS TO A MATERIAL FACT, A PARTY IS ENTITLED

TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW

54. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Philippine Veterans Bank
G.R. No. 233850, July 1, 2019
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
In a complaint for specific performance filed by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) againts Trade
and Investment Development Corporation (TIDCORP), the former alleged that together with other
banking institutions (Series A Noteholders), it entered into a Five-Year Floating Rate Note Facility
Agreement with debtor Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PhilPhos). To secure payment of the
Series A Notes, petitioner TIDCORP, with the express conformity of PhilPhos, executed a Guarantee
Agreement whereby petitioner TIDCORP agreed to guarantee the payment of the guaranty obligation of
the outstanding Series A Notes. Due to the devastation made by Typhoon Yolanda to Philpos’
manufacturing facilities, it failed to resume operations. Thus m, it filed a Petition for Voluntary
Rehabilitation under the FRIA of 2010, to which the rehabilitation court issued a stay order. Respondent
PVB filed its Notice of Claim with TIDCORP. The latter declined to give due course to respondent PVB's
Notice of Claim, invoking the Stay Order issued by the Rehabilitation Court.
In its Complaint, respondent PVB asserted that "[t]o secure the payment of the Serie's A Notes,. petitioner
TIDCORP, with the express conformity of PhilPhos, executed a Guarantee Agreement with the Series A
Noteholders. In its Answer with Counterclaim , petitioner TIDCORP argued that the RTC cannot validly try
the case because of the Rehabilitation Court's Stay Order, which enjoined the enforcement of all claims,
actions and proceedings against PhilPhos. In view of the Answer filed by petitioner TIDCORP, respondent
PVB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The RTC granted respondent PVB’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, holding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact posed by petitioner TIDCORP
with respect to its liability under the Guarantee Agreement, except as to the amount of damages. Hence,
TIDCORP file a Petition for review on certiorai under Rule 45 to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Is there a genuine issue raised as to a material fact as to not warranty the granting of the motion for
summary judgment?

HELD:
No, there is no genuine issue raised as to a material fact as to warranty the granting of the motion for
summary judgment. There is no "genuine issue" which calls for the presentation of evidence if the issues
raised by a party are a sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not
to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings,
admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. In the
instant case, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, petitioner TIDCORP readily admitted that it was bound
by the Guarantee Agreement, which expressly obligated petitioner TIDCORP to guarantee the payment of
the Guaranty obligation, which was specifically pegged at 90% of the outstanding Series A Notes. With
petitioner TIDCORP admitting that it was " bound by the terms and conditions enumerated in this
Guarantee Agreement and such other related documents x x x," the RTC did not commit any error in
holding that respondent PVB was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jurisprudence holds that " the
defendant must show that he has a bona fide defense to the action, one which he may be able to
establish. It must be a plausible ground of defense, something fairly arguable and of a substantial
character. This he must show by affidavits or other proof."
The RTC was correct in holding that petitioner TIDCORP failed to proffer a plausible ground of defense of
a substantial character, considering that in its Answer, the only special and/or affirmative defense raised
by petitioner TIDCORP was the argument on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC in light of the
Rehabilitation Court's Stay Order, which as previously discussed, is an erroneous assertion.
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GRANTING THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND ADMIT A SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AUTHORIZES THE FILING OF THE SECOND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION;
THE RULE PROHIBITING THE FILING OF A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS BY NO
MEANS ABSOLUTE.
55. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines,
Inc.
G.R. No. 178083, 13 March 2018
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
Resolving the appeal of FASAP, the Third Division of the Court promulgated its Decision on July 22,
2008 reversing the CA’s Decision and entering a new one finding PAL guilty of unlawful retrenchment.
PAL filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court denied, through the Resolution of October 2,
2009. Not satisfied, PAL filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of October 2, 2009 and
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008. The Court granted PAL's
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration in its resolution of January 20, 2010.
FASAP asserts that PAL's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 was a
prohibited pleading.
ISSUE:
May the Court entertain the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by PAL?
HELD:
No. PAL's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 could be allowed in the
higher interest of justice.
It is already settled that the granting of the motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for
reconsideration authorizes the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thereby, the second
motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading, and the Court cannot deny it on such basis
alone. In granting the motion for leave to file the second motion for reconsideration, the Court could not
have intended to deceive the movants by allowing them to revel in some hollow victory. The proposition
manifestly contravened the basic tenets of justice and fairness.
With the Court's resolution of January 20, 2010 granting PAL's motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration, PAL's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 could no
longer be challenged as a prohibited pleading.
Nonetheless, we should stress that the rule prohibiting the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is
by no means absolute. Although Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court disallows the filing of a second
motion for reconsideration, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) allows an exception. Under
the IRSC, a second motion for reconsideration may be allowed to prosper upon a showing by the movant
that a reconsideration of the previous ruling is necessary in the higher interest of justice. There is higher
interest of justice when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust
and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.
The arguments of PAL sufficed to show that the assailed decision contravened settled jurisprudence on
PAL's precarious financial condition. It cannot be gainsaid that there were other businesses undergoing
rehabilitation that would also be bound or negatively affected by the July 22, 2008 decision. This was the
higher interest of justice that the Court sought to address. Hence, we deemed it just and prudent to allow
PAL's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008.
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A PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, BEING AN EQUITABLE REMEDY, MUST STRICTLY
COMPLY WITH THE APPLICABLE REGLEMENTARY PERIODS
56. Lasam v. Philippine National Bank
G.R. No. 207433, December 5, 2018
J. Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Fe Lasam had filed a Complaint for Annulment of Mortgage against the Philippine National
Bank before the same court; that her counsel failed to appear for the initial reception of evidence; that the
RTC issued an order dismissing the civil case for failure to prosecute and for failure of her counsel to
appear; that her former counsel filed a motion explaining the absence but the same was dismissed for not
being seasonably filed; and that her former counsel sought the reconsideration of the order which was
denied for being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.
Lasam further alleged that her former counsel filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was
dismissed. An Urgent Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or PI was also filed. The CA stated that it could
no longer act on the same because there was already a Resolution and and Entry of Judgment. The Entry
of Judgment stated that the Court’s resolution dated February 22, 2012 denying the Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution had become final and executory and had been
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 3, 2012.
Lasam claimed that she only learned of the Finality of the order after consulting a different lawyer; that
she was seriously deprived of her right to present her case due to the gross negligence and ignorance of
her former counsel. Specifically, it was the counsel who caused the dismissal of her complaint for
annulment of mortgage due to her failure to appear in the hearing; who failed to file the motion for
reconsideration on time; and who availed of the wrong remedy by filing a second motion for
reconsideration which led to the finality of the order. Thus, a petition for relief from the order of the RTC.
The trial Court dismissed the petition for relief outright. It reasoned the same should be filed must be filed
within: (a) 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside; and (b) six months from entry of such judgment, order, or other proceeding. It emphasized that
these two periods must concur and must be strictly observed since compliance with the reglementary
periods is jurisdictional. Further, contrary to Lasam's belief, the 60-day period had commenced when she,
through her former counsel, received a copy of the April 29, 2010 Order denying the reconsideration of
the dismissal of the case on February 23, 2010, and not from the time of her belated knowledge of the
finality after consulting with a different lawyer.
ISSUE:
Did the Regional Trial Court properly dismiss the Petition for Relief from Judgment?
HELD:
Yes, the petition was filed out of time thus justifying the dismissal.
A petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings is an equitable remedy which is allowed
only in exceptional circumstances. The petition is the proper remedy of a party seeking to set aside a
judgment rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing, was
prevented from taking an appeal, or a judgment or final order entered because of fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence.
However, as an equitable remedy, strict compliance with the applicable reglementary periods for its filing
must be satisfactorily shown because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the
part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order, or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to
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litigation. As such, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the petition was filed within its
reglementary periods, otherwise, the petition may be dismissed outright.
In this regard, Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for relief from judgment
must be filed within: (1) 60 days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set
aside; and (2) six months from the entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods
must concur. Further, these periods could not be extended and could never be interrupted.
Unfortunately for Lasam, she failed to comply with these two periods when she filed her petition for relief
from a final order before the RTC. It must be emphasized that the subject of Lasam's petition for relief is
the RTC's February 23, 2010 Order. Accordingly, the reglementary periods provided in Section 3, Rule 38
of the Rules of Court must be reckoned from Lasam's knowledge of the said order, as well as on the date
it was entered.
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THE SUBMISSION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE SHOULD COME WITH ADEQUATE PROOF OF THE
FOREIGN LAW THAT ALLOWS IT
57. Nullada vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila

G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
A petition for registration and recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage
that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn
with the RTC. She claimed that she and Akira got married in Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of
Marriage that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was registered with
both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry
Division. The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship turned
sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. Thereafter, Akira and Marlyn
secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate5 that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in
the Philippines. Marlyn and Akira's acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported
by an Acceptance Certificate that was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan, an English
translation of which forms part of the records. She sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the
Philippines, and filed with the RTC the petition for recognition which was granted. Marlyn testified mainly
to identify the pertinent pieces of documentary evidence - original copies of the divorce and authentication
certificates. Akira did not file an Answer to the petition. The Republic also did not offer any evidence to
rebut the case of Marlyn. RTC denied petition and cited of Article 17 of the New Civil Code is a policy of
non-recognition of divorce. For the trial court, the fact that Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly
filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had validly
obtained a divorce.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so as to apply
only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the divorce was mutually
agreed upon by the spouses?
2. Whether or not Marlyn complied with Rule 39 in recognition of foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
1. Yes. This question of law was directly resolved by the Court in the recent case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, which was promulgated by the Court subsequent to the filing of
the present petition. The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code,
which states. Art. 26. ... Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the
divorce was inconsequential. In several other jurisprudence, recognition of the effects of a foreign divorce
was also implied from the Court's disposition of the cases. The specific issue on the binding effect of a
divorce decree obtained by a Filipino spouse on one's marital status was then expressly and directly
tackled by the Court. In determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a foreigner spouse should be
recognized in the Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought by the Filipino national. The Court
reasoned that there is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings.
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
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2. No. The fact that the divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not sufficient
ground to reject the decree in this jurisdiction. While Marlyn and Akira's divorce decree was not disputed
by the OSG, a recognition of the divorce, however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under
prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the
foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently proved. "Because our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any other fact." To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of
excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center,
Embassy of Japan. This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of
Japan's law on divorce.
Therefore, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a
remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on
divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.
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A JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OF A FOREIGN TRIBUNAL CREATES A RIGHT OF ACTION, AND

ITS NON-SATISFACTION IS THE CAUSE OF ACTION BY WHICH A SUIT CAN BE BROUGHT UPON
IT FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT.
58. Mercantile Corp vs. Yi

G.R. No. 534301, March 18, 2019
Reyes, JR., J.
FACTS:
FAM MART Co., Inc., owned and operated by the Chuns, was secured by an insurance policy issued by
petitioner Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc. (MIC), through its California surplus lines broker, Great
Republic Insurance Agency (GRI). Yi was involved in an accident while within the premises of FAM
MART, a business establishment located at El Cajon, California, United States of America. As a result of
which, her right little finger was severed. FAM MART notified MIC of the accident. A memorandum from
the latter, acknowledging that there is a valid policy in favor of FAM MART and that a contract existed
between FAM MART and MIC, was issued. Yi filed a personal injury action against the Chuns. Upon
service of summons, FAM MART tendered the claim to its insurer, MIC. Initially, MIC, through counsel,
defended FAM MART in said personal injury action without any reservation of rights. However, sometime
in August 1992, it withdrew its representation.The Superior Court of the State of California for the County
of San Diego (Superior Court of California) issued a judgment in favor of Yi.
Yi, together with the Chuns, filed a complaint for breach of insurance contract, breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, fraud and negligent misrepresentation and negligence against MIC. However,
despite service of summons, MIC did not file any pleading. Hence, a Judgment by Default was issued by
the Superior Court of California. Said Judgment became final and executory as no appeal was filed by
any of the parties. On September 21, 2005, a Notice of Renewal of Judgment was issued by the Superior
Court of California allowing Yi to enforce the Judgment for an additional period of 10 years from the date
of Application for Renewal of Judgment was filed.Per Attachment to the Renewal of Judgment, the
adjusted amount inclusive of interest owed by MIC to Yi and the Chuns amounted to $1,552,664.67.
As Yi was not able to enforce the Judgment in California, she filed an action for enforcement of judgment
before the RTC .MIC filed an Answer, denying the claims of Yi and its alleged liability. It averred that it
has no privity of contract with Yi and FAM MART as it was not aware of any case of such nature
considering that its operations are within the Philippines. The RTC, dismissed the case for lack of merit. It
maintained that Yi was not able to prove her claim because the insurance policy was not presented in
evidence and that it has no jurisdiction over MIC as the latter was not properly served with summons.Yi
filed an appeal via Rule 44 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling
of the RTC and ordered MIC to pay the amount adjudged in the judgment rendered by the Superior Court
of California. The CA maintained that in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is
the foreign judgment itself. Thus, it is not imperative on the part of Yi to provide proof of the insurance
policy and her insurable interest. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by MCI was denied in a Resolution.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the judgment issued by the Superior Court of California may be enforced in our
jurisdiction.
(2) Will the failure of Yi to implead the Chuns, who are indispensable parties, renders all actions of the
court null and void.
HELD:
(1) In our jurisdiction, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal creates a right of action, and its non-
satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides for the conditions for the recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment, to wit:
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SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:(a) In case of a
judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing; and (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title.
The causes of action arising from the enforcement of foreign judgment and that arising from the
allegations that gave rise to said foreign judgment differs, such that the former stems from the foreign
judgment itself, whereas the latter stems from the right in favor of the plaintiff and its violation by the
defendant's act or omission. The evidence to be presented likewise differs.
What is indispensable in an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is the presentation of the
foreign judgment itself as it comprises both the evidence and the derivation of the cause of action.
Further, the above-cited rule provides that a foreign judgment against a person, i.e., an action in
personam, as in this case, is merely a presumptive evidence of rights between the parties. Such judgment
may be attacked by proving lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law. Thus, contrary to MIC's position, the burden is upon MIC to prove its allegations
against the validity of the foreign judgment sought to be enforced.
In disputing the foreign judgment, MIC argues that there was want of notice to it as there was no proper
service of summons in the trial before the California court. On this note, we highlight that matters of
remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by
the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which is the State of California in this case. This Court is well
aware that foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. In this case, Atty. Robert G. Dyer (Atty. Dyer), member of the bar of the State of California for
more than 30 years, testified as to the applicable law related to summons. In detail, he stated the exact
pertinent provision under the California Code of Civil Procedure
Indeed, pursuant to the above-proven law in the State of California, the service of summons by mail to
MIC, an entity outside its state, was valid. As such law was sufficiently alleged and proven, it is beyond
the province of this Court's authority to pass upon the issue as to the factual circumstances relating to the
proper service of summons upon MIC in the case before the State of California.It is also significant to note
that MIC impeaches the credibility of Atty. Dyer as an expert witness for the first time on appeal. Before
the RTC and the CA, MIC merely raised the argument that Atty. Dyer failed to specifically cite the law of
the State of California with respect to service of summons.
(2) No. Here, it is apparent that the Chuns are not indispensable parties, whose inclusion is
determinative of the final outcome of the case. Their legal presence will not render the resolution of the
action incomplete and ineffective for there was a final judgment already rendered by the foreign court. As
previously mentioned, what our courts will do is to recognize the foreign judgment as a fact and enforce
the same as such foreign judgment creates a right of action in favor of Yi. Relevantly, MIC's failure to
satisfy the terms of the foreign judgment engenders a cause of action as to Yi, who becomes clothed with
requisite interest to institute an action for enforcement.
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DESPITE PRIOR AVAILABILITY OF AN APPEAL, RESORT TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CAN

BE ALLOWED IN CASE OF LACK OF SERVICE OF NOTICE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS
59. Orlina v Ventura

G.R. No. 227033, December 03, 2018
Peralta, J.:
Facts:
Ventura owned a 406 square meter parcel of land located in Baesa, Quezon City. Ventura had been
delinquent in the payment of its real property taxes, failing to pay despite notice of such delinquency. As a
result, the City Treasurer of Quezon City issued a warrant subjecting the property to levy. To satisfy the
tax delinquency, the property was then advertised for sale at a public auction by posting a notice at the
main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, as well as in a public and conspicuous place in the barangay
where the property was located, and by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. A public auction
was conducted during which Orlina turned out to be the highest bidder. The corresponding Certificate of
Sale was issued in his favor . After the lapse of the one (1)-year period of redemption without Ventura
redeeming the subject property, the City Treasurer of Quezon City issued a Final Bill of Sale to Orlina.
Orlina filed a petition for the cancellation of the original title, and issuance of a new certificate of title for
the subject property in his favor. There being no opposition filed, the RTC issued an order of general
default and granted Orlina's motion to present evidence ex-parte.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner Reynaldo Orlina.
Ventura filed an an omnibus motion seeking a reconsideration of the RTC's Decision arguing that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, thus, depriving her of her .right to due process. She also
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the writ of possession,
praying for the suspension of its implementation pending resolution of the omnibus motion. The RTC
denied the motions.
CA annulled and set aside the Decision of the RTC and held that there was no proof that Ventura was
served with notices of the proceedings before the trial court. As a consequence of this violation of her
constitutional right to due process, said court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.
Issues:
Whether or not the remedy of certiorari can be availed of by the respondent despite loss of remedy of
appeal.
Held:
Yes, the remedy of certiorari may be availed of.
As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not
only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the
court final and executory. This is in line with the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment
under which a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
But like any other rule, the doctrine of immutability of judgment has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction
of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. Similarly, while it is doctrinally entrenched that certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal, the Court has allowed the resort to a petition for certiorari despite the
existence of or prior availability of an appeal, such as: (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy
and adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction; (3)
for certain special considerations, as public welfare or public policy; (4) where in criminal actions, the
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court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy;
(5) where the order is a patent nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future
litigations.
In the instant case, the trial court failed to serve Ventura with a notice of hearing and a copy of the petition
with its annexes. As aptly found by the CA, there was no proof that Ventura was personally served with
said notice. Neither was there proof of substantial service or even service by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation. Orlina insists that he and the City Treasurer of Quezon City actually sent the
warrant of levy and notices to Ventura. The Court, however, finds said contention unacceptable. First, the
notices allegedly sent to Ventura were made in a separate and distinct proceeding, specifically, the tax
sale. Nowhere in the records of the case, however, did Orlina show that Ventura was duly notified of the
instant proceeding for the approval of the final bill of sale, cancellation of the original title, and issuance of
a new certificate of title for the subject property in Orlina's favor.
While Orlina persistently argues that notices were sent to Ventura, the validity and due execution of the
same remain doubtful. The Court is curious as to why, in attempting to prove proper notification, Orlina
makes reference to different addresses.
Even if We assume that he sent notices to the different addresses by mere honest mistake and in good
faith, believing said addresses to be true, the fact remains that Ventura was, indeed, not properly notified
of the instant proceedings. Verily, this fact alone is a denial of her right to due process which the Court
deems necessary to correct. Time and again, the Court has held that where there is an apparent denial of
the fundamental right to due process, a decision that is issued in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction, in view of the cardinal precept that in cases of a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted from their jurisdiction. This violation raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Thus, it is well settled that a judgment or decision rendered without
due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at any time directly or collaterally by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked for such
judgment or decision is regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight,
or ignored wherever it exhibits its head."
Therefore, for being violative of Ventura's right to due process, the petition for certiorari is aptly allowed.
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AN EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT IS WHENEVER

CIRCUMSTANCES TRANSPIRE AFTER THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION RENDERING ITS
EXECUTION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE
60. Adoption of Karen Herico Licerio

G.R. No. 208005, November 21, 2018
FACTS:
Spouses Joel H. Borromeo and Carmen H. Licerio (petitioners) are husband and wife they petitioned to
legally adopt Karen , the illegitimate daughter of petitioner Carmen. The verified petition for adoption was
filed with the RTC of Marikina, the RTC of Marikina granted the petition and in its decision order the OCR
of Quezon City to comply the decision. However, the OCR of Quezon City informed them that to
implement the decision of the RTC of Marina, the registration of the birth certificate in the OCR of
Caloocan must be likewise cancelled. Spouses filed a petition in the RTC of Caloocan for the cancellation
of the birth certificate, but the RTC of Caloocan merely order a correction of the entries in the birth
certificate of Karen. To implement the decision granting the adoption given on June 27, 2006 the spouses
filed in the RTC of Marikina dated February 19, 2013 a motion to correct the adoption decree by inserting
the phrase "City Civil Registrar of Caloocan City in lieu of the "City Civil Registrar of Quezon City” The
RTC of Marikina denied the motion The RTC of Marikina City found that its June 27, 2006 Decision has
long been final and executory, which made it immutable and unalterable. It also ruled that none of the
three exceptions to the rule on immutability of final judgment was found. A motion for reconsideration was
filed but was subsequently denied. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition review on certiorari with the
following arguments ; 1) adoption and correction of entries in the civil registry are special proceedings and
ROC does not apply to special proceedings and final judgment may be modified or altered to harmonize
the same with justice and the facts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not final and executory judgment may be modified
HELD :
YES. In the case of Antonio Mendoza v. Fil- Homes realty development Corporation the court pointed out
4 exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment;
1) The correction of clerical errors;
(2) The so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; harmonize the same with
justice and the facts.
(3) Void judgments; and
(4) Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable
The fourth exception to the doctrine on immutability of judgment is present in this case. After the June 27,
2006 Decision granting the adoption of Karen has become final and executory, new facts and
circumstances occurred which made its execution inequitable and impossible. Due to the belated
discovery of the duplicitous registration of Karen's birth, and the subsequent refusal of the RTC of
Caloocan City to cancel the registration in the OCR of Caloocan City, the petitioners have no way to
enforce the June 27, 2006 Decision.
The assailed Order dated May 23, 2013 and Order dated July 1, 2013 issued by the RTC of Marikina City
in JDRC Case No. 05-1119-MK are ANULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is thus REMANDED to Branch
273 of the RTC of Marikina City, which is hereby directed to:
(1) RECEIVE evidence relevant to the duplicitous registration of Karen's birth;
(2) DETERMINE the proper OCR to enforce the June 27, 2006 Decision; and
(3) CORRECT the decision, if needed, only as to the proper OCR to enforce it.
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A CASE IS DEEMED TERMINATED ONLY UPON FULL SATISFACTION OF THE JUDGMENT
61. Diamond Drilling Corporation Of The Philippines vs. Crescent Mining And Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 207360, April 10, 2019
A. Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Crescent Mining and Development Corporation (Crescent), a Filipino corporation, and Pacific Falkon
Resources Corporation (PFRC), a Canadian corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) in
preparation for the formation of a joint venture to undertake mining operations within Guinaoang Project.
Thereafter, Crescent and PFRC executed a Letter-Agreement amending the JVA. Under their new
arrangement, PFRC acquired a 40% stake.
PFRC's 40% share in the Guinaoang Project was attached and levied upon through a Notice of
Attachment/Levy in a case involving its drilling contractor DDCP.
Eventually the trial court rendered a Decision in 2001 holding PFRC liable to DDCP. Entry of Judgment
was issued in the case and, at DDCP's instance, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. By
virtue thereof, the 40% interest of PFRC in the Guinaoang Project was levied.
PFRC's interest in the Guinaoang Project was publicly auctioned whereupon DDCP came out as the
highest bidder. Hence, DDCP became the 40% equitable owner of the MPSA.
DDCP requested the MGB to record its 40% interest in the Guinaoang Project. The request was denied
by then DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos (Director Ramos) on the ground that DDCP has not
acquired any interest in the said MPSA is between the government and Crescent.
During 2008, in view of the denial, DDCP filed a Motion praying that an order be issued directing the
DENR Secretary, thru the MGB Director, to amend the MPSA by incorporating the 40% ownership of
DDCP therein. The trial court granted the motion. The DENR filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and
Crescent also assailed the order through another petition for certiorari.
The CA 17th Division agreed with Crescent's assertion that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to
issue the assailed order, as DDCP's motion to amend the MPSA is essentially a motion for execution of
the Decision dated 2001 which was filed beyond the five-year period within which a decision may be
executed by motion.
The CA 2nd Division ruled against DENR and in favor of DDCP. Notably, the CA 2nd Division viewed the
order as part of the execution proceedings, such that the court's "general supervisory control" over the
execution process remains applicable
ISSUE:
Can the trial court issue the assailed order despite the motion being filed beyond the reglementary period
for executing a decision by motion?
RULING: NO
"It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and for
all." "[I]t is when the judgment has been satisfied that the same passes beyond review, for satisfaction
thereof is the last act and end of the proceedings." A case in which an execution has been issued is
regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no
question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of
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execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may
be involved in the execution.
Also, Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court limits the time within which a writ of execution may be
issued; but it does not prescribe a period when the sale at public auction shall take place after the
issuance of such writ and a valid levy made pursuant thereto. The execution sale simply carries out the
execution writ and the levy which, when issued, were valid. Accordingly, the Court has held that a valid
execution issued and levy made during the lifetime of the writ of execution may be enforced by a sale
thereafter, i.e., a sale made even beyond the lifetime of the writ of execution, provided such sale is made
within ten (10) years from the entry of judgment.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the Court holds that the judgment in favor of DDCP should be
deemed fully satisfied at the time it filed the motion to amend the MPSA. The trial court had already lost
jurisdiction by the time it issued the assailed order, for upon the acquisition by judicial sale of DDCP of
PFRC's 40% interest in the Guinaoang Project, DDCP had already acquired property of its judgment
debtor which stands as payment for the judgment debt.
Thus, DDCP's assertion that the assailed order is a mere continuation of the execution proceedings is
unavailing.
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EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT IN PERSONAM IS BINDING ONLY UPON THOSE PROPERLY

IMPLEADED
62. Bayani vs. Yu

G.R. No. 203076-77, July 10, 2019
Bersamin, CJ.
FACTS:
In 1953, a parcel of land was subdivided. Melencio filed applications for free patent as to Lot nos. 2 and 4,
and his lots were eventually approved. Sometime after 1963, Melencio executed an Agreement to
Transfer Rights and Deed of Sale and a Quitclaim Deed upon the intervention of Alfonso Non. It turned
out, however, that said documents were for the sale of all the subdivided lots to one John Z. Sycip,
instead of only the lot covered by the free patent issued to Melencio. As a result, the original certificate of
title was delivered to Sycip instead of to Melencio and Talinanap.
After the subdivision, the disposition of the Makar property particularly Lot no. 2 became the subject of
controversy in several civil cases, the rulings in which were ultimately brought to the court, namely :
(a) G.R. NO. 76487 entitled Heirs of Sycip v. CA, whose decision was promulgated on November 9,
1990: After discovering that the OCT had been delivered to Sycip, Melencio and Talinanap commenced in
the CFI of South Cotabato and action for the Declaration of nullity of documents and recovery of
possession of real property. As it turned out, Sycip had long abandoned the Makar property. As of the
time of the execution of the ruling, others were already occupying Lot No. 2. Among them were YUHAI
and Heirs of Non Andres. RTC rendered decision declaring absolute ownership in favor Melencio Yu and
Talinanap. When the sheriff implemented the writ of execution, the occupants refused to vacate. Thus,
the Heirs of Yu moved for the demolition of the occupants improvements. In its October 9, 2007 order
(2007 Resumption Order), the RTC granted the motion and directed the provincial sheriff to proceed
with and complete the demolition.
(b) G.R. NO. 182371 entitled Heirs of Yu vs. CA, whose Decision was promulgated on September 4,
2013: On December 14, 2007, the CA granted Heirs of Non Andres’ prayer for the TRO enjoining the
Provincial Sheriff from demolishing any improvements. Confronted by another impending delay in clearing
of the subject lot of the occupants, the Heirs of Yu moved to reconsider and reverse the grant of the writ
of preliminary injunction. After their move failed, they came to the Court to seek recourse by petition for
certiorari, which is the 2013 case. In the end, the 2007 Resumption Order was upheld.
(c) the present consolidated appeals: In the consolidated appeals, the Heirs of Non Andres aver that
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction attended the following (a) 2007
Resumption Order for being issued without the corresponding writ of demolition or writ of possession; and
(b) the sheriff’s implementation of the order for including them despite their not being parties in Civil Case
No. 1291 and Civil Case No 4647.
ISSUE:
Was the sheriff correct when he included the Heirs of Non Andres despite not being parties to the main
case.
HELD:
No. The execution of the judgment rendered could not validly include strangers to the case like the Heirs
of Non Andres. The Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply to bar the resolution of G.R.
No, 206765 and G.R. No. 207214 because the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 1291 and Civil Case
No 4647 did not bind the Heirs of Non Andres for not being parties thereto.
The petitioners raised in these consolidated appeals the core controversy concerning the proprietary of
the 2007 Resumption Order and its implementation. Indeed the ruling in the 1990 case affirming the
RTC’s pronouncement of the absolute ownership in favor of Melencio and Talinanap was not conclusive
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upon the issue raised herein of whether or not the RTC’s issuance of the 2007 resumption Order was
proper, for the determination of such issue was separable and independent from the issue of ownership.
Even granting that the issue of ownership of Lot No. 2 was previously resolved in favor of Melencio and
Talinanap, such resolution did not prejudice the rights of the Heirs of Non Andres as persons who had not
been parties in the main proceeding. Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the Execution
of Judgments for Specific Act. – (a) xxx
(c) Delivery or Restitution of Real Property. – The officer shall demand of the person against whom the
judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights
under him to peaceably vacate xxx
Evident from the foregoing is that such guidelines only extend to the judgment obligor or any person
claiming rights under him. It is truly doctrinal that the execution of any judgment for a specific act cannot
extend to persons who were never parties to the main proceeding. A court process that forcefully
imposes its effects on or against a stranger, even if issued by virtue of a final judgment, certainly offends
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
As explained in Munoz vs. Yabut, Jr.: A judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their
susccesor-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgement directing a party to deliver posssession of a
property to another is in personam; it is binding upon the parties and their susccesor-in-interest by the
title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and
recovery of ownership of real property, or reconveyance, is not a real action but it is an action in
personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
The Heirs of Non Andres were not impleaded in Civil Case No. 1291, much less personally served
summons therefore, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over any of them.
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AS AN EXCEPTION, MATTERS NOT ALLEGED IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR MAY STILL BE

SETTLED; ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF PARTIES NOT REQUIRED IN RES JUDICATA
63. Igot v. Valenzona

G.R. No. 230687, December 05, 2018
Tijam, J.
FACTS:
Elena, petitioner's mother, filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
against Agapito Valenzona (Agapito) before the MTC. The other heirs of Julian Valenzona were not
impleaded. In the said case, Elena claimed ownership of the subject property alleging that her father,
Gorgonio acquired the subject property from Julian in 1929. The said case was decided in favor of Elena
and was declared the lawful owner of the subject property. The MTC held that since the transfer of the
property to Gorgonio in 1929 was never questioned by Julian, the same is presumed to be legal. Thus,
the transfer of the tax declaration from Gorgonio's name to Julian in 1974 was illegal and invalid for
having no documentary evidence to support the same. The ruling of the MTC in Civil Case No. 418 was
affirmed by the RTC and became final when Agapito failed to file an appeal therefrom.
On the basis of such decision, respondents alleged that in 2004, Elena was able to cause the issuance of
a tax declaration over the subject property, the execution of a resurvey plan which included a house and
portions belonging to the respondents, and the demolition of Julian's ancestral house where Agapito lived.
Due to these acts, respondents brought the matter to the barangay for possible conciliation. The
proceedings before the barangay having failed, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession, Ownership, Quieting of Title, Nullity of Tax Declarations and Resurvey Plan, and for
Damages against Elena.
Petitioner and Elena contended that the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 418 already declared
Elena as the owner of the subject property and that the said decision already became final on June 20,
2001.
The MTC held that the complaint was not barred by res judicata as the respondents were not parties in
Civil Case No. 418. However, the RTC granted the appeal and reversed the MTC. RTC found that Julian
no longer had ownership of the subject property because he already sold the subject property. Aggrieved,
they elevated the case to the CA on appeal. The CA granted respondents’ appeal and reinstated the MTC
Decision. Petitioner filed Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
(1) May the issue of res judicata be settled even though not raised in the assignment of errors
(2) Is there res judicata even if there is no absolute identity of parties
(3) Is there identity of causes of action
HELD:
(1) YES, We find that the CA could have properly discussed whether res judicata applies in the present
case even though it was not explicitly raised in the respondents' assignment of errors.
The same falls under the exception, as it is a matter not specifically assigned but raised in the trial court
and is a matter of record, having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored. This is bolstered by the fact that the CA, in its recital of the factual
antecedents of this case, took note of petitioner's contention that the decision in Civil Case No. 418
already put to rest the issue of ownership over the subject property.
(2) YES. The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2)
the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should
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identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its
aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply.If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be
shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment applies
It is not disputed that the decision in Civil Case No. 418 had already attained finality. Neither is the
jurisdiction of the MTC disputed. It is also not disputed that both the present case and Civil Case No. 418
involved the same subject matter, which is the subject property. Admittedly, the respondents in the
present case were not impleaded as parties in Civil Case No. 418. However, We find that Elena was
correct in not impleading the other heirs of Julian considering that it was only Agapito who claims the
subject property adversely against Gorgonio, and as far as she was concerned, her father Gorgonio
owned the subject property and not Julian. Nevertheless, this does not preclude a finding that there is
identity of parties in the present case and in Civil Case No. 418.
Absolute identity of parties is not required but only substantial identity and there is substantial identity of
parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second
case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. A shared identity of interest is sufficient to
invoke the coverage of the principle of res judicata. In Civil Case No. 418, Agapito claimed ownership of
the subject property as an heir of Julian. In the present case, the respondents claim ownership over the
subject property by virtue of acquisitive prescription as successors-in-interest of Julian. As held by the
CA, both Agapito and the respondents have the same claim of ownership as heirs of Julian.
(3) YES, there is identity of causes of action. The test is if the same facts or evidence would sustain both
actions, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to
the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. The Court finds that there is identity of causes of action in Civil
Case No. 418 and in the present case. In Civil Case No. 418, Elena sought the recovery of ownership and
possession of the subject property from Agapito. In the present case, the respondents filed the present
action against Elena and the petitioner after the latter entered the subject property by virtue of the
decision in Civil Case No. 418 on the basis of their claim of ownership of the subject property by
acquisitive prescription. In both cases, Elena and petitioner claimed ownership through Gorgonio whom
they claimed as having acquired the subject property from Julian. On the other hand, both Agapito and
the respondents are claiming ownership of the same as heirs of Julian.
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COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS BY THE APPEALING PARTY IMPOSES ON THE TRIAL
COURT THE MINISTERIAL DUTY TO APPROVE AND GIVE DUE COURSE TO SAID PARTY’S
NOTICE OF APPEAL
64. RCBC vs. F. Franco Transport, Inc.

G.R. No. 191202. November 21, 2018.
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The respondent filed a Notice of Appeal to the RTC to recall the alias writ of possession on the ground
that the alias writ of possession was allegedly invalid. Public respondent denied the Notice of Appeal
ratiocinating that petitioner had no right to appeal inasmuch as the final order of the court which
completely disposed of the case was its 7 August 2001 Order granting private respondent's petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession, and not its 26 February 2007 Order. The lower court further
emphasized that the 26 February 2007 Order could not be the subject of any appeal since its issuance
was merely incidental to the execution of a final order.
The respondent elevated the matter to the CA by petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
to the RTC in denying due course to its notice of appeal. The CA granted the petition for certiorari, and
directed the RTC to give due course to the notice of appeal of the respondent. It opined that the
determination of whether an appeal was proper or not was outside the province of the RTC as the trial
court but pertained instead to the CA as the appellate court where the intended appeal would be taken.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC err in dismissing the Respondent’s Notice of Appeal?
HELD:
Yes. In an ordinary appeal, it requires, among others, the statement of the material dates showing the
timeliness of the appeal, and is deemed perfected, as to the party appealing, upon filing of the notice of
appeal in due time. The Rules of Court also mandates the appealing party to pay the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of the court rendering the judgment or final order
being appealed from. The compliance with the requirements by the appealing party imposes on the trial
court (i.e., the RTC in this case) the ministerial duty to approve and give due course to said party's notice
of appeal.
Although the power to dismiss an appeal exists in both the trial and the appellate courts, the only
difference being in the time and the reason for the exercise of the power. Section 13, 14 Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court empowers the RTC to dismiss appeals by notice of appeal, but such dismissal is based
on only two grounds, namely:
a. the appeal is taken out of time; or

b. (b) the non-payment of the docket and other fees within the reglementary period.
The competence of the RTC as the court of origin to dismiss the appeal is limited to said instances. RTC
has no power to disallow an appeal on any other ground; hence, the RTC could not anchor its
disallowance of the notice of appeal on any of the grounds stated in Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, the
determination of such grounds being addressed solely to the sound discretion of the CA as the appellate
court. The determination of whether or not a case is appealable pertains to the appellate court.
Thus, the dismissal of the appeal by the RTC on the ground that the judgment or order appealed from
was not appealable was done in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, for
it could only be made by the CA as the appellate court. Such ground has been expressly provided for in
Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
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A DECISION WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY MUST BE ASSAILED IN A PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGEMENT AND NOT IN AN APPEAL ON A SEPARATE CASE WHICH
RELIED ON SAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION
65. Tortal vs. Taniguchi

G.R. No. 212683, November 12, 2018
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
On June 8, 1999 Tortal married Taniguchi, they lived in a house and lot in BF Homes, Parañaque City
(subject property). On April 11, 2000, Taniguchi filed a petition for nullity of her marriage with Tortal which
the trial court granted on August 25, 2003. In the same petition for nullity the subject property was
declared to be the exclusive property of Taniguchi. Tortal did not move for reconsideration of the decision
hence, it became final and executory on October 14, 2005. During the pendency of the nullity case, a
complaint for collection of sum of money was filed by Sales against Tortal. Eventually Sales and Tortal
entered into a compromise agreement, which was approved by the RTC of Taguig. The subject property
was levied upon in accordance with the compromise judgement. On May 2005, Taniguchi filed a
Complaint for Reivindication of Title, Annulment of Levy and Sale in Execution among others against
Tortal and Sales. She prayed that the levy over her house and lot be declared null and void and an
injuction be issued against the RD of Parañaque City.
On October 28, 2011 the RTC granted Taniguchi’s application for injunction and enjoined the RD from
cancelling the title of the subject property and issuing one is Sales’ favor. Tortal and Sales appealed the
RTC decision to the CA but the CA dismissed their appeal and upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA
rejected the allegation of Tortal of the supposed defect of the RTC decision nullifying his marriage with
Taniguchi, the decision having been final and executory. The CA likewise rejected Tortal’s assertion that
Taniguchi had no right to acquire property because she was not a Filipino Citizen. CA emphasized that
Tortal failed to bring up Taniguchi’s citizenship during pre-trial and only did so for the first time on appeal.
According to the CA Tortal should have assailed the RTC Aug. 25, 2003 Decision nullifying his marriage
with a petition for annulment of judgement, not in the present case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Tortal may assail the final and executory judgment nullifying his marriage with
Taniguchi in his appeal on the CA Decision which granted Taniguchi’s petitioner for annulment of levy and
sale in execution.
HELD:
NO. Without a ruling from the Court of Appeals nullifying the Regional Trial Court August 25, 2003
Decision, which granted the nullity of petitioner and respondent's marriage and declared respondent as
the exclusive owner of the house and lot, this Decision remains valid and subsisting. Moreover, it became
final and executory as early as October 14, 2005
The proper remedy which Tortal should have availed of is a petition for annulment if judgement under
Rule 47 if it is indeed true that summons was improperly served to him during the nullity of marriage case.
A petition for the annulment of judgment of Regional Trial Courts may be given due course if it is
sufficiently proven that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." Furthermore, Rule 47, Section 2 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides only two (2) grounds for an action for annulment or judgment: extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud cannot be considered a valid ground in an
action under Rule 47 "if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief."
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REMEDIES OF APPEAL AND CERTIORARI ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
66. James S. Pfleider v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 196058, November 12, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner James Pfleider and private respondent Pfleider-Alba are siblings and among the compulsory
heirs of Fred G. Pfleider and Luisa Sanz-Pfleider. Petitioner, as compulsory heir and pursuant to an
approved Project of Partition, inherited parcels of land from Fred. Those parcels of land were used as
collaterals in the Real Estate Mortgage ("REM") in favor of the Philippine National Bank, executed by Fred
during his lifetime
Petitioner averred that respondent volunteered to represent all of Fred's compulsory heirs before the PNB
upon agreement that all siblings must prepare their share on the amortization payments. Petitioner
alleged that at the back of the official receipt issued by PNB, respondent affixed a handwritten
computation of each of the sibling's share on the amortization payment. Respondent then assured
petitioner and their mother that she will take care of the transaction with the PNB. Thereafter, their mother
learned of PNB's foreclosure of her husband's mortgaged properties. During the interim period, petitioner
heard of respondent’s supposition that all her siblings already relinquished their properties to respondent
himself. Respondent allegedly called up petitioner and informed him that she would redeem the
foreclosed properties. Relevant thereto, respondent informed petitioner that he should accomplish a Deed
of Quitclaim over all the foreclosed properties since PNB required its execution. Petitioner, after much
hesitation but upon receipt respondent’s letter reassuring him that he would not be prejudiced by the
quitclaim, signed it. Petitioner was shocked when he learned that TCT No. T-2070016 consolidating the
entire lot was registered in the name of respondent. Hence, the filing of the complaint in the RTC of
Kabankalan.
Respondent raised the defense of litis pendentia. She contended that there is another case pending
between them involving the same issues, the same properties and even the same pieces of documentary
evidence in RTC Bacolod. However, RTC of Kabankalan ruled in favor of the petitioner. Respondent filed
a manifestation and motion for consideration, which was granted.
This time, it was now the petitioner who filed a motion for consideration, which was likewise denied.
Hence, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the CA, under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, assailing
RTC Kabankalan’s order. The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal outright. due to the availment of the
wrong remedy. The CA found that petitioner’s appeal raised pure questions of law, involving the
application of the concept of litis pendentia in the instant case due to the pendency of Civil Case. Hence,
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal under Rule 41
taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, the CA dismissed the
instant appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Decision and Resolution
dismissing Pfleider's appeal outright.
HELD:
No. The CA is correct. Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of
appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
a. If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper
recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the
Rules of Court; and
b. If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary, under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to
the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, as issues purely of law are not reviewable by the
said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate
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judgment of an RTC shall be dismissed. The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory
language, in establishing the rule that an appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to the
CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed outright.
The appeal of the petitioner, as correctly held by the CA, essentially raised issues purely of law. Time and
again, the Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law from those of pure questions of
fact in the following manner — a question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a re- evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence
or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is
factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the
issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.:
Evident from the foregoing is that the petitioner is primarily appealing before the CA the propriety of RTC,
Kabankalan City's dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. A dismissal based on this
ground does not involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application of the law and the
applicable jurisprudence on litis pendentia.
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THIS COURT GENERALLY GIVES WEIGHT TO THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURTS; IN CRIMINAL CASES, HOWEVER, THE ACCUSED HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS PROVEN, AND THE COURTS MUST
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN RELATION TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED
67. Lapi vs. People

G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
which upheld the Regional Trial Court founding Simeon M. Lapi (Lapi) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
having violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentenced him to six (6) months of
rehabilitation at a government-approved facility.

According to the prosecution, at around 1:50 p.m. on April 17, 2006, operatives of the Bacolod City Anti-
Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2,
Bacolod City, where the accued, together with the others were arrested for engaging in a pot session.
Lapi tested positive for shabu upon undergoing two drug tests but countered that on his way home, two
persons approached him and searched his pocket. They took his money, handcuffed him, and boarded
him on a tricycle with four (4) other persons whom he did not know. Lapi stated that upon reaching the
Taculing Police Headquarters, he and the others were subjected to a drug test. They were then escorted
to their detention cell without being informed of the test results. Rolando Cordova, a barbecue vendor in
the area, corroborated Lapi's testimony.

Petitioner argues that while he raises factual questions, his case falls under the exceptions under the
Rules of Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals' factual findings are totally bereft of support in the
records and so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion, and asserts that while
he failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering his plea, his warrantless arrest was illegal
from the start and any evidence obtained cannot be used against him. He argues that P02 Villeran
committed "a malevolent intrusion of privacy" when he peeped through the window because had he not
done so, he would not see what the people in the house did. He contends that this intrusion into his
privacy "cannot be equated in plain view; therefore, petitioner cannot be considered caught inflagrante
delicto." He submits that to "rule otherwise would be like giving authority to every police officer to intrude
into the private homes of anyone in order to catch suspended drug offenders."

Respondent, on the other hand, counters that petitioner prays for a review of the facts and evidence,
which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari, asserting that the warrantless arrest
was valid, as "the act of having a pot session is clearly the overt act required under the law, which
indicates that petitioner is actually committing an offense." Respondent also argues that what prompted
P02 Villeran to enter the house was not the noise from one (1) of the houses, but what he saw petitioner
and his companions were doing in the house where they were apprehended. Further, respondent claims
that since petitioner was not the owner of that house, he had no "reasonable expectation of privacy that
must be upheld," submitting that "a houseguest who was merely present in the house with the consent of
the householder cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in his host's home."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition should be denied for raising questions of fact.

RULING:
Yes, the Petition must be denied, not on the fact that it raises questions of fact, but for Petitioner’s failure
to question the validity of his warrantless arrest before entering his plea during the arraignment.

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This Court is not a trier of facts. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law, wherein the parties may only raise issues that can be
determined without having to review or re-evaluate the evidence on record.
This Court generally gives weight to the factual findings of the lower courts because of the opportunity
enjoyed by the lower courts to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their
testimony. In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven, and the courts must evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the
elements of the crime charged – making the finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact and for which
reason, the entire records of a criminal case are thrown open for this Court's review.

It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and
that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from, whether they are assigned as errors or not.

This Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual findings of the lower courts, or even arriving at a
different conclusion, "if it is not convinced that the findings are conformable to the evidence of record and
to its own impressions of the credibility of the witnesses." The lower courts' factual findings will not bind
this Court if facts that could affect the result of the case "were overlooked and disregarded."

An examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals shows no error that
requires this Court's review. On this ground, the Petition can be outright dismissed.

The Court went on to rule that even if no less than the Constitution protects a citizen’s right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and in connection with these rights, also discussed the elements of
a valid warrantless arrest under the Revised Penal Code, it was, however, the Petitioner himself who
admitted that he failed to question the validity of such warrantless arrest before entering his plea during
the arraignment – which act gave the court jurisdiction over his person. Because of such failure, Petitioner
is deemed to have waived his right to question such defective warrantless arrest on appeal before this
Court.
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A DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH IS NOT APPEALABLE, BUT MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IF THE DENIAL IS TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
68. Cagang v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, 210141-42, July 31, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
The consolidated petitions question the Sandiganbayan’s denial to quash the Informations and Order of
Arrest against Cesar Matas Cagang despite the Office of Ombudsman’s alleged inordinate delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation.
In an anonymous complaint, it was alleged that several officers and personalities of the Vice Governor’s
Office, Sarangani Province committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds given as grants or aid
using barangay officials and cooperatives as “dummies”. This complaint was referred to the Commission
on Audit (COA) for Investigation. Relevant thereto, a fact-finding investigation on a news report from Sun
Star Davao entitled “P61M from Sarangani coffers unaccounted” was also made. The COA’s audit report
found that official and employees of the Provincial Government of Sarangani appear to have embezzled
millions in public funds from grants, aid, and the Countrywide Development Fund of Representative Erwin
Chiongbian using dummy cooperatives and people’s organizations. The Office of the Ombudsman
concurred with the findings of the COA and recommended that a criminal case for Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 be filed.
The list of persons that could be held liable on the irregularities involved 180 accused. Petitioner holds the
position of Provincial Treasurer.
The criminal complaint against petitioner was filed on February 10, 2003. On August 11, 2004, the Office
of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner. This Resolution,
however, was modified by the Resolution dated October 18, 2004, which ordered the conduct of further
fact-finding investigation against some of the other respondents in the case. This further fact-finding was
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 2005. On August 8, 2011, or six years after the
recommendation to file informations against petitioner was approved by Tanodbayan Simeon Marcelo,
Assistant Special Prosecutor II Pilarita Lapitan submitted the informations for Ombudsman Carpio
Morales' review. Informations against petitioner were filed on November 17, 2011.
Petitioner argues that there was an inordinate delay of 7 years in the filing of information and that the
delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases. The Office of the
Ombudsman, on the other hand, said that there was no showing that the delay in the filing was
intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the pendency of the proceedings before the Supreme Court suspends the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan?
2. W/N the denial of the Motion to Quash may be the subject of a petition for certiorari?
3. Is there an inordinate delay, considering that the complaint was filed in 2003 but the informations
were filed only in 2011, that would justify the quashal of the Informations and Order of Arrest against
petitioner?
RULING:
1. No. The pendency of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court will not prevent the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
2. Yes. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not appealable as it is merely interlocutory.
Likewise, it cannot be subject of a petition for certiorari. The denial of a motion to quash can still be raised
in the appeal of a judgment of conviction. The adequate, plain, and speedy remedy is to proceed to trial
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and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. A party may, however, question the denial in a
petition for certiorari if the party can establish that the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied his Motion
to Quash/Dismiss, insisting that the denial transgressed upon his constitutional rights to due process and
to speedy disposition of cases.
3. There was no inordinate delay for there is a waiver on the part of petitioner. To grant the present
Petitions and to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the
due process rights of the State. Despite the pendency of the case since 2003, petitioner only invoked his
right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations were filed on November 17, 2011. Petitioner
was aware that the preliminary investigation was not yet terminated. Admittedly, while there was delay,
petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead to wait until the
information was filed against him with the Sandiganbayan.
The Supreme Court clarified the mode of analysis in situations where the right to speedy disposition of
cases or the right to speedy trial is invoked.
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale
for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against
courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is importantnt is that the accused may already be prejudiced by
the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary
investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for
preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond
this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to
the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been
inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the
given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods
that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the
right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the
prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. If the defense has the burden of proof, it must
prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by
utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay. Once the burden of
proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure
in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity
of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was
suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context
of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised. An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely
motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued
prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the
prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially
proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay. Another
exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to
speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no
longer be invoked. In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be
properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
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Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The
respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The period for the determination of whether inordinate delay was committed shall commence from the
filing of a formal complaint and the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The periods for the resolution
of the preliminary investigation shall be that provided in the Rules of Court, Supreme Court Circulars, and
the periods to be established by the Office of the Ombudsman. Failure of the defendant to file the
appropriate motion after the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods shall be considered a waiver of
his or her right to speedy disposition of cases.
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RIGHT TO APPEAL IS A STATUTORY RIGHT
69. Leonora Rivera-Avante v. Milagros Rivera, et al.

G.R. No. 244137, April 3, 2019
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a house and lot. Respondent is petitioner’s sister-in-law. Petitioner
claims that she and her husband allowed respondents to stay in the disputed premises out of compassion
for respondent and in consideration of respondent’s husband. However, in 2005, petitioner and her
husband, finding the need to utilize the subject property and in view of their plan to distribute the same to
their children, demanded that respondents vacate the premises in question. Respondents refused the
demand of petitioner, and even filed a case questioning petitioner’s ownership of the said property
contending that they are, in fact, co-owners of the subject property and that petitioner obtained title one
the disputed lot through fraud, deceit and falsification. Petitioner sent a formal demand letter to
respondents asking them to vacate the disputed premises, but this remained unheeded. Hence, petitioner
filed an unlawful detainer case with the MeTC of Manila.
The MeTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents then filed an appeal with the RTC.
RTC granted the appeal. The RTC, nonetheless, held that MeTC correctly held that petitioner has the
right to possess the disputed lot on the basis of the MeTC’s provisional finding of ownership in her favor.
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Then, Petitioner
filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision and dismissed petitioner’s petition for review. Hence, the present case.
ISSUE:
Was petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the questioned CA Decision belatedly filed?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the questioned CA Decision was belatedly filed.
Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that
right must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the manner and within the
period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same
renders the judgment final and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution should be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. If no
appeal or motion for reconsideration is filed within this period, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgment as provided under Section 10, Rule 51
of the same Rules.
Here, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration on July 1, 2015. Under the rules, petitioner was given
15-days from such receipt, or until June 30, 2015, to file her motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was
belatedly filed.
Hence, since petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was belatedly filed, the Decision of the CA became
final and executory by operation of law.
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A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE THE SC IS THE PROPER REMEDY TO
APPEAL A DECISION OF THE BIR BASED ON PURE QUESTION OF LAW
70. Association of Nonprofit Clubs, Inc. (ANPC) v. BIR

G.R. No. 228539, June 26, 2019
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued RMC No. 35-2012, subjecting the income of
recreational clubs from whatever source, including but not limited to membership fees, assessment dues,
rental income, and service fees subject to income tax, and its gross receipts subject to VAT.
Thereafter, ANPC invited the Chief of Staff, Operations Group of the BIR, to discuss the effects of the
said Circular. During the meeting, the attendees were encouraged to submit a position paper to the BIR to
express their concerns. ANPC submitted a position paper requesting the non-application of RMC No. 35-
2012 for income tax and VAT liability on its membership, association and other fees. However, despite
the lapse of 2 years, the BIR did not act on the request. ANPC was subject to both income and VAT.
ANPC then filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, to declare RMC 35-2012 invalid. The
OSG sought its dismissal on the ground that ANPC failed to exhaust all its administrative remedies; that it
did not file an appeal with the Secretary of Finance pursuant to Section 4, Title I of the 1997 NIRC.
The RTC found that there was no violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, since
judicial intervention was urgent in light of the impending imposition of taxes on the membership fees and
assessment dues paid by the members of the exclusive clubs. However, the RTC still upheld the validity
of RMC 35-2012 RTC due to the apparent intent of Congress to subject recreational clubs to taxes. ANPC
then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, raising pure questions of law, directly to the Supreme
Court. Respondent sought to dismiss the same on the ground of violation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for violating the :
a. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
b. Doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
HELD:
a. No. There was no violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts because the present petition for review
on certiorari, filed pursuant to Section 2 (c), Rule 41 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is the sole
remedy to appeal a decision of the RTC in cases involving pure questions of law.
Clearly, the correctness of the BIR' s interpretation of the 1997 NIRC under the assailed RMC is a pure
question of law, because the same does not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Thus, being the only remedy to appeal the RTC's
ruling upholding the Circular's validity on a purely legal question, direct resort to this Court, through a Rule
45 petition, was correctly availed by ANPC.
b. No. As dictated by the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the validity of RMC No. 35-2012
should have been first subjected to the review of the Secretary of Finance before ANPC sought judicial
recourse with the RTC.
However, as exceptions to this rule, when the issue involved is purely - as in this case where a legal
question, or when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention membership
fees, assessment dues, and the like of all recreational clubs would be imminently subjected to income tax
and VAT - then the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed.
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A PARTY'S APPEAL BY NOTICE OF APPEAL IS DEEMED PERFECTED AS TO HIM UPON THE

FILING OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IN DUE TIME.
71. Bernardo vs Soriano

G.R. No., 200104 June 19, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
On 31 August 2010, the [RTC issued an Order denying] [Bernardo's] Motion for Reconsideration. [On the

very same day, Soriano timely filed through registered mail her Comment (With Motion for Partial
Reconsideration) dated August 27, 2010. In sum, Soriano asserted that the custody of Stephanie should
be granted in her favor immediately and not only after school year 2009-2010.]
[The RTC's denial of Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration on August 31, 2010] prompted [Bernardo] to
file a Notice of Appeal on 08 September 2010. However, the [RTC], through the first assailed Order dated
09 September 2010 ruling therein that the assailed 05 August 2010 Decision and the 31 August 2010
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration have not yet attained finality, and thus, may not be the
subject of an appeal. [Hence, the Notice of Appeal of Bernardo was denied due course.] The [RTC]
ratiocinated that [Soriano], who received a copy of the 05 August 2010 Decision on 13 August 2010,
timely filed her Comment (with Motion for Partial Reconsideration) [dated] 27 August 2010. The
dispositive portion of the said Order states:
CA held that The RTC's Decision cannot yet be considered a judgment that may be appealed due to the
filing of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition, holding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when the latter denied Bernardo's Notice of Appeal due course due to the
pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
HELD:
Deny the petition.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable
Being an appealable judgment on the merits, Bernardo had the right to appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court the RTC's Decision by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC's Order
dated August 31, 2010 denying Bernardo's timely-filed Motion for Reconsideration. This was exactly what
Bernardo did. She timely filed a Notice of Appeal, containing all the required contents of a notice of
appeal under Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and paid the corresponding appeal fees on
September 8, 2010.
Therefore, the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010, notwithstanding the fact that it is a judgment on the
merits, was to be treated as a mere interlocutory order not subject to appeal owing to the pendency of
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence, despite already having her own Motion for
Reconsideration denied by the RTC, Bernardo's right to appeal was made contingent and dependent on
Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The RTC and CA's positions are erroneous.
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EXTRINSIC FRAUD SHALL NOT BE A VALID GROUND IF IT WAS AVAILED OF, OR COULD HAVE
BEEN AVAILED OF, IN A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR PETITION FOR RELIEF. HOWEVER, THE
SAME CANNOT BE SAID FOR THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.
72. Heirs of Cullado vs. Gutierrez

G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
In May 1995, an Original Certificate of Title over a parcel of land measuring 18, 280 sqm. in Isabela was
issued in favor of respondent Gutierrez. Respondent, represented by his father, filed before the RTC an
action for recovery of ownership and possession against Alfredo Cullado, the father of herein petitioners.
Respondent’s counsel repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled hearings, so the petitioners were
eventually allowed to present their evidence after the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to
cross-examine the petitioner’s witnesses. Subsequently, in May 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in
favor of herein petitioners.
In March 2011, Respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that his counsel’s
negligence in handling the case prevented him from participating therein and from filing his appeal.
However, the same was denied by the RTC for having been filed out of time. Thus, respondent filed with
the CA a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
CA granted the petition ruling that the defense raised by the petitioners for the reconveyance of the
property, that the lot was fraudulently titled in respondent’s name, constitutes a collateral attack against
respondent’s title which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana as this would require a review of the
registration decree. Hence, the trial court had no jurisdiction to resolve the twin issues of reconveyance
and fraudulence raised by petitioners. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Is the availment by the respondent of the exceptional remedy of annulment of judgment proper?
HELD:
Yes, the respondent properly availed of the exceptional remedy of annulment of judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of annulment by the CA of judgments
of the RTC can only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available, without the fault of petitioner. Thus, a petition for
annulment of judgment is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without
fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law; and
such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the
ordinary remedies. As to the grounds, Section 2 of Rule 47 provides that the annulment may be based
only on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of,
or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. The applicable period for filing
the petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud is within 4 years from discovery, and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
Considering that respondent had already availed himself of the remedy of a petition for relief from
judgment raising the issue of extrinsic fraud, he is effectively barred from raising the same issue via his
petition for annulment of judgment. However, the same cannot be said for the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Since respondent immediately resorted to a petition for relied and a petition for annulment of
judgment upon learning of the unfavorable decision in the accion publiciana case, he cannot be deemed
guilty of laches not placed in estoppel. The trial court was bereft of jurisdiction to rule with finality on the
issue of ownership and consequently, was without power to order the reconveyance of the subject land to
the petitioners given the fact that the original complaint was only an accion publiciana.
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JUDGMENT IN A REPLEVIN CASE BAR A SUBSEQUENT ACTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
73. Central Visayas Finance Corporation v. Spouses Eliezer and Leila Adlawan
G.R. No. 212674, March 25, 2019
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan obtained a Php3,669,685.00 loan from petitioner Central Visayas
Finance Corporation covered by a Chattel Mortgage over a Komatsu Highway Dump Truck. An action for
replevin was filed by petitioner Central Visayas when respondents Sps. Adlawan failed to pay the loan.
RTC ruled in petitioner's favor, and respondents were ordered to deliver possession of the dump truck to
petitioner. Petitioner then foreclosed on the chattel mortgage and caused the sale at public auction of the
dump truck, which was then sold to it as the highest bidder for Php500,000.00. Petitioner Central Visayas
commenced a second case before the RTC, this time for collection of sum of money and/or deficiency
judgment relative to respondents' supposed unpaid balance on their loan, which petitioner claimed to be
at Php2,104,604.97 - less the value of dump truck - with damages. RTC dismissed the complaint
complaint having been barred by res judicata. CA affirmed RTC’s dismissal.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA, petitioner averred that there is no
identity of cause of action as the first was one for the recovery of personal property used as collateral in
the loan, while the latter case was one for deficiency judgment and based on the continuing guaranty
executed by respondents Sps. Adlawan.
ISSUE:
Whether a judgment in a replevin case would bar a subsequent action for deficiency judgment?
HELD:
Yes, judgment in a replevin case bars a subsequent action for deficiency judgment.
In Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal the Court held:
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor which consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to
the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above
stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and
thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint
will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously
or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be
authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so
much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
By praying for recovery of possession with a money judgment as a mere alternative relief, and when it did
not pursue a claim for deficiency at any time during the proceedings in said case, including appeal,
petitioner led the courts to believe that it was not interested in suing for a deficiency so long as it
recovered possession of the dump truck; after all, the basis of its alternative relief for collection of the
outstanding loan is the same as that of its prayer for replevin - the respondents' unpaid obligation in the
amount of Php2,604,604.97, plus interest and penalty. Its actions were thus consistent with and limited to
the allegations and relief sought in its pleadings. This consistency in action carried on until the dump truck
was foreclosed and sold at auction.
Hence, judgment in a replevin case bars a subsequent action for deficiency judgment.
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MANDAMUS IS A COMMAND TO EXERCISE A POWER ALREADY POSSESSED AND TO PERFORM

A DUTY ALREADY IMPOSED
74. Department of Education vs. Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit, Inc.
G.R. No.202097, July 03, 2019
Lazaro-Javier, J.
FACTS:
The Department of Education devised and implemented a payroll deduction scheme for the loans they
secured with its duly accredited private lenders. Respondent Rizal Teachers Kilusang Bayan for Credit,
Inc. (RTKBCI) was among them. RTKBCI was assigned Deduction Codes 209 and 219, and DepEd was
paid 2% of the total monthly deductions as administrative fees. By a Memorandum, DepEd
Undersecretary, Ernesto Pangan directed Dr. Blanquita Bautista, Chief Accountant to hold the remittance
of the collection scheme for RTKBCI pending resolution of the teacher’s numerous complaints against the
latter’s alleged unauthorized excessive deductions and connivance with some of DepEd’s personnel.
RTKBCI wrote Undersecretary Pangan to demand the release of the collections but it was denied.
According to Undersecretary Pangan, the suspension of the salary deduction scheme was necessary to
protect the concerned public school teachers.
Respondent RTKBCI filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Mandamus to compel
DepEd to remit to them the loan collections and to continue with the salary deduction scheme until the
loans of the public school teachers should have been fully paid. The trial court granted the writ of
Mandamus and ordered DepEd to release to RTKBCI the collections amounting to P111,989,006.98.
On DepEd’s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but deleted the award of actual damages.
It sustained the alleged clear legal right of RTKBCI to receive the payments. Further, it stated that the
payroll deduction scheme started as a privilege but later on became a property right of RTKBCI after
DepEd authorized it to avail of the scheme and actually collected the payments for its account. Hence,
this petition for review.
ISSUE:
May DepEd, by a writ of Mandamus be compelled to continue to collect and remit on RTKBCI’s behalf
loan payments from public school teachers?
HELD:
No. DepEd cannot be compelled to continue to collect and remit loan payments. In order for the Writ of
Mandamus to be issued, the applicant must prove by preponderance of evidence that there is a clear
legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the
party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act. Mandamus is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. Further,
Mandamus can only be issued when it is in accordance to the performance of a ministerial duty. The duty
is ministerial when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment. A writ of Mandamus will not compel a public official to do anything which is not his or her duty
or otherwise give the applicant anything to which he or she is not entitled to under the law. RTKBCI has
failed to prove that a writ of Mandamus is the appropriate legal remedy to compel DepEd as a matter of
legal obligation to collect and remit on its behalf. DepEd has no legal duty to act as a collecting and
remitting agent. Further, DepEd is not precluded from suspending its activities under the payroll deduction
scheme since it only expressly describes the services it offers as a privilege. As such, DepEd may act as
a collecting and remitting agent but doing so must always be in consonance with DepEd’s powers, duties
and functions. RTKBCI has no clear legal right to demand that DepEd act as its collecting and remitting
agent. This is not one of DepEd’s powers, duties or functions, but a mere accommodation that the agency
does for the protection and promotion of the teacher’s welfare. RTKBCI, in failing to prove that it
possesses the legal right, the writ of Mandamus cannot be issued in its favor.
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75. Zabal vs. Duterte

G.R. No. 238467. February 12, 2019
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, were earning a living from the tourist activities therein. Zabal claims to build sandcastles for
tourists while Jacosalem drives for tourists and workers in the island. While not a resident, Bandiola, for
his part, claims to occasionally visit Boracay for business and pleasure. The three base their locus standi
on direct injury and also from the transcendental importance doctrine.4 Respondents, on the other hand,
are being sued in their capacity as officials of the government.
Claiming that Boracay has become a cesspool, President Duterte first made public his plan to shut it
down during a business forum held in Davao sometime February 2018. This was followed by several
speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a state of calamity. True to his
words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a cabinet meeting and that the total
closure of Boracay would be for a maximum period of six months starting April 26, 2018.
On April 26, 2018, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 47512 formally declaring a state of calamity
in Boracay and ordering its closure for six months from April 26, 2018 to October 25, 2018.
Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had been
engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough to feed their
families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and irreparable damage.
Petitioners state that a petition for prohibition is the appropriate remedy to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. An action for
mandamus, on the other hand, lies against a respondent who unlawfully excludes another from the
enjoyment of an entitled right or office. Justifying their resort to prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether a petition for prohibition and mandamus is the appropriate remedy in this case?
HELD:
YES. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides for a petition for prohibition as follows:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. xx xx
"Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered directing the defendant
to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper
function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the performance of an act which is about to be done. It is not
intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. "
Mandamus, on the other hand, is provided for by Section 3 of the same Rule 65:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. -When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
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enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other
time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respond xx xx
"As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station."
It is upon the above-discussed contexts of prohibition and mandamus that respondents base their
contention of improper recourse. Respondents maintain that prohibition is not proper in this case because
the closure of Boracay is already a fait accompli. Neither is mandamus appropriate since there is no
neglect of duty on their part as they were precisely performing their duty to protect the environment when
the closure was ordered.
Suffice it to state, however, that the use of prohibition and mandamus is not merely confined to Rule 65.
These extraordinary remedies may be invoked when constitutional violations or issues are raised. As the
Court stated in Spouses Jmbong v. Hon. Ochoa, Jr. :
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as
there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It must be stressed, though, that resort to prohibition and mandamus on the basis of alleged constitutional
violations is not without limitations. After all, this Court does not have unrestrained authority to rule on just
about any and every claim of constitutional violation. The petition must be subjected to the four exacting
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, viz.: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; ( c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.27
Hence, it is not enough that this petition mounts a constitutional challenge against Proclamation No. 4 7
5. It is likewise necessary that it meets the aforementioned requisites before the Court sustains the
propriety of the recourse.
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4C 2019-2020
THE AWARD OF LEGAL INTEREST IN CASES WHERE THE GOVERNMENT ACQUIRES PRIVATE
PROPERTY THROUGH VOLUNTARY SALE IS NOT A MATTER OF LAW.
76. Republic Of The Philippines vs. Jose Gamir-Consuelo Diaz Heirs Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 218732; November 12, 2018
Reyes, Jr. J.,
FACTS:
Respondent is a corporation composed of the heirs of Jose Gamir and Consuelo Diaz. It was the
registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,836 sqm. On August 9, 2005, respondent and RP,
through the DPWH, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where it was agreed that respondent would sell
said property to RP in consideration of P275,099.24. The parcel of land forms part of Sta. Ana A venue, a
national road.
On November 15, 2006, respondent filed a Complaint before the RTC alleging that: parcel of land was
taken by the DPWH sometime in 1957; the value of P275,099.24 as just compensation stated in
the Deed of Absolute Sale, was based on the value of the property in 1957; it made verbal and written
demands to petitioner for the payment of interest from 1957; and it had a right to receive interest because
the DPWH had not paid just compensation when it occupied the property in 1957.
RTC dismissed the complaint, and was reversed by the CA. CA expounded that without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just if the property is taken immediately because the property owner
suffers the immediate deprivation of both the land and the fruits and income thereto. Legal interest
accrued from the time of the actual taking of the property until actual payment to place the landowner in a
position as good as the position he was before the taking occurred (Apo Fruits doctrine). CA ordered
payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from 1957 until full payment is made.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent is entitled to receive payment of interest notwithstanding the absence of any
stipulation in the deed of absolute sale with petitioner
HELD:
Essentially, expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically an unwilling seller.
Nevertheless, there is nothing that precludes the government from entering into a negotiated sale
with a private landowner to acquire a property to be devoted for a public purpose. In fact,
expropriation proceedings or court intervention would be unnecessary should a deed of sale be
executed where the parties come to an agreement as to the price of the property to be sold. Here,
the parties are bound by their sale contract transferring the property without the condition applicable in
expropriation cases. Interest payment should be viewed in a different light when there is a voluntary
sale between the landowner and the government. Expropriation and voluntary sale have different
legal effects, especially considering that in the latter, the parties could freely negotiate the terms
and conditions of the contract, i.e., they could include a stipulation concerning the payment of
interest. In addition, in entering into a voluntary purchase or sale, the state does not exercise its
power of eminent domain. The award of legal interest in cases where the government acquires
private property through voluntary sale is not a matter of law. Unlike in cases where the state
exercises its power of eminent domain or a party initiates expropriation proceedings and other
similar actions, in negotiated sale, there is an existing contract that governs the relations of the
parties and determines their respective rights and obligations. In turn, these contractual
stipulations should be complied with in good faith, unless they are contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policies. the laws relating to contracts should govern in case of
controversy in their application. Respondent freely agreed to enter into the covenant knowing fully well
that petitioner was not bound by its terms to pay interest. If it feels shortchanged, the Court cannot offer
any reprieve. After all, courts have no alternative but to enforce contractual stipulations in the manner
agreed upon by the parties, and they do not have the power to modify contracts or save parties from
disadvantageous provisions.
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VIOLATION OF THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CONTRACTS IS SUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE

THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE
77. Planters Development Bank v. Lubiya Agro Industrial Corp.

G.R. No. 207976, November 14, 2018
A. Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Planters Development Bank (Planters Bank) granted two (2) loans to respondent Lubiya Agro Industrial
Corporation (Lubiya). The said loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two (2) parcels of land
with improvements thereon located in General Santos City. When Lubiya defaulted, Planters Bank sent a
letter to it demanding payment and informing the latter that failure to heed such demand shall prompt
Planters Bank to institute a legal action against it. Consequently, due to Libuya's failure to settle its
obligation, Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the properties offered as security by Lubiya. A public
auction was held wherein Planters Bank emerged as the sole and highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale
was thereafter issued in its favor and recorded with the Registry of Deeds as consolidated and titles
thereto were correspondingly issued in the name of Planters Bank.
Lubiya filed a complaint for nullification of the loan agreement, foreclosure proceedings, damages, and
attorney's fees, with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and injunction against
Planters Bank. The said complaint was anchored on Planters Bank's alleged failure to furnish Lubiya with
notices regarding the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties despite being obligated in their
mortgage contract to do so. In its Answer, Planters Bank admitted that the loan agreements are contracts
of adhesion and Lubiya was indeed not notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. In view of the
foregoing admissions, Lubiya moved for a summary judgment alleging that no genuine issues exist as to
the material facts of the case. The RTC granted the motion and rendered judgment adversed to Lubiya as
the RTC dismissed its complaint against Planters Bank. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC and nullified the foreclosure sale. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Did the lack of personal notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgagor render the
same null and void?
HELD:
Yes, the foreclosure sale was null and void. As a general rule, personal notice to the mortgagor in
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages only requires the 1) posting of the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure
sale in three public places; and 2) publication of the said notice in a newspaper of general circulation. The
exception to the rule is when the parties stipulate that personal notice is additionally required to be given
the mortgagor. Failure to abide by the general rule, or its exception, renders the foreclosure proceedings
null and void. The provisions of Act No. 3135 notwithstanding, under paragraph 12 of the real estate
mortgage contracts signed by the parties, Planters Bank obligated itself to notify Lubiya of any judicial
or extrajudicial action it may resort to with respect to the mortgages. Hence, Planters Bank’s contention
that the demand letter that it sent to Lubiya satisfies the bank's additional obligation to provide personal
notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor was not correct.
Thus, when Planters Bank failed to send the notice of foreclosure sale to Lubiya, it committed a
contractual breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on null and void.
Page 114 of 135

4C 2019-2020
THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CAN BE PROVISIONALLY RESOLVED IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA
78. Jun Miranda Vs. Sps. Ernesto

G.R. No. 218343. November 28, 2018
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to a writ of execution, a Notice of Levy, dated April 2, 2003, was issued covering the parcel of
land, located at San Antonio, Nueva Ecija (subject property) in the names of therein judgment debtors,
Spouses Reyes. A public auction was held whereby the subject property was sold to the Spouses Mallari
as highest bidder. On March 3, 2004, the Spouses Mallari filed the suit for recovery of possession against
Jun Miranda (Miranda). Thereunder, they alleged that, sometime after causing the Certificate of Sale in
their favor to be annotated in TCT No. NT-266485, they conducted an inspection of the subject property.
At which time, they discovered that the same was in the possession of Miranda who claimed to be the
owner thereof, having bought the property from the Spouses Reyes sometime in 1996. Claiming to be
entitled to the ownership and possession of the property, they prayed that Miranda be ordered to vacate
and to surrender the possession thereof to them.
In his Answer, Miranda denied all the material allegations in the Spouses Mallari's complaint. He averred
that he is already, and continues to be, the owner of the subject property as he bought the same from the
Spouses Reyes way back March 20, 1996 despite that he failed to cause the registration of the sale as he
lost the owner's copy of TCT No. NT-266485. Asserting that the Spouses Reyes no longer have rights or
interests over the subject property at the time of the levy, he maintained that the Spouses Mallari acquired
no right over the same. Further, he insisted that the Spouses Mallari have no cause of action since the
said spouses are mere claimants in an execution sale and no formal demand to vacate was made upon
him. Also, Miranda filed a Third-Party Complaint against the Spouses Reyes. In essence, he alleged that
he would have immediately transferred the ownership of the subject property in his name had he known
of the suit between the Spouses Reyes and the Spouses Mallari; and, that because of such lack of
knowledge, he is now in extreme danger of losing his property.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision granting the Spouses Mallari's complaint and dismissing Miranda's
third-party complaint. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
ISSUE/S:
1. Can the issue of ownership be provisionally resolved in an accion publiciana?
2. Who has a better right of possession of the land between Miranda and Spouses Mallari?
HELD:
1. YES. Unlike forcible entry and unlawful detainer where there is an express grant for the provisional
determination of the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession
pursuant to Sections 16 and 18 of Rule 70, there is no express grant in the Rules that the court hearing
an accion publiciana can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership. Despite the lack of an express
Rule, however, there is ample jurisprudential support for upholding the power of a court hearing an accion
publiciana to also rule provisionally on the issue of ownership.
Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure), which
should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court (depending upon the value of the
property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year (or for less than a year in cases
other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules).
The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property independently of title.
This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens title. Thus, a lessee, by virtue of
a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with a term longer than one year may file, as
against the owner or usurper, an accion publiciana if he has been dispossessed for more than one year.
In the same manner, a registered owner or one with a Torrens title can likewise file an accion
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publiciana to recover possession if the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer has already lapsed. Since the resolution of the issue of ownership in an accion publiciana, like
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, is passed upon only to determine the issue of possession, the
defense of ownership raised by the defendant (i.e., that he, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner)
will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff’s certificate of title.
Therefore, the rulings of the RTC and the CA on the issue of ownership should be considered as merely
provisional and not conclusive.
2. Miranda. Pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on the contract of sale and modes of
acquiring ownership, Miranda acquired ownership of the subject property when he took actual physical, or
at least constructive, possession thereof. The non-registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija did not affect the sale's validity and effectivity. Since
ownership of the subject property had been transferred to Miranda in 1996, it ceased to be owned by
Spouses Reyes as early as then. Not being owned by Spouses Reyes, the subject property could not
therefore be made answerable for any judgment rendered against them.
Section 9(b), Rule 39 of the Rules, which authorizes a "levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of
every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from
execution" presupposes that the property to be levied belongs to and is owned by the judgment debtor.
Also, according to Section 12, Rule 39, the effect of levy on execution as to third persons is to create a
lien in favor of the judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment obligor in such
property at the time of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. If the judgment obligor
no longer has any right, title or interest in the property levied upon, then there can be no lien that may be
created in favor of the judgment obligee by reason of the levy.
Based on the above rulings, a judgment creditor or purchaser at an execution sale acquires only whatever
rights that the judgment obligor may have over the property at the time of levy. Thus, if the judgment
obligor has no right, title or interest over the levied property — as in this case — there is nothing for him to
transfer.
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EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT IN EJECTMENT CASES MAY BE SUSPENDED DUE TO

SUPERVENING EVENT
79. Rosita Maravilla v. Marcelino Bugarin, et al.

G.R. No. 226199 and 227242-54, October 1, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
In 2011, petitioners filed separate complaints for unlawful detainer against respondents. They seek to
eject the respondents from the portions of land which is registered in the name of petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Carlos Tuason. The complaints were then consolidated before the same MeTC.
The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The RTC affirmed the same.
While the appeal before the CA was pending, petitioners moved for execution of the decision, to which
the respondents opposed. They contended that due to the supervening events that transpired, the
decision becomes inequitable i.e., the City of Manila had: (a) passed several ordinances authorizing the
City Mayor to acquire the subject land and appropriating funds therefor; and (b) already made a formal
offer to purchase the subject land. The RTC directed the issuance of a writ of execution and ruled that
respondents failed to substantiate their claim of the existence of a supervening event. Subsequently,
respondents filed an amended motion to suspend issuance of writ of execution grounded on the existence
of a supervening event, i.e., the filing of an expropriation case over the subject land by the City of Manila.
The RTC issued an order to suspend the issuance of the writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Should the issuance of the writ of execution be suspended due to the existence of a supervening event,
i.e., the filing of the expropriation case over the subject lot by the City of Manila?
HELD:
No, the issuance of the writ of execution should not be suspended.
In ejectment cases, the judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory,
and is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC, or in the appellate
court's discretion, suspended or modified, or supervening events occur which have brought about a
material change in the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable.
There is no dispute that at the time the assailed Orders were issued the City of Manila had filed an
expropriation case to acquire the subject land, and in fact, obtained a ruling in its favor. These
occurrences notwithstanding, records fail to show that the City of Manila had either: (1) priorly posted the
required judicial deposit in favor of petitioners in order to secure possession of the subject land; or (2)
paid the petitioners, the adjudged final just compensation for the subject land so as to consider the
expropriation process completed and consequently, effectuate the transfer of ownership to it. Thus, at the
time the assailed Orders were issued, petitioners remained the owners of the subject land, and therefore
were entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto.
However, the SC is at a quandary as to how the City of Manila's interest in the expropriation case bears
any direct relation to respondents' interest in the ejectment cases, given that the latter were not, in any
manner, shown to benefit from the expropriation of the subject property. Absent any competent proof
showing that respondents have been identified and registered as socialized housing program
beneficiaries for the particular locality/project, they cannot claim any right over the subject land on the
basis of the said ordinance, on which the expropriation case is anchored. Consequently, the SC finds that
respondents failed to establish the existence of any supervening event or overriding consideration of
equity in their favor, or any other compelling reason, to justify the RTC’s issuance of the order suspending
the execution of its consolidated decision against them pending appeal.
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4C 2019-2020
LANDOWNER CANNOT EJECT PUBLIC UTILITY CORPORATION WITH THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN
80. National Transmission Corp vs. Bermuda Development Corporation

G.R. No. 214782, April 3, 2010
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
On 22 December 2009, Respondent Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) filed a case for Unlawful
Detainer against Petitioner National Transmission Corporation ([TransCo] with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Cabuyao. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2498.
The MTC ruled in favor of BDC.
On 17 September 2009, Petitioner [TransCo] interposed an appeal before the RTC, Branch 24 of Biñan,
Laguna. Respondent BDC, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of the aforesaid 24
August 2009 Decision of the MTC of Cabuyao.
On 28 October 2009, RTC, Branch 24 granted Respondent BDC's Urgent Motion for Execution. A Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal was then issued by the said court.
Proceeding from the immediately cited Writ of Execution, the trial court a quo issued a Notice of
Garnishment on 06 November 2009, against Petitioner [TransCo's] account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
On 10 November 2009, Petitioner [TransCo] filed an Omnibus Motion asking for the reconsideration of the
trial court a quo's 28 October 2009 Order granting Respondent BDC's Urgent Motion for Execution.
Petitioner likewise prayed for the quashal of the 30 October 2009 Writ of Execution and 06 November
2009 Notice of Garnishment.
In the meantime, on 21 January 2010, Petitioner [TransCo] filed a Complaint for Expropriation of the
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 258244, (the same property subject of the
Unlawful Detainer Case) before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna.
Subsequently, on 25 February 2010, Petitioner [TransCo] filed with RTC Branch 25 an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Petitioner [Transco] then deposited the amount of P10,704,000.00 with the Landbank of the Philippines,
purportedly representing the provisional value of the property sought to be expropriated. Consequently,
on 29 March 2010, RTC Branch 25 issued an Order granting Petitioner's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, RTC, Branch 24 dismissed Petitioner [TransCo's] appeal in the unlawful
detainer case for being "moot and academic", because of the filing of the expropriation case.
Petitioner [TransCo] seasonably sought for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling but the same was
denied by RTC Branch 24 in its Order dated 30 May 2011.
Hence, [the] Petition [for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules before the CA].
The CA affirmed the ruling of RTC branch 24.
TransCo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the ejectment case filed by BDC should have been dismissed because it was filed against
TRANSCO which is a public service corporation endowed with the power of eminent domain.
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HELD:
Yes. It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment against a
public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied the land
belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto by
negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility
corporation to vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment
and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel. The proper
recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the
proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or (2) to dismiss the case
and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings
and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with
the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just compensation and consequential
damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has jurisdiction
over the value of the subject land.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 913631 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, the National
Transmission Corporation (TransCo or TRANSCO), a government agency, was created to assume the
electrical transmission functions of the National Power Corporation and is vested with the power of
eminent domain subject to the requirements of the Constitution and existing laws. 32
Given that BDC filed before the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against TransCo, which erected
and then energized a 230 KV transmission traversing the whole extent of the subject property, 33 the MTC
should have found or taken judicial notice that TransCo is a public service corporation with the power to
expropriate. Upon such finding, the MTC, pursuant to the aforecited prevailing jurisprudence, should have
then ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case without prejudice to BDC's right to recover the
value of the land actually taken, or ordered TransCo to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation
proceedings and to pay the just compensation and damages assessed therein. The MTC could not have
proceeded to determine just compensation given that the value of the subject property is clearly beyond
its jurisdiction.
Further, the award of rental in arrears by the MTC is improper because BDC is only entitled to the just
compensation of the subject land and consequential damages as determined pursuant to Sections 5 and
6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. While the award of rental in arrears is proper in an unlawful detainer
action, its award in the present case cannot be upheld since an unlawful detainer action is not a
sanctioned remedy in case a public service or utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent
domain, like TransCo in this case, has occupied privately-owned property without first acquiring title
thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings.
The MTC being bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the unlawful detainer case, its Decision mandating
TransCo to vacate the subject property and remove all structures thereon and to pay BDC
P10,350,000.00 as reasonable rental computed from December 13, 2008 is without legal basis.
The subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful
detainer case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding with the unlawful detainer
case and not dismissing it following the prevailing jurisprudence.
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4C 2019-2020
UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS A SUMMARY ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF REAL

PROPERTY
81. Spouses Liu vs. Espinosa

G.R. No. 238513, July 31, 2019
Hernando, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner Spouses Liu owns a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title in Barangay Centro,
Agdao, Davao City. They acquired said land from their predecessor-in-interest who, in turn, merely
tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents Espinosa. The latter are the present occupants of
the land. After title was transferred to the petitioners, they likewise tolerated the presence of the
respondents upon the understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the petitioners' need to
use the same arises. When petitioners' demands to vacate the property were made, however the
respondents refused to comply. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against them.
Petitioners asserted that respondents' offer to purchase the property from them was a tacit recognition
that the petitioners owned the property.
ISSUE:
Is the case for unlawful detainer will stand?
HELD:
YES. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action
may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied.
In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However,
defendant's possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant
refused to heed such demand.
It is clear upon perusal of the records that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject property, as
evidenced by TCT No. 146-2010008891, and that the respondents’ occupation of the subject property
was merely tolerated by the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest and the petitioners themselves based on
the understanding that the said respondents will peacefully vacate the same once the need to use the
land by the petitioners arises. Further, it should be pointed out that respondents would not have made an
offer to purchase the subject land from petitioners had they been truly in possession of the property in the
concept of an owner. Their claim is thus negated by the fact that the subject land is registered in the
name of the petitioners. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in
favor of the person in whose name the title appears.
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4C 2019-2020
THE PROPER MeTC, MTC, OR MCTC HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF AN

EJECTMENT CASE OVER AN ALLUVIUM CLAIMED TO BE OWNED BY THE COMPLAINANTS

82. Spouses Sanchez v. Aguilar
G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma Sanchez (Spouses Sanchez) a 600
square meter lot identified as Lot 71 located in the Municipality of Lake Sebu. The heirs of Juanito Aguilar,
the respondents, fenced the boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses and the
alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of the land by the lake Sebu. Spouses Sanchez protested the
act of fencing by Esther before the barangay, but since no settlement was reached, they filed a Complaint
for Forcible Entry against the heirs of Aguilar before the MCTC.
The Spouses Sanchez claimed that under the law, they are the owners of the alluvium which enlarged
their 600- squaremeter lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced by the heirs of Aguilar. On the other hand, the
heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. The MCTC dismissed the ejectment complaint by the Spouses
Sanchez. Hence, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment before the RTC seeking to
annul the decision of the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for rendering judgment
over a non-existent parcel of land since the District Engineer's Office found that the width of the national
highway is almost 60 meters wide, the edge of their 600-square-meter lot must have gone downwards
and necessarily reached the edge of the 20-meter wide public easement abutting the Lake Sebu. Thus,
the heirs of Aguilar could not have been in "actual physical possession" of a non-existent lot for the
disputed area belongs to them.The RTC granted the spouses' complaint and annulled the decision of the
MCTC, which was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Does the MCTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, which is the alluvium claimed to be
owned by Spouses Sanchez?

HELD:
Yes. The MCTC had both jurisdictions over the person of the defendant or respondent and over the
subject matter of the claim. On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On
the latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
As duly noted by the CA, the area beyond the 600-squaremeter lot abutting Lake Sebu, whether it is a lot
claimed to be in "actual physical possession" of the heirs of Aguilar or a public easement, refers to the
"alluvium" lot area claimed by the Spouses Sanchez as their own in their forcible entry complaint. It is
clear, therefore, that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter, which, in this case, is the 600-
square-meter lot and its alleged alluvium.
As to the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint, ruling that the heirs
of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over the subject property should have been raised by the
Spouses Sanchez in an appeal before the RTC. But as the records reveal, the spouses did not do
anything to question the decision of the MCTC. Thus, allowing the same to attain finality.
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ANY INTERRUPTION OR DELAY OCCASIONED BY THE DEBTOR WILL EXTEND THE TIME WITHIN
WHICH THE WRIT MAY BE ISSUED.
83. Maria Perez v. Manotok Realty, Inc.

G.R. No. 216157, 14 October 2019
Inting, J.
FACTS:
The parties herein entered into a Compromise Agreement with regard to an Unlawful Detainer case filed
by respondent against petitioner. The agreement was approved by the MeTC on 15 July 1999.
However, petitioner violated the terms and conditions thereof. Thus, respondent moved for its execution.
The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the compromise
agreement. However, the writ was not implemented as the Sheriff received a written communication from
petitioner’s counsel strongly urging him, under pain of contempt of court, to desist from taking any action
against petitioner in view of the pending case before the RTC. The petition before the RTC was
dismissed on 10 May 2004 and eventually reached this Court via a Petition for Certiorari. The petition
was denied, and, in a Resolution dated 17 November 2008, this Court denied the motion for
reconsideration with finality.
On 28 April 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Enforce the 15 July 1999 Decision. The MeTC ruled that it
was filed beyond the 10-year period provided under the Rules for the enforcement of a judgment through
a motion. Upon appeal, the RTC ruled in favor of Manotok Realty and held that the 15 July 1999 Decision
can still be enforced by motion despite the lapse of more than 5 years inasmuch as the delays were
caused by petitioner. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Can the 15 July 1999 Decision still be enforced by motion?
HELD:
Yes.
Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment may be executed on motion
within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After that, a
judgment may be enforced by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. However, there are
instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon
meritorious grounds.
In the case of Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, et al., this Court pronounced:

xxx Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may
be issued without scire facias.
The foregoing principle has been applied by this Court in several cases. Under the circumstances of the
case at bar, where the delays were caused by the petitioner for her advantage, as well as outside
respondent’s control, this Court holds that the five-year period allowed for enforcement of judgment by
motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.
This Court reiterates the principle that the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing
judgments is to prevent the parties from sleeping on their rights. The respondent in this case, far from
sleeping on its rights, was diligent in seeking the execution of judgment in its favor.
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ONE YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY THROUGH STEALTH IS RECKONED
FROM THE TIME THE ENTRY WAS DISCOVERED
84. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation
G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019
Leonen., J.
FACTS:
Since 1992, Citi Appliance owned a parcel of land in Cebu City. In 2003, it constructed a 16-storey
commercial building on it. The Cebu City Zoning Board required Citi Appliance to construct a one-level
parking lot. To comply, Citi Appliance made a deep excavation for the foundation of the parking lot. It
discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground placed by PLDT in 1982. This
encroached on Citi Appliance’s property, preventing it from excavating the land. Citi Appliance applied for
exemption from the parking requirement which was initially granted. It was later denied upon
reconsideration and Citi Appliance was made to pay P3,753,600 as parking exemption fee. Citi Appliance
thus wrote PLDT demanding it to remove the lines, cables and manholes or to order the fee. A final
demand was made. PLDT failed to comply thus prompting Citi Appliance to file a complaint for ejectment
against PLDT.
PLDT, it its answer, alleged that the telephone lines, cables and manholes did not encroach on the
property as they were positioned alongside and underneath a public sidewalk. It later amended its answer
alleging that the action for forcible entry has prescribed as an action for forcible entry based on stealth
should be reckoned from the discovery of the alleged unlawful entry, not just the last demand to vacate. It
also argued that the area was part of the public domain as it was part of the sidewalk. Also that if it
belonged to Citi Appliance, PLDT had the right to eminent domain.
The Municipal Trial Court granted the ejectment complaint. It was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. A
Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals was filed which affirmed the lower tribunals. PLDT then filed
a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. It its reply, it also raised the argument that
there was no cause of action for ejectment because of the absence of prior physical possession by Citi
Appliance since it was PLDT who had prior physical possession since 1983.
ISSUE:
1. Is the element of prior physical possession present?
2. Should the one year prescriptive period of an action for forcible entry through stealth be reckoned from
the time the unlawful entry is discovered instead of the last demand to vacate?
HELD:
1. No, prior physical possession is not present in this case.
An action for ejectment is a summary proceeding meant “to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right of possession of property.” In this special civil action, the title to the property is
not involved. The only matter resolved is the question as to “who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the premises or possession de facto.”
With respect to possession, in forcible entry, the possession of the intruder is illegal at the outset because
his or her “possession thereof is made against the will or without the consent of the former possessor.” In
unlawful detainer, by contrast, the possession is previously legal but becomes unlawful upon the
expiration of ones right to possess the property after, for instance, the termination or violation of a lease
contract.
For forcible entry, the one year prescriptive period is generally reckoned from the date of actual entry on
the land. However, if forcible entry is done through stealth, the period is counted from the time the plaintiff
discovered the entry. In marked contrast, the one-year prescriptive period in unlawful detainer is counted
from the date of the last demand to vacate.
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Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than physical or material possession, not legal
possession. It is not required that the complaint is the owner of the property. If the issue of ownership is
raised, the court may resolve this question only to determine the question of possession.
Here, petitioner claims that when it installed the lines and cables beneath the property, the property was
not yet owned by respondent. Hence, it concludes that respondent had no prior physical possession of
the property.
A cursory reading of the complaint shows that respondent failed to allege its prior physical possession
over the property. It merely submitted proof of ownership over the property, which is not sufficient to prove
prior physical possession.
2. Yes, the period should be reckoned from the time of discovery thus the case was filed beyond the one-
year prescriptive period.
A judicious review of these cases and jurisprudence, both old and recent, reveals that the one-year time
bar in forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of discovery of the encroachment, not from the date
of the last demand to vacate.
The one-year prescriptive period is a jurisdictional requirement consistent with the summary nature of
ejectment suits.
Here, a review of respondent’s own narration of facts reveal that it discovered the underground cables
and lines in April 2003 when it applied for exemption from the parking slot requirements with the Cebu
Zoning Board.
Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive period to file the forcible entry suit had already lapsed
sometime in April 2004. Thus, by the time the complaint for forcible entry was field on October 1, 2004,
the period had already prescribed. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities, therefore, no longer had jurisdiction
to resolve the case.
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THE RESOLUTION OF A BOUNDARY DISPUTE IS NOT WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE SUMMARY
ACTION OF FORCIBLE ENTRY UNDER RULE 70
85. Martinez vs. Heirs Of Remberto F. Lim

G.R. No. 234655 September 11, 2019
Bersamin, C.J.,
FACTS:
An action for Forcible Entry led by herein respondents heirs of Lim against petitioner Jessica Lio Martinez.
Respondents are the heirs of Remberto Lim who, during his lifetime, owned, possessed, and cultivated a
parcel of land located in Coron, Palawan. Adjoining Remberto's land is the land of his brother — Jose
Lim. The property is bounded on both the east and west by the properties of the Heirs of Socorro Lim,
which were later on acquired by the late Remberto Lim. As it happened, Jose sold his land to a certain
Dorothy and Alexander Medalla who, thereafter, subdivided the same into two (2) smaller lots, subdivided
into nine (9) smaller lots, thereafter l sold to herein petitioner Martinez. Martinez and her father entered
into the property and uprooted some of the acacia mangium trees that were previously planted thereon by
the late Remberto Lim and his son, Alan Lim. To further delineate their claimed property, petitioner fenced
the same and placed signs thereon that read "NO TRESPASSING" and "NOTICE THIS PROPERTY IS
OWNED BY THE MARTINEZ FAMILY."
Now then, claiming that petitioner had unlawfully encroached into a portion of their property, respondents,
through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioner demanding that she immediately remove the fence
that she built on respondents' land as well as to turn over peaceful possession of that portion of property
that petitioner intruded into. Unfortunately, the demand was ignored by petitioner, and respondents were
constrained to file the instant complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against petitioner before the MCTC and ordered petitioner, among others, to vacate and turn
over peaceful possession of the disputed portion of property. RTC affirmed MCTC in toto which was
further sustained by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in granting possession of disputed lands to respondents Lim?
HELD:
Yes. The issue involved in and determined through accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of
real property. This action can be 􏰁led when the dispossession lasted for more than one year. It can be
gleaned therefrom that the dispute essentially concerned the actual metes and bounds of their respective
properties. Under such circumstances, the issue was really whether or not the petitioner's titles included
the disputed portion.
The dispute did not primarily concern merely possessory rights, but related to boundaries, and could not
be summarily determined. We reiterate that a boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily through the
action for forcible entry covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the
defendant had the prior possession de facto. If the petitioner had possession of the disputed areas by
virtue of the same being covered by the metes and bounds stated and de􏰁ned in her Torrens titles, then
she might not be validly dispossessed thereof through the action for forcible entry. The dispute should be
properly threshed out only through accion reivindicatoria. Accordingly, the MCTC acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and resolving the dispute as one for forcible entry.
Given the foregoing, the CA committed reversible error in a􏰀rming the judgments of the lower courts, and
in ordering the summary ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed area.
Considering that the remedy availed of by the respondents as the plaintiffs was improper, the Court need
not discuss and settle the other issues raised by the petitioner.
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IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER, THE DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT LOT IS

MERELY PROVISIONAL AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE APPROPRIATE ACTION FOR
RECOVERY OR QUIETING OF TITLE.
86. Spouses Belvis vs. Spouses Erola

G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019
Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
The instant case stems from a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages filed by respondents, as
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Maureen. In their complaint, respondents alleged that they are
owners of a lot situated in Capiz. The subject property, Lot 597 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-26108 and a tax declaration, both in the name of respondent Conrado V. Erola, who allegedly
purchased the same in October of 1978. As the parties were close relatives, i.e., petitioner Cecilia Erola-
Bevis being the sister of respondent Conrado, respondents allegedly allowed petitioners to possess the
lot, subject to the condition that they would vacate the same upon demand.Respondents sent petitioners
a letter requiring the latter to vacate the property within 30 days from receipt of the letter. Petitioners,
however, refused to comply. After unsuccessful barangay conciliation proceedings, respondents filed the
instant complaint.
Petitioners claimed that in 1979, the subject property was purchased by the late Rosario V. Erola, the
mother of petitioner Cecilia and respondent Conrado.Conrado, however, allegedly succeeded in
registering the property solely in his name. Hence, an implied trust was allegedly created over the
undivided hereditary share of petitioner Cecilia. For over 34 years, petitioners alleged that they possessed
and cultivated the lot in the concept of an owner, believing in good faith that they were co-owners of the
subject lot. In the course of their possession, petitioners allegedly introduced various improvements
thereon by planting bamboos, nipa palms and coconut trees, and by constructing fishponds. In their
Answer, petitioners further claimed that respondents failed to personally appear during the barangay
conciliation proceedings and that their representative, Maureen, had no authority to appear on their
behalf.
After pre-trial and trial, the MCTC granted the complaint. In the RTC, petitioners reiterated their claims
and further alleged that respondent Conrado never interrupted his sister's possession and cultivation,
despite knowledge thereof.Hence, they were builders in good faith under Article 448 of the Civil Code.In
denying the appeal, the RTC held that despite the non-appearance of respondents, the parties failed to
arrive at a settlement before the Office of the Punong Barangay.On the substantive issue, the RTC held
that petitioners failed to prove that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the property or that the same was
purchased by Rosario. Unfazed, petitioners filed a petition for review before the CA.The CA denied the
petition and found that respondents substantially complied with R.A. 7160
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether respondents complied with the mandatory conciliation proceedings under R.A. 7160
(2) Whether petitioners are builders in good faith under Article 448 and thus have a right to retain the
subject lot until payment of necessary useful and luxurious expenses.
HELD:
(1) Yes, In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondents failed to personally appear during the
conciliation proceedings as required by Section 415 of R.A. 7160. [47] They were, however, represented by
Maureen.[48] Although dismissible under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Court finds that
respondents have substantially complied with the law.The CA, the RTC, and the MCTC unanimously
found that petitioners and respondents' representative underwent barangay conciliation proceedings.[50]
Unfortunately, they failed to arrive at any amicable settlement.[51] Thereafter, upon agreement of the
parties, the Office of the Punong Barangay issued a Certification to File Action. [52] During pre-trial, the
parties again underwent mediation before the PMC and JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was
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reached.[53] Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the purposes of the law, i.e., to provide avenues for
parties to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent the "indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts," [54]
have been sufficiently met. Considering that the instant complaint for unlawful detainer, an action
governed by the rules of summary procedure, has been pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to
relax the technical rules of procedure in the interest of speedy and substantial justice.
(2) No, In the case at bar, the CA properly held that petitioners have no right to retain possession of the
property under Article 448 as they were aware that their tolerated possession could be terminated at any
time. Thus, they could not have built on the subject property in the concept of an owner.
Even assuming that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the subject property, Article 448 would still be
inapplicable.
While petitioners cannot be deemed to be builders in good faith, it being undisputed that the land in
question is titled land in the name of respondents, the CA and the lower courts overlooked the fact that
petitioners constructed improvements on the subject lot with the knowledge and consent of respondents.
In exceptional cases,[69] the Court has applied Article 448 to instances where a builder, planter, or sower
introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and consent of the owner.
In the instant case, while respondents may have merely tolerated petitioners' possession, respondents
never denied having knowledge of the fact that petitioners possessed, cultivated and constructed various
permanent improvements on the subject lot for over 34 years. As such, the Court finds that respondents
likewise acted in bad faith under Article 453 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to the aforementioned article, the
rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as though both acted in good faith.
On a final note, it bears emphasis that this is a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, "[t]he sole issue for
resolution x x x is [the] physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties." The determination of the ownership of the subject lot is merely
provisional and is without prejudice to the appropriate action for recovery or quieting of title.
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ONLY PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION , NOT TITLE, IS THE ISSUE IN FORCIBLE ENTRY CASES;
PARTY DEPRIVED OF POSSESSION MUST NOT TAKE LAW INTO HIS OWN HANDS

87. Rhema International Livelihood Foundation, Inc., Et Al., V. Hibix, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 225353-54, August 28, 2019
Carandang, J.:

FACTS:
Rhema Intl. filed a complaint for forcible entry against Hibix, Inc. (Hibix) and its Board of Directors. Rhema
alleged that by virtue of a donation from Marylou Bhalwart, it "became the owner of a large tract of land
consisting of 71,409,413 [square] meters and was issued Original Certificate of Title OCT 128. Rhema
averred that it previously enjoyed juridical and physical possession of the property for years when
suddenly, Hibix, together with armed men claiming to be members of the special action unit of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), forcibly evicted Rhema's personnel.
Hibix on the other hand, alleged that, Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation (Philippine Fuji) acquired a parcel
of land from Executive Realty and Development Corporation. A new title was issued to Philippine Fuji
.Philippine Fuji constructed its building over said property and occupied the same upon its completion
.Philippine Fuji sold the property, together with its improvements, to Hibix. TCT No. 143048 was issued
and registered in the name of Hibix. Since then, Hibix had been in possession of the property until a
certain Romeo Prado (Prado), introducing himself as a special sheriff, together with four policemen, six
security guards, and a certain Julian Go, claiming to be the owner of the property accompanied by two
armed security guards, took over the possession of the property through force, violence, and intimidation.
According to Hibix, Prado told the security guards of Hibix that they were implementing a special writ of
execution purportedly issued by the Regional Trial Court with respect to a civil case. Hibix, however,
found out that the CA had already enjoined the enforcement of said order, making the writ of execution
that Prado presented bogus. Hibix lodged a complaint with the NBI relative to the unlawful and forcible
take-over of the property. Then, Hibix and the NBI took possession of the property.
The MeTC found Hibix to have forcibly entered the property and immediately ordered Hibix to vacate the
property. The RTC affirmed the decision.
CA reversed the decisions of the RTC of Parañaque City and the MeTC, and dismissed the case for
forcible entry against Hibix. The CA ratiocinated that Rhema failed to establish prior physical possession
of the property because at the time NBI officers conducted an investigation and verified the complaint filed
by Hibix, Rhema abandoned the property. Thus, when Hibix retook possession thereof, Rhema had no
prior physical possession over the property.
ISSUE:
Are the elements of forcible entry present?

HELD:
Yes, the elements of forcible entry are present.

The elements of forcible entry are: (1) prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful
deprivation of it by the defendant through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. Possession in
forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical possession or possession de facto; not legal
possession. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. For forcible entry to prosper, an
appreciable length of time of prior physical possession is not required. However short it is, for as long as
prior physical possession is established, recovery of possession under Rule 70 of the Rules may be
granted.
In this case, it was shown that Hibix enjoyed possession of the property until June 25, 2008, when Rhema
wrestled possession of the property from Hibix. However, Hibix did not file a case for forcible entry against
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Rhema. It was proven that, Hibix, aided by the NBI and without any court order, retook possession of the
property. Hence, Rhema had prior physical possession of the property .
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:

The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal
disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what
he claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Ejectment
proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can settle speedily actions to recover possession
because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.
Undeniably, it was Rhema who first used violence in order to deprive Hibix possession over the property.
The remedy, which the latter should have resorted to, is to file a case for forcible entry against Rhema.
Instead, Hibix went to the NBI to lodge a complaint and sought their aid to wrestle possession back from
Rhema. This is tantamount to putting the law into one's hands, which is the evil sought to be avoided by
the special civil action of forcible entry.
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A JUDGEMENT OR FINAL ORDER DISMISSING A CHARGE OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT ON THE

MERITS – LIKE AN ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE- NECESSARILY BECOMES FINAL AND
EXECUTORY UPON ITS PROMULGATION.
88. Ang., Jr., vs. Spouses Bitanga

G.R. No. 223046, November 28, 2019
FACTS:
Pyramid construction company is a domestic construction company, Macrogen Realty engages the
services of Pyramid company for the construction of a mall in Sucat, Paranaque. However, Macrogen
failed to settle its outstanding obligation. Pyramid initiated arbitration proceedings before the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission ( CIAC)in order to compel Macrogen to settle its obligation, the parties
entered into a compromise agreement which effectively abated the progress of the arbritation proceeding.
The fulfillment of by Macrogen of its obligation under the compromise agreement was secured by a
guaranty of the respondent Benjamin Bitanga, the president of the Macrogen, he “absolutely,
unconditionally and irrevocably” guaranteed the full and complete payment by Macrogen of its obligation
under the compromise agreement. However, Macrogen failed to comply with the compromise agreement.
Because of the failure of Macrogen to comply with the compromise agreement, Pyramid filed with the
CIAC a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution against Macrogen. The CIAC granted the motion,
however the sheriff filed a return on the writ of execution stating that he was unable to locate any property
of macrogen except the laters bank account Pyramid send a letter of demand to Bitanga but it was also
went unheeded. Thus Pyramid filed before the RTC complaint for specific performance, Notice of
garnishment and execution sale. Pyramid claimed that the notice of garnishment was served to the
corporate secretary of Manila gofl & country club (MGCCI)

Bitanga was adjudged by the supreme court as liable for the debt of Macrogen as a guarantor and
Pyramid won as the highest bidder in the public sale of shares of stocks in MGGCI which was subject of
the notice of garnishment, Pyramid requested MGCCI for the transfer of the stocks in its name, however it
was tured daw by MGCCI because the said stocks was already sold and transferred to Wilfred Siy.
Pyramid the filed an indirect contempt case against MGCCI, Bitanga and Siy, The RTC initially found
them to be guiltiy of indirect contempt however it was later on found by the RTC that they were incapable
of violating the notice of garnishment because such notice was not delivered to MGCCI or Siy but to a
completely different entiry, the Manila Polo Club.
Pyramid assigned all its rights and interest as judgment creditor to Engracio U. Ang, petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the dismissal in the indirect contempt case final and unappealable?
HELD:
YES. The order of the RTC dismissing / absolving MGCCI and SIY the case for indirect contempt became
final and executory immediately upon its promulgation. This is due to the norm, observed in our
jurisdiction, that regards as unappealable any judgment or final order that dismisses on the merits a
charge of indirect contempt. Sec 11, Rule 71 provides that the appeal in contempt proceedings may be
taken as in criminal case. Hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order of
dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt of court. Since no appeal could lie against it, a
judgement or final order dismissing a charge of indirect contempt on the merits – like an acquittal in a
criminal case- necessarily becomes final and executory upon its promulgation.
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INDIRECT CONTEMPT NOT INITIATED BY THE COURT MOTU PROPRIO MUST BE, MUST BE
COMMENCED BY VERIFIED PETITION

89. Masakazu Uematsu Vs. Alma N. Balinon
G.R. No. 234812. November 25, 2019
Inting, J.
FACTS:
This case emanated from a Petition for the issuance of a permanent protection order (PPO) under
Republic Act No. (RA) 9262 (PPO case) filed by Alma N. Balinon (respondent) against petitioner, an
alleged drug dependent.
In the Decision of the RTC-Tagum, the petition for the PPO case filed by the respondent was granted and
a PPO against petitioner was issued. The Decision in the PPO case became final and executory.
Then, petitioner filed with the RTC-Tagum a Motion (To Order Defendant Alma N. Balinon to Account)"
(Motion to Account) praying that respondent be ordered to account all the proceeds of their closed
businesses and sold properties. The RTC Tagum directed respondent to file a comment on the motion.
However, despite the 15-day extension period granted her, respondent failed to file her comment.
The RTC-Tagum directed respondent to explain why she should not be sanctioned for her failure to
comply with the directive of the court within a period of five days. In the same order, it granted respondent
a period of 15 days to make an accounting.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Resolution. He declared that respondent was still unable to submit
for accounting their common properties. Consequently, he prayed for the RTC-Tagum to issue an order
citing her in contempt of court and to resolve his Motion to Account.
The RTC-Tagum found respondent guilty of indirect contempt in its resolution. The latter filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the resolution. The CA granted the petition. The CA ruled that the RTC-Tagum
committed grave abuse of its discretion when it cited respondent in indirect contempt even if its basis was
a mere motion filed by petitioner, without observance of the required procedure in indirect contempt
cases.
ISSUE:
Did the act of respondent of failing to file a comment despite court order make her guilty of contempt?
RULING: NO
A person may be punished for indirect contempt when he or she disobeys or resists a lawful court order,
among other acts enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The proceedings thereto may
be commenced by the court initiating it motu proprio or by a verified petition with supporting particulars as
well as certified true copies of relevant documents and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing of initiatory pleadings for civil actions. As the CA observed, the RTC-Tagum found respondent guilty
of indirect contempt, not on account of it having initiated the proceedings motu proprio, but on the basis of
the motions filed by petitioner. Let it be recalled that in his Motion to Direct [Respondent] to Comply with
the Order of this Court and Motion for Resolution, petitioner claimed that respondent disobeyed the lawful
order of the court and prayed that she be cited in indirect contempt. Such being the case, petitioner
should have had filed first a verified petition in pursuing the contempt charge against respondent. The
indirect contempt charge against respondent was initiated by petitioner's mere motion; thus, without
compliance with the mandatory requirements under Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Specifically,
not only did petitioner fail to file a verified petition, he, likewise, did not comply with the requirements for
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the filing of initiatory pleadings. This being so, the RTC-Tagum had improperly taken cognizance of the
charge and conversely, it should have dismissed the motion.
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IN ORDER TO STAY EXECUTION A SUPERVENING EVENT MUST ALTER THE EXECUTION TO

BECOME INEQUITABLE, IMPOSSIBLE OR UNFAIR AND CANNOT REST ON UNPROVED FACTS
90. National Power Corporation vs. Delta P, Inc.

G.R. No. 221709, October 16, 2019
Reyes, A., Jr., J
FACTS:
Delta P previously took over the operations of a generating plant in Puerto Princesa City owned by
Paragua Power Corporation (PPC). At the time of the takeover of the operations, PPC had a Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA) with petitioner NAPOCOR. As a result of delta P’s takeover, the NAPACOR
requested to direct payment for the services to Delta P. However, NAPOCOR refused to do so, with the
reasoning that PPC, not Delta P, is the contracting party involved in the PPA. The standstill resulted in
Delta P subsequently advising NAPOCOR that it could no longer operate the power station for lack of
funds. NAPOCOR Vice-President for strategic Power Utilities Group, Marcelo, issued a Memorandum to
NAPOCOR President Murga seeking approval to supply the fuel and pay the manpowers services of
PPC’s generating plant due to the imminent power shortage in Puerto Princesa City. Allegedly, this
shortage was caused by Delta P’s inability to produce the required electricity due to the lack of bunker
fuel. The fragile equilibrium began to further fracture when Delta P instituted an action for collection of
sum of money against NAPOCOR for payment of electricity “off taken” by NAPOCOR. NAPACOR was
ordered to pay. This judgement attained finality and was subsequently implemented. The contractual
relationship of the parties continued without any hitch until the NAPOCOR issued Debit Memo deducting
P24,448,247.36 from Delta P’s account for the alleged incremental costs of the fuel it had supplied to
Delta P from February 25, 2003 to June 25, 2003. Delta P countered by filing a sum of money case
assailing the validity of the Debit Memo for lack of prior agreement authorizing payment of the fuel costs.
Delta P alleged that NAPOCOR voluntarily chose to supply fuel in the power station despite lack of
request, in order to avoid a disruption of fuel and that Delta P’s acceptance of the fuel should not be
construed as an implied approval to bear the costs of the same. In response, NAPOCOR invoked Delta
P’s alleged voluntary acceptance and benefit from the fuel supplied, and that upon audit, it was
discovered that there were variances between the actual costs of fuel and the fuel costs tariff. The RTC
ruled in favor of Delta P. MR denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the post-audit constituted a supervening event that would bring into operation the
non-application of the immutability doctrine.
HELD: No. The Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment applies in this case. It is axiomatic that when final
judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect either by the tribunal which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is founded on
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must
become final at some definite point in time. It has two-fold purpose: first, to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and
second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors which is precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely, and the rights and obligations of every litigant must
not hang in suspense for an indefinite period in time. But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. To successfully stay or stop the execution of a final
judgement, the supervening event: (1) must have altered or modified the parties’ situation as to render
execution inequitable, impossible, or unfair; and (2) must be established by competent evidence;
otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable
judgment. In this case, the post audit of the adjudged amount based on the PPA with PPC which provided
a formula in the fuel component computable in the billings is irrelevant to the proceedings and cannot be
deemed to be facts that transpired after the judgment became final, as it was already existing. The post-
audit concerned itself with the subject amounts already deemed final, and not any amounts that came
about through the contemporaneous or subsequent actions of the involved parties.
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THE SELECTION OR REMOVAL OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS IS NOT GOVERNED BY THE

RULES REGARDING THE SELECTION OR REMOVAL OF REGULAR ADMINISTRATORS. COURTS
MAY APPOINT OR REMOVE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS BASED ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN
THOSE ENUMERATED IN THE RULES, AT THEIR DISCRETION.
91. Calma vs. Turla

G.R. No. 221684; July 30, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Marilu Turla filed with the RTC a Petition for Letters of Administration alleging, among others, that her
father, Mariano died intestate, leaving real and personal properties with estimated value of ₱3,000,000;
that she is the sole legal heir entitled to inherit and succeed to the estate of her deceased father; and that
she is entitled to be issued letters of administration. She presented her Certificate of Live Birth signed and
registered by Mariano himself with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. RTC gave due course to the
petition and a Letter of Special Administration was issued to Marilu.
Maria Turla Calma, claiming to be the surviving youngest half-sister of Mariano (he was her mother's
illegitimate son before her marriage to her father), filed an Opposition; and alleged that Mariano and his
wife Rufina did not have any child; that the information recited in Marilu’s two birth certificates are false.
Calma argued that she is entitled to the administration of the estate of her half-brother.
Calma filed a Motion to Order DNA Testing as respondent's blood relation to Mariano is in issue. Marilu
opposed, claiming that Calma lacked the legal right or personality to request for a DNA Test. Test granted
by RTC. RTC ruled that while respondent's birth certificate stated her father to be Mariano and her mother
to be Rufina, the DNA test results conclusively showed that she is not Rufina's daughter. Marilu was
removed as Special Administratrix. CA annulled said RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Can Marilu be removed as Special Administratrix on the strength of the DNA Evidence?
HELD:
NO. The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators
based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said
discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice
and legal principles. While respondent was shown to be not blood related to Rufina, however, the DNA
result did not at all prove that she is not a daughter of Mariano. Section 5 of A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Rule
on DNA evidence, provides that the grant of DNA testing application shall not be construed as an
automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA evidence that may be obtained
as a result thereof. Here, the DNA result was not offered in accordance with the Rules on
Evidence. Therefore, we do not find the DNA test results as a valid ground for the revocation of
respondent's appointment as Special Administratrix and her removal as such. The rule is that after
the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer
the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon
presentation shall assess the same as evidence in keeping with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5- SC). At that point when the RTC used it as basis for the removal of
petitioner, the DNA Test Result is not yet considered evidence, depriving petitioner the
opportunity to contest the same. Petitioner's filiation with Rufina Turla is not material in the resolution
of the right of petitioner to the estate of Mariano Turla and/or to administer the same, whether as a regular
or as a special administratrix.
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CASE DIGESTS IN REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

DEAN ED VINCENT S. ALBANO

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS DETERMINED FROM ALLEGATIONS IN THE

1. Malabanan vs. Republic

2. Sanchez vs. Vda. De Aguilar

FOR PRACTICALITY, THE NEED TO ISSUE A SEPARATE PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE

3. Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar vs. Miguel M. Paller

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE

4. Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Rogelio Ang

The RTC and the CA denied the petition.

THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE VENUE OF APPEALS AND PROPER

5. Dr. Fe Lasam vs. Philippine National Bank

EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS ARE MORE TAILORED TO THE

6. MWSS vs. LGU of Quezon City

JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT, TYPE OF

7. Heirs of Ramiro vs. Sps. Bacaron

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES ONLY POSSESS JURISDICTION OVER MATTERS THAT ARE

8. VICTORIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION VS. VICTORIA

JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED BY THE COMPLAINT AND RELIEF SOUGHT

9. Berbano vs. Heirs of Tapulao

2. NO, Petitioners now cannot repudiate the jurisdiction of the court.

10. Heirs of Renato Dragon vs. Manila Banking Corp.

Concededly, Rule 141, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states:

THE JOINDER OF COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY AND ACTION FOR EJECTMENT IS

14. Central Visayas Finance Corporation vs. Sps. Adlawan

JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS MANDATORY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF

15. Tumagan, Halil, and Padilla vs. Kairuz

16. Heirs of Gabriel vs Cebrero

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

17. PNCC vs Superlines

ABSENCE OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY RENDERS ALL SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS OF THE

Hence, Orosa is an indispensable party who should also be impleaded.

THE RESIDENCE OF A CORPORATION IS CONSIDERED AS THE PLACE WHERE ITS PRINCIPAL

19. Hygienic Packaging vs Nutri-Asia

20. Racpan v. Barroga-Haigh

CA: Affirmed RTC's decision.

The Complaint was exempted from Barangay Conciliation Proceedings

21. Radiowealth Finance Corp vs. Pineda, Jr.

22. Sps. Rebamonte vs. Sps. Lucero

OMISSION IN THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING THAT WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE

FOR A PARTY TO BE GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS

25. Leriou vs. Longa

26. BF Citiland Corporation vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

1. Yes, petitioner committed forum shopping.

GENERAL DENIAL AMOUNTS TO AN ADMISSION OF THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION

RTC: Ruled in favor of the respondent.

28. Moreno v. Kahn

29. Francisco Delgado v. GQ Realty Development Corp., et. al

30. Webb vs. NBI Director Gatdula, et.al.

31. Royal Plains View Inc. vs. Mejia

CA: Ordered to file and thereafter admitted Nestor's appellee's brief.

32. Rebadulla vs. Republic

The Court has also held that:

33. Villalongha vs. Court Of Appeals

SERVICE BY ORDINARY MAIL IS ALLOWED ONLY IN INSTANCES WHERE NO REGISTRY

34. Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) vs. Papa

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON MAY BE ACQUIRED THROUGH 1) SERVICE OF SUMMONS

35. UCPB vs. Spouses Ang Sy