Nishida Kitaro PG 50

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( 50 ) Basho

should be possible to distinguish between the terms of a relationship and the


relationship itself, and also between that which unifies the relationship and
that wherein the relationship is implaced. Even if we attempt to think in
regard to acts, taking the I as a pure unity of acts, insofar as the I is conceived
in opposition to the not-I, there must be that which envelops the opposition
between I and non-I within itself and makes the establishment of the
so-called phenomena of consciousness possible within itself.4 Following the
words of Plato’s Timaeus, I shall call the receptacle of the ideas in this sense,
basho [place; χώρα, chōra].5 Needless to say, I am not suggesting that what I
call basho is the same as Plato’s “space” or “receptacle place.”
Although this is a very simple idea, we think that material bodies exist
within space and interact within that space. Even traditional physics con-
cedes to this. Otherwise we may think that without things there is no space,
and that space is nothing but the relationship between material bodies or,
further as in Lotze,6 that space is within things.7 But if we are to think in
such terms, the related and the relation must be one. It would be, for
example, like physical space.8 However, that which relates physical space to
physical space is no longer physical space, and there must further be a basho
wherein the physical space is implaced. On the other hand one might think
that when the related are reduced to a system of relations, we conceive a
single whole established by means of it, and that there would be no further
point in considering something like a basho that establishes it. But strictly
speaking, in order for any sort of relationship to be established as a relation,
there must be what we can take to be the terms of the relation. For example,
a form of knowledge requires content. Even if we can conceive a single
whole unifying the two together, there must be a basho wherein it can be
mirrored.9 But one might also say that this designates nothing but an [epis-
temologically] subjective concept. But if we take the object to be indepen-
dent, transcending the subjective act, the basho wherein the epistemological
object [kyakkantekinaru taishō] is established must not be subjective;10 the
basho itself must be transcendent.11 And when we look at the act [itself] by
objectifying it, we look at it by mirroring it upon the basho of such objects
of thought. Even if we think that the meaning itself is objective, the basho
wherein that thing is established must be objective as well. One might say
that this sort of thing is a mere nothing [mu].12 Even nothing, however,
possesses objective significance in the world of thought.
When we think of thing-events there must be a basho wherein they are
mirrored. Initially we may think of this as the field of consciousness. To be
conscious of something one must mirror it upon the field of consciousness.
However, we must distinguish the mirrored phenomena of consciousness
and the field of consciousness that mirrors them. We can even say that there
is no such thing as a field of consciousness apart from the very continuity of

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