Answer 1.

a) The reason stated by Ramesh, is right in terms of the lease agreement. According
to Clause 16 of the Lease deed, Shreekanth cannot conduct any trade, business or
profession from the residential premises and Clause 15 the agreement could get
automatically terminated if there is any breach in the contract, so if Shreekanth
violated clause 16, the agreement could be terminated immediately according to
clause 15.

Although, the section 27 of the Indian Contract Act states that any
agreement in restraint of trade is void; but here clause 16 of the agreement is not
completely restricting Shreekanth from carrying out his lawful profession, trade or
business as he has an office in the Saket court premises. Like in the case of
Niranjan Shankar Golikar v. Century Spinning and manufacturing Co. Ltd., it was
held that the plaintiff, an employer for the defendants, couldn’t quit his job to
acquire a job in a rival company unless he compensates for the same, according to
clause 17 of their Employment contract. In this case the defendants are not
completely restricting the lawful profession of the plaintiff because he is under an
agreement with them which indeed provides employment for him. Similarly,
Ramesh is not putting a complete restriction to Shreekanth’s trade, business or
profession; they are merely telling him not to do it on the premises of residence.

b) Yes, According to clause 22 of the Lease Agreement, In-case Ramesh sells,

mortgages or transfers the premises to any third party, then Ramesh shall ensure
that the obligations towards the Shreekanth according to this lease agreement are
not waived off and Ramesh shall have the right to retain the possession as per the
provisions of this lease agreement. This means that even if the property is sold to a
third party, until the agreement is legally terminated Shreekanth can choose to be
residing in the premises. Moreover, according to Clause 17 of the Lease
agreement, both parties may terminate the lease before the agreement expires by
giving one month’s advance notice or one month’s rent in lieu thereof.

This disallows State bank to ask Shreekanth to vacate the premises as they
could own the property yet cannot occupy the property unless Shreekanth assents
to it and that too with a prior 1 month notice of the termination.

Yes, these clauses are valid under Section 37 [see illustration (a)] and 2 (i) of
The Indian Contract Act respectively.

We would’ve advised him to revise clause 15 from “…then this agreement

would get automatically terminated” to “…then both the parties are bound to
discuss the matter and if the act still continues, then the agreement would get
automatically terminated.” Discharge by Breach of Contract - [Murlidhar
Chatterjee v. International Film Co., (AIR 1943 PC 34)]
 c) According to Clause 26 of the Lease Deed, Shreekanth is bound to attempt
negotiation with Ramesh, at least twice, before approaching any legal forums.
However, this clause is void according section 28 of the Indian Contract Act.

Answer 2.
The doctrine of Promissory Estoppel can be understood by taking into account
Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act which helps one come to a conclusion that this
doctrine intends to prevent a promisor from claiming that his promise cannot be legally
enforced.
In the case of Kedarnath v. Gorie Mohamed we see that the defendant contracts in
agreeing to pay Rs. 100 in consideration of the plaintiffs erecting the townhall. However the
defendant fails to pay the amount and claims that there was no consideration for his promise.
But we know that the defendant had voluntarily consented into paying the aforementioned
amount after knowing that it would be used for the construction of the townhall. People were
asked to subscribe and they knew the end purpose for which their money was to be utilized.
Subsequently, it is implied that as part of their contractual subscription they had an obligation
to pay the builders for their work. Since there was a bilateral contract and the plaintiffs
furnished consideration by building the townhall, the defendant’s argument is nullified. From
section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act, we can say that an agreement is formed by a set of
promises forming consideration. A contract comprises of two essential ingredients which are:
agreement and consideration both of which are present at the time of formation of the
contract between the subscriber and the builders. Since consideration was furnished by the
builders forming a valid contract and since promissory estoppel is departure from
consideration, we can say that there will be no promissory estoppel.
In Doraswamy Iyer vs Arunachala Ayyar, it was found that there was a bare promise
(promise without consideration) to subscribe, however there was also a request that the
promisee would construct the townhall. There is no such request on behalf of the defendants
for the performance of such an act. In this particular case, the mere act of putting one’s name
down in the subscriber’s list without any actual payment of the amount does not furnish
consideration. Since, there was a promise by the defendant without consideration there was
no valid contract composed. Hence, the doctrine of promissory estoppel will be applicable
and the plaintiffs can be estopped from enforcing the payment from the defendant.
The juxtaposing elements of these two cases lead us to believe that ‘the doctrine of
promissory estoppel can be used as a shield and not as a swords (Denning LJ).

Answer 3.
In the case of A.T. Raghava Chariar v. O.A Srinivasa (1916), the full bench of the
Madras High came to a conclusion that a minor is allowed to enforce a contract that is of
some benefit and under which he is required to bear no obligation. The bench involved three
judges who unanimously agreed to the said judgement.
 C.J. John Edward Power Wallis argued  that when a minor has binded himself by the
way of contract and the vendor or mortgagor has executed a registered conveyance in his
favour, there shouldn’t  be any reason that the transfer in his favour should not take effect. I
concur with his argument as it would be contrary to natural justice that in a case where full
consideration has been paid  by the minor and still he is disallowed to derive any benefit out
of it just because he is considered incompetent.
Whereas Abdur Rahim, J. differentiated this case with reference to Mohiri Bibee v.
Dharmodas Ghose and asserted that in the present case, it is the mortgagor who is enforcing
the contract and thus Section 64 and Section 65 of the Indian Contracts Act won’t apply.
Justice Srinivasa Iyengar focuses on Consideration and by reasons tells us that there is
nothing in the Contract Act which prevents an infant from being a promisee and  applying the
precedent of Mohiri Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, that any sought of contract or agreement
with a minor shall be void ab initio ,in this case, would have been unjust and wrongful.
The whole question boils down to whether minors are competent to contract. Section
10 corroborates the fact that the parties to a contract must be competent and Section 11
declares that a minor is not competent. However, I firmly believe that minors shouldn’t be
treated as incapable of accepting benefits. In this case the minor has paid the full
consideration and nothing more is required to be done by him under the contract.
There is no doubt that a minor may show poor judgement whilst entering into a
particular contract and Section 11 of the ICA is to safeguard a minor’s own ignorance. But in
this case, the minor has kept his promise and that performance has been accepted by the
adult, there should be no reason as to why the minor can’t enforce the promise.