10CR - Mens Rea in Statutory Offences
10CR - Mens Rea in Statutory Offences
10CR - Mens Rea in Statutory Offences
1
The courts are prepared to interpret a statute which is silent on the matter of
fault as tacitly excluding the requirement of fault, although they are
reluctant to conclude an offence as being one of strict liability (S v Qumbella)
and in S v Arenstein the AD even set up the requirement of fault as a
presumption
In S v Van Zyl the court (CPD) relied on a rule that intention would be
required for a statutory offence unless there is clear indication that
2
negligence is sufficient, however it is better to examine a legislative
objective independently rather than apply a rigid formula.
The use of the word “intention” in a statute naturally indicates dolus as a
requirement, but this does not necessarily imply dolus eventualis is sufficient
for liability
Certain offences created by statute have been held to require dolus directus
rather than dolus eventualis.
There are analytical tools that have been developed by the courts which
guide us
3
appellant’s argument was that 6 bottles were packed a second so they could
not control if such things fell into the bottle.
Legal principle: Was mens rea a prerequisite for liability?
Court held: The question of whether or not the absence of mens rea
constituted a defence to the charge depended on the nature of the
prohibition. There was no intention on part of the Legislature to dispense
with the mens rea as the use of the words “cause or permit” were more
consistent with the presence than absence of mens rea. The majority found
that mens rea in the form of negligence was required in this instance and the
appellant had been negligent in permitting bottles to pass checking officials
at a speed at which contamination could not be detected.
The minority however favoured strict liability: Botha JA said it is unsafe to
draw general conclusions as to the meaning of words such as “cause” or
“permit” in any particular statutory provision. It is safe to consider the
context in which the words are used and in the present case the context of
the by-law requires the words “cause or permit” to be interpreted as
importing mens rea. Strict liability can occasionally produce undesirable
results but these results that come about in exceptional circumstances are
mild in comparison to the much greater potential harm that may eventuate
from holding that mens rea is an element of the offence and this depriving
the by-law of much of its effectiveness.
Reverse Onus
Despite deviation (R v Wallendorf) the law now concerning the onus of proof
in statutory offences is that the onus rests with the state even if the statute
is silent in respect of fault and the court nevertheless concludes that fault is
required (S v Jassat; S v Qumbella; S v De Blom)
4
Example: Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act: a dealer would procure a harsher
sentence than a consumer but the difficulty comes in distinguishing between
a dealer and a consumer. Therefore there is a presumption that dealers will
have a certain amount and the onus rests on the accused to show they are not
a dealer if they have that prescribed amount.
There is a maxim that the “role of a judge is to interpret the law and not to
make it”
The onus of proof is generally on the state but in some instances it rests on
the accused. Proving culpability rests on the state and this was extended for
statutory crimes (S v De Blom)
CASE: R v H 1944, AD
Facts: The appellant was convicted of having had illegal carnal intercourse
with a black woman but he contended he thought she was coloured.
Court held: He was found guilty on the basis that mens rea was an essential
ingredient of the offence. Negligence may constitute sufficient proof of
mens rea even in cases where negligence is not the gist of the offence
charged, if there was a duty on the part of the person to be circumspect
5
CASE: S v Jassat 1965, AD
Facts: The appellant was charged with a violation of a notice issued with
regard to his duty of reporting to the police station (link to R v Arenstein). He
was a medical doctor and had arranged with his mother and secretary to
remind him to report to the station at the relevant times. He also indicated
that on the day in question he failed to report he had a particularly busy
schedule so he ‘overlooked his duty’ to report to the station. The provincial
division dismissed his appeal from the magistrate but he appealed to the AD
Court held: Steyn JA said the appellant had been negligent because he had
failed to report to the station.
Rumpff JA: forgetting to comply with the order was negligent
Willems JA: steps to prevent such an occurrence were insufficient and he
failed to adhere to a high degree of circumspection.
The legislation aimed at protecting against a dangerous and negligent social
evil
NEGLIGENCE
Where a court decides an offence is not of strict liability the starting point is
to consider intention, however in exceptional situations mens rea in the form
of culpa is required.
To diminish the harsh effect of the strict liability doctrine the courts have
been prepared to accept that an accused should escape liability if he can
adduce evidence that his contravention of the statute was not negligent.
Determining the requirement of negligence avoids strict liability while giving
effect to the imposition of stricter standards of care in relation to public
welfare legislation.
6
R v H: “Negligence may constitute sufficient proof of mens rea even in cases
where negligence is not the gist of the offence charged, if there was a duty
on the part of the person to be circumspect…”
Culpa may be the fault element of a statutory offence even though
negligence is not the gist of the offence.
In determining whether culpa is the fault element it is unnecessary to search
for words indicating negligence but rather the enquiry is if the Legislature
required so high a degree of circumspection that despite the absence of
express provision it must have intended that mere omission to exercise that
degree of care which the law expects of a bonus paterfamilias, is
sufficient to render one guilty of the offence.
(1) Language
It may serve to indicate negligence by use of words or phrases such as
“negligently” or “without due care”
The language is to be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the
legislature by for example, considering the meaning given to the same words
used elsewhere in the statute
(3) Implementation
7
The fact implementation of a statute will be facilitated by negligence being
sufficient for liability rather than intention, indicates negligence is the
appropriate fault requirement
(4) Penalty
Severity of the penalty imposed indicates negligence rather than intention
Where a statute attracts severe punishment it will be interpreted as requiring
fault however if it attracts slight punishment such as “regulatory offences”
which are not morally reprehensible (ie TV licenses) a court may interpret it
as strict liability.
(5) Reasonableness
The fact negligence involves an objective test of liability affects the question
of reasonableness or requiring negligence as the form of fault for particular
offences.
This is because the application of an objective standard may result in
hardship so unjust as to make it unlikely that Parliament could have intended
any such result.
Reasonableness of excluding culpability: Courts take into account the
inequitable results of the accused and the State
If it has been determined that negligence was the required form of mens rea, to
test if the accused was negligent the test of Kruger v Coetzee must be applied.
APPLICATION
X moves to the suburbs and celebrates by slaughtering a cow. His neighbours call the
police and it eventuates that X has contravened by-laws for that area. X says he was
unaware of that law.
1) Look at the statute: does it require mens rea? Consider the factors
2) Weigh up these factors and apply And then draw a conclusion and use cases
3) Once it has been concluded that mens rea is a requirement THEN mistake of
law can be considered (because if there is no fault there can be no
consideration of mistake of law)
4) Apply for mistake of law: (S v De Blom; S v du Toit; S v Waglines; S v Rabson
etc)