Basho refers to a place or receptacle that allows for relationships and oppositions to exist. The author argues that for any relationship to be established, there must be terms of the relationship, and a basho where the relationship is placed or mirrored. Even if we think of relationships as a unified whole, there needs to be a basho that establishes this whole. Further, for objective knowledge or meaning to exist, the basho in which these are placed must be transcendent and not just subjective.
Basho refers to a place or receptacle that allows for relationships and oppositions to exist. The author argues that for any relationship to be established, there must be terms of the relationship, and a basho where the relationship is placed or mirrored. Even if we think of relationships as a unified whole, there needs to be a basho that establishes this whole. Further, for objective knowledge or meaning to exist, the basho in which these are placed must be transcendent and not just subjective.
Basho refers to a place or receptacle that allows for relationships and oppositions to exist. The author argues that for any relationship to be established, there must be terms of the relationship, and a basho where the relationship is placed or mirrored. Even if we think of relationships as a unified whole, there needs to be a basho that establishes this whole. Further, for objective knowledge or meaning to exist, the basho in which these are placed must be transcendent and not just subjective.
Basho refers to a place or receptacle that allows for relationships and oppositions to exist. The author argues that for any relationship to be established, there must be terms of the relationship, and a basho where the relationship is placed or mirrored. Even if we think of relationships as a unified whole, there needs to be a basho that establishes this whole. Further, for objective knowledge or meaning to exist, the basho in which these are placed must be transcendent and not just subjective.
should be possible to distinguish between the terms of a relationship and the
relationship itself, and also between that which unifies the relationship and that wherein the relationship is implaced. Even if we attempt to think in regard to acts, taking the I as a pure unity of acts, insofar as the I is conceived in opposition to the not-I, there must be that which envelops the opposition between I and non-I within itself and makes the establishment of the so-called phenomena of consciousness possible within itself.4 Following the words of Plato’s Timaeus, I shall call the receptacle of the ideas in this sense, basho [place; χώρα, chōra].5 Needless to say, I am not suggesting that what I call basho is the same as Plato’s “space” or “receptacle place.” Although this is a very simple idea, we think that material bodies exist within space and interact within that space. Even traditional physics con- cedes to this. Otherwise we may think that without things there is no space, and that space is nothing but the relationship between material bodies or, further as in Lotze,6 that space is within things.7 But if we are to think in such terms, the related and the relation must be one. It would be, for example, like physical space.8 However, that which relates physical space to physical space is no longer physical space, and there must further be a basho wherein the physical space is implaced. On the other hand one might think that when the related are reduced to a system of relations, we conceive a single whole established by means of it, and that there would be no further point in considering something like a basho that establishes it. But strictly speaking, in order for any sort of relationship to be established as a relation, there must be what we can take to be the terms of the relation. For example, a form of knowledge requires content. Even if we can conceive a single whole unifying the two together, there must be a basho wherein it can be mirrored.9 But one might also say that this designates nothing but an [epis- temologically] subjective concept. But if we take the object to be indepen- dent, transcending the subjective act, the basho wherein the epistemological object [kyakkantekinaru taishō] is established must not be subjective;10 the basho itself must be transcendent.11 And when we look at the act [itself] by objectifying it, we look at it by mirroring it upon the basho of such objects of thought. Even if we think that the meaning itself is objective, the basho wherein that thing is established must be objective as well. One might say that this sort of thing is a mere nothing [mu].12 Even nothing, however, possesses objective significance in the world of thought. When we think of thing-events there must be a basho wherein they are mirrored. Initially we may think of this as the field of consciousness. To be conscious of something one must mirror it upon the field of consciousness. However, we must distinguish the mirrored phenomena of consciousness and the field of consciousness that mirrors them. We can even say that there is no such thing as a field of consciousness apart from the very continuity of
Does The Intentionalist Theory of Perception Provide A Convincing Expanation of Why The Argument From Illusion Fails? If So, What Is It? If Not, Why Not?