G.R. No.

93833 September 28, 1995

FACTS

PARTIES:

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

Plaintiff Argument/Relief
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's
dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3,
1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the
taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication.4

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic
Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance
or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.
Defense
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of
violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith
RULING
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order
of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:

WON the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Ruling of the Supreme Court

1. Verba Legis

2. Ratio legis et Anima

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

FACTS

PARTIES:

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.

Delfin Saldivar-Friend of Imelda Salazar

Mr. Agustin Maramara- Subongera

 Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon)- ka
contract daw ni Delfin Saldivar

Plaintiff Argument/Relief
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private
respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9,
1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of
submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended
to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages,
after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered
dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings.
Defense
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of
violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith
RULING

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which
forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order
of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In
thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:

WON the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Ruling of the Supreme Court

1. Verba Legis
 2. Ratio legis et Anima

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

Relevant Facts

G.R. No. 208062, April 07, 2015

Parties:

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. AND PULSE ASIA, INC., Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Plaintiff Argument/Relief

SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms.

Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather

Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey firms of
similar circumstance"[4] to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners and
payors... of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those
of their "subscribers."
Defense
Representative Tobias M. Tiangco (Tiangco)... wrote Atty. Esmeralda Ladra, Director of
COMELEC's Law Department
"compel [SWS] to either comply with the directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC
Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and give the names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the
[pre-election survey conducted from February 15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for
the... violation thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense.
directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5]... the... violation
thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense."
"be furnished the identity of persons who paid for the [pre-election survey conducted from
February 15 to February 17, 2013] as well as those who subscribed to it."
COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
stated that the proceeding was merely a clarificatory hearing and not a formal hearing or an
investigation.
DIRECT
SWS, Pulse Asia... and other survey firms... within three (3) days from receipt of this
Resolution the names of all commissioners and payors of... surveys published from
February 12, 2013 to the date of the promulgation of this Resolution for copying and
verification by the Commission.
A violation of these rules shall constitu[t]e an election offense as provided in Republic Act
no. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
SWS and Pulse Asia alleged... they had not been furnished copies of Resolution No. 9674.
(They emphasized that while a certified true copy... of this Resolution was attached to their
Petition, this was a copy which they themselves secured "for the purpose of complying.with
the requirement that Rule 65 petitions must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
assailed order or resolution[.]... certified true copy... of this Resolution was attached to their
Petition,... copy which they themselves secured
"for the purpose of complying.with the requirement that Rule 65 petitions must be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed order or resolution
SWS and Pulse Asia... informed COMELEC Chairman Brillantes that they had not received
a copy of Resolution No. 9674.
Resolution No. 9674 was tainted with irregularities,... violation of the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution
Thus, they requested that COMELEC defer or hold in abeyance Resolution No. 9674's
enforcement.
COMELEC Law Department issued a Notice... directing it to furnish COMELEC with a list of
the names of all "commissioners, subscribers, and payors of surveys published from
February 12, 2013 until April
23, 2013."
COMELEC issued a Subpoena... notifying SWS and Pulse Asia that a Complaint "for
violation of Section 264[,] par. 1 and 2 of the Omnibus Election Code... in relation to R.A.
9006"
SWS and Pulse Asia maintained that before receiving the Subpoena... they were never
informed that a criminal case had been filed against them. They added that they were never
furnished copies of the relevant criminal Complaint.
Resolution No. 9674, in requiring the... submission of information on subscribers, is in
excess of what the Fair Election Act requires.
Resolution No. 9674 transgresses the Fair Election Act in making itself executory
immediately after publication.
violates the non-impairment of contracts clause
"guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service"
COMELEC of the power to "supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all...
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any...
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary."
Issues:

Defense:
19
As basis for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1)  of the 1987
20
Constitution and Sections 5.1 to 5.3  of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair
Election Act, as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.

What are the relevant facts of the case

 SWS and Pulse Asia Inc.
o SWS and Pulse Asia are social research and public polling firms. Among their
activities is the conduct of pre-election surveys.

 Comelec
o Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather
Stations, Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (Pulse Asia), as well as "other survey
4
firms of similar circumstance"  to submit to COMELEC the names of all
commissioners and payors of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April
23, 2013, including those of their "subscribers."

Law/provison involved
As basis for Resolution No. 9674, COMELEC cited Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution
and Sections 5.1 to 5.3 of Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, as implemented
by COMELEC Resolution No. 9615.

Questions being raise in the case

First, whether Resolution No. 9674 is invalid in that it requires the disclosure of the names of "subscribers"
of election surveys;

Second, whether the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the requirement to submit the
names of their subscribers;

Third, whether Resolution No. 9674, insofar as it compels petitioners to submit the names of their
subscribers, violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts (Article II, Section
10);

Fourth, whether at the time petitioners were required by COMELEC to reveal the names of the subscribers to
their election surveys, Resolution No. 9674 was already in force and effect; and

Lastly, whether COMELEC deprived petitioners of due process of law when it:
a) failed to provide them with a copy of Resolution No. 9674 and the criminal complaint for an election
offense; and

b) refused to specify the election offense under which they were being prosecuted.

How did the SC answer the on the question

We sustain the validity of Resolution No. 9674. The names of those who commission or pay for
election surveys, including subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a)
of the Fair Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power and
effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to opportunities for public
47
service[.]"  Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free
speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts.

However, it is evident that Resolution No. 9674 was promulgated in violation of the period set by
the Fair Election Act. Petitioners were also not served a copy of Resolution No. 9674 with which they
were asked to comply. They were neither shown nor served copies of the criminal Complaint subject
of E.O. Case No. 13-222. Petitioners' right to due process was, thus, violated.

Rules of Stat Construction

Clarifications, however, are in order.
First, verba legis or the so-called plain-meaning rule applies only when the law is
completely clear, such that there is absolutely no room for interpretation. Its application is
premised on a situation where the words of the legislature are clear that its intention,
insofar as the facts of a case demand from the point of view of a contemporary
interpretative community, is neither vague nor ambiguous. This is a matter of judicial
appreciation. It cannot apply merely on a party's contention of supposed clarity and lack
of room for interpretation.

This is descriptive of the situation here.Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners

appeal to what they (respectively) construe to be plainly evident from Section 5.2 (a)'s
text: on the part of COMELEC, that the use of the words "paid for" evinces no distinction
between direct purchasers and those who purchase via subscription schemes; and, on the
part of petitioners, that Section 5.2 (a)'s desistance from actually using the word
"subscriber" means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. 117 The variance in the
parties' positions, considering that they are both banking on what they claim to be the
Fair Election Act's plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic rigor that foments absurdity.
The dangers of inordinate insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and
need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means endemic to legal interpretation.
Even in everyday conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for humor. A
fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire
approach to text can stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that unbridled
textualism purports to bolster." 118
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain language is erroneous. In
reality, universality and uniformity of meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly
assumes that language is static.

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial:
to consider context and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the
envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social
ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is the
bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular
that describes the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of
constitutional primacy.

Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2 (a) of the Fair Election Act in isolation. Here, we
consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the
statute of which
it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a
cloistered provision
but a norm that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those
who currently read, depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.