The Causes of The Falklands War of 1982
The Causes of The Falklands War of 1982
The Causes of The Falklands War of 1982
Abstract
Whenever there’s been a war in the history of the world, it’s not just one cause that
leads to the war but the multiple factors which are often not explored or have ever
been investigated. Number of scholars have been writing about the causes of wars
which justify the main root causes of the wars.
This short paper tries to investigate the causes of the Falklands War between the
British and Argentina over the islands, which are physically very close to Argentina
but are the part of the British Empire. This paper will justify few war theories that
are applicable to the Falklands War of 1982. The war theories mentioned in this
paper are learned from Greg. Cashman’s book “The Causes of War”.
Abstract
In March 1982, some Argentinian scrap metal dealers landed on British sovereign territory,
widely known as “the island of St. Georgia” in the South Atlantic. The Argentineans raised their
national flag and declared the territory as part of Argentina. However, British claimed that by
invading the territory the Argentineans had not only violated the international law but also did
illegally move towards British sovereignty that is clearly an announcement of an open war.
Later, a group of Royal Marine Commandos was dispatched to remove the ‘Argentinean
invaders’.
On April 2nd, 1982, a large Argentine military force landed on the Falkland Islands and
occupied the territory. Despite the U.S intervention at a diplomatic level led by Secretary of
State Al Haig, the Argentine military [Junta] led by General Galtieri refused to leave the
territories. This situation led the British to respond in military terms.
The war resulted in the loss of dozens of lives and later the Argentineans had to surrender. This
paper will analyze the causes of this war with reference to the war theories.
Key words: Malvinas/Falklands War, Junta, diplomatic failure, aggression, survey report
Background of the Falklands War
Fighting and suffering had become ‘the reality of war’ to which civilians were blind and ignorant
‘while the whole range of wartime expressions and emotions has to be measured’. 1 The Falkland
Islands War of 1982 in many ways is a throwback to the eighteenth and nineteenth century
warfare. It was a war fought more for colonial interests than reasons of global peace and security
and it was perhaps The United Kingdom's last colonial war. 2 The Falkland Islands are British’s
territory that is almost 8000 miles away from the Britain. The Falkland’s population is nearly
five to six thousand in total owning their self-government. The Falkland is a self-sufficient
country with its tiny economy. The people living on the Islands personally opted for the British
to rule over the territory instead of Argentina that is less than 400 miles away from the Islands.
The people living in the Falkland Islands are British citizens who enjoy the same rights as a
1
Boyce, D. George The Falkland War, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p 191
2
Snyder, Craig Alexander, The Falkland Islands War of 1982: A legal, Diplomatic and Strategic
evaluation, M. Phil thesis, Brock University Ontario, 1989, p 5
2
common British citizen in the United Kingdom. Throughout its history, the Islands possessed
great importance between the British and Argentina since 18th century. Both the countries have
been negotiating over the Island issue for many decades, which ended with a war in 1982. In the
later 1980s this war became a model for the changes in limited war doctrines based on short and
conventional campaigns, and it is now seen as an early example of the new wars of intervention
and expeditionary wars that have characterized the post-cold war era.3
There will always be wars because men are just aggressive. 4 However, authoritarians or military
rulers often go far a war without listing to their people, but in this case the Falkland war was
initiated by a military government of Argentina followed by its people’s endorsement and wish,
to occupy the Falkland Islands that resulted in unexpected war in 1982. In this situation the war
at state level theory applies.
Though, the both countries never declared an official war over the Falkland Islands and the cold
war had been the main part of their discussion at the international platform, most of the
historians state that the Falkland Island used to be a chain that provided a useful base for the
Royal Navy of Britain and indeed proved to the case in the first and second world wars. However
in a period of post-war decolonization, the Argentineans expected and hoped that the British
interest in the South Atlantic would fade and sovereignty of the islands would be handed over to
the Argentineans. The Argentinians believes that the islands were inherited from Spain after the
Independence of 1816 but were taken from them by the British.5
The Argentinian military named the Falkland Island as “Malvinas” Through many years; the
ownership of this Island became the world focus when the United Nations urged Britain and
Argentina to solve the issue by peaceful negotiations. In this regard, the UN also passed a
resolution in 1965.
Both countries negotiated for almost 17 years with no fruitful results and later on 2nd of April
1983, Argentina invaded the Falklands by arresting the British governor at Stanley [the capital of
the Falkland. Stanley was used as an Argentine strong point throughout the conflict. However,
3
An overview of the Falklands war: Politics, Strategy and operations,
http://www.nids.go.jp/publication/senshi/pdf/201303/10.pdf, dated 4 November 2014
4
Cashman, Greg, The Causes of Wars: Second Edition, 2014, Maryland, p13
5
The Malvinas/Falklands War (1982): Pacific Solutions for an Atlantic Conflict,
http://www.ub.edu/dpfilsa/coola102bellot.pdf dated. Nov.4, 2014
3
the British responded by sending a large naval task force to reclaim the islands. The British
began military operations on May 1, and on June 13 the Argentines surrendered. The Argentine
armed forces suffered a dismal defeat, with only the air force performing with any degree of
competency. The military was fully discredited, and had no choice after the war but to announce
plans for a return to democracy the following year. 6 The Argentina still claims the territory as its
own part. However The Falklands war was remarkable for the adherence of both parties to the
laws of war and to general just war understandings. Hastings and Jenkins comment that it was
‘fought with remarkable respect for decency on both sides. 7 The Falklands War lasted just over
eleven weeks, ending with a complete victory for one side.
Economic reasons
Wars are often take place when there is any sense of economic desire. Though, it’s not necessary
that wars are always fought for the economic opportunities but the majority of conflicts and wars
have been ended with a conclusion of economic desires. Keith Hartley and N. Hooper argue in
their edited book titled, Economic Theories of Peace and War that economy is one of the sources
of conflicts or wars.
Apart from the atrocities to human rights that were being committed and the corruption that
invaded even the highest ranks of the Argentineans government, the country was going through a
devastating economic crisis. The Argentineans military government (the Junta) had presided over
a collapsing currency, runaway inflation at over 100% and had been forced to introduce savage
cuts of their own in Argentina. It was these cuts to services and benefits that saw Argentines take
to the streets early in 1982. These demonstrations began to get out of hand, and the Junta sensed
that it was losing popularity and even the ability to impose law and order. It was thought that
they might be able to restore some of their credibility by playing to their institutional strength
and launching an invasion of what they referred to as the 'Malvinas'.8
6
The Falklands War: Causes and Lessons, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=453694 dated. Nov.
4, 2014
7
Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (WW Norton and Company 1983),
p.321
4
At the same time in Britain, the newly elected conservative government of Margaret Thatcher
was savagely cutting back spending across the board in Britain. This was the time where the
Junta had an opportunity to divert the nation’s attention from economic problems to the
capturing of Malvinas [The Falklands]. The decision by the Argentine’s dictator was largely
welcomed and the people started expecting the military ruler to get their proclaimed territory
back. According to Hastings and Jenkins the Falkland Islands have never been of any great
strategic importance, yet, “from the moment of their discovery they seem to have embodied the
national pride of whoever held them”.9 The Junta was also of the view that major cuts in the
British defense may also provide them an opportunity to invade the Island and British troops
may not come to re-capture the area. Although the Falkland Islands had a very limited economy
but the Argentine wanted to capture these Islands in order to make another shipping port and
economic hub. Considering the facts mentioned above, the situation and the economic cause of
the Falkland Islands war clearly justifies the Economic theory of war.
Personality Complex
If we go back towards the history of Argentina, we may find that the country was once a great
power in the early 20th century and inflated sense of national boundaries have combined to
create a unique self-image of greatness. By the early 20th century Argentina was ranked amongst
the advanced countries in the world. In 1914 Buenos Aires had grown to be the second largest
city on the Atlantic seaboard, with grand architecture and infrastructure to match European
capitals. Argentine per capita GDP matched that of Germany, and surpassed Spain, Italy,
Sweden, and Switzerland. Furthermore it ranked among the world’s top exporters: number one in
corn, second in wool, and third in live cattle and horses.10
8
Causes of the war,
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/southamerica/falklands/falklandswar.htm
dated. Nov. 4, 2014
9
Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon, The Battle for the Falklands. Suffolk: Richard Clay, 1983. p
113
10
Argentine turn of the century performance data from: David Rock, Argentina 1516-1982 From
Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985),
172- 173
5
Later, in the early 1920s the country had [unfortunately] to see the great losses in terms of
economy thereafter. As discussed earlier, losses are accepted very slowly, and it seems that
Argentina has yet to accept its decline in status throughout the twentieth century. This brand of
nationalism, called a “national superiority complex” by Escudé and “exceptionalism” by Joseph
Tulchin, creates a highly exaggerated sense of Argentina’s real place in the world. According to
a series of IPSA polls, a majority of the Argentine population thinks;
1. That the world has a great deal to learn from Argentina;
2. That Argentina has nothing to learn from the world;
3. That Argentina is the most important country in Latin America;
4. That in no country [in the world] do people live as well as in Argentina;
5. That Argentina deserves an important place in the world; and
6. That Argentina’s scientists and professionals are the best in the world.
This strong perception of greatness fosters ardent nationalism; understandably, the people
genuinely believe in the greatness of their nation.11
Considering the fact mentioned above, the Personality complex theory does apply on this
situation, which is ultimately another cause of war.
Psychological factor
One of the important factor of the Falkland Island war episode was that the Argentina was being
ruled by a military dictator General Galteiri, who came into power in 1976 by a military coup
deposing President Isabel Martínez de Perón.The Junta immediately abolished the national
constitution, depriving the citizens of most of their fundamental civil rights: soon it was also
announced that the Death Penalty was to be re-established.
If we go through the history of the world we may find so many examples of and theories where
the military rulers have initiated most of the wars. Many books on war theories state The
Democracies are less likely to go for wars than to the military regimes. In this case the
Psychological theory fits in the situation where a military dictator was not expecting a women
Prime Minister of Britain [Margate Thatcher] to respond in a way-the way military responds.
11
The Falklands War: Causes and Lessons, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a524486.pdf
dated. Nov. 4,2014
6
General Galteiri hoped that since the British are going through the similar economic problems
and a woman Prime Minister would not be in position to start a war with Argentinian military.
He also thought that the British has no intentions to look after the territory that is almost 8000
miles away. His miscalculation resulted into a battle that was fought for couple of weeks, but
lost.
General Galteiri came into power by announcing to stay for one year only but later extended it to
more than seven years of his dictatorial rule followed by the economic losses for his country.
Although Argentina had already suffered under other military regimes, this was considered to be
the worst dictatorship in Argentina (Corradi 1996: 92), it included a Dirty War that violated
human rights and which resulted in thirty thousand political activists “disappearing”, according
to the CONADEP (Comisión Nacional sobrela Desaparición de Personas).12
Narcissism
General Galteiri is often called as ego-obsessed and narcissist. He was the third martial law
dictator in the history of Argentina who not only dismissed the democratic constitution of the
country but also imposed his harsh decisions over Argentinians. Although, after losing the
Falkland Islands war, the dictator was jailed for 12 years and died at the age of 78, but his profile
as General and head of the country, has remained questionable for Argentineans. After taking
over the country and announcing his authority over Argentina, the country saw many protests
against the martial law, imposed by him. The country became more violent as it captured the
international attention towards itself a country under the worst dictatorship. The Galteiri regime
rose through a coup and retained power by consolidating almost all legislative and judicial
control. At the time, in order to establish peace in the country, General Galteiri spread his terror
by announcing an “arrest and kill” policy. This kind of response by General Galteiri was not
acceptable to the nation, but the Argentinians had no other option except to live under the
shadow of fear. General Galteiri, a hard-liner, also showed the least interest in reviving the
democratic setup in the country. Having a lust for power to rule over Argentina General Galteiri
kept on ignoring to initiate the election process in the country.
12
The Malvinas/Falklands War (1982): Pacific Solutions for an Atlantic Conflict,
http://www.ub.edu/dpfilsa/coola102bellot.pdf dated. Nov.4, 2014
7
Considering the facts about General Galteiri, one can understand his personality well. The
Narcissism theory gives almost the same profile of an individual with egoistic administration
style. Therefore, one of the causes of the Falkland Islands war was the Narcissism personality of
General Galteiri.
The Diversionary/Scapegoat
Another main reason of the Falklands war was the fact that the Junta lost its credibility amongst
the people. As discussed earlier Argentina used to be at the top of the countries in terms of
agricultural economy but the late 1920s were not the fortunate years for Argentina. The
Argentinean military took over the charge of the country by throwing out a political government
but the nation did not welcome the Junta. On other hand, the economic downfall of the country
led the junta to divert the public’s attention from the economic issues to the Falklands. This
decision by the junta was largely welcomed by the nation and even media started liking the junta.
However, many analysts believed that the Argentinians may not be able to control the Islands for
that long as the British will never spare its territory, but still the out of blue diversion of the
public mattered a lot.
Considering the above past scenario, we may say that the diversionary/scapegoat theory does
apply on this situation. There are many countries that often make an excuse of conflict at the
State level that leads to war, on the basis of this theory.
Aggression
There are strong utilitarian grounds for supporting a general rule that the only just cause for war
is the aggression by the both parties over the Falklands, for many decades. As discussed earlier
that “Human beings are naturally aggressive” therefore the theory is justified in this situation.
This was the aggression that despite international community got itself involved in the crises in
order to solve the situation, as normal, the Junta chose to invade the Islands. No grievances or
policies will justify resort to aggressive war whatever grievances a nation may have, however
objectionable it finds the status quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those
grievances or for altering those conditions.13 The United States seemed to be supportive for the
sequence=1
dated. 5 November, 2014
8
British in case of the Falklands. This response by the U.S was somehow not acceptable to the
Junta. On other hand, the growing frustration level on the economic crisis in Argentina and
considering the Falklands their own territory, being governed by a foreign power invader, which
is already 8000 miles away from the U.K., led the Junta to feeling a bit aggressive.
On March 1, 1982, the Argentine government issued a public statement that declared that it had
decided that Argentina was free to choose the best course of action in moving forward in the
Malvinas dispute, and would do so according to Argentine national interests. 14 This was the
reason that despite having less military equipment, compared to the British, the Junta opted for
an offensive on the Falklands Islands. Although this aggression escalated into war between both
the giants, but the outcome of that war did not solve the problem.
One of main factor of the aggression by the Argentinian Junta was a disregard of the principle of
peaceful settlement of international disputes. Despite the fact that the international community,
under the U.N platform, tried to normalize the situation between both Argentina did not respond
to the U.N recommendation.
According to Professor Moore, “[n]on-democratic leaders have almost unfettered ability to
internalize all the benefits of international aggression while externalizing the cost of potential
harm upon their populations. Thus, non-democratic leaders are far more disposed to high-risk
aggressive actions risking major war and other disasters.15
Misperception
War had come because Argentina had misinterpreted the position and hence the actions of the
British government in the first three months of 1982.16 The Falklands War illustrates the role of
political miscalculation and miscommunication in creating war. Although, both the countries
were not calculating the intensity of any possible war but out of blue invasion of Stanley led both
14
Malvinas: The Argentine perspective of the Falkland’s conflict,
http://www.offnews.info/downloads/ADA523209.pdf, dated. 5 November, 2014
15
Re-Examining the Falkland war, http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1012&context=gjicl, dated 4 November 2014
16
Anderson, Duncan, Essential Histories: The Falklands War 1982, Osprey, Oxford, 2002, p 88
9
countries [Argentina and Britain] to think and act for the future. History tells that the Argentina
sent the UN multiple hints of a possible invasion of the islands but the British ignored these
threats and did not react. British were of the view that the Junta would never dare to confront
Britain directly. On other hand, until March 1982, the British did not discover that the Falkland
Islands were intended target for the Argentina. When the Argentineans landed on the Island, the
British Intelligence discovered that the Argentinian had been gathering weather data for the
Falkland Islands, an Argentine submarine had been deployed off the coast of Port Stanley, the
Argentine 'exercises' had been broken off and the fleet was sailing towards the Falkland Islands,
an army commander had been appointed the commander of an amphibious force, and, most
distressing of all, the Argentine Embassy in London had been ordered to destroy all of its
documents. Plotting the movements of the ships, British planners predicted that an invasion force
could expect to land on the Falkland Islands in the early hours of April 2nd. 17 During the war
over the Falklands, the Britain faced defeat during the first session. Almost all British ships were
totally destroyed and multiple air strikes by the Argentinian Air Force, resulted [almost] in
complete destruction for the British military. The Argentinian force signaled their head quarter
that the British force is defeated and the Falkland Islands are won.
While British’s new invention the “Sea Harrier Air craft” having the capability of attacking the
core targets with minimum time, super-fast attacker with night vision capability, it won the show
during the second session of the war. This use of the Sea Harrier for visual searches without
recourse to their modern radar was anachronistic in every sense of the word, bearing more
resemblance to the use of naval aircraft in World War II than to that appropriate for the 1980s.18
The Argentinian military was not expecting any kind of “re-action” by the Britain. The Harriers
destroyed much military hardware of the Argentinian forces. Later, the remaining Argentinian
forces had to surrender and they declared the Falklands as British’s re-occupied territory.
Considering this cause we may fix the Misperception theory here at various levels. First, the
Junta was not expecting the Britain to respond on the occupation of the Falklands. Two, when
the Argentinian forces were landed on the islands to occupy Stanley and arrest the governor, they
17
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/forces/armycampaigns/southamerica/falklands/falklandswar.ht
m dated. Nov. 4, 2014
18
Finlan, Alastair, The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War: Culture and
Strategy, London, Frank Cass, 2004, p 164
10
miss-calculated any possible attack by the Britain military. Three, during the war, when the
Britain military was defeated, during the first session, The Argentinian forces were not expecting
any further military attacks by the British.
Conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to find out the causes of the Falkland Islands war of 1982
with reference to the war theories. The objective of the whole conflict between British and
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Falklands_War#Failed_diplomacy dated. 4
19
November 2014
11
Argentina revolves around the notion of sovereignty. Although the issue is still going on and
both the countries are still in doldrums situation over the Islands the war in 1982 has presented
many lessons to learn.
Considering the timeline of the war between the British and Argentina, we focused on the war,
analyzed the situation and came to learn about some war theories that have justified the
situations in a particular manner. The war has touched many theories like war at state level,
Personality complex, Narcissism, Psychological theory, Human beings are naturally aggressive,
Democracies are less likely to go for war, Misperception theory and Authoritarianism that give a
clear indications of the main causes of the Falkland war.
Moreover, the several peace plans proposed by international mediation failed due to the fact that
they were unable to bring a solution to the issue of sovereignty. Argentina rejected the pacific
solutions proposed at the time of war because they failed to grant the discussion about the
dominion of the territory. Britain keeps avoiding this issue and insists that the power to decide
should be given to the inhabitants of the islands. All in all, this old dispute for the
Malvinas/Falkland islands has become utterly symbolic for both nations. Although the
probabilities of a solution in the near future are doubtful, the possibility of another war is also
unlikely.
Bibliography
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Oxford, 2002
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Cashman, Greg, The Causes of War: Second Edition, Row man & Little field, Maryland,
2013
Finlan, Alastair, The Royal navy in the Falklands conflicts and the Gulf war: Culture and
Strategy, London, Frank Cass, 2004
12
Mackay, Francis and Cooksey, Job, Pebble Island: The Falklands war 1982, South York
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