G.R. No.

L-16749             January 31, 1963 P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of
the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that
the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and
vs. (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-
half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees. deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
LABRADOR, J.: decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things
the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death,
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
provisions: 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through
counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA denied. Hence, this appeal.
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was
born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los The most important assignments of error are as follows:
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
I
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and
no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY. HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
xxx     xxx     xxx CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about II
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the
same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National III
Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE
thereon, is exhausted..
RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
xxx     xxx     xxx ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN IV
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of
which I may be possessed at my death and which may have
come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: V
....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor

in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
OWNERSHIP. conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
executor himself in appellee's brief: meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he
has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has
no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in
facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
it. But if he went on business which would require his
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the
a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in
the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A.
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
States and stayed there for the following nine years until inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
school in Sacramento, California. domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many
shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to
the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
again returned to his own country, and came back to the defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
Philippines the following year, 1939. follows:

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. of the country where said property may be found.
Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622,
as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
California shortly after the making of his last will and
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
(pp. 2-3)
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions,
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and however, would show that if a French court were called upon
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the to determine how this property should be distributed, it would
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors,
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
thus:
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it
of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of
law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law,
the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of 571.)
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why
the reference back should not have been to Michigan
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless
be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts
or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical
in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
reason why the original reference should be the internal law
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of
internal law as the rule of reference.
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is
court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of
the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the
the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American
choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
would be for the woman. The same result would happen, reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in
though the courts would switch with respect to which would an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531.
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not
a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a law.
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
xxx     xxx     xxx
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
following theses:
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin. (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists,
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the court shall respect:
 (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
their personal statute, and desires that said California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
personal statute shall be determined by the law of Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
the domicile, or even by the law of the place where provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
the act in question occurred. govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16
of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
law, provided it be certain that one of them is
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
the determination of a question to the same
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
system of law.
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
xxx     xxx     xxx the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
the personal estate of an Englishman who has died conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
would make the distribution in accordance with the law of them.
nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons,
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters Civil Code.
with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner. We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled
at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same reversed, with costs against appellees.
rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The
New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled
abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.