52

The Military
Paul Zagorski

The important and frequenily pivotal role the military has played in most
Latin American countries is made clear by René de la Pedraja in Chapter 3
and Thomas J. D'Agostino in Chapter 4. This role. however, requires fur-
ther elaboration, for the armed forces are likely to be more critical than
ever in establishing democratic stability or easing the way for a return of
political instability or authoritarianism. And we cannot adequately under-
stand the armed forces without appreciating the historical legacy embod-
led in their current institutions and practices. From the time of the con-
quest, the military has played a key role in frontier security and,
intermittently, in the maintenance of internal order. The armed forces have
enjoyed a privileged corporate existence whereby individual members gain
status and rights through their group membership. Yet despite this conti-
nuity. significant changes have occurred in the class origins of members of
the officer corps, the military's doctrine and matériel. and its political ori-
entation. And the military continues lo evolve.

E” EARLY CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Military prestige. privilege. and special political role have deep roots in
the Iberian tradition. The transplantation of this tradition was no mere coin-
cidence. The Moortsh kingdom based in the city of Granada fell in 1492.
cappine off the reconquista (he reconques): Columbus's first voyage to
America occurred that same year. With the destruction al the last Mooriskh .

stronghold in the peninsula, Spain and its military aristocracy were. Iiteraldy,
looking for new worlds to conquer. Stiriking similarities between the con-
Quest of America and the reconquest of Iberia promoted the transter of in-
stitutions and practices rom the old world to the new. This legacy included
a social system that fused military power, soctal prestige, and landed wealth.

Y5
% Panl ZagorsKi

Spanish and Portuguese rule was based on a strong mutual interest

that linked the mother country with the local European elite (eriolloy). Yer
local and imperial interests diverged in a vartety ol ways, and relorms in
the late erghieenth century provided a glimpse of increased trade and ex-
panded local econonne activity without resolving these antagonisms. Thus.
1towas not surprising that when the Napoleonic wars provided Spanish
America and Brazil with the opportunity to gain more control of their own
hey took at.
afíarres,
Brazil's eventual declaration of independence mas not contested by
Portugal, thus paving the way for the continuance of the established so-
ctal and political institutions (including the monarchy). And in Spanish
America, the military tradition was modified rather than displaced, even in
the face of wars for independence. Revolutionary generals (caudillos)
plaved pivotal roles in these wars. Whereas intellectuals could provide the
rationale for independence by popularizing the rights of individuals pro-
claimed by the French Revolution, only mulitary force could secure inde-
pendence and establish the authority of a new government.
More than North Americans, the nevmly independent Spanish Ameri-
cans found the process of gaming independence and establishing govern-
ments fraught with problems. Caudillo-led military forces mere both part
of the and part of the problem. Only they could unifvy nations; yet
solption
reliance on force promoted the region's fissiparous tendencies. Schemes
for a nearly regionnide govermment for Spanish-speaking America (most
notably Bolivar?s Gran Colombiay colapsed in a welter of factional 1n-
Miehting and local revolts. Moreover, the lack of a professional, competent.
and effective military institution, combined with the personalistic charac-
ter of military Icadership, made it easy for rebel leaders to seize power.
Successful catdillos became presidents and were ihreatened in turn by
other catidillos. The lack of a dominant independent small-farmer class
(the preponderant group in most parts of English-speaking America) meant
there was na civilian republican counterbalance to the miitarization of
politics. Thus. the process of mobilizing armies of the disenfranchised car-
red the danger of social instability without the promise of establishing sta-
ble republican institutions.
In sum, the nineteenth-century military inherited manv characteristios
from the periods of imperial rule and wars for independenceo. Mitmars-
Icadership was personalistic and rehied on a fusion Of social, military. and
political roles. Vhe imlitary continued to have certain institutional rights
and privileges GJueros) hat separated at trom the rest ol soctéls and jimuted
he qurisdiciion ol emiliano couris over miitary ollicers As a general rule,
the military could not adequatels full ts mission» of frontier defense,
ternal pacification, and protection of the govermment agalast armed re-
volts, Tn fact as me hare seen, to speak of “the militari” as dal were a
unified, centrally organized institutión is an orversimplification. Tn Brazil.
 The Military 97

rivalries between the professional officer corps and the militia officers in
the hinterland were dysfunctional. In much of Spanish America, the weak-
ness of national armies meant that ad hoc military forces under amateur
generals remained a part of the system.

I EARLV PROFESSIONALISM

Given the inadequacies of the military system in the nineteenth cen-

tury, it is not surprising that military reform became part of a complex of
changes meant to modernize the state and provide the basis for economic
development. As the century wound down, governments and military re-
formers looked to Europe for models upon which to reorganize their own
forces. Britain, France, and Germany were happy to send military missions
to Latin Ámerica to assist in the restructuring of both armies and navies.
Thus, European rivals provided both matériel and advice. And as the twen-
tieth century began, few countries believed they could atford to be without
their own foreign experts lest regional rivals gain a decisive advantage in
projecting power into or defending disputed territory.
The race toward modernization required professionalization. New
equipment, new organizations designed to use the equipment effectively,
and a reserve system capable of raising mass armies necessitated an offi-
cer corps that could manage these complex new elements of military
power. These new demands meant officer recruitment and promotion prac-
tices had to be changed as well. Nonprofessional credentials for advance-
ment—such as political connections, class status, or nepotism—would no
longer suffice. Modern military officers were charged with managing large
numbers of specialized troops with new and complicated weapons systems
over great distances. With more effective national military organizations,
governments were able to suppress revolts by regional caudillos and in-
digenous peoples. Professional military staffs settled down to long-range
planning to meet foreign threats. And probably most important, the char-
acter of the officer corps itself was eventually transformed.
Professional officership entailed its own set of norms and habits-—a
military mentality that influenced the way in which officers addressed mil-
itary and political issues. In the eyes of the professional, international con-
flict was not simply a matter of personal ambition but was the result of in-
exorable geopolitical forces. National strategy required professional
analysis and direction. The issue ol military power became much braader
than the immediate size and condition of the armed forces.
The military power of modern states rested on an economic and social
base, the cultivation of which became a matter of military concern. Mili-
tary decisionmaking specifically and governmental decisionmaking gener-
ally (if 11 were to be done properly) needed to take on a technical cast. In
YN Panal Zagorshú

addition, protessionalization gave the armed forces vet another reason to

assert her traditional privileges over the political class: The technically
proper direction ot the military institution required that tramed profes-
sionals make military decisions. At all costs. civilians must avoid the
“politicization” ol the armed forces that occurs ahen politicians interfere
with personnel matters or questions of internal military policy.
Hence, professionalization provided an additional basis for asserting
mulitars tutelage over pobities. Mana of the early -nineteenth-century con-
stitutions had provided tor maibitary enforcement of laa n emergeney stt-
uations. In addition. others established the armed forces as a guardian of
the constitution. a virtual fourth branch ot government. These legalisms
had provided a pretext and legal cover for dictatorial rule by malitary
cattdillos, and such constitutional provisions persisted into the iwenticth
century. Whercas catrdilloy could use such provisions to support therr per-
sonal ambitions. the neu officer corps could cite them as the legal ratio-
nale for asserting ds institutional interests, Tn short, changes brought about
by professionalization made the mibitary more than just a vehicle by hich
mM

individuals sought power: 1t became an institutional actor an its own right.

The military had developed a new relationship with the rest of society.
Were the armed forces progressive or conservative? Did they represent the
middle class or their own distinct institutional mterests?
Military officers formed lodges that had nationalist and vaguely pro-
gressive orientations. Dissatistied with the politics and policies af conser-
vative cliques. military personnel applied pressure for political reform ma
number of countries during the 1920s and 10305. In fact. as late as 1908,
leftist mibitary coups overthrew civilian governments in Peru and Panama.
Yet the armed forces” commitment to political and social chanze was far
from unequivocal. Whereas the armed forces nught challenge conserva-
tives on policies that seemed to promote economic backu ardness and
threatened eventual social upheaval, thev were even more suspicious of
leftist acióvism. Thus, the armed forces often played an important role in
“brealihrough” or “middle-class” coups that challenged the unilateral von-
trol of the entrenched elite. Yet as the imentietb century more on, militar
officers more commonly led “veto” coups to defend their institutions” qu-
tonoma or to prevent ibe adoption of leftast policies that seemed to
threaten natronal units through therr class-based appesls.
The ambiguits of the militan s political role mas more the result of
otlicers” professional development than of her class orrema, Prospective
oflicers received their education ato malitars acadennes and. im some cases.
multar secondary schools: Promotion was a step-Dv step process that re-
quired further education, appropriate tofteb unatiracUre) postings, and ser-
Vice for a required period in the nest-most-junior grade. Such reyuire-
ments tended to discourage the scions of the social elite trom choose
ollicersbip as a carecer, For the dom er middle class, however, the promise of
 The Military 99

free education and career prospects that exceeded opportunities in civilian

life more than offset the disadvantages. Thus, professionalization changed
the class composition of the officer corps, but even more. it imbued pro-
fessional officers with a mentality that distinguished them from other
members of the middle class.
Professionalism meant technical expertise. Professional military lead-
ership required more than personal charisma: it demanded the mastery of
technological and organizational skills. In military science, as in engineer-
ing, there were better and worse solutions to problems, as well as nonsolu-
tions. Tactical and strategic doctrines (the principles for employing military
force to fulfill military missions) were not a matter of personal taste. Doc-
trine was to be grounded on an understanding of scientific laws. It was the
product of disciplined scientific investigation rather than of majority vote.
Professionalism also meant discipline. Military organizations could
not function effectively. and the nation would be put at risk, if personal in-
terests and opinions were not ultimately subordinated to the authority of
the command structure. Professionalism meant loyalty to the nation and
the,armed forces above all else. Family, class. and party loyalties had to be
sudordinated to this higher good. Military officers were expected to sel
aside such extraneous loyalties. and they expected that governments would
avoid anything but professional considerations in their governance of the
military institution.
Itis hard to imagine a worse match than that between the professional
officer and the politician. Compromise. bargaining. and the satisfaction of
factions and interests are the very stuff of politics. To the professional of-
ficer these activities seem mildly unsavory at the least or totally corrupt
at the worst: hence the military's ambivalence toward politics and govern-
ment. In professional terms, at least in theory, politics is something to be
avoided. Yet in practice, such an apolitical stance was out of harmony with
the Latin American tradition and with what military officers often saw as
the overriding national needs.
Thus, whereas professionalization did not mean the abolition of mili-
tary intervention into politics, it did alter the motivation for such interven-
tion. Defense of military professionalism against the intrusión of politics, as
well as the promotion of national power, became additional rationales tor
military involvement, Nonetheless. military involvement in politics rarely
entailed the long-term displacement of civilian institutions. Ás individuals.
officers could gain a political following because of a military career, but
when they became involved in long-term politics they normally reverted
legally to a civilian or retired status. As an institution, the armed forces
served as a balancer or mediator or intervened to protect the autonomy of
the institution itself from what it considered undue political control. Nor-
mally, after a coup the armed forces ruled the country for a brief pertod
until an acceptable version of the status quo ante could he reestablished and
100 Paul Zagorska

then returned to the barrackás. Political coups. hike electrons in consolidated

democraciós, were a widely accepted, almost normal means of transterring
power and assuring a more general stability.
ln sum, by the mid-1wentieth century, protessionalization had changed
the character of the armed forces in part but had not—as had occurred in
leading countries of Western Europe and in the United States—marginal-
ized them as a political force. Latin American officers had ceased to be
amateur military leaders drawn primarily from the upper class; officers
were much more trequently from the middle sectors and developed a dis-
tinct attmtude toward modermzation, class conflict. and natronal power. Yel
eftective pohitical power essentially continued to be held by a relatively
narrom portion ef the population. and “violen” changes of government
tended more to preserve than to threaten the ruling sectors.

POLFTICAL DEVELOPMENT
AND THE NEW PROFESSIONALISM

Yet the image of a evele of civilian governments and coups d'état.

with the military “praectorian guard” preserving an adjusted status quo, is
overly simplistic. Dynamic forces underlying this apparently banal eyeli-
cal repetition challenged politics as usual as well as the armed forces" pe-
culiar role as the twentieth century wore on.
Traditionally, political demands had been accommodated by intraclite
bargaining, and new social and economic groups had been co-opted by a
process of adjustment that allowed for the gradual expansion of privileges
to these new groups. In Uns manner, commercial mterests and the middle
sectors had managed to gain entry into the sysiem that had originally ex-
cluded them. But with accelerated social and economic change. 11 became
difficult to accommodate new groups suecessfulla and sell miintain prac-
Lices that were essentially exclustonary in nature. Likew ise, 1t was becom-
img less possible for the armed forces to carry out their balancing role—in-
tervening for short periods and then returning lo the barracks—because
more than plecemeal changes 1h the polttical system seemed to he re-
quired As a consequence, he military eventualla moved from a moderal-
ing to a ruling role under the rubric of the nes protessionalism.
Exvcats in Argentina, one of the most economicalla advanced countries
m the region, dlustrate the sorts of challenges that eventuallvy faced most
Latin American regimes and their armed forces. By the second decade of the
tnenticth century, the Radical Party. based on the support of the rising mud-
dle sectors. had finally broken the traditional eltteós monopola on political
power. Pohitical tetona entranchised ie auddle sectors and allowed etfec-
ive pobitical competition. Sectors ol the armed forces Mere sympathetic to
this development. But by 1930, the military was reactinge delensively to
 The Military 101

Radical President Hipólito Irygoven's attempts to make senior military ap-

pointments on the basis of political criteria. This political-military conflict
led to a coup and to a period in which the armed forces become more,
rather han less, entrapped in politics. For a decade and a half. military
presidents or civilian protégés of the armed forces ruled the country. The
military aligned itself with conservatives and attempted to block a Radi-
cal accession to power. Á pattern emerged that continued into the 1980s:
No elected president served a full term or transferred power through the
electoral process.
The armed forces” balancing act was complicated further by the emer-
gence ot a labor movement and the appointment of military officers to nor-
mally civilian portfolios. Political and administrative issues increasingly
became day-to-day concerns for the officer corps. The crisis occurred in
1946. when Colonel Juan Perón. the labor minister. was dismissed from
his post and imprisoned by his military colleagues in the government.
Perón and his wife, Eva. had cultivated the labor movement as a base of
support. and Eva Perón helped to mobilize masses of urban workers to de-
mand Perón's release. Their success eventually culminated in a multiterm
Perón presidency and the creation of a peronist political party and labor
federation. Even a successful coup that removed Perón from office in 1955
could not eliminate the newly awakened working class as an important po-
litical actor. Periodic bans on Perón himself. his party. and peronist candi-
dates handicapped and fragmented the movement but could not destroy it.
The lower classes could no longer be ignored.
In less industrialized countrics and countries in which political party
development was different. the pattern by which the disenfranchised lower
classes became a critical factor varied. Yet in almost all instances. main-
taining stability could not be achieved simply by buving off and incorpo-
rating relatively small. organized groups into the power structure.
By 1960. this social and political problem had assumed a military di-
mension. The victory of Cuban revolutionaries in January 1959 energized
the radical left throughout the region. Whereas mamline communist parties
had declared that revolution was impossible im the short term. Castro's
guerrillas and the 26th of July Movement had demonstrated the opposite.
The Cuban Revolution provided a model, and Cuba provided a base of
support. Tor would-be revolutionaries throughout Latin America. The fact
that the revolutionarics were overly optimistic. their opponents overly
alarmist, and the initial analyses of the cause behind the revolutions wide
of the mark is beside the pot. All of Latin America scemed on the brink
of violent left-wing guerrilla-led revolution. A military response was in-
evitable.
This response came in the form of the national security doctrine. which
was at he core of what a as termed He new professtenalisn. Vradhitional ly.
prolessional armed forces had focused on external Uircala. Strategy. licitos.
102 Paul Zagorsha

raton. and the sequisilion el matérrel were premised upon delerrimy

and Gubine agarmst nesehbboring slales or others ihat could estectively
threaten the territorial inteztitv OS the slale rough outrizht military inva-
ston. Latin American countries had developed military institutions de-
signed to fight conventional mars. involvement in domestic politics had
been the by-product of Latin American constitutions and political tradi-
tions rather than of protessionalism per se.
The national securty doctrine changed all that. The primary enemy
was nos underdevelopment, which spauned subversión, Subversion s pri-
mary logistic and recruitment base was not the elaborate depot and tratn-
mg system of a foreign conventional armed force but was a group of the
citizons of the country itself, who provided direct and indirect support as
well as recruits for the guerrillas. Thus. military concepts for fighting wars
(militara doctrine) had to change.
Military theorists mm many countries, both inside and outside Latin
America, had considered the problems associated with this sortof internal
war. Although significant differences extsted in the strategy and tactios
they recommended, a common thread ran throughout the analyses. Irreg-
ular forces—guerrillas who fought a hit-and-run war of attrition— were the
direct military threat and would have to be deteated. An eticctive strategy.
however, would have to provide for defeating the logistic. intelligence. and
recruitment bases. as well as underdevelopment itself otherwise, no final
victory would be possible. The defeat of the guerrillas would be tactical
only, and armed conflict could easily reemergoe. The underlying cause of
subversion was the lack of social. economic. and political development. A
proactive policy was likely to be more successful and much less costly
than a simple reactUive response.
Much of the expansion of the militarvós new role, as defined bv the
doctrine. took relativels benign forms: nation building and civic action —
programs to help develop physical and human infrastructure, supposedly
in areas M here the civil govermments and the private sectorós efforts were
inadequate. More threatening were the expansion of military nuelligence
into the domestic arena and the possibility of the armed forces taking over
ordinary police functions. The stage was set for a qualitatively and quan-
titativels different sort of mibitara political mvolvement.
The miitarization el poltttes did not emerge immediatels. initialla, the
altered threat percepuon gave impetus to such regronwide efforts 1s We
Alliance lor Progress Uncant lo address underivine social, economic. amd
pehtical problems es well as U.S. ¿induced and indigenas citors to redi-
rectomilitary attention lo ¿he internal cuerribta threat Butas the alliance
and other civilian retorm efforts taltered. nulitary attention became more
lived on the mternal threat. Phrasal was not surprise that an the 1960xs,
another excle of military governments arose throughout the region.
 The Military 103

Aa,

Vinember of the larabindo Mart

National Liberation Eroutin El Salvador, 1992.
103 Panl Zagorski

2
EA TSE A

y,
iy
bi

ce

Menibers 0) the bFarabundo Marte National Liberation Eront, 1992,

O THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE

As Thomas D'Agostino showed in Chapter 4, most of the govern-

ments during this evele were strikinglv different from those in prior peri-
ods of military rule. Previously. the armed forces had functioned as mod-
erators. Their direct interventions were usuallv relatively brief and did not
involve them as an institution assuming civilian administrative functions.
Except at the most senior levels, military personnel tended to remain in
military posts. Even long-term military presidents normallv left active dut
and developed civilian support as a foundation of their governments,
The national security doctrine changed all this. The nou burcaucratic
authoritarian national security state meant to do sometliiing other than
repurr and reestablish the political status quo. Military governmments as-
sumed the mission of reforming the underlving social, economic, and po-
litical structure thit had been the source of instabilityo Thus, the militar,
took on a neu "ruler” role that rested on the national security doctrine. as
well as on the wellestablished tradition of militara intervention. The wa-
tershed between the old and nex patterns of the muliary was stark. Before
the 1063 Brazilian coup. an almost every counter the armed forces plaved
the more himited moderator role, whereas almost evers nterncntion after
the coup established military govermments with much broader aspirations.
Uhese nen goveraments generalla ment ihrouzh a number of phases.
The tirst was a stabilization phase that generalls took about a rear Coups
 The Ailitary 105

were normally induced by a variety of problems: subversive violence, po-

litical deadlock, economic difficulties, and threats to the viability of the
armed forces. Stabilization was meant to suppress these threats. Coups fre-
quently led to a political recess: the abrogation of political guarantees. the
closing of congress, and the banning of certain individuals and political
parties. Military interveners took control of key civilian institutions. Secu-
rity was tightened. Frequently, subversives or suspects were detained with-
out trial. exiled, and sometimes executed. When open combat occurred, the
armed forces often assumed direct contral of the civilian population, es-
tablishing curfews and sometimes moving entire villages and enlisting
civilians in part-time paramilitary units. In almost all instances. armed re-
sistance was either negligible or quickly collapsed. In the economic realm,
governments took steps to control strikes and inflation through stern fis-
cal measures.
As the initial crisis faded, the military government could turn to the
second phase—constructing new institutions. If the country were to be-
come economically progressive and politically stable, new social, eco-
nomic. and political habits had to be developed. This phase was never
more than adumbrated by military doctrine, and the task of creating new
institutions was much more complex than simply seizing power and im-
posing order. Militaries in various countries took different approaches, but
a number of common themes emerged. The executive branch of the gov-
ernment had to be strengthened. Political participation had to be restruc-
tured to prevent uncontrolled mass mobilizations and the undue influence
of special-interest pleading. Patriotism and duty were to be the dominant
ideological themes; class struggle as a rallying point had to be eliminated.
The economy needed to be modernized to produce dynamic rates of
growth. Institutional capacity to prevent and contain social iturmoll was
essential.
Yet by the beginning of the 1980s—and in certain countries even ear-
lier—when the construction of new institutions was far from complete,
many military-sponsored reforms had miscarricd. In addition, the armed
forces” authoritarian rule had provoked widespread opposition, often in-
volving such mainline sectors as the church. professionals. and segments
of the business community. Morcover, the effort at national reconstructuion
eventually entangled the armed forces in a host of issues with which they
were unfamiliar and that engendered factionalism within the institution. lt
was time for a strategic retreat.
Thus, in most countries the last phase of military governmment—transi-
tion to civilian suecessors—did not proceed as the armed forces had orig-
inally anticipated. The transfer of power was meant to maintain the
achievements of the military regimes. including a major domestic role for
the armed forces. lt was to have been a graduallv and carefully orches-
trated process.
10 Paul Zagoesha

in actual practice, however, these transters Mere driven to a grealer or

lesser degree by popular pressure and factióons aaithin the armed forces.
Patteros varicd from country to country, Transitions ranged from forced
exit to military -dominated transter. The best example of the former is the
Argentine auliary's extt from power 11 Decembes 1933. which was
spurred by the disastrous Falblands/Malvinas War cighicen months caurlier.
Phe prestigc ot the military was at an all-Game dow, and the mibrtary gov-
ermments amnealy law was revohed by bis civilian SUCCESS Ors.
The most nearly successful nulitary -staged transition mas that in
Chile. here the military-inspired 1980 constitution provided the vehicle
mu

for installing a new regime. Even in Chile, however, the transition did not

go exactls as seripted. The military junta had hoped to have a single

regime-nominated candidate (the incumbent, General Augusto Pinochen)
approved by the voters. In October 1988, however, the “no” vote against
Pinochet gained the majority, and the regime vas forced to use ts fallback
mechanism: a competitive election. In this contest, held a vear later.
proregime candidates lost as well. Nonetheless, the militaryós constitution
largely held agaimst popular pressure to change it. The military retained
most of its prerogatives as spelled out in the document, including ap-
pointed senators, an additional esght-year term for incumbent service
chicfs, and a fixed portion of the gross domestic product (GDP) for the
military budget.

BS "THE POSTNATIONAL SECURITY STATE

Change, or the Same Old Thing?

The armed forces have not disappeared and still possess considerable
political influence. Even in Argentina, where the armed forces suffered
their greatest loss of poner and prestigo. there has been no serious consid-
eration of eliminating them or even of systematicallvy purginge the institu-
tion. In fact, the attempt to punish Ihose guilty of the most hemous human
riegbts abuses during die Dirty War (mine Housand extrigudicial hitlines of
those 1n military custody) ecventualla collapsed after a sertes ol military re-
volís. ln short, the armed forces, even un thetr generally diminished polt-
cal position, retain some capacitr te challenge civilian governments
The national securita state is dead, but a postnational securita has
emerged. In this nexo polbttical environment, issues from Ue past —someo ds
old as the Iberian tradition, some associated the national securia doc-
trineo remar on The Lata American pobitical agenda alone awthonemo issuras
Ural hice emerged in the post Cold War era. Can the armed forces be de-
mocratized and subordimated te covibian athorita? Can militara tendenciós
toward political mternention be contamed and croded? la light ot the kind
 He Military 107

of transformation required, actual constitutional amendments are essen-

tially symbolic and peripheral. These issues are more far-reaching than
simply amending the language of written documents: (hey entail changing
deep-seated practices and attitudes.
Advanced democracies have relied on anumber of methods to protect
against military authoritarianism. Among the most important of these is
cultivating the norm of apolitical professionalism both within the mili-
tary's own ranks and in the broader political community. Such profession-
alism grants the armed forces a significant degree of autonomy but only
within a rather narrowly defined field of competence. Military autonomy
is generally limited to matters of organization and lactics, and decisions
concerning missions and overall funding are the province of civilian policy-
makers. On such matters of high-leve) military policy, the sentor ofticers
are competent to give advice, but this advice alone does not determine pol-
icy. On all other matters of policy, military epinion is irrelevant or, more
accurately, professional military opinion is. by definition, nonexistent.
Apolitical professionalism is clearly out of step with the Latin Amer-
ican tradition of military involvement in politics. lis adoption would mean
the loss of the armed forces” status as an institutional balancer. Such pro-
fessionalism would require altering military codes that hitherto secured a
special legal status for the armed forces. lt would subject individual offi-
cers to civilian courts and would largely deprive them of the legal defense
of “due obedience” (following orders). lt would lead to the abandonment
of the new professionalism's claim that the armed forces have a broad pro-
fessional competence in devclopmental and internal security matters. lt
would undermine their role as managers and administrators in a host of
governmental and quasi-governmmental institutions hat are only loosely
connected to military competency as that term is narrowly understood.
Is such a change possible? Even though nearly every neu lv reestab-
lished civilian govermment has favored the adoption of standards of apo-
litical professionalism, and virtually every Latin American military force
has announced that the armed forces are essentially nondeltberative. his-
tory would counsel caution. Latin American civilian governments have
rarely suecceded in obtaining full control over the armed forces except in
a revolutionary context, for only im such cirecumstances could the military
institution be completely purged and restructured or cren abolished.
The development of a múlitary ethos, however, vwhether apolitical or
highly politicized, depends in large measure on the contestan wluch the
military organization operates. Prolessional milttary officers Gramed, com-
missioned. and promoted within a Dburcaucratie system destened to manage
the instruments of modera varfare) generally have Ivo apparentla contra-
dictory attitudes: conservatism and a distaste Por poltties. They tend to be
conservativo because they arc—by temperament and tramung—ertremely
nationalistic. skeptical ef idealistic projects, alarmist. and believers in the
108 Panl Zajorsha

necessity of force to settle conflicts. Yet they also find the naked self-
interest, compromise, and bargaming of politics distasteful because such
traiis conflict with the technical. engineerlike approach to problema that
tvpibies the military professional. Hence, 1n stable regimes with no over-
riding constitutional conflicis that adversely affect the ability of the gov-
ernment to actually govern, a melbestablished professional ethos leads to
an apolitical armed forces. In the face of serious ideological and constitu.
tional crises, the armed forces” inherent conservatism kicks 1. They are
apt to make thejr presence felt in promotng authoritarian and nationalis-
te solutions to the country's problem».
in Latin America. the professionalization of the armed forces that
began a century ago has never produced an apolitical force. Endemic po-
litical and social conflict has been sufficiently severe to induce repeated
military involvement in politics. Yet in the 19905, Latin American circum-
stances have changed. The experience of the national security state has
taught all parties about the limits of military competence. the dystunc-
tional nature of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence. and the
value of the rule of law. Yet problems remain.

SC Human Rights
During and sometimes immediately preceding military rule, the armed
forces of many countrics fought what they believed was an ideological war of
national survival, To be fair, in most instances the threat of violent subversion
was real. if ecxaggerated, and widespread support or tolerance often existed tor
the militarvós action at the mc mas undertahen. Yet in many instances the
ato

military's prosecution of such wars involved glanng haman nights violations.

Acts of torture, murder, rape. and detention without judicial sanction
violated both national and international lau, and im some cases thev oc-
curred on a massive scale. Yet the armed forces feel therr actions were ab-
solutely necessary for the defense of the nation and remain unrepentant.
They argue that the guerrillas and their alles were. im effect. forcign
agents (combatants operating without legal belligereney or internationally
required insienta and uniforms) and hence were outside the protection of
the law. The military viens rights trials as attempls by subrersives lo carry
on wars by other means,
Foresccing potential legal sanctions, military governments often tried
to assure themselves of an amnesty before the transfer of poner to civil-
ans. Perhaps the most successful of these attempia has beca the de facto
understandine in Brazil that has made prosecution of riebis vrolatora
largely a nonissue. Legal amnesties in Argentina, Chile. and Uruguas have
been challenged. but only im Chale was the issue ongomea as late as mid-
1994 An amnesty law passed an El Salvador m 1993 13 also likely to hold.
in mid-1996 the rights issue io Guatemala and Peru was still largely unre-
solved, despite some detentions.
 The Military 109

Human rights issues pose a dilemma for civilian governments. If they

ignore past violations, they risk creating a precedent for impunity that the
armed forces or police could use to suppress civil commotion (a real pos-
sibility) or to engage illegally in domestic intelligence and covert action (a
less likely but still important avenue for military intervention). Moreover,
the armed forces could easily interpret governmental tolerance of past
abuses as a sign that the government was not serious about establishing
civilian control. On the other hand, if civilian governmments attempt to
challenge the armed forces by trying a significant number of ofíicers, they
risk serious consequences as well. The armed forces have ample means to
make the government pay a high price for its efforts, ranging from lobby -
ing and reliance on right-wing political allies to outright revolts, Thus.
such an effort is likely to be time-consuming. to detract from other gov-
ernment reform efforts. and to require the expenditure of a good deal of
political capital.
In Argentina, Raúl Alfonsín's attempt to escape this dilemma during
the mid-1980s foundered. President Alfonsín tried to distinguish herween
the military as a necessary and valued institution and individual ot ficers
who had committed heinous crimes. Nonetheless. he could not induce the
armed forces to prosecute their own members. nor could he convince them
of the validity of his distinction. Three military revolts werc each followed
by embarrassing government backdowns that seemed to indicate that the
armed forces had won. Chile"s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, es-
tablished by the new civilian administration of Patricio Aylwin in 1990,
was another attempt to find some sort of middle ground, but here too the
armed forces were unwilling to express remorse for any excesses and re-
main adamantly opposed to any rights prosecutions—although a number
have gone forward. In 1993, El Salvador established a similar commission
as the result of the peace agreement that ended the mar berween the gov-
ernment and leftist rebels, and the government provided amnesty.
Although hardly a perfect fulfilliment of national and international
legal obligations. such half measures buttress, howerer imperfecily, the
principle of due process of law. Any action against past abuse serves no-
tice that future violations mav carry significant risks. Moreover, the esca-
lation of conflict by the military over the rights issue carries significant
costs for the armed forces themselves. Military intransigence over the
rights issue in Argentina cost the institution prestige, deprived it of finan-
cial resources. and sapped its will to resist reform in other arcas.

TC Other Opportunities and Threats

Most civilian goveraments appear to realize the need to undertake mil-
ttary reform, although they have not bcen uniform in their efforts to do so.
There is no “silver bulle” to solve the problems involved in establishine
effective democratic control of the military and securioz the rule of lam.
110 Panal Zagorki

Yet a number of changes have mert and require persistent oversight The
military code of justice should be retormed to remove the concept of due
obedience and should establish im 1ts place the principle that each soldier
ts responsible tor obeving the lau, Due obedience should be a mitizating
rather han an cxculpatine argument
Civiltans should no longer seck out the military during times ot polit-
ical crisis in an effort to promote coup. And in a lesser but related mat-
a

ter. civilian presidents must not rely on the armed forces as a substitute for
civilian pobttical support and administrative talent. The tirst temptation, al-
though it has not disappeared entirely, was more characteristic of the past
than the present, but the second-—reltance on the armed forces for political
and administrative support—1s troublingly contemporary.
Mihough the specific causes for the second phenomenon are diverse,
they fall under two main headines. First. the armed forces oflen want to re-
tain at least a veto power Over significant government policies outside the
military sphere as strictly defined or even seck to capand their role. The
administration of state compantes, civil construction, and environment
management is a source of jobs for military officers and a reason to ex-
pand the military budget. A second impulse toward overreliance on the
armed forces comes rom the other direction. Civildian prestdents may seck
military officers to appotnt to cabinet and other high-level posttions. Latin
American political parties are frequently factious and 11)-disciplined. and
civilian appolntees may be more interested in dispensing patronage and
preparing for the next election than they are in efficient adinunistration. To
such instances. a president with dubious popularity and legislativo support
may do well. as was the case math Brazil's Htamar Franco mm the last year
of his interim presidencs. to appomt military otfftcers to his cabinet rather
than civilian politicians and business-based cxperts. whom Franco labeled
“birds of prey.” In contrast to their civilian counterparts. military ofTicers
often seem more committed to strengihening the executive branch and
achievine administrative efficieney and to be less prone to the worst
pects ol interest-group politics.
Such reltance on the armed forces, houever, involves very real dan-
gers. The use of military ofticers 1d govermmental posts 11 which cividrans
should have adequate cxapertise stifles democratic des clopment, provides a
mibitara tilter on the advice and information the president recenes. and
positions the armed Torcesfio support an «doxolpe Eseli-coup: an enecu-
tve mancuver, sepported by ile nulitary. hal suspends the operation 0!
the leristarure and the couris). Uhiós és the most likely route the armed
lerces will follaw tb they are to assule power agar. ln April 1002, Pros-
iden Alberto Fujimor: ot Pesu suecesstully used such a move m the con”
teviot an ongomne cverribla war and economic erisis. Pressare trom the
imernational community torced a partial rebtreat. and Peru hetd ctections
for a new constituem assembivAcesdaturo by the end ot the vear. in June
 The Military 111

1993, President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala tried the same procedure. In

the Guatemalan case, however, political protests forced Serrano's resigna-
tion, and human rights ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio was elected by
the legislature to fill the vacated presidential chair.
Both Peru and Guatemala ¡llustrate the current posture of the armed
forces high command in many other countries as well. Military leaders are
unwilling to take the lead in an outright coup in which all three branches
of government would come under military supervision or be replaced, but
they are deeply concerned about the maintenance of law and order and the
so-called governability problem.
Political deadlock, the fiscal and administrative collapse of the state,
widespread outbreaks of popular disorder, or worse threaten most Latin
American countries to at least some degree in the 1990s. Whether the
armed forces co-opt the president or the president co-opts them is largely
irrelevant. The dynamics of executive dictatorships are not conducive to
democratic development. When a similar self-coup occurred in Uruguay in
1973. the government felt impelled to be increasingly repressive and ex-
clusionary until finally the civilian president was replaced with a general.
There is a compelling need to restrict the sphere of military activity to areas
in which its organization and expertise are essential and do not threaten
democracy. Military skills, which are useful and necessary in dealing with
defense matters, are often inappropriate in other fields. Thus, appointing
generals to civilian posts is clearly a move in the wrong direction.
Rather than militarize civil administrations to consolidate democracy,
governments need to civilianize the upper levels of the military bureau-
cracy. This task is politically and technically delicate. No strict dividing
line exists between responsibilities that are properly purely military and
those that are simply a matter of the discretion of the civilian political
leadership. Rather, various sorts of activities each have a particular bal-
ance of civilian and military responsibility. The development of tactics,
training, promotion, and internal discipline are largely—but not exclu-
sively—matters of military concern. Budgets. procurement of strategic
weapons, the defining of military missions. and matters of war and peace
are fundamentally the concern of civilians—although sound military ad-
vice is important,
Establishing civilian control requires the appointment of civilians to
the post of defense minister and other senior-level positions and the estab-
lishment of legislativo oversight committces. But at least ds important 1s
the development of civilian expertisc in defense matters. Civilian bosses
must be capable of evaluating the advice of their nominal military sub-
ordinates. Political leaders, academicians, and others must be able to en-
gage in a technical dialogue with military otfficers. Without adequate
knowledge. civilians will find it difficult to gain meaningful control over.
and real respect from. the armed forces.
nm Paul Zagordu

Regardless of who actually controls the armed forces. civibians or uni-

formed officers, these authorities have to decide what the military's pur-
pose 1s. This 1s no longer as obvious as itonce was, because global and re-
gional developments have radicallv undermined old assumptions. The
19805 witnessed the end of the national security state and the disappear-
ance of revolutionary communism as a major ideological force. Thus. the
collapse of the Soviet Union im 1991 capped a series of events that ren-
dered obsolete most of the Cold War and pre-Cold War missions that for
decades had been integral to military planning in the Americas.

A Defense Against External Aggression

One of the primary, if not he primary, missions of any states military
forces is the territorial defense of the country against external attack. Over
the course of more than a century and a half of independent statchood. this
mission has changed considerably in Latin American countries, although
perceptions have frequently been slow to catch up with reality. In the nine-
teenth and carly twenticth centuries. Latin American countries generally
had more to fear from their immediate neighbors than from other powers.
Thus. the adoption of modern professtonal forces that focused systemati-
cally on this mission made good sense. The military staffs of professional
forces could simulate conflicis with neighboring states and could formu-
late contingeney plans and organize and train forces in light of the results.
But hy the mid-twentieth century, wars between Latin American states
were little more than border skirmishes. and the investment of significant
public resources on external defense was of questionable value. The U.S.-
inspired mission of hemispheric defense agaimst Soviet invasion was sim-
arly questionable, since (he ESSR—even at the height of lts power—
lacked the capacity for significant force projection into the Western
Hemisphere. ls existence. however, did provide a pretemt for defense
spending and equipment acquisition.
The hypothesis of a major imminent external threat was further un-
dermined by the movement toward regional integration hegun in the mid-
1980s by newly returned crvilian regimes, Economic and diplomatic coop-
eration became the natehword, and it made little sense to maintain the
fiction that a country mas thbreatened by a major conventional cross-bor-
der attack. Hence, a number of prestigious military projects-—most notably
the nuclear aeapons programs of Brazil and Argentina—cante into ques-
tion. Why maintalo large forces. a mobilization base, and rescarch and de-
velopment programs for technologically advanced a eaponry df national se-
curits could not justifa the cost?
ll bas taken time, however, for logic to erode bureaticratic and imtel-
lectual mertia, Prestigious projects are always hard to give up. Decreasing
he size ot military forces and changing their missions wreaks havoc with
 The Military 113

established career patterns and powerful institutional interests. Moreover,

geopolitics is popular with military intellectuals. lt propounds the notion
that international politics is the struggle between states for territory and
that states function as quasi-living organisms in this Darwinistic survival
of the fittest. War. or at least preparation for war, with neighboring states
is the natural (and sensible) order of things. Yet the military has gradually
shifted emphasis away from war preparation and has cut the size of its
forces, although this downsizing is more a result of financial exigency than
of clearly thought-out arguments or an explicit rejection of geopolitics.

O Domestic Intelligence and Development

The traditional activities involved in internal defense—*frontier secu-
rity, the imposition of order in remote areas, and the use of the military to
supplement police forces in times of internal disturbance—have their roots
in preindependence times. The activities associated with the national secu-
rity doctrine—domestic intelligence, civic action, and direct control of the
population—are of more recent vintage and are more controversial.
Latin American states are attempting to strike a balance between re-
stricting the armed forces entirely to external defense or simply allowing
them to participate in internal defense and development operations in an un-
regulated fashion. Civilian governments have begun to address a variety of
issues through constitutional change. statute, or decree. Modern states need
some type of mechanism to defend themselves and their citizens against
those who would engage in political violence: bombings, assassinations, Kid-
nappings. and other common crimes that have political motivations. Latin
America has not been immune from such outbreaks. The task is to protect
the government and society without degenerating into a police state. Yet the
Dirty War in Argentina, with its nine thousand extrajudicial murders, is an
object lesson about what can happen when security forces, the military, or
both are unrestrained by due process or any constitutional checks.
To correct these problems, a number of governments have downsized
and restructured their intelligence services. Domestic intelligence 15 now
restricted largely to information gathering rather than involving the con-
duct of covert operations. Military units responsible for the worst abuses,
such as the Honduran 3-16 Battalion. have been disbanded. In other cases,
civilian structures have been erected to supervise the collection of intelli-
gence information. The principle of habeas data (securing an individual 's
access lo information collected onlbim or her by ide govermment) has been
legally established in a number of countries. The effectiveness of these
measures in limiting abuses has vet to be proven and will depend on the
follow-through by governments and privale associations.
The participation of military engineecrs in cival construction dates back
to the Napoleonic era. Yet in Latin America today, use of the armed forces
114 Panal Zategorshu

mareas tangentially related to thetr primary competence 4s sul controver-

sal. This controversy stems from a number of sources. One source is a kind
of! guilt by association ol civic action with the national security doctrine.
ahich Galong awath counterinsurgency stratega generally) consideras the par-
Ucipaton ol military forces 1m projects to directls benetal the population as
partol an mtegrated strategy. Órnvic action projecis—- such as construction of
baste public facibities (especially in rural arcas), immnunizatión campalgns,
and the distribution of relief supplies and other materials that immediately
benefit the population—are adjuncts to repressive measures directed against
guerrillas and other subversives. In the context of counterinsurgeney strat-
cgy. such activities are meant lo win support for the govermment and to in-
directly promote the gathermge of intelligence information.
In peacetime., such activities have been justified by the inability of
civilian agencies or the private sector to provide such services. Yet civic
action projects have been eriticized for that very reason: Thev tend to dis-
place civilians from technical and administrative activitios that are essen-
ttally civilian im nature. Why should the armed forces. rather than the pub-
lic health service, provide immunizations? Why should nulitary engineers
construct rural roads, schools. and wells rather than other government
agencies working through the private sector? Why should disaster relict
and activities to preserve the environment (a new mission that as popular
with some militaries) be a military mission «when civilian government
agencies can be reformed and restructured to handle 1hese tasks?
An even more disturbing consequence 13 political displacement. Pa-
tronage 1s a staple of electoral politics. Leaders who deliver benefits to
people are often able to deliver their votes as well. Both North American
ward heelers and Latin American caciques local political bosses) have al-
ways understood this. What happens to the prospects for party develap-
ment and democratic consolidation if the local military commander is seen
as a powerful patron?

2 Peacekecping
With the end of the Cold War, seventy thousand troops have been de-
ployed on peacekeepine missions under UN auspices. The use ol UN “hlue
helmets” is no longer restricted to arcas af limued superpom er compeution
as itonas durmge the Cold War. Today. restricuons on such deployment are
based essentially on cost-bencfit analysis rather than on ideological con-
siderations. Plus changed environment has provided an mercased Oppor-
tuntty tor Latin American countries te participate in peacekeeping. and
mana have seed that opportunia
Troops trom Argentina, Brazal, Chale, Uruguans, and Venezuela have
partepated in operations a such places as Cambodia, the Persian Gulf.
Iraq. El Salvador, Mozambique. Cyprus, and Croatia Such participation
 The Military 115

provides more than UN financial support; it provides actual operational

experience with multinational forces, some of whose elements come from
technologically advanced organizations. Such opportunities have been
sorely lacking for most Latin American armies. These operations can also
provide an environment to help induce change in the military's organiza-
tional culture. Argentinas army chief of staff noted in an interview that
army battalions deployed in Croatia not only expanded their geographic
horizons but also witnessed the beginning of a transformation of the
army's traditional castelike barriers between officers and enlisted person-
ncl. UN peacekeeping also provides a rational immediate use for small.
well-trained torces. which most military and civilian leaders believe is a
hedge against future threats to the state's national security and territorial
integrity.

E Counternarcotics Operations
Another nontraditional mission that has recently come into vogue, al
least in the United States. is counternarcotics operations. Such operations
involve the armed forces in survelllance and interdiction of drug ship-
ments. their precursors, and chemicals needed for processing. Additional y,
the armed forces are asked to destroy drug laboratorics and possibly coca
and poppy plants used for the production of drugs. In the late 1980s. the
Bush administration felt military involvement in these endeavors was part
of a comprehensive war on drugs. The military seemed sulted for the mis-
sion because 1 had personnel and technology that could be useful in the
antidrug effort.
Many Latin American governments and armed forces were less sure.
Emploving the armed forces in the counternarcoties struggle threatened to
reduce the status of military officers. Given global conditions after the end
of the Cold War, Latin American mbitaries were looking for advanced mil-
itary missions rather than ones that seemed 10 confuse their role with that
of the police. Civilian governments. mary of the dangers of military role
expansion, were often less than enthustastic as well. Moreover, the temp-
tation of corruption, when trafífichers could otter bribes that far exceeded
military pay. (hreatened the institutions integrity. After all. large-scale
militars involvement in drug trafficking «as not uninos n in Latin Amer-
ica durine the 1980s,
Nonetheless. at times the United States mas able to ofler significan
inducements. Little U.S, military assistance mas available to Latin Amer-
ica outside the counternarcottos area, and the sophisticated radars and sen-
necessary for part ol the eftort beld appeal. lo addition, the case of
coca-producine countries like Bolivia and Peru, a haichb provided most of
the crop tor Colombia-based drur cartels, the United States ted economic
aid to the tultiliment of national coca-eradication targets.
llo Paul Zagorski

Thus, Peru the armed forces became heavily involved

im coun-
ternarcotics operations. although not without cost. During the high point of
the struggle against Sendero Luminoso puerrillas in the late 19805. counter-
drug operations threatened to undermine efforts to M over the coca-
gron ing peasantry. And the influence of drug money mas corrosive. Un
mid- 1994, the commander ím chief of the armed forces announced that one
hundred officers were beme tried for involvement in the drug trade. In Bo-
livia, most of the antidrug efforts had been carried out by a special civilian
force rather than the army. In other countries in South America, the mili-
tary's involvement has been more marginal and has been more or less an
adjunct to the contro] of frontiers in remote areas.

CONCLUSION

Although present-day Latin American armed forces—like every long-

standing institution—are influenced by the past. by the mid-1990s they
had passed a watershed. The military, which tor centuries had been a key
pillar ot authoritarianism. is changing as a result of a changed regional and
global context.
The national security state of the 19605 through the 1980s represented
the culmination of a number of trends in the evolution of Latin American
military institutions. lt was authoritarian and statist and stressed traditional
values, as had the Latin American armed forces since the time of the con-
quest. lt was modernizing, technocratic, and meritocratic, as the protes-
sional armed forces of the region had been—at Icast in aspiration—since
the turn of the century.
But the national security state could not last. lt lacked a distinctive
ideology to legitimize ts institutions. And in fact, dt proclaimed tiself to he
transitional. Where it achieved a modicum of success (e.g.. Chile), the
regimeós own rules provided the basis for a transfer to the opposition,
Where it was an almost unqualified failure (c.2.. Argentina), the exper-
ence of the national security state delegitimized military governance al-
most everya here,
Morcover, the political and social environment of the mid- 19905 dif-
fers substantially from that of the mid-1960s—when the national security
mate hirstarose and new issues have emerged, The experience ol repres-
sion has made the deft realizo the importance of compentive elections and
due process. The end ot the Cold War has resulted mm muted 1deologrcal
compeution. Vhe failure of state soctalism globally, as well as the tounder-
my of state-led development in Latin America. bas both narrowed poliuy
options and made Lat countries more susceptible and receptivo
Amegican
to international influence.
 The Military 117

The armed forces themselves fit into this general pattern. To be mod-
ern and professional means to follow Western European and North Amer-
ican institutional patterns. The armed forces must be not onlv technologi-
cally advanced. highly mobile. and capable of joint (air, land, and sea)
operations but also nondeliberative, obedient, and apolitical. The need to
modernize, professionalize, and restructurc the military is clear to both
civilian and military leaders.
This is not to say the process of reform is easy and free of contention.
Economic difficulties limit the availability of funds for military modern-
ization. The potential for social turmoil continues to provide a pretext for
resurrecting an attenuated version of the national security doctrine. The
armed forces in some countries (Venezuela, Peru. and, during the late
1980s, Argentina) have openly divided into factions over the issue of sub-
ordination to political authority. In most countries, an exact statement of
military roles has yet to be ironed out and, more important, sincerely ac-
cepted by the armed forces. Nonetheless, the balance of the evidence in-
dicates that the armed forces in Latin America will participate in an era of
democratic consolidation.

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