G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, 
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents. 

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731,
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309,
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The
view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly
affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be
granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he
holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult
to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article.
In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue
at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the
mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent
ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain
ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por
el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette
as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this
petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar.
In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such
broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of
its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan
vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have
been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal
laws provide that they shall take effect immediately. 
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only
to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it
to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts
not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I
am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil
Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair
play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people
who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of
their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15
days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
rights.
 
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not
that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
 
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
 
 
 
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion
of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to
have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need
not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to
be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential
decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute
of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only
to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be
impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that
precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority
decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it
to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is
the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not
dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts
not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have
conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach
due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed
settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued
under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it
could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a
question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I
am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil
Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative
enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair
play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people
who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the
same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of
their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15
days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a
date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15)
days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have
retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested
rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not
that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a
prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide
not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides
for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them,
"important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it
should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes

G.R. No. 102316 June 30, 1997

VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY INC., petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the "(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-
landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo" 1 valid? This is the main question
raised in this petition for review assailing the Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals 2 in CA-
G.R. No. CV-20156 promulgated on October 15, 1991. The Court of Appeals modified the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. to
pay plaintiff the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) representing the value of the policy
of the lost logs with legal interest thereon from the date of demand on February 2, 1984 until the
amount is fully paid or in the alternative, defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to pay
plaintiff the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS (2,000,000.00) representing the value of lost logs
plus legal interest from the date of demand on April 24, 1984 until full payment thereof; the
reasonable attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to five (5) percent of the amount of the
claim and the costs of the suit.
Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation the sum of
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing the balance of the
stipulated freight charges.
Defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Company's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
In its assailed Decision, Respondent Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED except in so far (sic) as the liability of
the Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to the plaintiff is concerned which is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. 3
The Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as narrated in the Court of Appeals Decision are as follows:
It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff (Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc.)
entered into an agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers (Shipping Corporation) whereby
the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former's lauan round
logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.
On 20 January 1984, plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or damage with defendant South
Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00 and the latter issued its Marine Cargo
Insurance Policy No. 84/24229 for P2,000,000.00 on said date.
On 24 January 1984, the plaintiff gave the check in payment of the premium on the insurance
policy to Mr. Victorio Chua.
In the meantime, the said vessel M/V Seven Ambassador sank on 25 January 1984 resulting in
the loss of the plaintiff's insured logs.
On 30 January 1984, a check for P5,625.00 (Exh. "E") to cover payment of the premium and
documentary stamps due on the policy was tendered due to the insurer but was not accepted.
Instead, the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. cancelled the insurance policy it issued as of
the date of the inception for non-payment of the premium due in accordance with Section 77 of
the Insurance Code.
On 2 February 1984, plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy. Plaintiff
likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of
the lost logs but the latter denied the claim.
After due hearing and trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against
defendants. Both defendants shipping corporation and the surety company appealed.
Defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation impute (sic) to the court a quo the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
A. The lower court erred in holding that the proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel Seven
Ambassadors, was not due to fortuitous event but to the negligence of the captain in stowing and
securing the logs on board, causing the iron chains to snap and the logs to roll to the portside.
B. The lower court erred in declaring that the non-liability clause of the Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation from logs (sic) of the cargo stipulated in the charter party is void for being contrary
to public policy invoking article 1745 of the New Civil Code.
C. The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation
liable in the alternative and ordering/directing it to pay plaintiff-appellee the amount of two
million (2,000,000.00) pesos representing the value of the logs plus legal interest from date of
demand until fully paid.
D. The lower court erred in ordering defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to
pay appellee reasonable attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to 5% of the amount of the
claim and the costs of the suit.
E. The lower court erred in not awarding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Corporation its
counter-claim for attorney's fees.
F. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint against Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation.
Defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. assigns the following errors:
A. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua was an agent of defendant-appellant South
Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. and likewise erred in not holding that he was the
representative of the insurance broker Columbia Insurance Brokers, Ltd.
B. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua received compensation/commission on the
premiums paid on the policies issued by the defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance
Company, Inc.
C. The trial court erred in not applying Section 77 of the Insurance Code.
D. The trial court erred in disregarding the "receipt of payment clause" attached to and forming
part of the Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229.
E. The trial court in disregarding the statement of account or bill stating the amount of premium
and documentary stamps to be paid on the policy by the plaintiff-appellee.
F. The trial court erred in disregarding the endorsement of cancellation of the policy due to non-
payment of premium and documentary stamps.
G. The trial court erred in ordering defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance
Company, Inc. to pay plaintiff-appellee P2,000,000.00 representing value of the policy with legal
interest from 2 February 1984 until the amount is fully paid,
H. The trial court erred in not awarding to the defendant-appellant the attorney's fees alleged
and proven in its counterclaim.
The primary issue to be resolved before us is whether defendants shipping corporation and the
surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latter's lost logs. 4
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Sea
Surety and Insurance Company ("South Sea"), but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers
Shipping Corporation ("Seven Brothers") was not liable for the lost cargo. 5 In modifying the RTC
judgment, the respondent appellate court ratiocinated thus:
It appears that there is a stipulation in the charter party that the ship owner would be exempted
from liability in case of loss.
The court a quo erred in applying the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to establish
the liability of the shipping corporation. The provisions on common carriers should not be applied
where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier.
Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or
chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier.
As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the negligence of its
agent is valid (Home Insurance Company, Inc. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23 SCRA
24).
The shipping corporation should not therefore be held liable for the loss of the logs. 6
South Sea and herein Petitioner Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. ("Valenzuela")
filed separate petitions for review before this Court. In a Resolution dated June 2, 1995, this
Court denied the petition of South
Sea. 7 There the Court found no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that Chua was indeed an authorized agent of South Sea when he received
Valenzuela's premium payment for the marine cargo insurance policy which was thus binding on
the insurer. 8
The Court is now called upon to resolve the petition for review filed by Valenzuela assailing the
CA Decision which exempted Seven Brothers from any liability for the lost cargo.
The Issue
Petitioner Valenzuela's arguments resolve around a single issue: "whether or not respondent
Court (of Appeals) committed a reversible error in upholding the validity of the stipulation in the
charter party executed between the petitioner and the private respondent exempting the latter
from liability for the loss of petitioner's logs arising from the negligence of its (Seven Brothers')
captain." 9
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Validity of Stipulation is Lis Mota
The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the "(o)wners
shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the
cargo." 10 The validity of this stipulation is the lis mota of this case.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no dispute between the parties that the proximate
cause of the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the loss of its cargo was the
"snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of the logs to the portside due to the
negligence of the captain in stowing and securing the logs on board the vessel and not due to
fortuitous event." 11 Likewise undisputed is the status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a
private carrier when it contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter
admits this in its petition. 12
The trial court deemed the charter party stipulation void for being contrary to public
policy, 13 citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust
and contrary to public policy:
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the
goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the goods;
(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a good father of
a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the movables transported;
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its
employees;
(6) That the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not
act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods
on account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used
in the contract of carriage.
Petitioner Valenzuela adds that the stipulation is void for being contrary to Articles 586 and 587
of the Code of Commerce 14 and Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code. Citing Article 1306 and
paragraph 1, Article 1409 of the Civil Code, 15 petitioner further contends that said stipulation
"gives no duty or obligation to the private respondent to observe the diligence of a good father of
a family in the custody and transportation of the cargo."
The Court is not persuaded. As adverted to earlier, it is undisputed that private respondent had
acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner's lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil
Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by petitioner may not be applied unless
expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party. 16
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo
rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the
cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil
Code, such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of
private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private
carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be
binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private carriage does not
involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers
protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial
goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not contravened
by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts
involving common carriers.
The issue posed in this case and the arguments raised by petitioner are not novel; they were
resolved long ago by this Court in Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies,
Inc. 18 In that case, the trial court similarly nullified a stipulation identical to that involved in the
present case for being contrary to public policy based on Article 1744 of the Civil Code and Article
587 of the Code of Commerce. Consequently, the trial court held the shipowner liable for
damages resulting for the partial loss of the cargo. This Court reversed the trial court and laid
down, through Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the following well-settled observation and doctrine:
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law. Under
American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a
special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the
owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed
valid.
Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be
applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. The stipulation in the
charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would
be void if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force
where the public at large is not involved, as in this case of a ship totally chartered for the used of
a single party. 19(Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, where the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself does not apply. The general public
enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice in the
preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to,
it cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on
common carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets,
invoices or other documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no
choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not
similarly situated. It can — and in fact it usually does — enter into a free and voluntary
agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can stipulate the carrier's
obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine the price or consideration
of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside
the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this
option, he takes a normal business risk.
Petitioner contends that the rule in Home Insurance is not applicable to the present case because
it "covers only a stipulation exempting a private carrier from liability for the negligence of his
agent, but it does not apply to a stipulation exempting a private carrier like private respondent
from the negligence of his employee or servant which is the situation in this case." 20 This
contention of petitioner is bereft of merit, for it raises a distinction without any substantive
difference. The case Home Insurance specifically dealt with "the liability of the shipowner for acts
or negligence of its captain and crew" 21 and a charter party stipulation which "exempts the
owner of the vessel from any loss or damage or delay arising from any other source, even from
the neglect or fault of the captain or crew or some other person employed by the owner on
board, for whose acts the owner would ordinarily be liable except for said
paragraph." 22 Undoubtedly, Home Insurance is applicable to the case at bar.
The naked assertion of petitioner that the American rule enunciated in Home Insurance is not the
rule in the Philippines 23 deserves scant consideration. The Court there categorically held that
said rule was "reasonable" and proceeded to apply it in the resolution of that case. Petitioner
miserably failed to show such circumstances or arguments which would necessitate a departure
from a well-settled rule. Consequently, our ruling in said case remains a binding judicial
precedent based on the doctrine of stare decisis and Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides
that "(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of
the legal system of the Philippines."
In fine, the respondent appellate court aptly stated that "[in the case of] a private carrier, a
stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the negligence of its agents is valid." 24
Other Arguments
On the basis of the foregoing alone, the present petition may already be denied; the Court,
however, will discuss the other arguments of petitioner for the benefit and satisfaction of all
concerned.
Articles 586 and 587, Code of Commerce
Petitioner Valenzuela insists that the charter party stipulation is contrary to Articles 586 and 587
of the Code of Commerce which confer on petitioner the right to recover damages from the
shipowner and ship agent for the acts or conduct of the captain. 25 We are not persuaded.
Whatever rights petitioner may have under the aforementioned statutory provisions were waived
when it entered into the charter party.
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that "(r)ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a person with a right
recognized by law." As a general rule, patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed to rights to
personality and family rights which may not be made the subject of waiver. 26 Being patently and
undoubtedly patrimonial, petitioner's right conferred under said articles may be waived. This, the
petitioner did by acceding to the contractual stipulation that it is solely responsible or any
damage to the cargo, thereby exempting the private carrier from any responsibility for loss or
damage thereto. Furthermore, as discussed above, the contract of private carriage binds
petitioner and private respondent alone; it is not imbued with public policy considerations for the
general public or third persons are not affected thereby.
Articles 1170 and 1173, Civil Code
Petitioner likewise argues that the stipulation subject of this controversy is void for being contrary
to Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code 27 which read:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171
and 2201, shall apply.
If the law does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is
expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The Court notes that the foregoing articles are applicable only to the obligor or the one with an
obligation to perform. In the instant case, Private Respondent Seven Brothers is not an obligor in
respect of the cargo, for this obligation to bear the loss was shifted to petitioner by virtue of the
charter party. This shifting of responsibility, as earlier observed, is not void. The provisions cited
by petitioner are, therefore, inapplicable to the present case.
Moreover, the factual milieu of this case does not justify the application of the second paragraph
of Article 1173 of the Civil Code which prescribes the standard of diligence to be observed in the
event the law or the contract is silent. In the instant case, Article 362 of the Code of
Commerce 28 provides the standard of ordinary diligence for the carriage of goods by a carrier.
The standard of diligence under this statutory provision may, however, be modified in a contract
of private carriage as the petitioner and private respondent had done in their charter party.
Cases Cited by Petitioner Inapplicable
Petitioner cites Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 29 which, in turn, quoted Juan Ysmael &
Co. vs. Gabino Barreto & Co. 30 and argues that the public policy considerations stated there vis-
a-vis contractual stipulations limiting the carrier's liability be applied "with equal force" to this
case. 31 It also cites Manila Railroad Co. vs.Compañia Transatlantica 32 and contends that
stipulations exempting a party from liability for damages due to negligence "should not be
countenanced" and should be "strictly construed" against the party claiming its benefit. 33We
disagree.
The cases of Shewaram and Ysmael both involve a common carrier; thus, they necessarily justify
the application of such policy considerations and concomitantly stricter rules. As already
discussed above, the public policy considerations behind the rigorous treatment of common
carriers are absent in the case of private carriers. Hence, the stringent laws applicable to common
carriers are not applied to private carries. The case of Manila Railroad is also inapplicable because
the action for damages there does not involve a contract for transportation. Furthermore, the
defendant therein made a "promise to use due care in the lifting operations" and, consequently,
it was "bound by its undertaking"'; besides, the exemption was intended to cover accidents due
to hidden defects in the apparatus or other unforseeable occurrences" not caused by its
"personal negligence." This promise was thus constructed to make sense together with the
stipulation against liability for damages. 34 In the present case, we stress that the private
respondent made no such promise. The agreement of the parties to exempt the shipowner from
responsibility for any damage to the cargo and place responsibility over the same to petitioner is
the lone stipulation considered now by this Court.
Finally, petitioner points to Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Lopez Costelo, 35 Walter A. Smith &
Co. vs.Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 36 N. T . Hashim and Co. vs. Rocha and Co., 37 Ohta
Development Co. vs.Steamship "Pompey" 38 and Limpangco Sons vs. Yangco Steamship Co. 39 in
support of its contention that the shipowner be held liable for damages. 40 These however are
not on all fours with the present case because they do not involve a similar factual milieu or an
identical stipulation in the charter party expressly exempting the shipowner form responsibility
for any damage to the cargo.
Effect of the South Sea Resolution
In its memorandum, Seven Brothers argues that petitioner has no cause of action against it
because this Court has earlier affirmed the liability of South Sea for the loss suffered by
petitioner. Private respondent submits that petitioner is not legally entitled to collect twice for a
single loss. 41 In view of the above disquisition upholding the validity of the questioned charter
party stipulation and holding that petitioner may not recover from private respondent, the
present issue is moot and academic. It suffices to state that the Resolution of this Court dated
June 2, 1995 42 affirming the liability of South Sea does not, by itself, necessarily preclude the
petitioner from proceeding against private respondent. An aggrieved party may still recover the
deficiency for the person causing the loss in the event the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the loss. Article 2207 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity for the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract
complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against
the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance
company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover
the deficiency form the person causing the loss or injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any
reversible error on the part of Respondent Court. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102881 December 7, 1992

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, petitioner, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR. and SUN VALLEY MANUFACTURING
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
 
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This case involves a boundary dispute between Toyota Motor Phil. Corporation (Toyota) and Sun
Valley Manufacturing and Development Corporation (Sun Valley).
Both Toyota and Sun Valley are the registered owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land situated
in La Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila which they purchased from the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT).
The properties in question formerly belonged to Delta Motors Corporation (DMC). They were
foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and later transferred to the national
government through the APT for disposition.
APT then proceeded to classify the DMC properties according to the existing improvements, i.e.,
buildings, driveways, parking areas, perimeter fence, walls and gates and the land on which the
improvements stood. The entire DMC property is called GC III-Delta Motors Corporation, divided
into Delta I, Delta II, and Delta III. Further subdivisions for the separate catalogues were made for
each division e.g. Delta I into Lots 1, 2 and 3. After this classification, APT parcelled out and
catalogued the properties for bidding and sale.
Part of the duly parcelled Delta I property (Lot 2) was sold to Toyota through public bidding on
May 12, 1988 for the amount of P95,385,000.00. After its purchase, Toyota constructed a
concrete hollow block (CHB) perimeter fence around its alleged property.
On October 5, 1990, another part of the parcelled Delta I (Lot 1) covering an area of 55,236
square meters was purchased by Sun Valley from APT for the bid price of P124,349,767.00.
Relying upon the title description of its property and the surveys it had commissioned, Sun Valley
claimed that Toyota's perimeter fence overlaps Sun Valley's property along corners 11 to 15 by
322 square meters and corners 19 to 1 by 401 square meters for a total of 723 square meters.
(Rollo, p. 841)
Negotiations between the two (2) corporations for a possible settlement of the dispute bogged
down. Court battles ensued, grounded on purely procedural issues. In pursuing the resolution of
the dispute, both Toyota and Sun Valley opted to file separate actions. Much of the complications
that arose and are now before us can be traced to the two separate cases pursued by both
parties. There are other cases arising from the same dispute but which are not before us.
Culled from the records, these are the antecedents of the two cases which transpired below.
 
TOYOTA CASE (Civil Case No. 91-2504)
On September 11, 1991, Toyota filed a case against APT and Sun Valley docketed as Civil Case No.
91-2504 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146 presided by Judge Salvador Tensuan.
The complaint was for the reformation of the Deed of Sale executed between Toyota and APT.
Toyota alleges that the instrument failed to reflect the true intention of the parties, as evidenced
by the failure of the title to include the 723 square meters strip of land.
Toyota alleges that the discrepancy came about because of the serious flaw in the
classification/cataloguing of properties bidded out for sale by APT. Toyota was made to
understand that included in its perimeter fence is the disputed strip of land. Thus, Toyota sought
the resurvey of the property to correct this error in the title. Sun Valley was impleaded
considering that it purchased the adjoining land whose title allegedly included the 723 square
meters property.
On September 11, 1991, upon Toyota's application, Judge Tensuan issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) enjoining Sun Valley and APT from any act of destruction and removal of Toyota's
walls and structures. Sun Valley and APT were respectively served summons on the following day.
On September 16, 1991, Sun Valley filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the Toyota
complaint failed to state a cause of action against it (1) since it was not a party to the contract of
the deed of sale between Toyota and APT, and (2) the complaint was in effect a collateral attack
on its title.
On September 27, 1991, Judge Tensuan initially denied Toyota's application for preliminary
injunction on the finding that there was no evidence of any threatened destruction, removal or
dispossession of Toyota's property.
On October 10, 1991, Judge Tensuan denied Sun Valley's motion to dismiss.
Both Toyota and Sun Valley filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Toyota moved to
reconsider the denial of its injunctive application while Sun Valley moved to reconsider the denial
of its motion to dismiss.
On October 30, 1991, APT filed its answer with affirmative defenses alleging that the complaint
must be dismissed on the ground that Toyota and APT should first have resorted to arbitration as
provided in Toyota's deed of sale with APT. On December 4, 1991, Toyota filed a motion alleging
that Sun Valley's long threatened destruction and removal of Toyota's walls and structures were
actually being implemented to which Judge Tensuan issued another TRO enjoining acts of
destruction and removal of the perimeter walls and structures on the contested area.
Consequently, on December 17, 1991, Judge Tensuan reconsidered his earlier denial of Toyota's
application for injunction and granted a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Sun Valley from
proceeding with its threatened destruction and removal of Toyota's walls and directed Sun Valley
to restore the premises to the status quo ante.
On December 11, 1991, Judge Tensuan denied Sun Valley's motion for reconsideration of its
motion to dismiss. Sun Valley elevated this denial to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed
as CA-G.R. Sp. No. 26942 and raffled to the Eleventh (11th) Division.
Judge Tensuan's jurisdiction to act considering the defense of prematurity of action for failure to
arbitrate the validity of the TRO issued on December 4, 1991 and the order granting injunctive
reliefs were challenged in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals and docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 26813, assigned to the Second (2nd) Division.
 
SUN VALLEY CASE (Civil Case No. 91-2550)
On September 16, 1991, Sun Valley, on the other hand, filed a case for recovery of possession of
the disputed 723 square meters boundary with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati, Branch 61
presided by Judge Fernando Gorospe, Jr.
On the same day, Judge Gorospe issued a TRO enjoining Toyota from committing further acts of
dispossession against Sun Valley.
On September 19, 1991, Toyota moved to lift the TRO and opposed Sun Valley's application for
injunction.
On September 23, 1991, Toyota filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case since the complaint was a simple ejectment case cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). The motion to dismiss was set for hearing on September 27,
1991.
On September 27, 1991, Sun Valley filed an amended complaint to incorporate an allegation that
Toyota's possession of the alleged disputed area began in September, 1988 when Toyota
purchased the property.
Ruling that the amendment was a matter of right, Judge Gorospe admitted the amended
complaint. Toyota adopted its motion to dismiss the original complaint as its motion to dismiss
the amended complaint. After the arguments to Toyota's motion to dismiss, the same was
submitted for resolution. Sun Valley's application for prohibitory and mandatory injunction
contained in its complaint was set for hearing on October 1, 1991.
Protesting the admission of the amended complaint, Toyota went to the Court of Appeals,
on certiorari on October 1, 1991. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26152 raffled to the
Tenth (10th) Division.
Toyota was later prompted to file two supplemental petitions, before the Court of Appeals as a
result of Judge Gorospe's alleged hasty issuance of four (4) Orders, all dated October 1, 1992.
These are:
(1) First supplemental petition dated October 4, 1991 which sought to nullify the Order denying
Toyota's motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
(2) Second supplemental petition dated October 23, 1991 which sought the nullification of the
orders granting Sun Valley's application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and
denying Toyota's motion to cross-examine Sun Valley's witnesses on the latter's injunction
application.
On November 27, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals' Tenth Division promulgated its questioned
decision which is primarily the subject matter of the present petition before us.
The respondent court denied due course to the Toyota petition on the finding that the
amendment of Sun Valley's complaint was a valid one as Sun Valley's action was not for unlawful
detainer but an accion publiciana. Furthermore, the supplemental petitions filed by Toyota
assailing the prohibitory and mandatory injunctive writ were not ruled upon as they were
expunged from the records because of Toyota's failure to attach a motion to admit these
supplemental petitions.
Consequently, Toyota filed the present petition for certiorari on December 9, 1991.
Earlier, upon an ex-parte motion to clarify filed by Sun Valley on October 25, 1991, Judge Gorospe
issued another order dated December 2, 1991 which followed Sun Valley to break open and
demolish a portion of the Toyota perimeter walls, and eventually to secure possession of the
disputed area. Toyota was constrained to come to this Court for relief.
On December 11, 1991, we issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of Judge Gorospe's
injunction and break-open orders dated October 1, 1991 and December 2, 1991 respectively as
well as further proceedings in Civil Case No. 91-2550.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals' Second Division issued a TRO ordering respondent Judge
Tensuan and all other persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. 91-2504 and from enforcing the Order dated December 17, 1991 and the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction dated December 19, 1991.
This prompted Toyota to file a motion to quash the TRO and file a supplemental petition with this
Court impleading the Court of Appeals' Second Division.
On January 13, 1992, we admitted the supplemental petition.
On January 10, 1992, the Court of Appeals' Second Division issued the Resolution granting Sun
Valley's application for preliminary injunction which enjoined Judge Tensuan in the Toyota case
from implementing his injunction Order and from proceeding with the case before him (Civil Case
No. 91-2504).
Thus, Toyota filed its Second Supplemental Petition with this Court challenging the validity of the
injunction writ issued by the Court of Appeals' Second Division.
This Second Supplemental Petition was admitted on February 10, 1992.
On February 10, 1992, we gave due course to Toyota's petition.
Subsequently, through a manifestation dated April 29, 1992, Toyota informed the Court that on
April 15, 1992, the Court of Appeals' 11th Division (Sun Valley case) rendered a decision
dismissing the case before it for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Toyota
complaint was not a collateral attack on Sun Valley's title and that misjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissal.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 10, 1992.
In the instant petition Toyota raises the following issues, to wit:
1. The Court of Appeals' 10th Division gravely abused its discretion when it ignored or pretended
to ignore Toyota's protests against Judge Gorospe's injunction orders.
2. Sun Valley is guilty of forum-shopping and Judge Gorospe of case-grabbing.
Sun Valley, on the other hand raises the following:
1. Whether or not the petitioner availed of the proper mode of elevating the case to this Court.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act
upon petitioner's supplemental petitions for certiorari.
3. Whether or not the complaint filed in the court below is an accion publiciana which is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
4. Whether or not Judge Salvador S. Tensuan had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No.
2504 for reformation of instrument.
5. Whether or not respondent Judge Gorospe, Jr. committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
private respondent's application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory/mandatory injunction.
6. Whether or not Judge Tensuan committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
mandatory injunction dated December 19, 1991.
This case is far from settlement on the merits. Through legal maneuverings, the parties have
succeeded in muddling up the vital issues of the case and getting the lower courts embroiled in
numerous appeals over technicalities. As it is now, there are three appellate decisions/resolutions
before us for review and conflicting orders issued by lower courts as a result of the separate
cases filed by the parties. As in the case of Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v.Court of
Appeal,s 193 SCRA 158 [1991], the Court is explicit in stating that:
xxx xxx xxx
Where there are conflicting but inextricably interconnected issues in one and the same
complicated case, it is best that these be resolved in one integrated proceeding where an overall
picture of the entirety of the case can be presented and examined. Piecemeal determinations by
several trial courts on segments of the basic issue and disconnected appeals to different Divisions
of the Court of Appeals resulting in separate decisions each dealing with only part of the problem
are discouraged. Needless multiplicity of suits is something which is frowned upon.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Amid the clutter of extraneous materials which have certainly bloated the records of this case, we
find only two (2) issues vital to the disposition of the petition: first, is the matter of jurisdiction,
who as between Judge Tensuan or Judge Gorospe has jurisdiction over the dispute; and second,
who as between the parties has the rightful possession of the land.
Anent the issue on jurisdiction, we examine the two actions filed by the parties.
Toyota filed an action for reformation on September 11, 1991, before Judge Tensuan alleging that
the true intentions of the parties were not expressed in the instrument (Art. 1359 Civil Code). The
instrument sought to be reformed is the deed of sale executed by APT in favor of Toyota. Toyota
alleges that there was a mistake in the designation of the real properties subject matter of the
contract. Sun Valley was impleaded in order to obtain complete relief since it was the owner of
the adjacent lot.
Sun Valley, however, argues that the complaint for reformation states no cause of action against it
since an action for reformation is basically one strictly between the parties to the contract itself.
Third persons who are not parties to the contract cannot and should not be involved. Thus, Sun
Valley contends that it should not have been impleaded as a defendant.
The Court of Appeals' 11th Division, in its decision promulgated on April 15, 1992 where the
denial of Sun Valley's motion to dismiss was sustained, correctly ruled that misjoinder of parties
is not a ground for dismissal.
American jurisprudence from where provisions on reformation of instruments were taken
discloses that suits to reform written instruments are subject to the general rule in equity that all
persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, whether it is a legal or an equitable
interest should be made parties, so that the court may settle all their rights at once and thus
prevent the necessity of a multiplicity of suits (Bevis Construction Co. v. Grace [Fla App] 115 So 2d
84; Green v. Stone, 54 N.J.E. 387, 34 A 1099). As a general rule, therefore, all persons to be
affected by the proposed reformation must be made parties (American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Elder, 189 Ga 229, 5 SE 2d 668; Kemp v. Funderburk, 224 NC 353, 30 SE 2d 155). In an action to
reform a deed, all parties claiming an interest in the land or any part thereof purportedly
conveyed by the instrument sought to be reformed, and whose interests will be affected by the
reformation of the instrument are necessary parties to the action (Kemp v. Funderburk, 224 NC
353, 30 SE 2d 155).
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it would appear that Toyota was correct in impleading Sun
Valley as party defendant. However, these principles are not applicable under the particular
circumstances of this case. Under the facts of the present case, Toyota's action for reformation is
dismissible as against Sun Valley.
Attention must first be brought to the fact that the contract of sale executed between APT and
Toyota provides an arbitration clause which states that:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In case of disagreement or conflict arising out of this Contract, the parties hereby undertake to
submit the matter for determination by a committee of experts, acting as arbitrators, the
composition of which shall be as follows:
a) One member to be appointed by the VENDOR;
b) One member to be appointed by the VENDEE;
c) One member, who shall be a lawyer, to be appointed by both of the aforesaid parties;
The members of the Arbitration Committee shall be appointed not later than three (3) working
days from receipt of a written notice from either or both parties. The Arbitration Committee shall
convene not later than three (3) weeks after all its members have been appointed and proceed
with the arbitration of the dispute within three (3) calendar months counted therefrom. By
written mutual agreement by the parties hereto, such time limit for the arbitration may be
extended for another calendar month. The decision of the Arbitration Committee by majority
vote of at least two (2) members shall be final and binding upon both the VENDOR and the
VENDEE; (Rollo, pp. 816-817)
x x x           x x x          x x x
The contention that the arbitration clause has become disfunctional because of the presence of
third parties is untenable.
Contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Mercantile Ins. Co. Inc. v.
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., 169 SCRA 66 [1989]). As such, the parties are thereby expected to
abide with good faith in their contractual commitments (Quillan v. CA, 169 SCRA 279 [1989]).
Toyota is therefore bound to respect the provisions of the contract it entered into with APT.
Toyota filed an action for reformation of its contract with APT, the purpose of which is to look into
the real intentions/agreement of the parties to the contract and to determine if there was really
a mistake in the designation of the boundaries of the property as alleged by Toyota. Such
questions can only be answered by the parties to the contract themselves. This is a controversy
which clearly arose from the contract entered into by APT and Toyota. Inasmuch as this concerns
more importantly the parties APT and Toyota themselves, the arbitration committee is therefore
the proper and convenient forum to settle the matter as clearly provided in the deed of sale.
Having been apprised of the presence of the arbitration clause in the motion to dismiss filed by
APT, Judge Tensuan should have at least suspended the proceedings and directed the parties to
settle their dispute by arbitration (Bengson v. Chan, 78 SCRA 113 [1977], Sec. 7, RA 876). Judge
Tensuan should have not taken cognizance of the case.
But the more apparent reason which warrants the dismissal of the action as against Sun Valley is
the fact that the complaint for reformation amounts to a collateral attack on Sun Valley's title,
contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals' 11th Division.
It is disputed that Sun Valley has a Torrens title registered in its name by virtue of its purchase of
the land from APT.
Toyota contends that the 723 square meters strip of land which it understood to be included in its
purchase from APT was erroneously included in Sun Valley's title. This is the reason why
reformation was sought to correct the mistake.
Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of title can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, P.D. No. 1529).
In the case of Domingo v. Santos Ongsiako, Lim y Sia (55 Phil. 361 [1930]), the Court held that:
. . . The fact should not be overlooked that we are here confronted with what is really a collateral
attack upon a Torrens title. The circumstance that the action was directly brought to recover a
parcel of land does not alter the truth that the proceeding involves a collateral attack upon a
Torrens title, because as we have found, the land in controversy lies within the boundaries
determined by that title. The Land Registration Law defines the methods under which a wrongful
adjudication of title to land under the Torrens system may be corrected . . .
While reformation may often be had to correct mistakes in defining the boundary of lands
conveyed so as to identify the lands, it may not be used to pass other lands from those intended
to be bought and sold, notwithstanding a mistake in pointing out the lines, since reformation
under these circumstances would be inequitable and unjust. (McCay v. Jenkins, 244 Ala 650, 15
So 2d 409, 149 ALR 746)
Assuming that Toyota is afforded the relief prayed for in the Tensuan court, the latter can not
validly order the contested portion to be taken out from the Sun Valley's TCT and award it in favor
of Toyota.
An action for reformation is in personam, not in rem (Cohen v. Hellman Commercial Trust &
Savings Bank, 133 Cal App 758, 24 P2d 960; Edwards v. New York Life Ins. Co. 173 Tenn 102, 114
SW 2d 808) even when real estate is involved (Agurs v. Holt, 232 La 1026, 95 So 2d 644; Vallee v.
Vallee (La App) 180 So 2d 570). It is merely an equitable relief granted to the parties where
through mistake or fraud, the instrument failed to express the real agreement or intention of the
parties. While it is a recognized remedy afforded by courts of equity it may not be applied if it is
contrary to well-settled principles or rules. It is a long standing principle that equity follows the
law. It is applied in the abscence of and never against statutory law (Zabat v. Court of Appeals,
142 SCRA 587 [1986]). Courts are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to
disregard them. (See Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 40 [1986].) Courts of
equity must proceed with utmost caution especially when rights of third parties may intervene.
Thus in the instant case, vis-a-vis well-settled principles or rules in land registration, the equitable
relief of reformation may not come into play in order to transfer or appropriate a piece of land
that one claims to own but which is titled in the name of a third party.
On the other hand, Sun Valley filed an action for reconveyance against Toyota to recover
possession of the strip of land encroached upon and occupied by the latter. What Sun Valley
seeks in its complaint is the recovery of possession de jure and not merely possession de facto.
Toyota moved to dismiss on the assumption that the complaint was one for unlawful detainer
cognizable by the MTC.
We do not find any reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals' 10th Division where it
upheld Judge Gorospe's order denying Toyota's motion to dismiss. An amendment to a complaint
before a responsive pleading is filed, is a matter of right (Rule 10, Sec. 2). Whether or not the
complaint was amended, Sun Valley's complaint was one for accion publiciana cognizable by the
RTC. Its right over the land is premised on the certificate of title registered in its name after it had
purchased said land from APT. As the registered owner it had the right of possession of said land
illegally occupied by another (Ybañez v. IAC, 194 SCRA 743 [1991]). The case of Banayos v. Susana
Realty, Inc. (71 SCRA 557 [1976]) is quite instructive:
xxx xxx xxx
We deem it advisable, at this point, to reiterate the essential differences between three kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession of real property, namely: (1) the summary action for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer; (2) the accion publiciana; and (3) the accion de
reivindicacion.
The action for forcible entry may be brought where dispossession of real property had taken
place by any of the means provided for in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
in the case of unlawful detainer, where the possession is withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract express or implied. These
two actions must be filed within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession with the municipal or city court. These actions in their essence are mere quieting
processes by virtue of which a party in possession of land may not be, by force, dispossessed of
that land, the law restoring to him such possession in a summary manner, until the right of
ownership can be tried in due course of law. They are, therefore, intended to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. The
aforesaid Rule 70 does not, however, cover all of the cases of dispossession of lands. Thus,
"whenever the owner is dispossessed by any other means than those mentioned he may
maintain his action in the Court of First Instance, and it is not necessary for him to wait until the
expiration of twelve months before commencing an action to be repossessed or declared to be
owner of land." (Gumiran v. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174, 179. Cf. Medina, et al. v. Valdellon, 63 SCRA
278) Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property
illegally detained, together with rents due and damages, even though one (1) year has not
expired from the beginning of such illegal detention, provided the question of ownership of such
property is also involved. In other words, if the party illegal dispossessed desires to raise the
question of illegal dispossession as well as that of the ownership over the property, he may
commence such action in the Court of First Instance immediately or at any time after such illegal
dispossession. If he decides to raise the question of illegal dispossession only, and the action is
filed more than one (1) year after such deprivation or withholding of possession, then the Court
of First Instance will have original jurisdiction over the case. (Bishop of Cebu v. Mangoron, 6 Phil.
286; Catholic Church v. Tarlac and Victoria, 9 Phil. 450; Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618; Medina, et
al. v. Valdellon, supra) The former is an accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of
ownership as well as possession, while the latter refers to an accion publiciana, which is the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary proceeding in the Court of
First Instance. (Sec. 88, Rep. Act No. 296; Rule 70, Rules of Court; Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney
General, 20 Phil. 523; Lim Cay v. Del, 55 Phil. 692; Central Azucarera de Tarlac v. De Leon, 56 Phil.
169; Navarro v. Aguila, 66 Phil. 604; Luna v. Carandang, 26 SCRA 306; Medina, et al. v.
Valdellon, supra; Pasaqui, et al. v. Villablanca, et al., supra).
With the finding that Toyota's action for reformation is dismissable as it is in effect a collateral
attack on Sun Valley's title, Sun Valley's action for recovery of possession filed before Judge
Gorospe now stands to be the proper forum where the following dispute may be tried or heard.
We now come to the issue as to which of the parties has a legal right over the property to
warrant the issuance of the preliminary mandatory/prohibitory injunction.
In actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the plaintiff has fully
established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To authorize a temporary
injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing of a right to the final
relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse (Buayan Cattle Co. Inc. v.
Quintillan, 128 SCRA 286-287 [1984]; Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, 148 SCRA
326 [1987]).
Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of the
right to be protected, and the facts against which the injunction is to be directed, are violative of
said right. In particular, for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the existence of the right and
the violation must appear in the allegations of the complaint and an injunction is proper also
when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint. Furthermore,
the complaint for injunctive relief must be construed strictly against the pleader (Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, supra).
In the instant case the existence of a "clear positive right" especially calling for judicial protection
has been shown by Sun Valley.
Toyota's claim over the disputed property is anchored on the fact of its purchase of the property
from APT, that from the circumstances of the purchase and the intention of the parties, the
property including the disputed area was sold to it.
Sun Valley, on the other hand has TCT No. 49019 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque
embracing the aforesaid property in its name, having been validly acquired also from APT by
virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in its favor on December 5, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 823-825; 826-827).
There are other circumstances in the case which militate against Toyota's claim for legal
possession over the disputed area.
The fact that Toyota has filed a suit for reformation seeking the inclusion of the 723 square
meters strip of land is sufficient to deduce that it is not entitled to take over the piece of property
it now attempts to appropriate for itself.
As early as September, 1988 prior to the construction of the perimeter fence, Toyota was already
aware of the discrepancies in the property's description in the title and the actual survey.
The letter of its surveyor company, Summa Kumagai thus reveals:
09 September, 1988
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
10th Floor, Metrobank Plaza
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.
Makati, Metro Manila
ATTENTION: MR. FLORENCIO JURADO
Finance Officer
SUBJECT: PHASE I RENOVATION WORK
PERIMETER FENCE
GENTLEMEN:
This is in connection with the construction of the Perimeter Fence for the Toyota Motor Plant
Facilities which to this date we have not started yet due to the following reasons:
1. Lack of fencing permit which can only be applied to and issued by the Parañaque Building
Official upon receipt of the transfer certificate to title and tax declaration.
2. Although the Building Official has verbally instructed us to proceed with the renovation work
and construction of fence, we could not execute the fencing work due to discrepancies on the
consolidation plan and the existing property monuments. These discrepancies was (sic)
confirmed with the representatives of the Geodetic Engineer.
Kindly expedite the immediate confirmation with the Geodetic Engineer on the final descriptions
of the property lines.
We would appreciate your usual prompt attention regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
CESAR D. ELE
Project Manager (Emphasis supplied, Rollo, p. 811)
Despite such notification, Toyota continued to build the perimeter fence. It is highly doubtful
whether Toyota may be considered a builder in good faith to be entitled to protection under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
The records also reveal that Toyota's own surveyor, the Certeza Surveying & Acrophoto Systems,
Inc. confirmed in its reports dated April 1 and April 5, 1991 that Toyota's perimeter fence
overlaps the boundaries of Sun Valley's lot (Rollo, pp. 833-383).
Even communication exchanges between and among APT, Toyota & Sun Valley show that the
parties are certainly aware that the ownership of the disputed property more properly pertains
to Sun Valley. Among these are the following:
May 28, 1991
MR. JOSE CH. ALVAREZ
President
Sun Valley Manufacturing &
Development Corp. (SVMDC)
Cor. Aurora Blvd. and Andrews Ave.
Pasay City, Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Alvarez:
Thank you for honoring our invitation to a luncheon meeting held at noon time today at Sugi
Restaurant.
As per our understanding, we would like to propose as a package the settlement of differences
between your property and ours as follows:
1. Boundary Issue between TMP Main Office & Factory and the recently acquired property of
SVMDC.
The boundary lines to our property lines bidded early 1988 were determined after making full
payment in August 1988 jointly by representatives of TMP/Metrobank — Messrs. Mitake,
Pedrosa, Alonzo and Jurado, APT — Mr. Bince together with representatives of Geo-Resources
who installed the monuments and prepared the technical description of the property. The
construction of the fence utilized existing fence marked yellow on Exhibit 1 and made sure that
the new fence to set boundaries were on top of the monuments set by Geo-Resources. The
replacement of existing wire fence were affected by setting concrete walls on exactly the same
position.
This is the reason why we are surprised top be informed that our fence goes beyond the
boundary lines set forth in the Technical Description on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) to
our property. This occurs even on fence already existing and should have been maintained in the
TCT.
Since we have manifested our intention when we set boundaries to our property, we propose the
following in relation to the excess area occupied by TMP.
1. We offer to give way to an access road 5 m. wide more or less from point 15 to 16 of Lot 2
(14.65 m. in length) at the back of our Paint Storage Building (Exhibit 2).
2. We propose to pay for the balance of excess land inside TMP fence (contested areas) at a price
mutually agreed upon.
II. Question of ownership of certain permanent improvements (underground water reservoir and
perimeter walls/fences) located at Lot 6 which we won by bidding from APT on October 5, 1990.
We have made our position to APT that these permanent improvements are part of Lot 6 on "as
is where is" bid basis (See explanatory map — Exhibit 3). However, since you have relayed to us
that the underground water reservoir is of no use to you, as part of the total package we are
proposing to pay for the underground water reservoir, the applicable perimeter walls/fences and
the water pump/pipings at a price mutually agreed upon.
We hope that through this proposal we would settle our differences and look forward to a more
cooperative relationship between good neighbors.
We will appreciate your favorable consideration and immediate attention on the matter.
Very truly yours,
MASAO MITAKE
President
 
July 4, 1991
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
Rm. 15, South Superhighway
Parañaque, Metro Manila
ATTENTION: MR. MASAO MITAKE
President
Gentlemen:
This refers to our several meetings regarding the property problems at "Lot 6" and your
encroachment of SVMD LOT I.
We wish to thank you for finally acknowledging the legitimacy of our demands on both
properties. In order to start a good business relationship, we propose that the property problem
at "LOT 6" which consists of the perimeter fence, water reservoir, water pump and systems be
settled first, in the amount of P3,500,000.00 payable to CMANC.
We also would like to request you to allow us to continue usage of the MERALCO posts and lines
connecting to SVMD power station which passes thru your property and allow entry of MERALCO
linemen from time to time.
Upon acceptance of these requests, I will confer which our Japanese partners to consider the
selling of the 723 sq. m. of land adjacent to your Assembly Plant which you continue to use even
after said property has been legally transferred to us from last quarter of 1990.
In view of your present good behavior, we are hoping that this first problem be settled not later
than July 15, 1991, otherwise, we will consider the whole matter as unacceptable to you and we,
therefore, proceed as earlier demanded to immediately demolish the CHB fence that prevents us
from using our property.
We hope for your immediate action to start the resolution of these unwanted problems.
Very truly yours,
JOSE CH. ALVAREZ
President (Rollo, p. 832; Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Sun Valley puts forth evidence that Toyota has altered the boundaries of its own
property by moving the monuments erected thereon by APT's surveyor Geo-Resources and
Consultancy, Inc. when Lot 2 was initially surveyed in August 1988:
The Asset Privitalization Trust
10th Floor, BA-Lepanto Building
9847 Paseo de Roxas Building
Metro Manila
Attention: Mr. Felipe B. Bince, Jr.
Associate Executive Trustee
Dear Sirs:
This has reference to our letter to your office dated April 8, 1991, a copy of which is attached,
regarding the check survey of Delta I. After asking some of the field men who participated in the
various surveys of Delta I from the consolidation to subdivision surveys, we found out that some
more of the present corner points are not the same points shown to them during the surveys. We
shall show this during a meeting with the representatives of the owners of Lots 1 and 2.
We hope this will clarify the discrepancies.
Very truly yours,
NORBERTO S. VILA
Exec. Vice Pres. & Gen. Manager
(Emphasis supplied; Rollo, p. 839)
There is therefore sufficient and convincing proof that Sun Valley has a clear legal right to
possession in its favor to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary/mandatory injunction. Sun
Valley's TCT gives it that right to possession. On the other hand, Toyota has not established its
right over the said property except for the assertion that there was a mistake in an instrument
which purportedly should have included the questioned strip of land.
As between the two (2) parties, Sun Valley has a better right. Under the circumstances, therefore,
and considering that the clear legal right of Toyota to possession of the disputed area has not
been established sufficient to grant the prayed for relief, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction may be issued pendente lite. (See Mara, Inc. v. Estrella, 65 SCRA 471 [1975]; De Gracia
v. Santos, 79 Phil. 365 [1947]; Rodulfa v. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225 [1946] and Torre v. Querubin, 101
Phil. 53 [1957])
In view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to show reversible error,
much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the respondent court.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question. 
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila
where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them. 
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A.
de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of
Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A
similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. 
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case. 
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor. 
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. 
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness
therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a
more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option. 
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status beforeor subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is
without the legal capacity to do so. 
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a
criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed
of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be
whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital
bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter. 
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that — 
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.) 
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that
in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined
as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be
an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint. 
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. 
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus: 
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. ... 
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. 
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other. 
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity
of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is
entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce. 
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein. 
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent. 
SO ORDERED. 
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
PARAS, J., concurring: 
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege. 
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved. 
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people
or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would
be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both
with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife. 
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
 
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring: 
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege. 
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the
Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2)
different nationalities would be involved. 
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people
or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would
be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both
with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife. 
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

G.R. No. 138322 - October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner - a Filipina - and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy - respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 - or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending - respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage
to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before
our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
x x x 
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx-xxx-xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall
be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding
article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital
laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides,
the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by
statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be
prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption
or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of
Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce
decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B"
- Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" - Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" - Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" -
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" - Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" - Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that
the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a
quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Llorente vs CA
GR 124371 November 23, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15,  Art. 17, Art. 26 FC

FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife) ß Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)
Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927
to September 30, 1957
February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula Llorente were married before a parish priest, Roman
Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home
November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization
1945: When Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines,
He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente
December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as
Crisologo Llorente with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
the father’s name was left blank
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her
February 2, 1946: the couple drew and signed a written agreement which was witnessed by
Paula’s father and stepmother to the effect that 
1.    all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all
other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended
2.    they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings
3.    they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during
their marital life; and 
4.    Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.  
November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State
of California in and for the County of San Diego
December 4, 1952: the divorce decree became final
January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as husband and
wife and bore 3 children: Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children
December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed
Special Administratrix of his estate
January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive
January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding that the will was duly executedthe will to probate
June 11, 1985: before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died
RTC on the petition for letters of administration filed by Paula over Lorenzo’s estate contending
that she was the surviving spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate proceedings filed by
Alicia, gave due course to Paula’s petition 
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void
Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate and ½ conjugal estate
illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
RTC denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified that Raul and Luz Llorente are not
children “legitimate or otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him thus,
Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitles her to 1/3 of the estate and
one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate
CA: Affirmed with modification

ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven

HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente
by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate
dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:

o    nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality
o    Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law
Quita v. Court of Appeals: 
o    once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable 
Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.  Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed.  We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved.  
Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law.  In fact, the will was duly probated.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private-respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007
departing from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite possession of confirmed tickets,
petitioners filed an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 145. Advocating petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent
TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach
was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there
was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith
because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United
States of America it is allowed to overbook flights.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc.
for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the reconfirmation of their
reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m.,
an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because
the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats
available on the flight. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait-list while the two other
Zalameas were listed as "No. 34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on the wait list,
the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including petitioner
Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, were
not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare tickets were given first priority among the wait-
listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed
to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were
denied boarding. According to Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the he was
holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was also fully booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another
flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen
($918.00) Dollars.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As
aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1 dated January 9, 1989 the
dispositive portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the following
amounts:
(1) US $918.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets
bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles
from New York City;
(2) US $159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, representing the price of Suthira
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine
Currency, representing the price of Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007,
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral damages for
all the plaintiffs'
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's fees;
and
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a
damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad
faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice
of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations
by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines.
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was
overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be denied accommodation
on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or negligence cannot under the
circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along with
forty-eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over
discounted tickets.
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals3 dated October 25, 1991
states as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED in that
the award of moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs is eliminated, and the defendant-
appellant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following amounts:
(1) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of
Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(2) US$159.49, or its peso equivalent at the time of the payment, representing the price of Cesar
Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
(3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
(4) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for review on certiorari and
alleged the following errors committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:
I.
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT TWA
BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS.
II.
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
. . . IN NOT ORDERING THE REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR THE
AMERICAN AIRLINES
TICKETS.5
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow
petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed.
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws
do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.6 Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.7
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service
agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said
code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically
allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the
case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of
the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline.8 Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in
this case would be Philippine law.
Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals,9 where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute,
this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight,
on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that
he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit
for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk
of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the
check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not
allowed to board the plane because her seat had already been given to another passenger even
before the allowable period for passengers to check in had lapsed despite the fact that she had a
confirmed ticket and she had arrived on time, this Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad
faith in violating private respondent's rights under their contract of carriage and is therefore
liable for the injuries she has sustained as a result.
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings where the breach of contract of carriage
amounts to bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 11 where a would-be passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance
from immigration all clearly and unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included in the
passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did
not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding awarding her damages.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 12 This is
so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to provide
public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or
enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller
Boeing 707 because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very
well be accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby sacrificing the comfort of its first class
passengers for the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such inattention and lack of care for
the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration entitles the passenger
to an award of moral damages. 13
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in
not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they
have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated
stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these
policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to
ride with another airline.
Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the detached flight coupon upon which were written
the name of the passenger and the points of origin and destination, contained such a notice. An
examination of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said exhibit was not offered for the
purpose of showing the existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that Exhibit I was used
for flight 007 in first class of June 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles.
Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of
giving less priority to discounted tickets. While the petitioners had checked in at the same time,
and held confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed to board the plane ten minutes
before departure time because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given priority over
discounted tickets. The other two petitioners were left behind.
It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of overbooking and the airline system of
boarding priorities are reasonable policies, which when implemented do not amount to bad faith.
But the issue raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said policies but whether or not said
policies were incorporated or deemed written on petitioners' contracts of carriage. Respondent
TWA failed to show that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it present any argument
of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the
flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that
petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila,
then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The
failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling
respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith.
Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their
contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes respondent TWA
liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in
the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.
Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision not to require the refund of Liana
Zalamea's ticket because the ticket was used by her father. On this score, we uphold the
respondent court. Petitioners had not shown with certainty that the act of respondent TWA in
allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or deliberate act.
Petitioners had also failed to establish that they did not accede to said agreement. The logical
conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to
the course of action taken.
The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering the refund of the American Airlines tickets
purchased and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira
and Liana were constrained to take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they
"opted not to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because respondent TWA could
not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also fully booked. 14 The
purchase of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the consequence
of respondent TWA's unjustifiable breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In
accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible
for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of its obligation. In
the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a
passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to
another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets,
petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles. On
this score, we differ from the trial court's ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of the
American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both
prestations would have enabled petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare
being paid.
The award to petitioners of attorney's fees is also justified under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code
which allows recovery when the defendant's act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or
to incur expenses to protect his interest. However, the award for moral damages and exemplary
damages by the trial court is excessive in the light of the fact that only Suthira and Liana Zalamea
were actually "bumped off." An award of P50,000.00 moral damages and another P50,000.00
exemplary damages would suffice under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby MODIFIED to the extent of adjudging respondent TransWorld Airlines to pay
damages to petitioners in the following amounts, to wit:
(1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment representing the price of the tickets
bought by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines, to enable them to fly to Los Angeles
from New York City;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 154259, 28 February 2005

FACTS:
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko
Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr.
Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket
of fruits, the latter’s gift. He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great
shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a
loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a
Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr.Filart ignored him
adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by
the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. ZenaidaFruto, if
Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s
group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the
phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant
specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list.
She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close Ms. Lim was when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very close because we nearly kissed
each other”. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only
be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that
she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ruled that Mr.
Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance
of several guests. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “AmangBisaya”, an
entertainment artist.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
RULING:
No. Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the
necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave
the party.
Art. 19. of the Civil Code states that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith”. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent
to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Art. 21. of the Civil Code also states that: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage”.Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom,
public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
As applied to herein case Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against
him. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein
being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to
the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave
the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard
by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not
invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its
liability springs from that of its employees.

G.R. No. 141309             June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, 
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167,
which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina,
Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The complaint
filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights
arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93),
which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while
respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on
July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were
considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More,"
and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes
an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos
(P5.00) per pack."6
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr.
sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in
particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of
RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall
of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter assessed
respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of
RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993,
respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September
30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated
August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and
further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC
No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC
37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner
in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within
the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action
for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was
signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party
who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the
allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing
the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against forum
shopping was cured by respondent’s submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate
authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive
portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said
motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds
aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.13
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may
arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated
that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public
officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant case.
Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It also
sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was
cured by the submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to
execute the same.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts
done in the performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the
Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the
complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same
is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against
forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers’ "acts"
from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with
the public officers’ violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine
whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de
Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer
should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the
complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner
liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection
with the discharge of the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative
Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against
forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.17
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus –
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done
in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence.
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly
liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be
liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and
good customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said
public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action
and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally
understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular
portion or section of the state only.19
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should,
accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.
The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other
general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special
act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a
general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and specific
provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its
words any meaning at all.20
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change
the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be
construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication.21
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds
provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective
conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision and should prevail over Section
4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for defective street
conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries arising from the
failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from
negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act
409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that,
insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the
Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City
of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers
"to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the
city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of,
or injury suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In
other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the
object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189
is decisive thereon.23
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a
tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and
which requires their publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general
law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges,"
and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which
should prevail, the Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates
only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies
universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting
the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class.
And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent
general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation
where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in
particular. Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and
scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general,
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses
its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or
other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general
provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
xxxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as
follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that
Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another person’s
constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code
Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in
the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse
by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil
Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we
made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights
even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very
few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most
cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the law to comply with one’s duty. And
so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify the object of the
article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified
by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."25
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private
individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is
not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.
It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby
another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.28 There
are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and
not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of
the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful.29 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that
is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.30
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the
nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the
defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the
Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C.
Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.
In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties
of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely
held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for,
the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes
the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint
tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on
the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of
their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice,
and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said
provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is
general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or
omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie
of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort
for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of
public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil
Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress
from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus
with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from
errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which
must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional
rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that
bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the
failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The
courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of
the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent
submission of the secretary’s certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the
certification against forum shopping cured the defect of respondent’s complaint. Besides, the
merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina,
Branch 272, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5930             February 17, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
ABELO ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Amadeo D. Seno for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:

The defendant in the above-entitled case is charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with
the crime of bigamy, for having contracted a second marriage with one Efigenia C. Palomer on
September 21, 1947, while his previous valid marriage with Martina Godinez was still subsisting
and had not been dissolved. The information is dated May 22, 1951. On October 11, 1951, while
the case was pending trial, Efigenia C. Palomer filed a civil action in the same Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the defendant -appellant, alleging that the latter "by means of force,
threats and intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him", and praying that their
marriage on September 21, 1947 be annulled (Annex A). Thereupon and on April 30, 1952,
defendant-appellant filed a motion in the criminal case for bigamy, praying that the criminal
charge be provisionally dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for annulment of the
second marriage is a prejudicial question. The court denied this motion on the ground that the
validity of the second marriage may be determined in the very criminal action for bigamy. Against
this order this appeal has been presented to this court.
It is contended that as the marriage between the defendant-appellant and Efigenia C. Palomer is
merely a voidable marriage, and not an absolutely valid marriage, it can not be attacked in the
criminal action and, therefore, it may not be considered therein; consequently, that the civil
action to annul the second marriage should first be decided and the criminal action, dismissed. It
is not necessary to pass upon this question because we believe that the order of denial must be
sustained on another ground.
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
(question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal (Cuestion prejudicial, es la que surge en un pleito o causa, cuya
resolucion sea antecedente logico de la cuestion objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento
corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion — X Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p.
228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is first
element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second
element. In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null
and void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for
nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the
first marriage is a prejudicial question.
There is no question that if the allegations of the complaint on time the marriage contracted by
defendant-appellant with Efigenia C. Palomer is illegal and void (Sec. 29, Act 3613 otherwise
known as the Marriage Law). Its nullity, however, is no defense to the criminal action for bigamy
filed against him. The supposed use of force and intimidation against the woman, Palomer, even
if it were true, is not a bar or defense to said action. Palomer, were she the one charged with
bigamy, could perhaps raise said force or intimidation as a defense, because she may not be
considered as having freely and voluntarily committed the act if she was forced to the marriage
by intimidation. But not the other party, who used the force or intimidation. The latter may not
use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.
It follows that the pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Efigenia
C. Palomer, is absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendant-appellant. This
civil action does not decide that defendant-appellant did not enter the marriage against his will
and consent, because the complaint does not allege that he was the victim of force and
intimidation in the second marriage; it does not determine the existence of any of the elements
of the charge of bigamy. A decision thereon is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
There is another reason for dismissing the appeal. The order appealed from is one denying a
motion to dismiss and is not a final judgment. It is, therefore, not appealable (Rule 118, secs. 1
and 2).
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Doctrine of Operative Fact- Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of
unconstitutionality.
 
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code.1
 
Exception to the general rule, the doctrine of operative fact:
 
The Doctrine of Operative Fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In
Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation 2, the Cout held: The doctrine of operative fact,
as an exception to the general rule only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon the law creating it. 3
 
1Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011
2G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2018
3Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011

Stare Decisis
Principle of Stare Decisis

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions.  It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50]necessary for two simple
reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code.[51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and
was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion
in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not disturb
the calm.” The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the
same points come again in litigation.” As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of
equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the
“actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to
reach the decision.”
The doctrine migrated to theUnited States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According toHamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent
“arbitrary discretion in the courts.”Madisonagreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.” Prof. Consovoy
well noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.” He added that their ideas “reveal a deep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to
deal with for over two centuries.”
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy’s observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have
been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisisdeals with the duty of
lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own
precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an
obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a
command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisisinvolves judicial interpretations of
the Constitution while statutory stare decisisinvolves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis’ view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations
still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon
to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined:
“the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it.” In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or
by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning
that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.” This stance
reflects both respect for Congress’ role and the need to preserve the courts’ limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application
perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing
social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law
solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation.
In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that “separate . . . is inherently unequal.”
Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the
colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise
refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisisrule in order to promote public welfare. In La
Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we
overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is
bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed
on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability;
(2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a
remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to
be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.[53]
          To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle
of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down
in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

As a general rule, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively
in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward and not backward),[1] and is
conformable to Article 4 of the Civil Code. The rule is intended to the tendency of retroactive
legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability to punish individuals for
violations of laws not yet enacted, unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions[2], which is unconstitutional[3].
The principle of non-retroactivity finds application in various aspects of the legal system. Thus,
the rule is that the jurisdiction of a court depends on the law existing at the time an action is
filed[4]; a statute continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to its
amendment[5]; a new doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court overturning an existing doctrine
is to be applied prospectively, and not to parties relying on the old doctrine and acting on the
faith thereof[6]; and many others.
While in general, laws are prospective, they are retroactive in the following instances:
1. If the law itself provides for retroactivity (Art. 4, Civil Code), but in no case may an ex post facto
law be passed, such as one that criminalizes an act done before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when done[7]. A law is considered retroactivity if it is clearly expressed in the
language of the statute[8]. The existence of an effectivity clause defining when the law shall take
effect militates conclusively against the retroactivity of such law[9].
2. If the law is remedial in nature, since there are no vested rights in rules of procedure[10].
3. If the statute is penal in nature, provided it is favorable to the accused/convict and the latter is
not a habitual delinquent as defined under the Revised Penal Code[11].
4. If the law is of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police power of the
government[12].
5. If the law is curative, provided it does not impair vested rights nor affect final judgments[13].
6. If a substantive right is to be declared for the first time, unless vested rights are impaired.
CONFLICTS OF LAWS; Definition:

1. That part of the law of each state or nation which determines whether, in dealing with a legal
situation, the law or some other state or nation will be recognized, given effect, or applied (16
Am Jur, 2d, Conflict of Laws, 搂 1).
2. That part of municipal law of a state which directs its courts and administrative agencies,
when confronted with a legal problem involving a foreign element, whether or not they should
apply a foreign law/s (Paras).

DISTINGUISHED FROM PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

BASIS CONFLICT OF LAW LAW OF NATIONS

Nature Municipal in character International in character

1

Persons involved Dealt with by private Sovereign states and other entities
2
individuals; governs individuals possessing international
in their private transactions personality, e.g., UN; governs
which involve a foreign element states in their relationships amongst
themselves

Transactions Private transactions between Generally affected by public

3
involved private individuals interest; those in general are of
interest only to sovereign states

Remedies and Resort to municipal tribunals May be peaceful or forcible

4
Sanctions
Peaceful: includes diplomatic
negotiation, tender & exercise of
good offices, mediation, inquiry &
conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement by ICJ, reference to
regional agencies

Forcible:聽 includes severance of

diplomatic relations, retorsions,
reprisals, embargo, boycott, non-
intercourse, pacific blockades,
collective measures under the UN
Charter, and war.
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Territorial jurisdiction means that a criminal action should be filed in the  place  where  the 
crime  was  committed,  except  in  those cases provided for in Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Private International Law

A branch of Jurisprudence arising from 
the diverse laws of various nations th
at applies when private citizens of di
fferentcountries interact or transact bus
iness with one another.
Private international law refers to that part of the law that is administered between pri
vate citizens of different countries or isconcerned with the definition, regulation, and e
nforcement of rights in situations where both the person in whom the rightinheres and 
the person upon whom the obligation rests are private citizens of different nations. It i
s a set of rules andregulations that are established or agreed upon by citizens of differe
nt nations who privately enter into a transaction and thatwill govern in the event of a d
ispute. In this respect, private International
Law differs from public international law, which isthe set of rules entered into by the 
governments of various countries that determine the rights and regulate the intercours
e ofindependent nations.

Private international law

 The rules of a legal system governing which rules are to 
be applied in cases withan international dimension, as where 
one party is French and one German and the subject of the 
transaction is in Africa. Italso considers enforcement of jud
gments obtained. It does consider matters of public law, whi
ch are treated under publicinternational law. See FORUM NON
CONVENIENS, LEXI LOCI DELICTI, LEX LOCI SITUS, LIS ALIBI PENDENS.