018 Baguio v. De Jalagat (UMANDAP) futility.

It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances,

25 May 1972 | Barredo, J. | Res Judicata; Judicial Notice the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a
judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it.
PETITIONER: GABRIEL BAGUIO That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal.
Certainly such an order is not contrary to law.
RESPONDENTS: TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in
representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all
surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL DOCTRINE: The Court's dismissal of a previous case has the effect of an
JALAGAT adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded
in abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over the same
SUMMARY: issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff.

A complaint was filed for the quieting of title to real property by plaintiff, FACTS:
and a motion to dismiss was later filed by the defendants. The motion to 99.   A complaint was filed for the quieting of title to real property by
dismiss alleged that the instant complaint or case is identical to or the same plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio. Later, a motion to dismiss
as that of Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio was filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause
alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased, and whose legal heirs and successors in of action is barred by a prior judgment.
interest are the very same defendants in the instant complaint.
100.   This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or
There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff on the ground that for prior case, besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to
judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff
apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose
nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. legal heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the
instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Civil Case no. 1574 is a bar to the
filing of the case at bar? YES 101.   Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for
'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and
There was no denial as to the truth that there was a previous dismissal of the involving practically the same property and practically the same
same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of defendants, parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively,
who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat.
them and father of the rest.
102.   Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as
There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated. There
the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that was an opposition on the part of plaintiff on the ground that for prior
appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be
futile for the court to continue with the case as there had been such a prior apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there
judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be
court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was essentially inferred.
a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was predictable?
103.   Then, on September 26, 1966, came the order complained
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of : "Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the
of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its defendants anchored on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action is
barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-
 founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by
Case No. 1574, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new Rules of the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is
Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the not contrary to law.
instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is
hereby dismissed. 4.   There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in
ISSUE/s: force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice
97.   Whether or not the dismissal of Civil Case no. 1574 is a bar to the better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part
filing of Civil Case 2639? YES – The Court's previous dismissal of and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a
Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal
and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless
subsequent action against the same parties over the same issues and appeal.
the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff.
5.   It has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor, a
RULING: WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the
hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiff. altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law.
Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an
RATIO: imperative of our legal system in mind.
Issue 1
1.   The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be
raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on
the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of
applicant is that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement
made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal of the
same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of
defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased
husband of one of them and father of the rest.

2.   There was no denial either of the property involved being the same
and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would
show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It
would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as
there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant.
What then was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense
in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as
the outcome was predictable?

3.   Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the

Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by
nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that
under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial
notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously
 019 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Industrial enterprises either case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by
(HORTALEZA) Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in
January 15, 2014 | Brion, J. | Rule 129 Section 1-3 evidence copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP
opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however,
PETITIONER:Land Bank of the Philippines that the April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer
RESPONDENTS: Yatco Industrial enterprises in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient
SUMMARY: Yatco Industrial enterprises is the owner of Pursuant to compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the property at Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s
₱1,126,132.89.8 Yatco did not find this valuation acceptable and thus previous ruling – to be legally erroneous. because firstly he RTC-SAC
elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 and thus
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then acted outside the contemplation of the law. Lastly, The valuation fixed by
conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just Branches 35 and 36 was inapplicable to the property. Thus the Petition is
compensation. The PARAD computed the value of the property at Granted and Remanded to the RTC of San Pablo as both parties failed to
₱16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s current market value (as shown in adduce the real value of the property.
the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the formula "MV x 2."
The PARAD noted that the LBP did not present any verified or authentic DOCTRINE 1: The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of
document to back up its computation; hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous. The taking of
valuation. In turn he RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills
at ₱200.00 per square meter. The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation by the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it
adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City, is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to "take
Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in turn, adopted the judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when
valuation that the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 arrived at in Civil Case said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively, civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a decision or
weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1) the
LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other
likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so.45 In either
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The LBP contends case, the courts must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3,
that the RTC-SAC made an erroneous adoptions of the cases previously in Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in evidence
the cases of branch 35 and 36, because it ignores the factors in this case such copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP opposed.
as that the just compensation was pursuant to the (agrarian program). the These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming, however, that the
question of whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer in
for the property was proper.? NO. The rules allow the courts to take evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient compliance
judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous. with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, still
The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous
for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in ruling – to be legally erroneous.
this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized
to "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even FACTS:
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or 1.   Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the
before the same judge." They may, however, take judicial notice of a registered owner of a 27.5730-hectare parcel of agricultural land
decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court (property) in Barangay Mabato, Calamba, Laguna, covered by
if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49465.5 On April 30, 1999,6 the
the other party; or (2) the court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In
 government placed the property under the coverage of its present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). the CA’s May 3, 2006 resolution.
2.   Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 405,7 the LBP valued the 9.  
property at ₱1,126,132.89.8 Yatco did not find this valuation
acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of ISSUE/s:
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator 1.   WoN the RTC-SAC’s determination of just compensation for the
(PARAD) of San Pablo City, which then conducted summary property was proper? (i put all the explanations even those that might
administrative proceedings for the determination of just not be relevant to evidence. important is in bold) NO. The rules
compensation allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the RTC-
3.   The PARAD computed the value of the property at SAC’s valuation is erroneous. The taking of judicial notice is a
₱16,543,800.00;10 it used the property’s current market value (as matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose
shown in the tax declaration that Yatco submitted) and applied the that the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is
formula "MV x 2." The PARAD noted that the LBP did not present equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to
any verified or authentic document to back up its computation; "take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
hence, it brushed aside the LBP’s valuation. even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
4.   The LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD’s ruling. Instead, it court or before the same judge." They may, however, take
filed with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another
just compensation.12 case sitting in the same court if: (1) the parties present them in
5.   The RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the
₱200.00 per square meter.13 The RTC-SAC arrived at this valuation court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts
by adopting the valuation set by the RTC of Calamba City, must observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129
6.   Branch 35 (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,14 which, in of the Rules of Court. We note that Yatco offered in evidence
turn, adopted the valuation that the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36 copies of the decisions in the civil cases, which offer the LBP
(Branch 36) arrived at in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C15 (collectively, opposed. These were duly noted by the court. Even assuming,
civil cases). The RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s however, that the April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that
evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed noted Yatco’s offer in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it)
to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and likewise constitutes sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section
failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). valuation – based on Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally
7.   The RTC-SAC subsequently denied the LBP’s motion for erroneous.
reconsideration. The LBP appealed to the CA.
8.   The CA dismissed the LBP’s appeal.19 Significantly, it did not find RULING: Wherefore, in view of these considerations, we hereby
the LBP’s assigned errors – the RTC-SAC’s reliance on the GRANT the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
valuation made by Branches 35 and 36 in the civil cases – to be decision dated January 26, 2006 and the resolution dated May 3, 2006 of
persuasive. First, according to the CA, the parcels of land in the civil the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87530, and REMAND Agrarian
cases were the very same properties in the appealed agrarian case. Case No. SP-064(02) to the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
Second, Branch 36’s valuation was based on the report of the duly Branch 30, for its determination of just compensation under the terms of
appointed commissioners and was arrived at after proper land Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and Department of Agrarian
inspection. As the determination of just compensation is essentially a Reform Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, as amended.
judicial function, the CA thus affirmed the RTC-SAC’s valuation
which was founded on factual and legal bases. The LBP filed the
RATIO: its minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not
1.   The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial warrant the formula’s strict application; they may, in the exercise of
function that the Judiciary exercises within the parameters of the law. their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the factual
2.   The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial situations before them.39 They must, however, clearly explain the
function.26 Section 57 of R.A. No. 665727 explicitly vests the RTC- reason for any deviation from the factors and formula that the law
SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just and the rules have provided.40
compensation for lands under CARP coverage. 7.   The situation where a deviation is made in the exercise of judicial
3.   To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of discretion should at all times be distinguished from a situation where
R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into there is utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law
account to correctly determine just compensation. The law (under and by the implementing rules. For in such a case, the RTC-SAC’s
Section 49 of R.A. No. 665728) likewise empowers the DAR to action already amounts to grave abuse of discretion for having been
issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5- taken outside of the contemplation of the law.41
98 incorporating the law’s listed factors in determining just 8.   Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation teaches us that the use of the
compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take wrong considerations by the ruling tribunal in deciding the case or a
these factors into account. particular matter in issue amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In
4.   That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law Gonzales, the CA reversed the NLRC’s ruling that ordered the
(and consequently the DAR’s implementing formula) is not a novel payment of interest on the total monetary award. In reversing this
concept.29 In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,30 we said CA ruling and reinstating the NLRC’s award of interest, the Court
that the RTC-SAC must consider the factors enumerated under pointed out that the CA relied solely on the doctrine of immutability
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as translated into a basic formula by of judgments, a consideration that was completely erroneous
the DAR, in determining just compensation. We stressed the RTC- particularly in light of the other attendant and relevant factors, i.e.,
SAC’s duty to apply the DAR formula in determining just the law on the legal interests that final orders and rulings on
compensation in Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada31 and forbearance of money should bear, which the CA utterly ignored.
reiterated this same ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim,32 Accordingly, the Court considered the CA in grave abuse of
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Luciano,33 and Land Bank of the discretion as it used the wrong considerations and thereby acted
Philippines v. Colarina,34 to name a few. outside the contemplation of the law.
5.   in the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of 9.   This use of considerations that were completely outside the
determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted contemplation of the law is the precise situation we find in the
unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657- present case, as fully explained below.
enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. 10.  The rules allow the courts to take judicial notice of certain facts; the
These factors and formula provide the uniform framework or RTC-SAC’s valuation is erroneous
structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property 11.  The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and
subject to agrarian reform. This uniform system will ensure that they convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is
do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.43
contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just Generally, courts are not authorized to "take judicial notice of
compensation. This system will likewise ensure that the just the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases
compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
approximation of the full and real value of the property taken that is same judge."44 They may, however, take judicial notice of a
fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same
landowner. court if: (1) the parties present them in evidence, absent any
6.   When acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the RTC- opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in its
SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to discretion, resolves to do so.45 In either case, the courts must
 observe the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is
the Rules of Court. applicable, the formula shall be: LV = MV x 2
12.  We note that Yatco offered in evidence copies of the decisions in In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2
the civil cases,46 which offer the LBP opposed.47 These were exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under
duly noted by the court.48 Even assuming, however, that the consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that
April 21, 2004 order of the RTC-SAC (that noted Yatco’s offer order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of
in evidence and the LBP’s opposition to it) constitutes sufficient claimfolder.
compliance with the requirement of Section 3, Rule 129 of the 16.  After considering these factors and formula, we are convinced that
Rules of Court, still we find the RTC-SAC’s valuation – based on the RTC-SAC completely disregarded them and simply relied on
Branch 36’s previous ruling – to be legally erroneous. Branch 36’s valuation. For one, the RTC-SAC did not point to any
13.  First, The RTC-SAC fully disregarded Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 specific evidence or cite the values and amounts it used in arriving at
and DAR AO 5-98 and thus acted outside the contemplation of the the ₱200.00 per square meter valuation. It did not even consider the
law. property’s market value based on the current tax declaration that
14.  Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 reads: Yatco insists the RTC-SAC considered in addition to Branch 36’s
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining valuation. Assuming that the RTC-SAC considered the property’s
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current market value (which, again, we find that it did not), this alone will
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn not suffice as basis, unless justified under Item II.A.3 of DAR AO 5-
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment 98 (as provided above). Then too, it did not indicate the formula that
made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and it used in arriving at its valuation or which led it to believe that
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers Branch 36’s valuation was applicable to this case. Lastly, the RTC-
and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of SAC did not conduct an independent assessment and computation
taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on using the considerations required by the law and the rules.
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its 17.  To be exact, the RTC-SAC merely relied on Branch 36’s valuation
valuation. as it found the LBP’s evidence on the matter of just compensation
15.  While DAR AO 5-9850 pertinently provides: inadequate. While indeed we agree that the evidence presented by
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands the LBP was inadequate and did not also consider the legally
covered by VOS or CA: prescribed factors and formula, the RTC-SAC still legally erred in
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) solely relying on Yatco’s evidence which we find equally irrelevant
Where: and off-tangent to the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No.
LV = Land Value 6657.
CNI = Capitalized Net Income 18.  Lastly, The valuation fixed by Branches 35 and 36 was inapplicable
CS = Comparable Sales to the property
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration 19.  Civil Case No. 2326-96-C,52 decided by Branch 35, and Civil Case
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, No. 2259-95-C,53 decided by Branch 36, were both eminent domain
relevant, and applicable. cases initiated by the NAPOCOR under the power granted to it by
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 120,54 as amended by R.A. No.
applicable, the formula shall be: 6395,55 i.e., to acquire property or easement of right of way.
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) 20.  Evidently, the civil cases were not made under the provisions of the
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are CARL nor for agrarian reform purposes, as enunciated under R.A.
applicable, the formula shall be: No. 6657.57 In exercising the power vested in it by the provisions of
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) C.A. No. 120 (as amended), the NAPOCOR did not seek to acquire
and distribute lands to farmers and regular farmworkers; the
 NAPOCOR sought easement of right of way to transmit electric fixed by Branches 35 and 36 – considerations that we find were
power as it was completely irrelevant and misplaced. This is an error that now
21.  Also, we point out that the RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36’s valuation requires fresh determination of just compensation again at the RTC-
without any qualification or condition. Yet, in disposing of the SAC level.
present case, the just compensation that it fixed for the property 26.  As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is
largely differed from the former. Note that Branch 36 fixed a primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation
valuation of ₱20.00 per square meter;58 while the RTC-SAC, in the for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes.64 But
present case, valued the property at ₱200.00 per square meter.59 this determination is only preliminary. The landowner may still take
Strangely, the RTC-SAC did not offer any explanation nor point to the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication.65
any evidence, fact or particular that justified the obvious discrepancy Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction
between these amounts. over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under
22.  Lastly, in ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC.66 But, in its determination
expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking.60 The the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down by
"time of taking" refers to that time when the State deprived the law and the pertinent DAR regulations.
landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State
acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.62
23.  The RTC-SAC, in the present case, rendered its decision in 2004; the
LBP filed the petition for judicial determination of just compensation
in 2002. Obviously, the "taking" of the property could not have been
made any earlier than 2002; otherwise, the parties would have
pointed these out. Between 1997 in Civil Case No. 2259-95-C and
the earliest taking in 2002 in this case is a difference of 5 years – a
significant gap in the matter of valuation since the lands involved are
not in the hinterlands, but in the rapidly industrializing Calamba,
Laguna.
24.  Under these circumstances – i.e., the insufficiency of the evidence
presented by both the LBP and Yatco on the issue of just
compensation - the more judicious approach that the RTC-SAC
could have taken was to exercise the authority granted to it by
Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657, rather than simply adopt Branch 36’s
valuation. Under Section 5863 of R.A. No. 6657, the RTC-SAC may
appoint one or more Commissioners to ascertain and report to it the
facts necessary for the determination of the just compensation for the
property. Unfortunately, the RTC-SAC did not avail of this
opportunity, with disastrous results for the parties in light of the time
gap between now and the time the RTC-SAC decision was made in
2004.1âwphi1
25.  We cannot help but highlight the attendant delay as the RTC-SAC
obviously erred in a manner that we cannot now remedy at our level.
The RTC-SAC erred and effectively abused its discretion by fixing
the just compensation for the property based solely on the valuation
 020 Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading (Vargas Maipid the sum of P2,800.00 as unpaid balance of the purchase price
29 August 1969 | Barredo, J. | What Need Not Be Proved of certain personal properties (equipment, tools, engine blocks, spare
parts, etc) located in its Bodega No. 2 at Sta Mesa Boulevard, Manila
PETITIONER: Board of Liquidators, Trustee of the Land Settlement & which are described in the said complaint as “Lots Nos. 1 and 2,
Development Corporation Bodega 2, Sta Mesa Compound.”
RESPONDENTS: Ricma Trading Corporation and Ricardo M. Maipid 105.   The defendants RICMA and Maipid moved to dismiss the
complaint on two grounds:
SUMMARY: In 1962, the Board of Liquidators filed a complaint against a.   The cause of action is barred by statute of limitations.
RICMA to recover the sum of P2,800.00 as unpaid balance of the purchase Inasmuch as there was no written contract evidencing the
price of personal properties (equipment, tools, spare parts, etc). RICMA sale between the parties nor any written promise or
moved to dismiss the complaint based mainly on the contention that the commitment on the part of the defendants RICMA and
cause of action is barred by statute of limitations. Inasmuch as there was no Maipid to pay the alleged unpaid balance, the cause of action
written contract evidencing the sale between the parties nor any written ws merely based on an oral contract, which, pursuant to art.
promise or commitment on the part of the defendants RICMA and Maipid to 1139, should have been filed within 6 years from the accrual
pay the alleged unpaid balance, the cause of action ws merely based on an of the cause of action, i.e., from Oct. 24, 1955 – the date
oral contract, which, pursuant to art. 1139, should have been filed within 6 when the last partial payment was made to the same day in
years from the accrual of the cause of action, i.e., from Oct. 24, 1955 – the 1961. The complaint being filed in 1962, prescription had
date when the last partial payment was made to the same day in 1961. The already set in.
complaint being filed in 1962, prescription had already set in. The lower b.   The complaint states no cause of action in so far as
court ruled in favor of the petitioner BOL-LASEDECO. RICMA appealed. Maipid is concerned.
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether or not the lower court erred ISSUE/s:
in not dismissing the case as against defendant RICMA on the ground that 33.   Whether or not the lower court erred in not dismissing the case as
the cause of action has already prescribed – NO. While there was no formal against defendant RICMA on the ground that the cause of action has
written contract signed by the parties, separate documents (Res. 7173, already prescribed – NO. Thus, while there was no formal written
invoice receipt, official receipts) constitute written evidence of the contract signed by the parties, separate documents (Res. 7173,
agreement because these documents, although separate, if taken together, invoice receipt, official receipts) constitute written evidence of the
embody all the terms and conditions of the agreement of purchase and sale agreement because these documents, although separate, if taken
between the BOL-LASEDECO and RICMA. Therefore, the cause of action together, embody all the terms and conditions of the agreement of
has not yet prescribed – the action being based on a written contract. Besides, purchase and sale between the BOL-LASEDECO and RICMA.
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that contractual transactions Therefore, the cause of action has not yet prescribed – the action
with government or any of its instrumentalities are invariably in writing. being based on a written contract.
DOCTRINE: The reference to an action "upon a written contract" in Article RULING: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with
1144 of the Civil Code does not preclude instances when the agreement costs against appellant.
may not be found in one single document but in two or more separate RATIO:
writings related to each other, which when taken together contain all the Issue 1
elements of a contract. 1.   The main thesis of RICMA in regard to the issue of prescription is
that the transaction upon which the action is based was not evidenced
by any written agreement and, being verbal, said action prescribes in
FACTS: six years, and, therefore, the complaint should have been dismissed,
104.   On Aug. 15, 1962, The Board of Liquidators, as trustee of considering that it was filed only on August 15, 1962 whereas the
the defunct Land Settlement and Development Corporation said transaction took place in October, 1955.
(LASEDECO), filed a complaint to recover from defendants Ricma 2.   Overruling this contention, the court a quo sustained the claim of
Trading Corporation (RICMA) and its President/Gen. Manager
 BOL-LASEDECO that even if the said transaction was verbal "the said LASEDECO has offered for bidding certain personal
renewal of the bond executed by the Manila Underwriters Insurance properties consisting of equipment, tools, engine blocks, spare parts,
Co., Inc., on December 28, 1955, to secure the payment of said supplies, and other junks at its bodega No. 2 at Sta. Mesa, which are
balance of P2,800.00, has interrupted the running of said period of designated as Lots Nos. I and 2, and defendant corporation through
limitation." It held thus: its President, defendant Ricardo Maipid submitted its bid thereon on
". . . The evidence show that on January 2, 1957, the September 7, 1955, but which is not acceptable to plaintiff;
defendant, RicmaTrading Corporation, thru its President and General "2. That subsequently the defendant corporation through defendant
Manager, R.M. Maipid, wrote a letter (Exhibit 'G-l ') to Mr. Maipid negotiated with the plaintiff for the purchase of the
Filomeno C. Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators, Manila, as aforementioned personal properties, and which was awarded to said
follows: 'In connection with our Bond #D-050 issued by the Manila corporation in the amount of P10,000.00 as per Resolution No. 7173,
Underwriters Co. which expires on December 28, 1956, and in dated October 14, 1955, as evidenced by a certified true copy of the
compliance with your request for renewal, we beg to enclose extract of the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Liquidators,
herewith the renewal policy for another Year.' which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 'A';
"In the opinion of the Court, this letter is a manifest acknowledgment "3. That in pursuance to said Resolution No. 7173 defendant
on the part of the defendant corporation to pay said balance of corporation through defendant Maipid received on October 15, 1955,
P2,800.00 for it is certainly difficult to understand why the defendant the above- mentioned properties as evidenced by Memorandum
should renew the bond precisely to secure the payment of said Receipts which are attached hereto and marked as Exhibits 'B' and
balance of P2,800.00 if it was not willing anymore to recognize it as 'B-1';
its legitimate obligation and to pay the same. It is true that the "4. That defendant corporation paid the plaintiff the sums of
execution of said bond was for the purpose of securing the verbal P5,000.00 and P3,000.00 only on October 15 and 24, 1955,
obligation of the defendant with the Land Settlement and respectively, as evidenced by Official Receipts Nos. A-0266790 and
Development Corporation but when it renewed said bond, especially A-0263397, respectively, and which are attached hereto and marked
upon the request of the plaintiff, Board of Liquidators, as trustee of as Exhs. 'C' and 'C-1';
the Land Settlement and Development Corporation, the defendant "5. That actual delivery and receipt of Lot No. 2 in bodega 2 was
expressly acknowledged that it was still indebted to the plaintiff in effected on October 24, 1955, as evidenced by an Invoice Receipt
the sum of P2,800.00. According to Article 1155 of the New Civil No. 61 which is attached hereto and marked as Exh. 'D';" (Pp. 146-
Code, 'The prescription of actions is interrupted . . . when there 147, Record on Appeal)
is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.' 4.   Thus, while there was no formal written contract signed by the
Consequently, the contention of the defendants that plaintiff's parties, it cannot be denied that the Resolution 7173 of appellee
cause of action has already expired is devoid of any legal merit." Board, signed by all its members, and the invoice receipt signed
(Pp. 151-152, Record on Appeal) in two parts by defendant Maipid on behalf of appellant, not to
3.   This ruling is on the whole correct, but the truth of the matter is that speak of the official receipts issued for the payment of the articles in
although, according to His Honor, "it is admitted that the question, constitute written evidence of the agreement because
transaction is not evidenced by any written contract of purchase these documents, although actually separate ones, if taken
and sale and, therefore, it is verbal," it is clear from the record that together, embody not only all the elements of a contract but even
by this statement, His Honor must have meant only that there was all the terms and conditions of the agreement of purchase and
no formal contract executed in due form by the parties. For in the sale between the appellant and appellee.
stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, which this court may 5.   Besides, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that contractual
not disregard, it is clearly stated that: transactions with government or any of its instrumentalities are
"1. That the Board of Liquidators which is the agency designated invariably in writing.
under Republic Act No. 1160 to liquidate the assets of the Land 6.   In the case of Peralta de Guerrero vs. Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.,
Settlement and Development Corporation, and is acting as trustee of the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss an action for the
 recovery of damages resulting from the death of a passenger of
defendant's ship when it capsized on the ground that the same was
not based on a written contract, there being none alleged in the
complaint. This Court rejected this contention thus:
"We are inclined to uphold the contention of appellants, for a cursory
reading of the complaint would show that their cause of action is
predicated upon the failure of appellee to comply with its contract of
carrying the deceased from Malangas, Zamboanga to the City of
Manila safely, in that the vessel on which he was riding belonging to
defendant capsized because of the reckless and imprudent manner it
was managed and steered by its crew. It is true that the complaint
does not in so many words state that the transportation was
undertaken by virtue of a written contract of carriage, but this can be
implied from the complaint because it is a matter of common
knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship for
transportation from one place to another he is issued a ticket by
the shipper wherein the terms of the contract are specified.
According to appellants, 'This ticket is in itself a complete written
contract by and between the shipper and the passenger.”
7.   With much more reason can We hold in the case at bar that
appellee's action is based on a written contract. The reference to
an action "upon a written contract" in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code does not preclude instances when the agreement may not be
found in one single document but in two or more separate
writings related to each other, which when taken together
contain all the elements of a contract.
 021 PEOPLE v. MAPA (VICENCIO) Us creates a nagging doubt on the culpability of the accused-appellant. It is
March 31, 1993 | Nocon, J. | Judicial Notice sad to state that many innocent people become victims of physical violence
and/or harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the protectors
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines of the citizenry. We cannot condone such practices to continue in a civilized
RESPONDENTS: Elmer Mapa y de Gula society.

SUMMARY: Acting upon information that “Elmer” was engaged in drug- Judicial Notice of Bad Cops Who Plant Evidence - While this Court
pushing, policemen conducted a surveillance operation and buy-bust commends the efforts of law enforcement agencies who are engaged in the
operation in Valenzuela. Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, as a poseur-buyer, was difficult and dangerous task of apprehending and prosecuting drug-
introduced to be a “score” of “damo.” Elmer Mapa, after recevieing two traffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes nor ignore the many reports of
marked 10.00 bills, left for a while to get marijuana. The policemen then saw false arrests of innocent persons for extortion purposes and blackmail, or to
a certain person Serapio de Gula who handed something over to Elmer. satisfy some hidden personal resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer
Then, Elmer returned and the handed to the poser-buyer a plastic bag against the accused. Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped
containing 12 sticks of marijuana cigarettes. Pat. Capangyarihan identified up drug charges lest an innocent man, on the basis of planted evidence, be
himself as a policemen and arrested Mapa. Serapio, since he was also seen as made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
the person whom Elmer talked, was also arrested. They were charged for
violating Sec. 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The TC acquitted FACTS:
Serapio for reasonable doubt, while Mapa was found guilty. The People’s version of the facts is as follows:
11.   Acting upon a confidential information that a certain "Elmer" was
Issue: WoN Mapa’s conviction should be upheld – NO. “The conflicting and engaged in drug pushing at T. de Gula St., Marulas Valenzuela,
contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the weakness of its case Major Elias Casimiro, Chief of the Valenzuela Police Anti-Narcotics
thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his guilt.” The SC finds “several Unit dispatched a team composed of Valenzuela policemen, namely:
glaring inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the Cpt. Romeo Martin, Pfc. Pedro Protestante, Patrolmen Eduardo
prosecution witnesses as to engender doubt on the moral certainty of Elmer's Pabalan, Wilfredo Lucero and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct a
guilt.” For one, the policemen had conflicting testimony on whether Mapa surveillance operation in the area.
was present when Serpaio was being arrested. Secondly, prosecution cannot 12.   On July 16, 1986, at around 8 o’clock in the evening, the team
even determine what was really taken from Elmer, a tea bag or cigarettes launched a buy-bust operation against Elmer Mapa y de Gula
sticks. There were also inconsistencies on who requested for the seized (Elmer) at T. de Gula St., Marulas, Valenzuela using two (2) P10.00
articles to be examined by the NBI marked bills.
13.   Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, who then acted as a poseur-buyer
DOCTRINE: (From reviewer) Judidicial Notice of Presumption that Drug together with the confidential informant proceeded to Elmer's
User = Drug Dealer - It would be noteworthy to mention though, that address at T. de Gula Street.
accused-appellant was subjected to a drug test to find out whether he was 14.   Upon reaching the place, the confidential informant introduced Pat.
likewise a drug user. It is often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all Capangyarihan to Elmer as a "scorer" of "damo."
the time is also a drug user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support 15.   Pat. Capangyarihan asked for P20.00 worth of marijuana and then
his being a drug dependent. For whatever its worth, accused-appellant was handed to Elmer the two (2) marked P10.00 bills. After receipt of the
found to be drug free. In the NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646, 20 money, Elmer left for a while to get the "marijuana."
blood and urine specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for the 16.   Later, Elmer entered the yard of the house with a wooden fence and
presence of prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this report was not talked briefly to a certain person (later identified as accused Serapio
presented during trial, such is made part of the records. de Gula) who was seen by Pat. Capangyarihan handing over
something to Elmer.
Records Indicate Falsity - The evident falsehood spread on the records before
 17.   Thereafter, Elmer returned and handed over to the poseur-buyer a 28.   Serapio threatened to file charges against these police officers for
plastic bag containing twelve (12) sticks of marijuana cigarettes. mauling him so much so that said officers likewise arrested him
18.   Pat. Capangyarihan identified himself as a policeman and grabbed 29.   This was corroborated by a defense witness, Antonio Trinidad. In his
Elmer by the arms. Pat. Capangyarihan then signalled his testimony, Antonio revealed that one unidentified man entered the
companions to come and help him subdue the suspect. house and when questioned by Serapio de Gula, the man hit the latter
19.   At this juncture, Serapio de Gula approached the police team and with gun. He could not do anything, much less the other chess
told them that Elmer is his nephew. The policemen told Serapio that players present because guns were poked at them.
Elmer was placed under arrest for selling "marijuana". 30.   Both the accused were brought to the sub-station where they were
20.   Since Pat. Capangyarihan recognized Serapio as the person with mauled and forced to admit the charges against them.
whom Elmer talked after receiving the marked bills, Serapio was 31.   Serapio remembered Patrolman Inciong going to his cell and
also arrested. showing (14) tea bags and jestingly said, “Never will you be able to
21.   The two (2) marked bills were retrieved from the Elmer. Elmer and get out of this jail because we will charge you with drug pushing and
Serapio were brought to the Valenzuela Police Headquarters for we will use these as evidence against you.”
further investigation. 32.   Tarried in jail during the early months of their apprehension, Elmer
22.   The plastic bag containing the twelve (12) sticks of suspected Mapa learned that a policeman talked to a certain Dueñas who was
marijuana were forwarded to the NBI for examination. Microscopic, earlier detained for illegal possession of marijuana, that if he wanted
chemical and chromatographic tests was conducted on the seized to be released, he must give a substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo.
articles and all yielded "positive results" for "marijuana". 33.   That upon his apprehension, he learned that Eduardo Dueñas was
23.   Elmer Mapa y de Gula and Serapio de Gula y Tongco were both later released by the police.
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 34.   After a trial on the merits, Serapio de Gula was acquitted on
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Information reasonable doubt while accused Elmer Mapa was found guilty of
said: “... wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously possessed and sell and the crime charged and was sentenced accordingly to suffer the
gave away twelve (12) sticks of marijuana treated cigarettes” penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Elmer Mapa however, disputes the foregoing facts. Instead, the defense
maintains that the facts are as follows: ISSUE/s:
24.   At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1986, while accused 1.   WoN Elmer Mapa’s conviction should be upheld – NO. “The
Elmer Mapa was inside their house with his co-accused/uncle conflicting and contradictory evidence of the prosecution affirms the
Serapio de Gula and their chess club members playing chess, two weakness of its case thereby creating reasonable doubt as to his
men with drawn guns entered the premises of the accused's house guilt.” The SC finds “several glaring inconsistencies and
without permission, calling for accused Elmer Mapa, prompting contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to
accused Serapio de Gula to tell them, "pare, anong problema, engender doubt on the moral certainty of Elmer's guilt.”
trespassing kayo.”
25.   In answer, the men identified themselves as policemen and told RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed herefrom is hereby
Serapio not to interfere. However, Serapio de Gula insisted that even REVERSED, and the accused-appellant, Elmer Mapa y de Gula, is hereby
if they were police officers they should nevertheless ask permission ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
from the owner of the house before entering.
26.   In reply the police officers allegedly manhandled him while one of RATIO:
them entered the house where accused Elmer Mapa was, pulled him 13.   The prosecution presented only two of the members of the buy-
out and brought him to a waiting jeep. bust operation, whose testimonies unfortunately did not impress
27.   Serapio further testified that the four police officers who manhandled this Court. On the contrary, it weakens the prosecution’s case.
him were Patrolman Puchero, Patrolman Inciong, Patrolman 14.   Take for instance the testimony of Pat. Capangyarihan who testified
Capangyarihan and Patrolman Protestante that Serapio was arrested some 9 to 10 meters away from where
 Elmer Mapa was standing and that he was not present during the 41.   Q And after Elmer had approached you, what did he do?
arrest of Serapio de Gula. 42.   A He handed me a plastic container containing twelve (12)
15.   Contrary to his testimony however, Pat. Lucero testified that when handrolled suspected marijuana cigarettes.
Serapio was apprehended by him Pat. Capangyarihan was present 43.   Q And what did you do?
and saw him effect the arrest (Note: I’m reproducing the cross- 44.   A After Emer handed to me that suspected handrolled marijuana
examinations because they are important) cigarettes, I introduced myself to him and then I arrested him.
16.   Pat. Capangyarihan: 45.   On the other hand, Pat. Lucero testified that what Elmer was holding
17.   Q Do you know who was that person? is a tea bag of marijuana and not a plastic container containing
18.   A. Later on, I came to know the name of that person and it appears twelve (12) handrolled marijuana cigarettes.
that his name is Serapio de Gula. 46.   Q When you saw Elmer Mapa being held by Pat. Capangyarihan, did
19.   Q And how far were you from them when they talked with each you see him holding the money, referring to accused Elmer Mapa?
other? 47.   A Yes, sir.
20.   A. From the witness stand up to that wall, sir (Which was estimated 48.   Q What was that?
to be 9 to 10 meters). 1 49.   A One tea bag of marijuana.
21.   xxx xxx xxx 50.   xxx xxx xxx
22.   Q Mr. Witness, when you accosted Elmer Mapa, you actually were 51.   Q What happened to the tea bag being held by Elmer Mapa and two
not aware what happened to Serapio de Gula since you were not peso bills found in possession of Serapio de Gula?
present when he was accosted by Pat. Lucero? 52.   A The tea bag of marijuana was brought to the NBI for laboratory
23.   A It was Elmer Mapa who was first accosted and after he was examination.
arrested, my other police companions ran. 53.   Realizing probably his mistake, Pat. Capangyarihan later on changed
24.   Q And they ran towards what direction? his testimony by stating that he could not remember whether it was a
25.   A Towards the place where Serapio de Gula was standing. plastic container that was given to him or not. Thus —
26.   Q And when you said the place where he was standing, it is the place 54.   Q Mr. Witness, it appears that this alleged marijuana handrolled
where he was talking with Elmer Mapa? cigarettes is contained in an envelope with the marking DDM, etc. Is
27.   A Yes, Ma'am. this also the same container when you received the marijuana from
28.   Patrolman Lucero on the other hand, testified differently on this the accused?
matter 55.   A I cannot recall if this was the same thing wherein these 12 sticks of
29.   Q After you approached Pat. Capangyarihan, what happen next? marijuana were placed.
30.   A Subsequently a person pulled Elmer Mapa. 56.   xxx xxx xxx
31.   Q Who was this person who arrived and pulled Emer Mapa? 57.   Q But you don't recall. Mr. witness, at the time you apprehended the
32.   A Serapio de Gula, Sir. accused where was this marijuana cigarettes?
33.   Q Did Serapio de Gula succeed in pulling out Elmer Mapa from the 58.   A After having taken these marijuana cigarettes from Mapa, I took
hands of Pat. Capangyarihan? hold of them.
34.   A. No, sir. 59.   Q Meaning this was not contained in any container?
35.   Q What happened after that? 60.   A I cannot remember anymore if it was contained in any container or
36.   A We got hold of Serafin de Gula and asked him why he is not. 15
interfering. 61.   The trial court observed the strange testimony of Pat. Lucero on a
37.   xxx xxx xxx material point on cross examination wherein he admitted that a tea
38.   Q What did you do after you were informed about that? bag cannot be cigarette sticks. This shows that the prosecution
39.   A We also got hold of Serapio de Gula and frisked him. cannot even determine what was really taken from Elmer, a tea bag
40.   Another glaring inconsistency lies in the seized articles. Pat. or cigarettes sticks. Thus, the Court inquired:
Capangyarihan testifies:
62.   Q Now, Mr. Witness, who was in custody of the alleged tea bag 81.   The inconsistencies were never explained by the prosecution.
which was recovered by the team from Elmer Mapa, who was in Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies
possession from the time Elmer Mapa was already arrested up to the of the prosecution witnesses cast doubt on the culpability of the
time he was brought to the police station? Elmer and his guilt for the crime charged.
63.   A It was Pat. Mario Capangyarihan, sir. 82.   As it is, the bungled testimonies of the police officers cannot be
64.   Q But you admitted that you have occasion to look at the tea bag? given credence. We are more inclined to believe the testimony of
65.   A Yes, sir. Elmer that he was a "target" to be arrested not for selling
66.   Q What is the difference between the tea bag and the suspected marijuana but as a replacement for Eduardo Dueñas who was at
marijuana? What is the difference? the time detained in the Municipal Jail, with Elmer as the
67.   A Tea bag is like a tea bag, it is square contained like cigarette. substitute or "palit-ulo" in jail lingo, so that the detainee could
68.   Q You will agree with me that as far as I know a roach is like what be released.
we call "upos", a cigarette wrapped in a paper. I am referring to the 83.   It would be noteworthy to mention though, that Elmer was subjected
paper wrapper, rolling paper? to a drug test to find out whether he was likewise a drug user. It is
69.   A Yes, ma'am. often observed that a drug pusher usually, if not all the time is also a
70.   Not only are there inconsistencies as to what was recovered but also drug user. The act of pushing drugs is a means to support his being a
on who requested for the seized articles to be examined by the NBI. drug dependent.
Pat. Capangyarihan testified that it was police aide Carreon who 84.   For whatever its worth, Elmer was found to be drug free. In the
brought the seized articles to the NBI for examination, whereas Pat. NBI Toxicology Report No. TDD-86-646, blood and urine
Lucero testified that it was he who forwarded the marijuana to the specimens of Elmer Mapa showed negative results for the
NBI. Thus — presence of prohibited and or regulated drugs. Though this
71.   Pat. Capangyarihan: report was not presented during trial, such is made part of the
Q By the way who submitted this alleged marijuana handrolled cigarettes records.
to the NBI? 85.   The evident falsehood spread on the records before Us creates a
72.   A As far as I could remember, it was police aide Carreon who nagging doubt on the culpability of the Elmer. It is sad to state that
brought it to the NBI. 17 many innocent people become victims of physical violence and/or
73.   Pat. Lucero however testified: harassment from police officers who are supposed to be the
74.   Q You said you forwarded this to the NBI for laboratory protectors of the citizenry. We cannot condone such practices to
examination. Did you come to know the result of the examination? continue in a civilized society.
75.   A Yes, sir. 86.   While this Court commends the efforts of law enforcement agencies
76.   Q How did you come to know the result? who are engaged in the difficult and dangerous task of apprehending
77.   A There was a request to bring to the NBI and I waited for the result and prosecuting drug-traffickers, it cannot, however, close its eyes
and upon reaching the headquarters, we submit them to the nor ignore the many reports of false arrests of innocent persons for
investigating Fiscal. extortion purposes and blackmail, or to satisfy some hidden personal
78.   The foregoing contradictory testimony of two prosecution witnesses resentment of the "informer" or law enforcer against the accused.
on who brought the marijuana to the NBI for laboratory examination 87.   Courts should be vigilant and alert to recognize trumped up drug
is significant. Is it police aide Carreon or Pat. Lucero? charges lest an innocent man, on the basis of planted evidence, be
79.   Carreon never testified on the matter or that the specimen submitted made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
to the NBI for examination was the same specimen allegedly taken
from the accused.
80.   Neither was Pat. Lucero's testimony clear on the matter. Obviously,
one of them is lying, Pat. Capangyarihan or Pat. Lucero. On
such kind of shaky testimony conviction cannot be had.
 022 HEIRS OF CANQUE v. CA (YAP)
21 July 1997 | Panganiban, J. | Mandatory Judicial Notice 106.   Sps. Marcelino and Fecilidad Canque were the registered
owners of a parcel of land in Davao Del Sur, with an OCT issued by
PETITIONER: The Heirs of Felicidad Canque namely: Surviving Spouse virtue of a free patent granted to them.
Marcelino and Children Mariano, Leonilo, Perfecta, Mexiquela, Emilio, 107.   They supposedly sold 750sqm of the land to the Iglesia ni
Marcelino Jr., Alejandro, the Heirs of Jesus and Adriano, all surnamed Kristo Church.
Canque 108.   Sps. Canque obtained a first loan from theRural Bank of
RESPONDENTS: CA, The Rural Bank of Matanao (Davao Del Sur), Inc. Matanao, with the parcel of land as collateral, which they duly paid
and/or Conrado Antonio eventually.
109.   After his wife passed away, Marcelino obtained a second
SUMMARY: Pursuant to their first loan, Sps. Canque executed a real estate loan from the rural ban, having the same collateral. The rural bank
mortgage over their parcel of land in Davao Del Sur in favor of the Rural treated this as an extension of the first loan.
Bank of Matanao. This first loan was duly paid. When Felicidad Canque 110.   Marcelo failed to pay the second loan, so the rural bank
died, Marcelino Canque obtained a second loan. Marcelino defaulted so the extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage and bought the
rural bank (type of bank is material here) extrajudicially foreclosed on the property as the highest bidder.
mortgage and was the highest bidder at the public sale. The Sheriff’s 111.   September 9, 1983 – the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was
Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9, 1983. 7 years later, in registered.
1990, Marcleino and his children offered to repurchase the land, but the rural 112.   October 18, 1985 – the rural bank executed an affidavit of
bank refused. They filed a petition for specific performance for the rural consolidation of ownership and deed of absolute sale.
bank to honor their offer of repurchase. The trial court ruled that there was a 113.   December 23, 1985 – TCT was issued by the Register of
continuing mortgage and that the right to purchase had not prescribed. The Deeds in favor of the rural bank.
CA reversed on the ground that the 5-year prescriptive period from the 114.   7 years later, Marcelino and his children offered to redeem
foreclosure or registration of sheriff’s certificate of sale had lapsed. Hence, the property in question but the rural bank refused.
this petition. 115.   RTC ruled in favor of Marcelino on the ground that the 5-
year redemption period had lapsed. CA reversed on the ground that
The pertinent issue is whether the right of repurchase had prescribed. the correct date to reckon the start of the prescriptive period for
redemption is September 9, 1983, the date of the registration of the
The SC ruled in the negative. First, the SC had recently decided in Rural Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. However, Marcelino filed the suit to
Bank of Davao City v. CA that when property is mortgaged to a RURAL redeem the property was filed only on September 7, 1990. The
bank, the mortgagor has 2 years from either the date of foreclosure (if no period already prescribed back in 1988.
Torrens Title) or from the date of registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of 116.   Hence, this petition.
Sale (if with Torrens Title) to repurchase. After expiration of the 2-year
period, §119 of the Public Land Act provides that the mortgagor or his heirs ISSUE/s:
still have another 5 years to repurchase the property mortgaged. Second,
(doctrine). 34.   Whether Marcelino, et. al.’s right of redemption had lapsed. NO —
since they actually have 7 years (2 years from the date of foreclosure
DOCTRINE: Every court must take cognizance of decisions the SC has or from registration of the sheriff’s certificate of sale + 5 years from
rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice, and the expiration of the aforementioned 2-year period).
more importantly form part of the legal system. Here, the CA should have 35.   Whether there was a continuing mortgage constituted over the parcel
decided pursuant to Rural Bank of Davao City v. CA. of land. YES – because there was indeed a continuing credit secured
by mortgage whereby the payment on a particular day equaled the
amount of the mortgage.
FACTS:
 equaled the amount of the mortgage. In such a situation, the
RULING: WHEREFORE, petition GRANTED. mortgage is not discharged as long as subsequent loans and/or
advancements may be demanded, as Marclino did in this case by
RATIO: obtaining the second loan.
103.   GR: Factual findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed
Prescriptive Period to Repurchase Not Prescribed on appeal.
a.   EXC: Unless the trial court has overlooked or ignored some
98.   In Rural Bank of Davao City v. CA, the SC had already ruled on the fact or circumstance of sufficient weight or significance
issue of repurchase of property foreclosed by rural banks: which, if considered, would alter the situation.
104.   Hence, their factual finding as to the parties' intention in
§119, Public Land Act entering into a real mortgage under a continuing credit/mortgage
arrangement is binding upon this Court.
2 years form the registration of the 105.   In any event, this issue is really academic in view of our
If covered by a sheriff’s certificate of sale + 5 years holding on the first question.
If the land is Torrens Title from the expiration of the 2-year
mortgaged to a period (himself or by heirs)
rural bank If NOT 2 years from the date of foreclosure +
covered by a 5 years from the expiration of the 2-
Torrens Title year period (himself or by heirs)
If the land is
Within 1 year from the registration of sale. If he fails to
mortgaged to
do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property
parties OTHER
within 5 years from the expiration of the redemption
than rural
period.
banks

99.   Here, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was registered on September 9,

1983. Thus, the 2-year prescriptive period would end on September
9, 1985. In line with the Public Land Act, they would likewise have
an addition period of 5 years, or until September 9, 1990, to exercise
their right to purchase.
100.   Every court must take cognizance of decisions the SC has
rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial
notice, and more importantly form part of the legal system.
101.   The SC stressed that members of the bench have a
responsibility to know and to apply the latest holdings of the SC. The
nature of their calling requires no less.

Factual Finding of Continuing Mortgage

102.   The lower court had ruled that there was indeed a continuing
credit secured by mortgage whereby the payment on a particular day
 023 PEOPLE v. BERSAMIN (YARTE) his wife spent the night at her parent’s house in another Municipality
5 March 1951 | Per Curiam | Judicial Notice 2 kilometer away.
118.   When his wife, Macaria Dalag returned the following
PETITIONER: Casimiro Bersamin, alias Mirong morning, she found her husband dead with 2 gunshot wounds. The
RESPONDENTS: The People of the Philippines household articles were scattered around the house and merchandise
were missing.
SUMMARY: On the night of October 24, 1948, Caguing was alone in his 119.   It was said that the couple had been running a small
house at Mangatarem, Pangasinan. His wife spent the night at her parent’s business. The missing goods were salted fish, canned sardines,
house. The following morning, his wife found him dead with 2 gunshot canned salmon, Chinese wine, threads, glass jars with biscuits, and
wounds. Their househould articles were scattered and some of their one Bible, with a total value of Php 80.00.
merchandise were missing. During trial for the robbery with homicide case, 120.   There were no eye-witnesses to the crime, and the main
the prosecution presented Emiliano Tolentino (Tolentino) and Francisco evidence for the prosecution was given by the companions of
Bulatao (Bulatao) as witnesses. Their testimonies in part narrated that they Casimiro Bersamin (Bersamin) during the robbery incident-
were asked by Casimiro Bersamin (Bersamin) to accompany them to the Emiliano Tolentino (Tolentino) and Francisco Bulatao (Bulatao).
house of Caguing. They saw Bersamin had a gun- .45 caliber "rifle" as 121.   Tolentino testified that on the night of Oct. 24, he was “taken
described by Tolentino and a revolver according to Bulatao. At Caguing’s or asked” by Bersamin and Francisco Bulatao to accompany them.
house, Bersamin and De la Vega went upstairs and thereafter, Tolentino and On the way to the house of Caguing, they were joined by other men.
Bulatao heard 2 gunshots. They also De la Vega and Bersamin coming down Arriving at Caguing's house, Bersamin and De la Vega went upstairs,
the stairs- De la Vega was holding a knapsack and Bersamin was holding a Bersamin held a .45 caliber "rifle". Thereafter, he heard two
sack. The lower cour promulgated a decision convicting Bersamin and gunshots from the house while he was standing about six meters
De la Vega for robbery with homicide. However, only Bersamin appealed away outside the house. A few moments after the shots De la Vega
his conviction with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.The issue in the SC is and Bersamin came down, the former with a knapsack and the latter
Whether or not Bulatao and Tolentino spoke the truth-Yes, their with a sack.
testimony rings true in all material aspects, while Bersamin’s testimony is 122.   Bulatao testified that he was left at the road by Bersamin and
irrational and conflicting. Bersamin also failed to call any witness to De la Vega while these walked toward the house of Caguing,
corroborate him in his alibi. Furthermore, the court mentioned the Bersamin carrying a revolver and De la Vega a carbine. Afterward
participation of Bersamin in a case for murder and double murder and shots rang out inside the house. By and by Bersamin and De la Vega
that he was hiding in order to avoid prosecution for those cases. In the came down bringing with them a sack and a knapsack respectively,
double murder case he was convicted with the penalty of life imprisonment, the latter of which contained bottle soft drinks. When the band
while he is under preliminary investigation for the murder case. The court arrived at the "junction" after the crime they were given a bottle each
believed that these instances proved the moral perversity of Bersamin. by Bersamin. A book was also taken from the house and was given
Therefore, the penalty was changed from reclusion perpetua to death. to him by Bersamin when they were returning home.
123.   For the defense, Bersamin testified that he was in his house
DOCTRINE: There is one other proof of moral perversity which, added to in barrio Galarin, Urbiztondo, about eight or nine kilometers from
the circumstances already mentioned, compels the Court to deal with the Mangatarem. On foot, the trip from one place to the other would take
appellant with utmost severity-when Bersamin pretreated the crime at bar, he three and one-half hours. About six o'clock in the afternoon he went
had been the ringleader in the case for murder and another case for double with Domingo Palisoc to Caturay, Mangatarem, near the barrio
murder and was in hiding to avoid arrest and prosecution in those cases. school. He also denied ownership of the pistol mentioned in
Bulatao’s testimony. The only reason why Bulatao testified against
him because Bulatao was mad at him.
FACTS: 124.   Bersamin and De la Vega were both convicted for robbery
117.   On the night of October 24, 1948, Dalmacio Caguing with homicide in the lower court. However, only Bersamin
(Caguing) slept alone in his home in Mangatarem, Pangasinan, for
 appealed his conviction which sentenced him to reclusion 111.   There is one other proof of moral perversity which, added
perpetua. to the circumstances already mentioned, compels the Court to deal
ISSUE/s: with the appellant with utmost severity. When Bersamin
36.   WoN Bulatao and Tolentino spoke the truth YES— their testimony pretreated the crime at bar, he had been the ringleader in the
rings true in all material aspects, while Bersamin’s testimony is case for murder and another case for double murder and was in
irrational and conflicting. hiding to avoid arrest and prosecution in those cases.6
112.   In the case for double murder, Bersamin has been found
RULING: The decision of the lower court is reversed as to the principal guilty in a decision which affirmed that of the Court of First Instance
penalty, and the appellant, Casimiro Bersamin, is hereby sentenced to sentecing him to life imprisonment, and which is being promulgated
death to be carried out in the manner provided by law. The appealed with this decision.
judgment is affirmed as to the rest of the sentence. Costs of this appeal will 113.   In the other case, one of the defendants, Crispin Licuanan,
be taxed against the appellant. was found guilty and sentenced to prison for life by the Court of First
Instance and by this Court (G.R. No. L-2960). As far as can be
RATIO: gathered from the record of the present appeal, that case was pending
Discussion on the Testimony of Bulatao and Tolentino preliminary investigation with reference to Bersamin at the time of
the trial of the instant case for robbery with homicide.
106.   There is no sufficient justification for reversing the lower
court's findings on the appellant's guilt on the basis of the two
principal witnesses' evidence.
107.   The record discloses no ground for doubting the veracity of
these witnesses. Their testimony rings true in all its material aspects,
while Bersamin's testimony and his attempt to discredit Bulatao
sounds irrational and is conflicting.
108.   Furthermore, Bersamin did not impeach Tolentino's
testimony, nor did he call any witness to corroborate him in his alibi.
109.   It is immaterial that none of the witnesses saw who killed
Caguing. It has been proved that there was conspiracy to rob and
Bersamin was the moving spirit behind it. Conspiracy being
established, each and every one of the conspirators who took active
part in its execution is equally responsible for the ensuing crime
embraced in the plan.

Discussion on Aggravating Circumstances (relevant to Rule 129)

110.   The CFI found the presence of the aggravating

circumstances of nighttime, superior strength, and use of unlicensed
firearms. The prosecution is right in eliminating the use of
unlicensed firearms. The use of unlicensed firearm is special
aggravating circumstance applicable only in cases of robbery in
                                                                                                                       
band. The crime established here was one of simple robbery with
6 I think this is the part relevant to our discussion on judicial notice. Since Bersamin
homicide since only two of the malefactors are shown to have been has also been prosecuted and convicted for murder and double murder brought about
armed, Bersamin and de la Vega. the change in penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
 024 G HOLDINGS INC. v. NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED judgment obligors, or even the resort to receivership.
WORKERS UNION (APASAN)
October, 16, 2009 | Nachura, J. | Judicial Notice DOCTRINE: Before a court delves into an extended discussion of an
issue, it is essential to take judicial cognizance of cases intimately linked
PETITIONER: G Holdings Inc. to the present controversy which had earlier been elevated to and
RESPONDENTS: National Mines and Allied Worker’s Union Local decided by such Court. Thus, Judicial notice of previous cases to
103 (NAMAWU); Sheriffs Richard Aprosta and Alberto Munoz; DOLE determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or
Region VI, Bacolod District Office not a previous ruling is required before delving deeper into the issues
presented.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement, G Holdings
Inc., (GHI) bought ninety percent (90%) of Maricalum Mining Parties
Corporation’s (MMC) shares and financial claims. For the financial •   The petitioner, G Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation
liabilities assumed, MMC issued three promissory notes in favor of GHI primarily engaged in the business of owning and holding shares of
amounting to P500M and secured several mortgages over MMC’s stock of different companies.
properties. Four years thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC •   Private respondent, National Mines and Allied Workers Union
and the National Mines and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU), which Local 103 (NAMAWU), was the exclusive bargaining agent of the
was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of rank and file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC),
MMC. NAMAWU got favorable decision from the labor secretary and an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex at Sipalay,
as a result, an alias writ of execution was issued against MMCs Negros Occidental.
properties to satisfy the order of payment of back wages and other
•   MMC was incorporated by the Development Bank of the Philippines
benefits (remember that GHI already bought substantial shares of
(DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on October 19, 1984,
MMC). To protect its interests, GHI filed a case for injunction before the
on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
RTC to prevent the execution of the order. The RTC issued a writ of
Corporations assets. MMC started its commercial operations in
injunction. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC hinging its decision
August 1985. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National
on the fact that the mortgage between MMC and GHI was merely a Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a
sham. Issue: WoN the RTC properly issued the writ of injunction –
non-performing asset.
Yes. But before the SC delved into the extended discussion, it first
discussed judicial notice. (see doctrine) In the present case, the decision FACTS:
in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and 1.   On October 2, 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement
NAMAWU, the SC upheld the right of herein private respondent, executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the
NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial
former bought ninety percent (90%) of MMCs shares and financial
notice, the SC acknowledges its Decision in Republic of the Philippines,
through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in claims (liabilities).
which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of a.   These financial claims were converted into three Promissory
stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and
accompanying the said purchase. To repeat, these decisions respectively secured by mortgages over MMCs properties. The notes,
confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right which were similarly worded except for their amounts (see at
of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal the end of the digest).
properties of MMC. Nonetheless, NAMAWU is not without any remedy
since it can file under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to protect its 2.   Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the
rights against MMC. These include the examination of the judgment full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, GHI immediately
obligor when judgment is unsatisfied, the examination of the obligors of took physical possession of the mine site and its facilities, and took
 full control of the management and operation of MMC. Sipalay, Negros Occidental.
3.   Almost four years thereafter, or on August 23, 1996, a labor dispute 10.   SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FILED BY GHI: On October 14,
(refusal to bargain collectively and unfair labor practice) arose 2002, GHI filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan
between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing with City, Negros Occidental, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 1127 for
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of Bacolod City a Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
notice of strike. Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Nullify the
4.   QUISUMBING ORDER: Then Labor Secretary, Leonardo A. Sheriffs Levy on Properties.
Quisumbing ruled in favor of NAMAWU. a.   GHI contended that the levied properties were the subject of
a.   In his July 30, 1997 Order (Quisumbing Order), Secretary a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, dated
Quisumbing declared that the lay-off (of workers) September 5, 1996 executed by MMC in favor of GHI to
implemented was illegal and that MMC committed unfair secure the aforesaid P550M promissory notes;
labor practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid- b.   that this deed was registered on February 24, 2000; and
off workers, with payment of full backwages and benefits, c.   that the mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially
and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI as the highest bidder
agreement (CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of on December 3, 2001, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale
the previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the dated December 4, 2001.
workers daily wage. 11.   On October 17, 2002, the trial court ordered the issuance of a Writ of
5.   The Supreme Court sustained the validity of the Quisumbing order in Injunction enjoining the DOLE sheriffs from further enforcing the
two separate cases – G.R. Nos. 133519 and 138996 – which became Sto. Tomas Writ and from conducting any public sale of the levied-
final and executory. on properties, subject to GHIs posting of a P5M bond.
6.   BRION WRIT (partial writ of execution): On May 11, 2001, then 12.   RTC RULING (in favor of GHI and SC affirmed this): RTC
Acting Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary, issued its December 4, 2002 Omnibus Order, which denied
Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU, directed the issuance of a NAMAWUs motion to dismiss the writ of injunction and ordered the
partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs return to GHI of the levied firearms and handguns subject to a bond
to proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same. posted by the latter.
7.   In 2006, the Supreme Court, in G.R. Nos. 157696-97, 13.   NAMAWU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
entitled Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and NAMAWU, 14.   CA RULING (reversed the RTC, but set aside by the SC): the
affirmed the propriety of the issuance of the Brion Writ. appellate court rendered a Decision setting aside the RTC issuances
8.   STO. TOMAS WRIT (alias writ of execution and Break-Open and directing the immediate execution of the Sto. Tomas Writ.
order): The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs a.   The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances
resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, surrounding the execution of the September 5, 1996 Deed of
then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion that
the July 18, 2002 Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open Order the deed was sham, fictitious and fraudulent;
(Sto. Tomas Writ). b.   The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMCs real
9.   On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the members of properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien,
the union, and several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and, suspiciously, GHI did not intervene in the long drawn-
and levied on the properties of MMC located at its compound in out labor proceedings to protect its right as a mortgagee of
 virtually all the properties of MMC. acknowledges its Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its
c.   The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in
mortgage was irregular, effected precisely to prevent the which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the
shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the
satisfaction of the judgment against MMC.
company notes accompanying the said purchase.
a.   These company notes, consisting of three (3) Promissory
ISSUES: (NOTE: the evid issue was discussed by the SC prior to Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the
resolving the issues below) privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust
1.   WoN the RTC properly issued the writ of injunction to prevent the (APT) to GHI (fact no. 1). Each of these notes uniformly
enforcement of the Sto. Tomas Writ – Yes, it was the proper remedy contains stipulations establishing and constituting in favor
for GHI as a third-party claimant in a labor dispute of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal
a.   WoN the mortgage of the MMCs properties to GHI was a properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in
sham – No, the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the a separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and
Promissory Notes themselves are the best evidence that there Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996.Thereafter, the
was ample consideration for the mortgage Deed was registered on February 4, 2000.
b.   WoN there was an effective levy by the DOLE upon the 4.   The SC finds both decisions critically relevant to the instant
MMCs real and personal properties – No, since NAMAWU dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts below in the
had no properties of MMC to attach because the same had
disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To repeat,
been previously foreclosed by GHI as mortgagee thereof;
and these decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its
c.   WoN it was proper for the CA to pierce the veil of corporate labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its financial and
fiction between MMC and GHI – No, the mere interlocking mortgage claims over the real and personal properties of MMC,
of directors and officers does not warrant piercing the as will be explained below.
separate corporate personalities of MMC and GHI 5.   The assailed CA decision apparently failed to consider the impact of
these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, the SC finds it timely to
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
reiterate that: courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2003 is SET ASIDE. The Omnibus
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one
Order dated December 4, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61 of
or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case
Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental is AFFIRMED.
under consideration.
RATIO: 6.   However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower
JUDICIAL NOTICE (Evid related, SC discussed this before going into court to issue the challenged writ of injunction depends on the
extended discussions of all the issues) validity of the third partys (GHIs) claim of ownership over the
1.   Before the SC delve into an extended discussion of the foregoing property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor
issues, it is essential to take judicial cognizance of cases department (remember that the dispute was between MMC and
intimately linked to the present controversy which had earlier
NAMAWU). Accordingly, the main inquiry addressed by the CA
been elevated to and decided by such Court.
2.   FIRST CASE: Judicial notice must be taken by the SC of its decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a
Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the reach
and NAMAWU, in which they upheld the right of herein private of the Writ of Execution dated December 18, 2001.
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. 7.   In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial
3.   SECOND CASE: Upon the same principle of judicial notice, the SC notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide the necessary
 perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a efforts to execute on the properties of MMC, which were validly
valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of foreclosed by GHI, the SC sees that NAMAWU always had, and
execution. may still have, ample supplemental remedies found in Rule 39 of the
8.   In Juaban v. Espina, the SC held that in some instances, courts Rules of Court in order to protect its rights against MMC. These
have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that include the examination of the judgment obligor when judgment is
are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases unsatisfied, the examination of the obligors of judgment obligors, or
may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to even the resort to receivership.
invoke a rule of judicial notice. The two cases that the SC have
taken judicial notice of are of such character, and the instant The mortgage was NOT a sham
case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.
12.   The well-settled rule is that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the
9.   The SC notes that the case filed with the lower court involves a
property mortgaged. While it is true that GHIs foreclosure of MMCs
principal action for injunction to prohibit execution over properties mortgaged properties may have had the effect to prevent satisfaction
belonging to a third party (GHI) not impleaded in the legal dispute
of the judgment award against the specific mortgaged property that
(labor dispute) between NAMAWU and MMC. We have observed,
first answers for a mortgage obligation ahead of any subsequent
however, that the lower court and the CA failed to take judicial creditors, that same foreclosure does not necessarily translate to
notice of, or to consider, the SC Decisions in Republic, etc., v. G
having been effected to prevent satisfaction of the judgment
Holdings, Inc., and Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion and award against MMC.
NAMAWU, in which the SC respectively recognized the entitlement
13.   The SC also observes the error in the CAs finding that the 1996 Deed
of GHI to the shares and the company notes of MMC (under the
of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage was not supported by any
Purchase and Sale Agreement), and the rights of NAMAWU to its consideration since at the time the deed was executed, all the real
labor claims. At this stage, therefore, neither the lower court nor
and personal property of MMC had already been transferred in the
the CA, nor even the SC, can depart from its findings in those
hands of G Holdings.
two cases because of the doctrine of stare decisis.
14.   It should be remembered that the Purchase and Sale Agreement
10.   The SC is unmindful, however, of the fact that the labor claims of
between GHI and APT involved large amounts (P550M) and even
NAMAWU, acknowledged by such Court in Maricalum, still awaits spawned a subsequent court action (Civil Case No. 95-76132, RTC
final execution. While, theoretically, this case is not ended by this
of Manila). Yet, nowhere in the Agreement or in the RTC decision is
decision, since the lower court is still to try the case filed with it and
there any mention of real and personal properties of MMC being
decide it on the merits, the matter of whether the mortgage and
included in the sale to GHI in 1992. These properties simply served
foreclosure of the assets that are the subject of said foreclosure is
as mortgaged collateral for the 1992 Promissory Notes. The Purchase
ended herein, for the third and final time. So also is the consequential and Sale Agreement and the Promissory Notes themselves are the
issue of the separate and distinct personalities of GHI and
best evidence that there was ample consideration for the mortgage.
MMC. Having resolved these principal issues with certainty, the
SC There was no effective levy
finds no more need to remand the case to the lower court, only fo
r the purpose of resolving again the matter of whether GHI owns 15.   There appears in the record a factual contradiction relating to
the properties that were the subject of the latter’s foreclosure. whether the foreclosure by GHI on July 13, 2001 over some of the
11.   REMEDY OF NAMAWU: As success fades from NAMAWUs contested properties came ahead of the levy thereon, or the
 reverse. NAMAWU claims that the levy on two trucks was effected exercised over MMC, it was APT, not GHI, that wielded it. Neither
on June 22, 2001, which GHI disputes as a misstatement because the can we conclude that the constitution of the loan nearly four (4)
levy was attempted on July 18, 2002, and not 2001. years prior to NAMAWUs notice of strike could have been the
16.   What is undisputed though is that the mortgage of GHI was proximate cause of the injury of NAMAWU for having been
registered on February 4, 2000, well ahead of any levy by deprived of MMCs corporate assets.
NAMAWU. Prior registration of a lien creates a preference, as the
act of registration is the operative act that conveys and affects the The injunction was properly issued by the RTC
land, even against subsequent judgment creditors, such as respondent
19.   It is settled that a Regional Trial Court can validly issue a Temporary
herein. Its registration of the mortgage was not intended to defraud Restraining Order (TRO) and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction
NAMAWU of its judgment claims, since even the courts were to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution issued by a labor
already judicially aware of its existence since 1992. Thus, at that tribunal on the basis of a third-partys claim of ownership over the
moment in time, with the registration of the mortgage, either properties levied upon. While, as a rule, no temporary or permanent
NAMAWU had no properties of MMC to attach because the same injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out
had been previously foreclosed by GHI as mortgagee thereof; or by of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court--where the writ of
execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon the
virtue of the DOLEs levy to enforce NAMAWUs claims, the latter’s
property of a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima
rights are subject to the notice of the foreclosure on the subject facie showing of ownership of such claimant--a separate action for
properties by a prior mortgagees right. injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since
17.   GHIs mortgage right had already been registered by then, and it is said action neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute insofar
basic that mortgaged properties answer primarily for the mortgaged as the third party is concerned.
credit, not for the judgment credit of the mortgagors unsecured 20.   Likewise, since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to
the action, he cannot, strictly speaking, appeal from the order
creditor.
denying his claim, but he should file a separate reivindicatory action
Piercing the veil was NOT warranted against the execution creditor or the purchaser of the property after
the sale at public auction, or a complaint for damages against the
18.   In this case, the mere interlocking of directors and officers does not bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.
21.   A separate civil action for recovery of ownership of the property
warrant piercing the separate corporate personalities of MMC and
would not constitute interference with the powers or processes of the
GHI. Not only must there be a showing that there was majority or labor tribunal which rendered the judgment to execute upon the
complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances but levied properties. The property levied upon being that of a stranger is
of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked, not subject to levy. Thus, a separate action for recovery, upon a
so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the petitioner,
separate mind, will or existence of its own. The mortgage deed cannot be considered as interference.
transaction attacked as a basis for piercing the corporate veil was a 22.   Upon the findings and conclusions we have reached above, GHI is
situated squarely as such third-party claimant. The questioned
transaction that was an offshoot, a derivative, of the mortgages
restraining order of the lower court, as well as the order granting
earlier constituted in the Promissory Notes dated October 2, preliminary injunction, does not constitute interference with the
1992. But these Promissory Notes with mortgage were executed by powers or processes of the labor department. The registration of the
GHI with APT in the name of MMC, in a full privatization mortgage document operated as notice to all on the matter of the
process. It appears that if there was any control or domination mortgagees prior claims. Official proceedings relative to the
foreclosure of the subject properties constituted a prima
 facie showing of ownership of such claimant to support the issuance
of injunctive reliefs.
 
 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227;
025 PILIPINAS SHELL v. FREDELUCES (Arcenas) hence, it is a government property the possession of which, however long,
April 20, 2016 | LEONEN, J. | When hearing necessary for judicial notice "never confers title tothe possessor.
Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law are omitted in
PETITIONER/S: PILIPINAS SHELL FOUNDATION pleadings, the hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and material
RESPONDENT/S: TOMAS M. FREDELUCES facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts within the range of
SUMMARY: Pursuant to Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972, the judicial notice, as well as relevant laws and jurisprudence in resolving
government engaged the services of SHELL for the exploration, motions to dismiss. BUT there are EXCEPTIONS:
development and production of petroleum resources in northwest of Palawan. In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals: There is no hypothetical admission of the
SHELL needed to construct a concrete gravity structure and located site for veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
said construction in Subic, Zambales. Together with Subic Bay Metropolitan allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which are
Authority (SBMA), PILIPINAS SHELL and SHELL determined a 40- inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in the
hectare site in Sitio Agusuhin but that 80 households would have to be pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to
relocated within the Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone to carry out the the complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by
project. SHELL gave financial assistance for the relocated families and so stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case.’
they voluntarily dismantled their houses (they signed quitclaims). Fredeluces
et al (former residents) filed a Complaint for damages (complaint 1) against DOCTRINE: When a motion to dismiss is filed, only allegations of ultimate
SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL for arbitrarily and unlawfully evicting them facts are hypothetically admitted. Allegations of evidentiary facts and
while not giving them what they were allegedly due. Instead of answering the conclusions of law, as well as allegations whose falsity is subject to judicial
Complaint, SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL moved to dismiss the complaint notice, those which are legally impossible, inadmissible in evidence, or
based on the grounds of litis pendentia, failure to state a cause of action, and unfounded, are disregarded.
lack of cause of action, alleging that five (5) of the complainants earlier filed FACTS:
against them a Complaint for sum of money (complaint 2) in the same court 1.   Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 87, otherwise known as the Oil
as complaint 1. RTC granted the MTD finding identity of parties, causes of Exploration and Development Act of 1972, the Republic of the
action, and reliefs sought. CA reversed and appreciated in evidence a Philippines entered into Service Contract No. 38 (the contract) and
Revocation of Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the five. engaged the services of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (SHELL) for
Complaint 2 was, thus, filed without their authority, and there was no litis the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in
pendentia so as to bar the filing of Complaint. Hence, this petition. The an area offshore northwest of Palawan.
issues in this case are (1) whether Fredeluces, et al.'s Complaint for damages a.   The service contractors eventually discovered in offshore
should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. The court held in the Malampaya-Camago at least 2.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
affirmative, BUT only as to Bebiana San Pedro since she did not execute a deposits.
Revocation and Cancellation of SPA. The other four complainants (who were b.   Exploration and development of the Malampaya-Camago natural
involved in complaint 2) are not bound by the decision in complaint 2 since gas reservoir required the construction and operation of a
they executed the Revocation and Cancellation of SPA; hence, there was no shallow water platform off the coast of Palawan.
pending Complaint for sum of money when the Complaint for damages was c.   The water platform further required a concrete gravity structure
subsequently filed (no litis pendentia). that would sit on the seabed, and a topside or the platform's deck
(2) whether the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground of which would sit on top of the concrete gravity structure
failure to state a cause of action. The court also held in the affirmative. They d.   The topside was constructed in Singapore.
failed to allege any circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio e.   As for the concrete gravity structure, SHELL searched for
Agusuhin under claim of ownership for the required number of years. They possible construction sites here in the Philippines. And so
admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The property belongs to the identified a possible construction site in Subic, Zambales, and
 SHELL met with representatives of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Olongapo City for arbitrarily and unlawfully evicting Fredeluces, et al. 9
Authority (SBMA) from their place of abode and livelihood, and allegedly failing to act with
f.   SBMA proposed a 40-hectare site in Sitio Agusuhin as a possible justice, not giving them their due, and acted in bad faith. Fredeluces, et
construction site for the concrete gravity structure al. alleged the following
g.   The site formed part of the military reservation of the former a.   They resided in the area even prior to 1998 and lawful residents
naval base of the US in Subic, which, under Republic Act No. of Sitio Agusuhin.
7227, became part of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) b.   constructed their houses and introduced improvements in Sitio
h.   Results of a socio-economic survey commissioned by SHELL Agusuhin, such as fruit trees and other seasonal plants.
showed that there were about 200 households living at or near c.   However, for the direct benefit of the SHELL and PILIPINAS
the proposed construction site. SHELL, Fredeluces, et al. were effectively evicted from their
i.   Together with the SBMA and Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc., homes in "total disregard" of their rights.
(PILIPINAS SHELL), SHELL established contact with the d.   Admitting that some of the claimants were given financial
occupants of Sitio Agusuhin. It was ultimately determined that assistance, Fredeluces, et al. alleged that the amounts given were
80 households would have to be relocated to nearby areas within "insufficient to compensate the damages they sustained.
the Subic Seaport Economic Free Zone (Free Zone) to carry out e.   They were pressured, coerced or 'sweet talked'" into signing
the project. quitclaims and waivers.
2.   In May 1998, the SBMA and SHELL entered into a Lease and f.   ALSO, Fredeluces, et al. moved that they be allowed to litigate
Development Agreement (lease agreement) for the construction of the as paupers considering that the gross income of each of them and
concrete gravity structure in Sitio Agusuhin. SBMA relocated the the members of their families do not exceed P3,000.00, and that
affected households and SHELL gave financial assistance. none of them allegedly owned real property.
3.   The undertakings of SHELL were implemented through PILIPINAS 6.   Instead of answering the Complaint, SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL
SHELL and concluded agreements with some of the affected households. moved to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds of litis pendentia,
a.   In exchange for financial assistance, some of the claimants failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause of action, alleging that
voluntarily dismantled their houses and relocated to nearby areas five (5) of the complainants10 earlier filed against them a Complaint for
within the Free Zone. sum of money (complaint 2) in the same court as complaint 1
b.   Other claims, however, were denied by SHELL for the a.   Complaint 2 allegedly prayed for payment of disturbance
claimant's failure to show that he or she resided in Sitio compensation for their eviction from Sitio Agusuhin for the
Agusuhin prior to the construction project construction of the concrete gravity structure.
c.   With the assistance of the Subic Sangguniang Bayan b.   Hence, both complaints had substantially similar causes of action
(Sanggunian), a Compensation Community Relations Study and relief sought, rendering complaint 1 (for damages)
Group was organized to re-evaluate the claims that had been dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.
previously denied by SHELL. c.   The companies allege that Fredeluces, et al. do not have right to
4.   In the meantime, the construction of the concrete gravity structure was pray for payment of damages in the amount of the value of the
completed, and the shallow water platform was successfully installed in land since they never owned the land in Sitio Agusuhin, and the
Palawan on June 2, 2000.7 same belonged to the SBMA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227;
5.   ACTION: On December 1, 2000, a Complaint for damages8 (complaint hence, lands in Sitio Agusuhin are government property not
1) was filed against SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL before the RTC of subject to private ownership

                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                        9 Tomas M. Fredeluces, Marcos B. Corpuz, Jr., Reynaldo M. Samonte, Norma M. Samonte, Ambrocio
7SHELL turned over Sitio Agusuhin to the SBMA, cleared, leveled, and elevated, together with Villanueva, Salvacion A. Bon, Ramiro A. Bon, Luzviminda B. Andillo, Ludivico F. Bon, Elmo Areglo,
improvements "consisting of a finger pier, a fence and gate, a drainage system, and a berthing facility for Rose A. San Pedro, Dante U. Santos, Sr., Miguel Santos, Efren U. Santos, Ric U. Santos, Simon Marce,
ferry sea crafts or similar vessels along the southern bank of the basin. Jr., Joel F. Salinel, Bebiana San Pedro, and Marina Santos
8 See end of digest for amount of actual damages being claimed 10 Dante U. Santos, Sr., Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, Ric U. Santos, and Bebiana San Pedro
 d.   In addition, Fredeluces, et al.'s claims for the value of the relief sought simply because they do not own the land in Sitio
improvements were allegedly paid as evidenced by the Agusuhin.
quitclaims they had signed. Consequently, the Complaint for d.   RTC held the quitclaims were valid since Fredeluces, et al.
damages failed to state a cause of action. voluntarily executed them and even voluntarily vacated Sitio
e.   With respect to Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, the Agusuhin after they received financial assistance from SHELL
companies alleged that they never resided in Sitio Agusuhin and and PILIPINAS SHELL.
not entitled to any compensation and, therefore, lacked a cause e.   In resolving the issue of whether Tomas M. Fredeluces and
of action against the companies. Ludivico F. Bon were former residents of Sitio Agusuhin, the
7.   Fredeluces, et al. opposed the MTD and prayed for its denial. They argue RTC relied on the Affidavit of a certain Robert Hadji (Hadji), a
that in filing their MTD, hypothetically admitted the factual allegations former resident of Sitio Agusuhin and PILIPINAS SHELL's
in their Complaint. Corollarily, the RTC may not inquire into the truth of Community Coordinator in the site.
the allegations and may only resolve the MTD based on the facts as i.   Hadji stated in his Affidavit that Tomas and Ludivico
alleged in the Complaint. never resided in Sitio Agusuhin.
a.   First ground: The 5 complainants in Complaint 2 claim they ii.   While the resolution of the issue would generally require
were not aware they were included in the said complaint and presentation of evidence during trial, the trial court said
already revoked the SPA executed in favor of the lawyer in that Fredeluces, et al. did not even bother to attend the
Complaint 2. hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 20, 2001 to
b.   2nd ground: they expressly admitted that they never owned Sitio present evidence contrary to the allegations of SHELL
Agusuhin BUT they were peacefully settled in the area and and PILIPINAS SHELL. RTC said that in failing to
introduced improvements when the companies summarily present such contrary evidence, Tomas and Ludivico
evicted them. It is for their "unlawful eviction” from, not should be deemed non-residents of Sitio Agusuhin and,
ownership of, Sitio Agusuhin for which Fredeluces, et al. therefore, were not entitled to any compensation.
demand payment of damages. 9.   CA RULING: the CA appreciated in evidence a Revocation of Special
c.   3rd ground: they assailed the validity of these quitclaims for lack Power of Attorney allegedly executed by the five. Complaint 2 was, thus,
of consent, an issue requiring the presentation of evidence during filed without their authority, and there was no litis pendentia so as to bar
trial. They similarly argued that the issue of residence of Tomas the filing of Complaint 1.
M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon required the presentation of a.   Despite Fredeluces, et al.'s admission that they did not own the
evidence during trial. parcels of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin, the CA
8.   RTC RULING ON MTD: granted in favor of SHELL and PILIPINAS nonetheless held that they may file a complaint for damages for
SHELL. having been "adversely affected by SHELL’s construction
a.   Between Complaint 1 and 2, RTC found identity of parties, works. Fredeluces, et al. may likewise repudiate the quitclaims
causes of action, and reliefs sought. they executed.
b.   The trial court said that the 5 complainants in Complaint 2 b.   As to the issue of residence, the CA found that Ludivico F. Bon
"cannot feign ignorance that they were not aware that they were formerly resided in Sitio Agusuhin relying on the Report
included as party plaintiffs in the complaint because "they submitted by the Compensation Community Relations Study
actively secured copies of Certificates of Occupancy in Sitio Group where Ludivico F. Bon was listed as one of the
Agusuhin, which were annexed to the earlier filed Complaint. beneficiaries. But Tomas M. Fredeluces, he was not listed on the
c.   RTC held that Complaint 1 failed to state a cause of action. The Report and so not entitled to any financial assistance.
basis of the amount of actual damages they sought was the fair c.   CA denied SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL filed a Motion for
market values of the parcels of land they occupied and of the Partial Reconsideration and/or Clarification, which was denied.
improvements introduced on the property. They cannot avail the 10.   Hence, SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court.
 a.   The companies argue that the CA erred in limiting itself with the 1.   We grant the Petition. The Complaint for damages should have been
allegations of the Complaint for damages when it ruled that dismissed as to respondent Bebiana San Pedro on the ground of litis
Fredeluces, et al. had the right to demand for compensation from pendentia. Complaint 1 failed to state a cause of action.
SHELL and PILIPINAS SHELL. NO LITIS PENDENTIA
b.   The rule that the allegations of the complaint are hypothetically 2.   Only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of action. Hence, any
admitted when a motion to dismiss is filed is subject to suit subsequently filed for the same cause of action becomes unnecessary
exceptions. Annexes to the complaint as well as matters of and vexatious.
judicial notice may be considered in dismissing a complaint on 3.   When there is more than one suit pending between the same parties for
the ground of failure to state a cause of action. the same cause of action, litis pendentia exists and a motion to dismiss
c.   One matter of judicial notice is that the SBMA, not Fredeluces, may be filed on this ground as provided by Rule 16, Section 1(e)11 of
et al., own Sitio Agusuhin, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227. the Rules of Court.Occasionally referred to as lis pendens[116] or auter
Not being owners, Fredeluces, et al. may not demand action pendant,[117] litis pendentia has the following elements:
compensation based on the value of the properties they formerly a.   identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing
occupied. the same interests in both actions;"
i.   They were possessors in bad faith who, under Article b.   identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
449 of the Civil Code, are not entitled to any indemnity founded on the same facts;
with respect to improvements they have introduced in c.   identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
Sitio Agusuhin. cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
ISSUE/s: pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
1.   whether Fredeluces, et al.'s Complaint for damages should be dismissed amount to res judicata in the other case.
on the ground of litis pendentia – YES, but only as to Bebiana San Pedro 4.   No identity of parties. The first element of litis pendentia—identity of
since she did not execute a Revocation and Cancellation of SPA. The parties—is absent with respect to respondents Dante U. Santos, Efren U.
other four complainants (who were involved in complaint 2) are not Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric U. Santos.
bound by the decision in complaint 2 since they executed the Revocation a.   They executed the Revocation and Cancellation of Special
and Cancellation of SPA; hence, there was no pending Complaint for Power of Attorney and withdrew the authority they had earlier
sum of money when the Complaint for damages was subsequently filed granted Atty. Renato M. Collado to file a case in their behalf.
(no litis pendentia). Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that their signatures do
2.   whether the Complaint for damages should be dismissed on the ground not appear on the Verification and Certification against Forum
of failure to state a cause of action – YES. they failed to allege any Shopping appended to Complaint 2.
circumstance showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under b.   Hence, they should be deemed non-plaintiffs in the said
claim of ownership for the required number of years. They admitted that complaint. Consequently, the pendency of the Complaint for sum
they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The property belongs to the Subic Bay of money did not bar them from filing Complaint 1.
Metropolitan Authority, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, it is a 5.   The same cannot be said for Bebiana San Pedro since she was guilty of
government property the possession of which, however long, "never forum shopping, repetitively filing complaints asserting "the same
confers title tothe possessor. essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues"against the same defendants
RULING: The Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. CA decision a.   Bebiana San Pedro was a party plaintiff both complaints. She
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for Damages is hereby did not sign any document similar to the Revocation and
ordered DISMISSED.
                                                                                                                       
RATIO: 11 SECTION 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (e) That there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause[.]
 Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney. Thus, she did not 4.   The ground of failure to state a cause of action is based on Rule 16,
revoke the authority of Atty. Renato H. Collado Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court13
6.   Identity of rights and relief. The second element of litis 5.   Failure to state a cause of action goes into the sufficiency of the
pendentia likewise exists with respect to Bebiana San Pedro. There is allegation of the cause of action in the complaint.
substantial identity of rights12 asserted and reliefs sought between the a.   "When the facts alleged in the complaint show that the defendant
complaints filed. The following allegations are similar: has committed acts constituting a delict or wrong by which he
a.   Both claim that the complainants are lawful residents and long- violates the rights of the plaintiff, causing [the plaintiff] loss or
term occupants of Sitio Agusuhin injury, there is sufficient allegation of a cause of action.
b.   That the companies allegedly failed to sufficiently compensate Otherwise, there is none."
them for their eviction from Sitio Agusuhin: 6.   In this respect, a pleading sufficiently states a cause of action if it
c.   Bebiana sought identical reliefs: Bebiana San Pedro prayed that "contain[s] in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise, and direct
she be paid P1,500,000.00 in addition to the prayer for payment statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. or her claim.
7.   Because of the substantial identity of parties, causes of action, and reliefs b.   Ultimate facts are the "important and substantial facts which
sought in the Complaint for sum of money and Complaint for damages, either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or
all the elements of litis pendentia are present with respect to Bebiana San which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
Pedro. defendant."
a.   Since the Complaint for sum of money and the Complaint for c.   Allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law in a
damages assert substantially identical causes of action and seek pleading are omitted for they are unnecessary in determining
similar reliefs, the Decision dated February 27, 2004 binds whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
respondent Bebiana San Pedro. action.
b.   The Decision is res judicata with respect to the right of Bebiana d.   In filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
San Pedro to recover compensation for vacating Sitio Agusuhin. cause of action, a defendant "hypothetically admits the truth of
c.   That Bebiana San Pedro received P100,000.00 from the the facts alleged in the complaint."
companies as disturbance compensation, and that she e.   Since allegations of evidentiary facts and conclusions of law
voluntarily signed a quitclaim to waive any claims she might are omitted in pleadings, the hypothetical admission is
have over the parcel of land she occupied in Sitio Agusuhin, limited to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
are conclusive upon this Court. complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
8.   In sum, Dante U. Santos, Efren U. Santos, Miguel Santos, and Ric U. However, it is mandatory that courts "consider other facts
Santos revoked the authority to file the Complaint for sum of money on within the range of judicial notice, as well as relevant laws
their behalf. As for the four (4) respondents, there was no pending and jurisprudence in resolving motions to dismiss. BUT
Complaint for sum of money when the Complaint for damages was there are EXCEPTIONS:
subsequently filed. The trial court, therefore, erred in dismissing their i.   In Dabuco v. Court of Appeals: There is no
Complaint for damages on the ground of litis pendentia. hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
3.   The Complaint for damages (complaint 1) was initially dismissed on the allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to
ground of failure to state a cause of action, but the CA reversed and facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the
remanded the Complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. record or document included in the pleading these
allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not
                                                                                                                       
12 A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." For a cause of                                                                                                                        
action to exist, there must be "a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; a corresponding obligation on the 13 SECTION 1. Grounds.— Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
part of the defendant to respect such right;" and, "an act or omission of the defendant which constitutes a asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: (g) That the pleading
violation of the plaintiffs right which defendant had the duty to respect." asserting the claim states no cause of action
 confined to the complaint if there is evidence which has j.   Quitclaims are contracts in the nature of a compromise where
been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, parties make concessions, a lawful device to avoid litigation.
or in the course of hearings related to the case.’ That they perceived the amounts they received as
7.   Even assuming the truth of the ultimate facts alleged in the Complaint for "insufficient" does not make the quitclaims invalid.
damages, the Complaint states no cause of action. They may have k.   As for the allegation that respondents were "pressured, coerced,
resided in Sitio Agusuhin, constructed their houses, and planted fruit or sweet-talked into receiving compensation, this is a conclusion
trees in the area. However, they failed to allege any circumstance of law that may not be hypothetically admitted. The
showing that they had occupied Sitio Agusuhin under claim of circumstances of fraud and mistake must be stated with
ownership for the required number of years. particularity. Nothing in the Complaint for damages show
f.   They admitted that they do not own Sitio Agusuhin. The how respondents were particularly "pressured, coerced, or
property belongs to the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 'sweet-talked'" by Fredeluces et al into receiving
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227; hence, it is a government compensation. As found by the trial court, respondents
property the possession of which, however long, "never confers voluntarily vacated Sitio Agusuhin.
title tothe possessor.
g.   It follows that respondents may not ask compensation AMOUNT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED
equivalent to the value of the parcels of land they previously 1. Tomas Fredeluces P27,000,000.00
occupied in Sitio Agusuhin nor claim damages equivalent to 2. Marcos Corpuz, Jr. 905,000.00
the structures and improvements. The right to demand 3. Reynaldo Samonte 2,000,000.00
compensation for deprivation of property belongs to the 4. Norma Samonte 2,000,000.00
owner. 5. Ambrocio Villanueva 1,700,000.00
8.   Specifically with respect to Tomas M. Fredeluces and Ludivico F. Bon, 6. Salvacion Bon 750,000.00
the allegation that they resided in Sitio Agusuhin prior to the 7. Ramiro Bon 1,000,000.00
construction of the concrete gravity structure may not be hypothetically 8. Luzviminda Andillo 500,000.00
admitted. 9. Ludivico Bon 500,000.00
h.   Based on the evidence available during the hearing of the MTD, 10. Elmo Areglo 1,000,000.00
Tomas and Ludivico were indeed non-residents of Sitio 11. Rose San Pedro 500,000.00
Agusuhin prior to the construction of the concrete gravity 12. Dante Santos, Sr., 12,000,000.00
structure evidenced by the Report of the Compensation 13. Miguel Santos 4,000,000.00
Community Relations Study Group which declared Tomas a 14. Efren Santos 5,000,000.00
non-resident of Sitio Agusuhin. Moreover, as certified by the 15. Ric Santos 1,000,000.00
Punong Barangay of Barangay Cawag, none of the other 16. Simon Marce, Jr. 4,000,000.00
residents of Sitio Agusuhin recognized Tomas as a fellow 17. Joel Salinel (no amount)
resident. 18. Bebiana San Pedro 1,500,000.00
i.   As for Ludivico, the Office of the Punong Barangay of 19. Marina Santos 3,000,000.00
Barangay Matain, Subic, Zambales certified that he was a TOTAL P68,255,000.00[31]
resident of Barangay Matain, not of Sitio Agusuhin, corroborated
by Hadji, Pilipinas Shell Foundation, Inc.'s Community
Coordinator, in his Affidavit.
9.   Also, in receiving the amounts in the quitclaims, they declared in their
they waived, released, and abandoned any claims thait they might have
had over the parcels of land they occupied in Sitio Agusuhin as well as
the improvements they introduced in the property.
 026 Enriquez v. Isarog (Linds) the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
Nov. 16, 2016 | Peralta, J. | Judicial Notice; Exception to the rules on the deceased was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
admissibility 'minimum wage under current labor laws.
The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be
PETITIONER: William and Nelia-Vela Enriquez validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the
RESPONDENTS: Isarog Lines and Victor Sedenio RTC in this case aptly did, since it was indubitably in a better position to
assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
SUMMARY: Sonny was a passenger of Isarog bus driven by Victor.
They met an accident with a Pantranco bus driven by Aya-ay, resulting
in Sonny’s death, among other passengers. Sonny’s parents, Sps. FACTS:
Enriquez, sued Isarog and Victor for damages. RTC granted; CA 1.   Sonny Enriquez was a passenger of a bus owned and operated by
modified, deleted the award for unrealized income. respondent Isarog Line Express Transport, Inc. (Isarog Line) driven
by Victor Sedenio.
The issue is whether the Sps. Enriquez are entitled to the unrealized 2.   While traversing the diversion road at Silangang Malicboy, Pagbilao,
income. Quezon, said bus collided with another bus owned by Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. being driven by Primitivo Aya-ay.
Yes, since under the Civil Code, heirs are entitled to the indemnity for 3.   As a result of the impact between the two (2) buses, several
loss of earning capacity in such cases. General rule: The passengers died, including Sonny, who was twenty-six (26) years old
indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of at that time.
actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the 4.   Sonny's parents, petitioners William Enriquez and Nelia Vela-
best obtainable evidence thereof. Exception: damages for loss of Enriquez (the Spouses Enriquez), filed a complaint for damages
earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of against Isarog Line and Philtranco as well as their drivers before the
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased was self-employed and Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in 5.   RTC granted.14
which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the 6.   On appeal, CA affirmed with modification, deleting the unrealized
deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the income portion of the award.
deceased was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
'minimum wage under current labor laws.
ISSUE/s:
In this case, the Sps. Enriquez were able to present the best obtainable 1.   Whether the Sps. Enriquez are entitled to the unrealized income.
evidence of their son’s income – a certification from the employer of Yes, since they were able to substantiate the claim, and/or the
Sonny’s wages. The defense did not object to its admissibility in trial, defense failed to object to the evidence presented by the spouses, the
and hence can be utilized to render a decision. The CA thus erred when consequence of which the alleged unusable piece of evidence may be
it ruled that certification is inadmissible since the signatory of the same utilized and admitted in evidence.
was not presented in court. The case of Serra is inapplicable; not on all
fours with this case, the party therein did not present any evidence at all RULING: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
as regards its claim. GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 13, 2013 and Resolution dated March 4, 2014 in CA-
DOCTRINE: Damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded G.R. CV No. 97376, and REINSTATES the Decision of the Regional Trial
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased was                                                                                                                        
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current 14  50T  indemnity,  1.038M  unrealized  income,  100T  moral,  25T  exemplary  and  atty’s  
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in fees.  
Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 29 dated February 24, 2011 in when the prosecution presented said document, it was deemed
Civil Case No. L-896, with interest at six percent (6%)14per annum of the admitted and could be validly utilized by the trial court.
amount of damages awarded from the time of the finality of this Decision 4.   In the case at bar, while the CA itself ruled that the certification from
until its full satisfaction. ASLAN stating that Sonny was earning P185.00 per day as a
security guard is admissible in evidence, it held that the same has no
RATIO: probative value since the signatory was never presented to testify.
1.   Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code,15 the heirs of the victim are However, the rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed
entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity. admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving
2.   Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but at its judgment, as what the RTC in this case aptly did, since it was
for loss of capacity to earn. The indemnification for loss of earning indubitably in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly presented during trial.
proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof. 5.   Serra v. Mumar, as relied upon by the appellate court, does not apply
Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to because in said case they only presented testimonial evidence to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By prove damages for loss of earning capacity. No documentary
way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be evidence was submitted. The Court ruled that damages for loss of
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which must be
the deceased was self-employed and earning less than the duly proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the widow's
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial self-serving testimony. Also, in People v. Villar, the prosecution
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no merely relied on the widow's self-serving statement on her deceased
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased was husband's monthly earning. Here, however, there is actual
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the documentary evidence to support the claim. The Spouses Enriquez
'minimum wage under current labor laws. presented a certification from Sonny's employer to duly prove his
3.   Contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the Spouses Enriquez were income.
able to present competent proof and the best obtainable evidence
of their departed son's income. There is no showing that the Computation: (not relevant)
defense objected when they presented the certification from ASLAN Net Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income13 - Living
Security Systems, Inc. (ASLAN) during the trial. In People v. Lopez, Expenses
the Court ruled that documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity. The claimant = [2/3 (80 - age at death)] x GAI - [50% of GAI]
presented a similar certification from Tanod Publishing, showing that
the deceased was a photo correspondent for Tanod Newspaper and = [2/3 (80 - 26)] x P57,720.00 - P28,860.00
that his monthly salary ranges from P1,780.00 to P3,570.00 on per
story basis. The Court noted that since the defense did not object = [2/3 (54)] x P28,860.00

                                                                                                                        = 36 x P28,860.00
15  Article  2206.  The  amount  of  damages  for  death  caused  by  a  crime  or  quasi-­‐delict  
shall  be  at  least  three  thousand  pesos,  even  though  there  may  have  been  mitigating   Net Earning Capacity = P1,038,960.00
circumstances.  In  addition:  
(1)   The   defendant   shall   be   liable   for   the   loss   of   the   earning   capacity   of   the  
deceased,   and   the   indemnity   shall   be   paid   to   the   heirs   of   the   latter;   such   indemnity  
shall  in  every  case  be  assessed  and  awarded  by  the  court,  unless  the  deceased  on  
account   of   permanent   physical   disability   not   caused   by   the   defendant,   had   no  
earning  capacity  at  the  time  of  his  death;  
 027 PITC v. COA (Buenaventura) FACTS:
Nov. 21, 2017| Leonardo-De Castro, J. | what needs not to be proved
PETITIONER: Philippine International Trading Corporation 1.   PITC is a government-owned and controlled corporation that was
RESPONDENTS: Commission on Audit created under Presidential Decree No. 252 issued by then President
SUMMARY: Marcos. Thereafter, said law was repealed by Presidential Decree
PITC is a GOCC that was created by President Marcos, it granted No. 1071. On December 28, 1981, President Marcos issued
benefits to its employees (separation pay, retirement benefits etc.) PITC Executive Order No. 756, which authorized the reorganization of
was reorganized under a new law and it was given 6 months to PITC. Section 6 thereof states:
restructure and grant separation benefits to employees. PITC continued 2.   SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. - In recognition of the special
giving out benefits even after 6 months. The legality of their policy was nature of its operations, the Corporation shall continue to be exempt
resolved in G.R. No. 183517, wherein it was stated that PITC is included from the application of the rules and regulations of the Office of the
in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is evidently no longer Compensation and Position Classification or any other similar
exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in keeping with said law's agencies that may be established hereafter as provided under
intent to do away with multiple allowances and other incentive packages Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or employee
as well as the resultant differences in compensation among government who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled
personnel. to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest
PITC argues that the decision must be applied prospectively and not salary received including all allowances, in addition to the other
retroactively. COA argues that when the Court renders a decision that benefits provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or
merely interprets a particular provision of law - one that neither regulations to the contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have
establishes a new doctrine nor supplants an old doctrine - the served in the Corporation continuously for at least two
interpretation takes effect and becomes part of the law as of the date years: Provided, further,That in case of separated employees, the
when the law was originally passed. separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense the
penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided,
The issue is WoN the the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be finally, That in the commutation of leave credits earned, the
applied prospectively from the time it became final on September 27, employees who resigned, retired or is separated shall be entitled to
2010.- The court held no. the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither the full payment therefor computed with all the allowance then being
reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. the Court's enjoined at the time of resignation, retirement of separation
interpretation of the aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws,
G.R. No. 183517 retroacts to the date when Executive Order No. 756 rules or regulations. (Emphasis supplied.)
was enacted. 3.   On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive Order No.
877 that further authorized the reorganization of PITC. Section I
DOCTRINE: thereof reads:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are Reorganization. - The Minister of Trade and Industry is hereby
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why designated Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation with full
under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or powers to restructure and reorganize the Corporation and to
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal determine or fix its staffing pattern, compensation structure and
system. related organizational requirements. The Chairman shall complete
It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court upon laws such restructuring and reorganization within six (6) months from the
constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since date of this Executive Order. All personnel of the Corporation who
this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous are not reappointed by the Chairman under the new reorganized
legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. structure of the Corporation shall be deemed laid off; provided, that
personnel so laid off shall be entitled to the benefits accruing to
 separated employees under Executive Order No. 756 amending the 11.   According to PITC, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be
Revised Charter of the Corporation. (Emphasis supplied.) applied prospectively from the time it became final on September 27,
4.   Apparently, PITC continued to grant the benefits provided under 2010. To apply said decision retroactively would allegedly unjustly
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 to its qualified employees divest qualified PITC employees of their vested rights to receive the
even after the lapse of the six-month period specified in Executive benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The six-month
Order No. 877. period in Executive Order No. 877 was only for the purpose of
5.   The legality of such policy was put in issue and directly resolved by implementing reorganization, but not for the purpose of amending
this Court in the Decision dated June 22, 2010 in G.R. No. 183517, Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.
entitled Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission 12.   In praying for the dismissal of the petition, the COA asserts that
on Audit. In said case, the COA disapproved the claim of a retired when the Court renders a decision that merely interprets a particular
PITC employee for the payment of retirement differentials based on provision of law - one that neither establishes a new doctrine nor
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. PITC's bid to oppugn the supplants an old doctrine - the interpretation takes effect and
COA's disallowance via a petition for certiorari was dismissed by becomes part of the law as of the date when the law was originally
the Court, ruling in this wise: passed. The COA points out that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
6.   As an adjunct to the reorganization mandated under Executive Order did not overrule an old doctrine nor adopt a new one. The Decision
No. 756, we find that [Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756] cannot simply interpreted Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 and
be interpreted independent of the purpose or intent of the law. Rather clarified that the provision was effective in a temporary and limited
than the permanent retirement law for its employees that [PITC] now application when it was correlated with other laws.
characterizes it to be, we find that the provision of gratuities ISSUES:
equivalent to "one month pay for every year of service computed at 1.   WoN the the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 should be applied
highest salary received including all allowances" was clearly meant prospectively from the time it became final on September 27, 2010.-
as an incentive for employees who retire, resign or are separated NO. the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 neither reversed an old
from service during or as a consequence of the reorganization doctrine nor adopted a new one. the Court's interpretation of the
[PITC's] Board of Directors was tasked to implement. aforesaid provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
7.   PITC is included in the coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, it is retroacts to the date when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.
evidently no longer exempted from OCPC rules and regulations, in
keeping with said law's intent to do away with multiple allowances
and other incentive packages as well as the resultant differences in RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. SO
compensation among government personnel. ORDERED.
8.   PITC moved for a reconsideration of the above ruling, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated August 10, 2010.1âwphi1 The RATIO:
Decision in G.R. No. 183517 became final on September 27, 2010. 2.   The Ruling of the Court
9.   Pending the resolution of the above motion, PITC still allocated part 3.   At the outset, it did not escape our notice that PITC did not first
of its Corporate Operating Budget for retirement benefits pursuant to move for a reconsideration of the assailed COA decision before
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756. The amount allocated therefor filing the instant petition. Moreover, this is not the first time that
was ₱46.36 million. PITC made such an omission. In another petition for certiorari filed
10.   On September 30, 2010, PITC resident COA Auditor Elizabeth by PITC against COA, which was docketed as G.R. No. 152688, the
Liberato informed PITC that the accrual of the retirement benefits Court noted that PITC took a similar procedural shortcut. However,
under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 was bereft of legal said technical issue was resolved as follows:
basis. PITC was advised to stop the payment of such benefits or
reverse the amount already accrued. 4.   We first address the failure of the PITC to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. As a general rule, a petition
 for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the 11.   PITC argues, however, that the COA erred in relying on the second
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a sentence in the above excerption from Jabinal,which PITC dismissed
chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has as a "simple statement" that was "just an obiter dictum or an
certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) incidental remark that this Honorable Court made in passing."
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As a 12.   PITC's misinformed argument deserves scant consideration.
fourth exception, it was also held that the filing of a motion for 13.   The Court declared in Senarillos:
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is 14.   It is elementary that the interpretation placed by this Court
not a condition sine qua non, when the questions raised are the upon Republic Act [No.] 557 constitutes part of the law as of the
same as those that have already been squarely argued and date it was originally passed, since this Court's construction
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
5.   In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed the interpreted law carried into effect.
with not only because the issue presented is purely of law, but also 15.   Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as
because the question raised has already been extensively discussed in an independent source of law; it cannot create law. While it is true
the decisions of the Director, Corporate Audit Office II and the that judicial decisions which apply or interpret the Constitution or
COA.12 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are
6.   In the present case, the same situation is availing in that the issue not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are nonetheless
presented in this case is purely of law, i.e., whether the Decision in evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are
G.R. No. 183517 should be applied prospectively upon its finality, part of the legal system of the Philippines. Judicial decisions of the
and the same had already been squarely addressed by the COA in its Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself.
assailed ruling. 16.   Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code
7.   Article 8 of the Civil Code declares that "[j]udicial decisions and in light of the above disquisition, this Court emphatically
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that the principle of
of the legal system of the Philippines." While decisions of the Court prospectivity applies not only to original amendatory statutes and
are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to
evidence the laws' meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have judicial decisions.
the same binding force as the laws themselves. 17.   It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part
8.   Article 4 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, enunciates the rule on of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only
non-retroactivity of laws, in that ''(l)aws shall have no retroactive to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
effect, unless the contrary is provided." and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal
9.   In respectively arguing for and against the prospective application of thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
the Decision in G.R. No. 183517, both PITC and the COA invoke Co should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
v. Court of Appeals that cited, among others, the following ruling acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law
in People v. Jabinal : of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of
10.   Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the 18.   Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present case, the Court
reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial disagrees with PITC's position that the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution should be applied prospectively.1âwphi1
shall form a part of the legal system. The interpretation upon a law 19.   As the COA correctly argued, the Decision in G.R. No. 183517
by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date neither reversed an old doctrine nor adopted a new one. The
that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely Court merely construed therein the meaning and application of
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 by taking into consideration
construed intends to effectuate. the rationale behind the provision, its interplay with pre-existing
retirement laws, and the subsequent enactments and statutes that
eventually repealed the same. Prior to the Decision in G.R. No.
183517, there was no other ruling from this Court that explained the
nature of the retirement benefits under Section 6 of Executive Order
No. 756. Thus, the Court's interpretation of the aforesaid
provision embodied in the Decision in G.R. No. 183517 retroacts
to the date when Executive Order No. 756 was enacted.
 028 Vi Ve Chemical v. Commissioner of Customs (CELAJE) technical in nature and that only experts in the particular field know.
G.R. No. L-28693 | September 30, 1974 | Fernando, J. | Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: VI VE CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, INC., FACTS:
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE 1.   On March 22, 1966, the petitioner Vi Ve imported from Taiwan 250
COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF MANILA, PEDRO PACIS drums of glutamic acid, an article used in the manufacture of a food
seasoning known as "vetsin", on which it was required to pay, as it
SUMMARY: On March 22, 1966, the petitioner Vi Ve imported from did pay, the sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty.
Taiwan 250 drums of glutamic acid, an article used in the manufacture
of a food seasoning known as "vetsin", on which it was required to pay 2.   Contending that it is liable only for the amount of P3,519.00, and not
the sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty. Contending that it is liable only P27,274.00, it filed the necessary protest and requested the refund of
for the amount of P3,519.00, and not P27,274.00, it filed the necessary the difference in the sum of P23,656.00."5
protest and requested the refund of the difference in the sum of 3.   The sum of P27,274.00 as customs duty on 250 drums (11,340 kilos)
P23,656.00. Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the price should be based on of glutamic acid was levied and collected pursuant to Section 104,
the value of glutamic acid in 1966. But the Tariff Commission denied par. 29.23, of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by
such a claim, saying that the relevant EO was only passed in 1965 and Executive Order No. 225, dated December 13, 1965, which imposes
thus the 1966 price cannot be used. However, the Tariff Commission an alternate customs, duty, i.e., a specific duty of P2.40 per kilo of
based its computation on the value of said article in 1963, because it said glutamic acid or an ad valorem duty of 40%, whichever is higher.
that Petitioner Vi Ve failed to prove the price of glutamic acid in 1964
and 1965. 4.   The specific duty at the rate of P2.40 per kilo was applied to
petitioner Vi Ve's importation as the same is higher than the ad
But petitioner Vi Ve then presented the price of another chemical valorem duty of 40%. 40% of P35,190.00 is P14,076.00. Prior to the
compound, propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 and claimed that because amendment of Par. 29.23 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs
glutamic acid and propionic glycine are the same, the court should have Code by Executive Order No. 225, the customs duty on glutamic
taken judicial notice of the similarity of the two and thus the CTA should acid was 10% ad valorem, which, if applied to petitioner's
have attributed the price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 as being importation of glutamic acid valued at P35,190.00, it would be liable
the same price of glutamic acid in the same years. Issue: W/N the CA to pay only the sum of P3,519.00."6
should have taken judicial notice of the fact that propionic glycine and
glutamic acid are the same. No. 5.   Petitioner Vi Ve contends that Executive Order No. 225 is invalid for
failure to comply with Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code
The courts cannot take judicial notice of the similarity in the chemical authorizing the President to increase or decrease tariff rates under the
components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid because the chemical conditions specified therein, hence, it filed the corresponding protest
components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are with the Collector of Customs of Manila.
technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required
knowledge know their similarity or difference. Neither did appellant 6.   The Collector denied the protest solely on the ground that he has no
show that the chemistry book show the chemical components of power to nullify an executive order issued by the President. On
propionic glycine and glutamic acid are the same. This being so, it appeal to respondent Commissioner of Customs, the Collector's
cannot be said that these objects are of public knowledge or of decision was sustained also on the same ground."
unquestionable demonstration to be the proper subject of judicial notice 7.   The grounds relied upon by petitioner in assailing the legality of
by the Court Executive Order No. 225 may be summarized as follows: (1) There
was no prior investigation by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation by the National Economic Council in regard to the
DOCTRINE: The courts cannot take judicial notice of something that is increase of the customs duty on imported glutamic acid; (2) it has not
 been shown that the increase in the customs duty on said article is RATIO:
necessary in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
1.   (1) The first error assigned would find fault with the Court of Tax
national defense; and (3) the duty on said article was increased in
Appeals, for its finding that there was compliance with the statutory
said Executive Order by more than five times the former rate of duty
grant of authority to the President under Section 401 of the Tariff
... ." These were all rebutted.
and Customs Code. Thus the objection raised was that the required
8.   Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the price should be based on the value of investigation was not held. The Court of Tax Appeals, as shown
the article in 1966. The CTA stated that the value of glutamic acid above, considered such ground and found it insubstantial. Then
imported by petitioner Vi Ve in 1966 could not have been considered petitioner also claimed that the statutory limit of the increase not to
in the computation of the maximum increase in said duty because exceed five times was exceeded. Again, the Court of Tax Appeals, as
Executive Order No. 225 was promulgated only on December 13, made clear that it simply was not so. This Court is bound by the
1965. Thus the value of glutamic acid in 1966 cannot be used in the finding of facts of the Court of Tax Appeals, especially so, where as
computation. here, the evidence in support thereof is more than substantial.
9.   However, CTA based the price of the article in 1963, stating that 2.   (2) The second alleged error of the Court of Tax Appeals was that no
petitioner Vi Ve also failed to produce evidence of the value of judicial notice was taken of the similarity in the chemical
glutamic acid in 1964 and 1965. In fact, according to the Tariff components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid.
Commission, there is no record of any importation of said article
3.   Petitioner Vi Ve claims that the CTA erred in concluding that
during those years.
petitioner failed to produce evidence of the value of glutamic
10.   But petitioner Vi Ve then presented the price of another chemical acid in 1964 and 1965 because importations of glutamic acid
compound, propionic glycine, in 1964 and 1965 and claimed that under the commercial name of "propionic glycine had been
because glutamic acid and propionic glycine are the same, the court made in the years 1964 and 1965."
should have taken judicial notice of the similarity of the two, and
4.   Simplified Version: Petitioner Vi Ve presented the price for
thus the CTA should have attributed the price of propionic glycine in
propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965, not for glutamic acid. But
1964 and 1965 as being the same price of glutamic acid in the same
Petitioner Vi Ve is also claiming that propionic glycine and glutamic
years. Petitioner Vi Ve then claims that the price of propionic
acid are the same, thus the CTA should treat the price of propionic
glycine in 1964/1965 should have been used as the base for the
glycine in 1964 and 1965 as the same price for glutamic acid in 1964
computation of the tax, instead of the price of glutamic acid in 1963.
and 1965.
ISSUES:
5.   The Court of Tax Appeals, however, held that "the chemical
1.   W/N the CTA should have taken judicial notice of the fact that components of these article [propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are
propionic glycine and glutamic acid are the same chemical technical in nature and only persons possessed of the required
compounds. No. The chemical components of these article knowledge know their similarity or difference."
[propionic glycine and glutamic acid] are technical in nature and
6.   In other words, the CTA stated that it could NOT take judicial notice
only persons possessed of the required knowledge know their
of the price of propionic glycine in 1964 and 1965 and attribute it as
similarity or difference, and thus the chemical components of both
the price of glutamic acid because it is not of judicial notice that the
cannot be taken judicial notice by the court.
two chemical components are actually the same
7.   Petitioner Vi Ve claimed that the similarity in the chemical
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of July components of propionic glycine and glutamic acid should have been
31, 1967 is affirmed. Costs against petitioner. taken judicial notice of by the Court of Tax Appeals because it is a
matter which is capable of immediate and accurate determination by
resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.
 Petitioner further claims that there is already a certification that
propionic glycine is just another name for glutamic acid.
8.   The above assigned error was refuted by the then Solicitor General,
now Associate Justice, Antonio B. Barredo, and the then Assistant
Solicitor General, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Pacifico P. de Castro, thus: "Relative to appellants assertion that the
decision is erroneous as the Court of Tax Appeals did not take
judicial notice of the fact that "propionic glycine" is the same as
glutamic acid, we maintain that the lower court was correct in stating
that the chemical components of these articles are technical in nature
and only persons possessed of the required knowledge know their
similarity or difference. Neither did appellant show that the
chemistry book show the chemical components of propionic
glycine and glutamic acid are the same. This being so, it cannot be
said that these objects are of public knowledge or of unquestionable
demonstration to be the proper subject of judicial notice by the
Court."
9.   Affirmed.
 029 FLUEMER, vs. HIX (CRUZ) 2.   It is theory of Fluemer that the will of Hix was executed in Elkins,
March 17, 1930 | Malcolm, J. | Rule 38 West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, who had his residence in that
jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code and as certified
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix deceased. to by the Director of the National Library shall govern.
PETITIONERS: A.W. Fluemer 3.   The CFI denied probate of the will of Sec 300 and 301 of the Civil
RESPONDENT: Annie Coushing Hix Procedure were not complied with.
4.   Hence this appeal.
SUMMARY: Fluemer, the special administratix of the estate of Hix. It is 5.   While the appeal is pending submission in the SC, the attorney for
theory of Fluemer that the will of Hix was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, the Fluemer presented an unverified petition asking the court to
on November 3, 1925, who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition.
laws of West Verginia Code and as certified to by the Director of the a.   One of these documents discloses that a paper writing
National Library shall govern. The CFI denied probate of the will of Sec 300 purporting to have been presented for probate on June 8,
and 301 of the Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence this appeal. 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West
The issue in this case is WoN it is necessary to prove in the jurisdiction of Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of
the Philippines, the existence of the law of West Virginia as alleged by Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing
Fluemer as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording of the will of Hix. witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed.
The Court ruled in the affirmative. it is necessary to prove in the b.   It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June
jurisdiction of the Philippines, the existence of the law of West Virginia 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West
as alleged by Fluemer as a prerequisite to the allowance and recording Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as
of the will of Hix . The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of
themselves in our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
authorized to take judicial notice of various states of the American Union. c.   In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for
Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the law were not the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on
met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was printed February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia
or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under Issue:
the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code 1.   WoN it is necessary to prove in the jurisdiction of the Philippines,
of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the existence of the law of West Virginia as alleged by Fluemer as a
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was prerequisite to the allowance and recording of the will of Hix – YES,
executed. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
DOCTRINE: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in courts. It must be proved with facts.
our courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take 2.   WoN Fluemer is authorized to carry the appeal – No but he is a party
judicial notice of various states of the American Union. Such laws must be in interest
proved as facts
Ruling: For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Facts:
1.   The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix Ratio:
(Hix), A.W. Fluemer (Fluemer) appeals from a decision of Judge of Fluemer is not authorized to carry on this appeal.
First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to 1.   However, Fluemer, who appears to have been the moving party in
by the last will and testament of the deceased. these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or
 disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be 2.   Moreover, there is no showing that the deceased left any property at
permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he
the will left any in West Virginia.

it is necessary to prove in the jurisdiction of the Philippines, the

existence of the law of West Virginia as alleged by Fluemer as a
prerequisite to the allowance and recording of the will of Hix
1.   The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
judicial notice of various states of the American Union. Such laws
must be proved as facts.
2.   Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no
showing that the book from which an extract was printed or
published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3.   Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the
officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
4.   No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.

The due execution of the will and the domicile of the testator was not
established
1.   The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the
Fluemer. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will
was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent
witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to
require.
2.   On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of Fluemer to prove
execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

These facts under (facts #5) show the intention to make the Philippines the
principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration.
1.   However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with
Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a
will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been
requested.
 030 PCIB v. ESCOLIN (SIAPNO) share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half
March 29, 1974 | Barredo, J. | Foreign Laws thereof. ISSUE: WON Texan or Philippine law will govern the
legitime of Charles – No answer yet, remanded. The Court cannot
PETITIONER: Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by the
RESPONDENTS: Honorable Venicio Escolin, Presiding Judge of the parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent
CFI of Iloilo and Avelina Magno comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in
fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented It should be
SUMMARY (The original case is around 100 pages so please bear with borne in mind that the question of what are the laws of Texas
me J): Charles & Linnie Hodges, both Texan nationals, were domiciled governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of
in Iloilo City for around 50 years. In Linnie’s will she provided that she fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be
bequeaths remainder of estate to spouse. Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in
Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR. In Financial Statements submitted dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception
before the court, he made statements that the estate of Mrs. Hodges is in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge
1/2 of conjugal estate. He allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they
declaration in US. For 5 years before his death, he failed to make have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
accounting. It was incumbent upon Charles’ to liquidate the conjugal parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
partnership in order for the “rest, residue, and remainder” to be But wharever happens, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not
determined and distributed upon his death to Linnie’s surviving siblings, entitled to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they having argued that it is
pursuant to her will. Charles died. Initially, Magno, was the so which amounts to judicial admission.
administratrix of both spouse's estate. Later, PCIB became the
administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate, DOCTRINE:
including those properties/assets that passed to him upon Linnie Jane’s GR – Foreign Law, as a matter of fact, must be alleged and proven.
death. During probate proceedings, the administrators differed on EXC - Where the foreign law is within the actual knowledge of the
whether Philippine or Texan law should govern. Particularly, they court, such as when the law is generally well-known, had been ruled
differed as to how much of the conjugal estate should go to the siblings upon in previous cases before it, and none of the parties claim otherwise,
of Linnie. the court may take judicial notice of the foreign law.
PCIB: claims that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the Philippines
at the time of her death, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, construed in
relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what FACTS:
should be applied here should be the rules of succession under the Civil 1.   Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally
Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more than 1/4 of the from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and
said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already explained, the accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines
legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have disposed of and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and
nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). were domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years.
Avelina: denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines, since 2.   In the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein
allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original petitioner Charles Newton Hodges was directed to have the right to
residence of birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that, manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased Linnie Jane
anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she being Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two,
indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and
the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, remainder of my estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnie’s Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him, my said husband, during his
brothers and sisters are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her natural lifetime."
3.   Charles Hodges was engaged in the business of buying and selling
personal and real properties, and do such acts which petitioner may
think best.
4.   An Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Allow or Authorize Petitioner to PCIB’s Claims
Continue the Business in which he was Engaged and to Perform Acts 12.   Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with
which he had been doing while Deceased was Living was filed respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights,
praying that petitioner Charles Hodges be allowed or authorized to and the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions:
continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts a.   Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will
which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane Hodges was b.   Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person
living. The Hon. Court approved the motion. whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
5.   Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
wife's will, to duly liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which property may be found, shall prevail”. However, the Conflict of
constituted her estate, in order that upon the eventuality of his death, Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie
"the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be determined and Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law)
correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional
sisters. And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done. rights over movables, and the law of the situs of the property
6.   However, Charles died in without having liquidated Linnie’s estate, (also Philippine law as to properties located in the Philippines) as
which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. regards immovables.
7.   A longtime employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed c.   Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in
Administratrix (for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for the Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
Charles’). Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies d.   Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate
(representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was designated Co- of spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between
Special Administrator, who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, them. Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of the assets of
Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co- the Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained
administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol. own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
8.   SC was confused about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the e.   The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnie’s estate,
parties representing both estates were involved in a modus operandi cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be
to settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never enhanced or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments
saw)—which, however, went wary, with more and more heirs from accruing after her death. “All rents, emoluments and income from
the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers filing their said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
respective claims for retainer fees. authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may
9.   Later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a need or desire."
claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed f.   Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane
to him upon Linnie Jane’s death. Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent
10.   Magno opposed this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS) of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal
would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and
administrator (entering into sales and other such conveyances). legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said
11.   For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’ conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
estate, to which she responded by locking up the premises being used g.   In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s estate, Charles
by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s properties. appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all
the assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection
 with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just RULING:
as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie
Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, RATIO:
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and 1.   In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present
control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as such further evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing
exclusive owner of all said assets. of the two probate proceedings herein involved. After all, the court a
h.   As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues, and it is best for all
estate. Neither was there any asset left to Linnie’s estate at the time concerned that it should do so in the first instance.
of Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all 2.   Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot
of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate” which would go to be less than the remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
her siblings in the event of Charles death. The provision is thus properties, it may be mentioned here that during the deliberations,
void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets. the point was raised as to whether or not said holding might be
Avelina’s Claims inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her reliable evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A.
capacity as administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of “with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.) successional rights” that may be willed by a testator which, under
a.   Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in
her estate, and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over view of the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs.
the same estate, to her relatives. Hodges, these cases should be returned to the court a quo, so that
b.   After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the the parties may prove what said law provides, it is premature for
will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the
and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of
his life-estate and usufruct. inheritance to which the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are
c.   Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of entitled.
Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has 3.   It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of
been no such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’ what are the laws of Texas governing the matters herein issue is,
repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the
amount of rents, emoluments and income. rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and
Summary: have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the
PCIB Magno parties in any proceeding, with the rare exception in instances
when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the
court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have
The estate left by Mrs. Hodges < 1/2 of her Texas law applicable,
been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the
share in the conjugal estate (Apply Philippine wherein no system of
parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
law), notwithstanding Art 16 of our Civil code legitime provided so estate
4.   The case Aznar vs. Garcia could not have been a reference to certain
which mandates the application of Texas law, of Mrs. Hodges could not
provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas because of the
Mr.Hodges being a citizen of Texas be less than her share or
disparity in the material dates of that case and the present ones would
>1/2
not permit the Court to indulge in the hazardous conjecture that said
provisions have not been amended or changed in the meantime.
ISSUE/s: WON Philippine law governs the legitime of Charles – (Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as
Remanded there's a time difference between this case and that case, thus the
Texas law might have changed in between the rulings)
5.   In other words, since PCIB concedes that upon application of Article
16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of
the estate in controversy is just as We have determined it to be, and
Magno is only claiming, on her part, that it could be more, PCIB
may not now or later pretend differently.
6.   Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain
that the application of the laws of Texas would result in the other
heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And
since PCIB’s representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually
constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court
are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is “not permitted to
contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with them.”
7.   It is now beyond controversy for all future purposes of these
proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of
Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-
fourth of the conjugal estate of the spouses; the existence and
effects of foreign laws being questions of fact, and it being the
position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the
laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such
contention constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it
would be in estoppel in any further proceedings in these cases to
claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what might be
proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws
of Texas;
 001 CIR vs. FISHER (Eleazar) Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one
January 28, 1961 | Barrera, J. | Proving foreign law, Doctrine Processual that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other competent
Presumption evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law."

PETITIONERS: THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San
RESPONDENTS: DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil
the COURT OF TAX APPEALS Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the
obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
SUMMARY: Stevenson died in California, leaving a will instituting his existence of said law.
wife as his sole heir to real and personal properties acquired by them
while residing in the Philippines. The administrator of the estate filed an FACTS:
estate and tax return with the CIR. In the return, the administrator 1.   Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents,
claimed deductions and exemptions pursuant to the reciprocity provisions married in Manila to another British subject, Beatrice. He died in
in the NIRC in relation to the California Internal Revenue Code which 1951 in California where he and his wife moved to.
also allows for deductions. It also argues that in computing the taxable 2.   In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real
estate of the decedent, one-half (1⁄2) of the net estate should be deducted and personal properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in
therefrom as the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with the law Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines).
on conjugal partnership. The CIR disallowed the claims for deduction 3.   Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his
stating that the property regime applicable is that provided for under estate filed an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a
English laws which states that all properties acquired during marriage preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance
belong exclusively to the husband. With regard to the reciprocity of the Mines shares of stock.
provision, the CIR claims that Fisher failed to prove provisions of 4.   In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to
California Internal Revenue Code providing for exemption. The issue in the spouses Fisher.
this case is WoN deductions should be allowed pursuant to reciprocity 5.   Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming
provisions? – YES, The lawyer of Fisher was able to adequately prove ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and
the provisions of the California Internal Revenue Code. He testified that inheritance tax on the Mines’ shares of stock pursuant to a
as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from
the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed
the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.
of intangible personal properties, he cited pertinent sections of the 6.   CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be deducted from
California Code. While there is a provision in the Rules of Court on how the net estate of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property
to prove foreign law in Philippine Court, such does not preclude belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt from inheritance tax
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.
foreign law. Jurisprudence has already recognize that testimony is
sufficient to prove the existence of foreign law. ISSUE/s
WoN deductions should be allowed pursuant to reciprocity provisions? –
DOCTRINE: Testimony Can Serve as Other Competent Evidence to YES, The lawyer of Fisher was able to adequately prove the provisions of the
Prove Foreign Law - Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court California Internal Revenue Code. He testified that as an active member of
prescribes the manner of proving foreign laws before our tribunals. the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation
However, although we believe it desirable that these laws be proved in laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
accordance with said rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal
Steel Works v. Muzzal, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our properties, he cited pertinent sections of the California Code. While there is a
provision in the Rules of Court on how to prove foreign law in Philippine rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Court, such does not preclude presentation of other competent evidence to Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections 300 and 301 of our
prove the existence of a foreign law. Jurisprudence has already recognize that Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will convince
testimony is sufficient to prove the existence of foreign law. one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law."
RULING: WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, 5.   In that case, we considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of
the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not San Francisco, California who quoted verbatim a section of
inconsistent herewith. No costs. So ordered. California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at
the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
RATIO: establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no
1.   CIR disputes the action of the Tax Court in the exempting the error, therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the
respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of pertinent California law as proved by respondents' witness.
stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the 6.   We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue transfer or death taxes, between the State of California and the
Code, in relation to Section 13851 of the California Revenue and Philippines.
Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said proviso of the 7.   Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part,
California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by provides:
the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section a.   ... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a)
residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a state in the if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
United States; and (3) there is no "total" reciprocity between the foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose
Philippines and the state of California in that while the former a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of
exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not
personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the
inheritance tax.. foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the
2.   To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer
counsel for herein respondents, testified that as an active member of taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
the California Bar since 1931, he is familiar with the revenue and intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis
court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption of supplied).
intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 8.   On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax
13851 (a) and (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:.
published in Derring's California Code, a publication of the Bancroft- a.   "SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions.
Whitney Company inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation Intangible personal property is exempt from the tax imposed
of the cited section was offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the by this part if the decedent at the time of his death was a
respondents. resident of a territory or another State of the United States or
3.   It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our of a foreign state or country which then imposed a legacy,
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal
of them.5 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. property of its own residents, but either:.
4.   Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of i.   (a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax
proving foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we of any character in respect to intangible personal
believe it desirable that these laws be proved in accordance with said property of residents of this State, or
 ii.   (b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred in
which intangible personal property of a non-resident exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes 11.   We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal
of every character if the Territory or other State of Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6,
the United States or foreign state or country in which 1958, 54 O.G. 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H.
the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by the Collector
in respect to intangible personal property of of Internal Revenue. It will be noted, however, that the issue of
residents of the Territory or State of the United reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax law and that
States or foreign state or country of residence of the of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the
decedent." (Id.) ruling therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be
9.   It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must that as it may, we now declare that in view of the express provisions
be total, that is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and of both the Philippine and California laws that the exemption would
every character, in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, apply only if the law of the other grants an exemption from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of succession, or death taxes of every character, there could not be
the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states collects or partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or 12.   With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount
succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This of P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also
is the underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws. being claimed by respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in
10.   In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non- the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the
resident with properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an
and its settlement, both an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the
laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the other provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. Nor
hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax on is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law.
non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide  
for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in
the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will
have a situation where a Californian, who is non-resident in the
Philippines but has intangible personal properties here, will the
subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt from the
payment of the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino,
non-resident of California, but with intangible personal properties
there, be entitled to the exemption clause of the California law, since
the Californian has not been exempted from every character of
legacy, succession, or death tax because he is, under our law, under
obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we exempt
the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a
Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California because
under the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he
is bound to pay the same, there being no reciprocity recognized in
respect thereto. In both instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a
disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature has intended
such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own government and
 002 MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST v. GUERRERO 1.   On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero (Guerrero)
(Escalona) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers
February 19, 2003 | Carpio, J. | Foreign Laws as Judicial Notice Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank (the Bank) with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Guerrero sought payment of
PETITIONER: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank
RESPONDENTS: Rafael Ma. Guerrero
damages allegedly for
a.   Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
SUMMARY: On May 17, 1994, Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against checking account with the Bank;
Hanover and/or Chemical Bank (Bank) with the RTC of Manila. b.   A returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
Guerrero sought payment of damages for verification problems; and
a.   Illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank
c.   An unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero
b.   A returned check worth $18,000 due to signature verification amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
problems 2.   On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging that
c.   Unauthorized conversion of his account by stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New York law
The Bank answered that by stipulation, Guerrero’s account is governed by New and this law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except
York law, and such law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual
damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (PSJ),
actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for
contending that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual damages only. Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros
The “Walden Affidavit” was presented by the Bank to support its Motion for claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and
PSJ. The RTC and CA denied the Bank’s Motion for PSJ, stating that the exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees on the same
Walden Affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial
jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its Motion.
should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero
The issue is WoN the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York opposed the motion.
law and jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ. 3.   The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney,
supported the Banks Motion for Partial Summary
The SC ruled that the Walden Affidavit was insufficient. The Bank cannot rely Judgment. Alyssa Waldens affidavit (Walden affidavit) stated
on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue
v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open
that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the
court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of
sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden Affidavit was taken Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Philippine
abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
Affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only affidavit.
because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York
law on damages.  The Bank also failed to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on
4.   The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary
how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts. The Walden Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996
Affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. and July 17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for
Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue. the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the
DOCTRINE: Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14,
fact, they must be alleged and proven. 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the Banks motion for
  reconsideration.
FACTS: 5.   The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for
partial summary judgment.
 for damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts as
ISSUES: illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
1.   WoN the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and
checking account with the Bank, a returned check worth
jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ – NO. Because US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and
the Bank failed to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a unauthorized conversion of his account. In its Answer, the
foreign law and decisions of foreign courts. The Walden Affidavit did not Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern
prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank their contractual relation bars the recovery of damages other
has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence
are on the matters at issue.
than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros
complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses are
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The ruling of set out in the Banks answer.
the CA is affirmed. 138.   True, the court can determine whether there are genuine
issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-
RATIO:
affidavits submitted by the parties to the court. However, as
132.   The petition is devoid of merit.
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for
133.   The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment
partial summary judgment as supported by the Walden
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which
affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerreros claims are sham,
reads:
a.   Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party - A party against
fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden affidavit
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the
declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part necessitating a formal trial.
thereof. 139.   There can be no summary judgment where questions of
134.   A court may grant a summary judgment to settle fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings
expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears are in dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far
no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of
judgment as a matter of law. judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
135.   In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether
is: are the issues raised in the New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims
pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be
depositions or admissions accompanying the motion? resolved only by a trial on the merits.
136.   A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for 140.   Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved
which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by
issue for trial. the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
137.   A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not
show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
formal trial. Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be
statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular
 officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The Walden
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on
be under the official seal of the attesting officer. damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it
141.   Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized does not state the specific New York law on damages. We
in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals which held that: reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
a.   Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance a.   3. In New York, [n]ominal damages are damages in name only,
with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded
of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a
Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) cause of action against the defendant, but is unable to prove actual
does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since
prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for nominal
Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of damages.
San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of b.   4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I
California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use
the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to the phrase temperate damages in its index. I have also done a
establish the existence of said law.Accordingly, in line with this computerized search for the phrase in all published New York
view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. cases, and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the
Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law phrase used in American law.
of California as proved by the respondents witness. In that c.   5. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs many aspects of
case, the counsel for respondent testified that as an active member a Banks relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs
of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue Guerreros claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000
and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the check. Guerrero claims that this was a wrongful
lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards dishonor. However, the UCC states that justifiable refusal to pay or
exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited accept as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a
Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and check for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or
Revenue Code as published in Derrings California Code, a illegible signature or a forgery, 3-510, Official Comment 2. .. to
publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no
testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in signature card on . and could not verify Guerreros signature. In my
evidence by respondents. Likewise, in several naturalization cases, opinion, consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and
it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign justifiable reason not to pay.
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, d.   6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that neither
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as
the circumstances, the Court is satisfied of the authenticity of the specifically provided in the Act or by other rule of law. UCC 4-103
written proof offered. Thus, in a number of decisions, mere further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than the New
Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a
that law. (Emphasis supplied) breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful
142.   The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron dishonor).
and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue e.   7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to
reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312,
testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif Construction
 Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d involves a high moral culpability. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d
868, 869-70 (4th Dept 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
Remedies 12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress). l.   14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law
f.   8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress that exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of
cannot be recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v. National contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong
Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. and not a public right is involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance
1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150 A.D.2d 860,540 Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept 1978).
N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dept 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 143.   The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the
54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dept 1976). Damage to affiants personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the
reputation is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif
Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-
case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing
70. any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of
g.   9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the
stock, New York courts will not take into consideration the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank
performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the
based on the value of the stock at the time of the breach, Aroneck
v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dept
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24
1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign
1023 (1983). courts.
h.   10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential 144.   The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit
damages if they were the type that would naturally arise from the is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However,
breach and if they were brought within the contemplation of parties
as the probable result of the breach at the time of or prior to
because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132
contracting. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts,
319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 223 the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New
N.Y. 32, 36 (1918). York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged,
i.   11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are
fees unless they are provided by contract or statute.E.g., Geler v.
National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y.
on the matters at issue.
1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 145.   Next, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to
179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept 1992); Stanisic v. submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However,
Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 the pertinent provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of
(1st Dept 1991). There is no statute that permits attorneys fees in a Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit
case of this type.
j.   12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach
mandatory, thus:
of contract, even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted a.   SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
with malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue Service of chester_v. hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
Insurance Co. of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall
N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dept 1980); Senior v. Manufacturers be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions
Hanover Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the
Dept 1985). amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
k.   13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by of law. (Emphasis supplied)
defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and 146.   It is axiomatic that the term may as used in remedial
law, is only permissive and not mandatory.
147.   Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments
in the Banks motion for partial summary judgment and the
Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing
affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary
judgment, although he did not present an opposing
affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing
affidavit, as there was no need for one, because the Walden
affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to
prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or
impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the Walden
affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York
law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an
opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary
judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as to
the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.
148.   Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless
for Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that
what the Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of
the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to
the Walden affidavit because his complaint itself controverts
the matters set forth in the Banks motion and the Walden
affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters already
averred in his complaint.
149.   There being substantial triable issues between the
parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the Banks motion for
partial summary judgment. There is a need to determine by
presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty
of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the
applicable laws.
150.   This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks
resort to a motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the
Bank has successfully defeated the very purpose for which
summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid
parties in avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial.
 003 WILDVALLEY SHIPPING v. CA (FARCON) event or transaction in issue. A review of the Complaint revealed that it
October 6, 2000 | Buena, J. | Doctrine of Processual Presumption was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of the
M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of
PETITIONER: Wildvalley Shipping Co. Venezuela.
RESPONDENT: Court of Appeals and Philippine President Lines Inc.
DOCTRINE: Under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
SUMMARY: The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of
President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of known as processual presumption.
Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine FACTS:
Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and 1.   The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by private respondent
egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel Philippine President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,
owned by Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the
Puerto Ordaz on that day. Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC of Manila vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
against Philippine President Lines. The trial court rendered its decision Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the
in favor of the petitioner Wildvalley. The CA reversed the Decision of harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas
the lower court. through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on
ISSUE: WoN Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar – NO. February 11, 1988, boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.
Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of 2.   The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro
Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, testified on the existence of the Colon, was at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the
Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when
and the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12, 1988. Captain
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). However, these written Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.
laws were not proven in the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 3.   The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered
of the Rules of Court. Both of these documents are considered in the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its
Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, result of the shallowness of the channel. Between mile 158 and 157,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela. It is not the vessel again experienced some vibrations. These occurred at 4:12
enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de a.m. It was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge.
Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain 4.   The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified
Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the that it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or
Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested the set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered
documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice all the double bottom tanks.
consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the 5.   At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As
office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
certificate could be found in the records of the case. A foreign law is petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail
considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the
 6.   Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with proved is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is
the RTC of Manila against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of decisions
Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest admitted in such courts. The court has interpreted Section 25 (now
thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
expenses of litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.
Company was dismissed. The trial court rendered its decision in 3.   We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
favor of the petitioner Wildvalley, ordering Philippine President Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Lines “to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual Venezuela, to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de
and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the Reglamento
incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the
$22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer, and navigation of the Orinoco River). Captain Monzon has held the
to pay the cost of this suit.” aforementioned posts for eight years. As such he is in charge of
7.   Both parties appealed: petitioner Wildvalley appealing the non- designating the pilots for maneuvering and navigating the Orinoco
award of interest, with the private respondent Philippine President River. He is also in charge of the documents that come into the office
Lines questioning the decision on the merits of the case. of the harbour masters.
8.   The CA reversed the Decision of the lower court. 4.   Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in
9.   Petitioner Wildvalley filed a motion for reconsideration but the same the manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Court.
a.   The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was
ISSUE/s: published in the Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of
1.   WoN Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar – NO. Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented
2.   WoN, under Philippine law, fault or negligence can be attributed to in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of
Philippine President Lines for the grounding of said vessel resulting Venezuela. The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1
in the blockage of the Rio Orinoco – NO. Philippine President Lines del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the Ministerio
was not negligent. It was the pilot (Vasquez) who was negligent. de Comunicaciones of Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the
said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
RULING: Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed. b.   Both of these documents are considered in Philippine
jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
RATIO: official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
Venezuelan law not applicable because it was not pleaded before the lower Venezuela.
court. 5.   For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the
1.   It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our following requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2)
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
2.   A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
when  admissible  for  any  purpose,  may  be  evidenced  by  an  official  publication  thereof  or  by  a  
an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the copy   attested   by   the   officer   having   the   legal   custody   of   the   record,   or   by   his   deputy,   and  
Rules of Court, as amended.16 Where the foreign law sought to be accompanied,  if  the  record  is  not  kept  in  the  Philippines,  with  a  certificate  that  such  officer  
has  the  custody.  If  the  office  in  which  the  record  is  kept  is  in  a  foreign  country,  the  certificate  
                                                                                                                        may  be  made  by  a  secretary  of  the  embassy  or  legation,  consul  general,  consul,  vice  consul,  
16Section   24   of   Rule   132   of   the   Rules   of   Court,   as   amended,   provides:   "Sec.   24.   Proof   of   or  consular  agent  or  by  any  officer  in  the  foreign  service  of  the  Philippines  stationed  in  the  
official  record.  -­‐-­‐  The  record  of  public  documents  referred  to  in  paragraph  (a)  of  Section  19,   foreign  country  in  which  the  record  is  kept,  and  authenticated  by  the  seal  of  his  office."  
 It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy regard to his own property. This we have found Philippine President
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or Lines to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the "main
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were checked and found
requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the to be in good running condition; when the master left a competent
giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is
foreign country. experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master
6.   It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the
Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as vibrations occurred anew.
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by 11.   The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who had control of the ship as he can still perform the duties conferred upon
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or him by law despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by charge of the vessel. It is not required of him to be on the bridge
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in while the vessel is being navigated by a pilot. However, Section 8 of
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides that “for entering a
the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits
in the records of the case. within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any
7.   With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel
for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory
weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best pilotage.” The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel
evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be
of the statute. knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the
8.   At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law river.
was not pleaded before the lower court. A foreign law is 12.   In his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is
considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading an official pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, and that he
about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal had been a pilot for twelve (12) years. He also had experience in
consequence on the event or transaction in issue. A review of the navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.
Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite 13.   The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule
the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas the order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop
9.   We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a the vessel, mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel. Moreover,
the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very
or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course
domestic law and this is known as processual presumption. headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when
navigating the Orinoco River.
No negligence on the part of Philippine President Lines. 14.   Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the
10.   There being no contractual obligation, Philippine President Lines is master chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited
obliged to give only the diligence required of a good father of a knowledge of the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the
family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel
Civil Code. The diligence of a good father of a family requires only safely.
that diligence which an ordinary prudent man would exercise with
 15.   We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot.
When the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what
was going on, and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the
middle of the channel and that the vibration was as (sic) a result of
the shallowness of the channel."
16.   Pilot Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as
well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of
the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of
the portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to
determine the depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his
set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we
hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding.
17.   As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of
control over the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a
compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary
for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur17, i.e., negligence and control, to
render respondent Philippine President Lines liable, are absent.

                                                                                                                       
17   For   the   doctrine   of   res   ipsa   loquitur   to   apply,   the   following   conditions   must   be   met:   (1)  
the   accident   was   of   such   character   as   to   warrant   an   inference   that   it   would   not   have  
happened  except  for  defendant's  negligence;  (2)  the  accident  must  have  been  caused  by  an  
agency  or  instrumentality  within  the  exclusive  management  or  control  of  the  person  charged  
with   the   negligence   complained   of;   and   (3)   the   accident   must   not   have   been   due   to   any  
voluntary  action  or  contribution  on  the  part  of  the  person  injured.  
 004 ATCI OVERSEAS v. ECHIN (Fordan) who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
Oct. 11, 2010 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Doctrine of Processual Presumption of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
PETITIONERS: ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal, and judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or
Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait forum law. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
RESPONDENT: Ma. Josefa Echin hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
SUMMARY: Echin was was hired by ATCI Overseas in behalf of its with Secs. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the ROC. The documents (kindly see
principal, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of Ratio 9 for the details), whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
medical technologist under a 2-year contract with a monthly salary of sufficiently prove that Echin was validly terminated as a probationary
US$1,200. It was stated in the MOA that all newly-hired employees undergo employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of
a probationary period of 1 year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Board Employment Contract No. 2. Echin was deployed on Feb. 17, 2000 Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what ATCI Overseas
but was terminated on Feb. 11, 2001 after not having passed the probationary submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
period. She filed for reconsideration but the same was denied and on Mar. translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at
17, 2001, she went home shoulding her own airfare. Echin filed with NLRC all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI Overseas as the local such Kuwaiti laws, Echin was validly terminated.
recruitment agency, represented by Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign
principal. The LA held that Echin was illegally dismissed and accordingly DOCTRINE: It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
ordered ATCI Overseas and the Ministry to pay her US$3,600, salary for 3 application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the
months unexpired portion of her contract. It found that ATCI Overseas and doctrine of processual presumption. In international law, the party who wants
the Ministry neither showed that there was just cause to warrant Echin’s to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee. On appeal to the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
NLRC and then to CA, both affirmed the LA’s ruling. Hence, the current pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of
petition. ATCI Overseas claimed that they should not be held liable because a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. To prove
Echin’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They with Secs. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the ROC.
thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the CA to
apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in FACTS:
deciding the present case. 35.  Josefina Echin (Echin) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation (ATCI Overseas) in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner,
The issue is whether or not Philippine labor laws is applicable. YES. It is the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position
hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a of medical technologist under a 2-year contract, denominated as a
foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of
processual presumption which, in this case, ATCI Overseas failed to US$1,200.
discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l. v. NLRC, 36.  Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary
illuminates: In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran period of 1 year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided Employment Contract No. 2.
for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination 37.  Echin was deployed on Feb. 17, 2000 but was terminated from
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) employment on Feb. 11, 2001 for not having allegedly passed the
to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating probationary period.
to the termination of the employment of Gran. In international law, the party
38.  As the Ministry denied Echin’s request for reconsideration, she held jointly and solidarily liable, ATCI Overseas cannot likewise be
returned to the Philippines on Mar. 17, 2001, shouldering her own air held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been
fare. judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
39.  On July 27, 2001, Echin filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI ISSUES:
Overseas as the local recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal 88.  Whether or not ATCI Overseas is held solidarily liable with the
(Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. Ministry for the unpaid portion of Echin’s salary. – YES, since it is
40.  The Labor Arbiter (LA) held that Echin was illegally dismissed and provided under RA No. 8042 which affords the OFWs with a recourse
accordingly ordered ATCI Overseas and the Ministry to pay her and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due
US$3,600, salary for 3 months unexpired portion of her contract. It them.
found that ATCI Overseas and the Ministry neither showed that there 89.   Whether or not Philippine labor laws is applicable. – YES, since
was just cause to warrant Echin’s dismissal nor that she failed to ATCI Overseas failed to prove the Kuwaiti civil service laws, the
qualify as a regular employee. NLRC also affirmed LA’s ruling. Philippine labor laws would apply.
41.  On appeal of ATCI and Ikdal to the CA, they claimed that their 90.  Whether or not Ikdal is also solidarily liable as corporate officer of
principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune ATCI Overseas. – YES, as provided by Sec. 10 of RA No. 8042.
from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that Echin
was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating RULING: The petition is denied.
within the 1-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service
Laws. They also further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an RATIO:
officer of ATCI. On solidary liability
42.  However, the CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution. It ruled that under 1.   ATCI Overseas, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade
the law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino Workers
for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming
worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first
employment. be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
43.  Hence, the current petition. ATCI Overseas and the Ministry claimed liable.
that: 2.   In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment
a.   they should not be held liable because Echin’s employment agencies with their foreign principals, RA No. 8042 precisely affords
contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and
governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals Maguad explains:
and the CA to apply the Labor Code provisions governing “. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
probationary employment in deciding the present case. entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign
b.   even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement
relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the
POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the “customs, agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but
host country.” the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
c.   assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will
from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing
 the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
enacted.” (emphasis supplied) Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
3.   The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of presumed- identity approach or processual presumption
of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
Verily, to allow ATCI Overseas to simply invoke the immunity from pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the
suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
the foreign principal’s liability before ATCI Overseas can be held determining the issues presented before us.” (emphasis and
liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile. underscoring supplied)
8.   The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence,
Applicability of Philippine labor laws (Important) they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a
4.   ACTI Overseas’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly comply with Secs. 2418 and 2519 of Rule 132 of the ROC.
provided in Echin’s employment contract, which she voluntarily 9.   To prove the Kuwaiti law, ATCI Overseas submitted the following:
entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed a.   MOA between Echin and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI,
by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and period of 1 year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and
practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated. Regulations apply;
5.   Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the b.   a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to
parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as Echin stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without
they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign
6.   It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, Translation Unit; and
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, c.   Echin’s letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted
ATCI Overseas failed to discharge. that in her first 8 months of employment, she was given a rating of
7.   The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l. v. NLRC illuminates: “Excellent” albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work
“In the present case, the employment contract signed by schedule.
Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern 10.  These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for sufficiently prove that Echin was validly terminated as a
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to                                                                                                                        
the termination of the employment of Gran. 18 “SEC. 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
In international law, the party who wants to have a Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or 19 SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.—Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
forum law. the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.”
 authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what ATCI Overseas submitted were mere
certifications20 attesting only to the correctness of the translations of
the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under
such Kuwaiti laws, Echin was validly terminated.

On Ikdal’s liability
11.   In respect to Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer,
the same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042
on money claims:
“SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond
to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by
law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that
may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.”
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

                                                                                                                       
20 “x x x x
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice
versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in
order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.” (emphasis supplied)
 River. The River was formerly on the east/north-east side of the
009 Gener v. De Leon (IGNACIO) parcel of land.
19 Oct 2001 | De Leon, Jr., J. | Judicial notice: court proceedings & records   Allegedly, in 1978, the Angat River changed its course by
moving more than 100m to the east/north-east, leaving its
PETITIONER: Hernando Gener former course/bed along the boundary of De Leon's lot, so
RESPONDENTS: Gregorio De Leon & Zenaida Faustino (Spouses De they extended their occupation on it once it tried up.
Leon) 23.   8 MAY 1989: Thus they were able to make use of the land until on
this date, Gener allegedly, through force, threat and intimidation,
(please take note of the dates in this case!) unlawfully entered the property & deprived the sps. De Leon of the
SUMMARY: The Sps. De Leon instituted a forcible entry case in the possession of the same.
MTC against Gener, alleging that on 8 MAY 1989, he took possession   Demands to vacate went unheeded and no settlement was
of their land through force, threat & intimidation. Gener countered that reached at the barangay level.
he had been in possession of the land since 10 OCT 1988, and that in 24.   Gener, on the other hand, insisted that he is the real owner of the
fact, it was Sps. De Leon which forcibly entered his land, on 2 separate land, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated 10 OCT 1988 by
incidents (24 OCT 1988, 12 MAR 1989), and which resulted in Gener Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous owner, Proceso Joaquin.
filing criminal cases of malicious mischief against De Leon's land Gener had the land declared for tax purposes and paid realty taxes
helpers and brothers (they destroyed his trees & crops). The records of thereon.
these criminal cases were presented in evidence. The MTC ruled in   Gener also alleged that De Leon in fact recognized Proceso
favor of the sps. De Leon. The RTC reversed this, and ruled for Gener. as the owner, via an affidavit De Leon executed in 1961
The CA reinstated the MTC decision. which mentions Joaquin as a neighboring landowner.
  Gener also claimed it was sps. De Leon who forcibly entered
The Supreme Court ruled that the MTC should have taken judicial his lot, as evidenced by 2 criminal cases which Gener filed
notice of the 2 criminal cases, because they were not objected to by the against De Leon's helpers and brothers, who allegedly
other party. Despite Gener being the sole witness of his defense, his entered the lot on 2 separate incidents (24 Oct 1988 & 12
claims were aptly corroborated by the existence of the 2 criminal cases. March 1989) and destroyed his coconut, papaya and langka
trees.
DOCTRINE: While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take   Gener also claimed that the case was filed beyond the 1 year
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, [...] this rule period
is subject to the exception that "in the absence of objection and as a 25.   19 FEB 1993: The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the sps. De
matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any Leon
part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the 26.   3 APR 1995: RTC reversed the decision of the MTC, choosing
records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the Gener's narrative of buying it from the heir of the former owner.
opposing party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some 27.   The case went up to the CA, which reversed the RTC and reinstated
other manner by which it is sufficiently designated." the MTC decision. The MR was denied.

ISSUE/s:
FACTS: 2.   Whether or not the 2 criminal cases should have been considered in
22.   30 APR 1990: The sps. De Leon filed a forcible entry case in MTC evidence? – YES. Although the general rule is that courts are not
Norzagaray, Bulacan, against Gener. They claimed that they are the authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of other
original claimants and actual possessors in good faith, under a bona cases, this rule may be disregarded in lieu of the rule that in absence
fide claim of ownership. The 4,404 sqm. parcel of land (and its of the objection of the other party despite having full knowledge of
adjoining lots) were originally part of the course/bed of the Angat the existence such evidence, it may be properly considered.
 taken judicial notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The possession.
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1997 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37346 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for forcible
entry is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action
in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. No pronouncement as to costs.

RATIO:
4.   The Municipal Trial Court and Court of Appeals totally overlooked
the fact that while petitioner was his own sole witness, his testimony
of prior possession was substantiated by several documentary
evidence, which were quite damaging to the existence of respondents
alleged cause of action for forcible entry. This Court noted that there
were two (2) incidents that occurred on October 24, 1988 and March
12, 1989 which resulted in the institution by herein petitioner of
criminal complaints for malicious mischief. These twin incidents,
evidenced by Sinumpaang Salaysay and Complaint show that prior
to May 8, 1989, the alleged date of forcible entry of petitioner,
petitioner was already in possession of the disputed land. As against
the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they
were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the
documentary evidence of petitioners prior possession, more
particularly the evidence of the two (2) incidents of October 24, 1988
and March 12, 1989, must prevail.
5.   The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken judicial
notice of the said criminal cases involving the subject parcel of land
and pending in its docket. While, as a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge, this
rule is subject to the exception that "in the absence of objection and
as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as
read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the
knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it, by name
and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated." Sps. De Leon did not impugn nor object to the evidence
of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal cases of malicious
mischief that sprung from the alleged forcible entry of petitioners
alleged property. Thus, the said Municipal Trial Court should have
 010 REPUBLIC vs. CA (LAGUILLES) 9.   The case was set for hearing and the Republic (petitioner) was
Vitug, J. | Aug. 18, 1997 | Rule 129; Judicial notice; when mandatory represented by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo Guayco and the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines of Puerto Princesa City, while Gacot (claimant) appeared without
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Court of Appeals and Josefa Gacot counsel, so the hearing was reset.
10.   Before the scheduled hearing, the court received a report from the
SUMMARY: Gacot claims that she owns the lot located in Palawan, but Land Registration Authority calling the court’s attention of the
the Republic insists that it is part of public domain, pursuant to a previous decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring the lot in
decision rendered by Judge Garlitos declaring the lot in question as question as property of the Republic but despite this declaration, the
property of the government. However, despite this declaration, the government did not bar Gacot from filing her answer, possessing and
government still allowed Gacot to use and occupy the lot, and even occupying the lot and in fact accepted her tax payments and issuing
accepted Gacot’s tax payments and even issued her tax declarations. The her tax declarations.
trial court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot, so the Republic appealed 11.   Gacot presented herself as witness and her son Vicente Dantic Jr.
and invoked the previous decision rendered by Judge Garlitos declaring the The witnesses testified that Gacot was married to Vicente Dantic Sr.
lot in question as part of public domain. Thus, the Republic filed a motion and were in actual possession of the property for more than 30 years,
with the CA to have the case reopened to allow the Republic to present the having bought the same from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera as per deed of
decision of Judge Garlitos. This motion was granted. However, during the sale. Gacot continued occupation of the property and introduced
rehearing, the government never presented the order of Judge Garlitos in improvements therein and declared it for taxation purposes in her
evidence. The court then declared Gacot as the lawful owner of the lot in name.
question because the government has not made any protest nor interposed 12.   Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of Gacot appeared in court
any objection on Gacot’s claim during the hearings. The Republic and manifested that he is waiving his claim over the lot in favor of
appealed, but the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence Gacot who is in actual possession of the property as he is only a
this petition. boundary owner.
13.   After the presentation of Gacot and Vicente, they offered their
The issue is WoN the Order of Judge Garlitos should have been considered exhibits and rested their case.
even if not formally offered as evidence – YES. 14.   The trial court rendered judgment declaring the lot to Gacot. The
Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the CA.
The Court held that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves During the pendency of the appeal, the OSG was able to verify that
but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper dispensation of the lot was earlier declared to be the property of the Republic in a
justice. Moreover, Justice Paras’ held that that a court will take judicial decision rendered by Judge Garlito on Oct. 20, 1950, following an
notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in order of general default. The SolGen thus filed a motion with the CA
prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of to have the case reopened and remanded to the trial court to allow the
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos. The CA granted
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. the motion.
15.   Thereafter, the case was set for hearing several times. The trial court
DOCTRINE: Technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but then held that because of the aforementioned development, it is of
primarily devised and designed to help in the proper dispensation of the opinion that the subsequent application of claim of Gacot on the
justice. lot which became part of the public domain where her occupation
FACTS: was well taken and therefore entitled to the lawful adjudication of the
8.   The entire lot is being claimed by Josefa Gacot located in Brgy. Los lot in her name. Besides, the government has not made any protest
Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan, but the area was not indicated. It also nor interposed any objection on Gacot’s claim during the hearings.
appeared that Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-owner. Neither was there a manifestation of protest of government use
 coming from the municipal officials of Palawan despite notice sent appended to page 19 thereof. But it is not evident by the prosecutor
to them of the cadastral hearing. And the sad part was that the and CENRO did not present it. The SolGen, nevertheless, invokes
government had accepted without protest all the taxes due the the rule that the Republic is not estopped by the mistake or error of
property paid by Gacot religiously. With this, there is no reason to its officials or agents.
disturb the previous decision of the court. 56.   Indeed, the Court realizes the points observed by the CA. First, that
16.   The Republic appealed, and the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
the trial court. The CA held that although Gacot filed her answer out evidentiary value, in ordinary trials, of evidence which is not
of time, the Republic still did not present as evidence in the rehearing formally offered. Second, that adjective law is not to be taken lightly
of the case the order of Judge Garlitos declaring the lot as property of for, without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not remain
the Republic, because precisely, the purpose of the rehearing was to assured.
enable the Republic to present in evidence the said order. During the 57.   The Court adds, however, that technical rules of procedure are
rehearing, however, the government failed to present the said order not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to
in evidence. help in the proper dispensation of justice.
17.   Thus, the CA held that it is the rule that the court shall consider no 58.   Section 1, Rule 129, provides:
evidence which has not been formally offered. It is true that the order SEC. 1, Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial
has been appended to the records of the case, but it is misleading on notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
the part of the SolGen to state “that records of the rehearing show territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
that an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Garlitos…” for during the and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
rehearing, the government did not present any evidence despite maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
having been ordered by the trial court. history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
18.   The CA also held that it also cannot take judicial notice of the order and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
because as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
knowledge of the contents of the record of other cases. Indeed, the 59.   Justice Paras opined that a court will take judicial notice of its own
government missed its opportunity to have the claim of Gacot acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior
declared as a nullity. proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records
19.   Hence this petition by the Republic. of another case between the same parties, of the les of related cases
ISSUE: in the same court, and of public records on le in the same court. In
54.   WoN the Order of Judge Garlitos should have been considered even addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or
if not formally offered as evidence – YES, because a court will take judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or
judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will
of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the also be taken of court personnel.
files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file 60.   The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The
in the same court. lot claimed and awarded to Gacot had not been specified in the
records. Indeed, on the basis of DENR, the lot would appear to
RULING: WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for contain an area of 394,043 square meters, 300,000 of which were
further proceedings for it to ascertain and resolve the conflicting claims of classified as Alienable and Disposable land and 94,043 as
the parties conformably with the foregoing opinion of the Court. timberland.

RATIO:
55.   The SolGen explains that the records of the reopened case would
show that a certified copy of the decision of Judge Garlitos has been
 011 MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION v. CA (LEONG) not be proved." Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal
Oct. 8, 1974 | Barredo, J. | Topic Tags force. As a means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to
evidence. In its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for
PETITIONER: MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, and BENITO proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is designed to fulfill and
MACROHON, in his capacity as Sheriff of Quezon City makes evidence unnecessary. It is frequently said that neither averment,
nor proof or admission, will prevail against matters which are judicially
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, PETRA R. FARIN and known to the court.
BENJAMIN FARIN

SUMMARY: A Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution FACTS:
of the CA, denying the motion of Petitioners to dismiss the appeal of 142.   A Petition for certiorari and mandamus against the resolution
Respondents upon the ground that the latter’s record of appeal does not of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 49342-R, Petra Farin, et al.
contain any statement to the effect that an appeal bond has been filed by vs. Benito Macrohon, et al., denying the motion of private
them. Counsel for appellant argues that that fact appears on the face of the respondents therein (herein petitioners) to dismiss the appeal of
record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the City Treasurer of therein petitioners (herein private respondents) upon the ground that
Quezon City, to the effect that petitioner-appellants' cash bond was actually the latter's record on appeal does not contain any statement to the
filed on October 30, 1970, simultaneously with the filing of petitioners- effect that an appeal bond has been filed by them.
appellants' Notice of Appeal. Respondents in their Answer admitted Par. 9
(#5) of Petitioner’s pleading which contained the statement that an appeal 143.   The Court of Appeals held that in her Opposition to the
bond has been filed together with their Notice of Appeal. The CA held that Motion to Dismiss, appellant herein admits that there is no mention
based on the admissions in the pleadings in that case, all the requisites of a in the Record on Appeal regarding fact that an appeal bond was filed
valid appeal have been complied with. The issue in this case is whether the on time. But counsel for appellant argues that that fact appears on the
CA should have dismissed the petition on the basis of failure to state in the face of the record of the case, as evidenced by a certification of the
record of appeal that an appeal bond has been filed? NO. The SC held that City Treasurer of Quezon City, to the effect that petitioner-
the CA did not in anyway abuse its discretion, but, on the contrary, acted in appellants' cash bond was actually filed on October 30, 1970,
accordance with law in refusing to dismiss the appeal of the Farins. The main simultaneously with the filing of petitioners-appellants' Notice of
purpose of the rules requiring that a record on appeal should show on its Appeal. Appellants' counsel further contends that "obviously,
face, by means of statements of the corresponding specific data, that the because said cash appeal bond was riled simultaneously with the
notice of appeal, the appeal bond and the record itself have been filed on Notice of Appeal, the undersigned counsel, through oversight, failed
time is to enable the appellate court to determine on the basis of the record to state or make mention of the filing of the said cash appeal bond in
on appeal itself and without the need of any independent evidence, that the the record.
appeal has been made on time. HOWEVER, as illustrated in the
circumstances of this case, there could be instances when the timeliness of an 144.   Appellant also calls attention to petition for certiorari with
appeal is a matter which the court can take judicial notice of and, preliminary injunction docketed with this Court in which a decision
consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy between the was promulgated by this Court on August 20, 1971.
parties in respect thereto could arise. In such instances, the court is no longer
145.   One of the reasons for Section 3, Rule 41 is to appraise the
supposed to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound by what it
appellate court whether an appeal is seasonably filed or not. The
has judicial notice of and none of the parties may be permitted to prove the
purpose of adding the clause "together with such data as will show
contrary.
that the appeal was perfected on time" was "to avoid disputes in the
appellate court concerning the fact of the perfection of the appeal."
DOCTRINE: Where a fact is one of which the court may judicially take
notice, no proof thereof is necessary. The maxim is "what is known need 146.   It is to be noted that in the petition for certiorari above-
 mentioned the private parties were the same as appellants and consequently, it would be inconceivable that any controversy
appellees herein. Paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof contained the following between the parties in respect thereto could arise. In such instances,
allegations: the court is no longer supposed to receive any conflicting evidence.
It would be bound by what it has judicial notice of and none of the
"8) That on October 15, 1970, petitioner thru counsel, received a parties may be permitted to prove the contrary.
copy of the decision of the respondent judge;
RULING: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is dismissed,
"9) That on October 30, 1970, petitioner filed their Notice of Appeal, with costs against petitioners.
from the said decision, together with their Appeal Bond and Record
on Appeal.” RATIO:
Issue 1
147.   Respondents therein, Honorable Judge Walfrido de los 151.   The SC held that the CA did not in anyway abuse its
Angeles, Sheriff Benito Macrohon (now Leonidas F. Villasenor) and discretion, but, on the contrary, acted in accordance with law in
Marcelo Steel Corporation, in par. 1 of their Answer, averred: refusing to dismiss the appeal of the Farins.
Admissions 152.   The main purpose of the rules requiring that a record on
appeal should show on its face, by means of statements of the
“1) That, respondents admit ... the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, corresponding specific data, that the notice of appeal, the appeal
7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, of the petition."
bond and the record itself have been filed on time is to enable the
148.   In consonance with the petitioner's allegations and appellate court to determine on the basis of the record on appeal
respondents "Admissions" the CA, in its statement of the case said: itself and without the need of any independent evidence, that the
appeal has been made on time. To allow the parties to indulge in a
“On Oct. 30, 1970, petitioners filed their notice of appeal, appeal controversy regarding the timeliness of the appeal and to present
bond and record on appeal …” their respective conflicting evidence on that point, which could take
much of the time of the court that it could otherwise devote to the
149.   The CA further held: Under the circumstances, therefore, it disposition of other cases demanding its attention, is detrimental to
cannot be said that this Court has no way of determining whether the the interests of justice and contrary to the public policy intended to
present appeal is seasonably filed inasmuch as it has not only been be served by the provision in question.
appraised thereof in the petition for certiorari but it has even made a
clear, unequivocal pronouncement based on the admissions in the 153.   But, as illustrated in the circumstances of the case at bar,
pleadings in that case, that all the requisites of a valid appeal have there could be instances when the timeliness of an appeal is a matter
been complied with. Judicial admissions contained in pleadings bind which the court can take judicial notice of and, consequently, it
the parties and the principle of estoppel operates. Hence, there would would be inconceivable that any controversy between the parties in
be no justification to dismiss this appeal for failure to state in the respect thereto could arise. In such instances, the court is no longer
Record on Appeal a fact about which there can no longer be any supposed to receive any conflicting evidence. It would be bound by
dispute inasmuch as it has already been judicially admitted in the what it has judicial notice of and none of the parties may be
pleadings permitted to prove the contrary.

ISSUE/s: 154.   In the words of Chief Justice Moran, "Where a fact is one
38.   Whether the CA should have dismissed the petition on the basis of of which the court may judicially take notice, no proof thereof is
failure to state in the record of appeal that an appeal bond has been necessary. The maxim is "what is known need not be proved."
filed? NO. There could be instances when the timeliness of an appeal Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. As a
is a matter which the court can take judicial notice of and, means of establishing facts it is therefore superior to evidence. In
 its appropriate field it displaces evidence since, as it stands for proof,
it fulfills the object which the evidence is designed to fulfill and
makes evidence unnecessary. It is frequently said that neither
averment, nor proof or admission, will prevail against matters
which are judicially known to the court.

155.   When a matter of fact supposed to be proven to the court is

one capable of being taken judicial notice of, being already known to
the court because it has already been proven or was undisputed or
judicially admitted in a related proceeding before it, it would be the
height of absurdity and contrary to one's sense of justice and
propriety to still require the parties to reopen the issue and litigate
relative to the same matter all over again.
 012 PEOPLE v. BERNABE (LU) 2) Whether the RTC erred in imposing the penalty of death – YES.
November 21, 2001 | Melo J. | Judicial Notice
Ruling:
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
1st Issue: There is no rule that rape can only happen in seclusion. The
RESPONDENTS: Virgilio Bernabe y Rafol Court may take judicial notice of the fact that among poor couples with
big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
SUMMARY: Virgilio Bernabe was charged of raping his own daughter problem despite the presence of other people around them.
Maria Esnelia Bernabe, then 17 years old. The People’s version of the
facts are as follows: While Maria was sleeping with her sister in their 2nd Issue: A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and
house located in Pasay City on October 29, 1998, her father came home nor does a medical report stating that the hymen is intact negate rape.
drunk. Virgilio went in the room, approached Maria and started kissing However, before the death penalty can be imposed in relation to R.A.
her nape and other parts of her body. He then removed her panty and 7659, the allegation of complainant’s age as well as filial relationship
inserted his penis. Esnelia resisted but to no avail. This started since with the accused is essential. Though such was alleged in the
1994. When Esnelia could no longer keep it to herself, she told her information, the prosecution failed to prove them using the baptismal
cousin Cristina aunts Marcelina and Analyn. They then reported the certificate for a baptismal certificate proves only the fact of baptism but
incident to the police precint and on 4 pm of the said date, Virgilio was not the circumstances of birth.
arrested. Upon examination by Dr. Soliman, the doctor reported that
there was no hymenal injury but noted that the opening of the hymen DOCTRINE: The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that
could accommodate an average penis without causing hymenal injury. among poor couples with big families living in small quarters,
copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of
Virgilio Bernabe alleges that he did not rape his own daughter and the other persons around them.
charge of rape was because Virgilio resented the boyfriend of Maria
Esnelia whom he found sleeping in their house. Furthermore, Virgilio's FACTS:
sisters (the aunts) assisted his daughter in filing the case of rape 8.   Virgilio Bernabe was charged of raping his own daughter Maria
motivated by the land dispute between them. Moreover, the medico-legal Esnelia Bernabe, then 17 years old. The People’s version of the facts
officer also made a finding that no rape was committed because there was are as follows: While Maria was sleeping with her sister in their
no hymen laceration. Lastly, Virgilio argues that it is impossible for house located in Pasay City on October 29, 1998, her father came
him to rape his daughter without being detected considering that his home drunk. Virgilio went in the room, approached Maria and
family lives in a very congested place and that Maria was sharing the started kissing her nape and other parts of her body. He then
room with her sister. removed her panty and inserted his penis. Esnelia resisted but to no
avail. This started since 1994. When Esnelia could no longer keep it
RTC: Convicted Virgilio with Rape under Art. 335 in relation to R.A. to herself, she told her cousin Cristina aunts Marcelina and Analyn.
7659 and imposed the penalty of death. They then reported the incident to the police precint and on 4 pm of
the said date, Virgilio was arrested. Upon examination by Dr.
Thus this automatic review by the Supreme Court. Soliman, the doctor reported that there was no hymenal injury but
noted that the opening of the hymen could accommodate an average
The issues are: penis without causing hymenal injury.

1) Whether Virgilio’s contention that it was impossible for him to rape 9.  Virgilio Bernabe alleges that he did not rape his own daughter and the
his daughter without being detected deserves consideration. – NO. charge of rape was because Virgilio resented the boyfriend of Maria
Esnelia whom he found sleeping in their house. Furthermore,
 Virgilio's sisters (the aunts) assisted his daughter in filing the case of essential element of rape. Even the fact that the medical report states
rape motivated by the land dispute between them. Moreover, the that the hymen of the victim is still intact does not negate rape It is
medico-legal officer also made a finding that no rape was committed well settled that full penetration is not even required, as proof of
because there was no hymen laceration. Lastly, Virgilio argues that entrance showing the slightest penetration of the male organ within
it is impossible for him to rape his daughter without being the labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient.
detected considering that his family lives in a very congested 6.   However, before the death penalty can be properly imposed for the
place and that Maria was sharing the room with her sister. crime of rape in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659, an
allegation of the complainant’s age as well as filial relationship. Both
10.   RTC: Convicted Virgilio with Rape under Art. 335 in relation to minority and actual relationship between the parties must be alleged
R.A. 7659 and imposed the penalty of death. and proved, otherwise, barred is any conviction for rape in its
qualified form supra).
11.   Thus this automatic review by the Supreme Court. 7.   In the case at bar, while the Information alleged both the minority of
the victim and her relationship with appellant, the prosecution failed
ISSUE/s: to prove the victim’s age when it presented only the baptismal
certificate of Maria Esnelia and not her birth certificate.
1) Whether Virgilio’s contention that it was impossible for him to rape his 8.   It is elementary that a baptismal certificate only proves the fact
daughter without being detected deserves consideration. – NO. of baptism but not the circumstances of birth. Without essential
proof on the matter of the date of birth of complainant, or other
2) Whether the RTC erred in imposing the penalty of death – YES. convincing evidence in the absence thereof, we cannot rule with
certainty whether Maria Esnelia was indeed a minor at the time of
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED the commission of the crime, especially so because she does not
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed on appellant is appear to be obviously a minor, as she allegedly was already 17
downgraded to reclusion perpetua, and with the awards for civil indemnity, years old at the time of the assault. Verily, with our young girls now
moral damages, and exemplary damages reduced to P50,000.00 for the first looking, acting, and dressing up more maturely, one would be hard
two, and P25,000.00 for the last. put to conclude with any measure of certainty, that a budding lass is
13 or 18 years of age.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs. 9.   Withal, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court on appellant
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua as provided for by law.
RATIO:
1.   1st issue: Hackneyed and discredited too is the argument that the
place where the rape was committed is so congested and packed with
people that any untoward incident would be well-nigh impossible.
The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does
not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons
around them. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in
seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter of
time and place”
nd
5.   2 issue: In People vs. De la Cuesta, we reiterated an old doctrine to
the effect that the absence of external injury does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape. Lack of lacerated wounds does not
also negate sexual intercourse. A freshly broken hymen is not an
 013 In re Siemens Estate (MAGBUHOS) appointed Charles Webb and Girard Trust Company of Philadelphia
22 March 1943 | Maxey, CJ. | Judicial Notice executors.
151.   After making certain charitable bequests, she bequeathed
*APPELLANT: Certain of the next of kin (relative of testatrix) [The case various amounts, totaling at least $211,000 to relatives and friends,
did not mention anywhere who exactly the appellant is. Sorry!] and then bequeathed the residue of her estate to “the Penna.
*APPELLEE: Pennsylvania Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to S.P.C.A.; requesting that they give all the attention possible to work
Animals in Tioga Co.” This residue amounted to $384,616.41. Her will was
probated on November 6, 1939.
SUMMARY: The testatrix's will bequeathed almost $ 211,000 to relatives 152.   At the hearing on January 29, 1941, the Pennsylvania
and friends, and then bequeathed the residue of her estate to "the Penna. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals filed a formal
S.P.C.A.," which residue amounted to $ 384,616. Appellants argued that the claim, setting forth that its principal office is in Philadelphia; that it
object of the residuary estate was not properly designated and asked that the has branches or agencies in many places in Pennsylvania; and that it
will be declared void thereto and that the testatrix be declared to have died is the residuary legatee named in the will of the testatrix. It asked
intestate as to her residuary estate. It was held that there was no case for a that that the residuary estate be awarded to it.
declaratory judgment. After the last accounting was filed, appellants sought a a.   The claimant asked the court to take judicial notice of
hearing to determine the rights of all persons entitled to share in the the meaning of the abbreviation: “the Penna. S.P.C.A.”
distribution of the residuary estate. and offered testimony as to what this abbreviation
meant.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court was correct in taking judicial 153.   On July 31, 1941, certain of the next of kin filed a petition
notice of the meaning of “the Penna. S.P.C.A.” for a declaratory judgment to construe the will, alleging that there is
a patent ambiguity upon the face of the will in that it fails to
The court stated that judicial notice could be taken of such ordinary designate with the certainty required any object for the
abbreviations as were universally understood because of their common use. residuary estate, and praying that the will be declared void insofar
The court held that the trial court properly took judicial notice of the as it relates to the residuary estate and that the testatrix be declared
meaning of the abbreviation, "the Penna. S.P.C.A.," and that it had properly to have died intestate as to her residuary estate.
looked to dictionaries and other evidence in determining that the humane 154.   On March 14, 1942, the court filed its adjudication, holding
society was the entity named in the testatrix's will as the beneficiary of the that the appellee is the residuary legatee named in the will and
residuary estate. awarding the residuary estate to it.
a.   The court stated, “where a subject exists which satisfies the
DOCTRINE: Judicial notice will be taken of such ordinary abbreviations as term of the will, and to which they are perfectly applicable,
by common use may be regarded as universally understood. The court may there is no latent ambiguity.” In addition, “the court in
inform itself from books of authority, though not introduced in evidence, or situations similar to this may take judicial notice of the
may admit such works to aid it in the exercise of its judicial function. meaning of the term used by the testatrix. There can be no
Judicial notice does not depend on the actual knowledge of the judges. When doubt of our duty to do so if by exercise of this function we
the fact is alleged, they must investigate and may refresh their recollection by can arrive at the meaning with reasonable certainty.”
resorting to any means which they may deem safe and proper. b.   “Judicial notice will be taken of such ordinary abbreviations
as by common use may be regarded as universally
understood.
FACTS: ISSUE:
150.   Marlon Siemens, a widow, died a resident of Wellsboro, 39.   Whether the lower court erred in taking judicial notice of the
Tioga County, Pennsylvania on October 26, 1939, leaving as her meaning of “the Penna. S.P.C.A.” ---No. Judicial Notice does not
next of kin certain cousins. By her will and by three codicils, she
 depend on the actual knowledge of the judges, When the fact is
alleged, they must investigate and may refresh their recollection by
resorting to any means which they may deem safe and proper.

RULING: The decree is affirmed at appellants’ cost.

RATIO:
1.   Judicial notice will be taken of such ordinary abbreviations as by
common use may be regarded as universally understood. The court
may inform itself from books of authority, though not introduced in
evidence, or may admit such works to aid it in the exercise of its
judicial function. Judicial notice does not depend on the actual
knowledge of the judges. When the fact is alleged, they must
investigate and may refresh their recollection by resorting to any
means which they may deem safe and proper.
2.   The court in aid of its "judicial knowledge" quoted definitions
of the abbreviations "S.P.C.A." from many standard
encyclopedias and dictionaries, showing that the initials
"S.P.C.A." have become a part of the English language as
symbols of the "Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals". To the authorities cited by the court there can be added
Webster's International Dictionary which states that the letters
"S.P.C.A." are "generally used in American and British printed
literature" as meaning "Society for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals".
3.   These and countless other abbreviations convey to the mind as
definite an impression of a legal entity or association (as the case
may be) as do the words themselves which they epitomize. If the
court itself had no judicial knowledge of the meaning of these words
(as presumably all courts in English speaking countries have) it
would be justified in accepting the standard works cited as fixing the
meaning of the abbreviation questioned here, to wit: "the Penna.
S.P.C.A." It was not even suggested in this case that any other
organization existed which could be identified with this abbreviation.
4.   Counsel for appellant suggests that the letters "S.P.C.A." might
indicate other societies, but the existence of any such societies was
not revealed by appellants' counsel even in their "speculations".
 045 IN RE MARRIAGE OF TRESNAK (Marcos) she attended the university in Kirksville full-time, where she later
Sept. 17, 1980 | McCormick, J. | Judicial Notice graduated with a B.A. degree in psychology.
159.   She planned to enter law school at the University of Iowa in
PETITIONER: Linda Lou Tresnak the fall of that year.
RESPONDENTS: Emil James Tresnak 160.   The children stayed in Chariton with Jim while Linda was in
school at Kirksville.
SUMMARY: This case involves a parental dipute over custody of two 161.   In the fall, the children remained with Linda and enrolled in
sons of Jim and Linda Tresnak. Linda Tresnak plans to to enter law school in Kirksville while Jim returned to Chariton.
school at the University of Iowa. Because of this, the trial court rendered 162.   The children have been in the continuous custody of Linda
a decision awarding the custody of the children to Jim. Its reason was that since then.
the court is of the opinion that her ambition for a career is not necessarily 163.   The trial court, rendered its decision, awarding custody of
for the best interest and welfare of her minor children. The legal the children to Jim.
education will consume most of her time and usually requires library 164.   Its reason was that the court is of the opinion that her
study. Further, the court believes that father will be able to engage in ambition for a career is not necessarily for the best interest and
various activities with the boys. Supported by amicus briefs, Linda is welfare of her minor children. The legal education will consume
challenging the statements of the trial court concerning the demands of most of her time and usually requires library study. Other than time
law school and the appropriateness of awarding custody of male children in class during the day, there will be study periods during the day in
to their fathers. The issue is WoN the trial court was justified in awarding the library, as well as in the evening, and which would necessarily
custody of the children to Jim – NO, because there is no basis for require the children being in the hands of a babysitter for many hours
characterizing Linda’s law school years as unstable and inimical to the a day when not attending school.
best interests of their children. The only evidence about the demands of 165.   The trial court further states that Jim has a stable position in
law school appeared in Linda's testimony. She acknowledged on cross- the Chariton school system, president of the teachers' association,
examination that law school would require many hours of study. and, so far as known now, can remain in the Chariton schools for
However, she also said she did not expect to leave the children with many years in the future. His salary, though not exceptionally high,
babysitters often, she would take them to the library with her if is adequate to maintain the children properly, and give them all the
necessary, and she did not believe her studies would interfere with her necessities of life.
care of the children. These matters are also not subject to judicial notice. 166.   Further, the court believes that father will be able to engage
(See doctrine) in various activities with the boys, such as athletic events, fishing,
hunting, mechanical training, and other activities that boys are
DOCTRINE: To be capable of being judicially noticed a matter must be interested in. It would also be benefitial to the children if they were
of common knowledge or capable of certain verification. Judicial notice allowed to remain in the Chariton school system where they have
"`is limited to what a judge may properly know in his judicial capacity, attended school and have many friends and acquaintances.
and he is not authorized to make his personal knowledge of a fact not 167.   Placing custody with the Linda would require the children to
generally or professionally known the basis of his action.' be placed in the Iowa City school system for only a temporary time
of three years, and again undoubtedly removed and placed in another
system where the she would locate to practice her profession.
FACTS:
168.   Supported by amicus briefs, Linda is challenging the
155.   This case involves a parental dipute over custody of two
statements of the trial court concerning the demands of law school
sons, Rick and Ryan, aged 11 and 9 respectively.
and the appropriateness of awarding custody of male children to their
156.   The parents are Emil James Tresnak (Jim) and Linda Lou
fathers.
Tresnak (Linda).
157.   During their marriage, Linda worked in a nursing home.
158.   She then entered junior college at Centerville and later on
ISSUE/s: appropriate to males, that "other activities" exist in which males have
40.   WoN the trial court was justified in awarding custody of the children a necessary interest, or that these children will necessarily have the
to Jim – NO, because there is no basis for characterizing Linda’s law same interests as other males. Nor does the record contain any
school years as unstable and inimical to the best interests of their evidence that Jim was capable of participating in any activities with
children. the children that Linda could not participate in with them equally
well.
RULING: Reversed and Remanded. 165.   Apart from the lack of evidentiary support, the statement has
at least two other flaws. It contains matters which are not subject to
RATIO: judicial notice, and it represents a stereotypical view of sexual roles
156.   The only evidence about the demands of law school which has no place in child custody adjudication.
appeared in Linda's testimony. 166.   Child custody cases are to be decided "upon what the
157.   She acknowledged on cross-examination that law school evidence actually reveals in each case, not upon what someone
would require many hours of study. However, she also said she did predicts it will show in many cases.
not expect to leave the children with babysitters often, she would 167.   As we said in Bowen, neither parent has an edge on the other
take them to the library with her if necessary, and she did not believe based merely on sex: "The real issue is not the sex of the parent but
her studies would interfere with her care of the children. which parent will do better in raising the children."
158.   These matters are also not subject to judicial notice. 168.   For the merits of the custody award, the Court’s review of
159.   To be capable of being judicially noticed a matter must the record is de novo.
be of common knowledge or capable of certain verification. 169.   Prior to returning to school, Linda fulfilled a traditional role
160.   In this case, the trial court defended its findings by asserting as housewife and mother while Jim was the breadwinner. She
a "personal acquaintanceship with the studies of law school." continued to have primary responsibility for the day-to-day parenting
However, judicial notice "`is limited to what a judge may of the children. And this was true even when she was attending
properly know in his judicial capacity, and he is not authorized junior college full-time.
to make his personal knowledge of a fact not generally or 170.   Although Jim had primary responsibility for the children
professionally known the basis of his action.' from January through May 1978, Linda came home each weekend to
161.   It is common knowledge in the legal profession that law clean house, help with the laundry, cook meals, and prepare foods to
school studies are demanding and time-consuming, but the be served during the following week.
requirements of a specific law school curriculum are not generally or 171.   During that period Rick required assistance at home with his
professionally known. spelling. After first agreeing to help, Jim later asserted he was too
162.   The trial court's statements about the necessity of extensive busy to do so.
library study and likelihood of Linda's work on the law review at the 172.   Jim likes his work and keeps busy with it. He is not as
University of Iowa law school are not matters of common knowledge concerned about household cleanliness as Linda nor did he display
or capable of certain verification within the meaning of the judicial her concern about the children's meals and clothing during the period
notice principle. he had their primary care.
163.   Because the statements have only tenuous support in the 173.   He has not been active in their school affairs, and he was not
evidence, they are entitled to little weight in evaluating the merits of aware of several of their allergies. Although this is explained in part
the custody dispute. In saying this, however, we do not suggest the by the necessity of devoting his time and energy to making a living,
court could not consider the demands of law school which were the record shows that even when he had primary responsibility for
shown in the evidence. the care of the children, he was not as attentive as Linda to the details
164.   With regard to the children’s preferred activities, no of their lives. Moreover, she maintained her attentiveness even
evidence was received that these boys were interested in hunting or during the times when her studies were demanding as much time as
mechanical training, that the enumerated pursuits are more Jim's work.
174.   It is common knowledge that in many homes today both
parents have demanding out-of-home activities, whether in
employment, school or community affairs.
175.   Neither should necessarily be penalized in child custody
cases for engaging in such activities.
176.   In this case, Linda seeks a legal education for self-fulfillment
and as a means of achieving financial independence. These goals are
not inimical to the children's best interests.
 014 Ohio Bell Tel Co v. Public Utilities Comm (MATSUMURA) the evidential facts that it has gathered here and there. How was it possible
April 26, 1937 | Cardozo, J. | Judicial Notice for the SC of Ohio to review the law and the facts and intelligently decide
that the findings of the Commission were supported by the evidence when
PETITIONER: Ohio Bell Telephone Co. the evidence that it approved was unknown and unknowable?
RESPONDENTS: Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
DOCTRINE: Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that there has been an
SUMMARY: Ohio Bell filed with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio economic depression, with decline of market values, but judicial notice
schedules of new rates to be charged in the communities. These charges were cannot be taken of the values of land, labor, buildings, and equipment, with
different per each of Ohio Bell’s exchanges, except for toll charges which their yearly fluctuations. This distinction is the more important in cases
would be uniform state-wide. A total of 43 protests were made through where the extent of the fluctuations is not collaterally involved, but is the
Pence Law Proceedings against the new rates, as well as 1 protest on the toll very point in issue.
rates. During the pendency of these protests, the Commission, on its own
motion, ordered the investigation of Ohio Bell’s properties and rates.
Moreover, it ordered for the consolidation of the pence law proceedings. FACTS:
After the investigation, the Commission set forth that the final valuation of 169.   Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (Ohio Bell), after being
Ohio Bell’s properties (both interstate and intrastate) amounted to reorganized, filed with the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
$96,422,276. This valuation was not based just on a day certain, but on the (Commission) schedules of new rates to be charged in communities
valuation for from 1926 to 1933. For this purpose it took judicial notice of where an increase was desired for the unified service
price trends during those years (see Fact 14 to know the specifics of what
they did). The findings where the trends were based on were NOT in 170.   Except for toll charges, the rates were non-state wide.
evidence, but the testimony and exhibits where they received the findings Instead they were separately stated for each of Ohio Bell’s
were received in evidence for certain limited purposes. This investigation to exchanges.
determine the rates was then transformed to a refund proceeding (refund of
those who paid in excess in the previous years). Ohio Bell protested the 171.   According to the Robinson law, which was applicable at the
findings arguing that: (1) the trend percentage accepted in the findings as time, the operation of an increase might be suspended for 120 days.
marking a decline in values did not come from any official sources which the Then at the end of the 120 days, the increased rate was to go into
Commission had the right to notice judicially; (2) that such had not been effect upon the filing of a bond.
introduced in evidence; (3) Ohio Bell wasn’t given a chance to rebut them.
The issue then is whether the Commission’s use of judicial notice violated a.   The bond represents the repayment to consumers of the
Ohio Bell’s rights? The SC said it did. The Commission, upon the strength of increased rate (with interest) should the Public Utilities
these unknown documents ordered Ohio Bell to refund money amounting to commission, upon final hearing, determine that the rates
millions. While the Commission reported its conclusion, it did not report the have been excessive.
underlying proofs. The proofs are still unknown at this point. This is not the
172.   41 protests were made against the new rates. Through the
fair hearing essential to due process. It is condemnation without trial. While
Pence Law proceedings, they protested (1) the rates to be revised,
courts can take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge, in this
and (2) the schedule for toll service that would be applied state-wide.
case not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them out. When
price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence a.   The Pence Law proveedings were made effective by bonds
upon a trial, the party against whom they are offered may see the evidence or
hear it and parry its effect. Even if they are copied in the findings without 173.   As for the other schedule of rates that were not protested,
preliminary proof, there is at least an opportunity in connection with a they became effective.
judicial review of the decision to challenge the deductions made from them.
The opportunity is excluded here. The Commission withheld from the record
174.   During the pendency of the Pence law proceeding, 12 this purpose it took judicial notice of price trends during those
additional protests were done. So by now the total number of protests years, modifying the value which it had found as of the date certain
were 43, plus the nation-wide toll rate case. by the percentage of decline or rise applicable to the years thereafter.

175.   The Commission, on its own motion, by order dated October 182.   The trend of land valuation came from:
14, 1924, directed a company-wide investigation of Ohio Bell’s
property and rates, and consolidated the bond cases. The order stated a.   examination of the tax value in communities where the
that in all the pending proceedings the important issues are identical, company had its largest real estate holdings.
and that a single consolidated case will enable rates to be determined
for all services within the state at a minimum expenditure of time b.   building trends and labor trends: based on price indices of
and money. the Engineering News Record, a recognized magazine in the
field of engineering construction.
176.   Accordingly, Ohio Bell was required to file with the
Commission a complete inventory of all its property, used and useful c.   Reference was made also to the findings of a federal court in
in its business. Illinois as to the price levels upon sales of apparatus and
equipment by Western Electric, an affiliated corporation.
177.   Note: the state-wide investigation is different from the Pence
Law proceedings consolidated therewith. 183.   The findings were not in evidence, though much of the
testimony and exhibits on which they rested had been received by
a.   Investigation: based on the General Code of Ohio, and its stipulation for certain limited purposes, and mainly to discover
scope was confined to the rates chargeable in the future. whether the prices paid to the affiliate were swollen beyond reason
b.   Pence Law proceeding: concerned with the basis for any
refund of rates collected in the past. 184.   The Commission consulted these findings as indicative of
market trends and learned upon them heavily. Using the
178.   Ohio Bell filed an inventory with supplemental inventories aforementioned sources, the Commission came up with these
every six months thereafter showing additions and retirements. percentages:

179.   A long investigation followed. On January 10, 1931, the a.  

beginning of 1926: 98.73% of the value at the date certain
Commission announced its tentative conclusion: that the valuation of b.  
1927: 95.7%
the property was $104,282,735, for all the property within the state, c.  
1928: 95%
whether used in interstate or in intrastate business. Protests were d.  
1929: 96.3%
filed both by Ohio Bell, the state, and the municipalities, so new e.  
1930: 92.2%
hearings were conducted. f.  
1931: 86.6%
g.  
1932: 76.8%
180.   The Commission made its findings and order setting forth h.  
1933: 79.1%.
what purports to be a final valuation. 185.   Upon that basis the company was found to have been in
receipt of excess earnings of $13,289,172, distributed as follows:
a.   Intrastate properties: $93,707,488
a.   1925: $1,822,647
b.   Total property (interstate and intrastate): $96,422,276. b.   1926: $2,041,483
c.   1927: $1,986,610
181.   The Commission did not confine itself, however, to a
d.   1928: $1,925,301
valuation of the property as of the date certain. It undertook also to e.   1929: $1,463,347
fix a valuation for each of the years 1926 to 1933 inclusive. For f.   1930: $1,481,680
 g.   1931: $1,659,760 the date certain upon the strength of information secretly collected
h.   1932: $908,335 and never yet disclosed.
i.   1933: nothing.
186.   The excess was arrived at by figuring a return of 7% upon 2.   The company protested. It asked disclosure of the documents
the value as a reasonable rate for the years 1925 to 1929, inclusive; indicative of price trends, and an opportunity to examine them, to
6.5% for the years 1930 and 1931; and 5.5% for the years 1932 and analyze them, to explain and to rebut them. The response was a curt
1933. There being no excess revenue for the year 1933, the last year refusal. Upon the strength of these unknown documents refunds have
covered by the report, the Commission did not fix any percentage of been ordered for sums amounting to millions.
reduction for the rates in future years.
3.   The Commission reported its conclusion, but not the underlying
187.   The state-wide proceeding to fix rates for the future on the proofs. Ohio Bell doesn’t know the proofs today. This is not the fair
basis of a date certain was transformed into a refund proceeding. hearing essential to due process. It is condemnation without trial.

188.   Ohio Bell protested and moved for a rehearing. In its protest 4.   An attempt was made by the Commission and again by the state
it stated that: court to uphold this decision without evidence as an instance of
judicial notice. In order to support this, the Commission used the SC
a.   the trend percentage accepted in the findings as marking a doctrine that the values of land and labor and buildings and
decline in values did not come from any official sources equipment, with all their yearly fluctuations, no longer call for
which the Commission had the right to notice judicially, evidence.
and that such had not been introduced in evidence
5.   However, the SC states such doctrine has been misread. Courts
b.   Ohio Bell had not been given an opportunity to explain or take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge. They take
rebut them. judicial notice that there has been a depression, and that a decline of
market values is one of its concomitants.
189.   In the final order (there were repeated protests by Ohio Bell
so I placed the last one before the SC petition), the Commission 6.   How great the decline has been for this industry or that, for one
ordered that Ohio Bell pay a total of $11,423,137 for exchange material or another, in this year or the next, can be known only to the
subscribers and $409,127 for toll patrons (total: $11,832,264) experts, who may even differ among themselves. For illustration, a
court takes judicial notice of the fact that Confederate money
190.   The SC of Ohio affiemed the Commission. Hence this depreciated in value during the war between the states.
petition.
7.   The distinction is the more important in cases like this one where
ISSUE/s: the extent of the fluctuations is not collaterally involved but is the
41.   W/N the judicial notice of the Commission violated Ohio Bell’s very point in issue.
rights -- YES because the basis of the amounts determined by the
Commission were made unknown to Ohio Bell. 8.   Moreover, notice, even when taken, has no other effect than to
relieve one of the parties to a controversy of the burden of resorting
RULING: The decree is reversed and the cause remanded for further to the usual forms of evidence.
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
9.   In the case at bar, the contention would be futile that the precise
RATIO: amount of the decline in values was so determinate or notorious in
1.   Without warning or even the hint of warning that the case would be each and every year between 1925 and 1933 as to be beyond the
considered or determined upon any other basis than the evidence range of question. So much is indeed conceded on the face of the
submitted, the Commission cut down the values for the years after report itself. No rational concept of notoriety will include these
 variable elements. True, the category is not a closed one. 'The the evidence can be known.
precedents of former judges, in declining to notice or assenting to
notice specific facts, do not restrict the present judge from noticing a 17.   Both the Commission and the Supreme Court of Ohio tell us that
new fact, provided only that the new fact is notorious to the they have applied the price trends to the value on the day certain by
community. Even so, to press the doctrine of judicial notice to the resort to judicial notice. The state now suggests that whatever the
extent attempted in this case and to do that retroactively after court or the Commission may have professed to be doing, there was
the case had been submitted, would be to turn the doctrine into a a basis in the evidence for the conclusion ultimately reached. To give
pretext for dispensing with a trial. aid to that suggestion reference is made to the findings of a federal
court as to the prices charged by Western Electric for telephone
10.   From the standpoint of due process—the protection of the individual equipment, which findings were not in evidence, though they were
against arbitrary action—even now the SC does not know the founded upon evidence received by stipulation for purposes narrowly
particular or evidential facts of which the Commission took defined and exclusive of any others. The terms of the stipulation
judicial notice and on which it rested its conclusion. have already been stated in this opinion.

11.   Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them out. 18.   Even if the SC assume’s in favor of the state that the evidence, when
When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in, could be considered as indicative of the trend of market values
in evidence upon a trial, the party against whom they are offered may generally, the judgment is not helped. The Commission did not take
see the evidence or hear it and parry its effect. the prices paid by Ohio Bell’s affiliated corporation as the only
evidence of market trends, but merely as one factor along with many
12.   Even if they are copied in the findings without preliminary proof, others.
there is at least an opportunity in connection with a judicial review of
the decision to challenge the deductions made from them. 19.   What weighting it gave them the record does not disclose, and the
Commission denied the Ohio Bell an opportunity to inquire.
13.   The opportunity is excluded here. The Commission, withholding
from the record the evidential facts that it has gathered here and
there, contents itself with saying that in gathering them it went to
journals and tax lists, as if a judge were to tell us, 'I looked at the
statistics in the Library of Congress, and they teach me thus and so.'
This will never do if hearings and appeals are to be more than empty
forms.

14.   How was it possible for the appellate court to review the law and the
facts and intelligently decide that the findings of the Commission
were supported by the evidence when the evidence that it approved
was unknown and unknowable?

15.   The SC of Ohio, in affirming the Commission did not even mean that
it had looked at the particular lists made use of by the Commission,
for no one knows what they were in any precise or certain way.
Nowhere in the opinion is there even the hint of such a search. What
the SC of Ohio did was to take the word of the Commission as to the
outcome of a secret investigation, and let it go at that.

16.   A hearing is not judicial, at least in any adequate sense, unless

 015 CATUNGAL V HAO (ARMAND) knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
28.   March 22, 2001 | Kapunan, J. | Judicial Notice uncertain; and (3) it must be known within the limits of jurisdiction of the
PETITIONER: Sps Ernesto and Mina Catungal court. The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the leased
RESPONDENTS: Doris Hao property subject of the case at bench based on its location and the commercial
SUMMARY: The original owner Aniana Galang, leased a 3-storey building viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC of the Baclaran area,
in Parañaque to BPI in 1972. During the lease period, BPI subleased the where the subject property is located, is fairly grounded.
ground floor to Doris Hao. In 1984, Galang and Hao executed a lease contract Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at the said conclusion,
on the 2nd and 3rd floors of the building. 2 years later, spouses Catungal the same being based on testimonies of witnesses, such as real estate broker
bought the property from Galang. Upon expiration of the lease agreements, Divina Roco and the petitioner Mina Catungal.
Catungal demanded Hao to vacate the building. The demand was unheeded so DOCTRINE: Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
petitioners filed for ejectment before the MeTC, which ordered Hao to vacate matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
the premises and pay P20,000 until she finally vacates. Petitioners moved for and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
clarificatory or amended judgment on the ground that although MeTC known within the limits of jurisdiction of the court
ordered defendant to vacate, it only awarded rent or compensation for the use
of said property for the ground floor and not for the entire subject property. FACTS:
the MeTC amended the judgment but petitioners moved for reconsideration 57.   The original owner Aniana Galang, leased a 3-storey building in
praying that respondent be ordered to pay P20,000 per month for the use and Parañaque to BPI in 1972.
occupancy of the ground floor and P10,000 per month for the 2nd and 3rd 58.   During the lease period, BPI subleased the ground floor to Doris
floors. The case was referred to RTC which affirmed the decision. On appeal Hao. In 1984, Galang and Hao executed a lease contract on the 2nd
to the CA, the latter reduced the P20,000 to P8,000 and the P10,000 each to and 3rd floors of the building. 2 years later, spouses Catungal bought
P5,000 each. the property from Galang. Upon expiration of the lease agreements,
The issue WoN trial court erred in increasing the amount of the fair Catungal demanded Hao to vacate the building.
rental value of the subject property – NO. The trial court was correct when 59.   The demand was unheeded so petitioners filed for ejectment before
it based its decision to increase the rentals to P40k by taking judicial notice of the MeTC, which ordered Hao to vacate the premises and pay
the nature of the property, its location and business practice of the area. P20,000 until she finally vacates.
Said premises is situated along Quirino Avenue, a main thoroughfare in 60.   Sps Catungal moved for clarificatory or amended judgment on the
Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila, a fully developed commercial ground that although MeTC ordered defendant to vacate, it only
area and the place where the famous shrine of the Mother of Perpetual Help awarded rent or compensation for the use of said property for the
stands. Withal, devotees, traders, tourists and practically people from all ground floor and not for the entire subject property.
walks of life visit said barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to 61.   The MeTC amended the judgment but petitioners moved for
mention thousand of residents therein. Needless to say, very square meter of reconsideration praying that respondent be ordered to pay P20,000
said community is valuable for all kinds of business or commerce of man. per month for the use and occupancy of the ground floor and
The RTC correctly applied and construed the legal concept of judicial notice P10,000 per month for the 2nd and 3rd floors.
in the case at bench. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of 62.   The case was referred to RTC which affirmed the decision. On
certain facts which a judge under rules of legal procedure or otherwise may appeal to the CA, the latter reduced the P20,000 to P8,000 and the
properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known to P10,000 each to P5,000 each.
him, or is assumed to have, by virtue of his office. Judicial cognizance is ISSUE/s:
taken only of those matters that are “commonly” known. The power of taking 1.   WoN trial court erred in increasing the amount of the fair rental
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken value of the subject property – NO. The trial court was correct
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject when it based its decision to increase the rentals to P40k by taking
should be promptly resolved in the negative. Matters of judicial notice have judicial notice of the nature of the property, its location and business
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general practice of the area.
 meter of said community is valuable for all kinds of business or
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby commerce of man.
rendered in favor of petitioners by reinstating the decision of the RTC, with 97.   Further, considering that the questioned property has three floors and
modifications, and ordering respondent to further pay: strategically located along the main road and consistent with the
1. The sum of Twenty Seven Thousand Pesos (P27,000.00), corresponding to prevailing rental rates in said business area which is
the difference between the P40,000.00 awarded by the Regional Trial Court between P20,000.00 and P30,000.00 as testified to by Divina Q.
and the P13,000.00 awarded by the Metropolitan Trial Court, as monthly Roco, a real estate agent and Mina Catungal, this Court finds the
arrears, computed from respondents unlawful detainer, 20 June 1988 (for the amount of P20,000.00 a month for the ground floor and P10,000.00 a
ground floor) and 15 August 1988 (for the second and third floors) of the month each for the second floor and third floor or a total
subject property until the time she vacated the premises on 7 January 1998; of P40,000.00 monthly rentals as appropriate and reasonable rentals
for the use and occupation of said premises.
2. Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the foregoing sum 98.   It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the
from the date of notice of demand on 27 September 1988 until fully paid; authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and
3. The sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as and for attorneys fees occupancy of the leased premises after the termination of the lease
and; contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the
4. The costs of suit. contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or
expiration of the Contract of Lease, the rental stipulated therein may
RATIO: no longer be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the
94.   At the outset, it should be recalled that there existed no consensual premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. At most, what we have values. Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the
is a forced lessor-lessee relationship inasmuch as the respondent, by general increase in rentals of real estate especially of business
way of detaining the property without the consent of herein establishments like the leased building owned by the private
petitioners, was in unlawful possession of the property belonging to respondents.
petitioner spouses. 99.   We find that the RTC correctly applied and construed the legal
95.   We cannot allow the respondent to insist on the payment of a measly concept of judicial notice in the case at bench. Judicial knowledge
sum of P8,000 for the rentals of the first floor of the property in may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge
question and P5,000.00 for each of the second and the third floors of under rules of legal procedure or otherwise may properly take or act
the leased premises. The plaintiff in an ejectment case is entitled to upon without proof because they are already known to him, or is
damages caused by his loss of the use and possession of the assumed to have, by virtue of his office.
premises. Damages in the context of Section 17, Rule 70 of the 1997 100.   Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters that are
Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to rent or fair rental value or the commonly known. The power of taking judicial notice is to be
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
96.   The Court a quo misappreciated the nature of the property, its requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject
location and the business practice in the vicinity and indeed should be promptly resolved in the negative. Matters of judicial
committed an error in fixing the amount of rentals in the notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
aforementioned Order.Said premises is situated along Quirino common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
Avenue, a main thoroughfare in Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must
Manila, a fully developed commercial area and the place where the be known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court.
famous shrine of the Mother of Perpetual Help stands. Withal, 101.   The RTC correctly took judicial notice of the nature of the
devotees, traders, tourists and practically people from all walks of leased property subject of the case at bench based on its location and
life visit said barangay making it suitable for commerce, not to the commercial viability. The above quoted assessment by the RTC
mention thousand of residents therein.Needless to say, every square
 of the Baclaran area, where the subject property is located, is fairly
grounded.
102.   Furthermore, the RTC also had factual basis in arriving at
the said conclusion, the same being based on testimonies of
witnesses, such as real estate broker Divina Roco and the petitioner
Mina Catungal.
103.   The RTC rightly modified the rental award from P13,000.00
to P40,000.00, considering that it is settled jurisprudence that courts
may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease
contract renewals much more with business establishments.
104.   The increased award of rentals ruled by the RTC is
reasonable given the circumstances of the case at bench. We note
that respondent was able to deny petitioners the benefits, including
possession, of their rightful ownership over the subject property for
almost a decade.
105.   The Court of Appeals failed to justify its reduction of the
P40,000.00 fair rental value as determined by the RTC. Neither has
respondent shown that the rental pegged by the RTC is exorbitant or
unconscionable. This is because the burden of proof to show that the
rental demanded is unconscionable or exorbitant rests upon private
respondent as the lessee. Here, respondent neither discharged this
burden when she omitted to present any evidence at all on what she
considers to be fair rental value, nor did she controvert the evidence
submitted by petitioners by way of testimonies of the real estate
broker and petitioner Mina Catungal.
 016 Corinthian Gardens Association Inc. v. Spouses Reynaldo And court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court
Maria Luisa Tanjangco, And Spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
(HORTALEZA) unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
June 27, 2008 | Nachura, J. | Rule 129 Sec 1-3 judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court must allow the
parties to be heard thereon. Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental
PETITIONER:Corinthian Gardens Association Inc, value of the premises in question without supporting evidence. mere judicial
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Reynaldo And Maria Luisa Tanjangco, And Spouses notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper
Frank and Teresita Cuaso rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found
SUMMARY: (I included the award of damages of the CA because its essential to that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession
the Doctrine of the case)Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco and use of their property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was
(the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we
No. 242245 and 282961 respectively, located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular
Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the
(Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a
Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots. before construction decade.
was to be made on Lot 65 a relocation survey was made, made by an engineer De
Dios referred to by Corinthians, after the construction was done fences that were DOCTRINE: YES, A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
made encroached on the property and the lots of Tanjanco in their lot 68 by 87 controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge,
meters. This led to the filing of the Tanjancos in the RTC for recovery of Possession or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
and damages against the Cuasos. Eventually Cuasos filed a third party complaint judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the
against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. Ultimately The RTC also ordered court must allow the parties to be heard thereon.
the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the
filing of the complaint. The RTC likewise held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent FACTS:
in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it constructed 1.   Respondent Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco
the house. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. It held that the Cuasos (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates of
acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April Title (TCT) No. 242245[4] and 282961[5] respectively, located at
5, 1989. Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is managed by
under Articles 449, 450, 451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include the right petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. (Corinthian). On the other
to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the hand, respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot
Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached area. The 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots.
Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, enjoyment 2.   Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey
and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate the property was necessary.
considering the location and category of the same. They were, likewise, ordered to 3.   As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under
pay the Tanjangcos P100,000.00, as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted all the
damages, and P150,000.00 as attorneys fees. The CA also imposed six percent (6%) previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred Engr.
interest per annum on all the awards. The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos, on De Dios to the Cuasos.
the other hand, was dismissed for lack of merit. On the third-party complaints, 4.   Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian
Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios were all found negligent in performing conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance
their respective duties and so they were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of
or a total of fifteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos Corinthian.
shall eventually pay under the decision, also with interest of six percent (6%) per 5.   Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the
annum.Corinthians appealed solely because it was made to be liable in part for the services of C.B. Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder,
judgement against the Cuasos. . The issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square
has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount prayed for meters.
in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and 6.   No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the
enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon, to P10,000.00? YES A Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter fence but the
 latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a
suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages. ISSUE/s:
7.   Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaintagainst Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and 1.   WoN there is legal basis for the Court of Appeals to hold petitioner
Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. liable to pay 5% of the judgment
to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios money to Sps. Tanjangco on account of the encroachment made by Sps.
for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing Cuasos? Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos
them to litigation. perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted
8.   The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury
and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making suffered by the Tanjangcos.
representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. 2.   WoN Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and
9.   The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00,
its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of
Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held the lot encroached upon, to P10,000.00? YES A court cannot take
answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take
construction. judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
10.   the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
11.   But Rendered the Cuasos Builders in Good Faith of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court
12.   The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2,000.00 must allow the parties to be heard thereon. Hence, there can be no
commencing from the time of the filing of the complaint. The RTC likewise judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without
held that C.B. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the supporting evidence. mere judicial notice is inadequate, because
correct boundaries of Cuasos lot when it constructed the house. It, thus, evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value.
ordered C.B. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA
attorneys fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were
13.   The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. De Dios, on the deprived of possession and use of their property. This uniform factual
other hand, was dismissed for lack of cause of action. finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented
14.   Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Tanjangcos, the Cuasos, and C.B. below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the
Paraz all appealed to the CA. increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular
15.   On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent
16.   It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of
meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5, 1989. their property for almost a decade.
17.   Correlatively, the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted
under Articles 449, 450, 451 and 549 of the New Civil Code, which include RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
the right to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the
encroached area.
18.   The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10,000.00 for the use, RATIO:
enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate
the property considering the location and category of the same. (issue 1, not the topics)
19.   The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos, on the other hand, was 1.   Undeniably, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on Lot 69 owned
dismissed for lack of merit. by the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters as duly found by both the RTC and
20.   On the third-party complaints, Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios the CA in accordance with the evidence on record. As a result, the
were all found negligent in performing their respective duties and so they Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been deprived of the use of that
were ordered to contribute five percent (5%) each, or a total of fifteen portion of their lot encroached upon. Thus, the primordial issue to be
percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall resolved in this case is whether Corinthian was negligent under the
eventually pay under the decision, also with interest of six percent (6%) per circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence contributed to the injury
annum. suffered by the Tanjangcos.
2.   A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and
a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded.
involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action 10.   Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall
of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was
is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor's position, in the in order.
same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of 11.   In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos
harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted
manner. constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury
3.   The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be suffered by the Tanjangcos.
stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have (ISSUE 2: Syllabus Judicial Notice)
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, 12.   our ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag[42] is instructive:
in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the a.   Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997],
discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to
the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In that
blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual findings,
and determines liability according to that standard. which were based on the evidence presented before the trial court.
4.   By this test, we find Corinthian negligent. In determining reasonable rent,
5.   While the issue of Corinthian's alleged negligence is factual in character, a b.   the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty
review by this Court is proper because the CA's factual findings differ from assessment of the land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the
those of the RTC's. prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court
6.   Thus, after a meticulous review of the evidence on record, we hold that the relied, not on mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented
CA committed no reversible error when it deviated from the findings of fact before it.
of the RTC. The CA's findings and conclusions are substantiated by the c.   Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use
evidence on record and are more in accord with law and reason. Indeed, it is and occupation of a disputed property. However, petitioners herein
clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of rent,
that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules and Regulations, thereby could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without
resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos property considering any evidence. As we have said earlier, a court may fix
7.   By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its action on
Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and the evidence adduced by the parties.
in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects 13.   In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002], the trial court
within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case. Reversing the RTC,
approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined
this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:
8.   It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its a.   A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of
no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
paid. judicial functions. Before taking such judicial notice, the court
9.   Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, must allow the parties to be heard thereon. Hence, there can be
the proposition that the inspection is merely a table inspection and, no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in
therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After question without supporting evidence.
all, if the supposed inspection is merely a table inspection and the approval 14.   Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a
granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules court to determine the proper rental value. But contrary to Corinthian's
arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the
 Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their
property.
15.   This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the
evidence presented below. Moreover, in Spouses Catungal v. Hao,we
considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the
particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent
denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their
property for almost a decade.
16.   Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession
and use of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their
own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by
the CA.
 017 SJS v. ATIENZA (MERILLES) into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the oil companies.
February 13, 2008| Corona, J. | Judicial Notice 4.   They agreed that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the
most viable and practicable option.
5.   The MOU was ratified by the sangguiang panlungsod in Reso No. 97.
PETITIONER: Social Justice Society, ladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and a.   The same rest declared that the MOU was effective only for a
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Jose L. Atienza Jr, Chevron, Petron. Pilipinas Shell, b.   On 30 Jan 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Reso No. 13, which
Dept. of Energy extended the validity of Reso 97 to April 30 2003 and authorizing
the mayor of Manila to issue special business permits to the oil
SUMMARY: Social Justice Society (SJS) was seeking the enforcement of companies.
Ordinance No. 8027, which disallowed the continuance of business of different 6.   On 7 March 2007, the SC issued a decision and ruled that Atienza had the
oil companies. A Memorandum of Understanding was initially agreed upon. ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to enforce all
The SC on 7 March 2007, decided for the implementation of Ordinance No. laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city,
8027. However, in 2006, or a year before the decision, Ordinance No. 8119 was a.   The SC did not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into
promulgated (also involving zoning). by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent
resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal
The SC in its decision dated 7 March 2007 did not take into consideration the Ordinance No. 8027
passage of Ordinance NO 8117 for it was never informed about this ordinance. b.   The SC concluded that there was nothing that hindered Atienza
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027
Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are 7.   The oil companies informs the SC that they have filed a complaint against
not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice the City of Manila for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027. However, the
under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. RTC enjoined the parties to maintain the status quo.
8.   In 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also
DOCTRINE: Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance
notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of of 2006.
ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The party 9.   Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila
asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the asking for the nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.
full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. a.   A TRO was issued enjoining the City of Manile from enforcing
Ordinance 8119
10.   One of the questions in issue is that the 7 March 2007 decision of the SC
FACTS: regarding the matter failed to take into consideration the passing of
1.   (Note: This case is really long, I included the SC discussion on Judicial Ordinance No. 8119.
Notice only) ISSUE/s:
2.   Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and 1.   (EVID RELATED TOPIC) WON in the 7 March 2007 decision of the SC,
Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original petition for mandamus under Rule they were able to take judicial notice of the passage of Ordinance No. 8119
65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. - NO. The 7 March 2007 did not take into consideration the passage of
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. Ordinance NO 8117 for it was never informed about this ordinance
8027.
a.   Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from RULING: We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and other
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee the relocation and
from operating their businesses within six months from the date of transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.
effectivity of the ordinance.
b.   Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called RATIO:
Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies (Chevron, Shell, Petron). 1.   While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by
3.   On 26 June 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances
 are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory
judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
2.   Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that: SEC. 50 Judicial notice of
ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the
ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].
a.   This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in
the City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of
the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform
the Court about it.
3.   Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial
notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial
notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have
access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to
supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to
have notice of.
4.   Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take
judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take
judicial notice of local ordinances.
5.   The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local
ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining
whether or not to take notice of an ordinance.
6.   Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its own in obtaining
evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance available to the
court for it to take notice.
 018 LATIP v. CHUA (NAPA) deducted from the SPOUSES’ liability.
16 Oct. 2009 | Nachura, J. | Judicial Notice vs. Judge’s personal knowledge DOCTRINE: But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court,
and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
PETITIONER: Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance
RESPONDENT: Rosalie Palaña Chua is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.
The reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be
SUMMARY: SPOUSES OMAR AND MOSHIERA LATIP leased the proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the
commercial premises owned by ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA. After one year of taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously
lease, ROSALIE demanded payment of back rentals and should the SPOUSES known, it will not be disputed by the parties. However, in this case, the
fail to do so, they should vacate the cubicles. The SPOUSES failed to pay hence requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary
ROSALIE filed a complaint of unlawful detainer in the MeTC attaching their evidence, the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders.
lease of contract in the complaint. SPOUSES LATIP argued that they have
already paid the rented cubicles evidenced by 3 receipts in ROSALIE’s FACTS:
handwriting in the amount of P2,570,000. In the MeTC, the decision was in favor
Facts in the MeTC
of ROSALIE finding that they failed to pay and the SPOUSES should pay
ROSALIE rent arrears. The RTC, however, reversed MeTC decision and did not 1.   ROSALIE is the owner of Roferxane Buidling, a commercial building,
give credence to the contract of lease presented by ROSALIE since it lacked located at No. 158 Quirino Ave. Cor. Redemptorist Road, Brgy. Baclaran
substantial aspects (see fact #11). RTC believed the claim of SPOUSES LATIP Parañaque.
that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented. RTC ruled that there is 2.   Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against the
an existing lease good for 6 years and already fully paid, thus SPOUSES LATIP SPOUSES LATIP and in the complaint he attached a contract of lease over
cannot be ejected. In the CA, it took judicial notice of this common practice in two cubicles in Roferxane bldg..
the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church paying 3.   A year after the commencement of the lease and with SPOUSES LATIP
payment of goodwill. This judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn already occupying the leased cubicles, ROSALIE, through counsel, sent the
Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to
money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. do so, to vacate the leased cubicles.
In the SC, the concept of Judicial Notice from Rule 129 Secs. 1 & 2 were 4.   ROSALIE, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of
discussed. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles.
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it When SPOUSES LATIP did not heed ROSALIE’S demand, she instituted
must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it the said complaint.
must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The 5.   SPOUSES LATIP refuted ROSALIE’s claim averred that they have already
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially paid the lease of the 2 cubicles and evidenced it by 3 receipts in
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited ROSALIE’s handwriting showing payment of P2,570,000.
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Now, the 6.   SPOUSE LATIP asseverated that sometime in October 1999, ROSALIE
SC resolved whether it was correct to take judicial notice of the alleged practice offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. They
of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor? accepted the offer immediately having in mind the Christmas season
NO. Only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill demands.
money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. The payment of goodwill is not common 7.   According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00
knowledge and it was still needed to be proven by documentary evidence. But would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to 8.   SPOUSES LATIP occupied the 2 cubicles as soon as it was finished
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally without waiting for the completion of 5 other stalls. Spouses Latip averred
known, the basis of his action. On the issue of Whether or not Latip should be that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of
ejected from the leased cubicles? YES because the lease has already ended. The lease rights of the subject cubicles.
unpaid rental should be paid to ROSALIE however the P2,570,000 should be
 9.   MeTC ruled in favor of ROSALIE, ordering the SPOUSES to vacate and 1.   Relevant to the topic: Whether its correct that CA took judicial notice of the
pay ROSALIE of the rent arrearages. alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill
Facts in the RTC money to the lessor? NO. The payment of goodwill is not common
10.   The RTC reversed the MeTC decision. The RTC did not give credence to knowledge and it was still needed to be proven by documentary evidence
the contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized, and in all other 2.   Whether or not Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles? YES
substantial aspects. because the lease has already ended. The unpaid rental should be paid to
11.   It lacked: ROSALIE however the P2,570,000 should be deducted from the
a.   ROSALIE’s husband’s signature SPOUSES’ liability.
b.   Signature of SPS LATIP signature on the first page
c.   Specific Dates for the term of the contract which only stated that Judicial Notice
the lease is for “6 years only from Dec 1999 to Dec 2005” 1.   Citing the case of State Prosecutors v. Muro: The doctrine of judicial notice
d.   Exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be
e.   The provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on
supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts. the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
12.   RTC believed the claim of SPOUSES LATIP that the contract of lease was
modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the two (2) 2.   Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the (1)   the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
amount of P2,570,000.00.
13.   ROSALIE claimed that the said payment was simply goodwill payment and (2)   it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
not for the lease rights, however RTC did not give credence to this and uncertain; and
pointed out the ROSALIE did not adduce evidence to substantiate this (3)   it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
claim. court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be
14.   RTC ruled that there is an existing lease good for 6 years and already fully assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
paid, thus SPOUSES LATIP cannot be ejected be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
CA Ruling records and facts of general notoriety.
15.   Hence, ROSALIE elevated tha case to the CA. The CA reinstated the 3.   Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable
decision of the MeTC reversing RTC decision. dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
16.   The CA’s decision on the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
merely constituted payment of goodwill money: the CA took judicial
questionable
notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially
around the Redemptorist Church. 4.   To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way
of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
17.   According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.
had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat.
5.   But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED. generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial
The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.
Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her 6.   Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may
as advance rentals. No costs. be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally
ISSUE/S: accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration.
The apparent matter does not meet the requisite of notoriety of a judicial notice
7.   To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to
pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC
nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the
practice was of “common knowledge” or notoriously known.
8.   ROSALIE adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of
P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money
9.   The reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not
be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense
with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so
notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties. However, in
this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching
documentary evidence, the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders.
10.   Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the
practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area.

Spouses Latip can be ejected because the lease ended in 2005.

11.   The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts
for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease.
However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was
payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period.
12.   There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt
of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole period of
the lease
13.   Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious
fact that the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the
contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt of the
monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of
the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the
lease.
14.   SPOUSES LATIP can be ejected from the leased premises as the lease
ended in 2005. They are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of
the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the
Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering
advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to
Rosalie.
 019 Republic v. Rosario (OLAZO) A-1, 42-A-2, and 42-A-3 of subdivision plan Psd 77362 and Psd
27 January 2016 | Perez, J. | Judicial Notice 4558.

192.   To support her petition, Rosario presented:

PETITIONER: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES as oppositor a.   Her owner’s duplicate copy of title;
RESPONDENTS: SEGUNDINA ROSARIO, joined by ZUELLGATE
CORPORATION b.   A certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to the effect that the original of Rosario’s TCT was
SUMMARY: Rosario filed a petition for reconstitution of title. Republic and among those burned in the fire of 11 June, 1998;
UP opposed, claiming that Rosario’s TCT covers land which are owned and
registered to UP. The RTC granted the petition for reconstitution, holding c.   Supposed original of her 1980 Tax Declaration No. 12158 to
that a petition for reconstitution does not pass upon ownership, and that UP show that the land declared there was covered by Rosario’s
failed to failed to sufficiently prove the existence of its title over the subject TCT;
land. The issue is WoN UP failed to prove the existence of its title over the
subject land. NO. UP’s titles over its landholdings are recognized and d.   Sketch plan of the subject land.
confirmed both by law (RA 9500) and jurisprudence. Republic and UP were 193.   Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and University of the
able to establish that Rosario’s TCT overlaps with two valid and existing Philippines (UP) opposed the petition. They presented public officers
certificates of title in the name of UP. Reports in support thereof were duly of various government agencies like the Land Registration Authority,
offerend in evidence. Thus, the RTC and CA should have taken judicial the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Land
notice of the various jurisprudence upholding UP’s indefeasible title over its
Management Bureau, the Quezon City Assessor’s Office, and the
landholdings. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court mandates that a Quezon City Treasurer’s Office to prove that:
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the a.   The land supposedly covered by Rosario’s TCT is located
Philippines. As both Congress and this Court have repeatedly and within the tract of land owned and registered in the name of
consistently validated and recognized UP's indefeasible title over its UP;
landholdings, the RTC and the CA erred when it faulted the Republic and UP
for presenting certified true copies of its titles signed by its records custodian b.   Psd 77362 is not available in the records of the DENR;
instead of either the duplicate originals or the certified true copies issued by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Court also held that the evidence c.   Tax Declaration No. 12158 is in the name of one Tecla
presented by respondent Rosario are of doubtful veracity and cannot justify Gutierrez and not in Rosario’s name.
the reconstitution of a title covering lots already registered in the name of
UP. 194.   RTC granted reconstitution. Republic and UP appealed
before the CA.
DOCTRINE: Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court mandates that a
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the 195.   In 2004, Rosario died. Zuellgate Corporation moved to
official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the substitute/join the petition, alleging that it acquired the lots covered
Philippines. by Rosario’s TCT from Rosario through a Deed of Absolute Sale.

196.   CA affirmed the RTC. The CA held that since the case was
FACTS: for reconstitution of title, it does not pass upon the ownership of the
191.   On November 12, 1997, respondent Rosario (Rosario) filed a land and thus, the RTC was correct in ordering reconstitution. It also
petition for reconstitution of TCT. No. 269615 (Rosario’s TCT) held that the petition cannot be said to have attacked, collaterally or
before the Quezon City RTC, claiming that her title covers lots 42- otherwise, the titles of UP because the latter failed to sufficiently
 prove the existence of its title over the subject land. of the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the Philippines.
ISSUE/s:
42.   WoN UP failed to sufficiently prove the existence of its title over the 182.   As both Congress and this Court have repeatedly and
subject land. – NO. It is judicial notice that the legitimacy of UP’s consistently validated and recognized UP's indefeasible title over its
title has been settled in several other cases. landholdings, the RTC and the CA clearly erred when it faulted the
Republic and UP for presenting certified true copies of its titles
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is signed by its records custodian instead of either the duplicate
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated October 17, 2008 and the originals or the certified true copies issued by the Register of Deeds
Resolution dated February 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV of Quezon City.
No. 85519, and the Decision dated January 5, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in LRC No. Q-9885(97), are REVERSED and SET 183.   RTC and CA should have taken judicial notice of UP’s title
ASIDE. The petition for reconstitution in LRC No. Q-9885(97) is over its landholdings, without need of any other evidence.
DISMISSED, and TCT No. 269615 in the name of Segundina Rosario is
declared SPURIOUS and VOID. The Land Registration Authority and the 184.   Although the RTC and CA is correct that a petition for
Register of Deeds of Quezon City are ordered not to entertain or act on any reconstitution of title does not treat of the issue of ownership, in the
application, conveyance, or transaction involving TCT No. 269615. case at bar, it is clearly established that Rosario’s TCT overlaps with
UP’s titles. Since UP’s indefeasible titles are recognized by law and
RATIO: jurisprudence, taking the view of the RTC and CA would have led to
The indefeasibility of the titles of the University of the Philippines over its pointless and unnecessary relitigation of a settled issue.
landholdings has been affirmed both by law and jurisprudence.
The evidence presented by respondent Rosario are of doubtful veracity and
177.   UP’s titles over its landholdings are recognized and cannot justify the reconstitution of a title covering lots already registered in
confirmed both by law and jurisprudence. the name of UP.

178.   Section 22 of R.A 9500 provides that “the absolute 185.   Certification issued by OIC-Technical Director of LMB-
ownership of the national university of these landholdings, including DENR-NCR, the DENR, attested to the non-existence of the survey
those covered by original and transfer certificates of title in the name plans alluded to in Rosario’s TCT.
of the University of the Philippines and their future derivatives, is
hereby confirmed.” 186.   The sketch plan presented by respondent Rosario in open
court bore the annotations "NOT FOR REGISTRATION" and for
179.   In the case at bar, the Republic and UP were able to establish "reference only," whereas the photocopy submitted to the court does
that Rosario’s TCT overlaps with two valid and existing certificates not contain said annotations. This discrepancy, unexplained by
of title in the name of UP. Reports in support thereof were duly respondent Rosario, coupled with the LRA Report with Attached
offerend in evidence. Thus, the RTC and CA should have taken Sketch Plan dated December 10, 1998 and the Official Report of
judicial notice of the various jurisprudence upholding UP’s OIC Regional Technical Director Mamerto Infante of the LMB-
indefeasible title over its landholdings. DENR-NCR, shows that something is suspicious about the land
described in Rosario’s TCT.
180.   Heis of Pael v. CA: The titles of UP over its landholdings
have become incontrovertible so that courts are precluded from 187.   Except for the year prior to the time she filed her petition for
looking anew into their validity. reconstitution, there is nothing in the records of the City Treasurer's
Office to support respondent Rosario's claim that she paid the real
181.   Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court mandates that a property taxes on the land covered by Rosario’s TCT from 1970 up
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, to 1998, or for a period of twenty-eight (28) years.
 188.   Teofista Pajara, Chief of the Assessment Records
Management Division, Office of the City Assessor for Quezon City,
also testified that respondent Rosario's 1980 Tax Declaration No.
12158 does not exist in the assessment records maintained by her
office. She also stated that from existing records in her office, the
reconstructed Tax Declaration No. PD-12158 is in the name of one
Tecla Gutierrez and refers to a different property and certificate of
title.

REMINDER BY THE COURT: We strongly admonish courts and

unscrupulous lawyers to stop entertaining spurious cases seeking further to
assail respondent UP's title. These cases open the dissolute avenues of graft
to unscrupulous land-grabbers who prey like vultures upon the campus of
respondent UP. By such actions, they wittingly or unwittingly aid the
hucksters who want to earn a quick buck by misleading the gullible to buy
the Philippine counterpart of the proverbial London Bridge. It is well past
time for courts and lawyers to cease wasting their time and resources on
these worthless causes and take judicial notice of the fact that respondent
UP's title had already been validated countless times by this Court. Any
ruling deviating from such doctrine is to be viewed as a deliberate intent to
sabotage the rule of law and will no longer be countenanced.
 020 People v. Tundag (PANALIGAN) the death penalty.
12 October 2000 | Quisumbing, J. | Judicial notice
FACTS:
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines 197.   The case is an automatic review from the Regional Trial
RESPONDENTS: Tomas Tundag Court of Mandaue City of 2 criminal cases finding Tomas Tundag
guilty of 2 counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death
SUMMARY: The case is an automatic review from the RTC which penalty twice.
convicted Tomas Tundag of 2 counts of qualified rape and sentenced him to
death penalty twice for raping his own daughter. The RTC found Mary 198.   Tomas Tundag was found guilty of raping his own daughter,
Ann’s (daughter) testimony credible and appreciated the aggravating Mary Ann Tundag, then a minor at the time, during 2 separate
circumstance of relationship and qualifying circumstance of minority. It occasions: on September 5, 1997 and November 7, 1997.
rejected Tomas’ defenses of denial and alibi. However, Mary Ann’s age was
not proven by the prosecution and was only given judicial notice despite the 199.   The evidence of the prosecution showed that Mary Ann
absence of documentary evidence to prove her real age and despite her lack Tundag was a 13-year old girl who did not know how to read and
of knowledge as to her real age. At issue in this case is WON Tomas’ write, had an IQ of 76% which was a very low general mental
conviction for rape should be affirmed and WON Mary Ann’s minority ability, and was living with her father, herein accused Tomas
should be given judicial notice despite failure of the prosecution to prove the Tundag.
same. YES, Tomas’ conviction should be affirmed, but modified to simple
rape with aggravating circumstance of relationship. The qualifying 200.   RTC found that during trial, Mary Ann Tundag’s testimony
circumstance of minority should not be applied since Mary Ann’s minority was clear and unequivocal; that she knew that if her father was found
was not established. NO, Mary Ann’s minority should not be given judicial guilty, he would be sentenced to death; that she testified on
notice absent a hearing to prove the same. The prosecution was not able to affirmative matters and that her account of the rapes complained of
present documentary evidence such as a birth or baptismal certificate to was straightforward, detailed and consistent.
prove her age, and neither was there proof presented to show that the
201.   She narrated how, on two separate nights, she was in the
birth/baptismal certificates were lost or destroyed. There is a need for
house together with her father. Before she went to sleep, her father
independent proof of Mary Ann’s age, aside from testimonial evidence from
was lying down on the mat while she was lying near, but not
her or her relatives, and despite the defense not contesting the same. Tomas’
necessarily beside him. During her sleep, she noticed that her father
conviction is modified from 2 counts of qualified rape to 2 counts of simple
was undressed and was embracing her; then he undressed her but she
rape with aggravating circumstance of relationship, and his sentence is
resisted, but her father held a knife against her and told her he would
commuted from death penalty to 2 counts of reclusion perpetua.
kill her if she shouted. After which, he proceeded to have carnal
knowledge with her.
DOCTRINE: Judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper despite the
defense counsel’s admission thereof, acceding to the prosecution’s motion. 202.   Tomas Tundag raised the defenses of denial and alibi; he
According to Rule 129 Sec. 3 of the Rules on Evidence, as to any other contends that on September 5 1997 he was working as a watch
matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went
notice of such fact. home tired and sleepy at around 11PM. On November 7 1997 he
claims he was at work. He also alleged that Mary Ann Tundag
The prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim pressed rape charges against him because she quarreled with him
even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim after he castigated her for misbehavior (she was often out of the
must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. It is the house when he was home). He also said it was very unlikely for him
burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was to have committed the rapes considering that he and his wife had 10
below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of children to attend and care for.
 203.   The RTC did not appreciate Tomas Tundag’s defenses of As to Tomas Tundag’s guilt for raping his daughter
denial and alibi, and since he did not present any other witnesses to 189.   SC finds no room to disturb RTC’s judgment concerning
corroborate his testimony, convicted Tomas Tundag for qualified Tomas Tundag’s guilt because his defense is utterly untenable.
rape (with aggravating circumstances of minority and
relationship) based on Mary Ann Tundag’s testimony. 190.   His defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving.
Against the testimony of Mary Ann who testified on affirmative
204.   The RTC also took judicial notice of Mary Ann Tundag’s matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an
minority despite failure of the prosecution to prove her age through inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of
any documentary evidence (birth/baptismal certificate) and despite positive identification by Mary Ann of Tomas Tundag as the violator
Mary Ann Tundag’s admission that she did not know how old she of her honor.
was because her mother did not tell her when she was born. She also
testified that her birth certificate was with her mother. The counsel 191.   SC finds that Mary Ann was unequivocal in charger Tomas
for the defense did not contest Mary Ann’s minority, to wit— with ravishing her. Her account of the rapes complained of was
straightforward, detailed, and consistent.
a.   “FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth
Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial 192.   In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the
notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.” single most important issue. The determination of the credibility of
witnesses is the function of the trial court, since it has the advantage
b.   ATTY. SURALTA (defense attorney): Admitted…” of having observed the firsthand demeanor of the witnesses on the
stand and is in a better position to form an accurate impression and
ISSUE/s: conclusion. Hence the conclusions of the RTC must be respected and
43.   WON Tomas Tundag’s conviction for 2 counts of qualified rape and the judgment rendered affirmed.
the 2 death penalty sentences should be affirmed – YES, Tomas
Tundag’s conviction for 2 counts of rape should be affirmed, but is 193.   Morevover, Mary Ann’s testimony was corroborated by
modified from qualified to simple rape; the 2 death penalty sentences medical findings that lacerations were present in her hymen. The
are modified to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. testimony of Dr. Acebes who examined Mary Ann told of healed
hymenal lacerations in Mary Ann’s private parts which meant a
44.   WON the RTC was correct in taking judicial notice of Mary Ann history of sexual congress on her part.
Tundag’s minority despite failure of the prosecution to prove the
same – NO, the RTC erred in taking judicial notice of Mary 194.   Additionally, Tomas’ assertion that Mary Ann has some
Ann’s age without a hearing. Thus the charges of qualified rape psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 does not favor his
are modified to simple rape. defense. Nor does the allegation of a family feud (See Fact #7)
explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such
RULING: WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously.
Mandaue City, Branch 28 in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203 is
hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of 2 As to Mary Ann Tundag’s minority
counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua 195.   In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that
and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000 as indemnity, P50,000 Tomas was Mary Ann’s father. But Mary Ann’s age was not
as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages. No pronouncement properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt.
as to costs.
196.   Mary Ann testified that she was 13 years old at the time of
SO ORDERED. the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when
she was born because her mother did not tell her.
RATIO:
 197.   Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which evidence from the victim or her relatives. The prosecution must
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it
already know them. is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must
be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself.
a.   Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be
mandatory23 or discretionary24 200.   It is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the
fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in
b.   With respect to other matters not falling within mandatory or order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial
notice of a fact only after a hearing under Rule 129 Sec. 325 201.   The failure to to sufficiently establish victim’s age by
independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified
198.   In this case, judicial notice of Mary Ann’s age is improper, form.
despite the defense counsel’s admission thereof acceding to the
prosecution’s motion. According to Rule 129 Sec. 3 of the Rules on 202.   Tomas, being the father of Mary Ann, a fact duly proven
Evidence, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required during trial, the Court finds that the alternative circumstance of
before the courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the relationship should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
age of the victim may be proven by birth or baptismal certificate of However, since the special qualifying circumstance of
the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said relationship was proved but not the minority of Mary Ann, the
documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral case is taken out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence.
evidence sufficient for the purpose.
203.   Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic
199.   The Court has emphasized in recent cases the need for aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplay/damages
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial are called for.
                                                                                                                       
23 SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial
notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.

24 SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial

notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.
25 SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its
own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter
and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.