19_Aertsen_5.

QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 375

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

IV. Filosofia scolastica e tardo-scolastica

19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 377

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Jan A. Aertsen

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science

Introduction

Most medieval commentators on Aristotle did not adopt the theological concep-
tion of metaphysics that prevailed among the Neoplatonic commentators in late
Antiquity, but understood metaphysics as the universal science of being, as “on-
tology”1. The medieval transformations of the Aristotelian concept of “First Phi-
losophy” were characterized by Ludger Honnefelder as “the second beginning
of metaphysics”2. Generally, I am not inclined to minimalize the importance of
medieval philosophy, but in this case I wonder whether the phrase is historical-
ly appropriate. If there is a “second beginning of metaphysics”, there are good
reasons for claiming that Arab philosophy rather than the Latin philosophy of
the thirteenth and fourteenth century deserves this place in the genealogy of
Western metaphysics. Avicenna’s views on the proper subject of First Philoso-
phy and his doctrine of the primary notions of the intellect determined the foun-
dations of metaphysical thought in Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Henry of
Ghent and John Duns Scotus.
This claim does not mean, of course, that medieval metaphysics was not the
scene of far-reaching changes of received conceptions. An original contribution
was the understanding of metaphysics as a “transcendental science”. The ex-
pression seems anachronistic, for the term transcendentalis does not occur in
medieval texts; their authors always speak of transcendens or the plural form
transcendentia. The reason that in modern studies the term ‘transcendental’ is

1 The classic study on this subject is A. ZIMMERMANN, Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über

den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert, Peeters, Leuven 1998 (2nd ed.). Cfr. the con-
tribution of C. Steel to this volume.
2 L. HONNEFELDER, Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der

Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert, in J.P. BECKMANN / L. HONNEFELDER / G.

SCHRIMPF / G. WIELAND (Hrsg.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, Meiner,
Hamburg 1987, 165-186.

«Quaestio», 5 (2005), 377-389

19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 378

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

378 Jan A. Aertsen

used for transcendens in retrospect, will become clear at the end of our essay.
The idea of a “transcendental science” presupposes a doctrine of the transcen-
dentals, which certainly has Aristotelian and Avicennian sources, but in its doc-
trinal elaboration was an achievement of the thirteenth century. Duns Scotus was
the first to use the expression scientia transcendens and modern scholarship has
attributed to him a decisive role in connecting metaphysics with the transcen-
dentals.
In several studies, Honnefelder underlined the discontinuity (“a crucial
break”) between Scotus’s conception of metaphysics and that of the thirteenth
century3. Scotus’s innovations, he states, were twofold. First, his scientia tran-
scendens becomes the whole of metaphysics in contrast to, for instance,
Aquinas’s conception, in which the doctrine of the transcendentals comprises
only one part of metaphysics. Furthermore, in Scotus’s conception First Philos-
ophy cannot be the science of the first being, but only of the first known, the con-
cept of being; it is ontology and not onto-theology, as it had been for the com-
mentators belonging to the first generation after the reception of Aristotle, Al-
bert the Great and Aquinas.
In my paper I will suggest another view of the relationship of Scotus‘s meta-
physics to earlier medieval conceptions, in particular to Aquinas’s4. To that end
the focus will be on two issues. The first is Scotus’s notion of scientia transcen-
dens: I shall analyse the text in which he introduces the notion and argue that
this text, which is generally considered as programmatic for Scotus’s project, is
traditional rather than innovative. The second issue is the medieval concept(s)
of transcendens (“transcendental”). The innovative character of Scotus’s project
need not to be demonstrated by marginalizing the importance of the doctrine of
the transcendentals in the thirteenth century, but becomes clear by his new un-
derstanding of what is transcendental. The medieval concept of transcendental-
ity turns out to be not homogeneous. That will be the subject of the second part
of my paper.

3 Good summaries of Honnefelder’s numerous studies on this topic can be found in L. HONNEFELDER,

Metaphysics as a Discipline: From the “Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients” to Kant’s Notion of Tran-
scendental Philosophy, in R.L. FRIEDMAN / L.O. NIELSEN (eds.), The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern
Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700, Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston-London 2003, 53-74, 59: «Sco-
tus’ ideas [...] represent a crucial break»; and ID., La métaphysique comme science transcendantale entre
le Moyen Âge et les Temps modernes, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2002.
4 Cfr. my discussion with Honnefelder’s view in J.A. AERTSEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Tran-

scendentals. The case of Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996, 432-434. See also S.D. DU-
MONT, Scotus’s Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradition of Metaphysics, in J.A. AERTSEN / A. SPEER
(eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?, Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für mittelalteliche
Philosophie, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York 1998, 192-212.
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 379

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science 379

I. Scotus’s notion of “scientia transcendens”

I.1. A “programmatic” text: Scotus‘s prologue to the first book of

his Questions on the Metaphysics

The expression scientia transcendens appears at the beginning of Scotus’s work

Questions on the Metaphysics. In the prologue to the first book, he argues that
what is most knowable in the first way (primo modo) is what is most common
(communissima), such as being qua being and its properties. There follow two
references to Avicenna’s doctrine of the first conceptions of the intellect and a
reference to Aristotle’s “ontological” description of First Philosophy in book IV
of his Metaphysics, which makes clear that the consideration of these commu-
nissima belongs to the domain of metaphysics5.
Scotus next makes an additional remark about the need for this science. Be-
cause the most common things are first known, they cannot be treated in any par-
ticular science; they are the very condition of the possibility of a particular sci-
ence. «Therefore, it is necessary that some universal science exists that consid-
ers these transcendentia as such»6.
On the basis of this conclusion, in which Scotus introduces the term ‘tran-
scendentals’ as another name for the communissima, he presents an (etymologi-
cal) explanation of the name ‘metaphysics’: «It is from ‘meta’, which means ‘tran-
scends’, and ‘ycos’, which means ‘science’. It is, as it were, the ‘transcending sci-
ence’ (scientia transcendens), because it is concerned with the transcendentals»7.

5 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, ed. G. Etzkorn, The Franciscan Institute, St.

Bonaventure, N.Y. 1997, 8, prol., n. 17: «Maxime scibilia primo modo sunt communissima, ut ens in quan-
tum ens, et quaecumque consequuntur ens in quantum ens. Dicit enim Avicenna I Metapysicae cap. 5
quod “ens et res imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se”. Et
infra: “quae priora sunt ad imaginandum per se ipsa sunt ea quae communia sunt omnibus, sicut res et
ens et unum. Et ideo non potest manifestari aliquod horum per probationem, quae non sit circularis”. Haec
autem communissima pertinent ad considerationem metaphysicae secundum Philosophum in IV huius in
principio: “Est scientia quaedam quae speculatur ens in quantum ens, et quae huic insunt secundum se”
[...]». Engl. transl. by G.J. ETZKORN / A.B. WOLTER, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns
Scotus, I, Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1997.
6 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, prol., n. 18, ed. Etzkorn, 8-9: «Cuius neces-

sitas ostendi potest sic: ex quo communissima primo intelliguntur – ut probatum est per Avicennam –, se-
quitur quod aliora specialioria non possunt cognosci nisi illa communia prius cognoscantur. Et non potest
istorum communium cognitio tradi in aliqua scientia particulari, – quia qua ratione in una, eadem ratione
in alia [...], et ita idem multotiens inutiliter repeteretur – , igitur necesse est esse aliquam scientiam uni-
versalem, quae per se consideret illa transcendentia».
7 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, prol., n. 18, ed. Etzkorn, 9: «Et hanc scien-

tiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a ‘meta’, quod est ‘trans’, et ‘ycos’ ‘scientia’, quasi transcen-
dens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus».
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 380

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

380 Jan A. Aertsen

This explanation, Honnefelder argues, would reveal the originality of Scotus’s

metaphysics: he made «the step to transcendental philosophy»8.
This interpretation seems to me questionable, for Scotus’s argument in this
supposed “programmatic” text adopts the common understanding of transcen-
dentals as the communissima in the thirteenth century – which is not quite, as
we shall see in the second part of our paper, Scotus’s view. What deserves spe-
cial attention is the fact that the understanding of metaphysics as the “tran-
scendental science” is based on what is most knowable primo modo (“in the first
way”). Apparently, there is another orientation, a “second way”. We have to
reread the text in full and consider its structure and purpose.

II.2. The structure of the prologue

Scotus’s purpose in the prologue is to show the dignity or nobility of this science
on the basis of Aristotle’s famous opening sentence of the Metaphysics: «All men
by nature desire to know». The syllogistic argument is as follows:
Maior: If all men by nature desire to know, then they desire most of all the great-
est knowledge or science. As the Philosopher indicates, the greatest science
is about those things that are most knowable (maxime scibilia).
Minor: Things are said to be most knowable in two ways: either (i) because they
are the first of all things known, without which nothing else can be known, or
(ii) because they are what is known most certainly. In either way this science
is about the most knowable.
Conclusion: This science [metaphysics] is therefore the greatest science and,
consequently, most desirable9.
Scotus provides a proof of both parts of the minor. We have seen his proof of
the first part; the proof of the second part of the minor reads: What is knowable
most certainly are principles and causes, and the more they are prior the more
certainly they are known. For from these stem all the certainty of what is poste-
rior. But this science considers such principles and causes. Scotus refers to the

8 L. HONNEFELDER, Duns Scotus: Der Schritt der Philosophie zur scientia transcendens, in W. KLUXEN

(Hrsg.), Thomas von Aquin im philosophischen Gespräch, Alber, Freiburg-München 1975, 229-244.
9 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, prol., n. 16, ed. Etzkorn, 7-8: «Nunc propo-

sitio ipsa [scil. omnes homines natura scire desiderant] est applicanda, videlicet ad ostendendum digni-
tatem et nobilitatem huius scientiae, sic: si omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ergo maxime scienti-
am maxime desiderabunt. Ita arguit Philosophus I huius cap 2. Et ibidem subdit: “quae sit maxime sci-
entia, illa scilicet quae est circa maxime scibilia”. Maxime autem dicuntur scibilia dupliciter: vel quia
primo omnium sciuntur sine quibus non possunt alia sciri; vel quia sunt certissima cognoscibilia. Utroque
autem modo considerat ista scientia maxime scibilia. Haec igitur est maxime scientia, et per consequens
maxime desiderabilis».
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 381

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science 381

first book of the Metaphysics, in which Aristotle states that First Philosophy is
“wisdom”, dealing with the highest causes10.
The core of Scotus’s argument in the prologue is the twofold orientation of
metaphysics. This science considers what is first known, that is, the communis-
sima or transcendentals (and for this reason metaphysics is called “transcen-
dental science”), as well as what is ontologically prior, the first causes. The first
outcome of our reading is that from this text as such one cannot draw the con-
clusion that for Scotus the whole of metaphysics is a transcendental science.

II.3. Comparison with Aquinas’s prologue

The traditional character of Scotus’s prologue particularly emerges in compari-

son with the prologue of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics. Scotus’s pro-
logue furnishes evidence that he was familiar with Aquinas’s commentary, for he
cites verbatim (nn. 5-7) Aquinas’s arguments for Aristotle’s claim that «all men
by nature desire to know». Comparing the two prologues with one another, we
notice a number of striking similarities.
(i) Scotus wants to show that the most desirable and greatest science is about
those things that are “most knowable”. Aquinas’s purpose is similar. He reasons
that there must be a first and highest science and then defines its distinctive fea-
ture: the first and highest science treats of the “most intelligibles” (maxime in-
telligibilia)11.
(ii) According to both thinkers what is “most knowable” or “most intelligible”
can be understood in several ways. The first way in Aquinas corresponds to Sco-
tus’s secundo modo. Aquinas relates the first meaning of the “most intelligibles”
to causality, since the intellect derives its certainty from the knowledge of the
causes. Therefore that science ist the highest which considers the first causes12.
The second way in which Aquinas understands “the most intelligibles” cor-

10 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, prol., n. 21, ed. Etzkorn, 10: «Secunda pars

minoris probatur sic: certissima cognoscibilia sunt principia et causae, et tanto secundum se certiora
quanto priora. Ex illa enim dependet tota certitudo posteriorum. Haec autem scientia considerat huius-
modi principia et causas, sicut probat Philosophus, I huius cap. 2, per hoc quod ipsa est sapientia».
11 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. M-R. Cathala retractatur cura et studio R.M. Spiazzi, Ma-

rietti, Torino-Roma 1950, 1: «[...] ita scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime in-
tellectualis est. Haec autem est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia versatur».
12 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 1: «Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter

assumere possumus. Primo ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus intellectus certitudinem accipit, viden-
tur esse intelligibilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex causis, causarum
cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et illa scientia, quae primas causas considerat, videtur
esse maxime aliarum regulatrix».
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 382

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

382 Jan A. Aertsen

responds to Scotus’s first mode, for he relates intelligibility to universality.

Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual which deals with the most uni-
versal principles. «These are being (ens) and that which is consequent upon be-
ing [...]»13. In this way Thomas connects the science of metaphysics with the doc-
trine of the transcendentals.
Unlike Scotus, Aquinas distinguishes a third type of the “most intelligibles”,
but, as it will turn out, this difference is not essential. “The most intelligibles”
can be taken in a third way «from the cognition of the intellect». From this point
of view intelligibility relates to immateriality, for something has intellective pow-
er in virtue of being free from matter. “The most intelligibles” are therefore
things which are altogether free from matter, such as God and the intelligences14.
(iii) After his account of what is most intelligible in the sense of what is most
common Aquinas adds, as Scotus does, a remark that emphasizes the need for
this science. His considerations are the same: Principles of this kind should not
be treated in any one particular science. Since each genus of beings needs these
principles for its knowledge, they would with equal justification be treated in any
particular science. They should therefore be studied in one scientia communis15.
(iv) Aquinas’s distinction of three types of “the most intelligibles” corresponds
to the three descriptions of First Philosophy, presented in Aristotle’s Meta-
physics: it is knowledge of the highest causes (book I); it considers, in contrast
to the particular sciences, being-as-being (book IV); and it is “theology”, since
it deals with the immaterial and the divine (book VI). At the end of the prologue
Aquinas explains the names given to this science on the basis of the three types
of “the most intelligibles”. Like Scotus, he reserves the name “metaphysics” for
the study of the communia and gives a methodological reason for this reserva-
tion. This science is called “metaphysics”, «insofar as it considers being and

13 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 1: «Secundo ex comparatione intellec-

tus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particularium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre videtur,
quod universalia comprhendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae circa principia
maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntut ens [...]».
14 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 1: «Tertio, ex ipsa cogntione intellec-

tus. Nam cum unaquaeque res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet
illa esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata [...], sicut Deus et intelligentiae».
15 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 1: «Huiusmodi autem non debent omni-

no indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alicui generi vel
speciei non possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent, quia cum his
unumquodque genus entium ad sui cognitionem indigeat, pari ratione in qualibet particulari scientia
tractarentur. Unde restat quod in una communi scientia huiusmodi tractentur».
16 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 2: «[Dicitur] Metaphysica, in quantum

considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis,
sicut magis communia post minus communia».
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 383

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science 383

what follows upon it, for these transphysica are discovered in the process of res-
olution (in via resolutionis) as the more common after the less common»16.
From our analysis we may conclude that Scotus’s supposed programmatic text
does not express a “crucial break” with tradition. All elements in his prologue
can be traced back to Aquinas’s prologue: its purpose, its argument, the remark
about the need for this science and the explanation of the name ‘metaphysics’.
Scotus’s introduction of the phrase scientia transcendens is not essentially dif-
ferent from Aquinas’s account of the name, since it continues the thirteenth cen-
tury linking of metaphysics with the doctrine of the transcendentals. Albert the
Great, in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, was the first to relate the question
as to the proper subject of metaphysics with the doctrine; this science, he states,
is concerned with the prima and transcendentia17. For Aquinas, metaphysics is
the scientia communis, because it considers ens commune, a term he adopts from
Avicenna.

I.4. The problem of the unity of metaphysics

In still another respect a comparison between Scotus’s and Aquinas’s texts is in-
structive, for both are faced with the same problem. In their prologues, they de-
scribe the manifold orientations of First Philosophy. In the case of Scotus, meta-
physics deals with the transcendentals and the first causes; in the case of
Aquinas, it considers the first causes, what is most common and the immaterial,
divine being. How are these objects related to one another? Their multiplicity
raises the problem of the unity of metaphysics.
This question is in fact Aquinas’s main concern in his prologue. He argues
that the threefold consideration of “the most intelligibles” should not be attrib-
uted to different sciences, but to one. For the immaterial substances (type iii) are
the first and universal causes (type i) of being (type ii). Now it belongs to the
same science to consider the proper causes of any genus and the (subject-)genus
itself. So it must belong to the same science to consider the separate substances
and being in general (ens commune), which is the “genus” of which these sub-
stances are the common and universal causes18.

17 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaph., I, tract. 1, c. 2, ed. B. Geyer, Münster 1960 («Opera omnia», vol.

XVI/1), 5.
18 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 1-2: «Haec autem triplex consideratio,

non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et
primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus
ipsum. [...] Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens
commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales».
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 384

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

384 Jan A. Aertsen

Aquinas’s next step is the determination of the proper subject of metaphysics;

it was under Avicenna’s influence a central topic among the Latin commentators,
because the proper subject of a science establishes its unity. He argues that, al-
though the consideration of this science is threefold, metaphysics does not study
any one of these three as its subject, but only ens commune. Aquinas again ap-
peals to the general structure of a science: «For the subject of a science is that
whose causes and properties we seek, but not the causes themselves». Hence
God is not the proper subject of metaphysics, but rather the end of its inquiry19.

Scotus, too, deals with the problem of the unity of metaphysics, not in the pro-
logue, but in the first question of the first book. He recalls his description of the
twofold orientation of First Philosophy in the prologue: «Concerning the object
of this science, it has been shown that this science deals with the transcenden-
tals. Likewise it has been shown that it is concerned with the highest causes».
He observes that there are various opinions about the question of which of these
ought to be its proper object – Scotus has in mind the discussions in Arab phi-
losophy – and concludes: «Therefore the first question is whether the proper
subject of metaphysics is being-as-being, as Avicenna claimed, or God and the
intelligences, as Averroes assumed»20.
Scotus’s reply is a long and a somewhat curious text, in which he does not
take a univocal stand. He extensively discusses arguments pro and con Aver-
roes’s as well as Avicenna’s positions and finally raises the question «How God
can be the subject of metaphysics?» Scotus answers that God can be called the
subject of this science, if “subject” is taken in the sense of “what is primarily
intended”, the end of metaphysical inquiry21. But he himself advances several
“doubts” (dubia) about this view.
Of particular interest is the sixth doubt, which questions the unity of meta-
physics. The doubt assumes that metaphysics has to be split up into two sci-
ences, a metaphysica transcendens – a term that undoubtedly refers to the phrase

19 THOMAS DE AQUINO, In Metaph., prol., ed. Cathala / Spiazzi, 2: «Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista

scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum
ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ip-
sae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consi-
deratio scientiae pertingit».
20 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, q. 1, ed. Etzkorn, 15: «De isto autem obiec-

to huius scientiae ostensum est prius quod haec scientia est circa transcendentia; ostensum est autem
quod est circa altissimas causas. Quod autem istorum debeat poni proprium eius obiectum, variae sunt
opiniones. Ideo de hoc quaeritur primo utrum proprium subiectum metapysicae sit ens in quantum ens
(sicut posuit Avicenna) vel Deus et Intelligentiae (sicut posuit Commentator Averroes)». Note that Scotus
uses the terms “subject” and “object” interchangeably.
21 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, q. 1, n. 140, ed. Etzkorn, 64.
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 385

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science 385

scientia transcendens in the prologue – and a science, dealing with the divine,
with the result that there will be four theoretical sciences, transcendental meta-
physics and three special sciences (theology, mathematics and physics)22. Sco-
tus’s doubt anticipates the splitting up of metaphysics into two distinct sciences,
a “general metaphysics” and a “special metaphysics”, which was established in
German School philosophy of the seventeenth century23.
Scotus rejects the idea of the division of metaphysics into a transcendental
and a special science and defends, like Aquinas, the unity of metaphysics. The
study of the divine cannot be separated from transcendental metaphysics, since
«all things naturally knowable of God will be transcendentals». «The purpose of
this science will be the perfect knowledge of being, which is knowledge of the
first being. But what first occurs to the intellect as most knowable is being in
general, and from this the primacy of the first being will be established»24.
Knowledge of being in general is the basis of our natural knowledge of God. For
Scotus, too, First Philosophy has an “onto-theological” structure25.

II. Medieval Concepts of Transcendentality

In the first part of our paper we have established that Scotus’s account of meta-
physics as scientia transcendens is traditional. In his Questions on the Meta-
physics, the real innovations in Scotus’s project remain mostly hidden, insofar as
his own understanding of what is transcendental is not identical with that in the
thirteenth century. In the second part of the paper we will state briefly the dif-
ferent concepts of transcendentality.

II.1. Common feature

The medieval doctrines have in common that they conceive the notion of “tran-

22 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, q. 1, n. 155, ed. Etzkorn, 69: «Igitur meta-

physica transcendens erit tota prior scientia divina, et ita erunt quattuor scientiae speculativae: una tran-
scendens, et tres speciales».
23 Cfr. E. ROMPE, Die Trennung von Ontologie und Metaphysik. Der Ablösungsprozeß und seine Mo-

tivierung bei Benedictus Pererius und anderen Denkern des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, Diss. Bonn 1968.
24 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, q. 1, n. 161, ed. Etzkorn, 71: «Ideo vitando

quattuor esse scientias speculativas, et hanc ponendo de Deo, omnia naturaliter cognoscibilia de ipso sunt
transcendentia. Finis huius est perfecta cognitio entis, quae est cognitio primi. Sed primo occurrens et
notissimum intellectui est ens in communi, et ex ipso probatur primitas».
25 Cfr. O. BOULNOIS, Quand commence l’ontothéologie? Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin et Duns Scot, «Revue

Thomiste», 95 (1995), 85-108.

19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 386

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

386 Jan A. Aertsen

scendental” in opposition to “categorial”. The surpassing, suggested by the term

transcendens, concerns Aristotle’s central doctrine of the ten categories, irre-
ducible to one another. Although they are the genera generalissima, they are nev-
ertheless surpassed towards predicates, signifying that what is common to
things, as “being” and “one”26.
A lead for the semantic transcendence of “being” might have been Aristotle’s
statement in book III of his Metaphysics: «Being (ens) is not a genus». Aristotle’s
argument is that if “being” were a genus, a difference would have to be found
which would restrict “being” to its various species. But no difference participates
in the essence of a genus, for then a genus would be twice included in the defini-
tion of the species. A difference is outside the essence of the genus. There is, how-
ever, no difference at all to be found that would be outside of being, for what is out-
side of being is nothing, and non-being cannot be a difference. Therefore “being”
cannot be a genus27. Aristotle’s statement, expressing the transcategorial charac-
ter of “being”, has a negative connotation: in contrast to the categories, “being”
does not contribute anything to the definition that indicates what something is.
The medievals converted Aristotle‘s negative statement into a positive one: «Be-
ing is a transcendens», because it surpasses the categories. The reformulation is
at the same time a sign of a more positive interpretation of the semantic value of
“being”: this most common predicate signifies a basic feature of reality.
The opposition of “transcendental” to “categorial” is fundamental for the me-
dieval doctrines. This is evident in Aquinas’s classic account in De veritate q. 1,
a. 1, which is based on the distinction between the particular modes of being,
signified by the categories, and the general modes of being, signified by the tran-
scendentals. The same opposition returns in Scotus’s definition of transcendens
in his Ordinatio (I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 114): «A transcendental does not have a
genus, under which it is contained», because that which belongs to a genus is
necessarily limited. Despite this basic agreement between Aquinas and Scotus,
their specific concepts of transcendentality diverge and consequently their mod-
els of metaphysics are different.

II.2. Aquinas’s concept

The current expression for transcendentia in the thirteenth century was commu-

26 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Summa theologiae, I, tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3, ed. D. Siedler, Münster 1978 («Opera

omnia», vol. XXXIV/1), 205: «Bonum dicit intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne
genus sicut et ens». THOMAS DE AQUINO, De malo, q. 1, a. 1 ad 11, ed. Leonina, vol. XXIII, 7: «[...] prout
genus dici potest quod genera transcendit, sicut ens et unum».
27 ARIST., Metaph., III, c. 3, 998b17-28.
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 387

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science 387

nissima. This designation does not mean, however, that the concept of “tran-
scendental” was purely extensional. Evidence for that is another regular name
for the transcendentia, taken from Avicenna: they are also called the prima, the
“first conceptions of the intellect”, included in everything that anyone appre-
hends28. Yet the universal extension was typical of the thirteenth century con-
cept of “transcendental”. Because of their commonness they surpass the cate-
gories in the sense that they are not determinate to one of them. Albert the Great
as well as Aquinas express this commonness in a striking formulation: Tran-
scendentals “run through” (circumeunt) all the categories29.
When the commonness of a transcendental refers to what is common to the
categories, then its immediate consequence is that God is not included in the no-
tion of transcendental, because he is not in a genus. God transcends the cate-
gories, but in another sense than the transcendentals; he is outside (extra) any
genus. God does not fall under the range of the transcendentals, but is rather
“transcendent” (the term taken in its modern sense).
Aquinas interprets, in line with his model of metaphysics, the relation of God
to the transcendentals as a causal relation. Like every science, metaphysics
seeks the causes of its subject. Ens commune, he states, is the proper effect of
the highest cause, God30. He is not part of the subject, but its cause. Thomas con-
nects the two poles of his metaphysics, transcendental being and God, with two
different kinds of commonness, predicative and causal commonness. The first
kind is applicable to the subject of this science: being is common by predica-
tion. The other (Neoplatonic) kind is applicable to God: his causality extends to
all that is, because he is the cause of being-as-being31.
The distinction of two kinds of commonness implies, however, that the sub-
ject of metaphysics, ens commune, is proper solely to created being; the com-

28 Cfr. THOMAS DE AQUINO, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, ed. Leonina, vol. VII, 169: «In his autem

quae in apprehensione omnium cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehen-
sione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis appehendit».
29 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, Metaph., X, tract. 1, c. 7, ed. B. Geyer, Münster 1964 («Opera omnia», vol.

XVI/2), 441: «Utrumque istorum [sc. unum et ens] sequitur et circuit omnes categorias». THOMAS DE
AQUINO, De virtutibus in communi, q. un., art. 2 ad 8, cura et studio A. Odetto, in Quaestiones Disputatae
II, Marietti, Torino-Roma 1965, 712: «[...] in transcendentibus, quae circumeunt omne ens».
30 THOMAS DE AQUINO, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 66, a. 5 ad 4, ed. Leonina, vol. VI, 436.

31 THOMAS DE AQUINO, Super librum De causis Expositio, lect. 4, ed. H.D. Saffrey, Société Philoso-

phique, Friburg / Nauwelaarts, Louvain 1954, 27: «Cuius quidem ratio est, secundum positiones plato-
nicas, quia [...] quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ponebant illud esse magis separatum et quasi prius
a posteriobus participatum, et sic esse posteriorum causam». For the two kinds of commonness, see AERT-
SEN, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals cit., 119 ff.
32 Cfr. the “adnotation” of Duns Scotus in his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, I, q. 1, ed. Etzkorn, 15,

in which he refers to a view, which is in fact that of Aquinas: «Nota quod, secundum communiter lo-
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 388

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

388 Jan A. Aertsen

monness of what is transcendental is confined to finite being32. Must not the

boundaries of this subject be surpassed, is not a more comprehensive notion of
commonnes to be found, which includes God in some way, since he is, after all,
the first being? On the basis of such a notion, subsequent thinkers developed a
different model of metaphysics, in which God is integrated into its subject.

II.3. Scotus’s concept

Henry of Ghent interpreted ens commune, the subject of metaphysics, as being
common to God and creature in an analogous way33; the logical consequence of
this view is that God is part of the subject. A further step was made by Scotus,
who maintains that the subject of metaphysics is being common to God and crea-
ture in a univocal way. Consequently, the consideration of God is part of the ex-
plication of the inner modes of being. Scotus’s thesis of the univocity of being,
which ushered in a new chapter in the history of the transcendentals, has re-
ceived much attention. Less attention has been paid to his transformation of the
concept of transcendentality itself.
Scotus does not consider commonness as a necessary condition of a tran-
scendental. It is true, as the doctrines in the thirteenth century taught, that the
communissima are transcendental, but the reverse does not hold; transcenden-
tals are not necessarily the communissima. What is essential for the notion of
“transcendental” is the negation of everything that belongs to a genus, what is
accidental, on the other hand, is its extension to many things34. This separation
of transcendentality from commonness enables Scotus to include God in the
transcendental domain.
Scotus proposes a new formulation of the traditional view that God is not in
a genus by converting the negative statement nullum dictum de Deo est in genere
into its positive equivalent quodlibet dictum de Deo est transcendens35. Just as
Aristotle’s negative statement “being is not a genus” was converted into the pos-
itive statement “being is a transcendens”, so the traditional view that God is not
in a genus was reformulated by Scotus in a positive manner to the effect that what

quentes, ens est hic subiectum in quantum est commune ad decem praedicamenta, et non in quantum est
commune ad omne ens [...]. Intelligitur ergo de ente creato».
33 HENRICUS DE GANDAVO, Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, a. 21, q. 3, ed. Parisiis 1520, f. 126E:

«[...] ens commune analogum ad creatorem et creaturam».

34 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3, n. 114, ed. Vaticana, IV, 206: «[...] ita tran-

scendens quodcumque nullum habet genus sub quo contineatur.Unde de ratione transcendentis est non
habere praedicatum supraveniens nisi ens, sed quod ipsum sit commune ad multa inferiora, hoc accidit».
35 IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio, I, ebd., n. 112, Adnotatio, ed. Vaticana, IV, 205.
19_Aertsen_5.QXD 21-04-2006 15:12 Pagina 389

journals.brepols.net - Downloaded By Marquette University - IP Address : 134.48.20.29

Metaphysics as a Transcendental Science 389

is proper to God is transcendens. The two poles of metaphysical orientation, that

which is common and that which is divine, are so brought together into the no-
tion of transcendens.
One could wonder whether there is not an ambiguity in this new concept of
transcendentality36. This ambiguity can be illustrated by an idea that is typical
of the Scotistic doctrine, the idea of “grades” of transcendentality. Petrus
Thomae, a Spanish Scotist of the first half of the fourteenth century, takes these
grades according to the way, in which universals are ordered in the so-called Por-
phyrian Tree. What is, as it were, genus generalissimum in the order of tran-
scendentals is “being” (ens); to this grade of transcendentality (transcendentia)
all notions that are convertible with being are reduced. What is, as it were,
species specialissima or rather individuum is the “divine essence” (essentia div-
ina). Petrus Thomae concludes that what is not transcendental per communi-
tatem communicationis, is nevertheless transcendental propter eminentiam enti-
tatis37.
This conclusion indicates that the Scotist concept of “transcendental” is
based on two quite different processes of transcensus: the one surpasses what is
categorial by the commonness of predication, the other by the eminence of be-
ing. The two poles of the metaphysical orientation, brought together into the no-
tion of transcendens, come back in the double meaning of this concept, which,
in modern terms, could be signified as “transcendental” and “transcendent”.
The exact origin of the term transcendentalis, probably framed on analogy with
praedicamentalis, is unknown. In the sixteenth century, Francisco Suárez, in his
influential Disputationes metaphysicae, used the term as synonym of transcen-
dens. The emergence (and the success) of the term “transcendental” could be
motivated by the desire to remove the ambivalence in the concept of transcen-
dens we observed.

36Cfr. O. BOULNOIS, Quand commence l’ontothéologie? cit., 108.

37PETRUS THOMAE, Quodlibet, p. 1, q. 1, ed. M.R. Hooper / E.M. Buytaert, The Franciscan Institute,
St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1957, 12: «Ad cuius evidentiam est advertendum quod gradus in transcendentibus
sic possunt accipi: in transcendentibus enim invenitur aliquid quod est quasi generalissimum, aliquid
quod est [quasi] genus subalternum, aliquid quod est quasi genus specialissimum, et aliquid quod est
quasi species specialissima. Genus generalissimum, ut ipsum ens; et ad istum gradum transcendentiae
reducuntur omnia convertibilia cum ente; [...] species specialissima, immo quasi individuum, ut divina
essentia. Quaelibet non sic transcendens per communitatem communicationis, est tamen transcendens
propter eminentiam entitatis».