Hearing: Cybersecurity Research and Development: Challenges and Solutions

CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY &

SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND
TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013
Serial No. 113–6
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
RALPH M. HALL, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
Wisconsin DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas ERIC SWALWELL, California
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia DAN MAFFEI, New York
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana DEREK KILMER, Washington
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
BILL POSEY, Florida ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming MARC VEASEY, Texas
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona JULIA BROWNLEY, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARK TAKANO, California
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota VACANCY
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
RANDY WEBER, Texas
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
VACANCY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY
HON. THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky, Chair
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SCOTT PETERS, California
DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona DEREK KILMER, Washington
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
HON. LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana, Chair
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
MO BROOKS, Alabama ZOE LOFGREN, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
(II)
CONTENTS
Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Page
Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2
Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Thomas Massie, Chairman, Subcommittee on

Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives ................................................................................................ 6
Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6
Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 7
Statement by Representative Frederica S. Wilson, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and Tech-
nology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 9
Statement by Representative Larry Bucshon, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Research, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives .................................................................................................... 11
Statement by Representative Daniel Lipinski, Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Research, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 13
Witnesses:
Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief Information Security Officer, PayPal, Inc.

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 17
Dr. Frederick R. Chang, President and Chief Operating Officer, 21CT, Inc.
Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34
Ms. Terry Benzel, Deputy Director, Cyber Networks and Cyber Security,
USC Information Sciences Institute
Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46
Discussion ................................................................................................................. 62
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief Information Security Officer, PayPal, Inc. .............. 80
Dr. Frederick R. Chang, President and Chief Operating Officer, 21CT, Inc. ..... 81
Ms. Terry Benzel, Deputy Director Cyber Networks and Cyber Security, USC
Information Sciences Institute ............................................................................ 83
(III)
IV
Page
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Department of Homeland Security letter submitted by Representative Fred-

erica S. Wilson, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Technology,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representa-
tives ....................................................................................................................... 88
National Science Foundation letter submitted by Representative Frederica
S. Wilson, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Technology, Com-
mittee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .... 91
CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT:
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013
HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas Massie
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology] presiding.
(1)
2
LAMAR S, SMITH, Te)(8S EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Te)(u
CHAIRMAN RANKING MEMBER
[ongfrns of the 1anited ~tatcs

l!iOU5E of 1RtprE5EntatiuE5
COMMITIEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301
1202) 225-6371
www.science.hou$e.gov
Subcommittees on Technology and Research Hearing
Cybersecurity Research and Development: Challenges and

Solutions
Wednesday, February 26, 2013
10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.
2318 Rayburn House Office Building
Witnesses
Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief lnformation Security Officer, PayPal
Dr. Fred Chang, President & Chief Operating Officer, 21 CT
Ms. Terry Benzel, Deputy Director, Cyber Networks and Cyber Security, University of Southern
California Information Sciences Institute
3
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBCOMMITTEES ON TECHNOLOGY AND RESEARCH
HEARING CHARTER
Cybersecurity Research and Development: Challenges and Solutions

10:00 a.m. 12:00 p.m.
2318 Rayburn House Office Building
Purpose
On Tuesday, February 26, 2013, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology's
Research and Technology Subcommittees will examine cybersecurity research and development
activities, including standards development and education and workforce training, and how they
align with current and emerging threats. The hearing will also review the Cyhersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2013 (H.R. 756) which reauthorizes cybersecurity programs at the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Witnesses
• Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief Information Security Officer, PayPal Inc.

• Dr. Fred Chang, President & Chief Operating Officer, 21 CT
• Ms. Terry Benzel, Deputy Director, Cyber Networks and Cyber Security, University of
Southern California Information Sciences Institute
Overview
Information technology (IT) has evolved rapidly over the last decade, leading to markedly
increased connectivity and productivity. The benefits provided by these advancements have led
to the widespread use and incorporation of information technologies across major sectors of the
economy. This level of connectivity and the dependence of our critical infrastructures on IT
have also increased the vulnerability of these systems. Recent reports of cyber criminals and
nation-states accessing sensitive information and disrupting services in both the public and
private domains have risen steadily, heightening concerns over the adequacy of our cybersecurity
measures. GAO found that the number of incidents reported by federal agencies has increased
782 percent from 2006 to 2012. J This dramatic increase is attributed in part to the proliferation
and increased sophistication of hacking and cyber attack technology.
According to the Office of Management and Budget, Federal agencies spent $8.6 billion in fiscal
year 2010 on cybersecurity and the Federal government has spent more than $600 billion on
information technology in the last decade. In addition, the Federal government funds more than
$400 million in cybersecurity research and development each year.
1 GAO.13.187, Cybersecurity, National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More
Effectively Implemented; http://www.gao.gov/assetsJ660/652170.pdf, February 2013
4
The National Science Foundation and the National Institute ofStandards and Technology
NSF is the principal agency supporting unclassified cybersecurity research and development as
well as technical education. NSF provides the largest federal investment in cyber-related
research and development activities.
NSF has also made significant investments in cybersecurity education and workforce. The
Scholarship for Service program provides awards to increase the number of students
entering the computer security and information assurance fields, and to increase the capacity
of institutions of higher education to produce professionals in these fields. NSF also offers
Advanced Technological Education grants educating technicians for high-technology fields
with a focus on two-year colleges.
NIST's core cybersecurity focus areas include: research, development, and specification;
secure system and component configuration; and assessment and assurance of security
properties of products and systems.
Title III of the E-Government Act (PL 107-347), entitled the Federal Infonnation Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), tasked NIST with developing cybersecurity standards,
guidelines, and associated methods and techniques for use by the Federal Government.
The Administration also tasked NIST in April 2011 with leading the National Strategy for
Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), an initiative focused on establishing identity
solutions and privacy-enhancing technologies to improve the security and convenience of
sensitive online transactions.
Research and Development
Cybersecurity research and development efforts include working on the prevention of cyber
attacks, detecting attacks as they are occurring, responding to attacks effectively, mitigating
severity, recovering quickly, and identifying responsible parties.
Research and development provides a better understanding of weaknesses in systems and

networks and of how to protect those systems and networks. The hearing will explore current
government research and development investments to ensure they are properly focused to
provide an effective level of cybersecurity. The Subcommittees will also assess the challenges to
establishing national research and development priorities that strategically includes near-tenn,
mid-term, and long-tenn goals.
Education and the Development o(Cybersecurity Prokssionals
Well-trained professionals are essential to the implementation of security techniques in critical

computer and network systems. Institutions of higher education are working to create and
improve cyber education and training programs focused on ensuring an adequate number of
trained professionals. Public awareness is also a critical component when it comes to protecting
sensitive infonnation. Federal agencies engaged in cybersecurity activities currently support a
2
5
number of cybersecurity education, training, and development programs. The Subcommittees

will consider the coordination and implementation of these activities across Federal agencies.
Standards Development
The Subcommittees will examine NIST's current and future role in the development of
benchmarks, guidelines, and standards for cybersecurity, in conjunction with other government
agencies and the private sector.
Agency Coordination
Since 1991, Federal agencies have been required to set goals, prioritize investments, and
coordinate activities in networking and information technology research and development. The
Subcommittees will explore what measures have been taken to improve the coordination of
federal cybersecurity research and development efforts and the best approach to improve the
coordination of private sector critical infrastructure and network cybersecurity.
H.R. 756 the Cvhersecuritr Enhancement Act o{2013
H.R. 756, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of2013, coordinates research and related activities
conducted across the Federal agencies to better address evolving cyber threats. By strengthening
agency coordination and cooperation on cybersecurity research and development efforts, the
legislation addresses certain critical aspects of our nation's overall cybersecurity needs.
In addition to providing coordination of cybersecurity research across the federal government,

the bill strengthens the efforts of the NSF and the NIST in the areas of cybersecurity technical
standards and cybersecurity awareness, education, and workforce development.
The bill is identical to legislation in the I 12th Congress, H.R. 2096, which passed the House by a
vote of 395-1 O.
Presidential Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure
On February 12th, President Obama signed an executive order (EO) on cybersecurity for
critical infrastructure. Among other things, the EO encourages information sharing between
public and private sectors and directs NIST to lead the development of a framework to
reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure. NIST is instructed to work with industry to
identify existing voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to incorporate
into the framework. The Subcommittees will examine NIST's current and future role in
carrying out this EO.
3
6
Chairman MASSIE. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on

Technology and the Subcommittee on Research will come to order.
Good morning. Welcome to today’s joint hearing entitled
‘‘Cybersecurity Research and Development: Challenges and Solu-
tions.’’ In front of you are packets containing the written testimony,
biographies, and truth-in-testimony disclosures for today’s wit-
nesses. Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing involving
two Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will operate proce-
durally so all Members will understand how the question-and-an-
swer period will be handled.
As always, we will alternate between the majority and minority
Members and allow all Members an opportunity for questioning be-
fore recognizing a Member for a second round of questions. We will
recognize those Members present at the gavel in order of seniority
on the full Committee, and those coming in after the gavel will be
recognized in order of arrival. I now recognize myself for five min-
utes for my opening statement.
We convene the first hearing of the Technology Subcommittee
and the 113th Congress held jointly with my colleagues on the Re-
search Subcommittee. This Subcommittee sits at the intersection of
technology and innovation and is uniquely positioned to address
topics affecting competitiveness of emerging high-growth indus-
tries. I look forward to learning from our witnesses today about
cybersecurity research and development challenges, and I look for-
ward to working with my colleagues to determine how we can
eliminate barriers to entrepreneurship in our country going for-
ward. In these difficult times, it is important that we continue to
empower our Nation’s innovators to maintain our economic com-
petitiveness.
I now yield two minutes of my time to the Chairman of the full
Committee, Mr. Smith of Texas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Massie follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

CHAIRMAN THOMAS MASSIE
We convene the first hearing of the Technology Subcommittee in the 113th Con-
gress, held jointly with my colleagues on the Research Subcommittee. This Sub-
committee sits at the intersection of technology and innovation, and is uniquely po-
sitioned to address topics affecting competitiveness of emerging high-growth indus-
tries. I look forward to learning from our witnesses today about cybersecurity re-
search and development challenges, and I look forward to working with my col-
leagues to determine how we can eliminate barriers to entrepreneurship in our
country going forward. In these difficult times, it is important that we continue to
empower our nation’s innovators to maintain our economic competitiveness.
7
Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding me the

balance of your time.
Mr. Chairman, the Preamble to the Constitution states that one
of the primary responsibilities of our Federal Government is to pro-
vide for the common defense. More than 200 years later, the mean-
ing has changed but the task remains the same. National defense
in the digital age no longer just means protecting ourselves with
arms against enemies who attack with traditional weapons. It now
means protecting America from enemies who launch cyber attacks
against our computers and networks.
Cyber attacks against U.S. Government and private sector net-
works are on the rise. In the last few weeks, some of America’s
largest companies have been hacked. Even the most sophisticated
companies can be vulnerable to cyber attacks. Recent targets in-
clude Apple, Facebook, Yahoo!, the New York Times, and the Wall
Street Journal. Various agencies of the Federal Government also
have been the target of attacks and attempted attacks. Unfortu-
nately, evidence suggests that foreign governments may be among
those responsible.
Protecting America’s cyber systems is critical to our economic
and national security. Americans deserve better protection, and the
Federal Government can help make sensitive information more se-
cure. This challenge requires a thorough and comprehensive effort
in both the public and private sectors. Private companies are in-
creasing their investment in cybersecurity. Congress should sup-
port those efforts. Only Congress can provide the incentives and
protections that would permit necessary information-sharing
among companies, and more importantly, between private compa-
nies and the Federal Government.
Today’s hearing examines an important step that we can take to
foster the kind of cooperation that this challenge requires. The
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act introduced by Committee Mem-
bers Michael McCaul and Daniel Lipinski coordinates research and
development activities to better address evolving cyber threats. The
legislation promotes much-needed research and development to
help create new technologies and standards that better protect
America’s information technology systems.
Cyber attacks threaten our national and economic security. To
solve this problem, America needs a solution that involves a co-
operation of many public and private sector entities. The McCaul/
Lipinski legislation helps foster such an effort, which will make our
computer systems more secure.
I hope we can learn how to improve the bill today and quickly
advance it through this Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LAMAR S. SMITH
The preamble to the Constitution states that one of the primary responsibilities
of our federal government is to ‘‘provide for the common defense.’’ More than two
hundred years later, the meaning has changed but the task remains the same.
National defense in the digital age no longer just means protecting ourselves with
arms against enemies who attack with traditional weapons. It now means protecting
America from enemies who launch cyber attacks against our computers and net-
works.
8
Cyber attacks against U.S. government and private sector networks are on the
rise. In the last few weeks, some of America’s largest companies have been hacked.
Even the most sophisticated companies can be vulnerable to cyber attacks. Recent
targets include Apple, Facebook, Yahoo! the New York Times and the Wall Street
Journal.
Various agencies of the federal government also have been the target of attacks
and attempted attacks. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that foreign governments
may be among those responsible.
Protecting America’s cyber systems is critical to our economic and national secu-
rity. Americans deserve better protection and the federal government can help make
sensitive information more secure.
This challenge requires a thorough and comprehensive effort in both the public
and private sectors. Private companies are increasing their investment in
cybersecurity. Congress should support those efforts.
Only Congress can provide the incentives and protections that would permit nec-
essary information sharing among companies, and more importantly, between pri-
vate companies and the federal government.
Today’s hearing examines an important step that we can take to foster the kind
of cooperation that this challenge requires. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, in-
troduced by Committee Members Michael McCaul and Daniel Lipinski, coordinates
research and development activities to better address evolving cyber threats. The
legislation promotes much-needed research and development to help create new
technologies and standards that better protect America’s information technology sys-
tems.
Cyber attacks threaten our national and economic security. To solve this problem,
America needs a solution that involves the cooperation of many public and private
sector entities. The McCaul-Lipinski legislation helps foster such an effort, which
will make our computer systems more secure.
I hope we can learn how to improve the bill today and quickly advance it through
this Committee.
9
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ms.

Wilson for her opening statement.
Ms. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Massie, for holding this joint
hearing on cybersecurity, and thank you to our witnesses for being
here today.
Before I begin, I would like to say that I am pleased to be the
new Ranking Member of the Technology Subcommittee. As a long-
time educator, principal, teacher, I am a big believer in the power
of scientific innovation. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to
working with you this Congress to help enable innovation that cre-
ates jobs and makes our Nation more secure.
Today’s hearing is a perfect example of the work this Sub-
committee can do to bolster national security. Cyber crimes are
ever increasing. In fact, the number of attacks reported by federal
agencies increased by 782 percent between 2006 and 2012. The
threats to federal systems in our critical infrastructure are not only
growing in number but in the level of sophistication. Over the last
month alone, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the
Washington Post, Twitter, and Facebook have all confirmed that
they have been the target of sophisticated cyber attacks. These
crimes may include identity theft, intellectual property theft, serv-
ice disruptions, and even espionage.
We are beginning to suffer the cost of cybercrime. A recent study
found that cybercrime now costs a U.S. business 8.9 million on av-
erage per year. The problem is so pervasive that security experts
now joke that there are only two types of American companies
these days: those that have been hacked and those that don’t know
they have been hacked.
Earlier this month, the President signed an Executive Order that
begins the process of strengthening our networks of critical infra-
structure against cyber attacks by increasing information-sharing
and establishing a framework for the development of standards and
best practices. But the President also acknowledged that Congress
must act to pass comprehensive cybersecurity legislation.
The bipartisan legislation introduced by our colleagues, Mr.
McCaul and Mr. Lipinski, and under consideration today should be
a part of this comprehensive package. I am looking forward to
hearing any recommendations our witnesses might have about how
to improve the legislation.
Additionally, I hope to hear more from our witnesses about their
thoughts on the role the Executive Order outlines for NIST. In the
past, Congress has asked NIST to bring the private sector together
to accelerate the development of voluntary standards. It seems ap-
propriate that NIST be tasked with the similar role in
cybersecurity, especially in light of their expertise in this field.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention the potential im-
pact sequestration will have on our ability to deter, defend, and re-
cover from cyber attacks. In a letter to Appropriations, the Na-
tional Science Foundation indicated that vital investments in re-
search and development would be jeopardized, and that one of the
areas that could be impacted by sequestration is research into ad-
vances in cybersecurity.
The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate plays a large role in the development and deployment
10
of cybersecurity technologies. The Directorate has indicated that

under sequestration, they will have to cut their cybersecurity re-
search by 30 percent, eliminating research and data, privacy, iden-
tity management, cybersecurity forensics, and security for cloud-
based systems. The need to invest in research and development is
critical as cyber threats continue to grow and involve. I hope we
will not let sequestration delay and derail these essential invest-
ments.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wilson follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER FREDERICA S. WILSON
Thank you, Chairman Massie for holding this joint hearing on cybersecurity, and
thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Before I begin, I’d like to say that
I am pleased to be the new Ranking Member of the Technology Subcommittee. As
a longtime educator, I am a big believer in the power of scientific innovation. Mr.
Chairman, I am looking forward to working with you this Congress to help enable
innovation that creates jobs and makes our nation more secure.
Today’s hearing is a perfect example of the work this Subcommittee can do to bol-
ster national security. Cyber crimes are ever-increasing. In fact, the number of at-
tacks reported by federal agencies increased by 782 percent between 2006 and 2012.
The threats to federal systems and our critical infrastructure are not only growing
in number, but in the level of sophistication.
Over the last month alone, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The
Washington Post, Twitter, and Facebook have all confirmed that they have been the
target of sophisticated cyber attacks. These crimes may include identity theft, intel-
lectual property theft, service disruptions, and even espionage.
We’re beginning to suffer the costs of cybercrime. A recent study found that
cybercrime now costs a U.S. business $8.9 million on average per year. The problem
is so pervasive that security experts now joke that there are only two types of Amer-
ican companies these days: those that have been hacked and those that don’t know
they’ve been hacked.
Earlier this month, the President signed an executive order that begins the proc-
ess of strengthening our networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attack
by increasing information sharing and establishing a framework for the develop-
ment of standards and best practices. But the President also acknowledged that
Congress must act to pass comprehensive cybersecurity legislation.
The bipartisan legislation introduced by our colleagues Mr. McCaul and Mr.
Lipiniski, and under consideration today, should be part of this comprehensive pack-
age. I am looking forward to hearing any recommendations our witnesses might
have about how to improve the legislation. Additionally, I hope to hear more from
our witnesses about their thoughts on the role the executive order outlines for NIST.
In the past, Congress has asked NIST to bring the private sector together to accel-
erate the development of voluntary standards. It seems appropriate that NIST be
tasked with a similar role in cybersecurity—especially in light of their expertise in
this field.
Finally, I’d be remiss if I did not mention the potential impact sequestration will
have on our ability to deter, defend, and recover from cyber attacks. In a letter to
appropriators, the National Science Foundation indicated that ‘‘vital investments in
research and development would be jeopardized’’ and that one of the areas that
could be impacted by sequestration is research into advances in cybersecurity.
The Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate plays
a large role in the development and deployment of cybersecurity technologies. The
Directorate has indicated that under sequestration they will have to cut their
cybersecurity research by 30 percent, eliminating research in data privacy, identity
management, cybersecurity forensics, and security for cloud based systems.
The need to invest in research and development is critical as cyber threats con-
tinue to grow and evolve. I hope we will not let sequestration delay and derail these
essential investments.
11
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Ms. Wilson. I look forward to

working with you as well on this Committee.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Research, Mr. Bucshon, for his opening statement.
Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning to
everyone. I am pleased that we are holding a hearing today on
such an important topic.
According to a recent report published by the Government Ac-
countability Office, there were nearly 50,000 cybersecurity inci-
dents reported by federal agencies in 2012. Considering that num-
ber was 5,500 in 2006, there is no doubt that addressing
cybersecurity needs is critical to global economic competitiveness
and national security interests of our Nation.
In December 2012, the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Re-
search at Indiana University held a roundtable on cyber threats,
objectives, and responses. This issue impacts everyone from chil-
dren using the Internet in their homes to government and industry
officials trying to ensure our domestic infrastructure is protected
from cyber terrorists.
During the Research Subcommittee hearing on February 14 on
Networking and Information Technology Research and Develop-
ment, or NITRD, witnesses testified about the cybersecurity
threats our Nation faces and emphasized that cooperation is re-
quired for stakeholders to research and design ways in which to
build and maintain safer computer network infrastructures. The
NITRD program, which was the primary subject of that hearing, is
the coordinating body which the McCaul/Lipinski Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act appropriately utilizes to establish a strategic
plan for specific cybersecurity research.
I am encouraged that the legislation we are discussing today en-
hances the education and development of information technology
professionals, including those who work in the areas of computer
systems, computer security, and cybersecurity.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their experi-
ences and their recommendations on addressing America’s
cybersecurity challenges.
I now yield the balance of my time to Chairman McCaul.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bucshon follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH CHAIRMAN LARRY BUCSHON
According to a recent report published by the Government Accountability Office,

there were nearly 50,000 cybersecurity incidents reported by federal agencies in
2012. Considering that number was 5,500 in 2006, there is no doubt that addressing
cybersecurity needs is critical to global economic competitiveness and national secu-
rity interests of our nation.
In December of 2012, the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research at Indiana
University held a ‘‘Roundtable on Cyber Threats, Objectives, and Responses.’’ This
issue impacts everyone: from children using the Internet in their homes to govern-
ment and industry officials trying to ensure our domestic infrastructure is protected
from cyber terrorists.
During the Research Subcommittee hearing on February 14 on Networking and
Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), witnesses testified
about the cybersecurity threats our nation faces and emphasized that cooperation
is required for stakeholders to research and design ways in which to build and
maintain safer computer network infrastructures. The NITRD program, which was
the primary subject of that hearing, is the coordinating body which the McCaul-Li-
12
pinski Cybersecurity Enhancement Act appropriately utilizes to establish a strategic
plan for specific cyber security research.
I am encouraged that the legislation we are discussing today enhances the edu-
cation and development of information technology professionals, including those who
work in the areas of computer systems, computer security, and cybersecurity.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their experiences and their
recommendations on addressing America’s cybersecurity challenges.
13
Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Bucshon.

I want to thank Chairman Massie, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Members Lipinski and Wilson for allowing me to introduce this bill
once again. Again, I believe this is the third time we have intro-
duced this. Hopefully, the third time is a charm and we will get
this important legislation passed. It passed overwhelmingly in two
Congresses. I do believe this is the Congress where we will get
cybersecurity legislation passed through the House, the Senate,
and signed by the White House.
It is imperative as we hear reports almost every day of hackings
taking place not only within the critical infrastructures but within
our Federal Government. The report about the Chinese military
hacking into our military systems, stealing our military secrets, the
attacks recently from Iran against Aramco in the Persian Gulf and
against our financial institutions in the United States, and of
course Russia, one of the most sophisticated countries that con-
tinue to hack this country on a daily basis.
Whether it is criminal, whether it is espionage, or whether it
cyber warfare, we cannot afford to wait any longer. The White
House has acted through an Executive Order. I think it is impera-
tive now that the Congress act and legislate as we are supposed
to be doing. It is not a question of if, but when the next—or when
a cyber Pearl Harbor will occur. And that is why I have worked
very closely with my good friend Congressman Lipinski to bolster
our Nation’s cybersecurity research and development.
On February the 15th, we introduced this bill once again, H.R.
756, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, which is identical to the
legislation passed overwhelmingly by the House last Congress. It
improves the coordination in government providing for a strategic
plan to assess the cybersecurity risk and guide the overall direction
of the federal cyber research and development. It updates—and
this responsibility is to develop security standards for Federal com-
puter systems and processes for agencies to follow.
Our bill also establishes a federal university private sector task
force to coordinate research and development, improving the train-
ing of cybersecurity professionals, and continues much-needed
cybersecurity research and development programs at the National
Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
Again, I would like to thank my colleague Chairman Smith for
allowing me to introduce this bill once again. I appreciate your sup-
port for this bill, my colleague from Texas. And I look forward to
working with my colleagues on this Committee to find solutions to
the challenges of cyber research and development.
And with that, I yield back.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Mr.——
Mr. BUCSHON. I yield back.
Chairman MASSIE. Okay. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. And thank
you, Mr. Bucshon.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lipinski for his opening state-
ment.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Chairman Massie.
I want to thank you, Chairman Smith and Chairman Bucshon,
for holding this hearing to examine the serious cybersecurity chal-
14
lenges faced by our Nation and what we can do to facilitate solu-

tions, including the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act that Mr.
McCaul said we recently reintroduced and I know that we have
passed this overwhelmingly in a Democratic House. In a Repub-
lican House, hopefully, this time we can get it all the way through
because our country especially needs it as the threats grow every
year.
Now, I want to echo my colleague’s remarks about the nature
and severity of the challenges we face in cybersecurity in both the
public and private sectors. Four years ago, when we began working
on this legislation, I said I had no doubt that our use of the Inter-
net and other communication networks would continue to grow and
evolve, and that threats from individual hackers, criminal syn-
dicates, and even other governments would grow and evolve, too.
Today, it remains difficult to imagine just how much more we will
simultaneously benefit from and be made more vulnerable by infor-
mation technology.
Hacking is no longer just a realm of computer whizzes. Today,
anyone can rent a botnet or gain access to other sophisticated hack-
ing tools with just a few keystrokes and less than $100.
Cybercrime threatens our national security, our critical infra-
structure, businesses of all sizes, and every single American. As
such, reducing our risk and improving the security of cyberspace
will take the collective effort of both the Federal Government and
the private sector, as well as scientists, engineers, and the general
public.
With respect to that collective effort, I need to emphasize the im-
portance of research into the social and behavioral aspects of
cybersecurity. People are perhaps the most significant part of our
IT infrastructure, but they are also the weakest link. Many cyber
attacks are successful because of human error, bad cyber hygiene
such as unwittingly opening a malicious email. Having the most so-
phisticated security systems available won’t make any difference if
users don’t change factory sets of all passwords or if they set easy-
to-crack passwords. Understanding the human element and edu-
cating users to practice good cyber hygiene is necessary to com-
bating threats and reducing risk.
Mr. McCaul and I are hopeful that our R&D bill will be part of
a comprehensive bipartisan cybersecurity bill. Previous efforts to
move a larger bill have stalled over some significant policy dis-
agreements, but I am hopeful that we will be able to resolve our
differences and I look forward to working with both my colleagues
and the Administration to ensure the development of a strong
cybersecurity strategy this Congress.
However, I am also concerned that top-line cuts to our federal
R&D budgets will have a negative impact on any long-term
cybersecurity strategy. So we must also take actions to mitigate the
impact of those cuts.
Today, we will hear from witnesses who are actively engaged in
efforts to improve the security of our digital infrastructure. I look
forward to their valuable insights and the challenges we face in
tackling this complex issue and the role of cybersecurity R&D and
education in any comprehensive solutions.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
15
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH

RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DANIEL LIPINSKI
I want to thank both Chairman Massie and Chairman Bucshon for holding this
hearing to examine the serious cybersecurity challenges faced by our nation. In par-
ticular, I look forward to hearing feedback from our witnesses on H.R. 756, The
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, that I recently reintroduced along with Mr.
McCaul.
I echo my colleagues’ remarks about the nature and severity of the challenges we
face in cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors. Four years ago when
I began working on this legislation I said that I had no doubt that our use of the
Internet and other communication networks would continue to grow and evolve, and
that threats from individual hackers, criminal syndicates, and even other govern-
ments would grow and evolve too.
Today it remains difficult to imagine just how much more we will simultaneously
benefit from, and be made more vulnerable by, information technology. Hacking is
no longer just the realm of computer whizzes. Today, anyone can ‘‘rent’’ a botnet
or gain access to other sophisticated hacking tools with just a few key strokes and
less than a hundred dollars.
Cybercrime threatens our national security, our critical infrastructure, businesses
of all sizes, and every single American. As such, reducing our risk and improving
the security of cyberspace will take the collective effort of both the Federal govern-
ment and the private sector, as well as scientists, engineers, and the general public.
With respect to that collective effort, I need to emphasize the importance of re-
search into the social and behavioral aspects of cybersecurity. People are perhaps
the most significant part of our IT infrastructure, but they are also the ‘weakest
link.’ Many cyber attacks are successful because of human error—bad cyber hy-
giene—such as unwittingly opening a malicious email. Having the most sophisti-
cated security systems available won’t make any difference if users don’t change fac-
tory-set default passwords or they set easy to crack passwords. Understanding the
human element and educating users to practice good cyber hygiene is necessary to
combating threats and reducing risk.
Mr. McCaul and I are hopeful that our R&D bill will be part of a comprehensive,
bipartisan cybersecurity bill. Previous efforts to move a larger bill have stalled over
some significant policy disagreements, but I am hopeful that we will be able to re-
solve our differences and I look forward to working with both my colleagues and the
Administration to ensure the development of a strong cybersecurity strategy this
Congress.
However, I am also concerned that top line cuts to our federal R&D budgets will
have a negative impact on any long-term cybersecurity strategy. So we must also
take actions to mitigate the impact of those cuts.
Today, we will hear from witnesses who are actively engaged in efforts to improve
the security of our digital infrastructure. I look forward to their valuable insight
into the challenges we face in tackling this complex issue and the role of
cybersecurity R&D and education in any comprehensive solution.
16
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening
statements, your statements will be added to the record at this
point.
It is now time to introduce our panel of witnesses. I yield to Ms.
Lofgren of California, who will introduce our first witness.
Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
it is indeed an honor to introduce Michael Barrett, who is the Chief
Information Security Officer for PayPal, located in San Jose, Cali-
fornia. He is the, as I say, the Chief Information Security Officer
for PayPal, and in his role, he is responsible for ensuring the secu-
rity of PayPal’s 113 million users worldwide.
Prior to joining PayPal, he was Vice President of Security and
Utility Strategy at American Express, where he helped defined the
company’s Information Security Program, and in prior years, he
was President of the Liberty Alliance, an Open Standards Consor-
tium focused on identity management standards and guidelines. He
was the driving force behind the introduction and standardization
of the Alliance’s federated identity concepts, and he also co-chaired
its Identity Threat Prevention Working Group.
He was twice named one of the 50 most powerful people in net-
working by Network World magazine, and it is wonderful that he
is testifying today about our bill that focuses on NIST and NSF,
but I am also pleased that he has identified in his testimony cer-
tain outdated statutes like EPCA, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, that have prevented anti-cybercrime-related programs,
which is also an important service that he is performing for the
Committee today.
So thank you for letting me introduce this important witness who
comes from back home.
And I yield back.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren.
I recognize Chairman Smith to introduce our second witness.
Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman, our second witness, Dr. Frederick Chang, is a Presi-
dent and Chief Operating Officer of 21CT. 21CT appropriately is
headquartered within Texas’ 21st Congressional District, which is
home to Cyber City USA, otherwise known as San Antonio, thanks
in part to technology organizations like Dr. Chang’s.
Dr. Chang brings to us today with 30 years of public and private
sector cybersecurity knowledge serving as the Director of Research
at the National Security Agency and then in an executive role at
SBC Communications. Additionally, he has served in academia at
both the University of Texas in San Antonio and the University of
Texas in Austin. He received his B.A. degree from the University
of California San Diego and both his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from
the University of Oregon.
We welcome you, Dr. Chang.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
Our final witness is Ms. Terry Benzel, the Deputy Director of
Cyber Networks and Cyber Security of the USC Information
Sciences Institute.
17
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to

five minutes each after which Members of the Committee have five
minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony will be in-
cluded in the record of this hearing.
I now recognize our first witness, Mr. Michael Barrett, for five
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL BARRETT,
CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER, PAYPAL, INC.
Mr. BARRETT. Chairman Bucshon, Chairman Massie, Ranking
Member Lipinski, Ranking Member Wilson, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about
what PayPal and the eBay Inc. family of companies are doing to
protect our users from the growing cybersecurity challenges facing
Internet-enabled companies and what our Nation’s policymakers
can do to assist us in tackling these problems.
My name is Michael Barrett and I am the Chief Information Se-
curity Officer for PayPal. EBay and PayPal connects millions of
buyers and sellers across the globe through eBay Marketplaces,
PayPal, GSI, and other mobile-based businesses. And we believe all
sustainable 21st century retail business models will use the Inter-
net and mobile technology. However, as the Internet and mobile
platforms become more attractive to consumers and businesses
alike, they also attract criminals. Companies like PayPal will con-
tinue to work to protect the safety and security of our platform and
our users.
However, we believe that the traditional technical measures
alone cannot significantly move the trend line and that there are
concrete steps that industry and policymakers should take to sig-
nificantly mitigate the impact of cybercrime. For example, on a
daily basis Internet companies are run into sites where they have
been compromised and they are used as ‘‘phishing’’ or ‘‘spoof sites.’’
Recognizing the growing threat, PayPal launched an industry
standards program called DMARC, which is intended to increase
trust and combat email deception and fraud. DMARC allows send-
ers to experience consistent authentication results for their mes-
sages at AOL, Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo!, and any other email re-
ceiver implementing DMARC. The program removes the guesswork
from the receiver’s handling of any failed messages, limiting or
eliminating the user’s exposure to potentially fraudulent and harm-
ful messages. In its first year, DMARC protected 60 percent of the
world’s email inboxes and rejected hundreds of millions of poten-
tially fraudulent messages.
In addition to email authentication, we have also been engaged
in efforts to create a reliable identity management system. We
have participated in two different programs: the National Strategy
for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) and the Fast Identity
Online Alliance, or FIDO.
NSTIC is a White House initiative led by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology, which is intended to work collabo-
ratively with all interested stakeholders to improve the privacy, se-
curity, and convenience of sensitive online transactions. PayPal will
be offering more services to our customers over the coming months
that directly support both the NSTIC vision, which we expect will
18
result in many new benefits to both our customers and the Internet
overall.
PayPal was also one of the cofounders of the FIDO Alliance,
which is intended to address the lack of interoperability among
strong authentication solutions, as well as the problems users face
with creating and remembering multiple usernames and pass-
words. By giving the option to replace passwords with authentica-
tion methods embedded in hardware, it can be used in biometric
tools such as fingerprint scanners, voice and facial recognition, or
more traditional security methods. Our goal is to provide an easier
and safer solution to every company, vendor, and organization that
needs to verify a user’s identity.
Although it is the responsibility of industry leaders like PayPal
to ensure the safety and security of our platforms and our users,
federal policymakers have an important role to play in creating a
secure Internet and mobile ecosystem. What we have found from
our years of combating cybercrime is that quantifying the forecast
is difficult, if not impossible, because many incidents are not re-
ported. Estimates of the magnitude and scope of cybercrime vary
widely, making it difficult for policymakers and industry to fully
understand the problem and the level of effort that will be needed
to combat it.
We recommend that policymakers fund some research that helps
fill some of the information gaps that currently exist as it relates
to cybercrime. We believe that this research will be a critical tool
in arming policymakers, law enforcement, and industry against the
growing threat of cybercrime.
In addition, PayPal appreciates the bipartisan efforts of the Com-
mittee to create a legislative framework that creates innovative so-
lutions to issues such as cybersecurity R&D, education and work-
force training, and standards development. Importantly, it achieves
these ends without creating undesired side effects, and we welcome
the opportunity to work with the Committee on these priorities.
To conclude, it is our hope that in the years to come the chal-
lenges we face today from cybercrime will be a faint memory. But
until then, PayPal is committed to partnering with policymakers
and private and public stakeholders to ensure that everything we
do in our power to create an ecosystem that is safe and secure.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barrett follows:]
19
TESTIMONY OF
Michael Barrett
Vice President, Information Risk Management
Chief Information Security Officer
PayPal
eBay Inc.
BEFORE THE
United States House of Representatives
Committee on Science, Space and Technology
Subcommittee on Research and Snbcommittee on Technology
"Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions"
PRESENTED
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2318
February 26, 2013
10:00 AM
20
Testimony of
Michael Barrett
Vice President, Information Risk Management
Chief Information Security Officer
Pay Pal
eBay Inc.
Before the
United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Research and Subcommittee on Technology
Presented:
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2318
February 26, 2013
10:00 AM
Chainnan Bucshon, Chainnan Massie, Ranking Member Lipinski, Ranking Member

Wilson, and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today
about Pay Pal and what we, and the eBay Inc. family are doing to protect our users from the
growing cybersecurity challenges that are facing Internet-enabled companies large and small and
what our nation's policymakers can do to assist us in tackling this growing problem.
My name Michael Barrett and I am the Vice President of Infonnational Risk

Management and Chief Infonnation Security Officer for PayPal, a member of the eBay Inc.
family. Founded in 1995 in San Jose, Calif., eBay Inc. connects millions of buyers and sellers
globally on a daily basis through eBay, the world's largest online marketplace, and PayPal, which
enables individuals and businesses to securely, easily, and quickly send and receive online
2
21
payments. We also reach millions through specialized marketplaces such as StubHub, the world's
largest ticket marketplace, and eBay classifieds sites. And through our company GS!
Commerce, eBay Tnc. has become the leading provider of eCommerce and interactive marketing
services for many of the world's premier brands and retailers, such as Toys R Us, Ralph Lauren
and Dick's Sporting Goods.
Additionally, eBay Inc. is actively working to revolutionize global commerce with the
recent additions of mobile technology companies WHERE, Milo, Zong and others combined
with the seasoned services of eBay Marketplaces Mobile and PayPal Mobile. In fact, in 2012,
eBay Inc. generated nearly $14 billion in global mobile sales. PayPal Mobile also experienced
great popularity across the globe, with over 17 million consumers in over 80 markets worldwide.
Our global consumers bought everything from cars, clothing, shoes, electronics, and toys from
eBay and PayPal's mobile applications.
eBay Inc. is a very diverse family of businesses supporting millions of users ranging from
individual consumers to merchants and retailers of every shape and size. As enablers of
commerce, eBay Inc. and PayPal facilitate consumers buying just about anything whether on or
offline. We enable consumers to pay online, pay with a phone, pay with a card from your wallet
or pay with nothing but a phone number and a secure pin. All sustainable 21 st Century retail
business models, large and small alike, will use the Internet and mobile technology tools and it is
our hope to be their partner in that venture.
With this growing trend in mind, eBay Inc. and PayPal recognize that our success and the
success of our retail partners are dependent on our ability to engender consumer trust and
confidence. It is our belief that without trust, the Internet and mobile marketplaces will fail to
reach their full potential. Security and trust are mutually reinforcing. It is hard to build
consumer trust without ensuring the safety and security of a consumer's personal information,
whether it is financial data, transaction history, etc.
To foster that trust, we've worked to meet customer expectations with every product we
offer. PayPal and its "shop without sharing" design, was created to offer a secure alternative to
3
22
traditional payment systems. Security is one of the fundamental building blocks of the PayPal
services. The beauty of PayPal is that it allows consumers to send money or pay for a good or
service without ever having to expose their credit card or bank account information to merchants
or other PayPal users. It allows consumers to shop online or on their mobile device without
having to share the most sensitive personally identifiable information, financial and banking
information. Not only does this security-enhancing technology allow consumers to fully enjoy
the convenience of online and mobile commerce without worrying about safety and security
concerns, but it also allows merchants to receive payments without the cost and potential liability
associated with processing and securing financial information.
However, as the Internet and mobile platforms become more attractive to consumers and
businesses alike, it also attracts criminals and bad actors that are looking to profit by exploiting
Internet companies and users. And unfortunately, their behavior has furthered the perception of
certain individuals that the Internet and mobile platforms are unsafe and therefore unsuitable for
everyday use. Companies like eBay and PayPal will continue to fight back against this
perception and work to protect the safety and security of our platform and our users. However, as
cybercriminal activities slowly get worse, we believe that traditional technical measures alone
cannot significantly move the trend line in a positive direction and that there are concrete steps
that industry and policymakers should take to significantly mitigate the impact of cybercrime and
reduce its frequency.
I would like to take the next few minutes to highlight some of the successful security-
related programs that my team has engaged in over the last few years and also recommend some
areas that would benefit from government engagement.
PayPaI's Efforts on Cybersecuritv
DMARC: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance
On a daily basis, Internet companies, including PayPal, run into sites that have been
compromised and are being used as "phishing" or "spoof' sites, which are intended to defraud
4
23
Internet companies and their users by various means. With the rise of the social Internet and the
ubiquity of e-commerce, spammers and phishers have a tremendous financial incentive to
compromise user accounts, enabling theft of passwords, bank accounts, credit cards, and more.
Unfortunately, email is very easy to spoof and criminals have found this activity to be an
opportunity to exploit user's trust of well-known brands. By simply inserting the logo of a well-
known brand into an email, spoofers give their emails instant legitimacy with many users.
Recognizing the growing threat from these types of behaviors, PayPal, in coordination
with other industry partners, launched a program over a year ago called DMARC, which is
meant to increase email trust and combat rampant email deception and fraud, such as spam and
phishing. DMARC, which stands for Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting &
Conformance, builds on previous email authentication advancements, with strong protection of
the author's address and creating a feedback loop from receivers back to legitimate email
senders. DMARC standardizes how email receivers perform email authentication using the
well-known Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM)
mechanisms. This means that senders will experience consistent authentication results for their
messages at AOL, Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! and any other email receiver implementing DMARC.
The program removes the guesswork from the receiver's handling of any failed messages,
limiting or eliminating the user's exposure to potentially fraudulent and harmful messages.
DMARC also provides a way for the email receiver to report back to the sender about messages
that pass and/or fail DMARC evaluation.
In its first year, DMARC:
• Protected 60 percent of the world's email boxes or 1.976 billion of the estimated 3.3 billion
email boxes worldwide. Protected 80 percent of US typical consumer mailboxes;
Has been adopted by the world's largest consumer email providers- AOL, Comcast, Google,
Mail.ru, Microsoft, NetEase, Xs4AIl, and Yahoo!;
• Can claim 50 percent of the top 20 sending domains publish a DMARC policy, with 70
percent of those domains asserting a policy that directs receivers to take action against
unauthenticated messages; and
5
24
Rejected hundreds of millions of potentially fraudulent messages. As an example, in

November and December 2012, more than 325 million messages were rejected as purporting
to be "From" domains with a DMARC reject policy.
Identity Management and Authentication
The Internet, especially with recent rapid mobile and cloud expansion, exposes users and
enterprises, more than ever before, to fraud. We at PayPal believe it is critical to know who
you're dealing with on the Internet at all times. Therefore, my team has also been very engaged
in efforts to create a reliable identity management system to promote identity and stronger
authentication. As a company that facilitates secure online and mobile financial transactions, it
is critical that we have the ability to authoritatively authenticate our users. We strongly support
efforts to create a workable "Identity Ecosystem" - where stakeholders work to protect
individuals, businesses, and public agencies from the high costs of cyber crimes, like identity
theft and fraud, while simultaneously helping to ensure that the Internet continues to support
innovation and a thriving marketplace of products and ideas. To accomplish this goal, we have
participated in two different programs, The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace (NSTIC) and The Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance.
As many of you know, NSTIC is a White House initiative, led by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, which is intended to work collaboratively with the private sector,
advocacy groups, public sector agencies, and other organizations to improve the privacy,
security, and convenience of sensitive online transactions. The program has been mostly led by
the private sector, in partnership with the federal government, consumer advocacy organizations,
privacy experts, state and local agencies, and others. Organizations representing 18 different
business and infrastructure sectors and 70 different nonprofit and federal advisory groups have
participated in the development of the "Strategy".
NSTIC differs from past efforts to encourage trusted IDs in several ways. From the
outset, the NSTIC has involved the private sector as a partner in the effort. For instance,
members of my team have served as significant contributors to the Identity Ecosystem Steering
Oroup (IDESO) and Brett McDowell of PayPal current chairs the IDESO Management Council.
6
25
In our work at the lDESG we've worked diligently to ensure that the rules and practices put in
place do actually fulfill the promise ofNSTIC.
We have consistently advocated that trustworthy online identity is a key component of a

healthy Internet ecosystem. PayPal will be offering more services to our customers over the
coming months that directly support the NSTIC vision, which we expect will result in many new
benefits to both our customers and the Internet overall.
PayPal was also one of the co-founders of The Fast Identity Online (FlDO) Alliance.
Formed in July 2012, with Lenovo, Nok Nok Labs, Infineon and others, the goal of the Alliance
is to address the Jack of interoperability among strong authentication devices as well as the
problems users face with creating and remembering multiple usernames and passwords. The
FlDO Alliance plans to change the nature of authentication by developing specifications that
define an open, scalable, interoperable set of mechanisms that supplant reliance on passwords to
securely authenticate users of online services. This new standard for security devices and
browser plugins will allow any website or cloud application to interface with a broad variety of
existing and future FlDO-enabled devices that the user has for online security.
How it works is that our protocol-based model will automatically detect when a FIDO-
enabled device is present, meaning that end users from the banking, corporate, public sector or
consumer arenas could be given the option to replace passwords with authentication methods
embedded in hardware. It can be deployed in biometric tools such as fingerprint scanners, voice
and facial recognition technology, or more traditional security aids such as one-time password
(OTP) tokens or trusted platform models.
The FlDO Alliance is a private sector and industry-driven collaboration to combat the
very real challenge of confirming every user's identity online. By giving users choice in the way
they authenticate and taking an open-based approach to standards, we can make universal online
authentication a reality. We wanted to provide an easier and safer solution to every company,
vendor, and organization that needs to verify user identity.
7
26
The National Cyber Security Alliance and Promoting Education Awareness
As a responsible corporate citizen, we believe that we have an important role to play in

education and awareness campaigns that help consumers and businesses protect themselves
online. Currently, PayPal is on the board of the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA) and
we are very engaged in their Stay Safe Online national program. We believe in the NCSA's
mission which is to "educate and empower a digital society to use the Internet safely and
securely at home, work, and school, while protecting the technology, individuals' use, the
networks they connect to, and our shared digital assets".
In cooperation with a number of large Internet companies and major web browser
makers, PayPal participated in an education campaign in 20 I 0 to encourage our customers to
upgrade their web browser to the latest and most secure version.
Recommendations for Federal Policymakers
Although it is the responsibility of industry leaders, like PayPal, to ensure the safety and
security of our platforms and our users, federal policymakers have an important role to play in
creating a secure Internet and mobile ecosystem. Here are some of our recommendations for
areas where the federal government, and specifically Congress, can lend a helping hand.
Research and Reliable Data
As you know, the Internet offers tremendous benefits and efficiencies to businesses and
consumers and over the years this has led to a burgeoning Internet-enabled industry. However,
as online business transactions increase and more and more consumers adopt Internet and mobile
services, cyber criminals are given greater access to business assets and personal information
than ever before, opening up risks for intellectual property theft, identity theft, and other crimes.
What we have found from our years of combatting cybercrime, is quantifying the full
cost is difficult if not impossible because many incidents are not reported. Estimates of the
8
27
magnitude and scope of cybercrime vary widely, making it difficult for policymakers and
industry to fully understand the severity of the problem and the level of effort that will be needed
to combat it. However, based on recent studies, cybercrime is definitely a growing problem. For
instance, a 2011 government-sponsored study in the United Kingdom found that cybercrime cost
£27 billion (about $44 billion) in the UK alone, with businesses bearing three-quarters of that
cost. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received 22% more
self-reported cybercrime complaints in 2009 than the previous year - and that the dollar value
of these incidents was skyrocketing, up III % in 2009 to more than $550 million. It's clear that
business is currently sustaining significant losses to cybercrime, but until we know how much
money is being lost, where the money is going and whether or not the responsible parties can be
held accountable, it will be hard to create a framework that really addresses the problems.
It is our recommendation that policymakers sponsor research that helps to fill in some of
the information gaps that currently exist as it relates to cybercrime. We believe that this research
will be a critical tool in arming policymakers, law enforcement and industry against the growing
threat of cybercrime.
Increased Resources for Law Enforcement and Greater Workforce Development
The difference between the effectiveness of law enforcement in the physical world and
on the Internet could not be more striking. In the real world even minor crimes such as
vandalism and burglary resulting in relatively low dollar losses merit at least a visit by a police
officer, while online crimes exceeding $25,000 frequently go uninvestigated, much less
prosecuted. We believe that this unfortunate reality is mainly due to insufficient funding for
cybercrime law enforcement and a general lack of trained cyber experts within law enforcement
and policy circles.
We believe that there is a significant increase or a reprioritization needed in the funding

of agencies which investigate and prosecute cybercrime offenses. We don't offer a specific
proposal for the appropriate funding levels but we believe the case for additional resources will
be easily made once better data is available regarding the scope of the problem. We recommend
9
28
that policymakers look to find ways to help law enforcement agencies address these resource
needs.
In addition, we encourage policy makers to find ways to encourage greater workforce

development and training for cybersecurity professionals. Most important for PayPal and e8ay
is training for computer programmers in secure development practices. While computer science
programs have been quite effective in turning out students with the appropriate general
programming knowledge and skills necessary for today's jobs, they have not kept up with the
demand of security conscious companies who need programmers who know how to develop
applications securely and free from technical flaws. While we are seeing progress at a number of
institutions we believe substantial investment is warranted in this field.
Increase Enforcement Across Borders
The European convention on cybercrime has represented an extremely important

framework for dealing with cybercrime internationally. However, there are two ways in which it
has fallen short.
The convention allows nations to cooperate with each other in investigating cases of
cybercrime. It permits one state to request that a second state preserves and supplies the
necessary data needed to support a particular investigation. However, the mechanisms used to
request the data are antediluvian: Multi-Lateral Assistance Treaties (MLATs), and "Letters
Rogatory". In all of the cases where we have worked with multi-country investigations, we have
never witnessed a case in which the data has been returned to the requesting law enforcement
agency in under three months. We have found that six months is more common, and we have
heard of cases where the data has been returned more than two years after it was originally
requested. Given the speed at which cyber attacks move, this slow response time effectively
hobbles the investigating law enforcement agency and frequently cripples investigations. During
this time, the criminals are allowed to keep victimizing citizens and law abiding organizations.
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We agree that there needs to be some level of supervision, and approval, such that rogue
officers (or worse) cannot request arbitrary infonnation from another state, without good
purpose. But, in the age of the Internet, most workflow functions can be highly automated. The
technology to do this exists, and is readily available. We recommend that policymakers consult
our domestic law enforcement organizations who best understand how to fix current practices
and make cross border enforcement a more coordinated and streamlined process.
Removing Barriers to Private and PubliclPrivate Cooperation
In our testimony we have highlighted a number of cases where we have partnered with
private and public entities to find solutions to the growing threat of cybercriminal activities.
Although we have been very successful in some of these cases, we believe that we could
accomplish more by working with policymakers to remove some of the barriers that prevent
private industry from working together to protect the Internet ecosystem.
One of those barriers relates to information sharing between private companies. We

understand and strongly support the need of strong privacy protections for consumers and
individual businesses, however, we also believe that outdated provisions of certain laws, such as
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), have been interpreted in a way that
impedes the ability of private industry to work together to combat cybercrime in a way that
protects ourselves and our users.
For instance, as I testified, our DMARC program has been very successful in stopping
unauthenticated emails from reaching inboxes. However, the DMARC program is not
necessarily as effective as it could be because of the limitations the current statute places on
private-to-private information sharing, even in cases of security. Not only does DMARC
provide a way for email providers to tell whether or not an email is authentic, but it also provides
a way for the email receiver to report back to the sender about messages that pass andlor fail
DMARC evaluation. This reporting is a matter of common sense. If cybercriminal is using a
company's trademark and brand in an unauthorized manner, we believe that company would
want to know, and should know, where that email is coming from in a timely manner so that they
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30
can work with the proper authorities to take down the rogue website. Unfortunately, some
current interpretations of ECPA prohibit voluntary information sharing of this nature between
private companies. Unfortunately, instead of helping to protect companies and consumers from
bad actors like its original intent, these privacy laws are serving to immunize illegal actions from
further scrutiny. We ask that policymakers review ECPA and other potentially outdated laws
that can prohibit companies from meaningfully protecting the security and privacy rights of their
users and themselves.
Increase Consumer Education Awareness
It is clear from a variety of sources, that most consumers have little idea how to protect
themselves online. However, it is also clear that the problem is much larger than the scope of
work happening today. There are many studies that show the majority ofInternet users are both
afraid of the risk of using the Internet, and simultaneously don't have the information needed to
protect themselves online.
While the education efforts from organizations like NCSA are helpful, they are simply
not at the scale needed to help hundreds of millions of Internet users across the United States.
This area needs to experience significant increase in investment from both private industry and
government stakeholders.
In addition, we believe that there should be some consideration of introducing cyber-

safety education curriculum into public schools. There are a number of studies showing how
these "digital natives" are in fact more trusting of the Internet. Although it is important that we
continue to foster adoption of Internet and mobile technologies at a young age, we also think it is
necessary to educate children on the potential risks and dangers and how to avoid them. This
problem is more tractable than general consumer outreach, as there are formal channels-i.e.
schools--by which this group of users can be reached. All that is needed is the development of a
formal safety and security curriculum, and an insistence that this topic becomes one of the core
areas taught to students.
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Establish a Coordinated Internet Safety Framework
When we look at other forms of technical innovation throughout history, we can clearly
see that these innovations were coupled with attendant public policy, self-regulation and public
reaction that were instructive for understanding the various roles and responsibilities that each
stakeholder had to play in order to maintain the safety and benefits of the technology. For
instance, today, when you ask an individual the parties responsible for ensuring the safety on our
highways, most people would probably be able to instinctively respond with the names of a few
ofthe responsible stakeholders, such as motorists, local and state law enforcement, state and
federal departments of transportation, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Most Americans know this because there is a solid framework that was created and implemented
years ago that is intended to keep motorists safe while traveling on our nation's highway system.
However, when you ask that same question, but replace highways with the Internet, the
same individual would most likely fail to give a response. Unfortunately, we as a country have
failed to adopt a framework for the Internet and mobile ecosystem that clearly lays out the
various stakeholders and jurisdictions involved and the roles that each stakeholder has to ensure
users safety while they are traveling on the World Wide Web.
We recommend that Congress work with various stakeholders, including consumers,

industry, policymakers, regulators, academics, and civil liberty groups, to create a national
framework that creates a clear and concise model for how our nation keeps one of our greatest
engines of economic growth safe and secure for all users.
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act
In light of these policy recommendations, I did want to take a few minutes to praise the
work that the House Science, Space & Technology Committee has done to address some of the
cybersecurity challenges facing our nation. PayPal appreciates the bipartisan efforts of the
Committee over the past few years to create a legislative framework that creates some innovative
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solutions to issues such as cybersecurity R&D, education and workforce training, and standards
development. Importantly, it achieves these ends without creating undesired side-effects.
In particular, we are very appreciative and supportive of the following provisions within
the legislation and would welcome the opportunity to work with Members of the Committee on
these priorities:
• Section 104 - Social and behavioral research in cybersecurity: This section is

well aligned with a number of our efforts and our recommendations in terms of
areas that need additional research. In particular, we think that Human Computer
Interaction (HCI) topics in security are a new frontier and we applaud the
Committee for their consideration of these issues.
• Section 109 - Security automation and Checklists: Improved automation and

repeatability are key. We appreciate the Committee's attention to these issues and
believe that this work will have a positive impact.
• Section 205 - Strengthen Authentication for Identity Systems: As I testified, this

is the wave ofthe future in terms of improving security of the Internet and mobile
ecosystems and this is completely aligned with our work on FIDO and NSTIC.
Conclusion
To conclude, Pay Pal is committed to providing our customers with the safety and security
that they not only deserve, but expect. We recognize that security is a key component of their
experience and the trust they place with us. As technology changes, as the world changes, the
security measures that we adopt will continue to change. However, my role is to keep up with
these rapidly evolving trends and not only surpass the bar that our consumers and employees
challenge us to reach on a daily basis, but work to find solutions that will benefit not just PayPal
but the entire Internet and mobile ecosystem. It is our hope that in the years to come the
challenges we face from cybercrime will be a faint memory. But until then, PayPal is committed
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to partnering with policymakers and private and public stakeholders to ensure that we do
everything in our power to create an ecosystem that is safe and secure.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I look forward to your
questions.
15
34
Chairman MASSIE. I now recognize our next witness, Dr. Fred-

erick Chang.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK R. CHANG,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, 21CT, INC.
Dr. CHANG. Chairman Massie, Chairman Bucshon, Chairman
Smith, Ranking Member Wilson, Ranking Member Lipinski, Mem-
bers of the Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today on the hearing on the topic of cyber R&D chal-
lenges and solutions.
My name is Frederick R. Chang and I am currently the Presi-
dent and COO of 21CT, Inc., a small high-tech company in Austin,
Texas. In prior positions, I have served as the Director of Research
at the National Security Agency, in academia at the University of
Texas—at both the San Antonio and Austin campuses, and in the
telecommunications industry.
I would also mention that I have served as a member of the CSIS
Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, and I am
currently a member of the Texas Cybersecurity Education and Eco-
nomic Development Council.
I do not have to tell you that we are under attack in cyberspace.
Those of us in the field of security have known about it for some
time now, but now the problem has broadened and deepened its
scope. Our friends know, our neighbors know, our kids know.
The field of cybersecurity is too reactive and after-the-fact. We
wait for something bad to happen and then we respond. We lack
the fundamental scientific understanding of causes, of solutions, of
countermeasures. Science uses words like evidence, metrics, repeat-
ability, predictability. In cybersecurity these words are not used
often enough. Indeed, when it comes to predictability, about the
only thing we can predict with a high degree of confidence is that
a determined hacker will be able to compromise the target system.
At the turn of the 20th century, life expectancy in the United
States was a little over 47 years. A century later, it was nearly 77
years. Why did this happen? A large part of the improvement can
be traced to advances in public health and an improved under-
standing of the science of infectious diseases. After World War II,
scientists isolated causes and developed solutions for diseases like
polio, measles, and chickenpox. I am not arguing that the
cybersecurity problem today is as bad as polio was in the ’40s and
’50s, but I am suggesting that we know how to make a dent in the
problem.
It won’t be easy because the problem is truly a daunting one
against a highly adaptive adversary. I believe that a broad and
interdisciplinary approach will be necessary. I offered a few ideas
in my written testimony.
One of the major obstacles to more progress in cybersecurity is
a lack of qualified and well-trained professionals in the field. Just
as a generation of students became fascinated by and intellectually
curious about space, science, and engineering after the launch of
Sputnik, we need for that to happen now for a new generation of
students about cyberspace science and engineering.
The skills gap comes up time and time again. It was a key issue
in our work on the CSIS Cybersecurity Commission co-chaired by
35
Congressman McCaul and Congressman Langevin, and it was a

key issue in our work on the Texas Cybersecurity Council.
And representing a small company with ongoing demand for
highly technical cyber hires, it is a constant challenge for us to
identify and recruit the necessary expertise. Not only do we need
a long-term pipeline of well-trained students to fill the many jobs
that will be necessary, but the demand is particularly acute with
respect to the requirement for the extremely deep technical skills
needed to operate at the very highest levels.
In a CSIS Commission report from 2010, there was an estimate
that we have about 1,000 deeply technical people in the United
States who can operate at the most elite levels but that we need
something like 10,000 to 30,000. The report went on to say we not
only have a shortage of the highly technically skilled people re-
quired to operate in support systems already deployed, but also and
even more desperate—a more desperate charge of people who can
design secure systems, write safe computer code, and create the ev-
ermore sophisticated tools to prevent, detect, mitigate, and recon-
stitute from damage due to system failures and malicious acts.
The legislation in H.R. 2096 places front and center two of the
items I believe are central to making more progress in improving
the Nation’s cybersecurity posture: research and development and
cybersecurity workforce development.
Let me close by saying that I have suggested some things in my
testimony that will take a long time to implement. For example,
producing a long-term, robust, and deeply technical cybersecurity
workforce or creating a science of cybersecurity could take decades.
I am reminded of an old proverb. The best time to plant a tree
was 20 years ago. The second best time is now. It is my sincere
hope that 20 years from now we can look back at this time and say
that this is when we began to turn the tables on our cyber adver-
saries and took the advantage back.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Chang follows:]
36
Written Testimony of
Dr. Frederick R. Chang
President and COO
21CT,lnc.
Before the
Subcommittee on Technology and the Subcommittee on Research
U.S. House of Representatives
Hearing on
February 26,2013
Chairman Massie, Chairman Bucshon, Ranking MemberWilson, Ranking Member Lipinski,

Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you in today's
hearing on the topic of Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions. My name is Frederick R. Chang
and I am currently the President and COO of 21 CT, Inc. in Austin, Texas. In prior positions, I
have served at the National Security Agency (as Director of Research); in academia (at The
University of Texas at San Antonio and at The University of Texas at Austin); and in the
telecommunications industry (at SBC Communications, Pacific Bell, and Bell Laboratories). I
would also mention that I have served as a member of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity
for the 44th Presidency and I am currently a member of the Texas Cybersecurity, Education, and
Economic Development Council.
You may not have heard of my company 21CT, Inc. before, but briefly we are a small,
technology company headquartered in Austin, Texas. We have a 12-year history of maturing
37
new technologies, starting with early research and going all the way through operational military
and commercial use. Our products are focused on the areas of intelligence analytics, computer
network defense analytics, and fraud detection.
The Cybersecurity Challenge
Not too long ago, we were anxiously awaiting the arrival of the "Information Superhighway". It
promised to improve our productivity, enrich our lives, educate our children and so much more,
via e-commerce, e-banking, e-Iearning, e-government, and the like. The Internet and the world-
wide-web are among the most successful technological and commercial advances in human
history. Yet with all the progress and success, there is a dark cloud hanging over cyberspace,
and that dark cloud is security. Cyber infrastructure is tightly woven into the very fabric of our
lives and it would be very hard to imagine going back to an earlier time -- but we are paying a
heavy price for our technological dependence and the problem is worsening with the passage of
time. Our trust in cyberspace has been taken from us by hackers, cybercriminals and
sophisticated cyber attackers who intend to do us harm. We deserve better. We expect our
information to be confidential from prying eyes. We expect system resources to be available to
us if we are legitimate users of those resources. We expect that our information will not be
altered in a way that we do not intend. We expect that it should not be impossibly difficult to
protect ourselves in cyberspace if/when the need arises. These expectations are simply not
being met today. Attacks on both the public sector and the private sector are rampant. Denial
of service, identity theft, and cyber extortion are now all too common. As you are all abundantly
aware, financial systems, national critical infrastructure systems, defense systems, and much
more are all targets of sophisticated cyber attacks.
Science of Cybersecurity
The discipline of cybersecurity today is too reactive and after-the-fact. In general, something
bad has to happen and then action is taken. There is certainly some ability to stop things that
have been seen before, but unfortunately new attacks, that haven't been seen before, are all too
common. Cybersecurity is not based on a firm science and engineering foundation and I
believe it is critically important that such a foundation be created. Some important activity has
started along these lines [e.g., 1, 2], but much more is needed. In our school science classes
we learned that water at sea level changes from a liquid into a gas at 100 degrees Celsius and
into a solid at 0 degrees Celsius. Similarly we leamed about gravity and that a freely falling
object near the earth's surface will increase by approximately 9.81 meters per second every
38
second. In science, the notions of laws, principles, experiments, metrics, repeatability, and
predictability (among others) are commonly used. These words and ideas are not common in
discussions of cybersecurity today, unfortunately. Indeed it has been noted [3] that when it
comes to predictability, about the only thing we can predict confidently in cybersecurity is that a
sufficiently motivated attacker will be able to compromise the targeted system.
There are at least three different ways to think about the role of science in cybersecurity [4, see
also 5]:
1) Universal laws that enable strong quantitative predictions;

2) Systematic generalizations of knowledge;
3) Conduct of research through hypothesis formation and experimentation.
While progress is being made, we have much more work to do in all three areas.
Cybersecurity metrics
"If you can not measure it, you can not improve it. "
"I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in
numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot
express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the
beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely in your thoughts advanced to the state of
SCience, whatever the matter may be."
These quotes are from the influential 19th century mathematical physicist and engineer Lord
Kelvin, and are appropriate in a discussion of cybersecurity metrics. While important work is
taking place [e.g., 4), we need improvements in hard, objective metrics and measures of
security. Metrics are needed at many very practical levels. At a very tactical level, how do you
know if computer system A is more or less secure than computer system B? Is computer
system A more secure than it was last month? Last year? At a corporate level, how you do
measure the security of your corporate information technology infrastructure? Is it more secure
now than it was last year? Do the measures allow a pinpoint assessment of where corporate
improvements are necessary? At a much more macro level, what metrics are best used to
determine if the industry as a whole is making progress toward improving its cybersecurity
posture? How would you measure the effect of an important government policy change in
39
cybersecurity? Is it making the difference that was intended? It is relatively straightforward to

determine the effects of changing the speed limit on traffic accidents. It won't be so clear for
cybersecurity. Developing a disciplined, agreed-upon, and readily implementable set of metrics
for cybersecurity remains a hard problem. Perhaps we can look for some assistance from other
fields -- medical research has successfully employed metrics to improve the science of human
health. Measures of human health and cyber health share an important common ingredient: in
both cases we are attempting to measure the absence of something bad (human disease or
system compromise).
Cybersecurity Research and Development
In the December 2008 report from the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th
Presidency [6J, we estimated that in 2009 about 0.2% of federal R&D funding would go into
cybersecurity. That was several years ago, and no doubt the picture is different today, but at
least as of that time, we start from a very small base. Let me highlight just a few areas that I
think are important in addition to the science of cybersecurity thrust mentioned previously.
Psychology and security
While travelling in London some years ago, I was nearly pulverized by one of those large red
double-decker buses. Being from the United States, before crossing a street, I am accustomed
to looking to my left before crossing. In this case, this instinct did not serve me well. I believe
that something similar is occurring for many people as we make decisions and operate our
computers in cyberspace. The instincts and tendencies that serve us well, the vast majority of
the time in the physical world actually betray us in the complex, abstract, virtual world of
cyberspace.
Security is very often about the weakest link. Hackers need just one way in. As technical
security measures improve (e.g., greater use of encryption), then people increasingly become
the weakest link. Hackers often employ a tactic known as "social engineering" to trick computer
operators to divulge sensitive information that can be used to compromise a system (e.g., a
password). These tactics can be extremely effective and much easier to accomplish than a
technical compromise. Indeed the well-known hacker Kevin Mitnick reported in testimony to
Congress that he was so successful in social engineering that he rarely had to resort to a
technical attack [7]. More generally, there are a well-known set of cognitive biases that people
use to assess risk and make decisions [8]. These biases often cloud our reasoning and cause
40
us to improperly assess risk, in many domains, including in cyberspace. We must take steps to
strengthen the weakest link. Gaining a much richer understanding of the cognitive biases at
work in the context of decision-making in cyberspace would be just one of many important
issues that need research at the intersection of psychology and cybersecurity.
Software assurance
Software is vulnerable - and that is a key reason why cyber compromise is so prevalent today.
Modern software systems are exceedingly complex and not only must work correctly in the face
of error or mischance, but must also work correctly when an adversary is trying to attack them
and this is exactly the sort of hostile environment that cyberspace creates for software.
Software today too often treats security as an after-the-fact problem. The software is
developed, tested and released and then a security incident occurs and the software must be
patched, after-the-fact. We must move to a model where security is built in to software from the
very beginning. How can we make dramatic breakthroughs in methods, procedures, metrics
and the like that incorporate building security into software, such that software is built to be
inherently resistant and resilient to attack? Can we introduce these new techniques in ways that
are cost-effective, that speed time to delivery and that are convenient to use for developers?
Can we compose new secure software from component pieces that are not secure? There
have certainly been important contributions made in this area of research, but I believe it is time
to accelerate and reinforce innovation and progress.
Trustworthy systems
Apparently we don't trust the software on our computers. We have millions and millions lines of
software code on our machines in the form of operating systems, device drivers, applications,
etc. We know that code may not be secure, so we purchase additional security software in the
form of firewalls, anti-virus software, anti-spyware software and the like. Well, security software
may be vulnerable as well, so now what? Do we buy a firewall for our firewall? You get the
idea. Related to the software assurance topic above is the notion of the need to build systems
that are inherently trustworthy. The problem expands in scope rather dramatically when you
now must consider building scalable trustworthy systems; systems of systems connected by
networks that must all be inherently trustworthy. You want these systems and networks to be
highly available, highly reliable, highly resilient, etc. These are very hard problems that will defy
easy solution as systems and networks continue to grow in size, scope and complexity.
41
Economics and cybersecurity
Would YQJd spend $50 on software to help protect mv: computer? When you purchase anti-virus
software for your computer, one of the things that it is supposed to do is help ensure that your
computer does not become part of something called a botnet. If your computer becomes a bot,
this would mean that unwanted, malicious software has been installed on your computer that
allows a hacker (also called the botmaster) to take control of your computer. Once the
botmaster has seized control of your computer he/she can command it, for example, to do
malicious things to other computers - perhaps mine. So in a very real way, the security of mv:
computer depends on whether or not YQJd have purchased software to protect YQ!JI computer. It
is important to note that this has nothing to do with technology per se but rather with whether
economic incentives are in alignment. That is to say, the security of a system may have more to
do with economic incentives than with technical capability. Similarly, software companies are
capable of making their software more secure but so far they haven't been economically
incented to do so. Business factors such as speed to market, enhanced features, improved
system performance, and the like, often take priority over security. How much should a firm
spend to secure its cyber infrastructure? Does increased spending on cybersecurity result in
improved cybersecurity? How should the money be spent? On hardware or software or more
staff? What about a cybersecurity insurance policy? Research here will be related to work on
metrics. An active field of research has been started in this area - the results are most
illuminating -- and much more is needed.
Cybersecurity as a "wicked problem"
In May of 1961 President Kennedy announced a bold national goal, "before this decade is out,
of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth." As we all know, that
historic mission was successfully accomplished in July of 1969. Early computer security work
was starting at around the time Apollo 11 was splashing down in the Pacific Ocean, and now-
well over 40 years later - computer security is far from a solved problem. Why has this been so
hard? There are many reasons, but recently people have talked about cybersecurity as a
"wicked problem" [9]. Wicked in this context does not refer to evil, but rather resistance to
solution. Wicked problems are extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to solve and include
these properties, among others [10J:
1. The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution.

42
2, Wicked problems have no stopping rule,

3, Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but rather better-or-worse,
4, Every wicked problem is essentially unique,
5, Every solution to a wicked problem is a 'one shot operation'
6, Wicked problems have no given altemative solutions,
To the extent that cybersecurity is indeed a wicked problem, then I believe that an
interdisciplinary research approach is needed, In addition to the disciplines of psychology,
computer science and economics described above, what can we leam from the fields of biology,
medicine, physics, anthropology, political science and more? I believe these other disciplines
will add much to the research dialogue.
There are other important research topics that are not described here, that are worthy of
mention including: secure cloud computing, secure mobile computing, secure hardware, secure
hypervisors, secure coding, insider threat, data science, and many more,
The Cybersecurity Skills Gap
"The cyber threat to the United States affects all aspects of society, business and govemment,
but there is neither a broad cadre of cyber experts nor an established cyber career field to build
upon, particularly within the federal government."
(Source: Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, CSIS Commission on Cybersecurfiy for the 44th Presidency. Dec, 2008.)
The cybersecurity skills gap has been discussed extensively over the last few years [e.g., 111
and indeed the continuing shortage of qualified cyber professionals remains a major obstacle in
making significant progress in cybersecurity. Representing a small company with on-going
demands for highly technical cyber hires, it is a constant challenge for us to identify and recruit
the necessary expertise and this is a consistent theme,
In our work on the Texas Cybersecurity, Education and Economic Development Council [121,
the skills gap issue came up time and time again. It was clear to us that the workforce gap
would be a long-term problem and we advocated a "pipeline" approach to ensure a long-term
supply of well-trained, motivated cybersecurity professionals in the state, This K-through-PhD
approach is represented in the figure below and incorporates both professional training and
awareness training.
43
Cybersecurity Education Information Security

[ Curriculum Curriculum (Certificates
[ through PhD & Post-Doc)
Dual Credit
& Programs
I Post Higher
[ ~~~;r~~~:~~l
1I~!IIIlI.
~1lI1l1.~I';'I Higher
[ of Study
Education
IJ Education
Awareness
p!IIIll!IlI_lf
1(-5
Industry-based Cybersecurity Professional Training and
Certifications
1
[
[ Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Programs
[ lifelong Learning for Cybersecurity Awareness
Proposed Texas Cybersecurity Education Pipeline

(Source: Texas Cybersecurity, Education, and Economic Development Council, Dec. 2012)
In addition to a broad-based "pipeline" approach, I believe it is extremely important to take a

depth-based view as welL "There are about 1,000 security people in the US who have the
specialized security skills to operate at world-class levels in cyberspace. We need 10,000 to
30,000" [11]. This quote is reflective of the fact that while there is a broad and long-term skills
gap, the gap is especially large when it comes to the exceedingly deep technical knowledge
needed to operate at the highest level. For example, in compromising a system, a sophisticated
cyber adversary will do so in a way that avoids detection. Thus to detect the compromise
requires a very high level of skill. A national discussion of the cybersecurity skills gap must
include innovative ideas as to how to increase substantially the number of cyber professionals
with exceedingly deep technical skill.
Comments on H.R. 2096, The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2012
I was asked to comment on H.R. 2096, The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2012, and would
offer these brief comments:
44
1. There is considerable mention of cybersecurity workforce issues in this legislation:

training, education, awareness programs, scholarships, and the like. As mentioned
previously, the cybersecurity skills gap today is large and represents a major obstacle to
significant progress in improving the nation's cybersecurity posture. Initiatives that lead
to breakthrough progress in the skills gap are to be applauded. I would note the point I
mentioned previously in my testimony regarding the especially large skills gap when it
comes to the numbers of people possessing exceedingly deep technical skill and would
encourage particular attention in this area. Let me also say that while in academia I had
the opportunity to witness the benefits to students of programs like the NSF Scholarship
for Service Program and the Department of Defense Information Assurance Scholarship
Program. These scholarships are making a difference and I believe they are an
important tool in helping to close the nation's cybersecurity skills gap.
2. In section 109 of the legislation there is discussion of the need for security automation
and continuous monitoring. These are both importan1 concepts and critical at this time
as cyber adversaries will continually adapt their attack vectors, in an effort to thwart the
current defensive posture that is in place. I believe it is important to automate what you
can, but hasten to point out that, as we a" know, automation can never be perfect-
something will get through. That leads us to continuous monitoring, which is similarly
important, but I would add that there needs to be some consideration given to requiring
continuous improvement along with continuous monitoring. We should have the
expectation that the networks that are being continuously monitored, become
increasingly more resilient over time, as well.
3. Finally, a centerpiece of this legislation is cybersecurity research and development.
mentioned earlier in my testimony the estimate of 0.2% of federal R&D spending going
to cybersecurity R&D in 2009. I believe that older estimate is worth repeating here
because to the extent that this legislation can raise the trajectory of cybersecurity R&D
spending from its historical levels, that would create long-term benefit in our effort to
improve the nation's cybersecurity posture. In my testimony I also highlighted the
importance of social science research (in psychology and economics, in particular) and
indeed social science research and cybersecurity are specifically identified in Section
104. In Section 108 there is a discussion of a cybersecurity university-industry task
force to explore opportunities for collaboration in research, development, education and
training. As part of those task force deliberations, I believe it would be valuable to have
some discussion abcut the task force potentially creating and then issuing some
45
cybersecurity research grand challenges - that meet the needs of industry, govemment
and academia. Solutions to such grand challenges could help advance the field and at
the same time help solve some enduring hard problems facing practioners in the future.
Finally, and more generally, in my testimony I stressed the importance I place in
developing a science of cybersecurity. I would mention here that not all cybersecurity
research produces a benefit to cybersecurity science. It's a subtle but important point.
Among other things, cybersecurity science should tell us something about the limits of
what is possible in a particular security domain, and have broad applicability beyond a
specific platform, a particular attack or a certain defensive implementation. To be sure,

increasing the amount of very high-quality cybersecurity research will produce a tangible
benefit, but it would be my hope that some of that high-quality research be directed
toward advancing the science of cybersecurity.
Let me close by saying that I've suggested some items in my testimony that will take a long time
to implement. For example, producing a long-term, robust and deeply technical cybersecurity
workforce or creating a science of cybersecurity, could take decades. I'm reminded of an old
proverb: The best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago - the second best time is now. Thank
you again for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today.
References
1. JASON Program Office. Science of cyber-security. Report NO.:JSR-l0-102. The Mitre Corporation,
McLean, VA, November 2010.
2. Developing a blueprint for a science of cybersecurity, The Next Wave, Vol. 19, No.2, 2012, National
Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD.
3. Evans, D. & Stolfo, S. The science of security. IEEE Security & Privacy, 9, 16-17,2011.
4. Stolfo, S., Bellovin, S.M. & Evans, D. Measuring security. IEEE Security & Privacy, 9,60-65,2011.
5. Schneider, F.B. Blueprint for a science of cybersecurity, The Next Wave, Vol. 19, No.2, 47-57,2012,
National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD.
6. CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, Securing Cyberspace for the 44th
Presidency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2008.
7. Mitnick, K. Kevin Mitnick in a hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
"Cyber Attack: Is the Government Safe?" March 2, 2000.
B. Kahneman, D., Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011.
9. lucky, RW. Cyber Amnageddon. IEEE Spectrum, vol. 47, no. 9, pp. 25-25, 2010.
10. Rittel, H. & Webber, M. Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, Policy Sciences, 4, 155-169,
1973.
11. A Human Capital Crisis in Cybersecurity: Technical Proficiency Matters. CSIS Commission on
Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington,
DC, July 2010,
12. Building a More Secure and Prosperous Texas: A Report from the Texas Cybersecurity, Education,
and Economic Development Council, Austin, TX, December 2012.
46
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Dr. Chang.

I now recognize our final witness, Ms. Terry Benzel.
STATEMENT OF MS. TERRY BENZEL,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR CYBER NETWORKS AND CYBER SECURITY,
USC INFORMATION SCIENCES INSTITUTE
Ms. BENZEL. Thank you, Chairman Massie, Ranking Member
Wilson, Chairman Bucshon, Ranking Member Lipinski, and Mem-
bers of the Subcommittees. I am pleased to offer my perspective on
cyber R&D challenges and solutions based on 30 years in the
cybersecurity community.
I bring an interesting perspective stemming from Principal at a
startup company, Vice President at McAfee Software, and now the
Deputy Director of our Cyber Networks and Cyber Security Divi-
sion at the Information Sciences Institute, a research lab with the
University of Southern California’s Viterbi School where I direct
the DETER project, a cybersecurity research, experimentation, and
test facility.
I would like to address four key points today: one, the impor-
tance of broadening the purview of cybersecurity R&D; two, the im-
portance of research infrastructure for experimental cybersecurity
R&D; three, the importance of new models for technology transfer
from university research into commercial practices and products;
and four, the importance of higher education for developing next-
generation cybersecurity researchers and technologies.
Let me start with the importance of broadening the purview of
cybersecurity R&D. All too often our research is narrowly focused
on single topics. For example, we have many people conducting ex-
cellent research in distributed denial of service, worms, botnets,
and Internet routing, each studied individually and deeply. But be-
lieve me, our adversaries are not looking narrowly. In fact, they are
looking at the combinations of these different kinds of threats and
vulnerabilities, as well as combining that with cyber physical sys-
tems and social engineering.
We can no longer afford to look narrowly at the hard problems.
Even more so, cybersecurity is no longer solely an engineering dis-
cipline. We must involve economists, sociologists, anthropologists,
and other disciplines. While there has been some progress in these
areas by the National Science Foundation, DHS S&T, and others,
my first recommendation is we must increase the breadth and
scope of strategic cyber R&D and increase opportunities for multi-
disciplinary research.
Let me next address the need for research infrastructure for
cyber R&D. Historically, we have struggled to prove the value of
security technologies. Security is often viewed as the absence of
something bad happening. I didn’t get broken into, so I must be se-
cure. When I was a Vice President at McAfee Software, I visited
large customers—banking, manufacturing, and retail—and I was
always asked about return on investment, how much to spend and
how best to leverage cybersecurity investments. The truth is we
had no easy answers except, of course, to buy our products.
We need to be able to conduct science-based cyber experimen-
tation and tests just as in other scientific disciplines, real hypoth-
esis-based testing, what-if scenarios, repeatable, demonstrable re-
47
sults. We provide this in the DHS- and NSF-funded DETER project

where we provide tools and methodologies for researchers to live in
the future creating new capabilities not yet imaginable. We must
as a Nation create a paradigm shift in experimental cybersecurity.
While NSF, DHS S&T, DOE, and DARPA have all invested in
cyber testbeds and ranges, the results are uneven and not widely
available.
And this brings me to my second recommendation. Formulate a
research strategy agenda to develop a broad multi-organizational
cybersecurity experimentation and testing capability.
Let me now address technology transfer. We have had major in-
vestments over the last 20 to 30 years, yet we are still inad-
equately prepared. Much research fails to see the light of day.
While historically we have had insufficient awareness of the com-
plexity of cybersecurity tech transfer, we have had scattershot ap-
proaches to cyber R&D, and a mismatch between markets and
threats. To address these growing demands, it is imperative we cre-
ate new models of technology transfer where the government-fund-
ed efforts help steer strategic cybersecurity R&D and their new
university public partnerships.
As I have said already, we need to finally have education. More
than just training, we need to educate the next generation of re-
searchers and technologists and we need to do this by offering
hands-on exercises and educational opportunities.
Let me summarize. We are beginning to see progress in all of
these areas. NSF, DHS, and others deserve recognition for the
focus they have brought to strategic programs. However, the cur-
rent steps are not enough. We are lacking by orders of magnitude.
In order to shift the dynamic in the battlefield, the Security En-
hancement Act of 2013 includes provisions for these recommenda-
tions. Taken together, the four recommendations I have outlined
today form a basis for multipronged, sustainable, national projects
to address R&D challenges, and I urge you to take action now.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Benzel follows:]
48
Testimony of
Terry V. Benzel
University of Southern California, Information Sciences Institute
Before the House Science, Space and Technology Committee Subcommittees on

Research and Technology
Hearing on
Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions
February 26, 2013
Thank you Chairman Massie, Ranking Member Wilson, Chairman Bucshon, Ranking
Member Lipinski, and Members of the Committee, for this opportunity to discuss Cyber
Research and Development Challenges and Solutions. I am pleased to add my
perspeetive on the Committee's questions, and my eomments on the Cyber Security
Enhancement Act of2013. My remarks are based on more than 30 years in the cyber
security research and development community, including:
• Senior positions at a Fcderally Funded Research and Development Center

(FFRDC);
• Senior positions at a startup security company, Trusted Information Systems, that
underwent a successful IPO and was acquired by a large enterprise security
vendor;
• Vice President of Research at McAfee, Inc., then called Network Associates, and
among the five largest software companies in the world;
• Special Projects Director at University of California at Berkeley;
• A consultant to cyber security start-up companies seeking Small Business
Investigative Research (SBIR) grants;
• My present position with two roles: Projcct Investigator on a large DHS S&T -
funded cyber security project; and Deputy Division Director at the University of
Southern California's Information Sciences Institute, in the Cyber Networks and
Cyber Security Division.
Given my experiences, I am passionate about the topics facing this hearing:
Cyber-security threats to our critical infrastructure,

The cyber component of homeland security,
• The R&D programs needed to create new cyber-defenses and stronger critical
infrastructure,
The coordination, collaboration and education that are needed for
o technology transfer from R&D to practical cyber-defenses, and
o building the next generation of cyber-defenders who will use the new
technology created by R&D.
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1. Background
First, let me provide some background on my current work. I am the Deputy Director of
the Cybcr Networks and Cyber Security Division of the Information Sciences Institute
(lSI), part of the Viterbi School of Engineering at the University of Southern California
(USC). USC is one of the world's leading private research universities and an anehor
institution in Los Angeles, a city that is now a global center for technology, international
trade and the arts.
The Viterbi School of Engineering has been a leader in the transformation from analog to
digital communications since the early 1960s. In fact, lSI was one of the handful of
institutions around the globe that created the Internet. Our researchers largely developed
the Internet communications protocols that are still in use, administered the domain name
system (DNS) for 16 years, and coined the terms "dot-com," "dot-org", "dot-gov" and
"dot-net" that are now ubiquitous worldwide.
My cornments on R&D, and on technology transfer and education in particular, are based
on my whole professional history. They are informed by my work at lSI, which has
unique whose unique characteristics are applicable to the issues facing this panel today.
In particular:
• Our work spans three complementary and critical areas: academic, including
research and education; industrial, delivering technology-based solutions for
government and business partners; and professional, offering students unusual,
hands-on experience.
o All these components are required to pursue R&D that is well prepared for
tech transfer and use by a well-educated technology workforce.
• Our research work spans pure fundamental research to applied technology that
can be transitioned to practical use in government and industry. Numerous
systems devcloped at lSI have been fielded in operational settings. Many have
become the basis of new product offerings, either for startups or acquisition by
established teclmology companies.
• Our reliance primarily on federal funding, our experience with applied projects
and our role in educating the next generation of researchers, gives us an unusual,
integrated perspective on research, education and technology transfer needs,
processes and solutions.
In the cyber-security part ofISI, our work shares all these characteristics. My group's
cyber-security work is focused mainly on the DETER Project, which is one of the
nation's foremost resources for innovative, experiment-based cyber R&D. In DETER,
we are working to address critical strategic issues:
• Whilc cyber-threat growth continues to accelerate, the stream of new and

effective cyber-defense technologies has grown much more slowly. The gap
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50
between threat and defense has widened, even as our adversaries deploy
increasingly sophisticated attack technology and engage in cyber-crime with
unprecedented power, resources, and global reach. Moreover, targets
increasingly are attacked with foreign state sponsorship.
Our nation's cyber-adversaries are focusing not only high-profile commercial and
govemment systems, and not only the traditional critical infrastructures such as
the power grid, hydro dams, and nuclear energy facilities, but also new targets
that affect individual health and safety: wireless computing and controls in cars,
medical devices, home appliances and safety systems, and the emerging smart
energy grid that is tying them all together.
Before moving ahead with my remarks and recommendations about the eyber security
challenge and the Cyber Security Enhancement Act, I will comment on how my group's
current work addresses this cyber-security challenge, including issues of, and promising
approaches to, cyber-security enhancement.
The DETER Project
The DETER project is working to fill the cyber-security gap described above. We
function both as a research project and as the operator of a major cyber experimentation
lab, DeterLab. Our research agenda spans a wide range of innovative methods,
technology, and infrastructure for the work of cyber-security researchers. We put our
research results and innovations into practice in DeterLab, which enables researchers to
experiment with and test their cyber-security advances. One strategic goal for DeterLab is
to help researchers dramatically accelerate the pace of their work, shifting from
repetitive, small-lab engineering to the repeatable, measurable scientific expcrimentation
and testing that we enable DeterLab users to conduct.
DeterLab is a large-scale facility used by researchers from hundreds of institutions

worldwide. We enable researchers to observe and interact with real malicious software,
operating in realistic network environments, at scales found in the real world.
Researchers use the knowledge they gain from their experiments to devise cyber-defense
innovations and to build systems that are inherently more robust. My team continually is
developing capabilities that support increases in experiment scale and that refine careful,
repeatable controls on that research.
Let me repeat my point about rigorous, repeatable testing and a realistic, large-scale test
environment. These capabilities address a historical problem in tech transfer: an
innovation that works well in a predictable, controlled environment, but turns out to be
much less effective, reliable or manageable in a major, critical government or enterprise
IT environment. Without realistic, large-scale resources and research environments,
results are unpredictable. As I observed when I worked for security vendors, large
enterprise-security companies have been burned time and again by acquiring small
security startups that are attempting to commercialize university-bred research. These
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51
products may work well for a few early adopters, but rarely scale up to real enterprise
environments in terms of effective protection or practical security management.
In DeterLab, we are continually extending the shared scientific facility to help

researchers better prove their work in a realistic setting, and to better prepare for
successful tech transfer. We - and our funders at DHS S&T and DoD - believe that
realistic, scientific experimentation and testing is critieal to advancing the seale, pace,
and power of cyber-security R&D. As R&D accelerates, testing proves effective, and the
eyber-research community grows, we are becoming better positioned to help bridge the
growing cyber-security gap that endangers homeland security and critical infrastructure.
2. Cyber-Security Challenges Facing the Nation
Members of the House of Representatives, I would like to address four key points:
I. The importance of broadening the purview of cyber-security research

2. The importance of research infrastructure for experimental cyber-security
research and development
3. The importance of new models for teehnology transfer from university research
into commercial practices and products.
4. The importanee of higher education for developing next-generation cyber-seeurity
researchers and teclmologies.
2.1 Broadening Cyber-Security Research
We face threats that are rapidly increasing in scope and sophistication. As was made
painfully clear by last week's revelations of Chinese military incursions (by the
"Shanghai Group" or "Comment Crew") into US systems, we now face state-sponsored
cyber-sleuthing and cyber-terrorism. This unstable environment includes targeted attacks
by ad hoc organizations and global cybcr-crime syndicates that are escalating their
operations against systems critical to our national safety and security.
Cyber security is now a constant challenge for every faeet of civilized soeiety. We have
become completely dependent on eyber capabilities and, as a result, highly vulnerable to
wide-ranging threats. Despite years of researeh, however, we are still at the losing end of
an asymmetric battle. As members of these Sub-Committees, I'm sure you have heard
many times that steps must be taken to change these dynamics. As a nation, we must
support new forms of research and development, and must ensure that resulting advances
are based solidly in experimental science.
But even the best work is meaningless unless a chain of activities works cnd to end.
cyber- science must be transformed into meaningful technology;
• that technology must demonstrate its viability in real-world settings;
• real-world viability must become the basis for transferring technology to critical
systems that otherwise remain vulnerable;
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52
critical systems opcrators must usc and manage the new technology effectively;
Efficacy must encompass the evolving landscape of threats.
If anyone of these links falters, then cyber-security innovations will not deliver real
value to government and commercial customers. Nor will they serve the ultimate
stakeholders in those systems: you and I and our friends and family, all of whom depend
on orderly air traffic, reliable electric power, secure personal data, an alert and ready
military enterprise, and countless other vital services.
Too often, cyber-security research is narrowly focused on a few specific areas of

investigation. Unfortunately, our adversaries also are doing theirR&D, and are planning
their attack scenarios, without any of the same constraints. They are looking across
multiple threat vectors for system vulnerabilities, within and across different
technologies, and picking targets for their strategic value - not simply because they are
easy marks.
For example, our community includes scientists conducting very good research on
distributed denial of service threats, Internet worms, botnets and Internet routing attacks.
Researchers typically specialize in just one of these well-known areas, where innovative
countermeasures, protection and hardening are extremely valuable. But our adversaries
are constructing attacks that combine these areas into even more potent, multi-faceted
weapons. Often, these approaches are amplified with sophisticated social engineering
attacks designed to steal the keys to vulnerable systems.
Fortunately, there is substantial progress away from the single-focus syndrome. Federal
agency sponsors have been steering researchers toward cyber-seeurity issues that are
critical to national, homeland and economic security. One result is more breadth in
cyber-security research. Another, perhaps more critical outcome is a shift away from
existing, commercial cyber-security problems to those that are not yet subject to rigorous
work. The National Science Foundation is pursuing this strategic approach through its
Frontier, Large, Medium, and Center focused Secure and Trustworthy Computing
Program (SaTC), and through other programs aimed at increasing research breadth and
dimensionality. The DHS Science and Technology group funding also is helping shift
research to difficult, nationally strategic issues.
Still, studying broadly within our own disciplines is not enough. Cyber-security is no
longer solely an engineering discipline. It requires deep involvement from economists,
sociologists, anthropologists and other scientists to create the holistic research agendas
that can anticipate and guide effective cyber-defense strategies.
Recommendation #1: Increase the breadth and scope ofstrategic cyber-

security R&D, and create opportunities for multi-disciplinary research.
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53
The Cyberseeurity Enhaneement Act of2013 includes provisions for addressing this
rccommendation in sec. 103, Cyberseeurity Strategic Research and Development plan,
and specifieally the call in item 2 for innovative, transformational technologies.
2.2. Researcb Infrastructure for Experimental Cyber Security Researcb and

Development
Historically, cyber-security R&D has struggled to prove its value. The scientific basis for
assessing the relative strength of theoretical and technological cyber-security solutions
often has been uncertain. That uncertainty has hampered tech transition and widespread
cyber-security adoption.
Corporations and government entities often pose security as a negative, as in: "We didn't
get broken into, so we must be secure." In essence, they define security as the absence of
visible insecurity. Even those that deploy cyber-security solutions may believe in simple,
reactive "attack-defend-dctect" approaches. Given my previous remarks and those of
other cyber-security experts, it may seem puzzling that large-system organizations retain
such a naIve position. I'd like to explain from personal experience how this mindset
came about, and how a different approach to R&D is shifting the paradigm.
When I was a Vice President at McAfee, I often met with top corporate customers, which
typically were large enterprises in banking, manufacturing, retail and other industries.
The chief information officers of these organizations typically would ask me about
return-on-investment (ROI) for our products. Their concern was how much to spend on,
and how to best leverage, their cyber security investments. The truth is that we had no
easy answers. At any single point in time, thcsc customers could assess their threats and
risks, and make rational choices on what defenses to purchase and why. But the threat
erivironment changes so rapidly that those choices might be sensible only at that specific
moment, based on what was limited knowledge we, and the customers, had at the time.
Later, some choices might prove to deliver little value, while others were far more than
worth their pricc. Still other, more devastating threats might remain threateningly at
large.
This is a serious issue. Companies, particularly those with public shareholders, can't sit
still and ignore the latest security technologies lest they find their systcms seriously
compromised. Security vendors have every incentive to reinforce that knowledge. They
continuously can deliver new security widgets to counteract newly discovered threats.
Some ofthese "solutions" invariably will be ineffectual or impractical. Are customers'
threats addressed and risks reduced overall, at any increased rate? While there was and is
no way to measure, the answer appears to be a resounding "No." We now see the world's
most extensive, sophisticated IT operations, in corporations and governments worldwide,
penetrated by China, Iran, organized crime and other top-tier adversaries.
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54
Given the fundamental flaw in reactive approaches, a community began to emerge in

around the year 2000 to create a science of experimental cyber-security. We saw a need
to build environments that would:
• support experimentation and testing ofhypothcses;

• enable creation of repeatable, science-based experiments that could be validated
by others;
• generate research results that could be leveraged into broad, multi-component
solutions in which components demonstrably support one another, making the
whole greater than the sum of its parts.
foster methodologies and tools to hclp guide experimenters toward this new,
scientific cyber-security, and provide an open environment for researchers in
industry, government and academia to build on one another's achievements.
Under funding from Dr. Douglas Maughan, then at DARPA, we performed a study,
"Justification and Requirements for a National DDoS Defense Technology Evaluation
Facility." The study provided the basis for defining key objectives for the DETER
project. In 2003, with funding from NSF and DHS S&T, we initiated the DETER
Project.
Looking forward, it is clear that cyber security R&D must be grounded in the same
systematic approach to discovery and validation that is routine in other scientific and
technological disciplines. To approach these challenging research problems, we must
create a paradigm shift in experimental cyber-security. Only by enabling demonstrable,
repeatable experimental results can we provide a sound basis for researchers to leverage
prior work - and create new capabilities not yet imaginable. Tomorrow's researchers
must be able to stand on the shoulders of today's researchers, not be consigned to re-
treading the same ground.
Only by living in the future - enabling researchers to experiment with techniques and
tools that do not yet exist and operate in environments only beginning to emerge - can
highly capable, fluid new approaches take shape. The alternative is to remain caught on
the new-widget treadmill, in which the nation must continually run faster to stay in same
place, while invariably falling behind.
Living in the future also means enabling continuous R&D infrastructure gains. Our
highly connected world is growing exponentially in scale and complexity. Critical
national assets, and the threats to them, evolve in tandem as well. While there are now
various cyber-security testbed experimentation facilities around the U.S., only a few are
applicable to a wide range of experimentation and almost none are openly available.
Still, their existence is a valuable step toward research into a cross-disciplinary range of
cyber-security experimentation and testing methods and tools.
NSF, DHS S&T, DOE and DARPA all have invested in this evolution, spurring valuable
advances such as federation of diverse scientific facilities. Researchers in disparate
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55
locations now are able to work collaboratively, at the same time, to conduct experiments
on a global scale.
But these advances are circumscribed and uneven. To match dramatic, ongoing change
and complexity in the world at large, our cyber-defenders need parallel growth in R&D
infrastructure capabilities. These initiatives must be expanded and coordinated to support
a highly capable, shared national resource.
Recommendation #2: Formulate a research strategy/agenda to develop open,

broad, multi-organizational cyber-security experimentation and testing
capabilities.
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of2013 includes provisions for addressing this
recommendation in sec. 103, Cybersecurity Strategic Research and Development plan.
Specifically, item 4 requires a plan to "maintain a national research infrastructure for
creating, testing, and evaluating the next generation of secure networking and
information technology systems."
2.3 Technology Transfer
The U.S. government and major corporations have poured hundreds of millions of dollars
into security R&D for more than 20 years. Creditably, this spending is growing in scale
and increasingly is strategically focused on critical infrastructure and homeland security.
These investments hold the promise of delivering real-world value: putting practical
security technologies in place to protect important assets. Of course, r recommend that
funding agencies continue to grow their emphases in these crucial directions.
At the same time, however, troubling technology-transfer issues remain. As Members of

this committee and its sub-committees, you may wonder: Why is technology transfer so
difficult? Why does so much promising research not find its way into viable commercial
products? Why do specific needs of specific government agencies and departments
remain unaddressed?
In part, the answer lies in what I've already discussed: that security R&D has tended to
be ad hoc, small-scale and lacking in the scientific methods of other disciplines - and
thus in creation ofa solid, accessible body ofknowlcdge. But there also have been, and
continue to be, structural problems with currcnt tech transfer processes that can't be
solved through hardening the science alone. Researchers and funders could achieve our
wildest dreams for effective, cost-efficient, privacy-assuring cyber-security. Yet the
results might have no impact unless the underlying structural issues are addressed and
resolved.
These issues historically have included:
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56
• Insufficient awareness of the complexity of cyber-security tech transfer. Tech

transfer, while difficult in any field, seems particularly so in the constantly
shifting world of cyber-security. At each stage from initial research idea,
advanced prototype and early stage product to widespread adoption, the process
can break due to internal factors or sudden shifts in attack methodologies, tools
and strategies. Commercializing security technologies effectively accordingly has
been, in some cases, largely a matter of chance.
• A scatter-shot approach (0 R&D. Over the last 40 years, governments and

businesses around the globe have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in
cyber-security R&D - but only loosely in coordination with one another.
Research often was initiated based on a largely reactionary model driven by the
hot security topic of the day.
• Mismatch between market and threat environment. Security vendors became vcry
tactical in focus, looking at which innovations would fuel the next incremental
security fix. They then upsold to existing customers and attempted to pull in new
ones.
• Assumptions of contained damage. When a major cyber-attack occurred in the

1990s, businesses and governments were forced to reboot a few thousand
systems. The scale and pervasiveness of computing technology has grown so
dramatically that such an approach is now wholly unfeasible.
As a result of this largely ad hoc approach, some government and private investment has
sparked revolutionary new products, companies and industries. Others have improved
the operational security practices ofIT departments around the world dramatically. Still
others have resulted in research papers and prototypes, but not commercializable
technologies. The net effect is that many potentially valuable security technologies never
saw the light of day.
Fortunately, the situation is improving. Tech-transfer issues are being mitigatcd as

researchers and funders set more realistic expcctations and achievable goals. Businesses
better understand that stellar approaches must be combined with sharp execution in
operations, finance, sales and marketing. An enormous, interconnected world market also
has forced research institutions and businesses to make more strategic choices in the
technologies and approaches they pursue.
New approaches to tech transfer also are paying - often literally - dividends. For
example, the Stevens Institute for Innovation at USC, funded by highly successful
venture capitalist Mark Stevens and his wife, assists faculty and students with everything
from nuts-and-bolts contracts and funding issues to instilling a culture of innovation
university-wide. Its reliance on public-private partnerships, while not unique to USC,
offers a uniquely effective means for engineers, physicians and other academic
researchers to connect with the world at large.
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57
In recent years, cyber-security R&D has been steered toward a model directed at
homeland security and critical infrastructure. This strategic shift is fostering
collaborations between universities and national labs, and is beginning to yield excellent
work on smart energy grids, advanced persistent threats, next-generation Internet, and
other security innovations that meet specified, high-priority needs. Much of this work is
both strategic and long-term in nature, with the potential for fundamental transformation
in protected assets or their protections.
Unfortunately, general enterprise security vendors have gone in the opposite direction.
Most are now completely tactical, rather than strategic, in focus. As long as the cyber-
security market was expanding dramatically, businesses could afford to pursue numerous,
promising approaches. But market growth for these large-enterprise vendors largely has
stalled despite the proliferation of technology. Large security vendors, like all players in
mature markets, are chasing incremental growth in revenue and market share. They are
dependent on creating small-scale innovations that will fuel the next incremental security
fix. The vendor with the longest list of Band-Aids has the competitive edge.
At the same time, the majority of critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated
in highly regulated industries, leaving them cost-constrained and lacking in capital for
new technology. These industries also constitute narrow vertical markets that do not
drive commercial product cycles. Such an approach is completely at odds with securing
critical cyber infrastructure - and with strategic, long-term, transformational innovation.
In my view, it's imperative that we invent a new virtuous cycle in which government-
funded work steers strategic cyber-security R&D. Clearly, the nation would be foolish to
rely solely on incumbent vendors and system integrators to decide which innovations
should be pushed forward and which consigned solely to professional journals. Public
private partnerships and other innovative approaches surely can help re-define what the
market is and how its vital players should be approached, For instance, the overall
market may include not just large enterprise systems, but control systems for
transportation, dedicated distribution like pipelines, and other businesses that deal in
critical infrastructure. I don't know what this tech-transfer model ultimately will look
like, but the current model flings open the door wide to cyber-insecurity.
There is, however, another structural issue: the businesses and government entities that
are major security customers. Beginning in the I 990s, hydroelectric power plants,
chemical manufacturers on major waterways, nuclear plants and other entities crucial to
public safety began running control systems to monitor and manage their operations.
Such systems theoretically separate their critical national assets from other systems
connected to the Internet - and thus vulnerable to outside attack. Many control systems
have known vulnerabilities, however, that are only partially addressed by commercial
security products. While innovative security technologies exist to harden these systems,
customers are slow to adopt them.
The reason: For decades, the security vendors on which these customers rely have
offered assurances that current technology is "good enough." To admit otherwise might
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58
require major, costly infrastructure changes for their customers. In highly regulated
markets with limited capital, vendors are better served by continuing offer "good
enough" and incremental low-cost Band-Aids.
As a result, the new virtuous cycle also must build sharply heightened threat awareness
into customers' mindsets. Businesses and government entities must understand the
magnitude of threats, the dire risks of miscalculation - to health and safety, citizen and
consumer trust, and public and private finances - and that the disruption of the
technology status quo may be more than worth the benefits. Customers must demand the
level and pace of trans formative technology that Americans deserve. Again, I don't
presume to know how this should be done, only that it is as vital a mandate as advancing
cyber-security defenses themselvcs.
In sum, the research challenges I described initially are compoundcd by significant tech
transfer challenges. Thesc challenges are surmountable if we:
• Continue steering security R&D firmly toward national strategic goals.

Use public-private partnerships and other approaches to define or redefine
markets and opportunities not served by incumbent security vendors.
• Find ways to engage customers in their own protection, both for the bcnefit of
organizations and of the Americans they serve.
• Recommendation #3: Develop new models oftechnology transfer operation,

funding, partnership and cultural change within organizations.
recommendation in sec. !O3, Cybersecurity Strategic Research and Development plan.
Specifically, item 3 calls for programs that, " ... foster the rapid transfer of research and
development results into new cybersecurity technologies and applications for the timely
benefit of society and the national interest. .. "
2.4 Educating the Next Generation of Cyber-Security Researchers and Professionals
Beginning to change the asymmetric dynamics of cyber-space requires astute,

knowledgeable researchers, educators, operators, users and citizens. But we as a nation
are nowhere near that goal. Rapid growth and spread ofinformation technology,
dramatically increased system complexity, and the multi-dimensional interdependence of
these systems have left us woefully unprepared on many fronts.
The current dearth of cyber-professionals has sparked significant new federal training and
education programs aimed at addressing this need. Among these initiatives: the National
Initiative for Cyber Security Education (NICE), the Scholarship for Service program, the
National Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance Education, and the
Centers of Academic Excellence in Research.
While these initiatives are beginning to increase the pipeline of cybcr-professionals, their
scale, pace and depth so far are nowhere near sufficient to address America's critical
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59
needs in the public or private sectors. The challenge now is to help government agencies,
contractors and critical infrastructure providers locate and access program suited for their
organizations' needs.
Just last week (on February 21,2013), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
launched the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS), an
online resource for cyber-security career, education, and training information. NICCS
will help expand, inform, monitor, certify and promote training programs. The process of
creating, cataloging and monitoring training programs is a positive step toward meeting
the nation's pressing cyber-seeurity needs.
To fundamentally change the cyber-threat dynamic, however, we need deep intellectual

resources as well. These are represented by the brightest, best trained, most curious and
most ambitious researchers and educators. We accordingly need to be prepared to make
significant investments in higher education. I applaud the efforts of the NSF and other
federal research agencies to create and fund eyber-seeurity research and education grants.
These fundamental research endeavors are the essential catalyst for research
breakthroughs. Only by educating the next generation of researchers and educators today
can we build the intellectual resources vital to solving tomorrow's problems.
USC actively is engaged in several new initiatives to advance eyber-education. The USC
Viterbi School of Engineering offers classes in computer security, and recruits and funds
graduate students who are exposed to leading-edge cyber security research. In addition,
the University will begin offering a Master ofCyber Security degree. This novel degree,
which will integrate strong engineering and computing theory with applicd science, will
educate students to help solve real-world information security challenges.
While classroom study and early exposure to research provide foundational cyber-
security education, effective training also demands direct, hands-on involvement.
Teaching eyber security is challenging. How do you demonstrate system weaknesses,
inspire students to create constructive new solutions to vulnerabilities, and provide an
environment in which they realistically can explore threat scenarios? We believe that
undergraduates with direct cyber-security experience are most likely to be eager to - and
capable of - earning master's degrces. Similarly, graduate students who engage in
science-based experimental research are most likely to develop the passion to pursue
demanding doctoral and post-doctoral studies, and to obtain the academic positions that
will enable them to continue developing our nation's cyber-warriors. None of these
advances would be possible without federal government investment in fundamental
cyber-security research.
The DETER Project at lSI offers precisely the hands-on security education, to a wide
range of colleges and universities, that is essential for strengthening our intellectual
resources. Teaching cyber-seeurity is a core component of DETER's two-fold mission: to
develop research into capable new eyber-seeurity methods and technologies, and to
operate DeterLab, our shared facility for cyber-security experimentation, testing and
education. Through the DETER Project, educators can tap into DeterLab, providing
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60
students with the vivid, realistic experience that can spark imagination and ignite passion
for research.
DeterLab also fills a significant gap in security instruction by providing educators

worldwide with substantive, thoroughly vetted facilities and materials. These security lab
exercises complement existing, more abstract courses, enabling students to see and feel
the phenomena they learn in classrooms. Instructors and students conduct lab exercises
using DeterLab's dcdicated hardware, networks and customized Web-based interface.
We need to develop a new generation of cyber-security researchers who are brought up in

the world of R&D performed in realistic settings, and we need to provide the resources
necessary for realistic, scientific testing and experimentation. We need to develop the
research community to be part of the invention of new models of R&D and tech transfer.
We cannot hope to begin to change the dynamics of the asymmetric cyber space if we
don't have knowledgeable researchers, educators, LT. operators, users and citizens.
Recommendation #4 - Increase educational programs in cyber-security

research and development, with an emphasis on doctoral degrees.
recommendation in sec. 106, Federal Cyber Scholarship For Service
18 Program; sec. 107, Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment; and sec. \08,
Cybersecurity University-Industry Task Force.
3. Summary
Cyber security is now a constant, serious and accelerating challenge in every facet of
American society. We have become completely dependent on cyber capabilities and, as a
result, highly vulnerable to wide-ranging threats. Where these once were largely
annoying hacker probes and network intrusions, we now face organized crime and state-
sponsored cyber-terrorism. Despite many years of research, we are still on the losing side
of an asymmetric battle. These dynamics must be changed to protect US government
information, corporate trade secrets, and public health and safety, among other vital
concerns. We can no longer treat cyber security as an engineering discipline, we must
embrace multiple disciplines bringing economists, sociologists, anthropologists and the
other sciences to the table to create holistic research agendas.
Increase the breadth and scope of cyber-security R&D, and create opportunities for
mUlti-disciplinary research.
Corporations and government entities often define security as the absence of visible
insecurity. Cyber-security R&D often has been small-scale and ad hoe, and has struggled
to prove its worth. Research must be grounded in the same systematic approach to
discovery and validation that is routine in other scientific and technological disciplines.
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61
New approaches to research and development must be energized - and new findings must
be based in hard experimental science - to support crucial cybcr-security discovery,
validation and ongoing analysis. Only by enabling demonstrable, repeatable
experimental results can we provide a sound basis for researchers to leverage prior work
- and create new capabilities not yet imaginable.
Formulate a research strategy/agenda to develop open, broad, multi-organizational

cyber-security experimentation and testing capabilities.
Technology transfer is particularly difficult in the constantly shifting world of cyber-

security. At each stage from initial research idea, advanced prototype, early stage product
and widespread adoption, the process can break due to internal factors or sudden shifts in
attack methodologies, tools and strategies. The net effect is that many potentially
valuable security technologies never sec the light of day. Commercializing security
technologies in some cases has been largely a matter of chance.
Develop new models oftechnology transfer operation,funding, partnership and

cultural change within organizations.
The U.S. needs deep intellectual resources to change the cyber-threat dynamic
fundamentally. In addition to creating, cataloging and monitoring training programs, we
need to be prepared to make significant investments in higher education. I applaud the
efforts of the National Science Foundation and othcr federal research agencies to crcate
and fund cyber-security research and education grants. These fundamental research
endeavors are the essential catalyst for research breakthroughs. Only by educating the
next generation of researchers and educators today can we build the intellectual resources
vital to solving tomorrow's problems.
Increase educational programs in cyber-security research and development, with an

emphasis on doctoral degrees.
Taken together, these four recommendations form the basis for a multi-pronged,
sustainable national program to address cyber R&D challenges - and to pursue the most
promising approaches to a new order for research, development and innovation
partnerships.
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Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Ms. Benzel.

I thank all the witnesses for their testimony today. Reminding
Members that Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes,
the Chair will at this point open the round of questions. And I now
recognize myself for five minutes.
Mr. Barrett, as a representative of private industry, it was good
to hear you acknowledge that it is PayPal’s responsibility to ensure
security for PayPal’s customers. But you alluded to some gaps in
the research that exists and that there might be a role for the Fed-
eral Government to fund research in these gaps. Can you motivate
the need for federal funding in this area and then also talk about
what some of those gaps are?
Mr. BARRETT. Yes, I alluded to this problem a little bit in my oral
testimony. Essentially, we have a problem at the moment which is
we actually don’t know how bad the problem is. We—it sounds per-
verse to say it that way, but essentially, there are hugely disparate
estimates that you see flying around in various publications of the
scale of the problem. Everybody agrees it is getting worse, but I
have three rhetorical questions that I would like to ask and they
are significant ones. And actually, at the moment, I defy anybody
to answer them.
So again, I am purely talking about cybercrime, not cyber ter-
rorism or cyber warfare. So I work for a commercial enterprise so
we have a narrow worldview.
So the questions are these: how much money is lost to cybercrime
on an annual basis in the United States alone? And I am not talk-
ing about how much money people like me spend on running a de-
fensive team. I am actually talking about dollars that our cus-
tomers—and therefore we—lose. So that is question one.
Question two is where does it go? Is it all going back into the
United States or is it going overseas? And what are the distribu-
tions of country? Now, various people in my industry have various
hypotheses about where it is going, and certainly, my team has all
sorts of interesting hypotheses. But fundamentally, it is unsup-
ported by large-scale data.
And then finally, do those countries actually have good programs
themselves to manage cybersecurity, and do they in fact prosecute
cyber criminals? Do they even recognize cybercrime violations as
being violations of law or are they just oh, well? It is kind of the
equivalent of doing some antisocial act and there are no con-
sequences.
We have no answers to those questions today and they are really
important ones that I think are at the heart of what the Federal
Government could do to help understand the problem better.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you.
My next question is for Ms. Benzel.
In this bill we are contemplating expanding funding at univer-
sities which are typically open universities where sharing is en-
couraged. And you mentioned the DeterLab at your institution,
which is funded by DHS and DOD I think. Can you tell us or give
us some level of comfort that we wouldn’t be funding efforts that
could then be used by our adversaries? Thank you.
Ms. BENZEL. Being part of a major university and having a deep
faith in the need for education, we do run an open facility. It is
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funded, as I said, by Department of Homeland Security. And so the

DeterLab is a national—and yes—it is an international resource
that is available for anyone to be able to use. Obviously, we vet our
users. Our approach within the DETER system is to be looking at
defenses. And defenses need to be something that can be openly de-
veloped. Looking at security by obscurity is sure to get us into trou-
ble.
Now, having said that, I am being a deep believer in being able
to educate our next generation and to do publications, et cetera,
there are opportunities to do research in other environments which
might be more closed and might be providing some classified sup-
port for. But we advocate an openness in educating the next gen-
eration. Thank you.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you very much. DeterLab makes a lot
more sense than DeterLab.
Ms. BENZEL. We do try and deter the attackers as we say. Thank
you.
Chairman MASSIE. Okay. I now recognize Ranking Member Ms.
Wilson for five minutes.
Ms. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as out-
lined in my opening statement, a few of the agencies within our
Committee’s jurisdiction have indicated that sequestration could
impact their cybersecurity research and development portfolios. I
would like to place two letters in the record, one from NSF and one
from DHS, detailing those potential impacts.
To all, in his testimony, Dr. Chang recommends that the legisla-
tion raise the trajectory of cybersecurity research and development
spending from its historical levels because it would create long-
term benefits in our effort to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity
posture. As you are all likely aware, sequestration is set to take ef-
fect on Friday. Sequestration will cut federal R&D budgets by 8.2
percent, and agencies like NSF and DHS have indicated that re-
search in cybersecurity may be affected.
How would the security posture of the United States be impacted
if sequestration were to take effect and cybersecurity research and
development was significantly cut? Dr. Chang?
Dr. CHANG. In the 2010 CSIS report, we reported a number of
about 2/10 of one percent of the federal R&D budget was spent on
cybersecurity. And I looked recently. That number is just a little
bit larger now. If you think about the priorities that the Nation is
now placing on cybersecurity, the fact that it is something less
than one percent seems to be a small number. It is not for me to
determine what the priorities are but that just strikes me as a sort
of a low number.
I guess I am suggesting that it needs to be a long-term prospect.
I mentioned this analogy with planting trees. I am suggesting that
we need to plant a few trees to place some bets on some research
issues that are going to build over time. Research certainly won’t
guarantee answers, but as I mentioned as related to infectious dis-
eases, we need to understand causes. We need to understand solu-
tions. We need to understand countermeasures. We know how to
do it. We have done it before. We have gone after large public pro-
grams before. And my suggestion is research is required to make
64
some long-term bets and begin changing the vector on what the de-
fensive posture looks like.
Ms. WILSON. Ms. Benzel?
Ms. BENZEL. Yes, I think that we have begun to see some
progress in the funding, of course, at a very small level as Dr.
Chang says in being strategic about our cybersecurity R&D. If we
are to slow that down as a result of funding cuts with sequestra-
tion, then we have set ourselves back. We are already on the losing
end of an asymmetric battle. And giving our adversaries another
year to gain a leg up while we fight our own internal budget is only
going to make the situation much worse.
You know, as it is with funding cycles with places like the Na-
tional Science Foundation it takes close to a year from the time I,
as a researcher, have an idea, submit that idea, and get a contract.
And so again introducing another delay as a result of the budget
battles is only going to set us back. And in particular, a point in
time when these agencies have become much more strategic, better
coordinated, and better focused in their research. We have re-
searchers in the pipeline. We have projects that are happening
today, and we can’t afford to stop them, slow them down, or lessen
and weaken their effects while the adversaries are on a dramatic
increase as we have seen recently.
The change that we see in the adversarial landscape in the last
year is ten times what we saw in the ten years before. And so any
gap in funding is going to be extremely detrimental. Thank you.
Ms. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman MASSIE. On the gentlelady’s request to include two let-
ters in the record?
Ms. WILSON. I have them.
Chairman MASSIE. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears in Appendix II]
Chairman MASSIE. I now recognize Chairman Bucshon for five
minutes.
Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And there has been some emphasis on the importance of social
science research and cybersecurity, among other areas, partly be-
cause so much security has to do with human behavior. And the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act supports this type of work in Sec-
tion 104 of the legislation.
The question is—I will direct this to Mr. Barrett first—is—let me
say a couple of things that have been funded recently—$1.2 million
to pay seniors to play video games, $764,825 to study how college
students use mobile devices for social networking. So with these
type of things being funded, how should we prioritize social science
research conducted by the National Science Foundation to ensure
that such work is focused on critical national needs such as
cybersecurity?
Mr. BARRETT. I am not sure whether it is necessarily proper for
me to have an opinion on how Congress should prioritize the work
of the National Science Foundation, but I do think there are key
research gaps, and certainly, in a number of areas in part about
cybersecurity education, which is woefully lacking across the spec-
trum from young kids up through college-level curricula and var-
ious different levels. As Dr. Chang alluded earlier, we don’t frankly
65
have enough information security professionals in the field. There

is essentially a major skills shortage there. There was basically
zero unemployment in my field throughout the recession. And that
in its own right is saying something.
Very clearly, there is a lot of work that can be done in under-
standing behavior around how people interact with computers from
a security perspective. And that certainly is a topic worthy of re-
search. Because if you don’t understand how people use the com-
puters, especially for security tasks, then it is very hard to see
what you can do with them. But I should——
Mr. BUCSHON. Yes, thank you very much. And again, the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act supports this type of work.
Dr. Chang, do you have anything to add?
Dr. CHANG. I do. Thank you. I mention in my written testimony
that cybersecurity is a wicked problem, wicked not meaning evil
but wicked being resilient to solution. A characteristic of the wick-
ed problem is that what you believe is a solution may actually
make things worse. As it relates to that kind of the human compo-
nent, I am reminded of a concept known as risk homeostasis, and
that is basically the idea that people have sort of a risk level that
they generally operate at, and if they believe that something is now
more safe, they will actually act riskier.
There are some classic experiments showing that when taxi driv-
ers are given better safety on their taxicabs, let us say antilock
brakes, you would think that the incidents of accidents would actu-
ally go down because the cars are safer, you can steer better and
stuff at high speeds. It turns out that the level of accidents might
actually go up a little bit because the taxi driver started thinking
they were safe and started driving faster and causing more acci-
dents.
Same thing might be happening in cybersecurity such that you
are actually making—you are telling the user that they are actu-
ally now more safe. When they think now I am more safe, and now
I am going to start doing riskier things. And so it is just a sort of
very complex thing where you have the best intention that a solu-
tion is making something better but it actually makes it worse.
Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you. And this will be directed at Ms.
Benzel. I am a parent. I have kids. And I know how my kids almost
shut down one of my computers, essentially a black screen. I had
to get a computer guy to come out and get it back, and there were
literally hundreds of viruses and Trojans and everything else. So
I mean I am amazed at what children can do on a computer. And
however, there are threats that are directed at all of us through
children. Does the current parental control technology adequately
protect minors against this type of threat if used properly or are
there areas of research and developmental efforts to address this?
Ms. BENZEL. Yes, I would have to say I am not a particular ex-
pert in the current set of parental control technology that is out
there. I believe that looking at how we model the human behavior
and understanding, as Dr. Chang said, the relationship between
the way people use their computers. And I am just as concerned
about our children as we are to the seniors or the uneducated
users. And so I believe that we do need to advance that technology,
66
but I would have to get back to you on the state-of-the-art in the

current parental technology.
Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Lipinski for
five minutes.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As many people here know, I am a—used to be—maybe I still
am—a political scientist, and I know that there is—I have seen
plenty of bad social science research in my time. But I think it is
important—and I am not trying to start a fight here on this but
I know that the—I pay attention—I look to see what is going on
and what is being said about some of the supposedly bad research
that is being funded. And my understanding is—was the $1.2 mil-
lion videogame claim was given a pants-on-fire by PolitiFact be-
cause it was helping to study how to keep seniors sharp and keep
their cognitive skills up as they are getting older.
But that said, I mean there is some bad research but we need
to be doing good research. Obviously, there are—as all of you have
pointed out—social science research and how people interact is key
because it is one of the weakest links that we have right now in
cybersecurity.
I wanted to ask about technology transfer. Ms. Benzel had men-
tioned barrier technology transfer in your testimony. I have a great
deal of interest in this, particularly in areas like cybersecurity. It
is vital that we translate as much federal research as possible to
new products and new companies that we can help keep our cyber
infrastructure secure, and also it has the added benefit of creating
new jobs so long as we can also address the workforce and edu-
cation issues that our witnesses have raised.
But I just want to ask the panel, what steps can Federal Govern-
ment take the best partner with industry in encouraging tech-
nology transfer in the cybersecurity sector? Ms. Benzel?
Ms. BENZEL. Yes, thank you very much for your question. It is
an important area.
So we do need Federal Government to help us fill the gap be-
tween the university research and industry. And I think I can
speak somewhat authoritatively to that having spent much time in
a university, as well as being a Vice President of Research at
McAfee. We have all heard about the Valley of Death.
So we really do have some models that are broken between ex-
pecting that industry can just pick up and take research prototypes
that have been developed in a university kind of setting. So we
need strategic funding which pushes us in a particular direction
with an awareness. The DHS S&T program run by Dr. Doug
Maughan has introduced new efforts to work with VCs to its signet
organization to be able to get venture capitalists and to have the
researchers be aware of technology transfer from the day that they
write their proposals.
The National Science Foundation had introduced its Transition
to Practice. I am arguing that we need a lot more of these sorts
of things where we have very early-on awareness of where we want
to go. And as a researcher, we want to do the fundamental basic
research, and that is absolutely necessary. But as researchers, we
also want to see our work have an impact. And we need help in
67
working with the different types of organizations. And that is

where we call for, as the bill currently does, industry partnerships
with venture capitalists, with different kinds of technology organi-
zations. There is really nothing currently in that middle to help fill
the gap between the research dollars and the product dollars. And
I have to say, unfortunately, it is not realistic to believe that indus-
try can simply pick up and do it. Industry is focused on its near-
term market, next quarter features, and are totally market-driven
and sales driven, particularly in today’s economy. And so we need
some bridging dollars which should come from combinations of uni-
versity, public/private partnerships, and federal funding in that
new area.
Thank you very much.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Dr. Chang, do you want to add something?
Dr. CHANG. Sure. I will just support what Terry mentioned.
There is this model I like to use: technology transfer is a contact
sport. So it is not uncommon for the private sector to establish sort
of I guess what you might call lab-lets or sort of mini-labs with the
university. And the folks in the private sector would work sort of
shoulder-to-shoulder with the folks at the university such that
when an innovation is developed, it isn’t sort of tossed over the cu-
bicle wall and you would like for the private sector company to in-
corporate it. But rather, they are generated together.
To the extent that this kind of notion, of kind of, working hand-
in-hand between the government, between the private sector and
academia would be representative of this notion of let us develop
the technologies together. Technology transfer is a contact sport.
Let us have them work together. I think that is a useful concept
here.
Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you.
A quick question. Mr. Barrett mentioned NSTIC. I just want to
know when will we be able to do—instead of having passwords,
have a thumbprint that we use to identify ourselves?
Chairman MASSIE. Very quickly, please.
Mr. BARRETT. Yes, we are actually working on that. That is the
FIDO Alliance work that I mentioned at the beginning, which is
trying to develop open standards to actually make those kind of
technologies become much more widely used. And I think you will
actually see products deployed in the market before the end of the
year that do exactly that.
I now recognize Mr. Hultgren.
Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you all for being
here. I appreciate it very much.
This would be first addressed to all of you. My understanding is
this growing mass of data that is available online certainly has im-
plications for cybersecurity. In some ways, I know the data can be
analyzed to help identify potential cyber threats, but I also know
in another way the data provides bad actors with additional oppor-
tunities to exploit that data.
I wonder can you discuss how the emerging big data phe-
nomenon poses both challenges and opportunities for cybersecurity
research and development, and also just any recommendations you
68
might have for policymakers to address this phenomenon in a bene-

ficial way and not a harmful way?
Dr. CHANG. Sure. I guess I will kind of mention the notion of
dual use. So many of the cyber technologies are so-called dual use.
So my company, 21CT, Inc., basically has capabilities to analyze
big data to sort of find suspicious behaviors in an attempt to im-
prove the defensive posture of somebody’s network. At the same
time, an adversary could use similar technologies to sort of target
folks similarly to look for vulnerabilities and so forth.
So it is always kind of a really important kind of balancing act
and kind of risk assessment proposition such that you will always
know that the technologies that could be used for defense could po-
tentially be flipped over. So it is important to kind of understand
both sides, understand the technologies deep enough and then
make sure you sort of come to the right balance point.
Ms. BENZEL. Well, as a researcher I find big data to be very ex-
citing. From the research point of view and networking and net-
work cybersecurity, we have always been lacking in data. And so
again, DHS has its PREDICT program and some of the researchers
in my organization have done some really groundbreaking work at
analyzing the data, mapping the Internet, the first Internet census
to give us information both about the known spaces and the dark
spaces.
Clearly, in all of our research, there are two sides to it and we
need to be very understanding about how things could be used
against us.
I say the other point to also bring in to this discussion about big
data are issues with privacy. And so as citizens, we need to under-
stand how the data is being used, stored, and moved about in tran-
sit.
Mr. HULTGREN. Mr. Barrett, before you answer, I would love to
hear your thoughts on this as well, but I have one other additional
question I would like to ask you so if maybe you can respond to
both. We already talked a little bit about authentication—online
authentication and the challenges there. I understand many Euro-
pean governments issue voluntary electronic identification cards
combining two unique identifiers to serve as a type of online pass-
port. But for various reasons, I believe the United States is un-
likely to endorse any sort of government-sanctioned identification
mechanism. I understand businesses have been working for years
on providing different online identity schemes to consumers and
that the Administration’s National Strategy for Trusted Identities
in Cyberspace, or NSTIC, intend to use that work to find common
standards for online identities.
I wondered in your view should the government be involved at
all in this process? If so, is NIST the appropriate agency to coordi-
nate the effort? How do we ensure privacy? And what prevents this
effort from eventually resulting in regulations that inhibit innova-
tion?
Mr. BARRETT. So we have been enthusiastic supporters of the
NSTIC initiative ever since it was first proposed. Simply because,
as Congresswoman Lofgren said when she introduced me, a decade
ago I chaired the Liberty Alliance, which is an open standards or-
ganization in the identity management space. It has actually prov-
69
en quite difficult to develop really large-scale identity ecosystems

on the Internet.
We show a lot of promise for users, and so tying that back to the
question about breaches in big data, the silver lining in the cloud
of all of the data that has been published in last few years essen-
tially as a byproduct of criminal activities is that we now actually
understand how consumers in large-scale use passwords in par-
ticular. And the answer is a depressingly large number of them,
something like 2/3 of them, use the same password absolutely ev-
erywhere they go on the Internet, with a net effect that their secu-
rity of every single account they possess is now the security of that
least secure place they visited.
And so having an ecosystem that is built around consumers man-
aging their own identity online and allowing the Federal Govern-
ment to help kind of just appropriately nudge that but not place
too constricting a role is very important. And that is actually why
a guy on my team was the first Co-Chair of the Identity Ecosystem
Steering Group so—
Mr. HULTGREN. My time is expired. Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I now recognize Mr. Bera.
Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As an academic physician who comes out of a research back-
ground, I truly appreciate the analogy with healthcare and what
we do in medicine and the importance of doing research in our aca-
demic and research universities. The fact that we do a lot of experi-
ments, that we look for solutions and we fail a lot, but we are con-
stantly feeding that back into the system. And then we have that
major breakthrough. Where we fall down in the academic centers—
and Ms. Benzel touched on it—is we don’t know how to then take
those ideas to market.
You touched on the issue of technology transfer and how impor-
tant that is. I am a firm believer that we would not be able to do
the research that we do without the Federal Government’s funding
of our academic centers. But we do need to do a better job with
technology transfer.
What would your suggestion be as a best practice model of taking
idea to market given that you have worked on both sides of this?
Ms. BENZEL. Well, thank you very much. You know, I agree with
Dr. Chang. It is a contact sport. We can’t do the wait-until-the-end-
and-throw-it-over. And so I think the best practice model is early
engagement. Engage early and often. So they say encouraging the
fundamental research funding organizations to call out for tech
transfer from day one from the time you write your proposal and
come up with your idea, opportunities for communications and
meetings with a variety of industry partners, opportunities to un-
derstand the needs that are out there and to work with different
kinds of funding models both with things such as venture capital
organizations who might be willing to take some of the risk in
early technology and also on the university side.
So at the University of Southern California we have the Stevens
Institute that works with our researchers early on. So early and
often. Thank you.
70
Mr. BERA. Absolutely.

Now, also as a former Associate Dean out of University of Cali-
fornia Medical School, we focus a lot on the workforce issue recruit-
ing the best and the brightest and then retaining those individuals.
You know, on the issue of cybersecurity, on the issue of making
sure we have the computer science professionals, we don’t have
enough engineers in this country and we are not graduating
enough engineering students or programmers. In other sectors of
IT we are certainly trying to get that workforce from abroad. But
on the issue of cybersecurity, we need a homegrown workforce be-
cause this—these are issues that are critical to national security.
Dr. Chang, you touched on this a bit. What are some models that
we can use to continue to recruit and retain the best and the
brightest to go into areas of information technology and then go
into both the service sector working for the Federal Government,
working for our Department of Defense and Department of Home-
land Security? Because they can make 10 times as much going off
into the private sector but we need some of the best and the bright-
est working to protect our country.
Dr. CHANG. I was recently in a meeting with some folks in Aus-
tin where we talked about a very sort of broad approach that would
incorporate trying to recruit students of many ages in many dis-
ciplines. There is a program that has recently started in New Jer-
sey. It is referred to as Cybersecurity Centers, and they basically
have these kind of initial competitions that begin attracting people
from all walks of life, maybe former military. There are 16 roles,
just a whole group of folks. And then depending on how they do
in that initial competition—and it is a fun competition. It sort of
capitalizes on people’s interest in just competing and sort of a per-
son-on-person competition. And then depending on how you do with
that, the people who are more skillful sort of move on.
But it is this notion of can we come up with ideas that attract
many, many people, and then if they have a particular propensity
to kind of move forward, then you can kind of winnow them down.
I mentioned that there was this need for extremely technical deep-
ly elite people. But you have to have a broad funnel to kind of
bring them in and then a way to successfully kind of pull out the
people who operate the highest levels.
Mr. BERA. Wonderful. So playing off of what you just mentioned,
I would ask our Committee to look at returning veterans, men and
women who have already shown their patriotism to this country,
already understand the service to our Country and the immediate
need to protect ourselves and looking for strategic ways to get
those folks engaged through our modern GI Bill and so forth to get
these skills.
I yield back.
I recognize Mr. Schweikert.
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barrett, first off, you have a bunch of PayPal folks in Scotts-
dale, don’t you? Yes, it is—when I am in–district, I seem to start
every morning having coffee with them. We all attend the same
Starbucks. As a company, you have been trying to roll out a num-
ber of different products, you know, cell phone billfolds or some of
71
those types of mechanics. When we are talking about cybersecurity,

how much is the threat on this site slowing down your adoption
and introduction of new products?
Mr. BARRETT. That is a really interesting question. It is hard to
measure. There is certainly good evidence that consumers have
been worried about security aspects of Internet solutions ever since
the beginning of the Internet. And there is certainly some evidence
that they care in the same way about mobile solutions, for exam-
ple, and that they want to see that they are appropriately protected
in those areas.
The difficulty, of course, is in saying how much does the appar-
ent lack of those features really impact their adoption? And so, for
example, if you see a—one solution that has a lot of barriers to it,
in terms of it is hard to use and has a lot of security features; but
on the other hand, you have another very similar product that was
much easier to use because it didn’t have all these apparent secu-
rity things that you have to do. Whether or not the consumers ac-
tually believe that, the one with the more security features is actu-
ally safer. And that ties back to the initial research we were talk-
ing about a little while ago.
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Well, Mr. Barrett, some of that is the adoption
side. I am interested on your engineering side. Is it a suppressing
effect to the design, you know, studio you would have on the intro-
duction of new technologies?
Mr. BARRETT. If I am understanding the question correctly, it
would depend on how much overhead we impose on the engineering
teams in terms of how much we try to partition them and so forth.
So, if we were working on confidential projects, then clearly we will
partition those off as well as, yes, we do impose a number of secu-
rity overheads as we develop those applications. But it is a—it has
lots of tentacles in terms of——
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. It is just having a fixation on expansion, eco-
nomic growth, and new technology. I have always wondered how
much of a suppressing effect I have over here.
Mr. Chairman, Ms.—is it Benzel?
Do you agree with Mr. Barrett’s earlier comments that we—it is
hard to have a quality census of how many bad actors, bad events,
bad things that are actually going on in the cyber marketplace?
Ms. BENZEL. Well, most absolutely. I thought his questions were
very astute and exactly right on. So——
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. So as a Member of Congress, where would you
send me if I really wanted to get from your academic, sort of, view
of the world as much data saying, look, here is what the best cen-
sus we have of banking attacks and this type of attacks? Or where
would you go?
Ms. BENZEL. I think that is a very hard question. I mean, clearly,
some of our intelligence agencies on the dark side have a good cen-
sus of some of the levels of attacks that are happening, particularly
in nation-state and against nation targets. The different industries
tend to keep those things pretty closely held. Now, some of the
work that has been done in the past to set up the Information-
Sharing and Analysis Centers, the ISACs, are places where that
knowledge is known but held close to the chest.
72
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay. And so right now, you are not sure there
is a good collection of the census, shall we say?
Ms. BENZEL. Oh, I don’t believe so.
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Okay. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Chang—and sorry, I
am down to just a few, but you actually started to touch on some-
thing that I would love to have an extended discussion with you.
And that is, how do we finance ourselves right now? Right now, we
are sort of in a classic academic sort of model of finance, primary
research. And hopefully, there is something that comes out of it.
But what you were describing a little while ago in your experi-
ence sounds more like almost the X-prize-type mechanic of bringing
people together, whether it be a garage engineer or an academic.
And the person that produces something great gets to move for-
ward. Do you think it is time we also start to wedge and design
some other ways to finance innovation here?
Dr. CHANG. I will answer that in—maybe in kind of in connection
with the question you asked to Mr. Barrett. Basically, security
today is not where it needs to be, and fundamentally, somebody is
going to have to pay to move security up. It will be the government
because they have to prosecute more criminals. It will be software
companies because they have to make software more secure. It will
be people because people are bearing losses.
So overall I would love to have a longer conversation.
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience.
Sorry.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you. If Dr. Chang would like to re-
spond in writing for the record, that would be fine.
I now recognize Ms. Esty. Oh, I am sorry. Mr. Peters. Sorry.
Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate the chance to be here today. This is an impor-
tant industry in my district as well in San Diego, both because we
are developing a lot of the software and also because the Navy has
a lot of—or the military has a lot of interest in the field.
And Dr. Chang, I am glad you are a UCSD grad, too. I appre-
ciate that.
My question is sort of, you know, we know that—I think it was
yesterday that the Global Information Security Workforce Study
from Booz Allen Hamilton said that 56 percent of cybersecurity
professionals feel that security organizations are short-staffed and
that the cybersecurity field is projected to grow 11 percent annually
over the next five years. And so there is—I think it is widely un-
derstood that there is a gap in the workforce. But what I am sort
of interested in is what are the—what is the field of cybersecurity
from an academic sense? You described it as an interdisciplinary
exercise. We know it is not just computer science or software. But
if you were trying to certify someone in cybersecurity, kind of—do
you have a sense—maybe you can help me understand what it is
that that person would need to know. And that is for anyone.
Dr. CHANG. Sure. I can start. So there are the traditional dis-
ciplines that you learn in computer science about programming,
about algorithms, about discrete math and so forth. You would add
some elements to that in order to focus more specifically in
cybersecurity. And so you would add more about networking, per-
haps more about analysis. There is this interesting conversation
73
happening at universities now where they talk about—that there

is a classic computer science major and that maybe there ought to
be a cybersecurity major as well.
So there are many things in common but it is different enough
such that it is worth an interesting dialogue about the extent that
there is the creation of a specific major in cybersecurity.
Mr. PETERS. Well, I guess I think it would be helpful for us be-
cause the intent of the legislation before us is to kind of secure our
future in that. But if we don’t know kind of what we are edu-
cating—if you don’t understand—if you don’t have a sense or a con-
sensus about what it is we are seeking to educate people in, we are
going to—I think we face some of the concerns that we are not
going to be or that the money is going to be bleeding, or we are
not going to be effective?
So if it is anthropology or if it is law in addition to these tech-
nical things, is there a way to land that plane?
Ms. BENZEL. So first off, I think you need to make a distinction
between education and training. So many of the training organiza-
tions and CISSP certifications, that is one level of something that
is about operations and being able to run things.
And then there is the education challenge in terms of creating
new researchers and new educators and Ph.D.’s. I think that we
are just as a community—as Dr. Chang said—beginning to put
forth master’s curriculums in cybersecurity. USC is just about to
introduce one starting next fall. And really, there are different
fields. So cybersecurity is not one narrow field. So there are
cybersecurity researchers in defenses, in active security, in mathe-
matical analysis, in networking. And so even in a master’s degree,
there will be specializations in these different areas drawing from
primarily a computer science curriculum but also some engineer-
ing, some systems kind of work, networking, and then bringing in
an understanding of human behavior.
Mr. PETERS. I guess there is going to be some sense we are going
to have to keep adjusting as we go.
Ms. BENZEL. That is right. There is not one answer that fits all.
Mr. PETERS. Mr. Barrett, maybe quickly, you might touch on the
first of your rhetorical questions which is how much money are we
losing? Do you have a sense of how we go about answering that
question?
Mr. BARRETT. I believe the answer is we need to put in place
more detailed reporting frameworks in order to actually ascertain
the scope of the problem. Because the estimates range all over the
place, I mean as low as a few billion up into the trillion range. My
own personal view is it is probably in the tens of billions of range.
But that would be hard to——
Mr. PETERS. That would be something that would be done by in-
dustry presumably. Is that right?
Mr. BARRETT. I believe so, yes.
Mr. PETERS. Okay.
Mr. BARRETT. It certainly could be done. A reporting framework
could be developed, but at the moment, what we have is entirely
voluntary and it models how much money is lost with how much
the company spends on defenses, and those two numbers are quite
different as well. And how much do you turn away?
74
Mr. PETERS. Again, I very much appreciate your being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to recognize Ms. Esty—Etsy.
Ms. ESTY. Esty, not the crafting website. Although I would be
much wealthier if it were mine.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
For Dr. Chang and Ms. Benzel, both of you had talked about the
need to create a science of cybersecurity. And if you can elaborate
a little bit on that, what are the metrics we would need? If we don’t
know right now if a company is more secure than it was a month
ago, where do we even start with this? What sort of research do
we need? What sort of metrics do we need to develop so that we
even know what we are talking about?
Dr. CHANG. Well, that is one of the key issues. We actually don’t
have the right language, the right set of metrics to even begin to
understand this notion of whether my—the computer this year is
more secure than it was last year, if this computer is more secure
than somebody else’s.
There is kind of this idea of understanding the limits of what is
possible. So that is what a science allows you to do. Can I under-
stand how secure something can be? We sort of don’t know, kind
of what is possible, you know, what are kind of the control bounds.
Cybersecurity is an adversarial science. And like anything adver-
sarial, we will probably never completely eliminate it. But if we can
establish some sort of control bars that basically say we are going
to make it harder for an adversary to kind of get through and
maybe the difficulty that their—you know, if we make it too hard
for them to get through, then, they will quit trying. But it is this
motion of kind of setting some control bars and trying to keep it
within that. We certainly won’t eliminate crime.
Ms. BENZEL. So we advocate being able to do experimental
science. So in many other sciences we have workbenches and labs
and we can go in and we can also repeat our peers’ experiments
and be able to understand what they are. Unfortunately, in com-
puter science and in—particularly in cybersecurity, the experi-
ments are very ad hoc. And so it might work once or it might work
in my lab or in my example.
This is one of the challenges also in technology transfer. It may
have worked in some researcher’s lab under some conditions, but
I don’t know that it is really going to work. So what we really advo-
cate is that we need an experimental science where we can create
hypotheses, we can do an experiment, see the results, modify some
parameters, rerun the experiment. And my colleagues similarly
have an opportunity to do that just as they would in any of the
hard sciences.
Ms. ESTY. Are there any of the federal agencies that are actually
doing work on this notion of the metrics that we would even use
to measure?
Dr. CHANG. I am aware of some work that has started at NIST,
and I would tell you I haven’t looked at the work in more detail.
I probably need to. But I am recalling from some years ago, oh,
maybe 2009 or 2010 within the Computer Security Division at
NIST, they started up a program in metrics. It is something I
75
would need to look at further. But I believe there is some activity

happening.
Ms. BENZEL. Metrics is a very difficult area in security and has
plagued us for a long time. I would say that DARPA has started
some work there and some very fundamental research. The Na-
tional Science Foundation and DHS S&T always include metrics as
a research topic in their calls.
Ms. ESTY. And one final question. As I know some colleagues and
friends of my son who is a junior in college, if you could elaborate
a little bit more on this adversarial science notion because I think
it is different—it strikes me as different than a lot of times what
attracts people to science and a sense of the purity and how you
go about thinking about recruiting young people designing pro-
grams—if they need to have this back-and-forth adversarial ap-
proach.
Dr. CHANG. I would have to do some more thinking about this,
but the models of the human immune system strike me as a rea-
sonable model. So basically, the human immune system is fighting
off adversaries of all kinds. And it is just sort of amazing how
versatile and how flexible the human immune system is. The
human immune system—by the way, about one percent of human
cells are leukocytes, are actually defensive. So when you think
about the body is basically allocating about one percent of its cells
to defense, that is a pretty substantial number. If you look at the
number of lines of computer code, I doubt one percent is dedicated
to defense.
The other model that seems to make sense to me in terms of the
science is in the field of actually agriculture. So agriculture also
has pests, and the pests try to eat the crops. And you can either
make the crops more resilient or you kill the pests. I mean that is
another sort of adversarial model that seems to be relevant.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you. I want to thank Chairman
McCaul for his initiative with this bill and his persistence in re-
introducing it and especially his patience today.
And I recognize him now for five minutes.
Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Chairman.
And Dr. Chang, let me say thank you for your service on the
CSIS Commission and to the Nation and to the University of Texas
in Austin.
And Ms. Benzel, I agree with you our adversaries are moving for-
ward, moving ahead. They are attacking our federal agencies every
day. In support—and building a record in support of this legisla-
tion, I see this bill doing several things, applying NIST standards
to the Federal Government. It provides—it bolsters research and
development in this area, a private-sector university federal task
force, education and awareness piece and procurement standards
within the Federal Government.
And I would like to go through each of you and if you could tell
me how you believe—if you do—that this legislation will advance
the cause for enhancing cybersecurity for this Nation. Mr. Barrett?
Mr. BARRETT. I would give a very brief answer which is maybe
not quite so brief.
In general, philosophically, we think that cybersecurity, as Dr.
Chang said, is a wicked problem. And as such, there is probably
76
no single bill that could be passed that will, on its own, materially
change the trend line. But on the other hand, the sort of lack of
a grand unification theory shouldn’t stop us from doing good work.
And this bill would definitely appear to be falling into that place
where it does no harm and it also does good work in the specific
areas it has chosen.
Mr. MCCAUL. That is a very good point. I think—I served on the
Speaker’s Cybersecurity Task Force, and our first action was to do
no harm by legislation. So I appreciate you saying that.
Dr. Chang?
Dr. CHANG. Thank you.
So in advance of reading the bill if I could have picked two things
that are critical to improving the Nation’s cybersecurity posture it
would be research and development and workforce development.
And so this legislation to me is just right on target relative to ad-
dressing the top two problems. I guess I would add, as I mentioned
in my spoken testimony, the notion that we need to be patient
about this. You know, I guess it would be great if we could sort of
plant a forest and all the trees turn into something that resulted
in wonderful research. But we—I see this legislation as important
in that it is at least planting a few trees. It allows us to plant
some—a few things that will grow into the future.
I would sure hate to be sitting here ten years from now, 20 years
from now still saying that we actually don’t understand causes. We
don’t understand solutions. We don’t understand countermeasures.
And this legislation I believe begins planting a few trees. Thank
you.
Mr. MCCAUL. And thanks for making the point about the cyber
workforce in the Federal Government. I think that is very, very im-
portant as well.
Ms. Benzel?
Ms. BENZEL. Yes, thank you for the opportunity and thank you
for your perseverance in this area.
I agree with my colleagues. There is no one answer. It is a very
difficult field. But I was quite—very impressed to see this par-
ticular bill in two areas that I would call out. And one is the tech-
nology transfer recognition of the difficulty of that problem. And I
have worked in a number of different public-private partnerships
over the years. I was part of the PCAST Committee back in the
early 2000s. I see that the opportunity here to do some real plan-
ning around university kinds of partnerships and bringing the uni-
versities into it so it is a three—tri-part aspect is very exciting in
the bill.
The other one is in the science of cybersecurity and under-
standing that there is a need for research and development kinds
of testbeds and experimentation. That is called out in the bill for
experimental science.
So I think technology transfer and experimental cybersecurity
have a chance to be fundamentally changing. And of course the
education and training are important, too.
Mr. MCCAUL. Well, let me thank the witnesses for your expertise
and for appearing here today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to participate in this
hearing even though I don’t sit on the Subcommittee. And I look
77
forward to the markup and hopefully overwhelmingly passage of

the bill and signed into law by the President. Thank you. I yield
back.
Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Chairman McCaul.
In closing this joint hearing, I would like to recognize Chairman
Bucshon for a moment to say a few words.
Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to remind everyone about a few facts. Overall spend-
ing in the Federal Government has gone up 17 percent since 2008.
This year, we are on track to spend $3.6 trillion with a tax collec-
tion of $2.7 trillion, which, by the way, is the highest amount in
history that is being projected. We have 16.5 trillion in national
debt, over 1 trillion in annual deficits for the past five years run-
ning. Recently reported, 110 billion in inappropriate payments the
government made just last year across a multitude of federal pro-
grams and the current sequester is 85 billion.
I agree that spending cuts need to be more targeted. That is why
the House has passed two bills over the last year that would target
these cuts more appropriately. So I think that we are very well
aware of research and development dollars that need to be there,
not only on cybersecurity but other issues. And we will work to-
wards this—a resolution that will help with that situation. Thank
you. I yield back.
I want to thank the witnesses for traveling here today and for
their valuable testimony and to the Members for their questions.
Members of the Committee may have additional questions for
you and we will ask you to respond to those questions in writing.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments
and written questions for Members.
The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.]
Appendix I
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
(79)
80
ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
Responses by Mr. Michael Barrett
81
Responses by Dr. Frederick R. Chang
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
TilE HONORABLE LARRY BUCSHON (R-IN)
U.S. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
I. I understand the severity of our cybersecurity problem and the possibilities of failing to
mitigate an attack; however, I cannot help but feel like this problem is like constantly trying to
find a needle in a haystack, and that both the federal government and companies will continually
spend without any measure of whether we have done "enough" or how safe our investments
rnake us. Is there any way past this perpetual bottomless pit?
Thank you for this question. I think that at least part of the answer lies in the development of
robust cybersecurity metrics, and these really don't exist today. How secure is my computer
right now? Is it more secure that it was a year ago? How about my company's computer
network- is it more secure than it was a year ago? If I doubled my corporate spending in
cybersecurity, have I doubled the security of my corporate cybersecurity infrastructure? I can't
improve what I can't measure. To the extent that the federal government can help lead the way
toward the development of a comprehensive, robust, and rigorous set of cybersecurity metrics,
that would be of tremendous value, in my opinion. Perfect cybersecurity is not attainable -
we've known this for some time now. So in some sense, it comes down to a risk assessment
decision. Can I make it more difficult for an adversary to compromise my network than they
have resources or time to do so? If I demand cybersecurity improvementtargets (again
assuming the existence of a robust set of metrics) such that week after week, month after
month, year after year, I'm seeing improvements, then I'm increasing the level of effort and
resources needed on the part of the adversary and I'm moving the advantage continually in my
direction and away from my adversary.
82

THE HONORABLE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON (D-TX)
I. In your testimony, you mention that education and training is vital for all individuals-from
users to professionals. Could you please address the role the federal government should play in
closing the cybersecurity skills gap? What can or should be done by federal agencies to improve
cybersecurity education at the K-12 level, undergraduate level, and graduate level?
Thank you for this question. At the K-12 level I tend to favor approaches that generally get more
kids interested in the STEM - science, technology, engineering and math - areas. There are so
many activities that compete for kids attention, that to the extent the federal government can
create a motivation and focus such that more kids pursue STEM subjects, then I think that would
be a win. Some of those individuals will pursue an interest in cybersecurity and that would be
terrific. Others may pursue an interest in physics, chemistry, biology or the social sciences, and
in my opinion that would be also be a win for the nation. Pcrhaps at some later time, these
particular individuals would develop an interest in cybersecurity. There are many examples of
great contributions to cybersecurity from people trained in a different area of
science/engineering. I know that there are many outstanding ideas that have been offered as to
how to increase interest in the STEM topics in the K-12 years, so I won't repeat them here.
At the post-secondary level, scholarships like the NSF Scholarship for Service (SFS) and the
Department of Defense Information Assurance Scholarship Program (!ASP) are invaluable tools
for bringing talented college students into the field of cybersecurity. While I was at the
University of Texas at San Antonio, I had the opportunity to work closely with several students
who were holders of these scholarships. I could see first-hand the sort of difference these
scholarships made to these students. I believe that by increasing the number and variety of
scholarships like this could be a very useful way to help increase the number of well-qualified
cybersecurity professionals. While at the University of Texas at Austin some years ago, I had the
opportunity to serve as the faculty advisor for the UT -Austin team that competed in the first
annual Texas Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition. These sorts of competitions give students a
wonderful perspective on the field - one that they cannot get in the classroom. Competitions like
this have grown in popularity over the years and to the extent that the federal government can
play a role in their continued growth and popularity, I believe that would be an important
contributor to increasing the number of trained professionals in the field.
83
Responses by Ms. Terry Benzel
THE HONORABLE LARRY BUCSHON (R-IN)
Cybersecurily Research and Development: Challenges and Solutions
I. I understand the severity of our cybersecurity problem and the possibilities of failing to
mitigate an attack; however, I cannot help but feel like this problem is like constantly trying to
find a needle in a haystack, and that both the federal government and companies will continually
spend without any measure of whether we have done "enough" or how safe our investments
make us. Is there any way past this perpetual bottomless pit?
That's an excellent question, starting with the recognition that we lack useful metrics for
assessing the practical benefits of deploying some new security technology, or of expanding
the use of existing security technology. That's all too true. And to point out two ways that
we can change that, let me explain two reasons for the current lack of metrics.
One factor is that it's only been in the last decade or less that we've realized a fundamental
difference in objective between government use of cyber-security technology, and the kind
of commercial use that drives the efforts of security vendors to bring new products to
market. In the commercial sector, the fundamental benefit of security technology is liability
management. Commercial organizations have obligations to their shareholders to protect
corporate assets; and they have regulatory obligations to protect regulated assets such as
personal data. There is no hard-and-fast measurement of "enough" but there is specific
guidance: corporations must demonstrate that they have taken reasonable, usual, and
customary measures to exercise due care in meeting those obligations. At any given point
in time, once enough spending and enough efforts have been taken to implement best
practices in security, there is little or no incremental value in additional spending.
Corporate assets will still be at some risk, but if business operations are impacted by a
future security event, the company can still demonstrate that they did all that they
reasonably could to do prevent and prepare. Regulatory sanctions may still apply, but the
company can still demonstrate due care, and avoid penalties being doubled or tripled for
negligence.
In short, there is a practical metric for commercial spending on security, and it's not
fundamentally based on effective protection so much as customary protection. That
motivates the enterprise security vendors to continually expand their offerings with new
technologies, to attract early adopters to use it, and then use the early adopters' example to
expand the definition of usual and customary measures. While the early adopters may have
chosen to use the new technology because of beliefs of effectiveness in their particular
environment, later adopters are less concerned with proving effectiveness, and more
concerned about demonstrating compliance. That's why enterprise security spending is at
a fairly steady state of continuing to pay for new security technologies.
84
But in the last decade or less, we've come to understand that in some government sectors,
as well as private-sector operators of critical infrastructure, effectiveness is actually
important. And unfortunately, it is very often the case that a new security technology
becomes available for commercial use, without any real demonstration of effectiveness in a
realistic environment. Both the commercial and research parts of my career, I've seen
many innovations work well in a limited test setting, but not work as intended in large
scale complex real world networks and systems. And it's no surprise! They were never
tested in such settings. In a very real sense, the early commercial adopters are the first real
testers. And even if effectiveness is actually demonstrated in some of a new security
product's vendors' customers, there is no guarantee that it will work the same for others.
That why I believe so strongly in the value of cyber-security experimentation and testing of
security innovations. I've seen first hand a new breed of researchers who are now able to
repeatably test innovations, scientifically measure their effectiveness in a variety of
conditions, and have the data needed to tune their innovations to operate better in more
large and complex settings. That means the anew technology can come to market along
with specific tests to measure how effective it is. Commercial organizations may adopt it in
order to keep up with the expanding definition of due care, but in the critical infrastructure
sector, potential adopters can make much more informed decisions, and actually measure
effectiveness using metrics that come with the new technology.
The second factor is easier to explain given the first. The path to commercial adoption has
often been through large security vendors who primarily want to acquire new technology
in order to add a new tool to the toolset that they offer customers. In the last decade, we've
seen a number of innovations in defending against increasing subtle malicious software
attacks. The vendors have taken some of them to market primarily to be able to get those
early adopters, expand the definition of due care, and up-sell the rest of their existing
customer base to buy the latest additions to the toolset.
As a result, much research was in specific silos of existing security problems, to come up
with incremental improvements. And with good reason -- the "market" for security R&D
was the commercial vendors who wanted incremental improvements.
Again, in just the last few years, R&D funders have made successful effort in directing
researchers away from existing silos, and toward new problems or known hard problems,
as well as problems that are specific to critical infrastructure, and emerging technology for
critical infrastructure, for example, the emerging smart grid. There may not be a large and
quantifiable market for the incumbent security vendors to spend on acquiring smart grid
technology, for some years to come. But the funding organizations have been directing
researchers to those problems anyway, and directing them to use scientific facilities -- the
testbeds, ranges, and community labs -- to prove the effectiveness of their innovations in
settings that are realistic to the environment that they are targeted to, even if those
environments seems like niche markets today. It's research that has to be done to be able
to secure our critical infrastructure as it evolves, rather than waiting for new assets and
85
new attacks on them, before even starting the R&D to protect them -- which is essentially
what happened with the early days of the commercial internet.
However, I'm sympathetic to the concern over continued spending. What I've said here is
that on the R&D side, the continued spending has recently been moving towards targeted
critical needs and scientifically demonstrated effectiveness in meeting those needs. But the
R&D spending will have to continue, because the technology that we need to protect is also
evolving. But I think that we've begun a re-orientation so that more of that R&D funding is
well-spent in terms of national interests. That's why I believe in the importance of
experimentation and test as well as needed research in measurement, metrics, assessment
and infrastructure for research and development.
86

THE HONORABLE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON (D-TX)
I. In your testimony, you mention that education and training is vital for all individuals-from
users to professionals. Could you please address the role the federal government should play in
closing the cybersecurity skills gap? What can or should be done by federal agencies to improve
cybersecurity education at the K-12Ievel, undergraduate level, and graduate level?
There is no question that we are facing a serious shortage for security professionals. To
obtain a greater yield of defenders out of our STEM education, we have to make cyber
security more attractive to the learners at a younger age. The ability to provide grad
students with a realistic test environment to run real mal ware and conduct scientific
security work is great, but we need to something similar in spirit for undergrads and high
school students. Packaged courseware is good for moving down into undergrad teaching as
tech students make choices about what career to pursue. But more than courseware, we
need to develop techniques for engaging learners on their own terms, at the age where
their interest in the cyber world is beginning, rather than waiting until college or grad
school. That may take the form of science competitions, or youth oriented cyber
competitions, capture the flag games, or even computer and mobile gaming targeted at
building cyber skills. There are a number of organizations initiating these types of efforts.
However, in order to realize a Significant paradigm change we need to explore new

programs and with nation wide scope and impact. Current federal funding for STEM are
an important first step and should be encouraged and expanded. Not only is there a need
for federal programs in traditional education venues, it is important to provide education,
training and cyber awareness in public programs.
At the K - 12 programs federal funding can begin by providing education and training of
teachers, development grants for technology, and innovative reach back from university
programs into K-12 institutions. Similar programs can advance educational opportunities;
while at the graduate level increasing funding for basic research in cyber security provides
increased funding for graduate students and new curriculum development.
Finally, it is important that steps be taken to specifically target women and

underrepresented minorities in cyber security at all levels. The field of cyber security lacks
diversity. There are far fewer women and underrepresented minorities in cyber field than
in many comparable computer and engineering fields.
Appendix II
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
(87)
88
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY LETTER SUBMITTED BY
REPRESENTATIVE FREDERICA S. WILSON
89
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski

Page 2
• The Transportation Security Administration would reduce its frontline workforce, which
would substantially increase passenger wait times at airport security checkpoints.
• The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) would have to curtail air and surface operations by nearly
twenty-five percent, adversely affecting maritime safety and security across nearly all
missions areas. A reduction of this magnitude will substantially reduce drug interdiction,
migrant interdiction, fisheries law enforcement, aids to navigation, and other law
enforcement operations as well as the safe flow of commerce along U. S. waterways.
• Furloughs and reductions in overtime would adversely affect the availability of the U.S.
Secret Service workforce, and hinder ongoing criminal investigations.
• Reductions in funding for operations, maintenance and analytical contracts supporting the
National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) would impact our ability to detect and
analyze emerging cyber threats and protect civilian federal computer networks.
• The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Disaster Relief Fund would be reduced by
over a billion dollars, with an impact on survivors recovering from future severe weather
events, and affecting the economic recoveries oflocal economies in those regions. State and
local homeland security grants funding would also be reduced, potentially leading to layoffs
of emergency personnel and first responders.
• The Science and Technology Directorate would have to stop ongoing research and
development including: countermeasures for bio-threats, improvements to aviation security
and cyber security technologies, and projects that support first responders.
• The Department would be unable to move forward with necessary management integration
efforts such as modernizing critical financial systems. This would hinder the Department's
ability to provide accurate and timely financial reporting, facilitate clean audit opinions,
address systems security issues and remediate financial control and financial system
weaknesses.
Hurricane Sandy, recent threats surrounding aviation and the continued threat of
homegrown terrorism demonstrate how we must remain vigilant and prepared. Threats from
terrorism and response and recovery efforts associated with natural disasters will not diminish
because of budget cuts to DHS. Even in this current fiscal climate, we do not have the luxury of
making significant reductions to our capabilities without placing our Nation at risk. Rather, we
must continue to prepare for, respond to, and recover from evolving threats and disasters - and
we require sufficient resources to sustain and adapt our capabilities accordingly. We simply
cannot absorb the additional reduction posed by Sequestration without significantly negatively
affecting frontline operations and our Nation's previous investments in the homeland security
enterprise.
90
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski

Page 3
The Department appreciates the strong support it has received from Congress over the
past 10 years. As we approach March I, I urge Congress to act to prevent Sequestration and
ensure that DHS can continue to meet evolving threats and maintain the security of our Nation
and citizens. Should you have any questions or concerns at any time, please do not hesitate to
contact me at (202) 282-8203.
Yours very truly,

91
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION LETTER SUBMITTED BY
REPRESENTATIVE FREDERICA S. WILSON
92
The Honorable Barbara Mikulski Page 2
Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction funding at $160 million or less in
FY 2013 will result in the termination of approximately $35 million in contracts and
agreements to industry for work in progress on major facilities tor environmental and
oceanographic research. This would directly lead to layoffs of dozens of direct scientific
and technical staff, with larger impacts at supplier companies. In addition, out year costs
of these projects would increase by tens of millions because of delays in the construction
schedule.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide you with this look at possible impacts ora
sequester on the Foundation. Please let me know if you have any additional questions,
and as always, thank you /01' your strong support orthe Foundation.
Sincerely,
Subra Suresh
Director

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CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY &

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013

Serial No. 113–6

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Statement by Representative Thomas Massie, Chairman, Subcommittee on

Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief Information Security Officer, PayPal, Inc.

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Department of Homeland Security letter submitted by Representative Fred-

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013

[ongfrns of the 1anited ~tatcs

Subcommittees on Technology and Research Hearing

Cybersecurity Research and Development: Challenges and

Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief lnformation Security Officer, PayPal

Dr. Fred Chang, President & Chief Operating Officer, 21 CT

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Cybersecurity Research and Development: Challenges and Solutions

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

• Mr. Michael Barrett, Chief Information Security Officer, PayPal Inc.

Research and Development

Research and development provides a better understanding of weaknesses in systems and

Education and the Development o(Cybersecurity Prokssionals

Well-trained professionals are essential to the implementation of security techniques in critical

number of cybersecurity education, training, and development programs. The Subcommittees

H.R. 756 the Cvhersecuritr Enhancement Act o{2013

In addition to providing coordination of cybersecurity research across the federal government,

Presidential Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure

Chairman MASSIE. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding me the

Chairman MASSIE. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ms.

of cybersecurity technologies. The Directorate has indicated that

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY

Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Ms. Wilson. I look forward to

According to a recent report published by the Government Accountability Office,

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Bucshon.

lenges faced by our Nation and what we can do to facilitate solu-

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH

Chairman MASSIE. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski.

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to

"Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions"

"Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions"

Chainnan Bucshon, Chainnan Massie, Ranking Member Lipinski, Ranking Member

My name Michael Barrett and I am the Vice President of Infonnational Risk

PayPaI's Efforts on Cybersecuritv

DMARC: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance

In its first year, DMARC:

Rejected hundreds of millions of potentially fraudulent messages. As an example, in

Identity Management and Authentication

We have consistently advocated that trustworthy online identity is a key component of a

The National Cyber Security Alliance and Promoting Education Awareness

As a responsible corporate citizen, we believe that we have an important role to play in

Recommendations for Federal Policymakers

Research and Reliable Data

Increased Resources for Law Enforcement and Greater Workforce Development

We believe that there is a significant increase or a reprioritization needed in the funding