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Banten in times of revolution

Else Ensering

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Ensering Else. Banten in times of revolution. In: Archipel, volume 50, 1995. Banten. Histoire d'une région. pp. 131-163;

doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/arch.1995.3068

https://www.persee.fr/doc/arch_0044-8613_1995_num_50_1_3068

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Else ENSERING

Banten in times of revolution4

The specific character of Banten

Who are the Bantenese and what distinguishes Banten from other regions
in Java?
To begin with the last question: for nearly three centuries (1527-1813)
Banten was a sultanate and an international trading state which experienced a
golden age in the 17th century. A second characteristic is the important role
which Islam has played since the 16th century and the relations maintained
since that time with Mecca, the cradle of Islam. And finally, the influence of
communism in the 1920's.
To learn more about the background to the social revolution that took place
between 1945 and 1949, and to give an idea of the identity of the Bantenese, it
seems worthwhile to go more deeply into the aforementioned anchorages
which, in trendy terms, can be referred to as «les lieux de mémoire (*)».

Prosperity and decline of the Bantenese sultanate

It was an ulama (Islamic scholar) from North Sumatra, now known as
Sunan Gunung Jati, who wanted to propagate Islam in this pagan region and
for this reason requested the Sultan of Demak to send troops to conquer the
city of Banten. It was presumably his son Hasanudin who commanded the
military operation which led to the Muslim victory of 1527. Sunan Gunung
Jati had his son proclaimed King of Banten by the Sultan of Demak, who in
turn gave his sister in marriage to Hasanudin. A new dynasty had been
founded and a kingdom created. At the mouth of the Ci-Banten, a new royal city
was built (Guillot, 1990, 19-20).
When Hasanudin died in 1570, the kingdom covered the whole of West
Java (except Cirebon) and South Sumatra up to and including Bengkulu. In
the 16th and 17th centuries Banten was one of the largest cities in South-East
Asia and round 1670 it had a population of approximately 150,000 (Guillot,
1990, 44-45). Moreover, it had an international harbour around which English,

[Archipel 50 - Paris, 1995 - pp. 131-164.]

132 Else Ensering

Dutch, French, Danish and Portuguese (from Macao) merchants lived in the
1670's. About 1660, the Minister of Trade, a Chinese named Kaytsu, had a
fleet of merchant ships built after the European model in order to compete
with the western companies that were controlling the international networks of
trade. Vessels were also bought from Armenians, Moors, Japanese and
Europeans. At the same time he decided to build Bantanese junks in order to trade
with China and neighbouring countries. In this way traditional commercial
ties were re-established and Banten was again in a position to trade directly
throughout Asia (Guillot, 1990, 49-50).
The decline of the sultanate was ushered in by the conflict between Sultan
Agung and his son Haji, who sent a message to Batavia requesting immediate
intervention. This was the opportunity for the Dutch to seize control of all the
trading activities of their former competitor. The sultan was imprisoned, first
in Banten, later in Batavia where he died in 1692. As a reciprocal service the
Dutch demanded that his son immediately oust all foreigners. The kingdom
lasted formally for another 150 years, until 1832, but because it was
compelled to carry out orders from Batavia, there was no longer any question of
sovereignty. By the end of the 17th century the colonial era, which was to be
marked in Banten by incessant agitation and revolt, set in. Overtly and
covertly, the Bantenese were to offer resistance to their colonial oppressors until
1945, approximately two and a half centuries!
For them the memory of the sultanate has remained alive. For instance, a
member of a prominent lineage, Achmad Djajadiningrat, writes in his
«Reminiscences» how in 1892, when he was 15 years old, he was initiated by his
mother into the Javanese art of living (elmoe kajawan) to counterbalance the
European education he was receiving in Batavia. She acts out the stories in
song and for these lessons draws upon the Babad Banten (the history of Ban-
ten), or upon the Ambia, (the history of the prophets). One of these poems
reads as follows:

Wedi asih ing wong toea

Setia toehoe ing Sang Adji
Ratoe ingkang angrèh pradja
Noehoni sakersa nèki
Soemoedjoed lahir Ian batin
Ikoe sadjatining elmoe
Dadarsaring kasatrian

In English this means:

Venerate and love the parents (to the parents also

belong the parents-in-law and in some cases the
eldest brother).
Be genuinely devoted to His Majesty,
The Sovereign, who rules the country.
Constantly gratify all their wishes.
 Banten in times of revolution 133

Be respectful to them, outwardly and inwardly,

That is the true elmoe (lesson).
The foundation of chivalry.
(A. Djajadiningrat, 1936, 71)

Even today the Bantenese still make pilgrimages once a year, mostly the
day after Lebaran (Islamic New Year) to the holy graves of the sultans in
what was formerly the city of Banten (interview with Moh. Amin, 27 July
1991).

Islam, tarekat Kadiriah and the contacts with Mecca

A second anchorage in Bantenese history are the contacts with Mecca since
the 17th century. In 1636, King Abdul Kadir sent envoys to Mecca for the first
time. When the delegation returned two years later it was proclaimed that the
Grand Shereef had granted the king and his son the title of sultan. This meant
the formal recognition of Banten's glory in those times. After 1638, the first
sultan received the complete title and name of Sultan Abul-Mafachir Mahmud
Abdulkadir (Drewes and Poerbatjaraka, 1938, 11).
The Indonesian poet Hamzah al-Fanzuri, who died round about 1590,
dedicated a poem to the holy Abd-al-Kadir al-Jilani when he visited his grave in
Baghdad. He was the first Indonesian of whom we can say with certainty that
he was a follower of the tarekat Kadiriah, a mystical brotherhood based on the
teachings of the aforementioned holy man (Van Bruinessen, 1989, 69). This
tarekat played a prominent part in the second half of the 19th century,
particularly in the Cilegon revolt of 1888 in Banten (Sartono Kartodirdjo, 1966), and
probably exerted its influence for several decades afterwards. For the
Bantenese it created an essential link between the sultanate and Islam, a
fundamental element that continued to surface after the peasant uprising of 1888, for
instance in the social revolution of 1945-1949.
As a result of their voyages to Mecca, the Bantenese had probably not only
become acquainted with the veneration of the aforementioned holy man, but
also with the tarekat Kadiriah. The word, tarikah, tarekat in Bantenese, means
«path» and indicates a system of rules with which a higher stage of spiritual
development can be reached leading to a direct personal experience of God
(Drewes and Poerbatjaraka, 1938, 5).
In popular belief, Abd-al-Kadir al-Jilani is the principle holy man to whom
the power has been granted to assist others in dangerous circumstances. In the
tarekat Kadiriah, invulnerability exercises (the so-called debus or dabus) as
well as the veneration of this holy man were developed by the reading of the
Manaqib or Hikajat S eh. He is revered and loved by the people more than all
other holy men. Wherever one goes the story of His Holiness' life is recounted
by the elderly (Van Bruinessen, 1989, 70, 72).
Sheikh Achmad Chatib of Sambas (Achmad Chatib, the first Bantenese
resident in 1945, could have been named after him) died about 1878 and was
replaced as leader of the tarekat by Abdulkarim of Banten, who lived in
Mecca. The charisma of the latter caused the tarekat Kadiriah to flourish
134 Else Ensering

rapidly, mainly in Banten but also in other regions, in particular in South

Sumatra and Lombok.
About 1870 a significant religious revival occurred in Banten which
mainly had to do with the tarekat Kadiriah. This tarekat reached a peak with the
arrival in Banten of the aforementioned Sheikh Abdulkarim. Whereas
previously the kiai (local religious leaders) operated independently with their
pesantrens (religious schools), and frequently in competition with each other,
the influence of Abdulkarim brought about a strong bond between them. The
hold on their adherents became stronger, the loyalty of the santri (students at
a pesantren) to their kiai was strengthened because they also associated
themselves with the Kadiriah (Sartono, 1966, 169). In general affection and respect
were felt for the kiai by the peasantry, who regarded them as symbols of
enlightenment. These local leaders received religious contributions, became
landowners which enhanced their status even more. They were able to
mobilize their followers, who had sworn unconditional obedience and were bound to
secrecy, at any moment desired. Consequently, it was easy to induce the
population to take part in a revolt. Obviously, these pesantrens and tarekats, which
were numerous in North Banten at the end of the last century, also served as
networks of information and as centres for the preparation of underground
uprisings. Each pesantren was potentially a centre of anti-European sentiment
(Benda, 1958, 18). Meetings were concealed from colonial officials and native
religious officials who were regarded as accomplices of the colonial
authorities. Religious wedding and circumcision festivals, but also regular prayer
services were the traditional fronts. Indeed, the cunning and secrecy of the
population and their local leaders were the reasons why the colonial rulers were,
time after time, unaware of the outbreak of a revolt. In their reports they
invariably noted that a revolt had broken out as a «bolt from the blue».
During the second half of the 19th century the number of pilgrims also
increased substantially. The mystical brotherhoods Naqsabandiah, Saliriah and
Kadiriah, three Sufi orders, were the driving forces behind the Islamic revival
in various regions of Java. Their missionary force came from the haji who had
returned from Mecca as adherents of the tarekats. These tarekats not only
brought about the revival of zealous religious practices, but also introduced
intolerance and fanaticism (Sartono, 1966, 158); especially the kiai who had
stayed in Mecca for one or more years to increase their knowledge were held
in great respect, but those who enjoyed an even higher social status among the
people were the guru tarekat (tarekat teachers).
Sheikh Abdulkarim Banten was not a radical revolutionary. Not until after
his departure to Mecca in 1876 did the tarekat undergo a fundamental
transformation: a strong anti-foreign prejudice infiltrated the tarekat ideology and
in the end rebellious haji and tarekat teachers virtually subjected mystical
discipline to political goals (Sartono, 1966, 165, 178, 179).

Illustration:
Map of the region of Banten
 „. P. KWIMttBUUK - P. PAN WANG
i/73^m&s
P..E^M^^^-.Q«a~7A'PO"
« „«&
À
136 Else Ensering

Therefore it is not surprising that Kiai Wasid, the chief rebel in the Cile-
gon revolt, remained a hero not only in the eyes of the population of Cilegon,
but throughout Banten. Hasan Djajadiningrat, a younger brother of Achmad
Djajadiningrat, observed: «Outwardly they may disapprove of Haji Wasid' s
rebellion, yet inwardly they still regard him, years after the 1888 affair, as
having fallen in the cause of Islam» (Williams, 1990, 94; H. Djajadiningrat
«Politieke stroomingen» in «De Taak», 1922).
It is essential to discern that in Bantenese society an inward as well as an
outward reality always plays a role. Without knowledge of this inward reality
it is not possible to gain good insight into what is really going on under the
surface in this region. An additional problem is that foreign - and perhaps
even Indonesian - researchers can hardly establish contacts with the
underground level. As was mentioned earlier, the tarekat members have pledged
themselves not only to obey the guru tarekat but also to ensure strict secrecy.
In 1906, in his Memorie van Over gave (Transfer Memorandum, written on
a resident's resignation), Resident J.A. Hardeman not only writes that their
slogan has always been: «Banten for the Bantenese», but he also points out the
contempt displayed by the Bantenese for the Dutch authorities and he does not
exclude further rebellion against the government in the future (Hardeman,
M.V.O. 1906, 6-10. A.R.A.). It seems that the Bantenese were proud of their
history, their cultural and mystical world and, as a result, were outwardly
capable of complying with the excessive demands of the colonial government
without this affecting them inwardly. They bided their time until a new
opportunity for revolt was afforded.

Did the communists mobilize the religious leaders or was it the other way
round?
A third historical anchorage was formed in the 1920' s when local leaders
started to become politically aware.
Not only did the first political associations come into being at that time but
also the largest political mass movement that Indonesia has ever known, the
Sarekat Islam (S.I. «Islamic Association»). Its original name was «Sarekat
Dagang Islamiah», and it was founded not in 1912 in Jogya by Haji Samanhu-
di, as mentioned in many historical studies, but in 1909 by Raden Mas Tirto
Adhi Soerjo, who became known as the «defender of the little people» (Pra-
moedya Ananta Toer, «Sang Pemula», Dutch translation «De Pionier», 1988,
121-124, with a preface by W.F. Wertheim; Van Niel, 1960, 60). This
movement was continued in 1912 in Yogya by Haji Samanhudi, but shortly
afterwards the executive committee came under the leadership of Raden Mas
H.O.S. Cokroaminoto in Surabaya. After 1912 the movement assumed
enormous proportions and soon it claimed a membership of more than two
millions (Blumberger, 1935, 59; Van Niel, 1960, 105). The Javanese peasants had
pinned all their hopes on the S.I. because the aim of this movement was to
improve the living conditions of the people in accordance with the Ethical
Policy which the colonial government was advocating at that time. One could
say about the «ethical government», under Governor-General Idenburg, that it
 Banten in times of revolution 137

had stimulated the S.I. since 1912, but had also «tamed» it because the
aforementioned Tirto Adhi Soerjo had been too radically nationalistic for its tastes.
Yet the policy of the executive committee was directed more and more
towards the enforcement of democratic rights, as a result of which religion
faded more and more into the background, whereas it was precisely Islam that
had made it so popular at all levels of the population. The Islamic peasants
felt they had been left in the lurch and dropped out of the movement.
In the higher circles of Islamic leaders discord arose: the modernist
leaders, united in the Muhammadiyah, an association which had been formed in
1912, were striving for purification of the faith, stripped of all local
influences, and for adjustment to the demands of modern times. The local
traditional kiai, who felt this as a threat to their position, were vehemently
opposed to this. They joined the S.I. hoping that this would enhance their status
and authority.
Among the members of the executive committee of the S.I. there was also
disagreement, which reached a climax in 1921 in the withdrawal of the more
radical Indies Social Democratic Association (I.S.D.V.) which had changed its
name in May 1920 to Partai Kommunis Indonesia (P.K.I., «Indonesian
Communist Party»).
Obviously, these developments on the national level were reflected in Ban-
ten. The rapid growth of the S.I. in this area had led to many traditional rulers,
i.e. kiai and descendants of the nobility, joining the association between 1915
and 1919. This resulted in the movement assuming a different nature. Hasan
Djajadiningrat, chairman of the S.I.-Banten, initially attempted to keep the
kiai and the jawara (village strongmen) out of the association. In April 1919,
he tried to form a local board without kiai, but his policies were superseded by
the events. The discovery in that same year of the so-called Section B of the
local S.I.-Priangan from which it appeared that local kiai had secretly united
with radical S.I. politicians in order to mount a campaign, was the opportunity
for the conservative officials of the European Civil Service (B.B.), under the
leadership of Resident De Stuers, to bring the S.I. into discredit. In this way
they voiced their suppressed resistance against the Ethical policy of the
government, which had backed the S.I. since 1912 and thus threatened the
position of the B.B. (Ensering, M.A. thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1982).
After the death of Hasan Djajadiningrat in 1920, Kiai Tubagus (Bantenese
title given to noblemen who belonged to the sultan's family) Achmad Chatib
took the chair of the S.I. But, as was the case elsewhere on Java, the influence
of the S.I. had waned considerably, with the exception of some regions such
as, in Banten, the areas around Menés and Labuan, where Chatib lived
(Williams, 1990, 130, 132). Not until the end of 1925 did the P.K.I, suddenly
have several thousand members and in 1926 this number was even larger
(Williams, 1990, 148). Membership was then estimated at 12,000, including
500 women members (Williams, 1990, 170).
Before further examining this phenomena, we will first give some
background information on a few S.I. leaders who became communists and played
a significant part in November 1926 in the so-called communist insurrection
138 Else Ensering

and later again in the social revolution of 1945-49.

It appears that Kiai Asnawi, Chatib's father-in-law and founder of the
pesantren Caringin, during an eight-year stay in Mecca followed the teachings
of Sheikh Abdulkarim Banten who was the leader of the tarekat Kadiriah and
who came from the Tanara district (information given by M. van Bruinessen
on 11 December 1992; Sumarda 1985, 27, who mistakenly calls Abdulkarim
Kiai Tanahera).
One of the Kadiriah centres in Tangerang is the pesantren Doyong in the
desa Jati and it was led in the 19th century by Kiai Rasihun. After his death, he
was succeeded by Kiai Chaerun born in 1892 and married to one of Rasihun' s
daughters. Their son, Achmad Chaerun, received his initial education in the
pesantren Doyong, but very soon he was committed to the care of Asnawi
(from 1908-1913) in Caringin. During his training period he met the student
Chatib and a close friendship developed between them. Chaerun completed his
studies with a stay (1914-1920) in Mecca where he also followed the teachings
of Abdulkarim Banten (Sumarda, 1985, 27). On his return he married and
opened a place of prayer in the kampong Pengodokan. At the urgent insistance of
his brother-in-law, Haji Nafis, he became a member of the S.I. {ibidem, 27,
28). Together with Haji Nafis and Sheikh Abdullah he later took over the local
board of the S.I .-Tangerang. The old board was considered to be too middle-
of-the-road.
In 1925, the S.I .-Tangerang together with the S.I .-Banten under Chatib's
leadership broke away from the S.I. and founded the Sarekat Rakyat (S.R.).
The local S.R. came under the P.K.I, which they had formed during a congress
on December 24-25, 1921. This S.R. consisted of former S.I. sections which
now opted for the radical policy of the P.K.I, under the chairmanship of Sutan
Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka who was of Minangkabau nobility and was
born in 1897. As a result of his forceful leadership of the P.K.I. Tan Malaka
was banished by the Netherlands-Indies government in 1922. He was not to
come back until twenty years later when he was to play a major part on the
national level during the years 1945-1948 (Anderson, 1972, 270, 271).
It is likely that Chatib influenced Chaerun to turn communist. They had
been friends from the days of their youth and pupils of Asnawi. When Chatib
returned in 1915 from a three-year stay in Mecca he became Asnawi' s son-in-
law (Williams, 1990, 253). Chatib and his friend Chaerun, who lived in
Tangerang, visited each other regularly (Sumarda, 1985, 30, 31).
From the aforesaid it is evident that close ties had been established
between Banten and Tangerang, intimate ties which no doubt had been
strengthened by the long periods of time spent in Mecca and the membership of the
mystical Kadiriah brotherhood, ties that would again become of significance
after 1945.
During a secret meeting at the Prambanan tempel complex in December
1925, the P.K.I, decided to organize a national insurrection against the
colonial government. Tan Malaka, who was then living in the Philippines, tried to
prevent it. He thought that the time was not yet ripe: without adequate
training, preparation and organization this would be a total disaster, for the party
 Banten in times of revolution 139

as well as for the population. The differences of opinion between the P.K.I,
and Tan Malaka which were never overcome, not even after 1945, date from
that time. The latter proved to be right: when the revolt broke out in
November 1926 in Banten and in January 1927 on the West Coast of Sumatra - all
other residencies failed to take part - it was crushed by the government. An
excellent study on this revolt in Banten has recently appeared and for the sake
of brevity I refer to it (Williams «Communism, Religion and Revolt in Ban-
ten», 1990).
The aforementioned study answers some essential questions:
- what were the causes that led to the P.K.I, suddenly attracting such a large
following in 1925 and 1926?
- how were the gaps between communism and Islam bridged on a local level?
- what can the explanation be for the fact that among the number of detainees
in 1888 as well as among those in 1926 a third were haji?

Unlike previous revolts, the P.K.I was concerned with a nationwide

uprising. This time the Bantenese would not stand alone in their struggle.
In order to mobilize Banten and knowing that in this region people were
open only to their compatriots, only Bantenese who had achieved status and
become communists were sent here. Examples were Tubagus Alipan and
Tubagus Hilman, descendants of the sultans and therefore people with a
personal authority (Williams, 1990, 160). For the second group of importance,
the religious leaders, Achmad Bassaif was delegated. He was the son of an
Arab father and Bantenese mother. In 1925 he became chairman of the Tange-
rang P.K.I, branch where his efforts to allay the local distrust of the party,
which was alleged to be hostile towards Islam, met with success. In August
1925 he formed the 37th P.K.I, branch in Banten.
In short, P.K.I, policy aimed at recruiting the nobility as well at the kiai
and with them their Islamic adherents in general and their Kadiriah supporters
in particular. In doing so, large sections of the peasantry were covered
(Sumarda, 1985, 32). That P.K.I, resistance was so widespread in Banten
(Williams, 1990, 254) at the time, cannot, in my opinion, be attributed so
much to the P.K.I, but rather to the kiai who, with their mosques, pesantrens
and brotherhoods, that is with their network which had been in existence much
longer, were willing to support the P.K.I.

The P.K.I, leaders observed strict rules: such sensitive subjects as the
relationship between communism and Islam had to be avoided. The three parties,
P.K.I., kiai and nobility, had the same goal, that is to overthrow colonial rule.
It is clear, however, that the kiai who had turned to communism for this
reason were able to mobilize their followers only if their argumentation was
moulded in the form of perang sabil (holy war) (McVey and Benda, 1960,
45).
In his report on the communist revolt on Sumatra's West Coast, Dr. B.
Schrieke gives examples of peasant interpretations of communism. Some of
these are the abolishment of taxes and statute labour, a more just division of
140 Else Ens er ing

land, in brief: equality for all, a sama rata - sama rasa society. In essence this
meant that Koran texts were used out of context to stir up rebellion against the
infidel government. Tarekai leaders also played a part in this revolt (Schrieke,
1928, 143-145).
The purpose for which this revolt had to take place may well have been
different for each group: a socialist state, restoration of the sultanate or an
Islamic state. In this context one may wonder whether, effectively,, it was the
communists who mobilized the kiai for their goal or the other way round, that
is that the kiai with their mass following were intent on using the P.K.I, as a
vehicle for attaining their ideals.

To conclude, the third question: although Williams states that it is of

interest to note that in 1925 there is no evidence of mystical brotherhoods being
involved in organizing the revolt, as was the case with the Cilegon
Insurrection in 1888 (Williams, 1990, 186), he nevertheless comes to a rather
contradictory conclusion at the end of his study.
He states that what is most striking in the list of ninety-nine persons who
were exiled from Banten (eight came from outside of Banten) is the «close
identity between the communist movement and religion». For eleven of the
ninety-nine detainees were religious teachers, whereas twenty-seven of the
ninety-nine were haji, and out of these twenty-seven at least seventeen had
lived one year or more in Mecca, in other words nearly one-third! A high
percentage when one knows that out of the first thousand persons from the whole
of Indonesia to be exiled to Boven Digul, only fifty-nine were haji (Williams,
1990,253).
He compares this with the 94 Bantenese who were exiled in 1888 after the
Cilegon uprising, of this number nineteen were religious teachers, compared
with eleven in 1926, and forty-three were haji, compared with twenty-seven in
1926. He states that these figures are not so radically different and that they
indicate a high participation of the religious elite in both revolts {ibidem).
On the basis of these figures, one could also conclude, however, that the
tarekat Kadiriah, under the leadership of the Mecca pilgrims, played a crucial
role in both revolts. Moreover, it could also offer an explanation for the large
number of illiterate peasants that took part in the 1926 revolt to the
astonishment of the B.B. officials, among whom Hillen, the Governor of West- Java
(Williams , 1990, 257). The participation of peasants in revolts has to do with
the authority of the kiai as charismatic leaders and this is particularly
characteristic of Banten.

Prelude to the social revolution in Banten

The communist fugitives and PA.R.I.
With many others the communist religious leaders from Banten and Tange-
rang were exiled, most of them to Boven Digul. One of the exiled from Banten
was Kiai Asnawi who was banished to Cianjur. He returned in 1934, died in
1937, after which he was succeeded as leader of the pesantren by Chatib when
 Banten in times of revolution 141

he returned from Boven Digul in 1940 (Williams, 1990, 283).

A few managed to escape, among them the P.K.I, secretary in Anyer, Tje
Mamat. With ten other P.K.I, members, among whom Alipan, he fled by way
of Palembang to Singapore. There the fugitives met Djamaluddin Tamin and
Subakat, who had received about a hundred communist fugitives, most of
whom came from the West Coast of Sumatra. From this number they selected
those who were fit to continue the struggle. In their eyes most of the fugitives
were «mystics» and these people were provided with brochures from Tan
Malaka and sent on to Mecca or Egypt for Islamic studies (Poeze, 1976, 354).
But Tje Mamat and Alipan were deployed for further combat. It was in
Singapore that Tje Mamat met Tan Malaka for the first time. The latter had
broken with the Comintern in 1927 and on the second of June of that same
year, in Bangkok, he formed together with Djamaluddin and Subakat, the Par-
tai Republik Indonesia (P .A.R.I.), whose aim was «to secure as soon as
possible the most complete liberation of Indonesia» (Poeze, 1976, 357). Tje
Mamat and Alipan also became P.A.R.I. members. The former returned to
Banten in the mid-thirties where he formed a clandestine group which had
contacts with the jawara, with trade unions established in Batavia and, round
about 1940, with returning ex-Digulists, among whom Chatib (Williams 1990,
283). It was Tje Mamat who staged a coup in Banten in 1945 and founded the
Dewan Rakyat (People's Council).

The Japanese occupation and establishment of the P.E.TA.

The Japanese occupation from 1942-1945 brought fundamental changes
with it. In contrast to the Dutch colonial rule, the Japanese in their planning
almost immediately assigned key roles to the local religious leaders. The Lati-
han kiai (training courses for kiais) were set up.
In October 1943, the Pembela Tanah Air (P.E.T.A., «Fatherland Defence
Force»), was formed as a decentralized auxiliary force which could go into
action if there was to be an Allied invasion of Java. Each batallion comprised
an average of five to six hundred men. Towards the end of the occupation the
Japanese had sixty-six batallions in Java and three in Bali (Anderson, 1972,
20). The leaders of these batallions, the daidancho, had been selected from
influential circles, for instance amongst former politicians, teachers, police
officials, prominent families, but also amongst rural religious leaders
(Anderson, 1972, 21).

Compulsory delivery offorced labour

A second fundamental change was the compulsory delivery of romusha,
forced labourers, for projects in aid of Japanese warfare and this applied to all
the provinces of Java. These people mostly worked for a pittance under
abominable circumstances. The Bantenese romusha were mainly deployed for the
coal mines in Bayah in South Banten. Labourers died by the dozens as a result
of a lack of food and medical provisions. They were often laid in mass graves
alongside the road which were submerged during the wet monsoon (Poeze,
142 Else Ensering

1976,516,517).
Romusha recruitement had far-reaching consequences for society.
Politicians, civil servants and the well-off were still able to live fairly comfortably.
Because of this, and because they were called in to apply the harsh Japanese
measures, they were loathed, if not hated by the people. The Japanese
measures had sharpened social contrasts. Consequently, many Bantenese felt
resentment against them, also against Sukarno and Hatta for their
collaboration with the Japanese (interview with Tubagus Haji Su'eb, Menés, 17
September 1991).
After twenty years of exile, Tan Malaka returned to Indonesia in 1942 by
way of Telok Betong (South Sumatra) where he had a meeting with Tje
Mamat. Because he was afraid he would be recognized in Batavia, he put in an
application when thirty civil servants were needed in Bayah in South Banten.
He was accepted and he worked there for two years under the pseudonym
Ilyas Husin @\ During the recruitment and the sending home of the romusha
Tan Malaka met the pemudas (see below) in Batavia and his contacts with
Chaerul Saleh and others date from that time (Purwaningsih, 1984, 41).

The resistance of the young to Japanese

A third significant development during the Japanese period was the revolt
of the pemuda against the occupational forces. In Batavia, groups of young
men discussed Indonesia's future and the plans of the Allies after the war and
voiced their criticism of the Japanese occupational measures. These groups
were concentrated in the asramas (student houses), where their members
could be among themselves. One group was formed in the asrama of the
medical faculty and one of its members was Eri Sudewo who was sent to Ban-
ten as its military commander in 1948. The members of this group came from
the pre-war elite and therefore had a rather pro- western attitude. Ideologically,
they had a close affinity with the social democrat Sutan Sjahrir. It was a more
or less liberal group of students.
The second group was that of the «Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia», the
home of the new generation of Indonesia in the Menteng 31 building, which
later became the Documentation Centre of the Struggle for Freedom. They
received a political schooling of a nationalist nature and all of the well-known
pre-war leaders gave courses here. Among the key personalities were Chaerul
Saleh and Sukarni, who later on were to become followers of Tan Malaka. The
future communists Aidit and Lukman also belonged to this group (Poeze,
1976,528).
After the Japanese capitulation it was the pemuda from the second group,
among them Chaerul Saleh and Sukarni, who kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta on
16 August 1945. They drove them to Rengasdenglok, outside Jakarta, and
pressured them into agreeing to the immediate proclamation of the Republik
Indonesia, and this took place the following day 17 August. With the
permission of the Japanese authorities, President Sukarno read out the proclamation,
the Indonesian flag was hoisted and the national anthem sung by all present.
After that the proclamation was made public throughout the world.
 Banten in times of revolution 143

A period of profound silence followed. There was no political programme,

no army, very few weapons and probably no funds. People awaited the
reactions of the Allies and the Dutch. The Allies instructed the Japanese to
maintain peace and order in Indonesia for the time being. The next day all P.E.T.A.
groups had to surrender their weapons to the Japanese.
It was during this period that resistance among the members of the younger
generation grew against the hesitant attitude of their leaders Sukarno and
Hatta. The older generation hoped to gain international recognition of the
young republic by pursuing a cautious course of action. In 1946 the P.K.I, also
opted for international recognition and diplomatic consultation. The younger
generation, however, saw its country being overrun again by the Allies and the
Dutch who were convinced that they could just resume the pre-war colonial
policies. It was for this reason that the younger generation went into action to
defend their country with all the means available to them. They sought
contacts with jawara groups and with the leaders of the underworld. It was at
that time that the lasykar rakyat (irregular groups of armed men) were formed
(3). At the same time social revolutions sprang up, which in their political
struggles showed many of the characteristics of the pemuda movement. They
expressed long-standing feelings of hatred against the indigenous officials
who had collaborated with the Dutch as well as the Japanese, against the
police and other institutions from two periods of colonial rule. In the battle of
Surabaya against the British in 1946, this pemuda mentality was expressed the
most forcefully.
In this period of revolution the old word «kedaulatan» (sovereignty or
authority) was linked to the word «rakyat» (the people), thus creating a new
word «mendaulat», a word that spread rapidly throughout Java and which
meant: deposition, humiliation, kidnapping or murder of hated officials or
other representatives of authority, usually carried out by groups of armed
pemuda (Anderson, 1972, 334).

Tan Malaka's Minimum Programme, 1946

On 3 January 1946 at a congress in Purwokerto, Tan Malaka presented his
political seven-point minimum programme, which in the following few
months was to cause bitter controversies. Because it was a radical programme
that undoubtedly not only touched the younger generation but probably also
the local leaders and the radical kiai in Banten, it is worthwhile making the
text known:
1. The state should be based on the acknowledgement of 100 percent
sovereignty and all foreign troops should leave the shores and waters of Indonesia.
2. (The formation of) a people's government.
3. (The formation of) a people's army.
4. The disarming of all Japanese troops.
5. The taking care of (mengurus) all European internees.
6. The confiscation and control of plantations.
7. The confiscation and control of industrial installations.
To this he added that the programme formed the basis for an anti-capitalist
144 Else Ens er ing

and anti-imperialist struggle, «that could easily be understood and fought for
by the common people» (Anderson, 1972, 290).
Thus the controversy becomes crystal clear: the older generation wanted to
gain international recognition of sovereignty by means of diplomatic
consultation and the younger generation rejected that point of view and found a
directive in Tan Malaka's ideas for a radical programme of action: the 100 percent
merdeka - freedom - should be won in armed battle.
Before this programme was announced, the pemuda had in fact already
begun, with armed gangs, to fight a guerilla war against foreign troops and to
disarm the Japanese to get hold of weapons. Their followers were instructed to
take power at the local level. This happened in particular during the social
revolutions in October 1945 in the Tangerang and Banten regions.

Social revolutions in Tangerang and Banten, 1945

Social revolution in Tangerang
The aksi daulat (social revolution) in Banten was preceded by that in
Tangerang.
On 18 October 1945, thousands of people were on their way to the house
of the regent Agus Padmanegara who was assembling jawara around himself.
The people felt this as a threat and civil unrest broke out. The regent was not
considered to be suitable leader for the revolution and they wanted him
replaced. In the presence of the crowd power was «spontaneously» transferred from
the regent to Sutejo, the chairman of the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (B.K.R.,
«People's Security Organization») which had been established by the
government for the safety of the population. On the same day Sutejo transferred
power to Kiai Achmad Chaerun and Sumo Atmodjo. This is how Chaerun
became the new regent of Tangerang. It demonstrated that Chaerun's authority
as a guru tarekat had remained intact and that his participation in the 1926
revolt and his subsequent exile had only enhanced his charisma.
Two days after the transfer of power, the new administration, the De wan
Rakjat Tangerang («People's Council») was established and the Badan Direk-
torium Dewan Pusat became the executive board. All government officials had
been dismissed and replaced by Chaerun's friends. Sheikh Abdullah became
the leader of the lasykar. On 22 October the lasykar prepared for an attack on
Legog and Curug which turned out to be a disaster (Sumarda, 1985, 74). After
that Abdullah formed the Lasykar Pasukan Brani Mati (L.P.B.M.). This group
consisted of eight hundred to a thousand men of whom most came from
jawara circles. They wore black shirts, black mid-length trousers and a black band
wound around their heads like a turban. That is why they were called Laskar
Ubel-Ubel («turban»), or Laskar Hitam («black laskar») (Sumarda, 1985, 75).
According to Tje Namat the strategy to transfer power at the local level
was planned beforehand by the Menteng 31 pemuda group and Abdul Muluk
was charged to pursue it. It was decided in the latter's house that Tje Mamat
would go to Banten, Jusuf to Cirebon and Djoko Atmadji to Surabaya with the
commission to assemble popular forces. On the way to Banten, Tje Mamat
Tubagus Kiai Haji Achmad Chatib, the first Resident of Banten
F

Above:
Polisi Tentara,
From left
charismatic
to right: Jusuf
leaderMartadilaga,
of the pemuda's
Head and
of the
alsoPolice;
formerAli
Head
Amangku,
of the Angka-
Mayor
tan Pemuda Indonesia -APS
Below: From left to right: Unknown; T.K.H. Achmad Chatib; Unknown; Unknown;
Mr. Jusuppadi Adiwinata; Colonel Eri Sudewo; Captain Peter Lee, Chinese military
Observer for U.N.O.
 From left to right: T.K.H. Achmad Chatib; Dr. Sukiman, Chairman of the Partai
Masyumi; Mr Jusuppadi Adiwinata, first Vice-Governor of West-Java

From left to right: Dr. Sukiman; an Australian Military Observer for U.N.O.; T.K.H.
Achmad. Chatib; Colonel Sukanda Bratamanggala; Mr. Jusuppadi Adiwinata
148 Else Ensering

stayed in Tangerang for one day and saw Wikana and the son of Haji Misbach
(a prominent P.K.I, leader in Yogyakarta in the 1920's) arrive. The arrival of
Tje Mamat as well as Wikana can indeed be an indication for the connection
with the Menteng 31 group, because two or three days after their visit the
transfer of power took place in Tangerang (Sumarda, 1985, 69).
In Banten the same thing happened. A week later, on 27 October, the aksi
daulat broke out. It also became known as Tje Mamat's «coup» in Serang, the
capital of Banten. But before this happened there were a few other events.

Tan Malaka 's contacts with Bantenese leaders

On the 9 August, a good week before the official proclamation, a secret
meeting was held in Rangkasbitung, central Banten, concerning the Proklama-
si Indonesia Merdeka («declaration of sovereignty») which was attended by
five representatives of pemuda groups from all over Banten. The meeting took
place in the house of Tachril, an official of the G.E.B.E.O. (Electricity
Company of Banten). Pah Husin, the chairman, made a speech in which he said
«We are not collaborators and freedom must not be given but won by the
struggle of the pemuda». After this meeting the pemuda were to immediately
get in touch with the P.E.T.A. daidanchos Chatib, Sjam'oen and Entol Ter-
naya, who would be asked to support this movement, preferably with
«military equipment, weapons and everything that was needed for the revolution».
He added that the proclamation had to be signed by Bung Karno and Bung
Hatta because both leaders were thought to be sufficiently capable of
representing the Indonesian people. This meeting was attended by the young Ayip
Dzuhri, Chatib' s future son-in-law, Abdurrachman, Chasi-in and Tachril.
After the meeting everybody accompanied Husin to the station where he
took the train to Jakarta to meet other pemuda there (Khalid Rasyidi, 1979,
20-22; interview with Wargo Sandiman, who latter became Chaerul Saleh's
personal secretary, Jakarta, 31 August 1991).
A week after the proclamation a car arrived in the kampong Ci-èkè in Pan-
deglang and drew up in front of Dzuhri' s house. Abdulhadi, a close friend of
Chatib's, jumped out. He asked for Chatib and the answer was that «perhaps
he is now in Labuan». Abdulhadi then said: «Tan Malaka is sitting in the car».
Everybody ran out of the house to see this legendary figure and to their
astonishment they saw that Tan Malaka was non other than Pak Husin, whom they
had already met on the 9 August (Khalid Rasyidi, 1979, 20-22).
Although, as far as is known, Tan Malaka came to Banten one more time,
that is at the end of September, for a secret meeting with, among others, Moh.
Tahir, Chatib, Tje Mamat and Kiai Achmad from Tangerang (Williams, 1990,
292), he does not appear to have played any part in further developments in
Banten. Nevertheless, his ideas about the revolution profoundly influenced
this region. The radical ideas expressed in his Minimum Programme seem to
subscribe well to the views of some of the Bantenese kiai.
 Banten in times of revolution 149

Contacts between religious leaders and jawara

Radical elements could also be found in Banten among the jawara. Apart
from their contacts with their followers in the pesantrens and tarekats, the kiai
frequently had close links with the jawara or garong leaders. From of old the
jawara had made this region unsafe. In the insurrections against the colonial
rule they were called in by the kiai as well as by the indigenous administrative
officials.
Jawara are not ordinary bandits. They were often people who had not been
able to find work, or dispossessed peasants who had consequently drifted into
the underworld. They frequently became pirates or rampoks (robbers). They
were often involved in actions against government officials (Sartono, 1966.
110-111). Because they defied the authorities they captured the sympathy of
the population.
The jawara can be split up into two groups: jawara-teri, petty thieves or
robbers, and jawara-gedeh, big jawara. The latter applied themselves not only
to pencak silat (the art of self-defence), to handling such weapons as goloks
(short, sharp machetes), krisses and bambu runtjing (bamboo spears), but also
to mystical development for which they were apprenticed to a kiai (interview
with Kuntjoro Jakti, Jakarta, 16 July 1991). As was explained in the chapter
on Islam, one can, by prayer on the highest plane of mystical experience reach
a state of mind in which one obtains, or believes one obtains, invulnerability.
This is one of the significant characteristics of Bantenese culture, and even
today there are young people who train for this.
As a result, close ties were established between the kiai and the jawara,
ties that had played a role in earlier revolts but that were also to be of
significance in the post-war period. The adherents of the kiai in Banten comprised
not only their followers from the pesantrens and tarekats but also jawara
gangs with whose leaders they had close contacts.

Social revolution in Banten

The news that Japan had capitulated reached Jakarta on 15 August 1945.
Chaerul Saleh instructed four pemuda, among whom Abdul Muluk, to pass on
the message to such Bantenese leaders as Chatib, Sjam'oen and Suriakertale-
gawa, the resident of Banten who had been appointed by the Japanese, but
also to such pemuda leaders as Ali Amangku and Ayip Dzuhri (Purwaningsih,
1984,47).
On 22 August the pemuda in Serang hauled down the Japanese flags. Many
Japanese civilians fled to Jakarta. After the assassination of two government
officials in Citangkil, all government officials who were not Bantenese
followed that example, including the resident, Raden Tirtasujatna, who had been
appointed by the Republic. Thus, almost the whole Corps of Banten's
administrators had disappeared.
Early in September the Serang branch of the Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia
(A.P.I., «Youth Organization of Indonesia», which had been formed in 1
September in Jakarta at the initiative of Chaerul Saleh), organized a meeting, led
150 Else Ens er ing

by Ali Amangku, with the elder leaders of Banten in order to assign the
various tasks:
- Suriakertalegawa had to seize power from the Japanese;
- Chatib was made responsible for the security of Banten;
- Ali Amangku, chairman of the A.P.I., was in charge of the contacts with the
pemuda and the organization of the struggle.
On this occasion Chatib was informally appointed resident, head of the
civil administration of Banten. He was to become the first Bantenese resident.
Sjam'oen was made responsible for military affairs (interview with Amangku,
Jakarta, 6 September 1991).
Sjam'oen, the grandson of Kiai Wasid, was born in Citangkil, studied in
the Teneng pesantren and then in the Kamasan pesantren. Later on, from
1905-1910, he studied Islam in Mecca and then at the al-Azhar in Cairo. Back
in Banten he founded the madrasah Chairijah in Serang (Purwaningsih, 1984,
52). He is known to have applied himself to social activities, whereas Chatib
had been engaged in politics since the 1920's.
On 10 September, Chatib was formally appointed Resident of Banten by
President Sukarno (interview with E. Tashin, Amsterdam, 7 August 1992).
Suriakertalegawa was appointed Assistant Resident. The regents, among
whom Raden Hilman Djajadiningrat of Serang, Raden Djumhana of Pande-
glang and Raden Hardiwinangun of Lebak, were requested to continue with
their tasks. For the Komi te Nasional Indonesia, set up by the Republic and for
which branches had to be established in each regency, Tje Mamat was
appointed for the Serang regency, Mohammad Ali for Pandeglang and Raden Djaja-
rukmantara for Lebak (Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia, part
2, 522-523).
Sjam'oen formed the local Badan Keamanan Rakyat (B.K.R., «People's
Security Organization») together with many ex-P.E.T.A. members and all
A.P.I, members.
In order to obtain weapons Chatib and Sjam'oen requested the Japanese
Kenpeitai (military police) in Serang to surrender their arms to the Republic,
that is to the local B.K.R. The Japanese agreed in condition that they would be
guaranteed a safe retreat to Jakarta. This was promised and in the beginning of
October an announcement was made that all the Japanese had to go to Serang
and that from there they would be escorted to Jakarta by the B.K.R. The
people remained calm because Amangku, the charismatic leader of the
pemuda, had informed them of the talks between the kiai and the Japanese
(interview with Amangku, 6 September 1991).
With the Japanese stationed at Gorda Airport everything went according to
plan: they came by truck to Serang, while one truck carrying weapons fell into
the hands of the B.K.R. But the Japanese from Sajira (Rangkasbitung) were
attacked in their trucks in the way to Serang by the population in Warunggu-
nung and four soldiers were killed (interview Amangku, 6 September 1991;
Williams, 1990, 293). This incident induced the Japanese to withdraw their
commitment and to set up a barricade around the Kenpeitai building. In an
announcement by the local government, pemuda, kiai and camat («sub-district
 Banten in times of revolution 151

heads») round Serang were called up to go to the capital. On 9 October at 4.30

a.m. the attack on the Kenpeitai was launched with primitive weapons. The
Japanese returned fire with machine guns and a number of people were killed.
The next day the lasykar rakyat, led by the haji Muhamin, Ma'mun and Nawi,
came to reinforce the pemuda. Between seven and eight o'clock in the evening
heavy gunfire was heard near the Kenpeitai. The following day it turned out
that this had been a subterfuge: the Japanese had fled that evening in four
trucks loudly shouting «Merdeka» («freedom», the pemuda cry at that time)
and had thus deceived their assailants ( interview with Amangku, 6 September
1991).
On 13 October there was an assault on the prison in Serang. It is not clear
by whom, but it was probably the jawara who had come to release their
imprisoned brothers-in-arms. At the same time, however, six Europeans were killed
in the prison, among whom ex-K.N.I.L. Captain Faber (Williams, 1990, 294).
On 5 October the Republik Indonesia had issued a new decree: the B.K.R.
was to be replaced by the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (T.K.R., «People's
Security Army»). Sjam'oen now set up the T.K.R. with former B.K.R. men. He
became commander of Division I which covered the area of Banten and Bogor
and ressorted under Command I. West Java, under the leadership of General
Didi Kartasasmita (Anderson, 1972, 240-241). In reality, however, the T.K.R.
was, for the time being, nothing more than a collection of former P.E.T.A.,
jawara and ordinary people.

Tje Mamat' s Dewan Rakyat (People's Council) in Banten (^)

The declaration of independence by the government was followed by the
order to take over authority from the old administration, an order which was
not carried out very quickly at the local level. The transfer of power in
administrative posts was carried out on 27 October 1945 by Tje Mamat, but in a
completely different manner than the government had intended.
Two days after the proclamation Tje Mamat, who was the self-appointed
leader of the jawara in Banten and of the Lampungs, was released from prison
by Abdul Muluk. Chaerul Saleh is alleged to have instructed his release and at
the same time to have requested Tje Mamat to go to Serang for the transfer of
power from the Japanese rule in particular, and from the Banten Residency in
general.
After spending the night in Tangerang, Tje Mamat went to Serang together
with Wikana and Haji Misbach's son. There they saw that the population had
hauled down the Japanese flags. Tje Mamat immediately informed Chatib of
Saleh' s instructions. Chatib, however, preferred to await further
developments. At that time there were still many officials in the Bantenese
administration from what Tje Mamat considered to be: «the heritage of Dutch and
Japanese colonial rule». Requests were made to replace these former colonial
officials but Chatib did not respond.
At 10 a.m. on 27 October, the office of the residency was occupied by Tje
Mamat and his followers, among whom were two truck loads of jawara from
Tangerang. At that moment those present were: Chatib, Sjam'oen and Abdul-
152 Else Ensering

hadi, an ex-Digulist. Tje Mamat forced them to assemble the population of

Serang and surroundings. The following day he addressed the crowd,
announcing that power had been transferred, that the De wan Rakyat had been
established, that he himself was its chairman for the whole of Banten. The kiai, the
regent of Serang, Hilman Djajadiningrat and Ali Amangku could, at that
moment, do nothing else but agree. Sjam'oen and Amangku did not
understand the weak attitude of the resident, but, according to Dzuhri, Chatib's right
hand, this was because he had known Tje Mamat for a long time and by
assenting was trying to prevent a bloodbath.
The same day Hilman Djajadiningrat was kidnapped and imprisoned.
When this became known, Sjam'oen, who headed the T.K.R., and Amangku
decided to assemble their followers and attack the headquarters of Tje Mamat
in Ciomas, 40 kilometres west of Serang. The chief of police, Oskar Kusuma-
ningrat, who as a non-Bantenese had expected problems, gave them all his
arms. In the meantime, the deputy resident, Suriakertalegawa, a
non-Bantenese, who had heard of the kidnapping, had fled to Sukabumi.
Chatib explored the possibilities and realizing that Tje Mamat had the
strong support of the population, he agreed to meet the demands of the new
leader to purge the administration of the «colonial heritage». A new
administrative machinery was set up consisting of ulama having sufficient influence
on the population. Sjam'oen became the new regent of Serang in addition to
his appointment as head of the T.K.R. Haji Hilman (not Hilman
Djajadiningrat) became regent in Pandeglang and Haji Hasan in Lebak. The posts of
wedana, camat and lurah were now also filled by kaum (religious officials)
and ulama. Moreover, a Majlis Ulama («ulama council») was appointed,
consisting of forty kiai, as an advisory council for the resident and to control
his performance. From one day to the next Banten had become an Islamic
stronghold.
Utter chaos spread throughout Banten. One of its causes was the terror
sowed by the followers of Tje Mamat who had formed the Lasykar «Gulkut»
(gulung pamong praja: «to roll up the native administration») to prevent this
administration from supporting the Dutch if they returned. Most of its
members were jawara from the area of Ciomas. They intimidated the population
with their sharp goloks and plundered property, especially that of the native
administrators and their descendants. Apart from that reprisals were carried
out which had nothing to do with the movement as such.
Besides Hilman Djajadiningrat, Oskar Kusumaningrat was picked up at
home almost immediately afterwards by Tje Mamat' s followers and
imprisoned first in Serang and later in Ciomas where Entol Ternaya, head of the
justice administration in Serang, had already been jailed.
That was the last straw, even for Chatib! He ordered Sjam'oen to destroy
the Dewan and liberate the administrative officials. The latter called in
Amangku for a punitive expedition. Djajadiningrat was freed in Serang and
later on escorted to Sukabumi via South Banten. After that the T.K.R. troops
went to the wedana office in Ciomas which was the stronghold of Tje Mamat.
Two T.K.R. men were killed, the administrative officials were freed, but it
 Banten in times of revolution 153

was found that Tje Mamat and some of his followers had fled to Lebak. There
he again assembled the Lasykar Gulkut. It's seat was now established in
Rangkasbitung in the house of Tachril, formerly the office of the G.E.B.E.O.
By the end of November almost the whole area around Rangkasbitung had
fallen into the hands of Tje Mamat, who had sent the local T.K.R. and police
home and replaced them by jawara.
The leaders of the young republic viewed these developments with alarm.
President Sukarno and Hatta visited the residency between 9 and 12 December
and in a speech on the alun-alun (market place) in Serang, the president made
an urgent appeal for all local government posts to be re-established, to abolish
the De wan Rakyat and to unite in the republic's struggle for freedom.
It was again Amangku and his followers who were responsible for tight
security round the two leaders because rumours were circulating that they too
would be kidnapped. This did not happen, but during the official visit the
Regent of Lebak, Raden Hardi winangun was kidnapped in Rangkasbitung and
later assassinated in South Banten.
After this assasination and others, esteem for the Dewan weakened
considerably. On 2 January 1946, the Dewan in Rankasbitung wanted to replace
Hassan, the new regent, and appoint a directorate which would supervise all
government institutions and armed forces. The T.K.R., which had been
abolished by Tje Mamat, but still operated under the leadership of Raden Djajaruk-
mantara, the nephew of the murdered regent (interview with Pah Suhadi,
Serang, 7 and 8 August 1991) replied with an ultimatum in which they
demanded the dissolution of the Dewan. When this failed, fighting broke out and the
Dewan's stronghold was liquidated, Tachril was arrested but again Tje Mamat
had fled. This time to Bogor where he threw in his lot with the lasykar rakyat
of Kiai Narja, who was also carrying out aksi daulat against the native
administration. It was there that he was run in by the lasykar rakyat Leuwilang,
under Soleh Iskandar who, at that time, was trying to annihilate Narja's group.
Tje Mamat was handed over to the T.K.R. in Purwakarta and jailed there. This
was the end of the «hundred days of the Dewan».
Much later, in 1982 at the age of eighty, Tje Mamat, in an interview with
Purwaningsih, again fervently defended his policy with the argument that the
intention had been to strive for real independence, free from intervention by
the government or by foreigners. A body truly representing the people had to
be found and in Banten that was the local ulama. That is why all the local
administrative posts were given to them.
What he did not take into account, however, was that in practice this would
bring problems along with it. First, the kiai had not been trained for this and
had no administrative experience at all. Secondly, even though many of them
mastered Arabic, certainly when they had spent several years in Mecca, they
did not know the Latin script! Indeed, studying this script was regarded as
studying the science of the kafirs («infidels»). Whoever did this would, in their
eyes, become a kafir himself. The kiai were popular leaders, but totally unfit
to serve in administrative posts (Purwaningsih, 1984, 92).
154 Else Ensering

The battle ofSerpong, Tanger ang

In 1946 there were three more clashes:
- on 25 January the battle of Lengkong;
- on 26 May the battle of Serpong;
- at the end of May the anti-Chinese riots in Tangerang.
The first and third events we shall treat briefly and after that go more
deeply into the attack of the Bantenese kiai on Serpong.
The battle of Lengkong was the struggle of the cadets from the Military
Academy in Tangerang, together with the T.K.R. and the police, against the
Japanese who held an arms and munition depot in Lengkong. The intention
was a peaceful transfer of power, but a bloodbath ensued as a result of a stray
bullet. Thirty-four cadets, the Governor of the Academy, Daan Nogot, and two
lieutenants lost their lives. Prime Minister Sjahrir was present at the funeral
(interviews with Suhadi and Bu Ating on 8 August 1991, and with B. Kuntjoro
Jakti in 19 July 1991, Jakarta).
The racist riots in Tangerang between 28 May and 1 June were focused
particularly on the Chinese, also because many of them had joined the Dutch
army (Sumarda, 1985, 116, 117). A government delegation, led by Moh. Nat-
sir, travelled to Serang to consult with Resident Chatib and Colonel Sjam'oen.
Because Natsir knew that they had great influence on the societies of
Tangerang and Banten, he asked for their cooperation in finding a good solution to
the conflicts in Tangerang. The result was that the local administration of
Tangerang, supported by the army, the police and the religious leaders came
to an agreement with the leaders of the Chinese community to provide
protection for the Chinese living in the interior of Tangerang (Sumarda, 1985, 120-
130).
The clash at Serpong, south of Tangerang, was caused by the occupation of
Kebayoran Lama and Serpong by the K.N.I.L. (the Royal Dutch-Indies Army).
The Bantenese kiai regarded this as the occupation of a country that had now
become truly theirs after it had been liberated for the first time in centuries
and declared a sovereign state. Furthermore, they considered it as another
occupation by infidels. They were determined to assist and liberate this
region!
It was Kiai Udjang of Menés, pesantren Caringin - guru tarekat Kadiriah
who had close links with the guru tarekats in the Tangerang regions? - who
took the initiative and became the driving force behind the action to free
Serpong and Kebayoran Lama from Menés via Rangkasbitung. Sjam'oen, head of
the Tirtayasa Division, instructed Amangku to support Kiai Udjang «as the
leader of the people» with one company of troops. On 26 May, the day of the
assault, Amangku as the commander of the company, first let his troops drink
(interview Amangku, Jakarta, 11 September 1991). In the Bantenese debus
game, in which the players pierce themselves with bodkins, ritual holy water
is always drunk beforehand so that they become invulnerable and not a single
drop of blood is shed.
Kiai Abdurrahim from Maya (Rangkasbitung), himself a guru debus, also
decided to join battle with a lasykar consisting of his students. They tested
 Banten in times of revolution 155

their invulnerability to fire and the golok and felt they would also be
invulnerable to the bullets of the Dutch. Without seeking coverage they attacked the
K.N.I.L. army. Nearly all of their 120 men were shot dead (Van Bruinessen,
1989,77).
Kiai Ibrahim from Maya and Kiai Harun from Tenjo had also joined this
military operation with one thousand men (Sumarda, 1985, 113).
It was a massacre, the K.N.I.L. killing almost all of the assailants. In Ban-
ten, people still talk about the «thousand dead of Serpong». A foundation has
been established that takes care of the widows of these heroes (interview with
the chairman of the Foundation, Ating Suhadi, daughter of Entol Ternaya,
Serang, 7 and 8 August, 1991).
Once more it was the kiai, whether communist or not, who mobilized their
numerous supporters to defeat the Dutch. With primitive means, but at the
same time with an unshakable belief in their own invulnerability and in their
holy sheikhs, they struggled for the preservation of their recently gained
independence. Many of them fell for this cause.

Further developments in Banten, 1946-1949

Governments measures
Vice-President Hatta was furious and cried out: «Banten is being ruled by
kiai!». He instructed Sukanda Bratmanggala, the head of the Bandung branch
of the T.K.R. who later became a colonel in the T.N.I. (Indonesian Army) and
who had managed to evade the disarmament of his three P.E.T.A. companies
by the Japanese in Bandung, to straighten out this matter. Bratamanggala
received supplies from Yogya which was then the seat of the government:
rice, clothes, four million O.R.I, (republican money), and Lee Enfield guns
smuggled from Singapore. By way of South Priangan and Sukabumi, he
arrived in South Banten in the middle of 1946. He took this route to avoid the
areas occupied by the Dutch. Chatib and Sjam'oen received him «with open
arms». They realized, however, that this military man had not been stationed
here by the government for nothing (interview with Bratamanggala, Bandung,
22 August 1991).
Because he sided with the Republic and furthermore came from Priangan,
he was continually thwarted by Amangku who at that time headed the Military
Police in Serang (interview with Mrs Sudewo, Jakarta, 30 August 1991). This
led to a rift between the Bratamanggala group and the native Bantenese group
(interview with Kuntjoro Jakti, Jakarta, 10 August 1991). Round the middle of
1948 this culminated in almost daily clashes between the T.N.I. army and the
Military Police, who then proceeded to again form lasykar rakyats (A.R.A.,
Archief Alg. Secretarie, inv. nr. 3012). About that time, Banten became
Brigade A of the Gerilja Bambu Runtjing Division - see below - and it is not
unlikely that these lasykars then started calling themselves Brigade Bambu
Runtjing.
In fact, Chatib occupied an unassailable position, to the extent that the
republic did not dare take measures against him. For this reason four advisors
156 Else Ensering

were made available to him with whom he carried out the administration.
They were:
- Jusuf Adiwanata LL.M. Vice-Governor of West Java, who by government
order was placed in Serang;
- Semaun Bakri, who had been Sukarno's personal secretary during the
Japanese period;
- Balwi, agricultural consultant and economic advisor;
- Sukendar of the T.N.I, as military advisor (A.R.A., Archief Alg. Secretarie,
inv. nr. 3012; interview with Kuntjoro Jakti, Jakarta, 10 August 1991).

The isolation ofBanten up to December 1948

On 4 May 1947, the Federal State «Negara Pasundan» (State of Pasundan)
was founded (Cribb, 1991, 145). Banten was not included in it. Until
December 1948 it remained a free region, virtually secluded from the government in
Yogya and economically secluded because the Dutch had imposed an
economic blockade on Banten (A.R.A., Archief Alg. Seer. inv. nr. 3012).
Because this region no longer received money from Yogya, Chatib was
provided with paper and authorized to print money, the ORIDAB, Oewang
Republik Indonesia Daerah Banten, of which the banknotes were signed by
Chatib (see illustration below). A «self-supporting» policy had to be pursued
{ibidem). This took place in 1948. In the meantime, Chatib had made his
program public in September 1946. He would restore the old city of Banten, its
mosque and its harbour, which had all been destroyed by the Dutch in the 19th
century. This gave rise to rumours that the sultanate would eventually be res-

REPUBLIK INDONESIA

KERTAS OARUPAT UNTUK DAERAH .BANTEN ■

TANOA PEM8AJARAN JANG SAH
BE

SERANG.
Q€StOEM-
15 OESEMBER
BANTEN-W47
 Banten in times of revolution 157

tored with Chatib at its head. He was a lineal descendant of the last-reigning
sultans and an orthodox Muslim (Williams, 1990, 305). Chatib himself has
always denied this, but there are still people who are convinced that he had
wanted to become «Sultan Tirtayasa» (interview with Haji Su'eb, Menés, 9
July 1991; Tubagus Dradjat, Bandung, 23 August 1991; Colonel Bratamang-
gala, Jakarta, 29 August, 1991). Chatib defended his actions in a report:
«Laporan tentang Pembangunan Banten» (report of the reconstruction of Ban-
ten) in February 1947, in which he states that 320,000 people were involved in
the restoration work. The work was done voluntarily because it was regarded
as waqaf («religious obligation»). Participation in the work was supposed to
have the same value as a pilgrimage to Mecca (Williams, 1990, 306. The
report is in the author's possession).
Indeed, Chatib restored the city for the most part and had a house built for
himself next to the mosque (interwiews with Kuntjoro Jakti, Jakarta, 19 July
1991; Bratamanggala, Jakarta, 29 August, 1991).
After the Renville agreement in January 1948, Colonel Bratamanggala was
recalled to Yogya and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Eri Sudewo, who was
made head of the Tirtayasa Brigade, formerly led by Sjam'oen. Sudewo's
chief of staff was Priatna Padma di Wiria, born in Banten. His mother was a
daughter of the wedana who had been murdered in Cilegon in 1888 and a
grand-daughter of the Regent of Caringin, Kusumaningrat. The last resident of
Serang, Sampurna - appointed Vice-Governor of West Java in 1992 - is a
great-grandson of the same wedana. Especially in administrative circles many
Bantenese were of old related to each other. One should know this in order to
correctly understand the relationships they had with each other.
In 1948, Priatna was placed by the government as a brigadier major under
Sudewo. He flew from Yogya to Gorda Airport, near Serang, in DC aircraft
with the American pilot Bobby Freeman (his passage had to be paid in gold)
along the south coast to escape the attention of the Dutch. The next day, that
same aircraft departed for India with three tonnes of gold bullion from the
gold mine Cikotok in South Banten. A day latter it was reported missing and it
has never been found. On board was also Semaun Bakri, Chatib's advisor.
Chatib had sent him along because the intention was to buy arms and aircraft
(sic!) with this gold. This decision had been taken by the local administration,
unknown to the government in Yogya (interviews with Priatna, Jakarta, 5
August 1991; Mrs Sudewo, Jakarta, 30 August, 1991).

The second police action of December 1948, and the continued resistance of
the lasykar rakyat
On 3 June 1947 the Indonesian army was again given a new name, Tentara
Nasional Indonesia (T.N.I., «Indonesian National Army»). President Sukarno
had decided to unite the T.K.R. and the lasykars and this was the first
rationalization of the armed forces (Harsjah Bachtiar, 1988, 17). All armed irregular
groups would, after selection - some would have to be sent home - be
incorporated into the T.N.I. and that as the Divisi Gerilja Bambu Runtjing (Bamboo
Spears Division) with Sutan Akbar in charge. Akbar divided the division into
158 Else Ens er ing

five brigades for Banten, Bogor, Jakarta, Priangan and Cirebon. Banten
became Brigade A of the Bambu Runtjing (from now on B.R.). He dealt in
particular with Chatib, whose conflicts with the T.N.I, were known (Cribb, 1991,
158). In 1948, the B.R. in Banten quickly went into action. In March it had
become the strong arm of the extreme left anti-Republican elements who
attempted to stage a coup. The leaders were taken captive, the remaining
troops fled and the Brigade A was banned. That is how it was presented in a
Nefis report dated 23 August 1948 (A.R.A. Archief Alg. Secretarie, inv. nr.
2689). This impression of things seems to be a little too simple.
Many of the lasykars that were demobilized in May 1947 by Kawilarang
and not incorporated into the Siliwangi Division of A.H. Nasution joined the
B.R. brigades (Cribb, 1991, 159).
Many of the guerilla fighters from the Krawang, Cikampek and Purwakarta
areas of action assembled in Banten, travelling either by land via Sukabumi
and Pelabuan Ratu to South Banten or by sea in fishing praus from the coastal
towns and disguised as fishermen (A.R.A. Archief Alg. Secretarie, inv. nr.
3012: letter by the Assistant Resident D. Schermer to the Resident, dated 10
October 1948).
The Dutch had appointed temporary government officials (T.B.A.) in Ban-
ten so that a double organization was formed. Until some time in 1949, Chatib
appointed administrative officials himself without the Dutch administration
being able to do anything about this.
On 19 December 1948, the Dutch launched the second police action.
Serang was attacked from the north. Jusuf Adiwinata and Eri Sudewo fled, by
way of Rangkasbitung, to the forests, but not before they had blown up the
Mexolie factory, the station and the resident's house there (interview with
Kuntjoro Jakti, Jakarta, 16 July 1991). North and Central Banten were then
occupied by the Dutch. The region of Baduis in South Banten, which was
inaccessible because of its forests, was never occupied.
On 7 May 1949, the Republic and the Dutch government once more signed
an agreement, the Rum- Van Royen Agreement. Under heavy pressure from
the Americans, the Dutch were prepared this time to negotiate seriously and
this was the beginning of developments towards an official transfer of power.
On 11 August 1949, Resident Makkes transferred his T.B.A. powers in
Banten to his Indonesian successor Asikin Nitiatmadja (A.R.A. Archief. Alg.
Secretarie, inv. no. 3017). At that time Banten was overrun by rampok gangs
and from the beginning of the occupation in December 1948, thirty-five civil
servants and desa administrators had been murdered {ibidem). To neutralize
the ulama, the government had appointed civil and military wedana from
Priangan, as a result of which the Bantenese again felt «occupied»: «Banten
dijajah lagi oleh Priangan» (Banten is colonized again by Priangan)
(Williams, 1990, 307). It seems likely that these officials became the victims
of the B.R. gangs. In April 1949, Chatib' s House was surrounded. His wife,
son and son-in-law were arrested, but Chatib managed to escape (A.R.A.
Archief. Alg. Secretarie, inv. no. 3017).
Together with Chaerul Saleh, many others in the Republic followed these
 Banten in times of revolution 159

developments with profound distrust. The fact that Tan Malaka had been
murdered by Republican forces in February 1949 (Jarvis, 1991, cxxi) could have
influenced this.
Saleh decided to assemble five lasykar units with their leaders in the hills
around Krawang. Because that environment was not woody enough to take
shelter in, it was decided to go to the Ujung Kulon peninsula by way of South
Banten, and from there cross over to the Lampungs to find a safer base in the
rugged regions of South Sumatra. From of old this had been a familiar escape
route (Cribb, 1991, 186). On the way they were joined by those left over from
the Bogor Brigade of the Bambu Runtjing, under Muhidin Nasution, and by
Banten units under Chatib and Mohamad Khusnun. On 11 October 1949, they
announced the formation of a new Tentara Rakyat (People's Army). Their
declaration ran as follows:
«... on 15 August, the Indonesian people forces their will on the national
leaders Sukarno and Hatta, to whom they entrusted the declaration of the
Indonesian people's freedom in the form of the proclamation of independence
on 17 August 1945. But in the course of the struggle which followed the
Indonesian people have experienced sadness and bitterness.
In the end it must be said that the fate, the interests and the needs of the
Indonesian people can no longer be entrusted to weak leaders who lack
confidence in the strength of the people themselves. The people in struggle have
realised that they cannot rely on anyone but themselves to defend and
guarantee their principles and their interests» (Cribb, 1991, 186, 187).
This declaration was signed by twenty-four people, among whom Chaerul
Saleh, Muhidin Nasution and Chatib (Cribb, 1991, 189, note 8).
However, before they could reach Ujung Kulon they were ambushed by the
Siliwangi Division under Major Sudarsono. Again many lasykars were killed,
but the leaders managed to escape. Shortly afterwards, Chaerul Saleh and
Muhidin Nasution were arrested and jailed. Later on Saleh was sent to Europe
to study. The surviving B.R. troops remained active for a long time afterwards
in the area of Krawang and probably also in Banten, but the Siliwangi
Division decimated their numbers.
Chatib survived the clash. Little, as yet, is known about further
developments, except that Kiai Chatib died in the late seventies.

Epilogue
The struggle for an independent Banten marks the 1945-1949 period like a
leitmotiv, which can be traced back to the times of a powerful sultanate and
the contacts with Mecca. In line with this was the slogan «100 percent Merde-
ka», heard everywhere, as it was expressed in Tan Malaka' s Minimum
Programme, in the aspirations of the pemuda and the lasykars under the
leadership of Chaerul Saleh, in even Tje Namat's coup and, finally, in Chatib's
ambition to regain the former prestige of the old city of Banten with
restoration works.
The terms of reproach directed at the Indonesian leaders for their lack of
confidence in the strength of the people, sound dramatic in the Tentara
160 Else Ensering

Rakyat's declaration of 11 October 1949, co-signed by Chatib.

During the Sukarno period the army consolidated its power and succeeded
in suppressing the various secession movements. But time and again, such
movements would spring to life as is happening in Aceh now. Tensions
between government policies and regional aspirations towards more
independence keep cropping up. It is questionable whether a government which, contrary
to a true democracy, leaves no scope for more regional autonomy, is not, in
the long term, inviting trouble.
With regard to the local administration in Banten, the government has
recognized that this region can best be led by Bantenese whose personal status
and charisma are acknowledged by the population as well as by the local
leaders. Resident Sampurna is a nephew of the regent Raden Hardiwinangun who
was murdered in 1945, and the descendants of Chatib and Sjam'oen now sit in
the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah Banten (D.P.D.B., «Representative Council of
Banten» - interviews in the Office of the Residency of Serang, 8 and 9 July,
1991).
The Bantenese Kiai seem to have become reconciled with the sovereign
state of Indonesia, even though this is not based on Islamic principles and the
major part of the population adheres to the Islamic faith. In any case they are
now rid of the foreigners and the kafirs. In their pesantrens and tarekats
education will no longer be focused on physical struggle but on gaining a deeper
insight into their religion.

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Interviews in 1991 with:

1. Mrs Etty Sumiarti Abdulrachman, Bekasi
2. AH Amangku, Jakarta
3. H. Mohammad Amin, Cibubur
4. Colonel Sukanda Bratamanggala, Bandung and Jakarta
5. Mrs Jo Djajadiningrat, Jakarta
6. Toebagus Achmad Dradjat, Bandung
7. Dr. Edi S. Ekadjati, Bandung
8. Monseigneur NJ. Geise, Bandung
9. Sidik Kertapati, Amsterdam
10. Mr Boy Kuntjoro Jakti, Jakarta
1 1 . Toebagus Lutfi, Jakarta
12. Junus Nataatmadja, Bandung
13. Johar Nur, Jakarta
14. Dr. Harry Poeze, Leiden
15. Brigade Generaal Priatna Padma di Wiria, Jakarta
16. Sri Handayani Purwaningsih, Den Haag
17. Mrs Partini Ribowo, Jakarta
18. Suhargo Sandiman, Jakarta
19. R. A. Ishbandiah Satrio, Jakarta
20. Mrs Mang Sudewo, Jakarta
21. Mrs Ating Suhadi, Serang
22. Imam Suhadi, Serang
23. Toebagus H. Su'eb, Caringin, Pandeglang
24. Edi Tahsin, Amsterdam
 Banten in times of revolution 163

NOTES

*. The author wishes to thank Professor W.F. Wertheim, Dr. J.N. Pluvier and Dr. M.
van Bruinessen for their comments on the first draft of this text.
1. The Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant of May 9th, 1992 concerning the research
project «Les lieux de mémoire» by the French historian Pierre Nora.
2. From Tan Malaka's biography, Dari penjara ke penjara (English translation, From
jail to jail, published in 1991, Ohio University, translator Dr. Helen Jarvis), it is
evident how much the suffering he witnessed there affected him. These
experiences will no doubt have influenced his political thinking.
3. See Robert Cribb, Gangsters and revolutionaries. The Jakarta People's Militia
and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949, 1991.
4. This account is based on interviews with Mr. B. Kuntjoro Jakti and Amangku, the
publication by Dr. Williams and Purwaningsih's M.A. thesis.