United States Supreme Court

CRAMER v. UNITED STATES(1945)

No. 13

Argued: November 6, 1944Decided: April 23, 1945

[325 U.S. 1, 2]   Mr. Harold R. Medina, of New York City, for petitioner.

Mr. Charles Fahy, Sol. Gen., of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

[325 U.S. 1, 3]  

Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

Anthony Cramer, the petitioner, stands convicted of violating Section 1 of the Criminal Code, which
provides: 'Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.' 1  

Cramer owed allegiance to the United States. A German by birth, he had been a resident of the United
States since 1925 and was naturalized in 1936. Prosecution resulted from his association with two of the
German saboteurs who in June 1942 landed on our shores from enemy submarines to disrupt industry in
the United States and whose cases we considered in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 , 63 S.Ct. 1. One of
those, spared from execution, appeared as a government witness on the trial of Cramer. He testified that
Werner Thiel and Edward Kerling were members of that sabotage crew, detailed their plot, and described
their preparations for its consummation.

Cramer was conscripted into and served in the German Army against the United States in 1918. After the
war he came to this country, intending to remain permanently. So far as appears, he has been of good
behavior, never before in trouble with the law. He was studious and intelligent, earning $ 45 a week for
work in a boiler room and living accordingly.

There was no evidence, and the Government makes no claim, that he had foreknowledge that the
saboteurs were coming to this country or that he came into association with them by prearrangement.
Cramer, however, had known intimately the saboteur Werner Thiel while the latter lived in this country.
They had worked together, [325 U.S. 1, 4]   roomed together, and jointly had ventured in a small and
luckless delicatessen enterprise. Thiel early and frankly avowed adherence to the National Socialist
movement in Germany; he foresaw the war and returned in 1941 for the purpose of helping Germany.
Cramer did not do so. How much he sympathized with the doctrines of the Nazi Party is not clear. He
became at one time, in Indiana, a member and officer of the Friends of New Germany, which was a
predecessor of the Bund. However, he withdrew in 1935 before it became the Bund. He says there was
some swindle about it that he did not like and also that he did not like their drilling and 'radical activities.'
In 1936 he made a trip to Germany, attended the Olympic Games, and saw some of the Bundsmen from
this country who went there at that time for conferences with Nazi Party officials. There is no suggestion
that Cramer while there had any such associations. He does not appear to have been regarded as a
person of that consequence. His friends and associates in this country were largely German. His social
life in New York City, where he recently had lived, seems to have been centered around Kolping House, a
German-Catholic recreational center.

Cramer retained a strong affection for his fatherland. He corresponded in German with his family and
friends there. Before the United States entered the war he expressed strong sympathy with Germany in
its conflict with other European powers. Before the attack upon Pearl Harbor, Cramer openly opposed
participation by this country in the war against Germany. He refused to work on war materials. He
expressed concern about being drafted into our army and 'misused' for purposes of 'world conquest.'
There is no proof, however, except for the matter charged in the indictment, of any act or utterance
disloyal to this country after we entered the war. [325 U.S. 1, 5]   Coming down to the time of the alleged
treason, the main facts, as related on the witness stand by Cramer, are not seriously in dispute. He was
living in New York and in response to a cryptic note left under his door, which did not mention Thiel, he
went to the Grand Central Station. There Thiel appeared. Cramer had supposed that Thiel was in
Germany, knowing that he had left the United States shortly before the war to go there. Together they
went to public places and had some drinks. Cramer denies that Thiel revealed his mission of sabotage.
Cramer said to Thiel that he must have come to America by submarine, but Thiel refused to confirm it,
although his attitude increased Cramer's suspicion. Thiel promised to tell later how he came to this
country. Thiel asked about a girl who was a mutual acquaintance and whom Thiel had engaged to marry
previous to his going to Germany. Cramer knew where she was, and offered to and did write to her to
come to New York, without disclosing in the letter that Thiel had arrived. Thiel said that he had in his
possession about $3600, but did not disclose that it was provided by the German Government, saying
only that one could get money in Germany if he had the right connections. Thiel owed Cramer an old debt
of $200. He gave Cramer his money belt containing some $3600, from which Cramer was to be paid.
Cramer agreed to and did place the rest in his own safe deposit box, except a sum which he kept in his
room in case Thiel should want it quickly.

After the second of these meetings Thiel and Kerling, who was present briefly at one meeting, were
arrested. Cramer's expectation of meeting Thiel later and of bringing him and his fiancee together was
foiled. Shortly thereafter Cramer was arrested, tried, and found guilty. The trial judge at the time of
sentencing said:

'I shall not impose the maximum penalty of death. It does not appear that this defendant Cramer
was aware [325 U.S. 1, 6]   that Thiel and Kerling were in possession of explosives or other
means for destroying factories and property in the United States or planned to do that.
'From the evidence it appears that Cramer had no more guilty knowledge of any subversive
purposes on the part of Thiel or Kerling than a vague idea that they came here for the purpose of
organizing pro-German propaganda and agitation. If there were any proof that they had confided
in him what their real purposes were, or that he knew, or believed what they really were, I should
not hesitate to impose the death penalty.'

Cramer's case raises questions as to application of the Constitutional provision that 'Treason against the
United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.' 2  

Cramer's contention may be well stated in words of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Robinson:3

'Nevertheless a question may indeed be raised whether the prosecution may lay as an overt act a
step taken in execution of the traitorous design, innocent in itself, and getting its treasonable
character only from some covert and undeclared intent. It is true that in prosecutions for
conspiracy under our federal statute it is well settled that any step in performance of the
conspiracy is enough, though it is innocent except for its relations to the agreement. I doubt very
much whether that rule has any application to the case of treason, where the requirement
affected the character of the pleading and proof, rather than accorded a season of repentance
before the crime should be complete. Lord Reading in his charge in [325 U.S. 1, 7]   Casement's
Case uses language which accords with my understanding:
"Overt acts are such acts as manifest a criminal intention and tend towards the accomplishment
of the criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is manifested and the means by which
it is intended to be fulfilled."4
The Government, however, contends for, and the court below has affirmed, this conviction upon a
contrary principle. 5 It said 'We believe in short that no more need be laid for an overt act of treason than
for an overt act of conspiracy. ... Hence we hold the overt acts relied on were sufficient to be submitted to
the jury, even though they perhaps may have appeared as innocent on their face.' A similar conclusion
was reached in United States v. Fricke; 6 it is: 'An overt act in itself may be a perfectly innocent act
standing by itself; it must be in some manner in furtherance of the crime.'

As lower courts thus have taken conflicting positions, or, where the issue was less clearly drawn, have
dealt with the problem ambiguously,7 we granted certiorari8 and after argument at the October 1943
Term we invited [325 U.S. 1, 8]   reargument addressed to specific questions. 9 Since our primary
question here is the meaning of the Constitutional provision, we turn to its solution before considering its
application to the facts of this case.

I.

When our forefathers took up the task of forming an independent political organization for New World
society, no one of them appears to have doubted that to bring into being a new government would
originate a new allegiance for its citizens and inhabitants. Nor were they reluctant to punish as treason
any genuine breach of allegiance, as every government time out of mind had done. The betrayal of
Washington by Arnold was fresh in mind. They were far more awake to powerful enemies with designs on
this continent than some of the intervening generations have been. England was entrenched in Canada to
the north and Spain had repossessed Florida to the south, and each had been the scene of invasion of
the Colonies; the King of France had but lately been dispossessed in the Ohio Valley; Spain claimed the
Mississippi Valley; and, except for the seaboard, the settlements were surrounded by Indians-not
negligible as enemies themselves, and especially threatening when allied to European foes. The
proposed national government could not for some years become firmly seated in the tradition or in the
habits of [325 U.S. 1, 9]   the people. There is no evidence that the forefathers intended to withdraw the
treason offense from use as an effective instrument of the new nation's security against treachery that
would aid external enemies.

The forefathers also had suffered from disloyalty. Success of the Revolution had been threatened by the
adherence of a considerable part of the population to the King. The Continental Congress adopted a
resolution after a report by its 'Committee on Spies'10 which in effect declared that all persons residing
within any colony owed allegiance to it, and that if any such persons adhered to the King of Great Britain,
giving him aid and comfort, they were guilty of treason, and which urged the colonies to pass laws for
punishment of such offenders 'as shall be provably attainted of open deed.' 11 Many of the colonies
complied, and a variety of laws, mostly modeled [325 U.S. 1, 10]   on English law, resulted. 12 Some of
the legislation in later years became so broad and loose as to make treason of [325 U.S. 1, 11]   mere
utterance of opinion. 13 Many a citizen in a time of unsettled and shifting loyalties was thus threatened
under [325 U.S. 1, 12]   English law which made him guilty of treason if he adhered to the government of
his colony and also under colonial law which made him guilty of treason if he adhered to his King. 14 Not
a few of these persons were subjected to confiscation of property or other harsh treatment by the
Revolutionists under local laws; none, however, so far as appears, to capital punishment. 15  

Before this revolutionary experience there were scattered treason prosecutions in the colonies16 usually
not well reported. Some colonies had adopted treason statutes modeled on English legislation. 17 But the
earlier colonial experience seems to have been regarded as of [325 U.S. 1, 13]   a piece with that of
England and appears not to have much influenced the framers in their dealings with the subject.

However, their experience with treason accusations had been many- sided. More than a few of them were
descend- [325 U.S. 1, 14]   ants of those who had fled from measures against sedition and its ecclesiastic
counterpart, heresy. Now the treason offense was under revision by a Convention whose members
almost to a man had themselves been guilty of treason under any interpretation of British law. 18 They
not only had levied war against their King themselves, but they had conducted a lively exchange of aid
and comfort with France, then England's ancient enemy. Every step in the great work of their lives from
the first mild protests against kingly misrule to the final act of separation had been taken under the threat
of treason charges. 19 The Declaration of Independence may seem cryptic in denouncing George III 'for
transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses' but the specific grievance was recited by
the Continental Congress nearly two years before in saying that '... it has lately been resolved in
Parliament, that by force of a statute, made in the thirty-fifth year of the reign of king Henry the eighth,
colonists may be transported to England, and tried there upon accusations for treasons, and misprisions,
or concealments [325 U.S. 1, 15]   of treasons committed in the colonies; and by a late statute, such trials
have been directed in cases therein mentioned.' 20  

The Convention numbered among its members men familiar with government in the Old World, and they
looked back upon a long history of use and abuse of the treason charge. 21 The English stream of
thought con- [325 U.S. 1, 16]   cerning treasons began to flow in fairly definable channels in 1351 with the
enactment of the great Treason Act, 25 Edw. III, Stat. 5, Ch. 2.22 That was a monumental piece [325 U.S.
1, 17]   of legislation several times referred to in the deliberations of the Convention. It cut a bench-mark
by which the English-speaking world tested the level of its thought on the subject23 until our own abrupt
departure from it in [325 U.S. 1, 18]   1789, and after 600 years it still is the living law of treason in
England. Roger Casement in 1917 forfeited his life for violating it. 24 We, of course, can make no
independent judgment as to the inward meanings of the terms used in a six-century-old statute, written in
a form of Norman French that had become obsolete long before our Revolution. We can read this statute
only as our forebears read it-through the eyes of succeeding generations of English judges, to whom it
has been the core of all decision, and of common-law commentators, to whom it has been the
text. 25   [325 U.S. 1, 19]   Adjudicated cases in English history generally have dealt with the offense of
compassing the monarch's death; [325 U.S. 1, 20]   only eleven reported English cases antedating the
Constitution are cited as involving distinct charges of adherence to the King's enemies. 26 When
constructive treasons were not joined on the face of the indictment, it is not possible to say how far they
were joined in the minds of the judges. No decision appears to have been a factor in the deliberations of
our own Constitutional Convention. Nor does any squarely meet our issue here, and for good reason-the
Act of Edward III did not contain the two-witnesses-to- the-same-overt act requirement which precipitates
the issue here.

Historical materials are, therefore, of little help; necessity as well as desire taught a concept that differed
from all historical models in the drafting of our treason clause. Treason statutes theretofore had been
adapted to a society in which the state was personified by a king, on whose person were focused the
allegiances and loyalties of the subject. When government was made representative of the whole body of
the governed there was none to say 'I [325 U.S. 1, 21]   am the State' and a concept of treason as
compassing or imagining a ruler's death was no longer fitting. Nor can it be gainsaid that the revolutionary
doctrine that the people have the right to alter or abolish their government relaxed the loyalty which
governments theretofore had demanded-dangerously diluted it, as the ruling classes of Europe thought,
for in their eyes the colonists not only committed treason, they exalted it. 27 The idea that loyalty will
ultimately be given to a government only so long as it deserves loyalty and that opposition to its abuses is
not treason28 has made our government tolerant of opposition based on differences of opinion that in
some parts of the world would have kept the hangman busy. But the basic law of treason in this country
was framed by men who, as we have seen, were taught by experience and by history to fear abuse of the
treason charge almost as much as they feared treason itself. The interplay in [325 U.S. 1, 22]   the
Convention of their two fears accounts for the problem which faces us today.

II.

We turn then to the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 so far as we have record of
them. The plan presented by Pinckney evidently proposed only that Congress should have exclusive
power to declare what should be treason and misprision of treason against the United States. 29 The
Committee on Detail, apparently not specifically instructed on the subject, reported a draft Constitution
which left no such latitude to create new treasons. It provided that: 'Treason against the United States
shall consist only in levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the enemies
of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to declare the
punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two
witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of bloods, nor forfeiture, except during the life of
the person attained.' 30  

This clause was discussed on August 20, 1787. Mr. Madison, who opened the discussion, 'thought the
definition too narrow. It did not appear to go as far as the Stat. of Edwd III. He did not see why more
latitude might not be left to the Legislature. It wd. be as safe in the hands of State legislatures; and it was
inconvenient to bar a discretion which experience might enlighten, and which might be applied to good
purposes as well as be abused.' 31 Mr. Mason was in favor of following the language of the Statute of
Edward III. The discussion shows some confusion as to the effect of adding the words 'giving them aid
and comfort,' some thinking their effect restrictive [325 U.S. 1, 23]   and others that they gave a more
extensive meaning. However, 'Col Mason moved to insert the words 'giving (them) aid comfort', as
restrictive of 'adhering to their Enemies, &c'-the latter he thought would be otherwise too indefinite.' The
motion prevailed.

Mr. Dickenson 'wished to know what was meant by the 'testimony of two witnesses', whether they were to
be witnesses to the same overt act or to different overt acts. He thought also that proof of an overt-act
ought to be expressed as essential to the case.' Doctor Johnson also 'considered ... that something
should be inserted in the definition concerning overt acts.'

When it was moved to insert 'to the same overt act' after the two- witnesses requirement, Madison notes
that 'Doc'r. Franklin wished this amendment to take place-prosecutions for treason were generally
virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against innocence.' James Wilson observed that 'Much may
be said on both sides. Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof
extremely difficult-as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.' 32 But the motion carried.

By this sequence of proposals the treason clause of the Constitution took its present form. The temper
and attitude of the Convention toward treason prosecutions is unmistakable. It adopted every limitation
that the practice of governments had evolved or that politico-legal philos- [325 U.S. 1, 24]   ophy to that
time had advanced. 33 Limitation of the treason of adherence to the enemy to cases where aid and
comfort were given and the requirement of an overt act were both found in the Statute of Edward III
praised in the writings of Coke and Blackstone, and advocated in Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws. Likewise,
the two-witness requirement had been used in other statutes,34 was advocated by Montesquieu in all
capital cases,35 and was a familiar precept of the New Testament,36 and of Mosaic law. 37 The framers
combined all of these known protections and added two of their own which had no precedent. They wrote
into the organic act of the new government a prohibition of legislative or judicial creation of new treasons.
And a venerable safeguard against false testimony was given a novel application by requiring two
witnesses to the same overt act.

District of treason prosecutions was not just a transient mood of the Revolutionists. In the century and a
half of our national existence not one execution on a federal treason conviction has taken place. Never
before has this Court had occasion to review a conviction. In the few cases that have been prosecuted
the treason clause has had its only judicial construction by individual Justices of this Court presiding at
trials on circuit or by dis- [325 U.S. 1, 25]   trict or circuit judges. 38 After constitutional requirements have
been satisfied, and after juries have convicted [325 U.S. 1, 26]   and courts have sentenced, Presidents
again and again have intervened to mitigate judicial severity or to pardon entirely. We have managed to
do without treason prosecutions to a degree that probably would be impossible except while a people was
singularly confident of external security and internal stability. 39   [325 U.S. 1, 27]   III.

Historical materials aid interpretation chiefly in that they show two kinds of dangers against which the
framers were concerned to guard the treason offense: (1) Perversion by established authority to repress
peaceful political opposition; and (2) conviction of the innocent as a result of perjury, passion, or
inadequate evidence. The first danger could be diminished by closely circumscribing the kind of conduct
which should be treason-making the constitutional definition exclusive, making it clear, and making the
offense one not susceptible of being inferred from all sorts of insubordinations. The second danger lay in
the manner of trial and was one which would be dimin- [325 U.S. 1, 28]   ished mainly by procedural
requirements-mainly but not wholly, for the hazards of trial also would be diminished by confining the
treason offense to kinds of conduct susceptible of reasonably sure proof. The concern uppermost in the
framers' minds, that mere mental attitudes or expressions should not be treason, influenced both
definition of the crime and procedure for its trial. In the proposed Constitution the first sentence of the
treason article undertook to define the offense; the second, to surround its trial with procedural
safeguards.

'Compassing' and like loose concepts of the substance of the offense had been useful tools for
tyranny. So one of the obvious things to be put into the definition of treason not consisting of
actual levying of war was that it must consist of doing something. This the draft Constitution failed
to provide, for, as we have pointed out, it defined treason40 as merely 'adhering to the enemies of
the United States, or any of them.'

Treason of adherence to an enemy was old in the law. It consisted of breaking allegiance to one's own
King by forming an attachment to his enemy. Its scope was comprehensive, its requirements
indeterminate. It might be predicated on intellecutal or emotional sympathy with the for, or merely lack of
zeal in the cause of one's own country. That was not the kind of disloyalty the framers thought should
constitute treason. They promptly accepted the proposal to restrict it to cases where also there was
conduct which was 'giving them aid and comfort.'

'Aid and comfort' was defined by Lord Reading in the Casement trial comprehensively, as it
should be, and yet probably with as much precision as the nature of the matter will permit: '... an
act which strengthens or tends to strengthen the enemies of the King in the conduct of a [325
U.S. 1, 29]   war against the King, that is in law the giving of aid and comfort' and 'an act which
weakens or tends to weaken the power of the King and of the country to resist or to attack the
enemies of the King and the country ... is ... giving of aid and comfort.' Lord Reading explained it,
as we think one must, in terms of an 'act.' It is not easy, if indeed possible, to think of a way in
which 'aid and comfort' and be 'given' to an enemy except by some kind of action. Its very nature
partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.

Thus the crime of treason consists of two elements: adherence to the enemy; and rendering him aid and
comfort. A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and harbor sympathies or convictions
disloyal to this country's policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act of aid and comfort to the
enemy, there is no treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take actions, which do aid and comfort the
enemy- making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in
defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion and diminish
our strength- but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no
treason.

Having thus by definition made treason consist of something outward and visible and capable of direct
proof, the framers turned to safeguarding procedures of trial and ordained that 'No Person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession
in open Court.' This repeats in procedural terms the concept that thoughts and attitudes alone cannot
make a treason. It need not trouble us that we find so dominant a purpose emphasized in two different
ways. But does the procedural requirement add some limitation not already present in the definition of the
crime, and if so, what? [325 U.S. 1, 30]   While to prove giving of aid and comfort would require the
prosecution to show actions and deeds, if the Constitution stopped there, such acts could be inferred from
circumstantial evidence. This the framers thought would not do. 41 So they added what in effect is a
command that the overt acts must be established by direct evidence, and the direct testimony must be
that of two witnesses instead of one. In this sense the overt act procedural provision adds something, and
something important, to the definition.

Our problem begins where the Constitution ends. That instrument omits to specify what relation the
indispensable overt act must sustain to the two elements of the offense as defined: viz., adherence and
giving aid and comfort. It requires that two witnesses testify to the same overt act, and clearly enough the
act must show something toward treason, but what? Must the act be one of giving aid and comfort? If so,
how must adherence to the enemy, the disloyal state of mind, be shown?

The defendant especially challenges the sufficiency of [325 U.S. 1, 31]   the overt acts to prove
treasonable intention. Questions of intent in a treason case are even more complicated than in most
criminal cases because of the peculiarity of the two different elements which together make the offense.
Of course the overt acts of aid and comfort must be intentional as distinguished from merely negligent or
undesigned ones. Intent in that limited sense is not in issue here. But to make treason the defendant not
only must intend the act, but he must intend to betray his country by means of the act. It is here that
Cramer defends. The issue is joined between conflicting theories as to how this treacherous intention and
treasonable purpose must be made to appear.

Bearing in mind that the constitutional requirement in effect in one of direct rather than circumstantial
evidence, we must give it a reasonable effect in the light of its purpose both to preserve the offense and
to protect citizens from its abuse. What is designed in the mind of an accused never is susceptible of
proof by direct testimony. If we were to hold that the disloyal and treacherous intention must be proved by
the direct testimony of two witnesses, it would be to hold that it is never provable. It seems obvious that
adherence to the enemy, in the sense of a disloyal state of mind, cannot be, and is not required to be,
proved by deposition of two witnesses.

Since intent must be inferred from conduct of some sort, we think it is permissible to draw usual
reasonable inferences as to intent from the overt acts. The law of treason, like the law of lesser crimes,
assumes every man to intend the natural consequences which one standing in his circumstances and
possessing his knowledge would reasonably expect to result from his acts. Proof that a citizen did give
aid and comfort to an enemy may well be in the circumstances sufficient evidence that he adhered to that
enemy and intended and purposed to strike at his [325 U.S. 1, 32]   own country. 42 It may be doubted
whether it would be what the founders intended, or whether it would well serve any of the ends they
cherished, to hold the treason offense available to punish only those who make their treacherous
intentions more evident than may be done by rendering aid and comfort to an enemy. Treason-insidious
and dangerous treason-is the work of the shrewd and crafty more often than of the simple and impulsive.

While of course it must be proved that the accused acted with an intention and purpose to betray or there
is no treason, we think that in some circumstances at least the overt act itself will be evidence of the
treasonable purpose and intent. But that still leaves us with exceedingly difficult problems. How decisively
must treacherous intention be made manifest in the act itself? Will a scintilla of evidenc of traitorous intent
suffice? Or must it be sufficient to convince beyond reasonable doubt? Or need it show only that
treasonable intent was more probable than not? Must the overt act be appraised for legal sufficiency only
as supported by the testimony of two witnesses, or may other evidence be thrown into the scales to
create inferences not otherwise reasonably to be drawn or to reinforce those which might be drawn from
the act itself?

It is only overt acts by the accused which the Constitution explicitly requires to be proved by the testimony
of two witnesses. It does not make other common-law evidence inadmissible nor deny its inherent powers
of persuasion. It does not forbid judging by the usual process by which the significance of conduct often
will be determined by facts which are not acts. Actions of the accused are set [325 U.S. 1, 33]   in time
and place in many relationships. Environment illuminates the meaning of acts, as context does that of
words. What a man is up to may be clear from considering his bare acts by themselves; often it is made
clear when we know the reciprocity and sequence of his acts with those of others, the interchange
between him and another, the give and take of the situation.

It would be no contribution to certainty of judgment, which is the object of the provision, to construe it to
deprive a trial court of the aid of testimony under the ordinary sanctions of verity, provided, of course,
resort is not had to evidence of less than the constitutional standard to supply deficiencies in the
constitutional measure of proof of overt acts. For it must be remembered that the constitutional provision
establishes a minimum of proof of incriminating acts, without which there can be no conviction, but it is
not otherwise a limitation on the evidence with which a jury may be persuaded that it ought to convict. The
Constitution does not exclude or set up standards to test evidence which will show the relevant acts of
persons other than the accused or their identity or enemy character or other surrounding circumstances.
Nor does it preclude any proper evidence, of non-incriminating facts about a defendant, such for example
as his nationality, naturalization, and residence.

From duly proven overt acts of aid and comfort to the enemy in their setting, it may well be that the natural
and reasonable inference of intention to betray will be warranted. The two-witness evidence of the acts
accused, together with commonlaw evidence of acts of others and of facts which are not acts, will help to
determine which among possible inferences as to the actor's knowledge, motivation, or intent are the true
ones. But the protection of the two-witness rule extends at least to all acts of the defendant which are
used to draw incriminating inferences that aid and comfort have been given. [325 U.S. 1, 34]   The
controversy before us has been waged in terms of intentions, but this, we think, is the reflection of a more
fundamental issue as to what is the real function of the overt act in convicting of treason. The prisoner's
contention that it alone and on its face must manifest a traitorous intention, apart from an intention to do
the act itself, would place on the overt act the whole burden of establishing a complete treason. On the
other hand, the Government's contention that it may prove by two witnesses an apparently commonplace
and insignificant act and from other circumstances create an inference that the act was a step in treason
and was done with treasonable intent really is a contention that the function of the overt act in a treason
prosecution is almost zero. It is obvious that the function we ascribe to the overt act is significant chiefly
because it measures the two-witness rule protection to the accused and its handicap to the prosecution. If
the over act or acts must go all the way to make out the complete treason, the defendant is protected at
all points by the two-witness requirement. If the act may be an insignificant one, then the constitutional
safeguards are shrunk en so as to be applicable only at a point where they are least needed.

The very minimum function that an overt act43 must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show
sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave44 aid
and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported [325 U.S. 1, 35]   by the testimony of two witnesses. The two-witness principle
is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the
testimony of a single witness. The prosecution cannot rely on evidence which does not meet the
constitutional test for overt acts to create any inference that the accused did other acts or did something
more than was shown in the overt act, in order to make a giving of aid and comfort to the enemy. The
words of the Constitution were chosen, not to make it hard to prove merely routine and everyday acts, but
to make the proof of acts that convict of treason as sure as trial processes may. When the prosecution's
case is thus established, the Constitution does not prevent presentation of corroborative or cumulative
evidence of any admissible character either to strengthen a direct case or to rebut the testimony or
inferences on behalf of defendant. The Government is not prevented from making a strong case; it is
denied a conviction on a weak one.

It may be that in some cases the overt acts, sufficient to prove giving of aid and comfort, will fall short of
showing intent to betray and that questions will then be raised as to permissible methods of proof that we
do not reach in this case. But in this and some cases we have cited where the sufficiency of the overt acts
has been challenged because they were colorless as to intent, we are persuaded the reason intent was
left in question was that the acts were really indecisive as a giving of aid and comfort. When we deal with
acts that are trivial and commonplace and hence are doubtful as to whether they gave aid and comfort to
the enemy, we are most put to it to find in other evidence a treacherous intent.

We proceed to consider the application of these principles to Cramer's case.

IV.

The indictment charged Cramer with adhering to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and
com- [325 U.S. 1, 36]   fort, and set forth ten overt acts. The prosecution withdrew seven, and three were
submitted to the jury. The overt acts which present the principal issue45 are alleged in the following
language:

'1. Anthony Cramer, the defendant herein, on or about June 23, 1942, at the Southern District of
New York and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did meet with Werner Thiel and Edward John
Kerling, enemies of the United States, at the Twin Oaks Inn at Lexington Avenue and 44th Street,
in the City and State of New York, and did confer, treat, and counsel with said Werner Thiel and
Edward John Kerling for a period of time for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and
comfort to said enemies, Werner Thiel and Edward John Kerling.
'2. Anthony Cramer, the defendant herein, on or about June 23, 1942, at the Southern District of
New York and [325 U.S. 1, 37]   within the jurisdiction of this Court, did accompany, confer, treat,
and counsel with Werner Thiel, an enemy of the United States, for a period of time at the Twin
Oaks Inn at Lexington Avenue and 44th Street, and at Thompson's Cafeteria on 42nd Street
between Lexington and Vanderbilt Avenues, both in the City and State of New York, for the
purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort to said enemy, Werner Thiel.'

At the present stage of the case we need not weight their sufficiency as a matter of pleading. Whatever
the averments might have permitted the Government to prove, we now consider their adequacy on the
proof as made.

It appeared upon the trial that at all times involved in these acts Kerling and Thiel were under surveiliance
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. By direct testimony of two or more agents it was established that
Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged and that they drank together
and engaged long and earnestly in conversation. This is the sum of the overt acts as established by the
testimony of two witnesses. There is no two-witness proof of what they said nor in what language they
conversed. There is no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to their
mission or indeed that he had any to give. No effort at secrecy is shown, for they met in public places.
Cramer furnished them no shelter, nothing that can be called sustance or supplies, and there is no
evidence that he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks.

The Government recognizes the weakness of its proof of aid and comfort, but on this scope it urges: 'Little
imagination is required to perceive the advantage such meeting would afford to enemy spies not yet
detected. Even apart from the psychological comfort which the meetings furnished Thiel and Kerling by
way of social intercourse with [325 U.S. 1, 38]   one who they were confident would not report them to the
authorities, as a loyal citizen should, the meetings gave them a source of information and an avenue for
contact. It enabled them to be seen in public with a citizen above suspicion and thereby to be mingling
normally with the citizens of the country with which they were at war.' The difficulty with this argument is
that the whole purpose of the constitutional provision is to make sure that treason conviction shall rest on
direct proof of two witnesses and not on even a little imagination. And without the use of some
imagination it is difficult to perceive any advantage which this meeting afforded to Thiel and Kerling as
enemies or how it strengthened Germany or weakened the United States in any way whatever. It may be
true that the saboteurs were cultivating cramer as a potential 'source of information and an avenue for
contact.' But there is no proof either by two witnesses or by even one witness or by any circumstance that
Cramer gave them information or established any 'contact' for them with any person other than an attempt
to bring about a rendezvous between Thiel and a girl, or that being 'seen in public with a citizen above
suspicion' was of any assistance to the enemy. Meeting with Cramer in public drinking places to tipple
and trifle was no part of the saboteurs' mission and did not advance it. It may well have been a digression
which jeopardized its success.

The shortcomings of the overt act submitted are emphasized by contrast with others which the indictment
charged but which the prosecution withdrew for admitted insufficiency of proof. It appears that Cramer
took from Thiel for safekeeping a money belt containing about $3, 600, some $160 of which he held in his
room concealed in books for Thiel's use as needed. An old indebtedness of Thiel to Cramer of $200 was
paid from the fund, and the rest Cramer put in his safe-deposit box in a bank for safekeeping. All of this
was at Thiel's request. That Thiel [325 U.S. 1, 39]   would be aided by having the security of a safe-
deposit box for his funds, plus availability of smaller amounts, and by being relieved of the risks of
carrying large sums on his person-without disclosing his presence or identity to a bank-seems obvious.
The inference of intent from such act is also very different from the intent manifest by drinking and talking
together. Taking what must have seemed a large sum of money for safekeeping is not a usual amenity of
social intercourse. That such responsibilities are undertaken and such trust bestowed without the scratch
of a pen to show it, implies some degree of mutuality and concert from which a jury could say that aid and
comfort was given and was intended. If these acts had been submitted as overt acts of treason, and we
were now required to decide whether they had been established as required, we would have a quite
different case. We would then have to decide whether statements on the witness stand by the defendant
are either 'confession in open court' or may be counted as the testimony of one of the required two
witnesses to make out otherwise insufficiently proved 'overt acts.' But this transaction was not proven as
the Government evidently hoped to do when the indictment was obtained. The overt acts based on it were
expressly withdrawn from the jury, and Cramer has not been convicted of treason on account of such
acts. We cannot sustain a conviction for the acts submitted on the theory that, even if insufficient, some
unsubmitted ones may be resorted to as proof of treason. Evidence of the money transaction serves only
to show how much went out of the case when it was withdrawn.

The Government contends that outside of the overt acts, and by lesser degree of proof, it has shown a
treasonable intent on Cramer's part in meeting and talking with Thiel and Kerling. But if it showed him
disposed to betray, and showed that he had opportunity to do so, it still has not proved in the manner
required that he did any acts [325 U.S. 1, 40]   submitted to the jury as a basis for conviction which had
the effect of betraying by giving aid and comfort. To take the intent for the deed would carry us back to
constructive treasons.

It is outside of the commonplace overt acts as proved that we must find all that convicts or convinces
either that Cramer gave aid and comfort or that he had a traitorous intention. The prosecution relied
chiefly upon the testimony of Norma Kopp, the fiancee of Thiel, as to incriminating statements made by
Cramer to her,46 upon admissions made by Cramer after his arrest to agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 47 upon letters and [325 U.S. 1, 41]   documents found on search of his room by permission
after his arrest,48 and upon testimony that Cramer had [325 U.S. 1, 42]   curtly refused to buy
Government bonds. 49 After denial of defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the prosecution's
case, defendant became a witness in his own behalf and the Government obtained on cross- examination
some admissions of which it had the benefit on submission. 50   [325 U.S. 1, 43]   It is not relevant to our
issue to appraise weight or credibility of the evidence apart from determining its constitutional sufficiency.
Nor is it necessary in the view we take of the more fundamental issues, to discuss the [325 U.S. 1,
44]   reservations which all of us entertain as to the admissibility of some of it or those which some
entertain as to other of it. We could conclude in favor of affirmance only if all questions of admissibility
were resolved against the prisoner. At all events much of the evidence is of the general character whose
infirmities were feared by the framers and sought to be safeguarded against.

Most damaging is the testimony of Norma Kopp, a friend of Cramer's and one with whom, if she is to be
believed, he had been most indiscreetly confidential. Her testimony went considerably beyond that of the
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to admissions of guilty knowledge of Thiel's hostile
mission and of Cramer's sympathy with it. To the extent that his conviction rests upon such evidence, and
it does to an unknown but considerable extent, it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness
not without strong emotional interest in the drama of which Cramer's trial was a part. Other evidence
relates statements by Cramer before the United States was at war with Germany. At the time they were
uttered, however, they were not treasonable. To use pre-war expressions of opposition to entering a war
to convict of treason during the war is a dangerous procedure at best. The same may be said about the
inference of disloyal attitude created by showing that he refused to buy bonds and closed the door in the
salesman's face. Another class of evidence consists of admissions to agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. They are of course, not 'confession in open court.' The Government does not contend and
could not well contend [325 U.S. 1, 45]   that admissions made out of court, if otherwise admissible, can
supply a deficiency in proof of the overt act itself.
 V.

The Government has urged that our initial interpretation of the treason clause should be less exacting,
lest treason be too hard to prove and the Government disabled from adequately combating the
techniques of modern warfare. But the treason offense is not the only nor can it well serve as the principal
legal weapon to vindicate our national cohesion and security. In debating this provision, Rufus King
observed to the Convention that the 'controversy relating to Treason might be of less magnitude than was
supposed; as the legislature might punish capitally under other names than Treason.' 51 His statement
holds good today. Of course we do not intimate that Congress could dispense with the two- witness rule
merely by giving the same offense another name. But the power of Congress is in no way limited to enact
prohibitions of specified acts thought detrimental to our wartime safety. The loyal and the disloyal alike
may be forbidden to do acts which place our security in peril, and the trial thereof may be focussed upon
defendant's specific intent to do those particular acts52 thus eliminating the accusation of treachery and
of general intent to betray which have such passion-rousing potentialities. Congress repeatedly has
enacted prohibitions of specific acts thought to endanger our security53 and the practice of foreign
nations with de- [325 U.S. 1, 46]   fense problems more acute than our own affords examples of
others. 54  

The framers' effort to compress into two sentences the law of one of the most intricate of crimes gives a
superficial appearance of clarity and simplicity which proves illusory when it is put to practical application.
There are few subjects on which the temptation to utter abstract [325 U.S. 1, 47]   interpretative
generalizations is greater or on which they are more to be distrusted. The little clause is packed with
controversy and difficulty. The offense is one of subtlety, and it is easy to demonstrate lack of logic in
almost any interpretation by hypothetical cases, to which real treasons rarely will conform. The protection
of the two-witness requirement, limited as it is to overt acts, may be wholly unrelated to the real
controversial factors in a case. We would be understood as speaking only in the light of the facts and of
the issues raised in the case under consideration, although that leaves many undetermined grounds of
dispute which, after the method of the common law, we may defer until they are presented by facts which
may throw greater light on their significance. Although nothing in the conduct of Cramer's trial evokes it, a
repetition of Chief Justice Marshall's warning can never be untimely:

'As there is no crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men than treason, no
charge demands more from the tribunal before which it is made, a deliberate and temperate
inquiry. Whether this inquiry be directed to the fact or to the law, none can be more, solemn, none
more important to the citizen or to the government; none can more affect the safety of both. ... It
is therefore more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution, that the
crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not
clearly within the constitutional definition, should receive such punishment as the legislature in its
wisdom may provide.' Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 125, 127.

It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the
framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than modern researches in psychology warrant.
Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of proof, such [325 U.S. 1, 48]   a mechanical
calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to
warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or not, is
severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by
James Wilson that 'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely
difficult-as in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy.' 55 The provision was adopted not merely in
spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by
accident, but because one of the most venerated of that venerated group considered that 'prosecutions
for treason were generally virulent.' Time has not made the accusation of treachery less poisonous, nor
the task of judging one charged with betraying the country, including his triers, less susceptible to the
influence of suspicion and rancor. The innovations made by the forefathers in the law of treason were
conceived in a faith such as Paine put in the maxim that 'He that would make his own liberty secure must
guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will
reach himself.' 56 We still put trust in it.

We hold that overt acts 1 and 2 are insufficient as proved to support the judgment of conviction, which
accordingly is

REVERSED.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice REED
concur, dissenting.

The opinion of the Court is written on a hypothetical state of facts, not on the facts presented by the
record. [325 U.S. 1, 49]   It states a rule of law based on an interpretation of the Constitution which is not
only untenable but is also unnecessary for the decision. It disregards facts essential to a determination of
the question presented for decision. It overlooks the basis issue on which our disposition of the case must
turn. In order to reach that issue we must have a more exact appreciation of the facts than can be
gleaned from the opinion of the Court.

I.

Cramer is a naturalized citizen of the United States, born in Germany. He served in the German army in
the last war, coming to this country in 1925. In 1929 he met Thiel who had come to this country in 1927
from a place in Germany not far from petitioner's birthplace. The two became close friends; they were
intimate associates during a twelve-year period. In 1933 Cramer found work in Indiana. Thiel joined him
there. Both became members of the Friends of New Germany, predecessor of the German-American
Bund. Cramer was an officer of the Indiana local. He resigned in 1935 but Thiel remained a member and
was known as a zealous Nazi. In 1936 Cramer visited Germany. On his return he received his final
citizenship papers. He and Thiel returned to New York in 1937 and lived either together or in close
proximity for about four years. Thiel left for Germany in the spring of 1941, feeling that war between the
United States and Germany was imminent. According to Cramer, Thiel was 'up to his ears' is Nazi
ideology. Cramer corresponded with Thiel in Germany. Prior to our declaration of war, he was
sympathetic with the German cause and critical of our attitude. Thus in November, 1941, he wrote Thiel
saying he had declined a job in Detroit 'as I don't was to dirty my fingers with war material'; that 'We sit
here in pitiable comfort, when we should be in the [325 U.S. 1, 50]   battle-as Nietzsche says-I want the
man, I want the woman, the one fit for war, the other fit for bearing.' In the spring of 1942 he wrote
another friend in reference to the possibility of being drafted: 'Personally I should not care at all to be
misused by the American army as a world conqueror.' Cramer listened to short-wave broadcasts of Lord
Haw-Haw and other German propagandists. He knew that the theme of German propaganda was that
England and the United States were fighting a war of aggression and seeking to conquer the world.

So much for the background. What followed is a sequel to Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 , 63 S.Ct. 2.

Thiel entered the German army and in 1942 volunteered with seven other German soldiers who had lived
in the United States for a special mission to destroy the American aluminum industry. They were brought
here by German submarines in two groups. Kerling was the leader and Thiel a member of one group
which landed by rubber boat near Jacksonville, Florida on June 17, 1942. They buried their explosives
and proceeded to New York City, where on June 21st they registered at the Hotel Commodore under the
assumed names of Edward Kelly and William Thomas.

The next morning a strange voice called Cramer's name from the hall of the rooming house where he
lived. On his failure to reply an unsigned note was slipped under his door. It read, 'Be at the Grand
Central station tonight at 8 o'clock, the upper platform near the information booth, Franz from Chicago
has come into town and wants to see you; don't fail to be there.' Cramer said he knew no Franz from
Chicago. But nevertheless he was on hand at the appointed hour and place. Thiel shortly appeared. They
went to the Twin Oaks Inn where they talked for two hours. Cramer admitted that he knew Thiel had come
from Germany; and of course, he knew that at that time men were not freely entering this country from
Ger- [325 U.S. 1, 51]   many. He asked Thiel, 'Say, how have you come over, have you come by
submarine?' Thiel looked startled, smiled, and said, 'Some other time I am going to tell you all about this.'
Thiel told him that he had taken the assumed name of William Thomas and had a forged draft card. Thiel
admonished him to remember that he, Thiel, was 'anti-Nazi'-a statement Cramer doubted because he
knew Thiel was a member of the Nazi party. thiel indicated he had come from the coast of Florida.
Cramer inquired if he had used a rubber boat. When Thiel said that the only time he was 'scared to death
was when I came over here we got bombed,' Cramer replied, 'Then you have come over by submarine,
haven't you?' Thiel told Cramer that he had 'three and a half or four thousand dollars' with him and that 'if
you have the right kind of connection you can even get dollars in Germany.' Cramer offered to keep
Thiel's money for him. Thiel agreed but nothing was done about it that evening. Cramer admitted he had
a 'hunch' that Thiel was here on a mission for the German government. He asked Thiel 'whether he had
come over here to spread rumors and incite unrest.' Cramer after his arrest told agents of the F.B.I. that
he had suspected that Thiel had received the money from the German government, that Thiel in fact had
told him that he was on a mission for Germany, and that 'whatever his mission was, I thought that he was
serious in his undertaking.' Thiel from the beginning clothed his actions with secrecy; was unwilling to be
seen at Cramer's room ('because I have too many acquaintances there and I don't want them to see me');
and cautioned Cramer against conversing loudly with him in the public tavern.

So they agreed to meet at the Twin Oaks Inn at 8 P.M. on the following evening, June 23, 1942. At this
meeting Kerling joined them. Cramer had met Kerling in this country and knew he had returned to
Germany. Kerling [325 U.S. 1, 52]   and Thiel told Cramer that they had come over together. Cramer had
a 'hunch' that Kerling was here for the same purpose as Thiel. Kerling left Thiel and Cramer after about
an hour and a half. Kerling was followed and arrested. Cramer and Thiel stayed on at the tavern for about
another hour. After Kerling left, Thiel agreed to entrust his money to Cramer for safekeeping. He told
Cramer to take out $200 which Thiel owed him. But he asked Cramer not to put all of the balance in the
safe deposit box-that he should keep some of it out 'in the event I need it in a hurry.' Thiel went to the
washroom to remove the money belt. He handed it to Cramer on the street when they left the tavern.
From the Twin Oaks Thiel and Cramer went to Thompson's Cafeteria where they conversed for about
fifteen minutes. They agreed to meet there at 8 P.M. on June 25th. They parted. Thiel was followed and
arrested.

Cramer returned home. He put Thiel's money belt in a shoe box. He put some of the money between the
pages of a book. Later he put the balance in his bank, some in a savings account, most of it in his safe
deposit box. He and Thiel had talked of Thiel's fiance e, Norma Kopp. At the first meeting Cramer had
offered to write her on Thiel's behalf. He did so. He did not mention Thiel's name but asked her to come to
his room, saying he had 'sensational' news for her. Cramer appeared at Thompson's Cafeteria at 8 P. M.
June 25th to keep his appointment with Thiel. He waited about an hour and a half. He returned the next
night, June 26th, and definitely suspected Thiel had been arrested. Though he knew Thiel was registered
at the Hotel Commodore, he made no attempt to get in touch with him there. When he returned to his
room that night, Norma Kopp was waiting for him. She testified that he told her that Thiel was here; that
'they came about six men with a U-boat, in a rubber boat, and landed in Florida'; that they 'brought
so [325 U.S. 1, 53]   much money along from Germany, from the German government' he was keeping it
in a safe deposit box; and that they 'get instructions from the sitz ( hideout) in the Bronx what to do, and
where to go'. The next morning Cramer left a note for 'William Thomas' at the Commodore saying that
Norma Kopp had arrived and suggested a rendezvous. Later in the day Cramer was arrested. He told the
agents of the F.B.I. that the name of the man who had been with him at Thompson's Cafeteria on the
evening of June 23rd was 'William Thomas', that 'Thomas' had been working in a factory on the West
Coast since March, 1941, and had not been out of the United States since then. He was asked if
'Thomas' was not Thiel. He then admitted he was, saying that Thiel had used an assumed name, as he
was having difficulties with his draft board. He also stated that the money belt Thiel gave him contained
only $200 which Thiel owed him and that the $3500 in his safe deposit box belonged to him and were the
proceeds from the sale of securities. After about an hour or so of the falsehoods Cramer asked to speak
to one of the agents alone. The request was granted. He then recanted his previous false statements and
stated that he felt sure that Thiel had come from Germany by submarine on a mission for the German
Government and that he thought that mission was 'to stir up unrest among the people and probably
spread propaganda.' He stated he had lied in order to protect Thiel.

The Court holds that this evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction of Cramer under the
requirements of the Constitution. We disagree.

II.

Article III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution defines treason as follows: 'Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to [325 U.S. 1, 54]   their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.'

The charge against Cramer was that of adhering. The essential elements of the crime are that Cramer (1)
with treasonable intent (2) gave aid and comfort to the enemy. 1  

There was ample evidence for the jury that Cramer had a treasonable intent. The trial court charged the
jury that 'criminal intent and knowledge, being a mental state, are not susceptible of being proved by
direct evidence, and therefore you must infer the nature of the defendant's intent and knowledge from all
the circumstances.' It charged that proof of criminal intent and knowledge is sufficient if proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the two witnesses are not necessary for any of the facts other than the overt
acts. On that there apparently is no disagreement. It also charged: 'Now gentlemen, motive should not be
confused with intent. If the defendant knowingly gives aid and comfort to one who he knows or believes is
an enemy, then he must be taken to intend the consequences of his own voluntary act, and the fact that
his motive might not have been to aid the enemy is no [325 U.S. 1, 55]   defense. In other words, one
cannot do an act which he knows will give aid and comfort to a person he knows to be an enemy of the
United States, and then seek to disclaim criminal intent and knowledge by saying that one's motive was
not to aid the enemy. So if you believe that the defendant performed acts which by their nature gave aid
and comfort to the enemy, knowing or believing him to be an enemy, then you must find that he had
criminal intent, since he intended to do the act forbidden by the law. The fact that you may believe that his
motive in so doing was, for example, merely to help a friend, or possibly for financial gain, would not
change the fact that he had a criminal intent.' On that there apparently is no disagreement. A man who
voluntarily assists one known or believed to be an enemy agent may not defend on the ground that he
betrayed his country for only thirty pieces of silver. See Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342, 347; Sprott v.
United States, 20 Wall. 459, 463. 'The consequences of his acts are too serious and enormous to admit
of such a plea. He must be taken to intend the consequences of his own voluntary act.' Hanauer v.
Doane, supra (12 Wall. 347). For the same reasons a man cannot slip through our treason law because
his aid to those who would destroy his country was prompted by a desire to 'accommodate a
friend.' 2 Loyalty to country cannot be subordinated to the amenities of personal friendship. [325 U.S. 1,
56]   Cramer had a traitorous intent if he knew or believed that Thiel and Kerling were enemies and were
working here in the interests of the German Reich. The trial court charged that mere suspicion was not
enough; but that it was not necessary for Cramer to have known all their plans. There apparently is no
disagreement on that. By that test the evidence against Cramer was overwhelming. The conclusion is
irresistible that Cramer believed, if he did not actually know, that Thiel and Kerling were here on a secret
mission for the German Reich with the object of injuring the United States and that the money which Thiel
gave him for safekeeping had been supplied by Germany to facilitate the project of the enemy. The trial
court charged that if the jury found that Cramer had no purpose or intention of assisting the German
Reich in its prosecution of the war or in hampering the United States in its prosecution of the war but
acted solely for the purpose of assisting Kerling and Thiel as individuals, Cramer should be acquitted.
There was ample evidence for the jury's conclusion that the assistance Cramer rendered was assistance
to the German Reich, not merely assistance to Kerling and Thiel as individuals.

The trial judge stated when he sentenced Cramer that it did not appear that Cramer knew that Thiel and
Kerling were in possession of explosives or other means for destroying factories in this country or that
they planned to do that. He stated that if there had been direct proof of such knowledge he would have
sentenced Cramer to death rather than to forty-five years in prison. But however relevant such particular
knowledge may have been to fixing the punishment for Cramer's acts of treason, it surely was not
essential to proof of his traitorous intent. A defendant who has aided an enemy agent in this country may
not escape conviction for treason on the ground that he was not aware of the enemy's precise objectives.
Knowing or believing that the agent was here on a mis- [325 U.S. 1, 57]   sion on behalf of a hostile
government, he could not, by simple failure to ask too many questions, assume that this mission was one
of charity and benevolence toward the United States. But the present case is much stronger. For Cramer
claims he believed the enemy agent's objective was to destroy national morale by propaganda and not to
blow up war factories. Propaganda designed to cause disunity among adversaries is one of the older
weapons known to warfare, and upon occasion one of the most effective. No one can read this record
without concluding that the defendant Cramer knew this. He is an intelligent, if misguided, man. He has a
quick wit sharpened by considerable learing of its kind. He is widely read and a student of history and
philosophy, particularly Ranke and Nietzsche. He had been an officer of a pro-German organization, and
his closest associate had been a zealous Nazi. He also had listened to German propagandists over the
short wave. But, in any event, it is immaterial whether Cramer was acquainted with the efficacy of
propaganda in modern warfare. Undoubtedly he knew that the German Government thought it efficacious.
When he was shown consciously and voluntarily to have assisted this enemy program his traitorous intent
was then and there sufficiently proved.

The Court does not purport to set aside the conviction for lack of sufficient evidence of traitorous intent. It
frees Cramer from this treason charge solely on the ground that the overt acts charged are insufficient
under the constitutional requirement.

III.

The overt acts alleged were (1) that Cramer met with Thiel and Kerling on June 23rd, 1942, at the Twin
Oaks Inn and 'did confer, treat, and counsel' with them 'for the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort' to the enemy; (2) that Cramer 'did accompany, [325 U.S. 1, 58]   confer, treat, and
counsel with' Thiel at the Twin Oaks Inn and at Thompson's Cafeteria on June 23rd, 1942, 'for the
purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and comfort' to the enemy; and (3) that Cramer gave false
information of the character which has been enumerated to agents of the F.B.I. 'for the purpose of
concealing the identity and mission' of Thiel and 'for the purpose of giving and with intent to give aid and
comfort' to the enemy.

The Court concedes that an overt act need not manifest on its face a traitorous intention. By that
concession it rejects the defense based on the treason clause which Cramer has made here. The Court
says an overt act must 'show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the
accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy.' It says, however, that the 'protection of the two-
witness rule extends at least to all acts of the defendant which are used to draw incriminating inferences
that aid and comfort have been given.' It adds, 'Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant
charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses. The two-witness
principle is to interdict imputation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the
testimony of a single witness. The prosecution cannot rely on evidence which does not meet the
constitutional test for overt acts to create any inference that the accused did other acts or did something
more than was shown in the overt act, in order to make a giving of aid and comfort to the enemy.' And
when it comes to the overt acts of meeting and conferring with Thiel and Kerling the Court holds that they
are inadequate since there was 'no two-witness proof of what they said nor in what language they
conversed.' That is to say, reversible error is found because the two witnesses who testified to the fact
that Cramer met twice with the saboteurs did not testify that Cramer [325 U.S. 1, 59]   gave them
information of 'value to their mission' such as shelter, sustenance, supplies, encouragement or counsel.

That conclusion, we submit, leads to ludicrous results. The present case is an excellent example.
It is conceded that if the two witnesses had testified not only that they saw Cramer conferring with Thiel
and Kerling but also heard him agree to keep Thiel's money and saw him take it, the result would be
different. But the assumption is that since the two witnesses could not testify as to what happened at the
meetings, we must appraise the meetings in isolation from the other facts of the record. Therein lies the
fallacy of the argument.

In the first place, we fully agree that under the constitutional provision there can be no conviction of
treason without proof of two witnesses of an overt act of treason. We also agree that the act so proved
need not itself manifest on its face the treasonable intent. And as the Court states, such intent need not
be proved by two witnesses. It may even be established by circumstantial evidence. For it is well
established that the overt act and the intent are separate and distinct elements of the crime. 3 The 'intent
may be proved by one witness, collected from circumstances, or even by a single fact.' Case of Fries, 9
Fed.Cas. pages 826, 909, No. 5,126; Respublica v. Roberts, 1 Dall. 39; United States v. Lee, 26 Fed.Cas.
page 907, No. 15,584; Trial of David Maclane, 26 How.St.Tr. 721, 795-798. Acts innocent on their face,
when judged in the light of their purpose and of related events, may turn out to be acts of aid and comfort
committed with treasonable purpose. It is the overt act charged as such in the indictment which must be
proved by two witnesses and not the related events which make manifest its treasonable quality and
purpose. This, we think, is the correct and necessary conclusion to be drawn from the concession that the
overt act need not on its face manifest the guilty purpose. The [325 U.S. 1, 60]   grossest and most
dangerous act of treason may be, as in this case, and often is, innocent on its face. But the ruling of the
Court that the related acts and events which show the true character of the overt act charged must be
proved by two witnesses is without warrant under the constitutional provisions, and is so remote from the
practical realities of proving the offense, as to render the constitutional command unworkable. The
treasonable intent or purpose which it is said may be proved by a single witness or circumstantial
evidence must, in the absence of a confession of guilt in open court, be inferred from all the facts and
circumstances which surround and relate to the overt act. Inference of the treasonable purpose from
events and acts related to or surrounding the overt act necessarily includes the inference that the
accused committed the overt act with the knowledge or understanding of its treasonable character. To
say that the treasonable purpose with which the accused committed the overt act may be inferred from
related events proved by a single witness, and at the same time to say that so far as they show the
treasonable character of the overt act, they must be proved by two witnesses, is a contradiction in terms.
The practical effect of such a doctrine is to require proof by two witnesses, not only of the overt act
charged which the Constitution requires but of every other fact and circumstance relied upon to show the
treasonable character of the overt act and the treasonable purpose with which it was committed which the
Constitution plainly does not require. Here, as in practically all cases where there is no confession in open
court, the two are inseparable, save only in the single instance where the overt act manifests its
treasonable character on its face. The court thus in substance adopts the contention of the respondent,
which it has rejected in words, and for all practical purposes requires proof by two witnesses, not only of
the overt act but of all other elements of the crime save only in the [325 U.S. 1, 61]   case where the
accused confesses in open court. It thus confuses proof of the overt act with proof of the purpose or intent
with which the overt act was committed and, without historical support, expands the constitutional
requirement so as to include an element of proof not embraced by its words.

We have developed in the Appendix to this opinion the historic function of the overt act in treason cases.
It is plain from those materials that the requirement of an overt act is designed to preclude punishment for
treasonable plans or schemes or hopes which have never moved out of the realm of thought or speech. It
is made a necessary ingredient of the crime to foreclose prosecutions for constructive treason. The
treasonable project is complete as a crime only when the traitorous intent has ripened into a physical and
observable act. The act standing alone may appear to be innocent or indifferent, such as joining a person
at a table, stepping into a boat, or carrying a parcel of food. That alone is insufficient. It must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was part of the treasonable project and done in
furtherance of it. Its character and significance are to be judged by its place in the effectuation of the
project. That does not mean that where the treasonable scheme involves several treasonable acts, and
the overt act which is charged has been proved by two witnesses, that all the other acts which tend to
show the treasonable character of the overt act and the treasonable purpose with which it was committed
must be proved by two witnesses. The Constitution does not so declare. There is no historical support for
saying that the phrase 'two Witnesses to the same overt Act' may be or can be read as meaning two
witnesses to all the acts involved in the treasonable scheme of the accused. Obviously one overt act
proved by two witnesses is enough to sustain a conviction even though the accused has committed many
other acts which can be proved by only one [325 U.S. 1, 62]   witness or by his own admission in open
court. Hence, it is enough that the overt act which is charged be proved by two witnesses. As the Court
concedes, its treasonable character need not be manifest upon its face. We say that its true character
may be proved by any competent evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict of a jury. Any other conclusion
lands to such absurd results as to preclude the supposition that the two witness rule was intended to have
the meaning attributed to it.

When we apply that test to the facts of this case it is clear to us that the judgment of conviction against
Cramer should not be set aside. The historical materials which we have set forth in the Appendix to this
opinion establish that a meeting with the enemy may be adequate as an overt act of treason. Hale,
Kelyng and Foster establish that beyond peradventure of doubt. Such a meeting might be innocent on its
face. It might also be innocent in its setting, as Hale, Kelying and Foster point out, where, for example, it
was accidental. We would have such a case here if Cramer's first meeting with Thiel was charged as an
overt act. For, as we have seen, Cramer went to the meeting without knowledge that he would meet and
confer with Thiel. But the subsequent meetings were arranged between them. They were arranged in
furtherance of Thiel's designs. Cramer was not only on notice that Thiel was here on a mission inimical to
the interests of this nation. He had agreed at the first meeting to hide Thiel's money. He had agreed to
contact Norma Kopp. He knew that Thiel wanted his identity and presence in New York concealed. This
was the setting in which the later meetings were held. The meetings take on their true character and
significance from that setting. They constitute acts. They demonstrate that Cramer had a liking for Thiel's
design to the extent of aiding him in it. They show beyond doubt that Cramer had more than a
treasonable intent; that that intent had moved from the realm of [325 U.S. 1, 63]   thought into the realm of
action. Since two witnesses proved that the meetings took place, their character and significance might
be proved by any competent evidence.

In the second place, this judgment of conviction should be sustained even though we assume, arguendo,
that Cramer's motion to dismiss at the end of the government's case should have been granted. To
concern of the Court is that acts innocent on their face may be transformed into sinister or guilty acts by
circumstantial evidence, by inference, by speculation. The rule announced by the Court is based on a
desire for trust-worthy evidence in determining the character and significance of the overt acts. But this is
not a case where an act innocent on its face is given a sinister aspect and made a part of a treasonous
design by circumstantial evidence, by inference, or by the testimony of a single witness for the
prosecution. We know from Cramer's own testimony-from his admissions at the trial-exactly what
happened.

We know the character of the meetings from Cramer's own admissions. We know from his own lips that
they were not accidental or casual conferences, or innocent, social meetings. He arranged them with
Thiel. When he did so he believed that Thiel was here on a secret mission for the German Reich with the
object of injuring this nation. He also knew that Thiel was looking for a place to hide his money. Cramer
had offered to keep it for Thiel and Thiel had accepted the offer. Cramer had also offered to write Norma
Kopp, Thiel's fiance e, without mentioning Thiel's name. Cramer also knew that Thiel wanted his identity
and his presence in New York concealed. Cramer's admissions at the trial gave character and
significance to those meetings. Those admissions plus the finding of treasonable intent place beyond a
reasonable doubt the conclusion that those meetings were steps in and part and parcel of the treasonable
project.

Nor need we guess or speculate for knowledge of what happened at the meetings. We need not rely on
circum- [325 U.S. 1, 64]   stantial evidence, draw inferences from other facts, or resort to secondary
sources. Again we know from Cramer's testimony at the trial-from his own admissions-precisely what
transpired.
Cramer told the whole story in open court. He admitted he agreed to act and did act as custodian of the
saboteur Thiel's money. He agreed to hold it available for Thiel's use whenever Thiel might need it. It is
difficult to imagine what greater aid one could give a saboteur unless he participated in the sabotage
himself. Funds were as essential to Thiel's plans as the explosives he buried in the sands of Florida.
Without funds the mission of all the saboteurs would have soon ended or been seriously crippled. Cramer
did not stop here. Preservation of secrecy was essential to this invasion of the enemy. It was vital if the
project was to be successful. In this respect Cramer also assisted Thiel. He cooperated with Thiel in the
concealment of Thiel's identity and presence in New York City. He did his best to throw federal officers off
the trail and to mislead them. He made false statements to them saying that Thiel's true name was
'Thomas' and that Thiel had not been not of the country since the war began.

If Cramer had not testified, we would then be confronted with the questions discussed in the opinion of
the Court. But he took the stand and told the whole story. It is true that at the end of the government's
case Cramer moved to dismiss on the ground that the crime charged had not been made out. That motion
was denied and an exception taken. If Cramer had rested there, the case submitted to the jury and a
judgment of conviction rendered, we would have before us the problem presented in the opinion of the
Court. But Cramer did not rest on that motion. He took the stand and told the whole story. Any defect in
the proof was cured by that procedure. As stated in Bogk v. Gassert, 149 U.S. 17, 23 , 13 S.Ct. 738, 739,
'A defend- [325 U.S. 1, 65]   ant has an undoubted right to stand upon his motion for a nonsuit, and have
his writ of error, if it be refused; but he has no right to insist upon his exception after having subsequently
put in his testimony, and made his case upon the merits, since the court and jury have the right to
consider the whole case as made by the testimony. It not infrequently happens that the defendant himself,
by his own evidence, supplies the missing link'. And see Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 121 , 21 S.Ct.
34, 36; McCabe & Steen Const. Co. v. Wilson, 209 U.S. 275, 276 , 28 S.Ct. 558, 559; Bates v. Miller, 2
Cir., 133 F.2d 645, 647, 648; 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 2496. And the rule obtains in criminal
as well as in civil cases. Sheridan v. United States, 9 Cir., 112 F.2d 503, 504, reversed on other grounds
312 U.S. 654 , 61 S.Ct. 619; Edwards v. United States, 8 Cir., 7 F.2d 357, 359; Baldwin v. United States,
9 Cir., 72 F.2d 810, 812.

Why then must we disregard Cramer's admissions at the trial? Why must we assume, as does this Court,
that those admissions are out of the case and that our decision must depend solely on the evidence
presented by the government?

The Constitution says that a 'confession in open Court' is sufficient to sustain a conviction of treason. It
was held in United States v. Magtibay, 2 Philippine 703, that a confession in open court to the overt acts
charged in the indictment was not an adequate substitute for the testimony of two witnesses where the
accused denied treasonable purpose. We need not go so far as to say that if the whole crime may be
proved by an admission by the accused in open court, one of the ingredients of the offense may be
established in like manner. See Respublica v. Roberts, supra. We do not say that if the government
completely fails to prove an overt act or proves it by one witness only, the defect can be cured by the
testimony of other witnesses or by the admissions of the accused. We do say that a meeting with the
enemy is an act and [325 U.S. 1, 66]   may in its setting be an overt act of treason. We agree that overt
acts innocent on their face should not be lightly transformed into incriminating acts. But so long as overt
acts of treason need not manifest treason on their face, as the Court concedes, the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish the treasonable character of the act, like the evidence of trasonable intent, depends
on the quality of that evidence whatever the number of witnesses who supplied it. There can be no doubt
in this case on that score. Certainly a person who takes the stand in defense of a treason charge against
him will not be presumed to commit perjury when he makes admissions against self-interest. Admissions
against self- interest have indeed always been considered as the highest character of evidence. When
two witnesses testify to the overt acts, why then are not admissions of the accused in open court
adequate to establish their true character? Could the testimony of any number of witnesses more
certainly or conclusively establish the significance of what was done? Take the case where two witnesses
testify that the accused delivered a package to the enemy, the accused admitting in open court that the
package contained guns or ammunition. Or two witnesses testify that the accused sent the enemy a
message, innocuous on its face, the accused admitting in open court that the message was a code
containing military information. Must a conviction be set aside because the two witnesses did not testify to
what the accused admitted in open court? We say no. In such circumstances we have no examples of
constructive treason. The intent is not taken for the deed. Proof of the overt act plus proof of a
treasonable intent make clear that the treasonable design has moved out of the realm of thought into the
filed of action. And any possibility that an act innocent on its face has been transformed into a sinister or
guilty act is foreclosed. For the significance and character of the act are supplied by the admissions from
the lips of [325 U.S. 1, 67]   the accused in open court. The contrary result could be reached only if it were
necessary that the overt act manifest treason on its face. That theory is rejected by the Court. But once
rejected it is fatal to the defense.

Cramer's counsel could not defend on the grounds advanced by the Court for the simple reason that the
government having proved by two witnesses that Cramer met and conferred with the saboteurs, any
possible insufficiency in the evidence which it adduced to show the character and significance of the
meetings was cured by Cramer's own testimony. Cramer can defend only on the ground that the overt act
must manifest treason, which the Court rejects, or on the ground that he had no treasonable intent, which
the jury found against him on an abundance of evidence. Those are the only alternatives because
concededly conferences with saboteurs here on a mission for the enemy may be wholly adequate as
overt acts under the treason clause. They were proved by two witnesses as required by the Constitution.
Any possible doubt as to their character and significance as parts of a treasonable project were removed
by the defendant's own admissions in open court. To say that we are precluded from considering those
admissions in weighing the sufficiency of the evidence of the true character and significance of the overt
acts is neither good sense nor good law. Such a result makes the way easy for the traitor, does violence
to the Constitution and makes justice truly blind.

Appendix

The most relevant source of materials for interpretation of the treason clause of the Constitution is the
statute of 25 Edw. III, Stat. 5, ch. 2 (1351) and the construction which was given it. It was with that body of
law and the English and colonial experience under it that the Framers were acquainted. That statute
specified seven offenses as [325 U.S. 1, 68]   constituting treason. As respects the three offenses
relevant to our present discussion, it provided as follows: if a man 'doth compass or imagine the death' of
the king, or 'if a man do levy war' against the king in his realm, or if he 'be adherent to the king's enemies
in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere, and thereof be probably attainted
of open deed', he shall be guilty of treason.

Coke makes clear that the requirement of an overt act under the statute applies to all of the offenses
included in the category of treason. See Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, Third Part (5th ed.
London, 1671), p. 5. There are indications by Coke that the overt act was a separate element of the
offense and that its function was to show that the treasonable design had moved from thought to action.
Id., pp. 5, 12, 14, 38. Hale is somewhat more explicit. In discussing the offense of compassing the king's
death he indicates that the overt act may be 'indifferent' in character. He says, 'That words may expound
an overt-act to make good an indictment of treason of compassing the king's death, which overt-act
possibly of itself may be indifferent and unapplicable to such an intent.' 1 Hale, History of the Pleas of the
Crown (Emlyn ed., London, 1736), p. 115. And he noted that 'If there be an assembling together to
consider how they may kill the king, this assembling is an overt-act to make good an indictment of
compassing the king's death.' Id., p. 119. Kelying states the same view. He cites Sir Everard Digby's
Case, 1 St.Tr. 234, for the proposition that the meeting of persons and their consulting to destroy the king
was itself an overt act. 'It was resolved that where a Person knowing of the Design does meet with them,
and hear them discourse of their traitorous Designs, and say or act nothing; This is High-Treason in that
Party, for it is more than a bare Concealment, which is Misprision, because it sheweth his liking and
approving of their De- [325 U.S. 1, 69]   sign.' He says that if a person not knowing their intent met with
them, heard their plans, but said nothing and never met again, that would be only misprision of treason.
'But if he after meet with them again, and hear their Consultations, and then conceal it, this is High-
Treason. For it sheweth a liking, and an approving of their Design.' Kelyng, A Report of Divers Cases in
Pleas of the Crown (3d ed., London, 1873), p. *17. And see p. *21.
Foster is even more explicit. Like Coke he asserts that an overt act is required for each branch of treason
covered by the Statute of Edward III. Foster, A Report of Some Proceedings on the Commission for the
Trial of the Rebels in the Year 1746 in the County of Surry, and of other Crown Cases (2d ed., London
1791), pp. 207, 237. He makes clear that an overt act is required not to corroborate the proof of a
traitorous intent but to show that the treasonable project has left the realm of thought and moved into the
realm of action. As respects the offense of compassing the death of the king, he says that the indictment
'must charge, that the defendant did traitorously compass and imagine &c, and then go on and charge the
several overt-acts as the means employed by the defendant for executing his traitorous purposes. For the
compassing is considered as the treason, the overt-acts as the means made use of to effectuate the
intentions and imaginations of the heart.' Id., p. 194. He refers to Crohagan's Case (Cro. Car. 332) where
the defendant said 'I will kill the King of England, if I can come at him' and the indictment added that he
came to England for that purpose. 'The traitorous intention, proved by his words, converted an action,
innocent in itself, into an overt-act of treason.' Id., p. 202. And he also points out that 'Overt-acts
undoubtedly do discover the man's intentions; but, I conceive, they are not to be considered merely as
evidence, but as the means made use of to effectuate the purposes of the heart.' Id., p. 203. And he
adds, 'Upon this [325 U.S. 1, 70]   principle words of advice or encouragement, and, above all,
consultations for destroying the King, very properly come under the notion of means made use of for the
purpose. But loose words not relative to facts are, at the worst, no more than bare indications of the
malignity of the heart.' Id., p. 204. He follows Kelyng in saying that attendance at a meeting with previous
notice of the design to plot the death of the king or a return to a meeting after knowledge is gained of its
treasonable purpose is treason, though bare concealment would not be if the defendant met the
conspirators 'accidentally or upon some indifferent occasion'. Id., p. 195.

It is true that these observations related to the offense of compassing or imagining the death of the king.
But Foster indicates that the same test applies to make out the offense of adherence to the king's
enemies. He says, 'The offense of inciting foreigners to invade the kingdom is a treason of signal
enormity. In the lowest estimation of things and in all possible events, it is an attempt, on the part of the
offender, to render his country the seat of blood and desolation.' Id., pp. 196-197. This was said in
connection with his discussion of Lord Preston's case, 12 How.St.Tr. 645, a landmark in the law of
treason. Lord Preston was indicted both for compassing the death of the king and for adherence to his
enemies. England was at war with France. The indictment alleged as an overt act of treason that on
December 30, 1690, Lord Preston and others hired a small boat in the County of Middlesex to take them
to another vessel which would carry them to France. The indictment alleged that the defendants were en
route to France to communicate military information to the enemy. After the vessel set sail for France and
when the vessel was in the County of Kent, the defendants were arrested. Papers containing information
of value to the enemy were found on the person of Lord Preston's servant. Lord Preston contended that
since the indictment laid the [325 U.S. 1, 71]   treason in Middlesex there was no showing that a legally
sufficient overt act of treason had been committed in that county. The court held, however, that the act of
boarding the boat in Middlesex was a sufficient overt act of treason. Lord Chief Justice Holt ruled, 'Now
the question is, whether your lordship had a design to go to France with these papers? If you had, and if
your lordship did go on ship-board in order to it, your taking boat in Middlesex in order to go on ship-
board, is a fact done in the county of Middlesex.' 12 How.St.Tr., p. 728.

Foster in his analysis of that case makes clear that taking the boat was an overt act sufficient not only to
the crime of compassing the death of the king but also adherence to the enemies of the king. Foster, op.
cit ., pp. 197-198. Yet on its face and standing alone the overt act of taking the boat was completely
innocent and harmless. Only when it was related to other activities and events did it acquire a treasonable
significance. Foster gives other indications that in case of adherence to the enemy the function of the
overt act is no different than when the offense of compassing is charged. The crime of adherence is made
out where the defendant attempts to send money, provisions, or information to the enemy 'though the
money or intelligence should happen to be intercepted; for the party in sending did all he could; the
treason was complete on his part, though it had not the effect he intended.' Id., p. 217.

Blackstone emphasizes the desirability of a restrictive interpretation of the offense of treason,

condemning 'constructive' treason and 'newfangled treasons' which imperil the liberty of the people. 4
Blackstone, Commentaries (6th ed. Dublin 1775), pp. 75, 83, 85, 86. Blackstone recognizes the
distinction between evidence of intent and the overt act: 'But, as this compassing or imagination is an act
of the mind, it cannot possibly fall under any judicial cognizance, unless it be demonstrated by [325 U.S.
1, 72]   some open, or overt act. And yet the tyrant Dionysius is recorded to have executed a subject,
barely for dreaming that he had killed him; which was held for a sufficient proof, that he had thought
thereof in his waking hours. But such is not the temper of the English law; and therefore, in this, and the
three next species of treason, it is necessary that there appear an open or overt act of a more full and
explicit nature, to convict the traitor upon.' Id., p. 79. When it comes to the offense of adherence to the
enemy he gives examples of adequate overt acts, some of which may be innocent standing by
themselves. 'This must likewise be provided by some overt act, as by giving them intelligence, by sending
them provisions, by selling them arms, by treacherously surrendering a fortress, or the like.' Id., pp. 82-83.
His analysis supports the views of Foster that the function of the overt act is to show that the traitorous
project has moved out of the realm of thought into the realm of action.

The English cases prior to 1790 support this thesis. We have mentioned Lord Preston's case. In the case
of Captain Vaughn, 13 How.St.Tr. 485, the principal charge against the defendant was adhering to the
enemy, though levying war was also alleged. The substance of the overt act of adherence was that when
France and England were at war the defendant cruised in a small ship of war, in English waters, in the
service of France with intent to take the king's ships. It was objected that the overt act alleged was
insufficient 'for it is said only he went a-cruising; whereas they ought to have alleged that he did commit
some acts of hostility, and attempted to take some of the king's ships; for cruising alone cannot be an
overt-act; for he might be cruising to secure the French merchantships from being taken, or for many
other purposes, which will not be an overt-act of treason.' p.531. But Lord Chief Justice Holt ruled: 'I beg
your pardon. Suppose the French king, with forces, should [325 U.S. 1, 73]   come to Dunkirk with a
design to invade England; if any one should send him victuals, or give him intelligence, or by any other
way contribute to their assistance, it would be high-treason in adhering to the king's enemies.' p. 531. And
Lord Chief Justice Treby added: 'The indictment is laid for adhering to, and comforting and aiding the
king's enemies. You would take that to be capable to be construed adhering to the king's enemies in other
respects; but I take it to be a reasonable construction of the indictment, to be adhering to the king's
enemies in their enmity. What is the duty of every subject? It is to fight with, subdue, and weaken the
king's enemies: and contrary to this, if he confederate with, and strengthen the king's enemies, he
expressly contradicts this duty of his allegiance, and is guilty of this treason of adhering to them. But then
you say here is no aiding unless there was something done, some act of hostility. Now here is going
aboard with an intention to do such acts; and is not that comforting and aiding? Certainly it is. Is not the
French king comforted and aided, when he has got so many English subjects to go a cruising upon our
ships?' pp. 532, 533. And he went on to say that acts which 'give the enemy heart and courage to go on
with the war' are acts of adherence even though the whole project was 'an unprosperous attempt.' p. 533.
He emphasized that the lack of success was immaterial, for 'if they have success enough, it will be too
late to question them.' p. 533. This is plain recognition not only that the aid and comfort may be given
though the project is thwarted1 but also that aid and comfort is given when the enemy is encouraged and
his morale bolstered as well as when materials are furnished. [325 U.S. 1, 74]   The case of Francis De la
Motte, 21 How.St.Tr. 687, is also somewhat illuminating. The indictment charged compassing and
adhering. The overt acts included writing and causing to be written documents conveying intelligence to
the enemy, procuring a messenger to cary the documents, and hiring a person to gather and to send the
intelligence. Mr. Justice Buller in his charge to the jury said: 'The sending intelligence, or collecting
intelligence, for the purpose of sending it to an enemy, to enable them to annoy us or to defend
themselves, though it be never delivered to the enemy; or the hiring a person for that purpose, is an overt
act of both the species of treason which I am stating to you from this indictment.' p. 808.

These materials indicate that the function of the overt act was to make certain that before a conviction for
the high crime of treason may be had more than a treasonable design must be established; it must be
shown that action pursuant to that design has been taken. The treason of adherence was defined
essentially in terms of conduct for it involved giving aid and comfort. Yet the attempt alone was sufficient;
the aid and comfort need not have been received by the enemy. Conduct amounting to aid and comfort
might be innocent by itself-such as collecting information or stepping into a boat. It was sufficient if in its
setting it reflected a treasonable project. It need not entail material aid; comfort or encouragement was
sufficient. The only requirement was that it definitely translate treasonable thought into action which
plainly tended to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

These materials likewise support the contention of the government that the overt act need not manifest
treason on its face.

The history of treason in this country down to the Constitution has been recently developed in Hurst,
Treason in the United States, (1944) 58 Harv.L.Rev. 226. We [325 U.S. 1, 75]   do not stop to explore that
field. But Professor Hurst's researches make plain that prior to the revolution the influence of 25 Edw. III
was strong in the colonies and that, if anything, the scope of the offense was somewhat broadened. The
Revolution changed matters. The Continental Congress recommended more restrictive legislation to the
colonies which limited treason to levying war and adhering to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort. Id.,
p. 247. No form of treason by compassing was retained. Id., p. 252. Distrust of constructive treason was
beginning to be voiced ( id., pp. 253, 254) though in some colonies treason was so broadly defined as to
include mere utterances of opinions. Id., pp. 266 et seq.

The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 have been related in the opinion of the Court.
And see Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 Harv.L.Rev. 395. As the Court points out the Framers
were anxious to guard against convictions of the innocent by perjury and to remove treason from the
realm of domestic, political disputes. Franklin expressed concern on the first in his statement that
'prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too easily made use of against innocence.' 2
Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, p. 348. Madison and Jefferson2 both expressed distrust of
treason for its long history of abuse in the political field. Madison said in language somewhat reminiscent
of Blackstone: 'As treason may be committed [325 U.S. 1, 76]   against the United States, the authority of
the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artifical treasons have been
the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually
wreaked their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a
barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof
necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from extending the
consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author.' The Federalist, No. XLIII.

The requirement of two wotnesses was not novel. England had long had that rule. 9 Holdsworth, A
History of English Law (2d ed. 1938) p. 207. The novelty was in the requirement that there be two
witnesses to the 'same' overt act. Moreover, there was no novely in the offenses which were included in
the definition of treason. Adhering to the enemy, giving him aid and comfort, like levying war, had long
been embraced in the English crime of treason as we have seen. But there was novelty in the narrow
definition of treason which was adopted-a restrictive definition born of the fear of constructive treason and
distrust of treason as a political instrument.

There is, however, no evidence whatever that the offense of adhering to the enemy giving him aid and
comfort was designed to encompass a narrower field than that indicated by its accepted and settled
meaning. Nor is there the slightest indication that the kind or character of overt acts required were any
different than those which had long been recognized or accepted as adequate. The overt act was of
course 'intended as a distinct element of proof of the offense in addition to intent.' Hurst, op. cit., pp. 415-
416. But any suggested difference from the body of law which preceded vanishes when two witnesses to
the same overt act are produced. As respects the point vital [325 U.S. 1, 77]   for our decision it is
therefore quite inaccurate for the Court to conclude that our treason clause 'taught a concept that differed
from all historical models.' That would be true only if there was a purpose to depart from the concept of
adhering to the enemy or the concept of overt acts which had become ingrained in the antecedent English
law. We find no such purpose.