Elbahrawy Amr PDF

A House of No Importance
The rise and fall of Nasr City’s middle class extended family houses
by
Amr elBahrawy
A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfilment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Architecture
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2015

© Amr elBahrawy 2015
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true
copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by
my examiners.
Author’s Declaration I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the
public.
ii
Since its urban boom around the mid 1980s, the Cairene residential
district of Nasr City has been the hub for a unique housing phenomenon.
It has seen middle class professionals appropriating its apartment
building typologies into households for their extended families. Over
the past ten years, however, many of those families have been aiming
to relocate their households to the emerging suburban developments
on Cairo’s periphery. This desire seems to be driven by nothing more
than their aspiration for the simulacrums of luxury and social status
associated with suburban living. Apart from superficial stylistic variations
in architectural expression, the housing typologies in these suburbs offer
the same functional arrangements as those in Nasr City; and as per their
building bylaws they accommodate the co-existence of fewer extended
family generations. These facts, coupled with the increased financial
hardships involved in acquiring a new suburban dwelling, highlight the
absurdity of the middle class professionals’ desire for such relocation.
Not only does it deplete their monetary standing in an Egyptian society
that now recognizes size of income and wealth as the only measures
of social status, but it also debases the solidarity inherent in their
characteristic intergenerational living. That is to say, it compromises the
basis of the very social status they are aiming to preserve.
This thesis tracks the history of 11 El-Insha Street, an apartment

building–extended family household in Nasr City, as well as the history
of the street it stands on, over the span of 30 years. That narrative serves
as the basis for a discussion of the evolution of the Egyptian middle
class, Nasr City, and the apartment building – extended family house
typology. Through an extensive analytical framework of demographic
and urban data, the discourse of this thesis tracks the link between
middle class professionals and that particular housing typology; its
Abstract particular prevalence in Nasr City once upon time; and the current
trend of its extinction as its inhabitants relocate to the suburbs.
iii
I would like to thank my supervisor, Val Rynnimeri, for all his support,
guidance, engaging conversations, and insightful feedback that helped
shape this thesis. I would also like to thank my committee members,
Tammy Gaber, for her continued advice, support, and encouragement;
and Rick Haldenby, for his keen interest in the topic of this thesis and
his constructive criticism. I would also like to thank my external reader,
Dr. Luna Khirfan, for the time she devoted to this thesis, and for her
thorough notes and feedback.
To my mother, Ola Abouzeid, who I know that completing this thesis

means more to than anybody else, including myself; thank you for your
support throughout this journey – I am forever grateful. To my sister,
Abla elBahrawy; thank you for your tremendous and thorough effort
filling in missing pieces of survey data. To Kathryn Bell; thank you for all
the support and motivation – I couldn’t have done this without you. To
my uncle, Ahmed Abouzeid, and Mrs. Nahed Fahim; thank you for the
time you took to tell my about the history and transformation of 11 El-
Insha Street throughout the years. To my father, Aly elBahrawy; thank
you for putting me in contact with all the practitioners and developers
who provided valuable information. To Yasser elShemy; thank you for
making available the otherwise inaccessible data about Nasr City. To my
Aknowledgements friends Tamer Aly, Mona Mannoun, and Antonious Nady; thank you for
providing all the raw maps, bylaws, and images.
iv
In loving memory of AbdelAziz Abouzeid and Amaal alSharqawy.
v
Tabel of Contents
List of Illustrations vii
Prologue 3
Chapter One
1.A The House Aziz and Gerges Built 8
1.1 The Egyptian Middle Class [1800s-1960s] 20

The origins and evolution of a homogeneous social stratum
1.2 Nasr City [1960s] 28

Prospects of a middle class Utopia
1.3 The Egyptian Middle Class [1970s-1990s] 47

A transformation into a divided social stratum
vi
Chapter Two
2.A A Street of Extended Family Houses 72
2.1 Nasr City [1990s] 118

An urban testament to a middle class divide
Chapter Three
3.A The Begining of an End 138
3.1 An Urban Exodus

New Cairo and the wasted potential of
Nasr City’s extended family house typology
Chapter Four
4.A Safe House 200
The perks of living in Nasr City during the January 25th Uprising
4.B An Unanswered Wake-up Call 238

The failings of older middle class professionals
in a post-Uprising Egypt and the imminent demise
of Nasr City’s apartment building-extended family households
Notes 271
Bibliography 289
vii
Page Numer Title and Source
1 – A House of No Importance
8 1.a.1 Entrance to 11 El-Insha Street
10 1.a.2 Mr. Gerges Fahim

1.a.3 Dr. Abd-alAziz Abouzeid
12 1.a.4 11 El-Insha Street – Site plan c.1984
14 1.a.5 11 El-Insha Street – Ground and typical floor

plans c.1984
15 1.a.6 Ola Abouzeid and Aly elBahrawy

1.a.7 Ahmed Abouzeid and Azza elDinasoury
16 1.a.8 The texture and color of 11 El-Insha Street’s

facade and staircase finishings
17 1.a.9 11 El-Insha Street – Main facade plans

c.1984
19 1.1.1 Decree of the President of the United

Arab Republic #815 for the year 1959 as
published in the Official Newspaper (issue
#104, May 21st, 1959); the original
decree of President Gamal Abd-alNaser
for the establishment of the public sector
‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbaseyya’
List of Illustrations
Images by author unless otherwise noted
21

1.1.2 Muhammad Ali Pasha
http://www.geocities.ws/djalosh/
muhamedali.html
viii
23 1.1.3 The stratification of the Egyptian population 34 1.2.4 Cairo Governorate Districts ‘66
according to income prior to WWI and in Recreated from a population density map
1952; a comparison showing the growth of in: Muhammad Riyad, AlQahira: Naseeg
the relative size of the middle class. alNas fi alMakan wa alZaman wa
Based on data from Galal Amin, Maza Moshkelateha fi alHader wa alMostaqbal
Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ [Cairo: The Make-up of its People in Place
alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever and Time and its Problems in the Present
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution and the Future] (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk,
of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945- 2001), 155.
1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 70;
and 127. 36 1.2.5 Nasr City’s residential zones and main street
network
25 1.1.4 Members of the Revolutionary Command
Council 38 1.2.6 The original detailed urban design of Nasr
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ City’s First and Sixth Zones
uploads/2007/7/23/revolution_Leaders.jpg Based on blueprints of The First and Sixth
Zone’s detailed planning obtained from the
30 1.2.1 A comparison of the planning schemes of Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban
Cairene high-end residential neighborhoods Development
31 1.2.2 Excerpt from a 1958 map showing the 39 1.2.7 First & Sixth Zones – Height Limits for
army barracks scattered across the desert Private Residential Properties ‘66
plains east and south of the neighborhoods Based on blueprints of The First and Sixth
of Waili and Masr Al-Gadeeda districts Zone’s detailed planning obtained from the
Cairo No. 3, 1:10,000, Edition 4-AMS, Series Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban
P971. U.S. Army Map Service, 1958 Development
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_
cities/txu-oclc-47175049-cairo3-1958.jpg 40 1.2.8 Street sections showing the relation
between the maximum building heights and
33 1.2.3 Nasr City – Original Master Plan the range of Nasr City’s street widths as per
Geometry recreated from a blueprint of Nasr City’s 1966 bylaws
Nasr City’s general planning obtained from
the Nasr City Company for Housing and 42 1.2.9 Nasr City – Planning c.1970
Urban Development Geometry recreated from a blueprint of
ix
Nasr City’s general planning obtained from 53 1.3.2 The stratification of the Egyptian population
the Nasr City Company for Housing and according to income prior in 1952 and in
Urban Development 1991; a comparison showing the growth of
the relative size of the middle class
43 1.2.10 Arial photo of the Cairo International Based on data from Galal Amin, Maza
Stadium and the Military Parade Square on Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’
Al-Nasr road alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever
Images 1.2.10 – 15 were extracted from a Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution
PowerPoint presentation regarding the of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-
history of Nasr city, which was obtained 1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 70;
from the Nasr City Company for Housing and 74.
and Urban Development; the presentation
was prepared by (photographer/ 57 1.3.3 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs and
cameraman) Samir alMoqaddem from the its most common reversal as it related to
Microfilm and Public Relations Department the social context in Egypt during the 70s
and 80s
44 1.2.11 The governmental organizations’
headquarters on Salah Salem road c. 1970 63 1.3.4 First & Sixth Zones – Height Limits for
1.2.12 Rab’a Al-Adawiya Complex in 1968 Private Residential Properties ‘85
45 1.2.13 A view of an inner street in the Second Zone 64 1.3.5 Street sections showing the relation
c.1970 between the maximum building heights and
1.2.14 The condominiums on Youssef Abbas street the range of Nasr City’s street widths as per
in 1969 Nasr City’s 1985 bylaws
46 1.2.15 The typical landscape throughout the First, 66 1.3.6 Nasr City – New Residential Neighborhoods;
Sixth, Seventh and Eighth zones in the early 1974 – 1993
70s
67 1.3.7 Nasr City – Planning c.1990
48 1.3.1 Anwar alSadat Geometry recreated from a blueprint of
Time Magazine Cover. June 9, 1975. Nasr City’s general planning obtained from
http://content.time.com/time/ the Nasr City Company for Housing and
covers/0,16641,19750609,00.html Urban Development
x
69 1.3.8 Map of Nasr City in the mid 90s 91 2.a.14 8 El-Insha Street – Elevation
Based on an autocad map of the area in
August 1993; prepared by the Centre for 92 2.a.15 10 El-Insha Street – Elevation
Geographic Information Systems (C.G.I.S.) of
the Central Agency for Public Mobilization
94 2.a.16 alSuhaymi House – Ground floor plan
and Statistics (CAPMAS)
Minor editing to the original: http://www.
nzdl.org/gsdl/collect/envl/archives/
72 2.a.1 El-Insha Street’s sign
HASH393b.dir/80a01e13.gif
75 2.a.2 Property allocation in 11 El-Insha Street in

96 2.a.17 11 El-Insha Street; Apartment 2;
the early 90s
1988 – 1997
78 2.a.3 El-Insha Street – Site plane; early 90s – mid

2000s
1987 – 1998
80 2.a.4 1 El-Insha Street – Elevation

98 2.a.19 11 El-Insha Street;Apartment 6;
1984 – 1995
82 2.a.6 3 El-Insha Street – Elevation 99 2.a.20 Dr. Abouzeid’s apartment; throughout the
years, it’s been the focal point of all sorts of
83 2.a.7 9 El-Insha Street – Elevation social activity for 11 El-Insha Street’s
extended family household
85 2.a.9 15 El-Insha Street – Elevation 1997 – 2004
86 2.a.10 13 El-Insha Street – Elevation 101 2.a.22 11 El-Insha Street; Apartment 10;
1998 – 2005
89 2.a.12 2 El-Insha Street – Elevation 2000 – present
2.a.24 11 El-Insha Street; Apartment 10;
90 2.a.13 4 El-Insha Street – Elevation 2005 – present
xi
103 2.a.25 11 El-Insha Street; Apartment 6; 8/280507_222116334492262_3267618_o.
1995 – 2002 jpg
104 2.a.26 11 El-Insha Street; Apartments 6 and 8; 119 2.1.2 Cairo Governorate Districts; 1996
2002 – 2008 Based on line drawings in “The Final Results
of The General Census of Population and
106 2.a.27 11 El-Insha Street; Apartments 6 and 8; Housing Conditions for the Year 2006” on
2008 – presentt the district level for Cairo Governorate and
Helwan Governorate.
1997 – 2010 120 2.1.3* Cairo Governorate Districts; Annual
Population Growth; 1986-1996
2010 – present 121 2.1.4* Cairo Governorate Districts; 1996;
Population
1993 – present 122 2.1.5* Cairo Governorate Districts; 1996; Residents
holding a Professional Occupation
1990 – present 123 2.1.6* Cario Governorate Districts; 1996; Families
dwelling in Villa or a House
1997 – present 124 2.1.7* Cairo Governorate Districs; 1996; Families
2.a.33 11 El-Insha Street; Apartment 9; Dwelling in an Apartment
1991 – present
125 2.1.8* Cairo Governorate Districts; 1996; Families
113 2.a.34 The transformation of 11 El-Insha Street’s dwelling in a Purchased Residential Unit
facade over the years; 1984 – present
126 2.1.9* Cairo Governorate Districts; 1996; Families
117 2.1.1 Aerial photo of a typical Nasr City dwelling in an Owned Residential Unit
neighborhood
https://fbcdn-sphotos-g-a.akamaihd.net/ 127 2.1.10* Cairo Governorate Districts; 1996;
hphotos-ak-xaf1/t31.0- Crowding
xii
128 2.1.11 Nasr City First Sub-Districts 140 3.a.2 Traffic congestion and lack of parking space
Based on a print-out drawing of Nasr City’s
sub-districts obtained from the Centre for 141 3.a.3 The new style of condominium tower that
Geographic Information Systems (C.G.I.S.) of took Nasr City by storm starting in the mid
the Central Agency for Public Mobilization 2000s
and Statistics (CAPMAS) 3.a.4 a close up on the overly ornate facade
details
129 2.1.12** Nasr City First Sub Districts; 1996;
Population
142 3.a.5 Buildings in New Cairo fetured the same
gaudy neo-classist style as the emerging
condominium typologies in Nasr City
Residents holding a Professional Occupation
3.a.6 Bustling construction in New Cairo in 2008

143 3.a.7 17 El-Insha Street
Families dwelling in a Purchased Residential
Unit
144 3.a.8 17 El-Insha Street, demolished, 2008
3.a.9 17 El-Insha Street, 2010
Families dwelling in an Owned Residential
145 3.a.10 El-Insha Street; 2010; Site Plan
Unit
133 2.1.16** Nasr City First Sub Districts; 1996; 146 3.a.11 El-Insha Street; 2010; Volumes
Crowding
147 3.a.12 An increasingly common scene in Nasr City
134 2.1.17 First Zone; 1994; Residential Buildings; since 2008; demolition of bylaw-abiding
Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws buildings
135 2.1.18 First Zone; 1994; Residential Building 148 3.a.13 Construction of new condominium towers
Heights in Nasr City
3.a.14 The prevalent style of Nasr City’s emerging
138 3.a.1 the demolition of a bylaw-abiding condominium towers
apartment building–extended family house
against a backdrop of two towering new 149 3.a.15 Abouzeid Residence Facade
condominiums.
xiii
150 3.a.16 Abouzeid Residence; Shorouq City; Ground 164 3.1.6*** Cairo Governorate Districts; Annual
Floor; Apartment 1 Population Growth; 1996 – 2006
151 3.a.17 Abouzeid Residence; Shorouq City; First 165 3.1.7*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006;
Floor; Apartment 2 Population
152 3.a.18 Abouzeid Residence; Shorouq City; Second 166 3.1.8*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006; Residents
Floor + Roof; Apartments 3 & 4 holding a Professional Occupation
154 3.a.19 Ghattas Residence Facade 167 3.1.9*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006; Families
dwelling in a Villa or a House
155 3.a.20 Ghattas Residence; New Cairo; Ground 168 3.1.10*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006; Families
Floor; Apartment 1 dwelling in an Apartment
156 3.a.21 Ghattas Residence; New Cairo; First + 169 3.1.11*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006; Families
Second Floor; Apartments 2 & 3 dwelling in a Purchased Residential Unit
157 3.1.1 Urban Exodus 170 3.1.12*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006; Families
dwelling in an Owned Residential Unit
159 3.1.2 A comparison of the planning patterns of
Nasr City and New Cairo 171 3.1.13*** Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006; Crowding

160 3.1.3 New Cairo; Planning c.2005 173 3.1.14**** Nasr City Sub Districts; 2006; Population
161 3.1.4 New Cairo; Sample Neighbourhood 174 3.1.15**** Nasr City Sub Districts; 2006; Residents
holding a Professional Occupation
163 3.1.5 Cairo Governorate Districts; 2006
Based on line drawings in “The Final Results 175 3.1.16**** Nasr City Sub Districts; 2006; Families
of The General Census of Population and dwelling in a Purchased Residential Unit
Housing Conditions for the Year 2006” on
the district level for Cairo Governorate and 176 3.1.17**** Nasr City Sub Districts; 2006; Families
Helwan Governorate. dwelling in an Owned Residential Unit
xiv
177 3.1.18**** Nasr City Sub Districts; 2006; Crowding 189 3.1.29 First Zone; 2008 – 2010; New Residential
Buildings; Replacement
178 3.1.19 First Zone; 2007; Residential Buildings;
Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws 190 3.1.30 First Zone; 2008 – 2010; New Residential
Buildings; Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws
179 3.1.20 First Zone; 1994 – Late 2007; New
Residential Buildings 191 3.1.31 First Zone; 2010; Residential Building
Heights
180 3.1.21 First Zone; 1994 – Late 2007; Demolished
Residential Buildings 194 3.1.32 Generational Capacity; Nasr City’s vs New
Cairo’s Typology
181 3.1.22 First Zone; 1994 – Late 2007; New
Residential Buildings; Replacement 199 4.a.1 “The 2Vth”, Graffiti by Marawan Shaheen
182 3.1.23 First Zone; 1994 – Late 2007; New 201 4.a.2 “Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice”
Residential Buildings; Adherence to Height Photo by Dina Fergani
Limit Bylaws
203 4.a.3 Strength in Numbers
183 3.1.24 First Zone; 2007; Residential Building http://assets.nydailynews.com/polopoly_
Heights fs/1.969163!/img/httpImage/image.jpg_
gen/derivatives/article_970/population31n-
185 3.1.25 Nasr City Residential Building Heights; 1-web.jpg
Universal Building Code; 2008
204 4.a.4 A Muslim Brotherhood Banner in Tahrir
186 3.1.26 First Zone; 2010; Residential Square
Buildings; Adherence to Height Limit http://almogaz.com/sites/default/files/
Bylaws styles/600x360/public/ikhwan-tahrir_0.
jpg?itok=GLEH_HYj
187 3.1.27 First Zone; 2008 – 2010; New Residential
Buildings 205 4.a.5 Time Magazine’s Person of the Year
Time Magazine Cover. December 26, 2011
188 3.1.28 First Zone; 2008 – 2010; Demolished http://content.time.com/time/
Residential Buildings covers/0,16641,20111226,00.html
xv
206 4.a.6 Mubarak’s Speech, January 28th TVfDs19zQpI/AAAAAAAAAIo/EXIKkYMJjDQ/
A still frame from youtube video of the s1600/egypt.jpg
speech 4.a.17 http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/multimedia/
archive/00107/81608743_Prison_107468b.
207 4.a.7 “Screw U Mubarak; I’m Not Going Home!” jpg
http://cdn.acidcow.com/pics/20111213/
best_protest_signs_40.jpg 213 4.a.18 Location of Nasr City in Relation to Tahrir
Square
208 4.a.8 https://www.flickr.com/photos/
radwa_b/5410094711/in/set- 214 4.a.19 http://cdn.acidcow.com/pics/20111213/
72157625835749035 best_protest_signs_06.jpg
4.a.9 http://cdn2.spectator.co.uk/wp-content/
blogs.dir/11/files/2012/07/53.jpg 215 4.a.20 Photo by Antonious Nady
209 4.a.11 http://i.lidovky.cz/11/013/lnorg/ 216 4.a.21 Photo by Antonious Nady

KAR38cc4a_MDF00119.JPG 4.a.22 Photo by Antonious Nady
4.a.12 http://totallycoolpix.com/ 4.a.23 Photo by Antonious Nady
magazine/2011/02/the-egypt-protests-
part-04 217 4.a.24 Photo by Antonious Nady
210 4.a.10 http://i.lidovky.cz/11/013/lnorg/ 220 4.a.25 http://justimage.org/blog/2011/01/30/

KAR38cc56_MDF00108.JPG egyptian-samurais/
211 4.a.13 http://ww.novosti.co.rs/upload/images/ 223 4.a.27 The street heirarchy in medieval Cairo.
gallery/2011/01/egipat%203/egipat3.jpg 4.a.26 El-Insha Street
4.a.14 http://timelines.latimes.com/media/event_
images/6/lfujj6nc.jpg 227 4.a.28 Nasr City, New Cario, and Shorouq City
4.a.15 http://mirror.dena-design.de/egypt-2011/ Images obtained from Google Earth
totallycoolpix.com/wp-content/
uploads/2011/30012011_egypt_riots_02/ 229 4.a.29 Photo by Antonious Nady
egypt_64.jpg
230 4.a.30 Photo by Antonious Nady
212 4.a.16 http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-xBvfnB-zXC4/ 4.a.31 Photo by Antonious Nady
xvi
231 4.a.32 Photo by Antonious Nady amendments in Cairo and Egypt
232 4.a.33 Photo by Antonious Nady 248 4.b.6 voters against passing the constitutional
4.a.34 Photo by Antonious Nady amendments vs. professional population in
4.a.35 Photo by Antonious Nady Cairo residential districts
4.a.36 Photo by Antonious Nady
4.a.37 Photo by Antonious Nady 250 4.b.7 Egytpian Parliament; 2012
4.a.38 Photo by Antonious Nady Recreated from:
233 4.a.39 Photo by Antonious Nady http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
4.a.40 Photo by Antonious Nady interactive/2012/01/201212392416169247.
html
234 4.a.41 El-Insha Street; Small Market
251 4.b.8 https://latuffcartoons.files.wordpress.
237 4.b.1 Couch party; graffiti com/2012/01/b-for-bullshit.gif
https://meanderingon.files.wordpress.
com/2011/07/couch.jpg 252 4.b.9 http://resources3.news.com.au/
images/2012/12/09/1226533/211207-
242 4.b.2 Caricature by Ahmed Nady egypt.jpg
http://arabist.net/blog/2011/7/5/
revolution-and-art.html 253 4.b.10 Rab’a Mosque and Square location relative
to 11 EL-Insha Street
244 4.b.3 “The Economist: Egypt in Peril”
http://www.economist.com/printedition/ 254 4.b.11 http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/beta/wp-
covers/2012-06-21/ap-e-eu-la-me-na-uk content/uploads/2013/07/8-14.jpg
246 4.b.4 Possible scenarios for either result of the 255 4.b.12 http://darkroom.baltimoresun.com/wp-
March 19 referendum of 2011 content/uploads/2013/08/AFP_
Recreated from: http://commons. Getty-522081284.jpg
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2011_Egyptian_ 4.b.13 Photo by Mosa’ab Elshamy
Constitutional_Referendum_process_in_ https://www.flickr.com/photos/
English.svg mosaaberising/9510846294/in/set-
72157635071774090
247 4.b.5 voters against passing the constitutional
xvii
256 4.b.14 http://i.huffpost.com/gadgets/ 267 4.b.26 El-Insha Street: 2014
slideshows/312876/
slide_312876_2803040_free.jpg 268 4.b.27 El-Insha Street:2014
4.b.15 http://i.huffpost.com/gadgets/
slideshows/312876/ 270 4.b.28 Elevation of 11 El-Insha Street
slide_312876_2799744_free.jpg
4.b.16 Photo by Mosa’ab Elshamy
https://www.flickr.com/photos/ * Denotes maps created using data of the corresponding criteria
mosaaberising/9508548299/in/set- on the district level in Cairo Governorate; obtained from:
72157635071774090
Arab Republic of Egypt. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and
Statistics (CAPMAS). “The Final Results of The General Census of
258 4.b.17 First Zone: 2014: Residential
Population and Housing Conditions for the Year 1996.”
Buildings Adherence to Height Limit
Bylaws
** Denotes maps created using data of the corresponding criteria
on the sub-district level in Cairo Governorate; obtained from:
259 4.b.18 First Zone: 2010 – 2014: New Residential:
Buildings Arab Republic of Egypt. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and
Statistics (CAPMAS). “The Final Results of The General Census of
260 4.b.19 First Zone: 2010 – 2014: Demolished Population and Housing Conditions for the Year 1996.”
Residential Buildings
*** Denotes maps created using data of the corresponding criteria
261 4.b.20 First Zone: 2010 – 2014: New Residential on the district level in Cairo Governorate and Helwan Governorate;
Buildings Displacement obtained from:
Arab Republic of Egypt. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and

262 4.b.21 First Zone: 2010 – 2014: New Residential Statistics (CAPMAS). “The Final Results of The General Census of
Buildings Adherence Population and Housing Conditions for the Year 2006.”
263 4.b.22 First Zone: 2014: Residential Building

Heights **** Denotes maps created using data of the corresponding criteria
265 4.b.23 2 El-Insha Street on the sub-district level in Cairo Governorate; obtained from:
266 4.b.24 Photo by Abla elBahrawy Arab Republic of Egypt. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and
4.b.25 Photo by Abla elBahrawy Statistics (CAPMAS). “The Final Results of The General Census of
Population and Housing Conditions for the Year 2006.”
xviii
1
A House of No Importance
The rise and fall of Nasr City’s middle class
2 extended family houses
Prologue
There’s a certain box-like apartment building that stands on a street. It’s a building that is no different from twelve
other box-like apartment buildings down the street upon which it stands. And for that matter, that certain street with its
buildings isn’t any different from the two streets at its ends nor the two branching off of it. It is but a generic segment of an
extensive orthogonal network of numerous similar streets weaving the urban fabric of a certain Cairene residential district.
That certain building, on that certain street, within that certain district, is my home. It has been the household of two
extended families for almost twenty years: my grandparents and the families of their son and daughter – my mother; and
fig.1.a.1 [previous page] Entrance to
11 El-Insha Street; the Arabic on the my grandfather’s life long friend and the families of his three sons and daughter. That certain building holds the number 11
marble plaque reads: “El-Insha Street,
Al-Nasr Building”. on El-Insha Street in the district of Nasr City.
3
At first glance, 11 El-Insha Street seems to be of no importance degrading quality as residential structures housing a new social breed
indeed; the generic quality and abundance of its architectural typology were inflicted around and within their existing fabrics. The propagation
deems it insignificant. This in turn translates into a common notion of this pattern through the remainder of the century culminated in cuing
among Cairenes that, within the context of Cairo, Nasr City exhibits a an exodus of their original inhabitants towards emerging suburban
similar insignificance in terms of urban quality. The only significance settlements that are now the new synonym of social status within the
this building, or any of the many buildings similar to it, might bear is Cairene domain.
that of a sentimental quality. It’s a significance specific to its inhabitants; Given the ongoing urban degradation and what original inhabitants
one that derives from their family ties for which this building serves perceive as the decline of the social demographic profile of their
as a physical realm. However, the profound sense of belonging I have districts, the motives behind this urban relocation are quite excusable.
towards 11 El-Insha Street as the household of my extended family is Nevertheless, my contention is that, in the case of middle class
not the only reason I’ve selected it to be the centerpiece of this thesis. professional families, it is rather unreasonable. The attempt to sustain
My main concern here is how Cairenes’ aspiration towards establishing their social status through establishing a relation to social elites by
or maintaining a relative position within the societal structure translates means of urban proximity and architectural reference quite ironically
into the architecture and urban situation of their residential dwellings. defies its own purpose. Other than their simulacrum of luxury, the
This particular dynamic seems to have always been at play throughout the architectural typologies offered in these districts and the economic
course of development of almost any given Cairene residential district. pressures involved in acquiring them clearly compromise the social
Its effect is most evident at the times of intense social mobility that attributes and financial assets of Cairene middle class families; that is to
paralleled key political, economic and cultural shifts throughout Egyptian say, the basis of the social status they originally set to maintain.
history. And while I acknowledge – and aim to verify – this dynamic as As I traced this phenomenon I kept being drawn back to 11 El-Insha
an incidental aspect to the realization of social potential, I am certainly Street and Nasr City. My personal experiences regarding my household,
against the consequences of its escalating magnitude during the latter the street it stands on, and the district of Nasr city as a whole, identified
decades of the 20th century and the early decades of the 21st century. seamlessly with its every aspect. The story of the insignificant building
The early 1970s saw a drastic ideological shift for Capitalism in Egypt on the generic street was presenting itself as a microcosm for the social
gravitating the basis of Cairene social hierarchy towards wealth rather and urban evolution of Nasr City that in turn served as a paradigm for the
than genuine social achievement. This manifested in the emergence of dynamics of this phenomenon in action. Coupled with the contending
a new elite class as well as the introduction of new social groups to the suburbs of New Cairo growing to its east, it only seemed fitting that I
demography of the Cairene middle class. Simultaneously, residential would employ Nasr City, as the realm of the household on 11 El-Insha
architecture and its urban situation were brought forth as a rather Street, to demonstrate my argument. Accordingly, the structure of this
convenient realm for validating a newly acquired social status. However, thesis revolves around a series of personal narratives of my household’s
the contemporary zeitgeist reduced this validation to an ostentatious development history and my observations of certain happenings within
display of the monetary capacity to obtain a residence in districts that its social and urban vicinity. Each of these narratives lays ground for an
were previously exclusive to classes of a genuinely realized status. As a objective analysis of the aspect of the phenomenon implied within its
result, these districts were ushered into an urban transformation of a events as it unfolds onto the larger scale of Nasr City’s development.
4
Using 11 El-Insha Street as a template, the discourse of this thesis this thesis towards empiricism and fieldwork. I essentially had to
identifies and explores the adaptable nature of a certain socio-spatial piece together the greater majority of the maps and documents that
arrangement in which an extended family household is cloaked in were used to demonstrate the argument of this thesis from various
a typical-floor-plan apartment building typology. It then goes on to fragmented sources; raw, unprocessed data; or urban surveys that I
highlight that this apartment building–extended family house typology conducted personally. In a sense, I believe that, if not for anything else,
is rather exclusive to the multi-generational families of middle class this thesis has its value in those mapping sets that I have produced in
professionals; and that, more than anywhere else in Cairo, it constitutes their capacity as an original record of Nasr City’s architectural and urban
a substantial portion of Nasr City’s core urban fabric. Pertaining to its evolution, and more importantly, as a research tool for anybody who
highly adaptable character, the point is made that, in the particular might be interested in the district as a whole and would come to face
case of Nasr City and its middle class professionals’ extended families, the same difficulties finding resources pertaining to it like I did.
this typology holds a wealth of latent potential to counter Nasr City’s This bias was also rather evident in the swift dismissal of any possible
social and urban degradation that is now being imposed by the value to my work once I voiced my interest in Nasr City as a research
phenomenon around which this thesis revolves. Not only does this focus to Cairene architects, urbanists, or any cultured Cairene individual
typology accommodate more family generations than the typologies for that matter. This dismissal, however, was never aimed towards
being offered in the New Cairo suburbs, but it also has the capacity to the validity of my argument regarding the negative architectural and
adapt and change, like it always has, to have the same stylistic attributes urban impacts of contemporary social transformations in Cairo. On the
of those suburban typologies with all their simulacrums of luxury and contrary, these impacts have been of major concern within the Cairene
status. In other words, Nasr City’s apartment building–extended family domain lately. Nevertheless, this concern has been primarily directed
houses have the potential to neutralize the need of their middle class towards the older districts of the city for the historic and aesthetic
inhabitants for an urban relocation since, and in turn, the capacity to value of their architectural typologies. On the other hand, given Nasr
hinder the propagation of Nasr City’s social and urban demise that City’s relatively recent inception and the contemporary zeitgeist of its
prompted such relocation in the first place. development that favored quantity to aesthetic quality, it seemed to
However, there was yet another crucial factor involved in my choice me that, collectively, the architecture and urban disciplines in Egypt had
of topic for this thesis, and that was what seemed to me as a collective deemed it devoid of any architectural or urban value worth preserving
neglect of Nasr City and the inherit potential of its apartment building– from the get-go. And that in itself was yet another reason for me to
extended family house typology. Throughout the course of my research, pursue highlighting the latent potential of Nasr City’s extended family
obtaining any kind of data specific to Nasr City was a rather difficult house typology.
and, more often than not, unsuccessful task. On a governmental level, I believe that the cynical gist implied in the title of this thesis is now
statistical censuses, building bylaws, and maps were either inaccessible, quite clear. However, this treatise is not based in sympathy for the
missing or altogether nonexistent. And even on an academic level, underdog. I did not produce this work out of a pure interest in the
publications were rather scarce and quite generic. This lack of resources understated architecture and urbanism of 11 El-Insha Street and Nasr
was personally provocative for it seemed to highlight a strong bias city per se. My concern for the apartment building–extended family
against Nasr City; and in many ways, it directed the methodology of household typology and this district pertains to their nature being the
5
characteristic dwelling and the major urban hub for Cairene middle
class professionals, whom I perceive as one of the very few, if not the
only, social group in Egypt that still lives by a higher moral standard.
I believe that the mutual preservation of Nasr City and its extended
family house typology, in essence, preserves this middle class, and in
turn the integrity of society as a whole. Having said that, the only two
questions left here are: How so, and why bother? And to answer both
those questions, I’ll leave you with this quote from a recently published
dystopian novel that extrapolates Cairene society into a near future:
“In the beginnings of the 21st Century, the last statistical

census that could be conducted showed […] the dissipation of
the middle class, which plays in any given society the role of
graphite rods in a nuclear reactor; it slows down the reaction
and without it the reactor would explode. A society without a
middle class is a society deemed for explosion.”
(Tawfik 2008, 137)
6
Chapter One
7
1.A The House
Aziz and Gerges Built
8
In late 1969, my grandfather’s best friend, Gerges Fahim, purchased a piece of land in Nasr City; a then new suburban
development on the eastern outskirts of Cairo. Mr. Fahim, who was a mathematics teacher and a school principal, acquired
the land through the Egyptian Teachers’ Syndicate which was offering its members facilitated payment arrangements for
buying land lots in the new suburb. He purchased the 525 square meter land lot holding the number 11 on El-Insha Street
in Nasr City’s First Zone at a convenient cost of 5 Egyptian Pounds per square meter which he paid in installments. However,
and in spite of such facilitations, many of Mr. Fahim’s peers and family members disapproved of this purchase, contending
that the desolate desert plains Nasr City was at the time would never be populated neither in the near nor far future. They
perceived the purchase as a rather bad venture and repeatedly advised him to sell the land at the first chance he gets,
although many doubted that such chance would ever come along.
Nevertheless, by the mid 70s Mr. Fahim was receiving offers to sell his land lot for four times its original price at 20
Egyptian pounds per square meter. But just as he didn’t succumb to the grim expectations of Nasr City’s urban future, Mr.
Fahim didn’t accept any of those generous offers either. He was determined to provide a household for the future families
fig.1.a.1 [previous page] Entrance to
11 El-Insha Street; the Arabic on the of his three sons and daughter on this land lot once he had the financial capacity to do so. Mr. Fahim saw this land lot as a
marble plaque reads: “El-Insha Street,
Al-Nasr Building”. future asset for his children rather than a mere investment opportunity.
9
However, by the end of 1980, and as the price of a square meter of land in Nasr City quadrupled once more to 80 Egyptian
pounds, Mr. Fahim was facing a pressing dilemma. The Teachers’ Syndicate notified him that if he didn’t start building a
residential structure on his land lot right away, the syndicate would withdraw it and refund him the original price he paid
minus a fine of 10% of that price. Lacking the financial assets needed for undertaking the building process, Mr. Fahim turned
to his friend Abd-alAziz Abouzeid – my grandfather – for help. A doctor of Internal Medicine and the director of Abbasiya
Hospital for Tropical Diseases at the time, my grandfather was also searching to purchase a piece of land in order to build a
household for the future families of his son and daughter. So Mr. Fahim approached him with a proposal to use the assets
he allocated for buying his own land lot to build an apartment building on Mr. Fahim’s instead, and consequently hold an
equal share in the ownership of both the land lot and the building. Given the rising land and building costs at the time, Dr.
Abouzeid agreed to his friend’s convenient proposal.
fig.1.a.2 [left] Mr. Gerges Fahim.
fig.1.a.3 [right] Dr. Abd-alAziz Abouzeid.
Mr. Fahim then commissioned both the design and construction of 11 El-Insha Street to an acquaintance of his by the
name of Alfonse – an architect and an experienced construction site manager. His design approach was more of a technical
exercise primarily aimed at achieving the maximum permissible floor area as per Nasr City’s building bylaws. It was well
received by both Mr. Fahim and Dr. Abouzeid who were preoccupied with making the most out of their lot in terms of size
and number of apartments rather than functional and stylistic preferences. Given his knowledge of how to manipulate those
bylaws and the bureaucratic loopholes of the system, Alfonse suggested to his clients exceeding the stipulated maximum
footprint for the building, which he argued would make its apartments considerably larger in area, and assured them that
10
even though such a violation would entail a fine after the building had been constructed, a building permit would still be
issued. He explained that he would intentionally mislabel the setbacks on 11 El-Insha Street’s permit drawings so that its
footprint would come out to the maximum percentage stipulated in the bylaw; and informed them that the officials who
review the drawings submitted for obtaining building permits do not actually verify the measurements on those drawings,
but rather they just use the dimensions written down on them to calculate weather or not the building adheres to the
stipulated footprint percentage. Mr. Fahim and Dr. Abouzeid agreed to Alfonse’s proposition, and the mislabeled drawings
of his “design” – which was hardly an outcome of an actual creative process – was then submitted to the Nasr City District
Authority for obtaining a building permit. Shortly after it was issued, the construction of 11 El-Insha Street commenced in
early 1981 and was completed three years later.
In 1984, the structure which then stood as 11 El-Insha Street was a three-storey high apartment building of a rather
generic typical floor plan that reflected the simple grid of its post-and-beam concrete structure. With two apartments on
each of its three floors, it was comprised of six apartments in total. Those on the first and second floors were symmetrical
around the building’s central east-west axis with an area of 125 square meters each. On the ground floor however, due to
a non-axial building entrance and in order to meet the stipulated building footprint, the apartments were asymmetrical
and slightly smaller in area. The south apartment on the ground floor had an area of 100 square meters, while the north
apartment had an area of 80 square meters rendering it the smallest in the building. Mr. Fahim and Dr. Abouzeid split the
building’s ownership vertically right through its central axis; Mr. Fahim was allocated the three apartments on the building’s
south side, while Dr. Abouzeid was allocated those on the north.
Having more children than Dr. Abouzeid, it only seemed fair that Mr. Fahim would own the building half with the larger
apartment on the ground floor so that he could entitle his three sons to equally sized apartments. Mr. Fahim, however,
was still short of an apartment to entitle to his daughter. He was quite disappointed with this shortcoming even though,
according to the norms of Egyptian society, it wasn’t the father’s obligation to provide the dwelling of his daughter’s future
family. But then again, it wasn’t the norms of society that prompted his desire to endow her with a property in the building;
it was rather a personal preference for the future family of his daughter to reside with those of her brothers’. Moreover, his
wish to be just among his children also prompted such desire. Mr. Fahim wanted to equally provide to his daughter what
he had to provide to her brothers regardless whether or not such property came to be her family’s residence. Be that as
it may, Mr. Fahim had to reluctantly accept such shortcoming since there wasn’t much he could have done about it at the
time. Although Nasr City’s building bylaws would have allowed for the addition of one more storey to 11 El-Insha Street,
Mr. Fahim was out of options as how to finance it. He still lacked sufficient funds and Dr. Abouzeid had already fulfilled
his commitment to him as per their agreement; paying for the construction of the building as it stood at a height of three
storeys had fully compensated for Dr. Abouzeid’s share in the land lot.
11
Neighbour
Mr. Fahim’s Dr. Abouzeid’s
3.40
Property Property
1.00
16.6
Neighbour
Neighbour
Driveway
Driveway
fig.1.a.4 11 El-Insha Street’s site plan c.1984; the front setback
was the only one that adhered to Nasr City’s building bylaws
at the time. The side setbacks exceeded the maximum allowable
dimension by 0.70 meters, and the rear setback exceeded the
maximum allowable dimension by 2.60 meters. The building
3.30 14.4 3.30
footprint stood at 43% of the lot area; 10% over the maximum
stipulated footprint at the time. Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim paid
a fine of 2,800 Egyptian Pounds for this “commonplace” and
“passable” bylaw violation.
2.00
2.00
El–Insha Street
Ground Floor Setback
Building’s Central Axis
12
3.45 3.375 3.375 3.45
bedroom bedroom
4.30
5.30
5.30
3.00
bathroom
2.00
2.00
3.45 1.25 4.25 1.25 3.45
w.c.
1.25
kitchen
1.80
3.675
kitchen
2.30
6.875
reception
reception dining room
5.00
+
5.00
dining room
building
entrance
13
1.00
1.00
3.45 3.375 3.375 3.45
5.30
bedroom bedroom
6.30
3.00
bathroom
2.00
3.45 1.25 4.25 1.25 3.45
fig.1.a.5 Ground [opposite page] and typical floor plans of 11

w.c. El-Insha Street; Alfonse’s original design that hardly involved
1.25
any input from the building’s intended inhabitants.
3.675
kitchen
2.30
reception
5.00
dining room
6.00
2.00
1.00
14
On his north half of the building, Dr. Abouzeid entitled his son to the apartment on the second floor, and driven by the same
inclinations as Mr. Fahim, he entitled his daughter to the apartment on the first floor. He reserved the smaller apartment
on the ground floor for his wife and himself with the intention to spend the latter years of their lives residing among their
children and grandchildren. In late 1984, Dr. Abouzeid’s newly wed son and daughter-in-law, Ahmed and Azza, moved into
their apartment becoming the first residents of 11 El-Insha Street. Both my uncle and his wife were freshly graduated
medical students at the time; he was embarking on both an academic and practicing career in surgery while she was
embarking on a similar dual career in pathology. Almost two years later, they were followed by Dr. Abouzeid’s daughter, son-
in-law and grandson: Ola, Aly and myself. My mother and father had just returned from Canada after being awarded their
doctorates in Political Science and Civil Engineering respectively and were set to assume their teaching posts in university.
Upon their return, my grandfather insisted that they reside in the apartment he had entitled to my mother rather than the
one my father had already provided as her suitor seven years earlier. My parents honored his will, and in early 1987 we
moved into our apartment in 11 El-Insha Street.
fig.1.a.7 [left] Ahmed Abouzeid and

Azza elDinasoury; first residents of 11
El-Insha street.
fig.1.a.6 [right] Ola Abouzied and

Aly elBahrawy; they followed in 1987.
15
fig.1.a.8 The texture and color of 11
El-Insha Street’s facade and staircase
finishings; the Royal Poincianas in
front of the building; and the lotus
pattern of the building gates.
I was only four years old at the time, but I can still remember a lot about 11 El-Insha Street and its surrounding context
back then. The building had a rather boxy volume; its almost flat facades were spray plastered in shades of ochre and had
wooden window shutters of a deep green color. The building gates were ornamented in a lotus floral pattern, and the
main staircase was finished in white terrazzo that contrasted its black metal railing. A low wall marked the perimeter of
the land lot, and on the sidewalk beyond it, three Royal Poincianas stood blooming in front of the building. Collectively,
these seemingly mundane features rendered 11 El-Insha Street with a warm homely feel; an impression that was further
accentuated by what I recall to be a considerably empty and alienating context.
16
fig.1.a.9 11 El-Insha Street’s main facade, as it briefly looked
like c. 1984, and a north-south section through it; the facade is
recreated from Alfonse’s original design and my memories of the
building at the time me and my parents moved in.
17
Driving in and out of Nasr City with my parents, I remember that almost all the buildings I saw around looked a lot like ours.
But I also remember that there were way more empty land lots than there were buildings, and that more often than not
buildings didn’t seem to have any occupants. Also, it seemed to me that there were much fewer buildings on main and
wider streets than on narrower streets like El-Insha Street. There were hardly any cars driving or people walking down the
streets during the day, and by nightfall the whole area lapsed into a haunting silence. I can recall all of that because those
trips with my parents were quite frequent; we had to do all our shopping, seek services, and carry out almost any other
everyday activity outside Nasr City since it clearly lacked the adequate facilities.
By that time in 1987, Nasr City had definitely come a long way from being the bleak wasteland it was when Mr. Fahim
bought his land lot on El-Insha Street almost twenty years earlier. Nevertheless, it was obviously still underdeveloped; Nasr
City was not picking up the pace of development one would have expected after such a long period of time. This, however,
was about to drastically change over the course of the following few years.
18
fig.1.1.1 Decree of the President of
the United Arab Republic #815 for
the year 1959 as published in the
Official Newspaper (issue #104, May
21st, 1959); the original decree of
President Gamal Abd-alNaser for
the establishment of the public sector
‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbaseyya’.
19
The Cairene residential district of Nasr City originated in 1959 when the
public sector ‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbasiya’ was established by
decree of the President of the United Arab Republic. The decree granted
the institution the full rights to 6,540 acres on the eastern desert plains
outside Cairo, and assigned it with removing the army barracks in that
area and developing it into a fully-fledged residential settlement with
adequate infrastructure and services.1 That suburban settlement, given
the name ‘Nasr City’, was meant to serve four primary objectives. The
first of which was to direct the urban growth of Cairo towards the desert
terrains to its east, and away from the agricultural lands to its north and
west. The second was to provide sufficient areas for accommodating
a series of large-scale national projects and government organizations’
headquarters. The third was to provide lots for developing middle class
housing complexes, which were to be commissioned to the Institution
of Nasr City and other public sector developers. And the fourth and final
objective was to offer the public individual land lots at convenient prices
for the construction of private residences.2
Despite how uneventful and generic they might seem, the launch of
Nasr City and its prescribed objectives – especially the latter two – were
unprecedented in modern Egyptian history. The stimulus behind that
occurrence and its significance would only come into perspective in
1.1 The Egyptian
light of the evolution of the Egyptian middle class and how it related Middle Class [1800s-1960s]
to the prevalent political and economic ideologies in Egypt during the The origins and evolution of a homogeneous
1950s and 60s. social stratum
20
The failure of Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt at the turn of the 18th
century set the stage for the inception of a modern middle class in Egypt.
The power vacuum it left behind saw Muhammad Ali, an Albanian high-
ranking officer in the Ottoman army sent to regain control of Egypt, rise
to power and eventually be appointed viceroy of Egypt by the Ottoman
Sultan in 1805. Widely regarded as the founder of Modern Egypt, he
practiced an almost autonomous rule over the country and pursued
reforming it into a regional power through two main ventures. The
first was establishing a sound economy based mainly on agriculture as
the source of national revenue, and the second was building a modern
military. In order to run the industries and administrative bodies
associated with those two ventures, Muhammad Ali established a
number of modern European-style schools and colleges in Egypt as well
as sponsored educational missions to Europe to train professionals and
a bureaucracy capable of such a task. That group of educated nationals
was the seed of the Egyptian middle class.3
It’s quite crucial to make the distinction that the emergence of that
social group was not an outcome of a genuine effort for social reform on
Muhammad Ali’s part. It was but a byproduct of an endeavor aimed at
centralizing power and wealth. The matter of the fact is, Muhammad Ali
was determined to establish a monarchic rule over Egypt by passing his
reign to his bloodline – a determination that spawned a dynasty which
ruled Egypt for almost 150 years. During the course of his venture to
establish the economy, Muhammad Ali, and subsequently his heirs
and the aristocracy in general, came to be the sole proprietors of all of
Egypt’s agricultural lands concentrating the capital wealth of the country
in the hands of an elite few. Also, the key positions in the modern army
he built were almost reserved for that same group.4 In other words,
Muhammad Ali’s endeavor for a Modern Egypt culminated into a
fig.1.1.2 Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849), socioeconomic system that allowed minimal to no chances of social
viceroy of Egypt (1805-1848); founder of ‘Modern
Egypt’ and a Dynasty that ruled the country as late mobility and catered primarily to the interest of an elite class. That in
as the mid 20th century. His reform efforts spawned
the seed of the Egyptian middle class. turn kept the emerging Egyptian middle class at bay in terms of size and
economic privileges throughout the reign of the Muhammad Ali Dynasty.
21
Within the context of that system, education was accentuated as the required for a bureaucratic job placement, and, in some cases, pursue
defining characteristic of the middle class by way of being the primary an even higher education at college level for a professional degree.7
asset for generating its income. The further modernization of Egypt Nevertheless, the pursuit of a modern education still entailed a great
under Khedive Isma’il, Muhammad Ali’s fourth successor who reined deal of financial hardship for the lower class.
between 1863 and 1879, brought significant advancements to the That is to say, attaining or maintaining middle class status at the
Egyptian modern education system. The quality education that system time was a rather difficult process that involved hard-earned genuine
offered was the steppingstone to public sector employment which had achievement. That, coupled with the fact that the Egyptian economy
become the fundamental source of middle class earnings by the turn didn’t experience any major introduction of new modes of production
of the 20th century. Land concessions that were occasionally granted or runaway inflation, added to the restrictions on social mobility. As
by the monarchy to certain members of the public – primarily during a result, the middle class did not exhibit any exponential growth and
the reign of Isma’il predecessor, Sa’eed Pasha – introduced small retained a homogeneous makeup over a long period of time. Those
agricultural property as an alternate stream of middle class revenue attributes were quite evident in the stratification of the Egyptian
as well. Nevertheless, it was insufficient as an only income source and population according to income during the years that led up to World
hence remained subsidiary to public sector employment. More often War I.
than not, middle class individuals who owned agricultural property Almost 100 years after its inception, the Egyptian middle class was
were also working in the government.5 still a considerably subdued social stratum.8 Out of Egypt’s population
Acquiring the kind of education needed for public sector employment of roughly 12 million at the time, the middle class constituted a little
however was a rather expensive undertaking, not to mention that under 10 percent. The rest of the population was polarized between
it required a high level of competence. And while this was not much a lower class of peasants that amounted to 90 percent and an upper
of an issue for the elite class, it presented a challenge for the middle class of aristocratic landowners that didn’t exceed 1 percent.9 Among
class which was naturally concerned with investing in education for those accounted for in that stratification were a lot of foreigners who
the sake of self-sustenance.6 Moreover, it made it virtually impossible had settled in Egypt due to the ample consultancy and investment
for individuals of the peasant lower class to obtain such an education opportunities associated with the European-inclined reforms of
prior to the early 1900s, save for the rare cases when they showed the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, as well as the British intervention in
extraordinary potential within the traditional Islamic education system government, economic, and army affairs since the 1882 occupation. They
to earn them scholarships or monarchy patronage for receiving modern were mainly agricultural landowners, bankers, commercial & industrial
schooling. The extent of that impossibility was relatively reduced at the entrepreneurs, and professionals. The majority of them fell within the
turn of the 20th century when the accumulation of foreign debt by the upper class percentile, while those who didn’t constituted a rather
end of Isma’il’s reign brought about the British occupation of Egypt in small portion of the middle class percentile. The bulk of the middle class
1882 and a subsequent period of financial restoration that concluded in however were well-educated Egyptian bureaucrats and professionals
1904. One of the outcomes of that restoration was a slight improvement chiefly employed in the pubic sector departments of education, justice,
to the monetary standing of peasant farmers. Many lower class health, taxation, agricultural supervision and irrigation, transportation,
individuals were then able to obtain the modern secondary education and public utilities.10
22
Upper Class
≈10% Middle Class c.1940
19%
Lower Class
c.1914 popultation ≈ 12,000,000
1952 popultation 21,400,000
fig.1.1.3 The stratification of the

Egyptian population according to
income prior to WWI and in 1952; a
comparison showing the growth of the
relative size of the middle class.
23
That structure of the middle class remained, to a great extent, unchanged of that influx and did not affect the homogeneity of the middle class or
as it continued to slowly grow during the decades following World War the qualities of sincerity and hard work associated with its status.15
I.11 Over that period, however, the restrictions on social mobility within In July of the same year, the ‘Free Officers’ movement, a group of
the rigid hierarchy of the Egyptian society were weakened as a result of young army officers who had attained middle class status through
two main factors. The first was the efforts of middle class intellectual military ranks during the 1940s, staged a coup d’état that later came to be
and political figures since the 1920s to make the modern education known as the July 23 Revolution of 1952. The agenda of that revolution
system accessible to all Egyptians regardless of financial capability. By was comprised of six principles: eradicating the British colonialism in
1950, those efforts culminated in decreeing free education across all Egypt and all its agents; eradicating feudalism; eradicating economic
the stages of the system preceding higher education at university level. monopolies and the capital proprietors’ domination of key government
And the second was the alleviation of social class related restrictions positions; establishing a strong national army; establishing a system
on the admission to the military academy in 1937.12 Consequently, the of government that promotes proper democracy; and fostering social
Egyptian middle class started to show a trend of rapid growth in the justice.16 Almost a year after its outbreak, the monarchy was overthrown
years between the beginning of World War II and the early 1950s; an and Egypt was declared a republic in 1953. In the years that followed, the
increasing number of lower class individuals were attaining middle class newly installed regime, under the presidency of the Free Officers’ key
status through public sector employment and military ranks. Also, those figure – Gamal Abd-alNaser, worked determinedly towards achieving the
years saw a substantial growth in the population of professionals within social and economic reforms prescribed by the revolution’s agenda. The
the middle class. Moreover, and notwithstanding that government- outcome was an unprecedented era of government-sponsored growth
employed professionals were still the dominant percentile, the and prosperity for the formerly disadvantaged Egyptian middle class.
percentage of self-employed doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other The reform efforts of the new regime throughout the 1950s and 60s
professionals within such a population increased considerably as well.13 involved the redistribution of wealth, the redefinition of the national
By 1952, that trend of growth was, once again, quite evident in the economic structure and the patterns of its activity, and the improvement
stratification of the Egyptian population according to income. The of the standard of living. To those ends, the regime implemented a
relative volume of the middle class almost doubled since before World number of socialist-inclined policies that centralized all aspects of the
War I to 19 percent of some 21.4 million Egyptians. The relative volume economy under the control of the state. It enacted agrarian reform
of the upper class remained at 1 percent, while that of the peasant lower laws that stipulated a fixed ceiling for the size of private agricultural
class dropped to 80 percent, 14 clearly compensating for the middle class property, and rearranged the parameters of agricultural land tenancy
increase. As mentioned earlier, such an influx of lower class individuals to favor tenants over their landlords. By the decree of those laws, the
into the middle class was still fundamentally based upon achievement mass agricultural holdings of the former aristocracy and social elites
in education which had then become less financially demanding than it were confiscated and redistributed in small parcels among the vast
was before. Nevertheless, during the span of World War II, and due to base of landless and near-landless peasant farmers. Moreover, the
the associated high rates of inflation, a number of individuals rapidly amount of rent for leasing agricultural land was no longer determined
ascended through the social hierarchy by way of making easy profit off by landlords but by the state instead, and was in turn reduced and fixed
stock speculation. Those, however, constituted a rather marginal portion at convenient rates; and tenants were given the right to perpetually
24
fig.1.1.4 Members of the Revolutionary Command Council: the July ‘52 Revoultion’s junta. Nine of them were the founders of
the ‘Free Officers’ movement. The head of the movement, Colonel Gamal Abd-alNaser [front row, second from the left], became
president after the council was dissolved in 1956. The reforms of the revolution’s regime brought forth unprecedented benefits to
the middle class during the 1950s and 60s.
25
pass on leases to their heirs. The regime also nationalized all major totally abolished, and the peasant farmers enjoying a significantly
industries; commercial & service businesses; insurance companies; better economic status due to agrarian reforms and the state’s special
and banks, including those under European ownership. As a result, attention to the agricultural sector, exponential numbers of the lower
the private and foreign sectors’ control over the means of production, class were then flocking into the education system in pursuit of the
distribution, and exchange was neutralized, and instead the public conventional means for attaining middle class status. The resultant
sector was installed as the predominant economic agent in Egypt. To influx of professionals and bureaucrats was accommodated by way of
consolidate that position, the regime brought the private sector under the government’s new employment policies. They were offered well-
extensive regulations which limited its share in domestic investment, paid job placements in the various branches of the rapidly growing
and enforced an embargo on foreign investment altogether. public sector, as well as in the recently established industrial sector. As
The regime then augmented the public sector not only in terms of a result, the middle class exhibited its highest growth rate to date while
the size and number of its establishments, but also in terms of the still retaining its long-standing homogeneous structure.18
scope of its activities. In addition to those of the education, health, The pivotal distinction in that case though was that such a trend of
transportation, and public utilities sectors, the government also came middle class growth was fully endorsed, if not induced, by the governing
to own and operate virtually all the establishments of the finance, regime. Moreover, the qualities of academic competence and genuine
communications, wholesale, and housing sectors, as well as major accomplishment associated with its status were not only preserved
retailers and construction firms. Moreover, the regime directed but were also brought through as the only measures of social stature.
domestic investment towards productive economic activities to ensure During that period, professionals in the fields of engineering, medicine,
an increased rate of national economic growth. It vested the sate education, law and agriculture were highly sought after in order to
with the authority to restrict the limited private investments to such attend to the regime’s massive reforms; a task that was promoted as an
activities, and allocated a substantial portion of state investment to honorable participation in a national cause. That demand was reflected
establish a national industrial sector. The latter measure was also in the prominent employment positions and the corresponding large
meant to instill manufacturing as a new mainstay of Egyptian economy salaries that the government offered to those professionals. That is to
so as to balance its excessive dependency on the agricultural sector. say, with the former elite class of aristocrats and foreigners effectively
Notwithstanding that however, the regime still directed large portions dismantled by way of the regime’s reforms, engineers, doctors, university
of state investment towards revamping the agricultural sector and its professors, teachers, judges, lawyers and many other professionals were
infrastructure. In parallel to those economic policies, and as early as one then being revered as an upper stratum of the Egyptian social hierarchy.
year after coming into power, the regime extended the scope of free Accordingly, earning a university placement to receive a specialized
education to university level in 1954. It also put into effect employment training and eventually a degree in one of those fields almost guaranteed
policies which obligated the government to provide job opportunities attaining economic and social high-standings. However, as late as the
for all university graduates.17 mid 60s there were only four public universities in Egypt whose student
Those factors combined stimulated a rapid rate of social mobility bodies were being kept at a limit so as not to compromise the quality
during the two decades following the revolution which even surpassed of education they offered. Coupled with the fact that every individual
that of the 1940s. With the financial hardships associated with education was then provided an equal chance to an education, that limitation
26
stipulated the level of excellence within the schooling system as the development agencies to develop new high-end residential settlements,
sole determinant for earning such promising placements. Academic as well as nationalized the foreign companies which managed already
competence had hence become of the utmost social consequence existing ones.21 The first and most significant of the former group was
across the full spectrum of Egyptian society, replacing hereditary titles the ‘Institution of Nasr City in Abbasiya’ with its assignment to develop
and property as the source of wealth and status.19 the suburb of Nasr City.
Apart from instating its hallmark as the new standard for social That significance did not only show in the institution’s conception by
hierarchy, the regime’s regard for the middle class was most evident in direct decree of the highest authority at the time, but also in the name
its commitment to the economic well-being of middle class individuals. ‘Nasr City’ itself. The word “nasr”, which means victory in Arabic, was
For the sake of improving the standard of living for society as a whole, then the regime’s preferred label for many of the contemporary reform
the regime adopted more policies that extended the state’s control over ventures. It was part of its propaganda to indicate the “triumph” of the
the economy. Those entailed the government heavily subsidizing the 1952 Revolution and its ideologies in bringing about pioneering national
prices of goods and service offered through the public sector; regulating reforms. Designating the prospective settlement with the name ‘Nasr
the prices of those not offered through it; and determining patterns City’ was essentially a proclamation of its stature as an urban venture
meant to embody a particular aspect of those revered reform efforts.
of domestic production and foreign trade. In practice, however, such
Given that the settlement was to cater exclusively to the middle
policies were of the greatest benefit to the middle class in particular.
class, such a name specifically implied the rise of the just social order
With the government already securing high-paying jobs for the middle
advocated by the revolution – one that, in effect, championed a middle
class, subsidized and regulated prices allowed its individuals to afford
class which had been unprivileged since its inception.
comfortable lifestyles and commodities that were previously beyond
their financial capabilities. Needless to say, universal free education was
a major contributor to such prosperity since it alleviated the financial
worries of sustaining their status. In addition to that, the government
was clearly biased towards manufacturing and importing goods that
were specifically meant for middle class consumption. Those were
mainly luxury and accessory items such as automobiles and modern
household appliances.20
Facilitating opportunities to own private residential property was
yet another notable aspect of the unprecedented economic privileges
granted to the middle class. The government’s primary concern within
the housing sector at the time was to provide middle class individuals
with quality residential units and land lots at considerably subsidized
costs – which came, to a certain extent, at the expense of a more
pressing need for providing low-income housing. In view of that
concern, the government established a number of housing and urban
27
Nasr City was indeed the legitimate urban-child of the Egyptian
zeitgeist during the 1950s and 60s. It was unique in every possible
aspect in correlation with the unprecedented favoritism towards the
middle class at the time. Out of the five Cairene high-end residential
neighborhoods during the latter half of the 20th century, Nasr City was
the only one purposefully directed towards a middle class clientele at its
outset. The other four neighborhoods – Zamalek, Garden City, Ma’adi,
and Heliopolis, which all predated the 52 revolution – originated as
suburban settlements for the social elite and foreigners. Those were
also originally planned and developed by foreign entrepreneurs and
private companies.1 Nasr City, on the other hand, was the first to be
fully developed by a national public sector body – the ‘Institution of
Nasr City in Abbasiya’.
Moreover, Sayyed Karim – the architect commissioned for planning
Nasr City – was the quintessential middle-class professional who had
deservingly attained such status during the years that led up to the 52 1.2 Nasr City [1960s]
revolution. He was born in 1911 to a typical pre World War I middle class Prospects of a middle class Utopia
28
family; his father was then a government-employed civil engineer. In the
late 20s he enrolled in Cairo University where he studied Architecture
and was later awarded a scholarship to continue his graduate studies
in ETH Zurich. There he specialized in Urban Planning and received his
doctorate in 1938 becoming the first Egyptian to ever hold a doctoral
degree in Architecture. Upon his return to Egypt, he assumed a faculty
position in Cairo University’s Department of Architecture as well as
founded the first architectural consulting firm in Egypt and the Middle
East.2 Throughout the 40s and 50s he became a highly sought after
practitioner. He was frequently commissioned to design public buildings,
plan new urban projects, and devise development schemes for existing
urban sites in Egypt and the Arab countries.3
Karim’s planning of Nasr City was by far the epitome of its distinction.
It was a departure from the late 19th century planning trends of its
precedent high-end residential settlements. In a clear reflection of his Garden City [1892]
Modernist inclinations, he based the design of 1,525 acres designated
for residential land use on a simple grid scheme that was intended to
facilitate any future extension of the settlement. Those were bordered
by desert plains to the east and south as venues for such an extension.
In compliance with its prescribed objectives, the rest of Nasr City’s
area was reserved for miscellaneous large-scale national projects that
were meant to render it as a Utopia incorporating all the aspects of
its contemporary national reforms. The most significant of those
were an Olympic park; an exhibition & fair grounds; an international
convention centre; the Azhar University new campus; the headquarters
for a number of key government departments and organizations; and a
strip of factories, warehouses, and bus depots for several state-owned
industrial, commercial, and service enterprises. That multitude of land
uses, together with areas retained by the military at the north of the
settlement, constituted a buffer between Nasr City’s residential areas
and the neighborhoods of Masr Al-Gadeeda district to the north, the
neighborhoods of Waili district to the north west, and an area of steep
limestone plateaus to the west. Heliopolis [1905]
29
Ma’adi [1904]
fig.1.2.1 A comparison of the planning schemes of
Cairene high-end residential neighborhoods; Nasr
City’s purely orthogonal scheme set it apart from
its precedents.
fig.1.2.2 [next spread] An excerpt from a 1958 map showing the army
barracks scattered across the desert plains east and south of the neighborhoods
of Waili and Masr Al-Gadeeda districts. In 1959, the shown area became the
northwest portion of the 6,540 acres assigned to the Institution of Nasr City.
In the settlement’s master plan, most of that portion was divided between
large-scale national projects and army property; the 1,525 acres designated
for residential land use spread across the shallow slopes south of the Cairo
Nasr City [1959] Municipal Boundary [bottom right corner].
30
31
32
50 250 500 1000 m
Nasr City | Original Master Plan 33

fig.1.2.4 The location of Nasr City in relation to the 21 administrative
districts of Cairo in 1966; The settlement was yet to be its own
administrative district and encompassed areas that were technically
under the jurisdictions of Waili and Masr Al-Gadeeda districts within
its vicinity. [for reference, the administrative boundaries of Waili
and Masr Al-Gadeeda running horizontally across Nasr City are
represented as Cairo Municipal Boundary in fig.1.2.2]
fig.1.2.3 Nasr City’s master plan; the settlement’s zoning arrangement was greatly affected by its
urban and topographic surroundings. The industrial strip was meant as a buffer against the steep
limestone plateaus; the lands retained by the army as a buffer against the neighborhoods of Masr
Al-Gadeeda and Waili districts; and the large-scale projects and condominium complexes as a
transitional buffer into the bulk of private residential properties. The 1,525 acres of residential
land use were specifically left with free ends towards the manageable flat topography to the east
and west to facilitate possible extensions.
Private Residential Properties – to be developed by the public

Condominium Complexes – to be developed by the Nasr City
Company, public sector housing agencies and developers
Miscellaneous Large-scale National Projects
Government Headquarters
Miscellaneous Mid-sized Projects
Light Industries
Army Property
Nasr City Boundaries
Waili District
Masr Al-Gadeeda District

0.5 1.5 2.5 5.0 km
Sand/Gravel Plains – Venue for future extensions of Nasr City

Lime Stone Plateaus – Contours at 2 meter intervals
34 Cairo Governorate Districts ‘66
Karim’s last contribution to the planning of Nasr City came in 1961 when on wider main streets and had their own sets of regulations concerning
he devised a detailed design for the Second Zone – a small residential building heights and footprints.
neighborhood in the north of Nasr City – as a prototype for the rest of the During the formulation of that detailed urban design, the ‘Institution
residential areas of the settlement. Five years later in 1966, the detailed of Nasr City in Abbaseyya’ was restructured into a state-run joint stock
urban design of those areas was completed by architects Gamal Fahim company in 1964 while retaining its original mission statement.8 It was
and Kamal Shohaib.4 The 1,525 acres were divided into four zones – the renamed the ‘Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban Development’
First, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth – with an intended density of about 70 and assumed its role as the regulator of all building processes in Nasr
to 100 persons per acre for each zone. On average, 30% of that area was City to ensure their compliance with the stipulated bylaws. Shortly
assigned to residential land use; 20% for services and commercial land after approving the design in mid 1966, the company and public sector
use; 10% for government buildings; and 40% for roads and green areas.5 contractors started realizing the settlement’s infrastructure systems,
The arrangement of those land uses followed a systematic pattern as well as a number of the proposed state projects and condominium
in all four zones; a feature mostly attributed to the orthogonal nature complexes.
of their planning. Each zone was comprised of two pairs of residential As the proprietor of all the land within Nasr City’s vicinity, the
company also started selling the private residential lots to the public
neighborhoods surrounding a service nucleus designated for large-scale
at subsidized prices. Some of those lots were allocated to syndicates
commercial, administrative, healthcare, and religious facilities. Similarly,
of professional practices which in turn offered their members the lots
the neighborhoods had smaller nuclei featuring parks, schools, and
with convenient payment arrangements. In essence, the company
small markets. Such an arrangement was specifically designed to reduce
was promoting a novel mode of residential property ownership to the
vehicular traffic within the neighborhoods by providing basic day-to-day
middle class. It presented them with an easy opportunity to own private
services at a walking distance from any residential unit.6
residences as opposed to rental which had been the prevalent mode of
The areas of the residential lots within the neighborhoods ranged
ownership to date.
between 400 and 700 square meters. A number of building bylaws were
stipulated for those lots in order to achieve the intended density and to
maintain a uniform urban character throughout the settlement. Only
one apartment building was allowed per lot with a footprint that didn’t
exceed one third of the lot’s area. Building footprints were restricted to
a minimum 7-meter setback from rear property lines and a minimum
4-meter setback from side and street-facing property lines. Building
heights were limited to four storeys at a maximum of 13 meters on
streets with widths less than 50 meters, and five storeys at a maximum of
16 meters on streets with widths equal or greater than 50 meters.7 And
while those lots were directed towards a clientele of private individuals, fig.1.2.5 Nasr City’s residential zones and main street network [for reference, as Salah Salem road
continues east, it becomes Al-Uruba street in fig.1.2.2]. Salah Salem and Al-Nasr roads were designed
a few large lots were reserved for public sector developers and housing as two of Cairo’s major vehicular arteries. They were intended to constitute a barrier between Cairo’s
periphery and Nasr City’s residential areas in order to highlight their suburban character. Al-Tayaran
agencies for developing condominium complexes. Those were situated and Youssef Abbas streets were meant to be the main entry routes into those areas.
35
Second Zone
[planned 1961]
Residential Zones
planned in 1966
First Zone
Sixth Zone
Seventh Zone
Eighth Zone
60-meter Streets
Salah Salem Road
50-meter Streets
Al-Tayaran Street
Youssef Abbas Street

50 250 500 1000 m
Al-Nasr Road
36
Nasr City | First Zone | Detailed Urban Design ‘66
Private Residential Lot - School Commercial Al-Tayaran Street Property of the Egyptian
showing min. permissible Postal Service
setbacks for building footprint
Preschool Administrative Abbas El-Akkad Street Property of Cairo Governorate
Condominium Complex
Hospital Unassigned Al-Nasr Road Property of Nasr City Company
Service Facility
Park Church Gas Station Ali Ameen Street Property of the Industrial
Fixations Company
Market Mosque Water Tower Residential-Administrative Property of the Sorting and Microfilm
mixed use project Company [Al-Ahram Institution]
* Street widths measured from lot lines. All inner street widths at 12 meters. 37
fig.1.2.6 The original detailed urban design of Nasr City’s First [opposite
page] and Sixth Zones; El-Insha Street and lot no.11 marked in red. The
First Zone had a more intricate design and a wider variety of small-scale
services within its neighborhoods. The Sixth Zone with its simpler design and
wider inner street widths served as a template for the Seventh and Eighth
zones. The strip of larger lots at the north of both zones was designated for
miscellaneous mid-sized projects that were meant to act as a buffer between
the zones’ residential lots and Al-Nasr Road.
Nasr City | Sixth Zone | Detailed Urban Design ‘66

Private Residential Lot - Police Station and Ahmed Fakhry Street
showing min. permissible Emergency Services
setbacks for building footprint
Market Hassan Ma’moon Street Makram Ebied Street
Abbas El-Akkad Street Property of the Institution of

Condominium Complex Labour Education
School Al-Nasr Road Property of the Egyptian Public Al-Nasr Automobile
Institution for Electricity Company
Park Unassigned Mustafa El-Nahhas Street Property of the General Committee Misr Company for
Service Facility for Charitable and Foreign Aid Automobile Trade
* Street widths measured from lot lines. All inner street widths at 16 meters. 38
4 storey apartment buildings | max. height: 13 meters
First & Sixth Zones | Height Limits for Private Residential Properties ‘66
39
fig.1.2.7 [opposite page] An example of the configuration of maximum
building heights for private residential properties as per Nasr City’s
original building bylaws; buildings with the higher maximum limit
lined the perimeters of Zones and neighborhoods. Condominium
complexes and non-residential facilities had their own building height
regulations.
fig.1.2.8 Street sections showing the relation between the maximum

building heights stipulated for private residential properties and
the range of Nasr City’s street widths. The 4-storey/13-meter limit
applied to all properties facing streets with widths less than 50 meters
regardless of the considerable differences between street widths
encompassed within such range. As shown in the bottom section, the
limit still applied if the street paralleled an open green space exceeding
50 meters in width.
40
50 250 500 1000 m
Nasr City | Planning c.1970

41
One year later however, Nasr City’s development came to an abrupt
stop due to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in June 1967. In the years
that followed, the government’s military spending to rebuild the army
and maintain attrition warfare, as well as the loss of two main sources
of national revenue – the Suez Canal and the Sinai oil reserves, flung
Individual Residential Properties
the Egyptian economy into stagnancy.9 As a result, the pace of all public
Condominum Complex sector works of construction and infrastructure in Nasr City dropped
Low-cost Housing drastically. Also, middle class individuals who had purchased lots in
Military Personnel Housing
the settlement were facing difficulties building their residences, and
those who hadn’t were either reluctant or unable to buy property there
Residential-Administrative Mixed Use
altogether.
Residential Zone Nucleus
[Miscellaneous Large-scale Services] And so by the early 70s, Nasr City was far from being the Utopian
Small-scale Retail/Service suburban community it was meant to be. Karim’s model Second Zone
Park was the only neighborhood close to completion with a few governmental
organizations’ headquarters and condominium complexes developed
Health Care
by the company standing there. Apart form that, the majority of
Basic/Secondary Education
settlement was nothing more than desert landscapes with empty road
Post-secondary Education networks cutting through. Such grim character didn’t change much over
Public Service Administration/Regulatory Organization the following ten years. However, a number of socioeconomic changes
Governmental Organization/State-owned Company in Egypt during that same period sparked an exponential trend of
development in Nasr City in the mid 80s.
Cultural
Sports
Industrial
Public Service Infrastructure
Religious
Cemetery
Army Property
Uassigned – Property of Governmental
Organizations/State-owned Companies fig.1.2.9 Nasr City’s official land use configuration in the early 70s. The largest and most significant of
the assigned land uses were the Olympic Park [sports, dashed white subdivisions – Cairo International
Unassigned – Property of Nasr City Company Stadium in the centre] and the Azhar University Campus [post-secondary education, south side of Al-
Nasr road]. Also, to the west of the Olympic park, the Cairo International Fair Grounds [cultural]; to
Squatter Settlement its southwest, the Cairo International Convention and Exhibition Centre [cultural]; to its south, the
Military Parade Square [cultural]; and to its east, the courts of the Armed Forces Federation [sports].
Nasr City Boundaries The isolation hospital, mental hospital, and police college at the north west corner of the settlement
predated the inception of Nasr City [see fig.1.2.2 bottom left corner for reference].
42
fig.1.2.10 Arial photo of the Cairo International Stadium and the Military Parade Square on Al-Nasr
road; those were among a sparse number of projects realized by the early 70s. The majority of Nasr
City’s public sector projects and residential areas were still pending development at the time due to the
economic aftermath of the Six-Day War.
43
fig.1.2.11 The governmental organizations’ headquarters on
Salah Salem road c. 1970; the Central Auditing Organization
[far right], the Central Agency for Public Mobilization And
Statistics, and the Ministry of Planning. Another example of the
few projects that were fully developed at the time.
fig.1.2.12 Rab’a Al-Adawiya Complex in 1968 [northwest

corner of Al-Nasr and Al-Tayaran intersection]; one of the first
condominium complexes developed by the Nasr City Company.
The special bylaws fashioned for condominium complexes are
quite evident in the buildings’ 11-storeys – more than double the
maximum height stipulated for private residential properties.
The complex was one of very few standing residential structures
in Nasr City during the 70s.
44
fig.1.2.13 A view of an inner street in the Second Zone c.1970
depicting the Utopian character intended for Nasr City’s
neighborhoods. The Second Zone was meant as an urban
prototype for the rest of the residential areas in the settlement;
it was mostly developed by the public sector into condominium
complexes that conformed to the building bylaws of private
residential properties.
fig.1.2.14 The condominiums on Youssef Abbas street in 1969;

another example of the complexes developed early on by the
company. The headquarters of the ‘Nasr City Company for
Housing and Urban Development’ appears in the far left. The
majority of completed structures at the time were centralized in
and around the Second Zone.
45
fig.1.2.15 The typical landscape throughout the First, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth zones in the early 70s;
the majority of Nasr City’s residential areas were hardly living up to their Utopian expectations. That
bleak vastness lingered on for another decade of hindered development.
46
During the 1970s and 80s, the Egyptian society continued to exhibit
rapid social mobility, arguably at a much higher rate than the 1950s
and 60s. And while the trends of social mobility during both periods
manifested mainly in a considerable growth of the middle class, they
were however hardly induced by the same factors. The 70s and 80s saw
a radical change to the socio-economic system that was established
during the 50s and 60s, and the middle class that emerged by the end
of 80s as result was far from the homogeneous class which had endured
for almost a 160 years.
The change of the social landscape in Egypt during that period was
brought about by three interrelated factors, all of which came into
effect roughly around 1974. Those were the ruling regime’s adoption of
the Open-Door Policy; the migration of Egyptians to work in Arab Gulf
1.3 The Egyptian States; and runaway inflation. Out of the three, the most important of
those factors was the adoption of the Open-Door Policy – an economic
Middle Class [1970s-1990s] platform which sought to shift the 50s and 60s’ state-controlled
A transformation into a divided social stratum economy towards free market capitalism.1
47
The Open-Door policy was introduced by President Anwar alSadat,
Abd-alNaser’s successor, shortly after the October War of 1973.
Despite being a member of the Free Officers movement and its political
establishment during the 50s and 60s, Sadat did not share his peers’
socialist conviction that maintaining an economy dominated by the
public sector was the best way to address the economic stagnancy
that had befallen Egypt since the Six-Day War. He instead was of the
opinion that a capitalist economic model which relied primarily on the
foreign and private sectors had the better potential to jump-start the
war-crippled Egyptian economy and bring prosperity to society as a
whole. He also saw in reorienting the economy towards such a model
an opportunity for political alignment with the United States, which
at the time played a chief role in the peace process with Israel. So in
early 1974, Sadat announced the launch of an Infitah or Open-Door
policy that would “open up” the Egyptian economy to the foreign and
private sectors in hopes that they would displace the public sector as
its primary engines. That policy, he decreed, was to involve three main
courses of action: gradually relaxing the state’s universal control over
the economy; encouraging the private sector to increase its share in
domestic investment; and stimulating an inflow of foreign funds and
investments into the economy.
Over the following two decades, the Sadat regime overturned
many of the economic policies that were enacted during the 50s and
60s in order to effectuate the mandate of the Open-Door policy. The
restrictions that had previously limited the share of the private sector
in domestic investment were alleviated; the state’s authority to direct
private investment and restrict it to productive economic activities was
rescinded; and the tax rates on private income and wealth were reduced
significantly. The embargo on foreign investment was not only lifted, but
foreign investors were also provided with ample incentives and granted fig.1.3.1 Anwar alSadat, President of Egypt (1970-1981). Sadat
introduced the Open-Door Policy in 1974; an economic platform
exclusive economic privileges such as further tax cuts and exemptions that brought about a number of fundamental socioeconomic
changes throughout the 70s and 80s.
and immunity from nationalization. And for the benefit of both private
and foreign sectors, the state’s authority to regulate the prices of the
48
goods and services that they offered was diminished considerably, and Owing to the newly adopted patterns of state investment for instance,
imports were liberalized from state control. the state spent less on maintaining, improving, and adequately
With those measures in place, many foreign corporations, banks, increasing its production and service facilities. As a result, the quotas
hotels, consultancy firms, and international institutions established their of subsidized goods and services provided by the government barely
practices in Egypt marking the return of a foreign sector that had been met the demand of the rapidly growing population, and their quality
eradicated twenty years earlier. Those measures also saw the private had become quite inferior – especially when compared to the wider
sector grow and its activity increase considerably in comparison to the variety of goods and services that had flooded the market thanks to the
50s and 60s. But since the state no longer dictated the patterns of its liberalization of imports from state control and the economic freedoms
activity, the private sector’s thriving investments were predominantly that were granted to the foreign and private sectors. Moreover, the
directed towards lucrative, yet less productive, economic activities that various tax cuts and exemptions that were awarded to the forging
did not contribute much to national economic development – activities and private sectors, as well as the decline that beset the country’s
such as stock and real-estate speculation, brokerage, importing foreign productive sectors due to the new patterns of state investment, seriously
goods, luxury housing, and tourism. The foreign and private sector’s undermined some of the main sources of state revenue. Consequently,
upswing however did not live up to the expectations of the Sadat regime government spending, including its sizable expenditure on subsidies,
and the public sector continued to dominate the Egyptian economy came to rely heavily on a number of unsecured and external sources
throughout the 70s and 80s. But then again, in yet another break with instead. Chief among those were the revenues from the Suez Canal
the economic principles of the 50s and 60s, state investments during duties and the Sinai oil exports that were restored to Egypt after the
that period were predominantly directed towards less productive War of October ’73, and which – in the case of the Sinai Oil exports
economic activities as well. As per the Open-Door policy’s agenda of – were quite high thanks to the 1970s energy crisis; and the inflow of
providing incentives to the foreign and private sectors, the majority loans and aid that Egypt received from foreign creditor governments
of state investments went to works of infrastructure, and especially in and international financial organizations in the wake of adopting the
cities, which came at the expense of investing in the development of the Open-Door policy and reorienting the country’s economy. Needless to
more productive industrial and agricultural sectors. say, that wasn’t a very sustainable approach as it became quite evident
Despite the strong overtones of Capitalism inherent within the by the mid 80s when the drop in oil prices dealt a heavy blow to Egypt’s
Open-Door policy however, the Sadat regime retained some of the oil revenues, and the country’s growing external debts prompted foreign
50s and 60s’ socialist policies – most notably the subsidization of basic creditors and financial organizations to withhold any further loans or aid
goods and services provided through the public sector, universal free to Egypt until the government took serious steps towards curtailing its
education, and the employment policies obligating the government to spending in order to relief those debts. Given such considerable loss
provide job placements to all university graduates. Those policies were of state revenue, the government began to gradually reduce subsidies
essentially kept in place in order to avert social unrest. And while they on the goods and services it offered towards the end of the 80s, and
might have served such purpose, the state’s otherwise full compliance stopped subsidizing a number of those goods and services altogether.2
with the Open-Door policy rendered them far less reliable than they Universal free education and government employment were both in a
were during the 50s and 60s. general state of decline as well. As the government continued to provide
49
universal free education for all, it perpetually increased the maximum to keep paying public sector employees the same sort of decent salaries
quotas of students admitted into university each year. Although the it had offered them during the 50s and 60s. And even though in its
government paralleled such increase with establishing new universities, superficial adherence to the socialist principles of that time period, the
the resultant influx of university admissions still overwhelmed the government continued to hand out annual bonuses and raises to public
student capacity of universities, and it was hardly matched with a sector employees, such increments were rather miniscule and did not
corresponding increase in faculties or adequate maintenance and help much – public sector salaries became quite meager all the same,
upgrade of educational facilities.3 A similar, if not worse, imbalance and were surpassed by their correspondent foreign and private sector
burdened the public school system since the government exerted less salaries at any given employment field or station.5
effort building new schools and maintaining existing ones while allowing All in all, the repercussions of adopting the Open-Door policy put large
more and more students to enroll in the system.4 Those discrepancies portions of the Egyptian society in considerable economic hardship.
led to the degradation of the quality education that was once offered Professionals for instance no longer had easy access to the comfortable
through the public education system. Nevertheless, that system yielded lifestyles and the decent economic standings they had enjoyed during
exponential numbers of new university graduates each year all the same. the 50s and 60s. Between the inadequacy of government subsidies and
Due to the newly adopted patterns of state investment on the other the declining quality of all what the public sector had to offer, foreign
hand, the growth of the industrial and agricultural sectors had slumped and private sector goods and services had become their only option
to a very slow rate, and there were hardly any new major government for maintaining an acceptable standard of living. But thanks to the
projects; which in turn meant that there weren’t enough new jobs within state’s diminished authority to regulate their prices, those goods and
the public sector to absorb the full influx of new university graduates. services were far too expensive for the public sector-employed majority
Regardless of that shortage however, the government continued of professionals to afford on their meager government salaries. Many
to offer jobs to all university graduates, mainly in its administrative of those professionals therefore had to explore other career options
sector. As a result, the public sector in general, and the bureaucracy besides, or instead of, their public sector jobs in order to make ends
in particular, had become vastly overmanned which had its negative meet. They either became self-employed or sought better-paying
effects on a number of different fronts. For one thing, an overmanned jobs in the foreign and private sectors – which were quite hard to get
and therefore inefficient bureaucracy stood in sharp contrast to the considering that, due to their relatively small size, those sectors only
regime’s proclaimed commitment to liberalizing the economy from offered a limited number of jobs. The high cost of foreign and private
state controls, and was arguably one of the main reasons why the sector goods and services was also a burden to professionals who did
Open-Door policy had failed to attract the desired volume of productive not work for the government. Although they were better off than their
foreign and private investments. But most importantly, overmanning public sector-employed counterparts, it was still rather difficult for them
the public sector in general led to the detriment of the once prestigious to afford those goods and services; and they were consequently caught
institution of government employment. It limited career advancement in a constant financial struggle to provide a decent life for their families.
opportunities within the public sector; and coupled with the slumping However, things were even more difficult for newly graduated
state revenues, it took a heavy toll on public sector salaries as the professionals. They were no longer guaranteed a good start in life since
government was left with an extensive payroll and no adequate means the public sector jobs offered to them by the government weren’t
50
exactly their best option for a promising career;6 and unlike older, and wages that by far trumped those offered by any of the domestic
more accomplished public sector professionals, they neither had the sectors in Egypt. Given the multitude of difficulties they were facing
experience nor the means to start successful private practices of their at home, many Egyptian professionals therefore opted to leave the
own. Their lack of experience also left them with a severe disadvantage country altogether and migrate to work in the Arab Gulf States for a
when it came to getting jobs in the foreign and private sectors as they number of years in order to support their families back in Egypt and
were up against strong competition from all the older, more experienced amass enough savings to secure their futures; or – in the case of newly
public sector professionals who were going after those limited jobs as graduated professionals – to make enough money that would help them
well in their search for better career options; not to mention that the start a family and a career once they returned to Egypt. However, the
exponential number of professionals that graduated university each greater majority of Egyptian temporary migrants were semi-skilled &
year made for an even more competitive job market. But then again, unskilled workers, craftsmen, and peasants who hailed form the poorer,
matters were even worse still for small-time government bureaucrats less educated masses. They were essentially hired as cheap labor;
and clerks. Given their mid-level education, they had the most limited nevertheless, the wages that they were offered in the Arab Gulf States
career options of all. They were essentially stuck in their government were still quite high by Egyptian standards. Consequently, working in
jobs, and more often than not, they also had to work one or more after- those states was a real game changer for those disadvantaged individuals
hours jobs just to get by. and their families back in Egypt to whom they sent their earnings. It
The repercussions of adopting the Open-Door policy had far-reaching granted them access to relatively large incomes and better lifestyles
negative effects on the poorer, less educated masses as well. The impeded which they couldn’t have possibly come by otherwise considering their
growth of the national industrial sector for example undermined the low or non-existent education and limited skill-sets.8
government’s ability to employ labor from among those masses, which Although migrating to work in the Arab Gulf States offered a lot of
meant that more and more of them were out of a steady job and thus Egyptians a way out of their economic and career troubles, such a
a secure source of income. Similarly, peasant farmers found themselves trend had quite the adverse side effect on Egypt’s economy. The sizable
in a dire economic state due to the overall decline of the agricultural remittances of Egyptians working in those states to their families back
sector, and its infrastructure in particular, which was brought about by home was chief among a number of factors which brought about a
the state’s diminishing investments in agriculture. The plight of those rampant rate of inflation that burdened the Egyptian economy for the
farmers was compounded even further by the government’s failure to better part of the 70s and 80s. On the one hand, those remittances, along
follow up on – let alone properly manage – the agrarian reforms of the with the foreign aid & loans granted to Egypt; the revenues of the Sinai
50s and 60s, in what was yet another instance of working against the oil exports; and the Suez Canal duties, introduced a large money supply
socialist polices of that era while upholding them only in name.7 into the Egyptian economy. On the other hand however, the diminished
Those economic hardships in turn prompted scores of Egyptians to productive capacity of Egypt’s domestic sectors, which was precipitated
temporarily migrate to the Arab Gulf States during the 70s and 80s in by the patterns of state and private investment during the 70s and 80s,
pursuit of high-paying jobs. At the time, those states’ new and thriving meant that such inflow was hardly matched by a comparable increase
oil economies had a high demand for professionals, and an even higher in products. As a result of that discrepancy, market prices skyrocketed
demand for labor of all sorts. Moreover, they offered hefty salaries taking inflation rates through the roof.9 Over the fifteen years since the
51
adoption of the Open-Door had brought the aforementioned factors and accordingly knowing when to buy them at a relatively cheap cost and when
into play – namely between 1975 and 1990, the cost of acquiring a to sell them for a sizable return once their value had surcharged. Interestingly
market basket of goods and services increased by 775% at an average though, not all of those Egyptians were originally tradesmen or businessmen
annual rate of 15.5%. Those figures were astronomical to say the least, by profession. As a matter of fact, that sort of opportunistic entrepreneurial
especially when considering that over the previous fifteen years that activity was particularly common among the Egyptian workforce returning from
cost had only increased by 81% at an average annual rate of 4%.10 the Arab Gulf States, as well as the aforementioned craftsmen and workers
Needles to say, such runaway inflation made the already strenuous who capitalized on the rising cost of services and shortage of labor. It was a
economic hardships of a great many Egyptians even more difficult. Small- relatively fast and rather easy way for the former group to invest and multiply
time government bureaucrats & clerks, as well as professionals who still their savings, and for the latter group to do the same with their increasing profit
depended solely on their public sector jobs, were among those whom margins – one that did not require either group to develop any significant skills,
it hit the hardest. The very slow rate at which their government salaries save for an ability to read and play the market. The 70s and 80s therefore saw
increased through meager annual bonuses & raises was nowhere near a significant portion of both such groups adopt those entrepreneurial activities
the rate at which the cost of living was surging as a result of inflation. as a source of income; and in turn accumulate considerable wealth that they –
Newly graduated professionals also reeled from the surging cost of living once again – couldn’t have garnered under any other circumstances given their
which was not at all conducive to them starting a family or a career. limited or lack of education and skills. It goes without saying here that such a
But at the same time though, the high rates of inflation during the 70s trend was one of the main reasons why private domestic investment during
and 80s benefited a lot of other Egyptians. Reputable professionals who that period was predominantly directed towards lucrative, yet less productive,
had their well-established private practices for instance profited from economic activities. Not to mention that the prevalence of those entrepreneurial
the rapidly rising cost of services as it brought in a substantial increase activities made for a very volatile market which further discouraged earnest
to their earnings. Likewise, craftsmen and workers also capitalized on investors from committing capital to long-term investments in Egypt’s more
the rising cost of services, if not more, considering that they were in productive economic sectors despite of all the incentives offered to them by
such high demand as a result of the shortage of labor caused by the the Open–Door Policy.12
migration of large portions of the Egyptian workforce to the Arab Gulf Ultimately, the adoption of the Open–Door Policy; the migration of the
States. Such shortage allowed them to ask for much more than what Egyptian workforce to the Arab Gulf States; and runaway inflation, along with
they would have typically charged for their services even after factoring their various effects throughout the 70s and 80s, had a number of significant
in inflation, which in turn enabled them to significantly increase their social outcomes. For one thing, the introduction of new veins of generating
profit margins.11 income, and the subversion of others, induced very high rates of both upward
However, it was the multitude of entrepreneurs who dealt in and took and downward social mobility, which – much like the social mobility of the 50s
advantage of the surging market value of highly sought-after items – and 60s – translated mainly in an exponential growth of the Egyptian middle
such as imported consumer goods; foreign currency; land property; and class. By end of the 80s, namely in 1991, such growth was quite evident in the
housing – that by far benefited the most from the 70s and 80s’ rampant stratification of the Egyptian population according to income. Over the span of
inflation. During that period, many Egyptians were able to make fortunes almost 40 years since the July Revolution of 1952, the relative volume of Egyptians
virtually overnight by anticipating the price fluctuations of those items; receiving a middle class income more than doubled from 19% to 45% of the
52
Upper Class
Middle Class
19%
45%
Lower Class
fig.1.3.2 The stratification of the Egyptian

population according to income in 1952 and in
1951; a comparison showing the growth of the
relative size of the middle class over the span of 40
years. Gala Amin argues that, although the middle
class grew significantly during the 50s and 60s,
much of the growth of the middle class during those
40 years occurred during the 70s and 80s.
53
country’s total population.13 Admittedly, such a time span encompassed 80s. By the end of those twenty years, and for the first time in the
two very distinct periods of social mobility that were brought on by two history of modern Egyptian society, middle class professionals were
fundamentally different sets of ideology and economic policy. However, no longer predominantly employed in the pubic sector, or primarily
based on his observations and the strong impressions they’ve left him, dependent on a government job for their income. Instead, the greater
prominent Egyptian economist Galal Amin argues that – despite the lack majority of them were either self-employed, held jobs in the private
of hard data to support his claim – social mobility during the 70s and 80s or foreign sectors, or worked in the Arab Gulf States. Moreover, and
was much higher than it was during the 50s and 60s; and that in turn, most importantly, professionals lost their rank as an upper echelon of
a much bigger portion of the middle class growth throughout those 40 the middle class. As opposed to the ideologies and economic policies
years or so occurred during the 70s and 80s rather than 50s and 60s.14 of the Nasser Regime during the 50s and 60s, which worked to their
Unlike the 50s and 60s though, the social mobility during the 70s benefit and helped them attain such rank, the ideological and economic
and 80s deeply altered the long-standing homogeneous makeup of platforms adopted by the Sadat Regime in the mid 70s put professionals
the Egyptian middle class; and as a result, by the early 90s the middle under a lot of financial strain; and in turn made it exceedingly difficult
class had become hardly the same harmonious stratum of well- for them to maintain their status as members of the middle class, let
educated, public sector-employed bureaucrats and professionals that alone hold a position at its top tier.
it had always been ever since its genesis in the early 1800s. Among Alternately, professionals were displaced by an influx of entrepreneurs
those involved in that drastic social transformation were small-time who hailed from the lower classes and quickly ascended through the
public sector bureaucrats and clerks, who found themselves up against social hierarchy during the 70s and 80s to become the uppermost tier,
insurmountable odds starting in the mid 70s. Between the overall as well as the other major component of the Egyptian middle class.
decline of the public sector; the multitude of economic challenges That social group was basically comprised of all the craftsmen, workers,
they were facing; and their extremely limited career options, they were and peasants who amassed considerable financial gains by capitalizing
soon caught in a downward social mobility that eradicated their middle on the unstable economic circumstances in Egypt at the time and
class status; and they quickly fell down the social ladder to effectively adopting the aforementioned opportunistic entrepreneurial activities
become part of the lower class instead.15 as occupations and primary sources of income. Their newly found large
With the bureaucracy out of the mix, the middle class that emerged incomes in turn saw them attain middle class status, and in some cases
by the early 90s consisted of two very distinct groups. Professionals – even upper class status, accounting for the majority of the increase in
such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, accountants, university professors, the relative size of both those classes between 1952 and 1991.16 Such
and teachers – accounted for one of those two groups, and as such, social placement made entrepreneurs the first new major addition to
they were essentially the only remnant of the original middle class the structure of the Egyptian middle class in the entirety of its history;
structure that survived the socio-economic upheaval of the 70s and however, as a social group, they were widely regarded as a parasitic
80s. But although professionals had managed to retain their long- class that did not contribute much to society as a whole.17
standing middle class status, their modes of employment and sources But perhaps the most significant social outcome of the 70s and 80s
of income, as well as their relative position within the middle class was the drastic change in the values of Egyptian society. With the
itself, were still the subject of considerable change during the 70s and rapid social rise of the entrepreneur class, academic competence and
54
excelling in the realm of education, as well as the sincere handwork that would help them garner astronomical profits in comparison. On
associated with both those aspects, were no longer the hallmarks of the other hand, many of those who accepted such bribes, particularly
the Egyptian middle class or the main methods of attaining a higher small-time bureaucrats and clerks, were driven to do so by a desperate
status within Egypt’s social hierarchy. Instead, starting in the mid 70s, need to keep their heads above the rising social tide rather than by an
size of income and wealth – regardless of their source – became the inherent flaw in their moral compass. Those bribes were essentially a
main criteria for societal stratification in Egypt, and the most common lifeline that helped them cope with the rising cost of living. And so, not
means of climbing the social ladder.18 As a matter of fact, middle class before long bribery also became a staple in even the simplest dealings
professionals were the only social group who, since then, remained between the bureaucracy and the general public as the former group –
keen on pursuing a good education, excelling at it, and making a living albeit not explicitly – usually asked for such payments, not to violate any
using it. It was essentially their way of self-preservation, their way of bylaws or regulations per se, but to expedite the latter group’s requests
perpetuating their social species. That is to say, the majority of upward and paperwork through the endless red tape of the government’s
social mobility in Egypt since the mid 70s was mainly the byproduct bureaucratic apparatus.19
of chasing monetary gain by whatever means possible no matter how In conclusion, the Egyptian middle class that emerged by the end of
unscrupulous they might be, rather than what had become the less the 70s and 80s, and which is largely the same stratum that still exists
“conventional” pursuit of education. today, was a class divided. On the one hand, professionals constituted a
Also starting in the mid 70s, the Egyptian society was beset with more moral, older middle class; and on the other hand, entrepreneurs
widespread corruption in yet another instance of major change in its constituted a new middle class that was morally lax in comparison.
value system. As mentioned earlier, the Egyptian government retained an Neither of those two factions shared the same values or sources of
extensive bureaucratic apparatus despite of its proclaimed commitment income, and they were basically lumped together as one class solely
to a more liberal, private sector-driven economy that is free of state on the basis of an abstract range of how much income they generated
controls. That basically resulted in a situation in which a vast body of annually.20
grossly underpaid government officials, inspectors, and civil servants, In the context of such divide, a phenomenon that could be best
who held the authority to issue legal permits and oversee compliance described as social emulation became rather prevalent within the
with regulations and bylaws, was put in direct contact with a host of Egyptian middle class as its newer members resorted to imitating
morally lax entrepreneurs who were willing to do almost anything to almost every aspect of its older members’ lifestyles, often in an
maximize returns on their investments. Consequently, bribery soon ostentatious manner, in order to assert their newly attained middle
became a rather commonplace occurrence in the interactions between class status. This peculiar phenomenon manifested itself across a
those two groups as entrepreneurs almost always paid off bureaucrats number of different domains. For instance, members of the new middle
to issue permits for ventures that did not meet stipulated regulations, class were preoccupied with acquiring the same grade of goods and
or to overlook certain violations of official bylaws. Those entrepreneurs products typically consumed by the old middle class. They also sought
regarded such bribes as an integral and a totally justifiable part of any the same level of education as the old middle class regardless of the fact
investment – and a very feasible one at that considering that it was such that it didn’t have any bearing on what they did for a living. Moreover,
a small price to pay for a measure of leniency towards transgressions and most importantly, they were also quite keen on situating their
55
residences in the same neighborhoods where large populations of the he or she then moves on to the next, higher tier and seeks satisfying
old middle class were known to dwell. In a sense, such behavior was the needs it entails, and so on (375). This hierarchy of human needs is
essentially a social form of a compensation mechanism. At that time, a rather popular concept, and its tiers are self-explanatory for the most
and despite the relative decline of their economic status, members of part. An in depth discussion of each one of these needs is therefore not
the old middle class – namely professionals – were still considered to all that pertinent to the discourse of this thesis. What is of particular
be a social ideal to aspire to in the collective consciousness of Egyptian relevance here is the third and fourth tiers of this hierarchy; namely the
society. The members of the new middle class on the other hand had belonging needs and the esteem needs.
just attained their middle class status; and they had done so over a very The belonging needs are defined by Maslow simply as a condition
short time span and not through the long-standing tradition of excelling wherein “[a person] will hunger for . . . a place in his group, and he will
in the realm of education, but rather by accumulating wealth through strive with great intensity to achieve this goal” (381). His definition of
practices that were then widely regarded as unscrupulous. It was the esteem needs, however, is a bit more elaborate:
therefore only natural for them to feel the need to associate themselves
with that old, revered, and more established faction of the middle “All people in our society . . . have a need or desire for a stable,
class. From their standpoint, a visible display of their ability to match firmly based, high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect,
the material attributes of the old middle class using their newly found or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. By firmly based
wealth served such purpose; and proved to themselves, as well as to the self-esteem, we mean that which is soundly based upon real
rest of society, that they had indeed become part of the middle class.21 capacity, achievement and respect from others. These needs may
The main argument here is that this notion of social emulation, as it be classified into two subsidiary sets. These are, first, the desire
was outlined above, played the central role in the urban boom of Nasr for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for confidence
City which began towards the end of the 80s. Both this argument, as in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom.
well as the outlined understanding of why and how social emulation Secondly, we have what we may call the desire for reputation
operates, draw primarily on the works of Abraham Maslow and Jean or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people),
Baudrillard. recognition, attention, importance or appreciation.” (381-382)
Maslow’s 1943 paper entitled “A Theory of Human Motivation” holds
the key to comprehending the psychological drive behind the tendency In the same paper, Maslow also points out that the hierarchal
of the members of a rising class to imitate the archetype of the class arrangement of the five basic human needs is not all that rigid; and
into which they have been newly introduced. In this paper, Maslow identifies satisfying the esteem needs before the belonging needs as
identifies five basic human needs and arranges them in an ascending the most common reversal within the hierarchy (386). To paraphrase,
order of satisfaction priority as follows: the physiological needs; the he argues that, for some people, satisfying the esteem needs takes
safety needs; the love and belonging needs; the esteem needs; and precedence over satisfying their need to belong mainly due to the
finally the need for self-actualization. Basically, he argues that an notion that a person who is most likely to be considered as part of a
individual is typically preoccupied with satisfying the needs found at certain group is one who inspires the same kind of respect reserved for
the lowermost tier of this hierarchy; and that once such goal is reached, the members of such group. These people therefore seek “self-esteem
56
creativity,
problem
SELF–ACTUALIZATION solving
self – others’
esteem respect
ESTEEM
sexual intimacy, family,

friendship, social group
LOVE & BELONGING
security of: body, employment,

resources, family, health, property
SAFETY
breathing, food, water, sex, sleep, excretion

fig.1.3.3 Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human
needs, and the most common reversal in that
hierarchy [opposite page] as it relates to the PHYSIOLOGICAL
societal flux in Egypt during the 70s and 80s.
and its behavior expressions more as a means-to-an-end than for its satisfying an innate human need to belong. As discussed earlier, despite
own sake”. That is to say, they seek respect for the sake of belonging the fact that their newly found wealth categorized them as members of
rather than for sake of esteem itself. the middle class, the then unconventional means by which they came to
Although Maslow’s arguments deal primarily with abstracts and the posses it casted doubts on their status as such. Acquiring and exhibiting
realm of human psychology, extrapolating them to the social context in the same material attributes as the old middle class was essentially
Egypt during the 70s and 80s explains why social emulation was such a their way of commanding the same kind of respect and prestige that
prevalent phenomenon at the time. By imitating their old middle class society reserved for its members; which in turn gratified their desire
counterparts, members of the new middle class were, albeit indirectly, to feel and be recognized as true members of the Egyptian middle
57
creativity,
problem
solving SELF–ACTUALIZATION
social group
LOVE & BELONGING
self – others’ respect

esteem
ESTEEM
security of: body, employment,

resources, family, health, property
SAFETY
breathing, food, water, sex, sleep, excretion

PHYSIOLOGICAL
class themselves. In Maslow’s terms, members of the new middle class counterparts. Given that their sense of self-worth was almost entirely
sought out satisfying their esteem needs as a means of gratifying their dependant on external input – namely other people’s respect, and
belonging needs; and in doing so, they were particularly focused on that they relied on nothing but their monetary ability for projecting a
satisfying their need for respect from others rather than their need for sophisticated social front in order to elicit that respect; the members
self-esteem that is based on real capacity and achievement. of the new middle class clearly neither possessed the healthiest of
It is worth nothing here that this imbalance in how members of the character traits, nor shared the best of social values. On the other hand,
new middle class went about satisfying their esteem needs was yet and within the same social context, the members of the old middle class
another aspect that set them further apart from their old middle class derived their sense of self-worth from their hard-earned achievements
58
throughout their education and subsequent professional careers, From there, Baudrillard then postulates that “consumption (taken in the
which then earned them other people’s respect. In other words, unlike sense of expenditure, of the purchase and possession of visible objects)
members of the new middle class, their sense of self-worth did not will gradually concede to other criteria and other types of behavior the
hinge on other people’s opinion of them, but was rather the product of preeminent role it currently plays in the variable geometry of status”;
a more balanced, and thus healthier, process. Needless to say, this stark meaning that it will be replaced by new, more effective social signifiers.
contrast made the failings of both the value system and the collective In that respect, he identifies level of education and habitat – among
psychological disposition of the new middle class all the more evident. others – as the most important emergent means of social distinction in
Moving on from the realm of Human psychology and onto the field of consumer societies.
sociology, Jean Baudrillard’s 1970 book “The Consumer Society: Myths Baudrillard’s notion of level of education as a means of marking one’s
& Structures” offers a material understanding of how social emulation status within the social hierarchy holds the key to understanding why the
takes effect in a modern consumer society – which is precisely the sort of regime in Egypt exponentially increased the student capacities of public
social structure that the Egyptian society was developing into during the universities during the 70s and 80s; as well as why it was particularly
70s and 80s. In the section entitled “The Social Logic of Consumption”, committed to establishing new universities as opposed to new schools.
Baudrillard states that in a consumer society “you never consume the Prominent Egyptian scholar Galal Amin argues that the regime did not
object in itself (in its use-value); you are always manipulating objects (in take those steps out of its genuine desire to make higher education
the broadest sense) as signs which distinguish you either by affiliating accessible to larger portions of the Egyptian society. He was rather of
you to your own group taken as an ideal reference or by marking you the opinion that those steps were merely the regime’s response to
off from your group by reference to a group of higher status” (61). This an overwhelming public demand for the type of higher degrees those
explains why the members of the new middle class developed such a universities offered – a demand that was primarily driven by the rising
voracious appetite for acquiring the same goods and services as their old new middle class.22 Much like their visible consumption of the goods
middle class counterparts. Their visible consumption of such “objects” and services typically used by their old middle class counterparts,
was basically a “social signifier” that distanced them from the lower members of the new middle class did not seek university degrees for
classes they had risen from, and associated them with the members of their use-value since their education hardly ever had a bearing on how
the old middle class who were the ideal reference of the higher-status they earned their income. Instead, they sough university degrees strictly
group they had recently become part of. for their function as a symbol of social distinction. As discussed earlier,
In that same section however, Baudrillard also argues that given a university degree was the hallmark of a middle class professional; and
the very nature of manufactured goods and services, the visible act at the time professionals were the ideal reference for what it is to be a
of consuming them is bound to become the least effective of social member of the Egyptian middle class. Therefore, by Baudrillard’s logic,
signifiers (57). His argument is this: because those consumer objects are obtaining the same sort of degrees as those professionals was yet another
by definition mass-produced, they are therefore abundant and readily means for the members of the new middle class to set themselves apart
available to all. This in turn will make them “less and less expressive of from the lower classes and register their newly attained higher status.
social rank”, and instead of being a means of social distinction, they will That is to say, university degrees ultimately had a “homogenizing”
eventually have a completely opposite “homogenizing” social effect. social effect within the context of the Egyptian middle class despite of
59
the many differences between the members of its two factions. This today than space and the social marking of space. Habitat thus
is exactly the reason why occupation, rather than level of education, perhaps has an opposite function to that of other consumables.
will be used as the primary criteria for identifying members of the old The latter have a homogenizing function, the former a
middle class throughout the demographic and statistical analyses of this differentiating function in terms of space and location.” (57)
thesis, even though they were the only members of the middle class that
actually made use of their formal education. On a somewhat relative In light of this statement, it is easy to understand why members of
note, it is also worth mentioning here that the status-driven demand for the new middle class fervently pursued residing among their old middle
education and the regime’s response to it were, in some sense, major class counterparts. It was mainly because a dwelling and its urban
contributors to the financial woes that beset middle class professionals context are by far the most visible, and least accessible, of consumer
since the mid 70s. As it was outlined before, the government-sanctioned objects; and therefore the most expressive of social signifiers. That
exponential increase in the student capacities of public schools and is to say, in comparison to obtaining the same level of education or
universities had a very adverse effect on the quality of education that acquiring the same grade of goods and services as their old middle class
those institutions offered. Middle class professionals therefore had counterparts, members of new middle class were able to communicate
to find a better alternative to the declining public education system their association to the middle class ideal in a far more conspicuous
given that their livelihoods depended on getting a good education. To manner by situating their residences in the same neighborhoods where
that end, they turned to private education institutions with their well- their old middle class counterparts were known to dwell. Such an act
maintained facilities and limited student capacities. But like all that was amounted to putting up a literal social façade that concealed their
offered through the private sector, getting a private education proved to lower class origins and showcased their new, higher status against a
be a rather costly undertaking for most middle class professionals, and comparable middle class backdrop – it basically assimilated them into
soon they found themselves in a very similar situation to the one that the social milieu of the middle class by helping them physically blend
previous generations of professionals were in before the introduction of in a middle class urban environment. Moreover, the relative scarcity
universal free education in Egypt. and high cost of “middle class” residential property in Egypt at the time
However, it is Baudrillard’s observations regarding habitat as one of added to the effectiveness of this particular means of social distinction.
the more effective means of social distinction in consumer societies Compared to the innately abundant manufactured goods and services
that are of the most relevance here. He states: or the accessible universal free education, a dwelling in a middle class
urban context was a far less obtainable commodity, which – according
“Segregation by place of residence is not new, but, being to Baudrillard – made it far more indicative of social rank.
increasingly linked to consciously induced shortage and Of all the residential neighborhoods in Cairo at the time, the use of
chronic speculation, it is tending to become decisive, in terms a dwelling and its urban context as a tool of social emulation was the
of both geographical segregation (town centers and outskirts, most prevalent in Nasr City – and it was such prevalence that fueled
residential zones, rich ghettos, dormitory suburbs, etc.) and Nasr City’s rapid urban development towards the end of the 80s. This
habitable space (the inside and outside of the dwelling, the raises two very important questions: Why Nasr City in particular, and
addition of a ‘second home’, etc.). Objects are less important why the end of 80s? As it was discussed earlier in this chapter, Nasr
60
City was the only Cairene residential settlement that was conceived as was mainly because the influx of returning middle class professionals
a middle class neighborhood from the outset; and it continued to live who were settling in Nasr City back then served to further highlight
as such in the collective consciousness of Egyptian society even after its its status as the quintessential middle class neighborhood. But more
development came to an abrupt stop with the outbreak of the Six-Day importantly, it was also because, owing to its underdeveloped character,
war in 1967, and as it remained mostly undeveloped throughout the Nasr City had a relative abundance of available residential property in
following twenty years or so. The status of Nasr City as the quintessential comparison to other Cairene neighborhoods, such as Heliopolis and
middle class neighborhood, along with its underdeveloped character, Ma’adi, which had substantial middle class populations but were already
were essentially what made it the most fertile urban medium for the fully developed at the time. Ultimately, that made Nasr City a far more
manifestation of the abovementioned variant of social emulation when convenient middle class neighborhood to settle in.
the demand for “middle class” residential property surged around the By the mid 80s, Nasr City had thus become one of the most sought-
mid 80s. after housing markets in all of Cairo, which in turn made it also one
That upswing was brought on by a number of different factors. For of the most sought-after markets for private investment. Thanks to
one thing, owing to the drop in oil prices since 1986, and the subsequent the surging demand for middle class residential property during the
decline in the economic boom of the Arab Gulf States, scores of the 80s, real estate prices in middle class neighborhoods were increasing
Egyptian professionals and labor who were working there at the time at exponential rates that exceeded even the rampant rates of inflation
were dismissed and sent back home. Moreover, the escalation of the that beset the Egyptian economy back then. Consequently, investment
Persian Gulf war from the mid 80s onwards, and later the outbreak of in middle class, or “luxury”, housing became one of the most profitable,
the Gulf War in the early 90s, prompted many more of those Egyptians and thereby one of the most popular, quick-return entrepreneurial
to return back home as well.23 Also, the mid 80s was roughly the time activities in Egypt at the time – as evident by the fact that 57% of all
when many members of the rising entrepreneur class had effectively private investment in Egypt went to the housing sector in the five years
attained middle class status after they had accumulated enough wealth between the beginning of 1982 and the end of 1986.24 In comparison
from their ventures over the previous decade – that is to say, it was the to other middle class neighborhoods, the exceptionally high demand
time when the new middle class had grown into a social force to be for residential property in Nasr City saw real estate there register some
reckoned with. the highest rates of price-increase. Between 1980 and 1987, the price
Naturally, Nasr City was a very fitting urban environment for many of land in Nasr City surged from 80 pounds per square meter to about
of the returning Egyptian professionals to settle with their families. 450 pounds per square meter; that is a 460% increase at an annual
They either purchased single-family apartments there, or built their rate of 28% when the consumer price index during that same period
own apartment-building houses on residential properties that they had increased by only 186% at an annual rate of 16%.25 Needless to say, such
either already owned or acquired upon returning from the Gulf States. skyrocketing rates made Nasr City a particularly lucrative quick-return
Likewise, Nasr City was also a very fitting urban environment for new investment market, and as a result, it became the focus of yet another
middle class entrepreneurs to situate their homes – one that perfectly type of demand that was driven by a multitude of aspiring individuals
met their criteria for a place of residence that would liken them to the of lower societal origins who saw in Nasr City a golden opportunity for
middle class ideal and, in turn, assert their newly attained status. That accumulating wealth and subsequent social advancement.
61
As it was discussed earlier, a lot of the Egyptian laborers who had meters. Moreover, in the two decades between the early 70s and the
returned from the Gulf Region in the mid 80s were looking to multiply early 90s, the government extended Nasr City’s limits increasing its area
the savings they had amassed while working there. Likewise, and around by about five times, and sanctioned the planning of a number of new
the same time, a lot of the craftsmen and workers who did not migrate neighborhoods within those extended limits.27
to the Arab Gulf States were also looking to multiply the financial gains
they had amassed due to the shortage of labor in Egypt during the 70s
and 80s. With its emergence as one of the most lucrative quick-return
investment markets at the time, many of those aspiring individuals
turned to Nasr City in order to achieve their goals. They most commonly
purchased land there, kept it off the market for some time until its value
multiplied, and then sold it to the highest bidder, garnering substantial
returns on their initial investments in the process. Another very
common practice for them was to exploit loopholes in the system, bribe
officials, or both, in order to construct apartment buildings that violated
Nasr City’s building bylaws and which thus had largest possible number
of units.26 Given the surging demand for residential property in Nasr
City, they then sold those units at a very high asking price, once again
garnering substantial returns on their initial investments in land and
construction costs. Eventually, those individuals accumulated enough
wealth from such ventures that effectively elevated them to middle
class status. Needless to say, once they had attained such status, they
too sought situating their residences in Nasr City in order to assert it.
In response to such overwhelming demand for Nasr City, the
Egyptian government took a number of key steps with regard to the
neighborhood’s building bylaws and the extents of its area. Around
the mid 80s, the government amended Nasr City’s building bylaws
increasing the maximum allowable residential building footprint from
one third to one half of the lot’s area. It also increased the maximum
height of all residential buildings by one storey. That is to say, residential
buildings overlooking streets with widths less than 50 meters were
allowed a height of five storeys at a maximum of 16 meters, while
residential buildings overlooking streets with widths equal or greater
than 50 meters were allowed a height of six storeys at a maximum of 19
62
First & Sixth Zones | Height Limits for Private Residential Properties ‘85
63
fig.1.3.4 [opposite page] An example of the configuration of
maximum building heights for private residential properties after
Nasr City’s building bylaws were amended in 1985. An extra
floor was added to the maximum height for all private residential
buildings, but the configuration remained the same – buildings
with the higher maximum limit still lined the perimeters of Zones
and neighborhoods.
fig.1.3.5 Street sections showing the relation between the

maximum building heights stipulated for private residential
properties and the range of Nasr City’s street widths after
amending the settlements building bylaws in 1985. The addition
of the extra floor, as per that amendment, had little effect on the
urban sections and character of Nasr City’s streets.
64
It is worth noting here that those steps were essentially what
Baudrillard (1970, 57) referred to as a “consciously induced shortage”
on the government’s part. The incremental increase to the maximum
allowable residential building heights in Nasr City did not really allow
for a substantial increase in its population density, at least not on an
official level since, in practice, Nasr City’s building bylaws were quite
often violated by all the profit-seeking real estate investors. Also, owing
to their smaller sizes; dissimilar planning; and peripheral character, the
newer neighborhoods that were added to Nasr City form the early 70s
onwards only served to highlight the higher quality of its four original
neighborhoods and the social weight that they carried. That is to say,
the prime real estate in Nasr City remained concentrated in the first,
sixth, seventh, and eighth zones.
ninth zone – planned in 1974

tenth zone – planned in 1974
eleventh zone – planned in 1985
sefarat neighborhood – planned in 1992
twelfth zone – planned in 1993
first, sixth, seventh & eighth zones
fig.1.3.6 Between 1974 and 1993, the area of Nasr Nasr City | 1974 – 1993
City was increased by about five times, and five new
neighborhoods of varying sizes were planned. New Residential Neighborhoods
65
66
50 250 500 1000 m
Nasr City | Planning c.1990

67
fig.1.3.7 Nasr City’s land use patterns in the early 90s. The only major change
Individual Residential Properties to the Nasr City’s original core was the conversion of the large military sports
courts area to the south of the Second Zone into condominium complexes.
Condominum Complex Out of the five new neighborhoods added between the 70s and 90s, three, the
Ninth and Tenth Zone, and Sefarat Neighborhood, were primarily intended
to a middle class clientele; the other two, the Eleventh and Twelfth Zones,
Low-cost Housing comprised an assortment of low cost housing and condominium complexes.
The extended limits of Nasr City came to include ‘Ezbet elHaggana; a large
Military Personnel Housing squatter settlement. The rest of the area added to Nasr City remained largely
unplanned, as evident by the very general planning scheme of the area on it
Residential-Administrative Mixed Use eastern boundary.
Residential Zone Nucleus

[Miscellaneous Large-scale Services]
Small-scale Retail/Service
Park
Health Care
Basic/Secondary Education
Post-secondary Education
Public Service Administration/Regulatory Organization
Governmental Organization/State-owned Company
Cultural
Sports fig.1.3.8 [next spread] A map of Nasr City’s core

residential neighborhoods in the mid 90s. In ten
years, Nasr City has come a long way from the
Industrial desolate, underdeveloped suburban settlement that
it was up until the mid 80s.
Light Industrial Services
Public Service Infrastructure
Religious
Cemetery
Army Property
Uassigned – Property of Governmental And so, by the early 90s, Nasr City had grown into one of the biggest
Organizations/State-owned Companies
middle class habitats in all of Cairo. However, as it shall be demonstrated
Unassigned – Property of Nasr City Company
in the next chapter, both the urban and architectural characters of
Squatter Settlement
Nasr City closely mirrored the deep social differences that divided the
Egyptian middle class.
68
3 325 000N
3 325 500N
3 326 000N
3 326 500N
3 327 000N
3 327 500N
336 000E 336 000E
88
86
84
82
80
70
336 500E 336 500E
337 000E 337 000E
337 500E 337 500E
69
338 000E 338 000E
106
104
102
90
96
98
102
100
338 500E 338 500E
339 000E 339 000E

339 500E 339 500E
340 000E 340 000E
340 500E 340 500E
341 000E 341 000E
13
8
140
142
4
14
6
14
70
150
148
341 500E 341 500E
342 000E 342 000E
342 500E 342 500E
343 000E 343 000E

3 325 000N
3 325 500N
3 326 000N
3 326 500N
3 327 000N
3 327 500N
Chapter Two
71
2.A A Street of
Extended Family Houses
72
The late 80s was a very interesting time for the household of 11 El-Insha Street. In 1988, my sister Abla was born, and shortly
afterwards, my grandparents moved into their apartment on the building’s ground floor. Also In 1988, my uncle Ahmad, his
wife, and his 2-year old daughter Samar, returned from the United Kingdom after he had finished his graduate studies there;
and they were back into their apartment on the buildings second floor. In other words, 1988 was the year that 11 El-Insha
Street became an extended family household.
In addition to myself and my cousin Samar, the arrival of my sister Abla gave my grandfather, Dr. Abouzeid, three
grandchildren in total. He accordingly had a mind to provide each of us, his grandchildren, with our own apartments in 11
El-Insha Street. So, shortly after Nasr City’s building height bylaws were amended to allow for an extra storey, Dr. Abouzeid
approached Mr. Fahim with the proposition of adding two more floors to El-Insha Street’s three floors and bringing it to the
maximum allowable height of 5 storeys. His idea was to grant the two new apartments on his side of the property that such
an addition would leave him with to myself and Samar, and to grant Abla with his own apartment on the ground floor since
fig.2.a.1 [previous page] El- she was the youngest of his grandchildren, and therefore would most likely have no use for her apartment until after both
Insha Street’s sign on the outer
wall of building no.15. him and my grandmother would have passed away and vacated the apartment.
73
Mr. Fahim was quick to agree to his friend’s proposition because he was still looking to provide his daughter and her future
family with their own apartment in 11 El-Insha Street. But since he only really needed one more unit to do that, and did
not have that much liquidity on hand, Mr. Fahim sold one of the apartments on his side of the property to one of my
grandfather’s younger acquaintances, Dr. Hatem elHabiby, in order to front his share of the construction costs of adding the
two extra storeys to 11 El-Insha street. However, when Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim went to issue a permit for adding those
two extra storeys, they were informed that although Nasr City’s amended building bylaws technically allowed a maximum
height of five storeys on their property, the original permit for 11 El-Insha Street was issued before the passing of those
amendments and therefore they technically do not apply to their already constructed apartment building. Instead, they
were told that in order to have a building of 5 storeys on their property, they had to knock down 11 El-Insha Street, issue a
new permit as per Nasr City’s amended building bylaws, and then rebuild it to that height. Needless to say that was a rather
ludicrous stipulation, and it was suggest to Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim that they should just follow the then conventional
practice of adding the two extra storeys without an official permit and later exploit the system loopholes to deem them legal
after the fact. Left with no other feasible choice, Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim elected to do so and the addition of two extra
storeys comprising four new apartments to El-Insha Street started in 1989, and was completed by 1990.
74
Fawzy Ghattas
Mina Ghattas
Nahed Fahim
Gerges Fahim
Victor Fahim
Amal Badei’
Eveline Banoob
Nady Fahim
Ramy Fahim
fig.2.a.2 The generational allocation of property

among the extended family households of 11
El-Insha Street in the early 90s. Although my Hatem elHabiby
grandfather, Dr. Abouzeid, only owned half of the
building, he was still able to endow each of his
children, and grandchildren at the time, with their
own apartments.
75
Azza elDinasoury
Samar Abouzeid
Abd-alAziz Abouzeid
Ahmed Abouzeid
Ola Abouzeid
Amaal elSharqawy
Abla elBahrawy
Amr elBahrawy
Aly elBahrawy
76
I was only a child of seven when 11 El-Insha Street became a 5-storey extended family household in 1990. At such a young
age I genuinely thought that its social configuration was the standard template for all residential buildings, and I had every
good reason to believe so. For one thing, most of the relatives that I visited with my family back then, who many of which
also dwelled in Nasr City, lived with their extended families in their own apartment buildings that resembled 11 El-Insha
Street. Also, on my daily bus ride back from school, it was more often than not a group of cousins that got off the bus
when it made stops at apartment buildings that looked a lot like 11 El-Insha Street. As for those who were on the bus
alone, or just with their brothers and sisters, they still usually spoke of their grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins who
lived with them in the same house if, once again, they were dropped off at buildings the were quite similar to 11 El-Insha
Street. And then there was El-Insha Street itself where every single building on it had pretty much the same height, feel,
and look as my extended family’s apartment building. For the longest time, I was only aware that the apartment building to
the left of ours, that is 9 El-Insha Street, and the one other apartment building at the end of the street, 10 El-Insha Street,
were in fact extended family houses like 11 El-Insha Street, simply because my sister and myself went to the same schools
as the youngest generations of both households. It must have been that awareness, along with the strong resemblance
between my extended family’s apartment building and the rest of the buildings down El-Insha Street, that left me with the
impression that each of those apartment buildings was a multi-generational family household as well. And it wasn’t until
I started working on this thesis that I came to learn that this was in fact the case – El-Insha Street was indeed a street of
apartment building–extended family houses.
77
0 5 10 20m
El-Insha Street | Early 90s – Mid 2000s
fig.2.a.3 El-Insha Street between the early 90s and

mid 2000s. Throughout that period, every single
apartment building on the street was in fact an
extended family household.
78
fig.2.a.4 [opposite page] 1 El-Insha Street; or Bayt alReda, houses an
extended family of three generations. The second generation – the main
inhabitants of the building – consists of three siblings, two sisters and a
brother, each with their own apartment for their respective nuclear families.
One of the sisters, however, lives in the states. The family rents out the
unoccupied apartments in the building.
79
80
fig.2.a.5 5 El-Insha Street; a very secretive
extended family lives in that apartment building.
Not much is known about the household.
81
fig.2.a.6 3 El-Insha Street; like Bayt alReda,
this extended family household rents out the vacant
apartments in the building to exchange students in
the nearby Azhar University.
82
fig.2.a.7 9 El-Insha Street; an extended family
household of three generations. Mr. Fahim’s and
this household’s families are acquaintances. 9
El-Insha Street’s family consists of a patriarch,
who owns a longstanding family business; two
daughters; and two sons. The ground floor of the
building is the business’s secondary headquarters.
The first and second floors have one apartment
each. The patriarch and matriarch of the family
live in the apartment on the first floor with the
understanding that it would pass to the nuclear
family of the last of their sons to get married. The
second floor apartment is allocated to their other
son. The third floor comprises two apartments, one
for each of their daughters’ nuclear families.
83
fig.2.a.8 7 El-Insha Street; another very
secretive extended family household. By the looks of
it though, 7 El-Insha Street has one apartment per
floor for a total of three apartments. The patriarch
and matriarch of the family occupy one of those
apartments, and the other two are allocated to the
nuclear families of each of their two children.
84
fig.2.a.9 15 El-Insha Street; An extended family
household consisting of the nuclear families of 3
brothers and two sisters. Most of the siblings of 15
El-Insha Street are Azharites.
85
household of three generations. Like that of 9 El-
Insha Street, the patriarch of this extended family
household also owns a longstanding business.
He built this 4-storey apartment building for
himself and the nuclear families of his 3 sons and
2 daughters. The patriarch and matriarch of the
household live on the apartment on the ground floor.
86
87
fig.2.a.11 17 El-Insha Street; this one-storey villa housed one
couple who had no children. After the wife passed away, the
husband’s nephew, along with his nuclear family, came to reside
with his uncle in the house.
88
fig.2.a.12 2 El-Insha Street; this two-storey
building is an extended family household where
the patriarch and matriarch of the family live in
the ground floor apartment. I went to the same
university as one of the patriarch’s grandchildren.
Although my university colleague’s father had his
own apartment in 2 El-Insha Street, for some reason
he did not reside there with his nuclear family. The
building was intended to be an extended family
household regardless.
89
household consisting of three generations. The
patriarch and matriarch of the family live in the
household, and one their of their sons has left the
country, but still has his apartment in the building.
90
91
fig.2.a.14 [opposite page] 8 El-Insha Street;
another extended family household consisting of
three generations. The patriarch and matriarch of
the family live in a duplex comprised of apartments
on the ground and first floor. Each one of their
children, and their respective nuclear families, has
their own apartment in the building.
fig.2.a.15 10 El-Insha Street; another extended

family household consisting of three generations.
The patriarch and matriarch of the family had only
one son. He has his own apartment in the building,
and his son and daughter, the grandchildren,
each have their own apartments as well. An extra
apartment in the building was sold to a close family
friend.
92
Some time after I got into architecture school in Cairo, I began to fully understand and appreciate the qualities and uniqueness
of 11 El-Insha Street’s architectural typology. Given Egypt’s wealth of architectural history, we were extensively taught
about the correlating subjects of the traditional houses of medieval Cairo and design by accretion; and I soon started to
notice a lot of similarities between the typology of those traditional houses and that of 11 El-Insha Street. The most obvious
of such similarities was that both typologies housed multiple generations of the same family simultaneously. In that sense,
it seemed to me that 11 El-Insha Street was a modern take on a very old concept – it was essentially a traditional extended
family house cloaked in a very modular, typical-floor-plan apartment building typology where each of the nuclear families
that made up the extended family household had its own private unit. And while, at first glance, it appeared as though
the very modular nature of 11 El-Insha Street’s typology was quite different from the atypical character of the traditional
houses of medieval Cairo, a closer look made it rather clear that, at a very basic level, both typologies “evolved” over time
in a very similar manner. One of the fundamental concepts we were taught about those traditional extended family houses
was that none of them had a predetermined long-term design scheme at the outset. Rather, a traditional extended family
house started off as a simple single-family home that was neatly arranged around a spatial element of pristine geometry
– typically a central courtyard; and as the family that inhabited it grew, and the needs of its members changed, the house
itself grew as well, and by multiple instances of addition and omission, its design was altered several times over the years
to accommodate the changing needs of its inhabitants. Many generations and layers of design later, those extended family
households ultimately became the highly irregular and atypical traditional houses that exist today.
11 El-Insha Street on the other hand featured a very standardized design that was devised with a set number of units
for a set number of generations and nuclear families in mind; and it was constructed in its entirety before many of its
intended inhabitants were ready to occupy or even had any use for their assigned units in the building. Despite that uniform,
predetermined character however, and much like the traditional extended family houses of yore, 11 El-Insha Street was
consistently altered over the years to accommodate the changing needs of its two extended families, which was a relatively
easy process due to the modular nature of the building’s simple post-and-beam construction. As a matter of fact, with
the exception of my grandparents who lived in their ground floor unit for some years before changing its original spatial
arrangement, the only time any of 11 El-Insha Street’s apartments followed the building’s original floor plan was when they
were unoccupied. Albeit at different times, my parents; as well as my uncle and his wife; and each of Mr. Fahim’s children
and their spouses, all altered the original spatial arrangement of their respective apartments in 11 El-Insha Street prior to
moving into the building; and some of them even went on to change those spatial arrangements again and again over the
following years. Those alterations to 11 El-Insha Street’s typical floor plans ranged from a simple addition of a wall to make
one big room into two smaller ones, or removing an existing wall or annexing a balcony to make a smaller room bigger; to
complete overhauls of the floor plan for the sake of repurposing an entire apartment into monastic accommodations, or
93
fig.2.a.16 Ground floor of alSuhaymi House; the
quintessential traditional extended family house of
medieval Cairo. 11 El-Insha Street’s typology is a
modern take on its socio-spatial arrangement.
94
punching through floor plates to make two separate apartments into one duplex. As a result, all throughout the 30 years it
has housed the extended families of Dr. Abouzeid and Mr. Fahim, 11 El-Insha Street hardly had a typical floor plan to speak
of, but rather it has been in a constant state of spatial flux. That is to say, despite its formal architectural beginnings, 11 El-
Insha Street ended up having a non-uniform character that is quite similar to that of traditional extended family houses and
by way of the same process.
Another striking similarity I found between the traditional extended family houses of medieval Cairo and 11 El-Insha
Street was how the extended family household itself interacted within both typologies. In the former, the central courtyard
typically functioned as both the spatial and social focal point of the household. It was the seat of the households’ patriarch
and a common space shared by all the inhabitants of the house – a place where the members of the extended family’s
different generations met, socialized and accepted guests away from their own private quarters. 11 El-Insha Street on the
other hand did not have a geometrical centre per se, but it most certainly had a spatial and social focal point as well; and
that was my grandparents’ apartment on the building’s ground floor. As the patriarch of the family, Dr. Abouzeid’s apartment
served the same purpose as the central courtyard in a traditional extended family house. In a sense, it was the gateway
to the household as a whole with its location on the ground floor and its proximity to the street. It was where my mother,
father, uncle, aunt, sister, cousins and myself gathered on Fridays every weekend, and on every seasonal holiday, to share a
meal that my grandmother cooked for us. It was where we had our birthday parties, and where we came together to meet
relatives when they came to visit. It was where me and my sister met and played with our cousins when we were younger.
And its veranda was where we waited for our school bus every morning with our grandparents, and where they waited
for us every afternoon when we got back from school. Essentially, 11 El-Insha Street’s unit number 2 was the communal
space that allowed for a healthy measure of interaction between the household’s nuclear families without infringing on the
privacy of their own apartments.
fig.2.a.17 [opposite page] Dr. Abouzeid’s

apartment on the ground floor; it’s the only
apartment that was occupied without making any
changes to its floor plan
95
doorman’s
room
storage
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 2 | 1988 – 1997
Abd al-Aziz Abouzeid & Amaal elSharqawy
96
fig.2.a.18 My parent’s apartment on the first floor;
one of the back bedroom was split into a bedroom
for myself, and later for my sister as well, and a
living room. Part of the front balcony was annexed
into a small study; an important space to my parents
since both are academics. Located at front portion
of the apartment next to the very formal, and hardly
used, reception and dining room, the study was
intended to be a quieter room to work in.
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 4 | 1987 – 1998
Ola Abouzeid & Aly elBahrawy 97
fig.2.a.19 My uncle’s apartment on the second
floor; like in my mother’s apartment, one of the back
bedrooms was split into a bedroom for his daughter,
and later for his younger daughter as well, and a
living room. Part of the front balcony was annexed
to make for an extra reception area.
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 6 | 1984 – 1995
Ahmed Abouzeid & Azza elDinasoury 98
fig.2.a.20 Throughout the years, my grandfather’s apartment has been the focal point of all sorts of social activity for 11 El-Insha Street’s extended family
household. It is where members of the household, usually received family guests and celebrated birthdays [top right]; where they gathered for a weekly meal that
my grandmother cooked for them on Fridays; where they celebrated seasonal occasions [bottom left and bottom right]; where me, my sister, and my cousins met
to play or watch TV together; and its veranda was where me and my sister waited for our school bus every morning with our grandfather [top left].
99
doorman’s
room
fig.2.a.21 In 1997, my grandfather added a veranda

to the front of his unit making his apartment more
accessible which in turn further emphasized its
character as the central communal space for the
extended family household.
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 2 | 1997 – 2004
Abd al-Aziz Abouzeid & Amaal elSharqawy
100
fig.2.a.22 In 1998, my nuclear family moved out of
apartment 4 on the first floor to apartment 10 on the
fifth floor. The two back bedrooms were rearranged
into a bedroom for my parents; two separate
bedrooms for me and my sister, and a living area.
The portion of the front balcony was, once again
annexed, this time to make for a larger reception
area.
fig.2.a.23 [opposite page, left] Two years later, in

2000, I got into architecture school. Accordingly,
the front portion of apartment 4 was repurposed
to become my studio, where I worked on school
projects since my room in apartment 10 was too
small to fit my drafting table or receive classmates
to work on group projects. The back portion of the
apartment was repurposed into a bigger study area
for my parents, with their former bedroom turned
into an office and our former living room turned
into a library for all their books.
fig.2.a.24 [opposite page, right] Five years after

that, in 2005, my sister got into architecture school
too. Accordingly, our living room in apartment 10
was repurposed to be her own separate studio; and
the living room was moved to the front portion of
the apartment.
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 10 | 1998 – 2005
Ola Abouzeid & Aly elBahrawy 101
storage
library
0 1m 2m 3.5 m 0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street 11 El-Insha Street

Apartment 4 | 2000 – present Apartment 10 | 2005 – present
Amr elBahrawy + Ola Abouzeid 102 Ola Abouzeid
fig.2.a.25 My uncle is, by far, the one inhabitant
of 11 El-Insha Street who’s responsible for the
most drastic, and the most instances of change to
his apartment over the years. Not being a fan of
eating in front of TV, and barred from using the
highly ceremonial dining room; in 1995, my uncle
got rid of the hardly used water closet and redid
his main bathroom to create more space for having
a small dining area that led into the living room.
That expanded living space became the centre of
activity in his apartment, where his kids studied and
received friends and relatives.
fig.2.a.26 [opposite age] In 1997, my uncle had

male twins. With four children, and in need of more
space; in 2002, my uncle embarked on his most
ambitious rearrangement of his unit to date. He
punctured through the floor slab of his apartment
with a staircase that connected it to his eldest
daughter’s intended apartment on the next floor
turning both units into one duplex. The lower level
of that duplex, namely apartment 6, consisted of
living and sleeping spaces. The former reception
in apartment 6 was turned into my uncle and his
wife’s bedroom; allowing for the two bedrooms at
the back of the apartment to become those of their
two daughters, and two sons respectively. The
former dining area in apartment 6 was turned into
an extra living space, and from there, the internal
staircase led to the upper level of the duplex,
namely apartment 8. The front potion of apartment
8 consisted of a large, open reception and dining
area, complete with their own small bathroom and
kitchenette; a ceremonial space that was primarily
designated to receive and entertain guests without
interfering with the privacy of the family’s living
spaces on the lower level. The back portion of
apartment 8 had a study for my uncle, and a
separate study for his daughters.
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 6 | 1995 – 2002
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartments 6 and 8 | 2002 – 2008
fig.2.a.27 [opposite page] Realizing that his and
his wife’s bedroom, which overlooked El-Insha
Street, was too noisy for his own taste; my uncle
relocated it to the quieter back portion of apartment
6 in 2008, switching bedrooms with his two sons.
That simple move, however, entailed yet another
spatial rearrangement of the back portion of
apartment 6. My uncle got rid of the living and
dining space there to make for a bigger master
bedroom for himself and his wife; complete with its
own little balcony and walk-in closet – which is a
rather novel concept in Egypt. He also reverted the
main bathroom to its original form, and redid his
kitchen giving it more area. The rest of the duplex
remained unaltered.
105
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartments 6 and 8 | 2008 – present
w.c.
w.c.
doorman’s driver’s
room room
bedroom bedroom
bathroom
w.c.
kitchen
living room
dining room +
reception
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 1 | 1997 – 2010
Ramy Fahim & Nagat Zakhary
107
fig.2.a.28 The same year my grandfather added
a veranda to his unit, Mr. Fahim’s youngest son,
Ramy, got married and was ready to move into
his unit on the ground floor; apartment 1. Before
moving in with his newly wed, the front portion
of the apartment was altered. The reception was
opened up on a walled porch that annexed the
setback in front of the apartment; and the kitchen
wall was knocked down opening it up to the dining
room.
108
w.c.
storage driver’s
room
bedroom
bedroom
bedroom
bathroom
w.c.
kitchen
living room
+ dining room
reception
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
Apartment 1 | 2010 – present
Ramy Fahim & Nagat Zakhary
109
fig.2.a.29 [opposite page] After having two sons,
in 2010, Ramy Fahim went through another
rearrangement of his unit. The rear set back behind
his apartment was annexed into another porch and
allowed for a bigger bedroom for himself and his
wife. It also gave him enough space to turn the
other bedroom into two separate one of each of his
sons. In the front portion of the apartment, the open
kitchen was closed up to become its own separate
space once again, after the open-concept kitchen
did not sit well with the heavy nature of Egyptian
cuisine.
bedroom bedroom
bathroom
kitchen
fig.2.a.30 Hatem elHabiby’s unit, apartment 3,
featured the most minimal alteration in all of 11 El-
Insha Street. The water closet was disposed of to
allow for a bigger kitchen.
dining room living room

+
reception
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
110
Hatem elHabiby & Mona Ismail
fig.2.a.31 In Nady Fahim’s apartment, part of
the front balcony was annexed and turned into a
study. The most common spatial alteration in 11 El-
Insha Street also occurred, as one of the two back
bedrooms was split into a bedroom for his older bedroom
son, and a living area; which was later turned into
his younger son’s bedroom.
bedroom
living room
[now bedroom]
bathroom
w.c.
fig.2.a.32 [opposite page, left] Apartment 7

featured one of the most interesting spatial and
functional adaptations in 11 El-Insha Street.
After graduating university, Mr. Fahim’s son,
Victor, became a monk. Now Father Dionysius, he kitchen
accordingly transformed his unit in 11 El-Insha
Street into something of a miniature monastery.
The back portion of the apartment was split into
four monastic cells; and part of the front balcony
was annexed into a guest bedroom, which along
with the reception and big dining room, made for
a communal space for less fortunate wayfarers to
stay while Father Dionysius’ parent monastery set
them up with jobs and their own accommodations.
reception dining room
[now living room]
fig.2.a.33 [opposite page, right] Nahed Fahim’s
unit, apartment 9, also features the most common
spatial alteration in 11 El-Insha Street also
occurred, as one of the two back bedrooms was split
into a bedroom for her son, and a living area; which
was then turned into a bed room for other son later
on. With the arrival of her third and youngest son, study
the dining room was appropriated into a bedroom
for her eldest son, while his former room became
that of his youngest brother. The reception, which
now doubles as a living room, came to also include
the dining room.
0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street
111 Nady Fahim & Amal Badei’
monastic monastic
cell cell bedroom
bedroom
monastic
cell
monastic living room
cell [now bedroom]
bathroom bathroom
w.c. w.c.
kitchen kitchen
reception
dining room reception

[now bedroom] [now also
dining room dining room]
guest
bedroom
0 1m 2m 3.5 m 0 1m 2m 3.5 m
11 El-Insha Street 11 El-Insha Street

Apartment 7 | 1997 – present Apartment 9 | 1991 – present
Father Dionysius [Victor Fahim] 112 Nahed Fahim & Fawzy Ghattas
1984 – 1988 113 1990 – 1997
fig.2.a.34 The transformation of 11 El-Insha
Street’s façade over 30 years; clearly less effort
was exerted, as well as, less attention given to
altering it in comparison to the buildings floor
plans. However, it has as much resilience and
capacity for adaptation as the floor plans. The
arched window on the top floor is my mother’s
pride and joy. Having that sort of window in was
one of her primary concerns during the furnishing
of apartment 10 before we relocated to it from
apartment 4. Apparently, this window became
an identifying marker in the area for 11 El-Insha
Street, much to my mother’s content.
1998 – present 114

However, it wasn’t just the parallels between the traditional extended family houses of medieval Cairo and 11 El-Insha
Street’s apartment building–extended family house typology that caught my interest. I also became quite interested in what
seemed to be a particular prevalence of that unique architectural typology within Nasr City’s urban context. By the time I
finished primary school in 1993, I had definitely outgrown my earlier childhood notion that 11 El-Insha Street’s apartment
building–extended family house typology was the template for all residential buildings. At the time, Nasr City was at the
height of its development boom that had started in the mid 80s, and condominium towers were clearly emerging as the
predominant residential typology throughout the whole neighborhood. Those towers looked like a much taller and bulkier
variant of 11 El-Insha Street since they obviously, and in the strictest architectural sense, followed a similar apartment
building typology. But it was also quite obvious that, unlike 11 El-Insha Street’s typology, those towers did not house the
same social structures. Instead, the substantially larger number of apartments in a condominium tower were inhabited
by unrelated nuclear families. Although it was much simpler version of it, I’ve had that impression since a very young age
because the majority of my schoolmates who dwelled in Nasr City lived in apartments in condominium towers, and rather
than relatives, they instead spoke of unrelated neighbors who lived with them in the same building.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming prevalence of condominium towers in Nasr City, once the apartment building–
extended family house typology caught my interest; I noticed three distinct trends that pertained to it within the context
of the neighborhood. The first was that, while it most definitely was not exclusive to Nasr City, the apartment building–
extended family house typology was by far the most prevalent there. More than any other Cairene neighborhood, it seemed
to me that Nasr City hosted some of the largest clusters of those apartment building–extended family houses, and had quite
a few streets that, much like El-Insha Street, were made up entirely of buildings that followed that typology. From there, it
also appeared to me as though, within the urban fabric of Nasr City itself, the streets on which apartment building–extended
family houses generally stood, as well as the streets that were made up entirely of such typology, were almost always inner
streets. Condominium towers on the other hand seemed to be far more common on Nasr City’s wider main streets.
And finally, it seemed to me that this clear distinction between the general locales of apartment building–extended
family houses and condominium towers within the context of Nasr City reflected an equally clear distinction between the
social groups that inhabited both such typologies. Apartment building–extended family houses appeared to be an almost
exclusive dwelling typology for middle class professionals, while members of the new middle class seemed to predominately
dwell in the condominium tower typology. That is not to say that no middle class professional ever dwelled in Nasr City’s
condominium towers, because a great many of them did. It just appeared to me as though this did not work in reverse
since there were hardly any new middle class extended families who dwelled in their own apartment building households.
I had this distinct impression since a very young age because I was aware that the older members of 11 El-Insha Street’s
two extended family households were all professionals – my grandparents, uncle and aunt were doctors; my parents were
115
university professors; and Mr. Fahim’s sons, daughters, and their spouses, were pharmacists, veterinarians, and accountants,
et cetera. I was also aware that those of my relatives, as well as the parents of my schoolmates, who dwelled in the same
type of building as 11 El-Insha Street were all professionals too. Conversely though, the parents of my schoolmates who
lived in condominium towers almost always had jobs that sounded both different and rather ambiguous to me at such a
young age – they either owned export and import companies, or dealerships, or were simply just “businessmen”.
All in all, in the fifteen years or so between the early 90s and the mid 2000s, 11 El-Insha Street stood as a quintessential
example of the apartment building–extended family house typology, and along with the other apartment building extended
family households down El-Insha street, it constituted one of several building blocks for a unique street model that was
particularly prevalent in Nasr City. By the end of those 15 years, I had no reason to believe that any of this would change. I
thought that 11 El-Insha Street will continue to adapt to the changing needs of my extended family for years to come, and
that the other extended family apartment buildings down the street will do so too. I also thought that El-Insha Street would
remain the urban enclave of middle class professionals that it had always been for decades to come. But little did I know, all
of that was, once again, about to drastically change over the following few years.
116
fig.2.1.1 Aerial photo of a typical Nasr City
neighborhood, showing the discrepancy between
the bylaw-abiding apartment buildings and the
towering, bylaw violating condominium typology.
There’s clearly more of the latter than there is of
the former.
117
2.1 Nasr City [1990s]
An urban testament to a middle class divide
“Although the broader changes in the Arab world have to establish that link by demonstrating two key findings. The first is that
favored the nuclear family, the extended family still plays a Nasr City, at the time, was the residential hub for professionals who, as
role outside the household. This is visible in the preference for it was established earlier, represented an older, more moral Egyptian
related nuclear family households to reside near one another, middle class. And the second is that Nasr City, at the time, had the
and to maintain a fairly intense contact. In cities like Cairo, a largest concentration of the building–extended family house typology
typical pattern at present is to build a multi-storey or multi- in comparison to the other Cairene neighborhoods – a point that would
apartment building with various married kin, each occupying be made by way of cross-referencing demographic indicators pertaining
their independent apartment. This novel combination gives the to the prevalent housing typologies and modes of housing ownership
adults many of the positive features of modern nuclear family in each of Cairo’s managerial districts. From there, another series of
and gives the children many of the positive features of the statistical maps applying the same demographic criteria to Nasr City’s
traditional extended family. Relatives live as neighbors, but in managerial sub-districts will be used to establish that, out of all those
economically independent households.” sub-districts, the apartment building–extended family house typology
as a unique form of middle class housing was the most prevalent in the
(Hopkins and Ibrahim 1997, 178) First Zone – the sub-district where 11 El-Insha Street is located. That will
then be followed by a number of urban analyses based on a survey that
Apart from the very broad reference to the apartment building– was carried out in Nasr City’s First Zone. Those analyses will illustrate
extended family house typology in the quote above, and as far as the the conformity of its residential structures to Nasr City’s building height
research for this thesis went, no other formal study or statistical data bylaws, in order to contextually visualize the urban patterns of where
that directly linked such typology, Nasr City, and the Egyptian middle apartment building¬–extended family houses stood in relation to
class together was to be found. Accordingly, a series of statistical maps condominium towers within the First Zone. In essence, the following set
that were reproduced from raw data pertaining to certain demographic of mapping exercises aims at corroborating the main arguments of this
criteria in Cairo’s managerial districts in 1996 are going to be used here thesis by way of concrete demographic and urban data.
118
fig.2.1.2 Managerially, Nasr City consists of two
districts, Nasr City First, and Nasr City Second.
The latter comprises most of Nasr City’s large-scale
projects, industrial areas, and low-cost housing.
The latter, on the other hand, comprises Nasr City’s
core residential zones, and thus is going to be the
main focus of the following analysis. Although it
is technically part of the Nasr City First district,
‘Ezbet elHaggana sub-district, one of Cairo’s larger
squatter settlements, has been excluded from Nasr
City First here so as not to skew the data. Moreover,
the seventh neighborhood, which technically is part
of the Nasr City Second district, had been included
here with the Nasr City first district, since it belongs
to Nasr City’s core Seventh Zone.
0.5 1.5 2.5 5.0 km
Nasr City First Boundaries
Cairo Governorate Districts 1996

119
7.8% 9.9%
1.3% 2.4%
0.2% 2.2%
8.2%
2.5%
1.5%
4.0%
fig.2.1.3 Between 1986 and 1996, the years of its
socially driven urban boom, Nasr City exhibited
4.4% one of the highest population growth rates in all
of Cairo, rivaled only by the typically fast-growing
lower end residential districts of the city.
2.3% 10.5%
1.5%
Cairo Governorate Districts

Annual Population Growth 1986 – 1996
Decrease Increase
120
fig.2.1.4 In 1996, Nasr City had some 256,000
inhabitants, a much higher population than Cairo’s
other high-end middle class neighborhoods, such as
Masr AlGadeeda and Nozha districts to Nasr City’s
north (120,000 inhabitants and 154,000 inhabitants
respectively).
Cairo Governorate Districts 1996 • Population [x1000]
5 – 20 20 – 50 50 – 100 100 – 200 200 – 400 400 – 600 600 – 850
121
fig.2.1.5 In the same year, 55.5% of Nasr City’s
working population were professionals, versus 46%
in Masr AlGadeeda and 52% in Nozha. Combined
with its fairly larger population, this means that
Nasr City was indeed the hub of professionals as
a social group. Given the high real-estate rates in
Nasr City at the time, it is safe to assume that the
other half of it’s working population belonged to
the entrepreneurial middle class who could afford
those rates.

0% – 5% 5% – 15% 15% – 25% 25% – 35% 35% – 45% 45% – 55% 55% – 60%
122
fig.2.1.6 As defined in the census, a house is a
residential structure of one to five storeys with
only one apartment on each storey; and a villa is
a residential structure of two storeys linked by an
internal staircase. And while these criteria might
have been useful to identify Nasr City’s bylaw-
abiding apartment building–extended family house
typology, the fact the apartment buildings that
follow such typology in the district usually have
more than one apartment per storey renders this
criteria useless. Not to mention that the census’s
definition of a “family” does not explicitly exclude
on include extended families. Indeed, in 1996,
Nasr City, like the majority of Cairo’s districts, had
a very low percentage of its families living in the
defined “House” or “Villa”.

Families dwelling in a Villa or a House
0% – 1% 1% – 2% 2% – 4% 4% – 6% 6% – 8% 22% – 24%
123
fig.2.1.7 Alternately, a single apartment is clearly
the prevalent form of dwelling for families in Nasr
City, as 94.5% of its families in 1996 dwelled in
a single apartment. That is also the case in Masr
AlGadeeda (91.4%) and Nozha (92.25%). An
alternate criteria for identifying the apartment
building–extended family house typology had to be
found.

Families dwelling in an Apartment
50% – 70% 70% – 80% 80% – 85% 85% – 90% 90% – 95% 95% – 100%
124
fig.2.1.8 The criteria for identifying the apartment
building–extended family house typology presents
itself in the mode of residential unit ownership.
A purchased unit is one that has been “sold” by
its owner to another party through a monetary
transaction. Apartments in condominiums, bylaw-
abiding or not, that were built by private citizens
and sold later to the general public, fall under that
type of unit. In other words, this criterion could be
used to identify unrelated nuclear families in any
given district. In 1996, 64% of families in Nasr
city dwelled in a purchased unit, one of the highest
percentages compared to the older districts Masr
AlGadeeda and Nozha where rental was still the
prevalent form of residential unit ownership.

Families dwelling in a Purchased Residential Unit
0% – 5% 5% – 15% 15% – 25% 25% – 35% 55% – 65% 75% – 85%
125
fig.2.1.9 Alternately, an owned unit is one that
has been intended for its owner at its inception.
Apartments in condominiums developed by
syndicates, or other community regulatory bodies,
for its members who paid for it beforehand fall
under that type of unit. Most importantly however,
apartments that are entitled to certain individuals
without a monetary transaction fall under that type
of unit as well. In residential areas directed towards
a clientele of private citizens, this criterion could
be used to identify nuclear families that are part
of an extended family household, as the patriarch
and owner of an apartment building–extended
family household would endow his offspring with
apartments in the household without the transaction
of money. In that regard, in1996, 13.07% of families
in Nasr City dwelled in owned apartments, three
percentage points higher than Masr AlGadeeda and
Nozha. Keeping in mind that the percentile range
for that criterion is rather small, and that Nasr
City has a considerably higher population than
either middle class district, this difference could
be extrapolated to mean that Nasr City hosts the
highest concentrations of the apartment building–
extended family house typology.

Families dwelling in an Owned Residential Unit
0% – 10% 10% – 15% 15% – 20% 20% – 30% 30% – 40% 40% – 50% 50% – 70%
126
fig.2.1.10 Crowding is defined as a ratio between
the number of individuals to the number of rooms
available in a certain area. It is a good measure for
assessing living quality and population density. In
that regard, in 1996 Nasr City had a crowding ratio
of 0.89 persons per room. It was a considerably
higher density in comparison to the much smaller
Masr AlGadeeda (0.83) and Nozha (0.86). This
speaks of the negative effect of the prevalence of the
bylaw violating condominium towers throughout
Nasr City, which typically had smaller apartments
with fewer rooms in order to allow for the maximum
possible number of apartments to sell per building,
and in turn the maximum possible return profit for
the building’s owner.
Cairo Governorate Districts 1996 • Crowding
0.60 – 0.80 0.80 – 0.90 0.90 – 1.10 1.10 – 1.20 1.20 – 1.30 1.30 – 1.40 1.40 – 1.50 1.70 – 1.75
127
fig.2.1.11 The same criteria applied on the district
scale in Cairo will now be applied on the sub-
district scale in Nasr City to demonstrate that the
First Zone, where 11 El-Insha Street is located,
has the highest concentration of the apartment
building–extended family house typology within
the district. What is of concern here are the core,
original residential zones on Nasr City.
0.5 1.0 2.0 km
First Zone Boundaries

Core Residential Zones
Nasr City First Sub-Districts
128
fig.2.1.12 In 1996, the First Zone had some 24,000
inhabitants. Owing to their highly underdeveloped
character at the time data from the Ninth and the
Tenth Zone are rather skewed and should not be
taken into account in the following analysis.
Nasr City First Sub-Districts 1996 • Population [x1000]
0 – 0.5 1–5 5 – 10 10 – 20 20 – 30 45 – 50
129
fig.2.1.13 In 1996, 50.7% of the First Zone’s
working population were professionals.
Nasr City First Sub-Districts 1996

25% – 30% 40% – 45% 45% – 50% 50% – 55% 55% – 60% 60% – 65% 70% – 75%
130
fig.2.1.14 Most importantly however, in 1996, only
40.8% of families in the First Zone dwelled in a
purchased residential unit; the lowest percentage in
all of Nasr City’s core residential Zones.

25% – 30% 40% – 45% 45% – 55% 55% – 65% 65% – 75% 75% – 85% 85% – 95%
131
fig.2.1.15 On the other hand, in 1996, 21.6% of
families in the First Zone dwelled in an owned
residential unit; by far the highest percentage in all
of Nasr City’s core residential Zones; in turn this
could be extrapolated to mean that the First Zone
has the highest concentrations of the apartment
building–extended family house typology.

0% – 10% 10% – 15% 15% – 20% 20% – 25%
132
fig.2.1.16 The First Zone also has the second lowest
crowding ratio of the districts core residential
zones, at 0.89 persons per room, indicating a lesser
presence of the towering condominium typology.
Nasr City First Sub-Districts 1996 • Crowding
0.65 – 0.80 0.80 – 0.90 0.90 – 1.00 1.00 – 1.10 1.10 – 1.20 1.20 – 1.30 1.50 – 1.55
133
fig.2.1.17 As illustrated here, the grossest
violations of Nasr City’s building height bylaws
in the First Zone in 1994 were mostly confined to
the major, wider streets. At the time, the narrower
smaller streets in the First Zone’s core had more
bylaw-abiding apartment building than they did
towering condominiums. Building on the preceding
statistical findings, it is safe to assume that a good
portion of those bylaw-abiding buildings follow
the apartment building–extended family house
typology.
%
11
%
5.9
66.5%
16
.6%
within height limit

1 to 2 storeys above height limit
5 or more storeys above height limit
First Zone | 1994

134 Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws
10 storeys and above 8 or 9 storeys 6 or 7 storeys up to 5 storeys
[11 stroreys and above on 50m streets] [9 or10 stroreys on 50m streets] [7 or 8 stroreys on 50m streets] [up to 6 stroreys on 50m streets]
135
fig.2.1.18 A three dimensional representation
of the building heights in the first zone in 1994,
illustrating the volumetric urban character of the
zone’s streets at the time.
First Zone | 1994

Residential Building Heights
136
Chapter Three
137
3.A The Begining
of an End
138
In 2003, during an urban course lecture about squatter settlements, our professor asked the class this question: what is
the largest informal settlement in all of Cairo? The class responded by naming some of the major squatter settlements like
Mansheyyet Nasser, ‘Ezbet elHaggana, etc. The professor rejected all of our answers as incorrect, and finally replied with a
smile on her face “Actually it is Nasr City”. A resident of Nasr City herself, she went on to explain that a squatter settlement
is just a type of informal settlement. Any urban settlement in which building bylaws are being consistently disregarded or
violated is, by definition, an informal settlement. Given Nasr City’s sheer size and the number of structures that violate its
building bylaws, she contended that Nasr City is by far the largest informal settlement in all of Cairo.
My professor didn’t really have any data to corroborate such a statement. It was more of an anecdote that spoke to the
perseverance of the condominium typology throughout Nasr City and the toll it had taken on the urban quality of living
in Nasr City. Almost ten years after Nasr City had become fully developed, the neighborhood was exhibiting a multitude
of problems with its infrastructure. Water and electricity were hardly dependable, there were constantly traffic jams that
blocked the main arteries in and out of the district, and there was a chronic shortage in parking spaces. Naturally that was
an inevitable outcome to the consistent violation of bylaws in Nasr City – an urban settlement in which the infrastructure
fig.3.a.1 [previous page] the was designed to accommodate buildings of a maximum height of five storeys, and yet has ended up with the majority of
demolition of a bylaw-abiding
apartment building–extended family buildings that exceeded this height limitation. Needless to say, that put a great deal of pressure on the infrastructure of Nasr
house against a backdrop of two
towering new condominiums. City and led to the aforementioned problems, much to the dismay of its inhabitants.
139
fig.3.a.2 Traffic congestion and lack of parking
space are some of the many troubles and woes
the residents of Nasr City live everyday, thanks
to the consistent violation of building bylaws
that culminated in overloading the settlements
infrastructure.
140
fig.3.a.3 [right] and fig.3.a.4 The
new style of condominium tower that
took Nasr City by storm starting in the
mid 2000s; a close up on the overly
ornate, yet only skin deep, details of
the facade
Around the same time, as a junior architecture student, I began to notice a certain style of condominium towers spread
throughout Nasr City. I vividly remember a condominium tower popping up two streets down from where I live, which
had a very ornate style to it. It looked to me as though it was a very gaudy derivation of a Neo-Classicism. But as far as its
functional arrangement and floor plans went, that building pretty much followed the same typology as the condominium
towers that pervaded throughout Nasr City since the early 90s. That is to say it was merely a new stylistic take on Nasr
fig.3.a.4 Accum sus, ipicti dolorem
City’s condominium tower typology. Not even a year later, a new condominium tower that looked almost identical to the
fugit dundit volorec toreperest,
aliquod minvenectur modicia sectest aforementioned building, was constructed on the same street. And then another soon followed on another street nearby.
iniendantium haris et volorrum facia
de non nem as ad ut ut quat.Pid es And then another, and another, and so on. It just seemed to me that every new building constructed in Nasr City from the
sae voluptatus dis molorum, qui
ommolorunt, early 2000s onwards followed that overly ornate style.
141
The early 2000s was also the first time I began hearing about New Cairo – A new suburban development that was emerging
on the eastern outskirts of Nasr City. It sounded as if most of my teaching assistants, who also had their small private
practices on the side as well as most of my professors who had fully established firms, had most of their business centered
around designing and constructing residential buildings in New Cairo. It was quite interesting for me to notice that most of
their residential building designs followed that same gaudy Neo-Classicist style of the condominium towers that were then
taking Nasr City by storm.
fig.3.a.5 [top] and fig.3.a.6 Bustling

construction in New Cairo in 2008;
Buildings there had the same gaudy
neo-classist style as the emerging
condominium typologies in Nasr City
142
In late 2008, this gaudy style of condominium tower came to El-Insha Street. At the time, I had returned to Egypt for my first
visit since I had moved to Canada earlier that year, and was surprised to find that the house at the corner of El-Insha Street
had been demolished and already another building was in the process of being constructed. When I inquired as to what had
happened, I came to know that the owner of the one-storey house that used to stand there had died, and that he was not
survived by any children of his own, but rather by a nephew who had sold the property. Shortly afterwards, the new owner
demolished the house and began constructing a 10-storey condominium tower.
During the same visit, both my mother and my uncle, each on a separate occasion, voiced their discontent with the
construction of the new condominium tower at the end of the street. I had the sense that they felt that structure would
infringe on the social character of El-Insha Street. They felt that it would bring in a new class of inhabitants to El-Insha
Street – a class they were not accustomed to. On a related note, they also both voiced their discontent with the overall
declining quality of urban living in Nasr City. These concerns were not new since they have always complained about the
power outages and water shortages ever since the late 90s and the early 2000s, but it seemed as though their complaints
were stepped up a notch.
Two years later in 2010 I came back to Cairo for another visit. The condominium tower on the corner of El-Insha Street
was fully constructed into the 10-storey stylistic monstrosity that it was. Right across from it, on the street perpendicular
to El-Insha Street, another bylaw abiding apartment building was being demolished. As a matter of fact, during that visit,
I noticed numerous similar buildings being demolished all over Nasr City and especially in the area around El-Insha Street.
During that same visit, I also learned that the inhabitants of the extended family house to the right of El-Insha Street
fig.3.a.7 17 El-Insha Street, after had relocated to the suburbs and repurposed the whole building to become the headquarters of their family business.
widowed owner of the villa died, his
nephew sold his uncle’s house and Moreover, I also learned that the inhabitants of the extended family house to the left of El-Insha Street were putting their
shortly there after it was demolished
in 2008. property up for sale.
143
fig.3.a.8 The vacant lot where 17 El-Insha Street used to stand. In Summer of
2008, the construction of a new building was already afoot.
fig.3.a.9 Two years later, a 10-storey condominium tower stood in place of the
one-storey villa that was 17 El-Insha Street.
144
fig.3.a.10
0 5 10 20m
El-Insha Street | 2010
145
fig.3.a.11
146
fig.3.a.12 An increasingly common
scene in Nasr City since 2008;
demolition of bylaw-abiding buildings
Most important of all, however, during that visit I also learned that my uncle had already purchased property and was in the
process of constructing his own extended family house in the suburb of Shorouq City. Most of Mr. Fahim’s children had also
each purchased property and were in the process of building their own separate extended family homes in the suburbs of
New Cairo. Both my uncle and Mr. Fahim’s children maintained that they were not intending on moving to those suburban
homes, but were rather constructing them for their own children to start their own families since, in the particular case
of 11 El-Insha Street, there wasn’t any space for them to provide each of their children with their own apartments. Most
147
fig.3.a.13 [left] and 3.a.14 Another
very common scene in Nasr City since
2008; the construction of condominium
towers that feature a very gaudy
derivation of neo-classicism
peculiarly however, my mother was also voicing a very keen interest on moving to the suburbs as well, even though as it
stands right now, herself, myself, and my sister each have our apartments in 11 El-Insha Street.
By the end of that visit, I came to the sad realization that El-Insha Street had quickly lost its very unique character as
a street of apartment building-extended family houses. The even sadder realization that twenty years after it had truly
become a modern version of extended family house, 11 El-Insha Street was itself on the verge of no longer being as such.
148
fig.3.a.15 Abouzeid Residence façade
in Shorouq City, this “villa” barely
accommodates the future nuclear
families of my uncle’s 4 children. The
coexistence of two full generations is
impossible, and a third generation,
namely my uncle’s future grandchildren,
are not account for at all in that villa.
A quite different situation than when my
uncle’s father, Dr. Abouzeid, built 11 El-
Insha Street.
149
4.00
2.50 2.50
Ahmed Abouzeid Azza elDinasoury
Samar Abouzeid Noha Abouzeid Muhammad Abouzeid Ali Abouzeid
fig.3.a.16
3.25
0 1m 2m 5m
Abouzeid Residence | Shorouq City

Ground Floor | Apartment 1
Ali Abouzeid [future occupant]
3.00
Ahmed Abouzeid & Azza elDinasoury
150
fig.3.a.17
0 1m 2m 5m

First Floor | Apartment 2
151 Muhammad Abouzeid [future occupant]
fig.3.a.18
0 1m 2m 5m

Second Floor + Roof | Apartments 3 & 4 [duplexes]
Samar Abouzeid & Noha Abouzeid [future occupants] 152
Fawzy Ghattas Nahed Fahim
Mina Ghattas Kirolos Ghattas Bishoy Ghattas
fig.3.a.19 [opposite page] Ghattas Residence Facade; this “villa” in New Cairo is intended to
accommodate Mrs. Fahim’s three sons’ nuclear families. Neither her nor her husband have units the
structure they built for their children
153
154
2.50
4.00
1.50
1.00
bedroom bedroom
4.25
bedroom
4.00
3.00 7.00 1.75 2.00 3.00 3.00
4.50
bathroom bathroom
2.00
1.25
bathroom
3.00
living room
3.80
3.25
4.50
kitchen
4.00
4.75
w.c.
1.50
4.50
18.50
6.00
6.50
4.00
Ghattas Residence | New Cairo

0 1m 2m 5m
Ground Floor | Apartment 1

Mina Ghattas [future occupant]
155
bedroom bedroom
4.25
bedroom
5.00
7.00 1.75 2.00 3.00
4.50
bathroom bathroom
2.00
1.25
bathroom
3.00
living room
3.80
3.25
4.50
kitchen
4.00
7.00
fig.3.a.20 [opposite page] and fig3.a.21
w.c.
1.50
4.50
18.50

7.00
7.50
Ghattas Residence | New Cairo

First + Second Floor | Apartments 2 & 3
Kirolos Ghattas & Bishoy Ghattas [future occupants]
156
fig.3.1.1 Since the mid 2000s, and driven by social
motives, the Nasr City’s middle class has been
flocking to new (sub)urban attractors to the east.
157
The main antagonist of this thesis is the city of New Cairo. This large
suburban development was formally established and planned in the
year 2000 to encompass an area of nearly 72,500 acres right on the
eastern border of Nasr City.1 In many ways, the suburbs of New Cairo
were quite different from Nasr City.
For one thing, New Cairo’s urban design is quite a departure from
Nasr City’s modernist, orthogonal planning. Instead, the over all design
of New Cairo closely followed the North American suburban model
with wider, meandering streets, and more open spaces. And then, there
were the differences in land use patterns in comparison to Nasr City.
More areas of New Cairo were assigned to private sector investors for 3.1 An Urban Exodus
the development of gated communities of a variety of different scales. New Cairo and the wasted potential of
As for the land that was assigned for development by private citizens, Nasr City’s extended family house typology
158
that is to say single land lots that would be sold individually to Egyptians
to build their private homes, those were predominantly allotted to a
villa typology versus Nasr City’s apartment building typology. The areas
of those lots ranged between 600 and 800 square meters.2 As far as
building footprint and setbacks went, the building bylaws for New
Cairo’s villas were not any different than those for Nasr City’s apartment
buildings at the time. Villas in most areas of New Cairo were allowed a
maximum footprint of 50% of the lot area with front and side setbacks
of 3 meters and rear setbacks of 4 meters. But with regards to building
heights, there was quite a difference. Villas in New Cairo were allowed a
maximum height of 3 storeys at 11 meters and in some areas a maximum
height of only 2 storeys at 8 meters.3
Although the curvilinear or deformed character of New Cairo’s grid
stands in sharp contrast to that of Nasr City’s orthogonal grid, land uses
0 0.5 1.0 2.0 km
in both settlements are organized in a very similar manner. Much like in
Nasr City, residential neighborhoods in New Cairo are typically situated Nasr City [1959]
around a central nucleus or spine of large-scale services with smaller

service nodes in the subdivisions of the neighborhoods themselves.
fig.3.1.2 A comparison of the planning patterns of

Nasr City and New Cairo. The latter’s is clearly
reminiscent of and marks a return to the patterns
of the high-end residential neighborhoods of yore.
fig.3.1.3 [opposite page] In comparison to

Nasr City, New Cairo’s planning features much
more areas designated for developers and gated 0 0.5 1.0 2.0 km
communities of varying scales. Apart from

the apparent difference in geometry, the areas New Cairo [2000]
designated for development by private citizens
follow the same arrangements in both Nasr City
and New Cairo.
159
Private Residential lots – Villas Industrial
Private Residential lots –

Apartment Buildings Public Service Infrastructure
Developer Lots Mixed–Use
Developer Lots –
Resort/Leisure Housing Cemetery
Government Housing Projects Army Property
City Centre
[Miscellaneous Large-scale Services] Nature Reserve
Residential Neighborhood Nucleus

[Miscellaneous Large-scale Services] Future Extension
Parks Unassigned
200 500 1000 2000 m
Post-secondary Education Nasr City Boundaries
New Cairo | Planning c.2005 Recreational / Cultural New Cairo Boundaries
160
fig.3.1.4 Although the streets are wider and are of
rather curvilinear geometry, neighborhoods within
New Cairo feature the same patterns as those in
Nasr City with a central small-scale service node
around which private residential lots are arranged.
20 50 100 m
Park
Small-scale Retail / Service
New Cairo | Sample Neighborhood Private Residential lots – Villas
161
Towards the mid 2000’s, New Cairo emerged as one of the strongest essential to demonstrating this link. The first is the trend of systematic
urban attractors in all of Cairo. With the simulacrum of luxury conveyed demolition of apartment building–extended family homes in Nasr City
through its novel urban form, many middle class, upper-middle class, and their replacement with condominium towers. The second is the
and upper class Egyptians were situating their homes there. Around the exodus of middle class professionals from Nasr City to New Cairo.
same time, specifically from 2008 onwards, Nasr City began exhibiting a
very peculiar trend. Many of its apartment buildings there that followed
Nasr City’s building bylaws were being systematically demolished and
replaced by condominium towers. It could be argued that this trend
was triggered by a single event: the enactment of the Universal Building
Code of 2008. By decree of that code, all residential buildings in Cairene
neighborhoods, including Nasr City, were allowed a maximum height of
one and a half times the street width they stand on with a maximum of
36 meters. Residential building footprints were further increased and
setbacks were decreased to a minimum.4 This code basically nullified
Nasr City’s building bylaws and in turn made it much easier for all those
who wanted to capitalize on the high real-estate values there. It allowed
them to construct towering apartment buildings with more units to
sell without having to break the bylaws and bribe officials or exploit
system loopholes in the process. And since Nasr City was essentially
fully developed at the time, this interest translated into buying and
demolishing the five or less storey, bylaw-abiding buildings. Needless to
say, New Cairo was exempt from that code. Much like Nasr City when it
was first established, New Cairo had its own bylaws that were enforced
by a separate regulatory body; in this case the New Urban Communities
Authority, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Housing.
As it was established in chapter 2, most of the bylaw abiding apartment
buildings in Nasr City were extended family houses for middle class
professionals. The systematic elimination of the apartment building–
extended family house typology could therefore mean one thing:
Many of those who were flocking to the suburbs of New Cairo were
professionals who were seeking to relocate their extended family homes
there. What comes next is a series of urban surveys and demographic
analysis that aim to highlight two very important phenomena that are
162
fig.3.1.5 Comprising the most developed portions
of New Cairo, the New Cairo First district emerged
as a new urban attractor and the main contender
to Nasr City First district in its capacity as a
residential hub for the middle class. New Cairo
First is bordered by New Cairo Second to the north
and New Cairo Third to the south.
0.5 1.5 2.5 5.0 km
Nasr City First Boundaries

New Cairo First
New Districts since ‘96

163
7.3% 4.4%
52.8%
1.1% N/A
0.3% 0.4%
5.4%
0.9%
4.5%
5.4%
13.4%
2.2%
2.1%
1.1%
4.7% fig.3.1.6 Between 1996 and 2006, the population of

New Cairo as a whole grew at the second highest
rate in all of Cairo, and at a much higher rate than
Nasr City did during its heyday between 1986 and
1996.
1.9% 3.3%
1.6%
Cairo Governorate Districts

Annual Population Growth 1996 – 2006
No Change Decrease Increase
164
fig.3.1.7 Compared to Nasr City First’s population
of 433,000, New Cairo First’s population of 28,000
is rather miniscule. This discrepancy could be
attributed to New Cairo First’s far less developed
character, but could also be foreshadowing a
sustained trend since it was clearly designed with a
much lower population density in mind.
433,000 ‘06
Nasr
City
First
256,000 ‘96
Cairo Governorate Districts 2006 • Population [x1000]
5 – 20 20 – 50 50 – 100 100 – 200 200 – 400 400 – 600 600 – 850
165
fig.3.1.8 In 2006, Nasr City First still held an
edge over New Cairo First, and nay other Cairene
district, in terms of its professional population.
However, the relative size of its professional
population has dropped by about 10% compared
to 1996. This either indicates an influx of non-
professionals moving into Nasr City, or an exodus
of professionals out of Nasr City, or both. On
the other hand, with professionals constituting
38.6% of its working population, New Cairo is
clearly a very strong urban attractor for middle
class professionals, and even more so for the
entrepreneurial middle class who can afford the
real-estate values there.
46.2% ‘06
Nasr
City
First
55.5% ‘96

0% – 5% 5% – 15% 15% – 25% 25% – 35% 35% – 45% 45% – 55%
166
fig.3.1.9 Unlike Nasr City, New Cairo was designed
to be the hub of the “Villa” and “House” typology
as defined in the Egyptian census. In 2006, 10.6% of
the families dwelling there lived in such typologies.

Families dwelling in a Villa or a House
0% – 1% 1% – 2% 2% – 4% 4% – 6% 6% – 8% 8% – 12%
167
fig.3.1.10 Conversely, with so little of its area
designated for the “apartment building” typology,
New Cairo First had one of the lowest percentages
of families living in an apartment in all of Cairo at
about 77%.

Families dwelling in an Apartment
50% – 70% 70% – 80% 80% – 85% 85% – 90% 90% – 95% 95% – 100%
168
fig.3.1.11 Modes of ownership for residential units
is still a very revealing criteria. While Nasr City
First did not exhibit a lot of change in terms of
families dwelling in purchased units in the ten years
between 1996 and 2006, New Cairo first exhibited
one of the lowest percentages of families dwelling
in a purchased unit among other middle class
Cairene districts. This seems to coincide with it
high percentage of families dwelling in a House or
a Villa – typologies of low occupant densities that
are hardly developed by private citizens looking to
make a profit through real-estate investments.
68.1% ‘06
Nasr
City
First
64.2% ‘96

0% – 5% 5% – 15% 15% – 25% 25% – 35% 35% – 45% 55% – 65% 65% – 75% 75% – 85%
169
fig.3.1.12 On the other hand, in 2006, at almost
19%, New Cairo First boasted one of the highest
percentages of families dwelling in owned units in
comparison to other Cairene middle class districts.
That is more than double the percentage of families
dwelling in owned units in Nasr City; which
dropped by 4% from 13.1% in 1996 to 9% in 2006;
a whopping 4% given the rather small percentile
range for that criterion. This may indicate a number
of things: that New Cairo First is becoming the new
hub for extended family households, and that there’s
been a sharp drop in the number of apartment
building–extended family households in Nasr city
due to an exodus of their middle class professionals
inhabitants to the suburbs of New Cairo, or an
exponential increase in the number of condominium
towers in Nasr City, or both.
9.0% ‘06
Nasr
City
First
13.1% ‘96

0% – 10% 10% – 15% 15% – 20% 20% – 30% 30% – 40% 40% – 50%
170
0.97 ‘06
Nasr
City
First
0.89 ‘96
Cairo Governorate Districts 2006 • Crowding
0.50 – 0.60 0.80 – 0.90 0.90 – 1.10 1.10 – 1.20 1.20 – 1.30 1.30 – 1.40 1.50 – 1.55
171
fig.3.1.13 The increase in the crowding ratio in Nasr City first from 0.89
persons per room to 0.97 persons per room further indicates decline of the
apartment building–extended family house typology in the face of the more
crowded condominium tower
172
fig.3.1.14 The same criteria applied on the district
scale in Cairo will now be applied on the sub-
district scale in Nasr City to demonstrate that the
First Zone, where 11 El-Insha Street is located, has
quickly lost its character as a hub for the apartment
building–extended family house typology over the
ten years between 1996 and 2006. Over the span of
that decade, the population of the First Zone, which
was, for the most part, already developed in1996,
still increased by a considerable 4,000 inhabitants.
This is strong indication that good portion of new
buildings erected during that period followed the
condominium tower typology.
30,800 ‘06
First
Zone
24,000 ‘96
Nasr City First Sub-Districts 2006 • Population [x1000]
1–5 5 – 10 10 – 20 20 – 30 30 – 35 40 – 45 80 – 90
173
fig.3.1.15 During that same period, the relative
population of professionals in the First Zone fell by
about 5%.
45.0% ‘06
First
Zone
50.7% ‘96

35% – 40% 40% – 45% 45% – 50% 50% – 55% 55% – 60%
174
59.9% ‘06
First
Zone
40.8% ‘96

45% – 55% 55% – 65% 65% – 75% 75% – 85% 85% – 95%
175
fig.3.1.16 [opposite page] and fig.3.1.17 Also
during that same period, the percentage of families
dwelling in a purchased unit in the First Zone
increased by a whopping 10% while the percentage
of families dwelling in an owned unit dropped by
almost to almost half what it was in 1996, in one of
the strongest indication of the fall of the apartment
building–extended family house typology against
the condominium tower typology, and possibly the
exodus of the former’s middle class inhabitants out
of the First Zone.
10.9% ‘06
First
Zone
21.6% ‘96

0% – 10% 10% – 15% 15% – 20%
176
fig.3.1.18 While the crowding ratio in the First
Zone hovered around the same value in 1996 and
2006, it increased to varying degrees in every
single one of the rest of Nasr City’s core residential
districts, indicating the rise of the condominium
tower typology and the toll it has taken on the living
quality and densities in said zones.
Nasr City First Sub-Districts 2006 • Crowding
0.80 – 0.90 0.90 – 1.00 1.00 – 1.10 1.10 – 1.20
177
fig.3.1.19 What follows is a series of maps tracking
urban changes in the First Zone 14 years after Nasr
City came into its own and on the eve of passing the
Universal Building Code of 2008.
%
11
%
5.9
66.5% 1994
16
.6%
%
15
6.3%
62.2%
16
.5
%
within height limit
First Zone | 2007

178
Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws
fig.3.1.20
New Residential
96 Buildings
14 Years
First Zone | 1994 – Late 2007

New Residential Buildings
179
fig.3.1.21
17 Demolised Residential Buildings
14 Years

Demolished Residential Buildings
180
fig.3.1.22
6.3%
93.7%
built on a vacant residential lot

built in place of a demolished residential building

181
Replacement
fig.3.1.23
19.8
%
58.3%
5%
12.
%
9.4
within height limit

182 Adherence to Height Limit Bylaws
183
fig.3.1.24
1994
First Zone | 2007

184
Nasr City Residential Building Heights
Universal Building Code | 2008
fig.3.1.25 The passing of the Universal Building Code of 2008 was a turning point for Nasr City. It made legal the construction of condominium towers that were, up to that
point, bylaw-violating structures in Nasr City. As illustrated above, applying the formula for building height stipulated in that code to Nasr City had a drastic altering effect to
the quality and character of its urban street sections in comparison to its original building bylaws. But most importantly, the passing of that code opened the floodgates for the
trend of demolishing the bylaw-abiding apartment building–extended family houses for the sake of replacing them with the now officially approved towering condominiums.
The following set of maps tracks the prevalence of that trend and its urban effects throughout the First Zone two years after the passing of the Universal Building Code of 2008.
185
fig.3.1.26
%
11
%
5.9
66.5% 1994
16
.6%
%
15
6.3%
62.2% 2007
16
.5
%
18%
7.1%
58.2%
16
.7%
within height limit
First Zone | 2010

186
fig.3.1.27
New Residential
96 Buildings
14 Years [1994 – late 2007]
New Residential
56 Buildings
2 Years
First Zone | 2008 – 2010

187
fig.3.1.28
14 Years [1994 – late 2007]
36 Demolished Residential Buildings
2 Years
First Zone | 2008 – 2010

188
fig.3.1.29
6.3%
93.7% 2007
53.6% 46.4%

First Zone | 2008 – 2010

189
Replacement
fig.3.1.30
19.8
%
58.3% 1994 – late 2007

5%
12.
%
9.4
1.8%
10
.7
%
69.6%
%
17.9
within height limit

First Zone | 2008 – 2010

190
191
1994
fig.3.1.31
2007 First Zone | 2010

192
Now that it has been established that there is indeed an exodus of middle open interior spaces. The prevalence of such structural schemes is
class professionals from Nasr City to the suburbs of New Cairo, the main primarily driven by a desire for more grand and luxurious character to
argument to be made here is that there is no logical sense for middle the home. The downside to utilizing those systems, however, is that floor
class professionals to abandon their apartment building–extended plans are much more difficult to alter. In comparison, the simpler and
family houses in order and relocate to the suburbs of New Cairo. The modular post and beam construction system of the Nasr City apartment
basis for making this argument is that the apartment building–extended building typology endows it with a very adaptive quality, as it has been
family house typology of Nasr City has a latent potential for providing demonstrated earlier in the evolution of 11 El-Insha Street. That is to
all what middle class professionals are seeking in the suburbs of New say it is far less likely for the villas of New Cairo to accommodate the
Cairo. changing needs of the extended families that live in them as opposed to
First and foremost, there is little difference between the architectural the Nasr City typology that has done so for multiple generations and has
typologies of Nasr City and New Cairo. When middle class professionals the potential to continue to do so for generations to come.
relocate their homes to New Cairo, they still construct their new homes However, the aspect in which the Nasr City typology has a clear
as extended family houses. Although they are dubbed ‘villas’ in New advantage over the New Cairo equivalent is how many generations they
can house simultaneously. With a maximum building height of 3 storeys
Cairo, the internal organization of the villa typology is still comprised of
for the villa typology in New Cairo, and extended family house can’t even
apartments, each of which is typically assigned to a current or future
fully accommodate 3 generations simultaneously. Assuming that each
nucleus family of their decedents. These might not be as typical as those
floor has 2 apartments of a decent size and that each generation has two
in Nasr City’s typology, but they are still apartments nonetheless. The
descendants that would leave 1 grandchild with no accommodation. That
only difference of note between both typologies is the architectural style
is not taking into account extended families in which each generation
of the building facades. In New Cairo, the prevalent architectural style
would have more than 2 decedents. Whereas in Nasr City, where the
can be best described as a gaudy derivation of Neo-Classicism while the
original building bylaws allowed for 5 storeys, an extended family house
apartment building–extended family houses in Nasr City hardly boasts
for the same extended family can easily house 3 of its generations
any style due to their very bland outward appearance. This is usually
simultaneously with 3 apartments to spare. In other words, middle
cited by middle class professionals as one of the primary reasons for
class professionals are essentially trading down when they relocate to
relocating to the suburbs of New Cairo. Setting aside any commentary
the suburbs and in turn, are compromising an inherent architectural
on taste and style, their justification is inherently flawed because of characteristic that defines them as a social group. Not to mention,
the very adaptable nature of the Nasr City typology. It is relatively easy that leaving their extended family houses in Nasr City usually involves
to alter the outward appearance of an apartment building–extended breaking up the extended family as most commonly each of the siblings of
family house so as to resemble the same prevalent style of New Cairo the second generations will construct their own extended family house,
without the need to relocate there. since if they were to build an extended family home together, the home
There is also the issue of how the villas of New Cairo are constructed. would only be able to accommodate 2 generations simultaneously.
The floor plans of those villas more often than not follow a non-modular
structural grid and employ structural systems such as hollow block slabs
and flat slabs that maximize spans and in turn allow for larger, more
193
Nasr City | Apartment Building New Cairo | Villa
Generational Capacity Generational Capacity
fig.3.1.32 Given the same base multigenerational

family, Nasr City’s apartment building–extended
family house typology has a clear edge over New
Cairo’s villa typology in terms of generational
capacity.
194
Finally, and most importantly, there is the question of the cost for middle specialist is powerless. He may poke fun at such activities as
class professionals to relocate their homes to the suburbs. Although much as he likes, deriding the leisure dreams and the taste of
real-estate values in Nasr City are still much higher than in New Cairo, souls deformed by work pressures as ‘kitsch’, and mocking the
when you take into account that the value of their extended family ‘sentimental’ manner in which feelings pent up and damaged
home in Nasr City is going to be divided amongst its inhabitants, as under the constraint of work are expressed. The need for that
well as the construction and permit costs of their new extended family which is here called ‘kitsch’ is socially imposed, while kitsch
homes, more often then not they hardly break even, or even end up itself, in the negative sense of the word, is the faithful reflection
losing money with their new acquisition.5 Such high costs have a deep of a state of the soul engendered by industrial society. This
impact on their economic standing as a social group, and in turn their endows the problem of kitsch with a seriousness with which it is
status in Egyptian society, in which currently money is the determinant not normally credited.” (33)
of place in the social hierarchy.
The tragedy here is that most professionals are fully aware of all the Although Elias’ ideas apply to the abstract realm of art, they are quite
above-mentioned shortcomings of relocating to the suburbs. Yet, they pertinent to the contemporary social dynamic in Egypt. Those whom
are still resolved in their decision to move there. That is mainly because he refers to as “the working population who’s souls [are] deformed by
such a decision is not based on any rational reasoning, but is rather work pressures” are essentially middle class professionals, and what
socially driven. The ideas of Norbert Elias (1998) concerning the social he refers to as their “leisure dreams” is their desire to relocate their
role of kitsch in a modern society, holds the key to understanding such homes to the suburbs of New Cairo. Their strong desire to move there
drive: is the outcome of the “constant strain of professional life, the desire to
discharge feelings heavily suppressed in working life, or the tendency to
“If we leave aside obviously utilitarian forms, any aesthetic work seek in leisure substitute satisfactions for wishes not fulfilled by work.”
has for the “public”, for the mass of the working population, Today’s middle-aged Egyptian Professionals grew up in the 50s and 60s,
the function of a leisure dream. This function gives our arts at a time when professionals were revered as a social ideal, considered
a very different face, compared to those of court, patrician the upper echelon of the middle class, and guaranteed a comfortable
or church hierarchies. The need of mass society for leisure lifestyle and economic standing by the socio-economic system of the
pastimes, which the specialists have to satisfy, is supplementary era. Accordingly, this generation worked hard and excelled in the realm
to the primary needs for work and bread. It is never as vitally of education in order to become professionals themselves. However,
important as these, and the form it takes is determined by them when they started their professional careers in the mid 70s, the socio-
– for example, by the constant strain of professional life, the economic landscape in Egypt was drastically shifting in the wake of the
desire to discharge feelings heavily suppressed in working introduction of the open-door policy. Instead of leading comfortable
life, or the tendency to seek in leisure substitute satisfactions lifestyles they were expecting, professionals struggled to maintain their
for wishes not fulfilled by work. In face of the compulsive way middle class status and a decent economic standing and they continued
in which professional life pushes the leisure activities of the to do so over the span of the last forty years. Now, they believe they are
industrial man in a highly specific direction, the individual art entitled to feel and project that they have indeed retained their middle
195
class status in the face of such adversity. This is where their relocating predicated on monetary standings, would both fall on deaf ears, for the
their homes to the suburbs of New Cairo comes in as a tool of achieving social logic behind that move trumps any rational reasoning. And after
such a goal. all, there is no feasible way to counter that trend in reality.
Forty years after the open-door policy has been introduced, the One of the main reasons middle class professionals cite as a basis
radical change of the value system of Egyptian society has been firmly for the decision to move to the suburbs is the degradation of the social
established, where size of income and wealth are the sole basis for and urban contexts of their extended family houses of Nasr City. It is
societal stratification regardless of their source. In turn, the much more beyond anyone’s control to put an end to that degradation. Initially
affluent new middle class entrepreneurs became more socially confident. this thesis would have concluded with a redesign scheme of 11 El-
They no longer felt the need to reside in the same urban context as the Insha Street that would have been intended to highlight how the latent
old middle class in order to prove their worthiness of a middle class potential inherent in its adaptability would have further accommodated
status. Accordingly, they relocated to the suburbs of New Cairo, making the changing needs of its inhabitants, nullifying their desire to move to
it the new urban mainstay of social status. This prompted the middle the suburbs of New Cairo. From there the idea would have been that
class professionals whose middle class status had been hanging by a other extended families down El-Insha Street would pick up on this re-
thread for so long, and who now feel entitled to be recognized as still design approach and implement it in their own extended family houses,
being a part of the middle class, to move to the suburbs as a means nullifying their desire to move to the suburbs of New Cairo as well, and
of social validation. That is to say, much like the social emulation by thereby preserving the urban and social character of El-Insha Street as
place of residence that has contributed to the rapid growth of Nasr City a whole. The rather optimistic construct that the extrapolation of that
throughout the 90s, it is now contributing to the rapid growth of New model throughout Nasr City’s inner streets which are predominantly
Cairo – only the role of who is emulating whom has been reversed. It is comprised of the apartment building–extended family house typology
now middle class professionals who are seeking the respect of others in would have collectively preserved the social and urban character of Nasr
order to feel that they indeed belong to the middle class. They are the City as a habitat for middle class professionals and ultimately would
ones whose sense of self worth is becoming more and more dependant have countered the trend of relocating their homes to the suburbs of
on other people’s opinions of them. In other words, they are exhibiting New Cairo. Needless to say, such a proposal had too many unknown
the same unhealthy imbalance in how members of the new middle class and unpredictable variables since people’s good judgment cannot be
went about satisfying their esteem needs forty years prior. the sole basis upon which to depend. As it has been proven in the case
As Elias pointed out, it is futile for any critic, including the author of El-Insha Street, the first of the apartment building–extended family
of thesis, to argue against this trend with the hopes of countering it. houses that was sold, demolished, and replaced by a condominium
The argument that the decision of the middle class professionals to tower, was the first and last nail in the street’s coffin. It began a chain
relocate to the suburbs is essentially a waste of the untapped latent reaction in which almost every extended family down the street either
potential of their Nasr City apartment building–extended family houses, abandoned or were looking to sell their apartment building houses.
or that it is quite absurd for them to expend large amounts of money With that design approach rendered useless, the only possible way to
and jeopardize their economic standings in their attempts to do so in counter that trend would have been an intervention on a legislative
order to assert their status in a society where the social hierarchy is level. That is to say, the government excluded Nasr City from the scope
196
of the Unified Building Code of 2008, reinstated its original bylaws,
and strictly enforced them, or more ideally if it past a bylaw or law
that specifically deters families that own apartment building–extended
family houses in Nasr City, from selling their homes and buying new
homes in the suburbs of New Cairo.
Once again, this is rather unrealistic because the Egyptian government
is the one party that stands to gain the most from this trend since
the state owns the land in the suburbs of New Cairo and is making a
lot of money selling it to the public. In many ways it seems that the
government is fueling the overwhelming demand by what Baudrillard
refers to as a “consciously induced shortage and chronic speculation”.
This is evident in a number of factors. First and foremost, the state does
not sell the land in New Cairo directly, but through a ballot system. It
also enforces a number of very stringent laws that require the owners
of land in New Cairo to build their residences in a very short time after
winning this land lottery or the government revokes their ownership of
the land after pocketing a percentage of the full cost of the land that the
owner had already paid. These difficulties in owning land create a sense
of shortage that in turn, incite more demand from the general public.
The tragic conclusion is that Nasr City is destined to lose, if it has not
already lost, its character as a hub for middle class professionals and
the apartment building–extended family house typology. Inevitably
all middle class professionals will abandon their apartment building-
extended family houses in Nasr City, waste the latent potential of that
typology, relocate to the suburbs of New Cairo for a watered-down
version of their former residences, and erode the monetary basis for
their middle class status, all for the sake of feeling and projecting that
they are still at the forefront of the Egyptian middle class. Ultimately,
it is beyond anyone’s power to combat this trend. All that is left now,
is to watch as the professional class self-destruct, and in turn for the
Egyptian society to descend into social mayhem.
197
Chapter Four
198
199
4.A Safe House
The perks of living in Nasr City
during the January 25th Uprising
When Egyptian protestors first took to Tahrir Square on the 25th of January 2011, my initial reaction was that of calm, and
almost detached, cynical analysis of events as they unfolded. I believe that being here in Canada at the time – some 9000
kilometers away from Egypt – had little to do with having such reaction. It was more because I’ve always been cynical about
the realm of applied politics. Although I was impressed by the huge turnout of Egyptian protestors, the way I saw it there
were going to be only two possible scenarios as to how the standoff between the protestors and the government will play
out – both of which were quite grim. In the first scenario, the Egyptian government was going to violently come down on
the protestors the way that it always did, and in turn the protestors will back down and that would be the end of it. And in
the second, the government was going to have the same response, but the protestors will stand their ground regardless; fig.4.a.1 [opposite page] The 2Vth; A
graffiti by Marwan Shahin in Louran,
and judging by what happened in Tunisia a month earlier, the governing regime – or at least its top officials – will be ousted. Alexandria. The 25th of January 2011
saw thousands of Egyptians take to
But then again, in the aftermath of this momentous event, the protestors will still be robbed of their achievement and the the streets across the country marking
the onset of what was later dubbed as
chance to realize the changes they sought by more organized, power-hungry groups in a dirty game of politics. January 25 Revolution.
200
fig.4.a.2 “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice”; The
protestors’ trifecta of demands to the Egyptian
government. As legitimate as they were, those
demands were more than anything else a testimony
of the protestors’ naïveté since the protestors did
not seem to have a clear-cut agenda for how to
achieve such abstract demands.
201
It was mainly because of the romantic naïveté of the protestors’ demands that I had such a pessimistic outlook. “Bread, Freedom,
Social Justice” was a very popular slogan among the protestors as they marched and rallied – one which basically summarized
all what they were demanding from the government. Surely, they specifically called for things like raising minimum wages and
suspending certain laws that have been abused by the Mubarak regime, but apart from that they provided no comprehensive
agenda as to how to realize that poetic triad of abstract ideals. To me, that was quite the blunder. In principle, the protestors
indeed had every right to ask the government to uphold such ideals. Yet the fact of the matter was this: On their own, “Bread,
Freedom, Social Justice” were very broad and ambiguous terms. As far as political and socio-economic ideologies went, they
could have been interpreted to mean very different things, and in turn there were a lot of diverse options for the manner in
which they may be put into effect. And still, whatever the interpretation or approach, those terms suggested a whole world
of problems that needed to be addressed; problems that ran deep across a wide range of various fields. The few ragtag issues
that the protestors appended to their poetic triad of demands were only the tip of the iceberg, and dealing with them was
definitely not enough to see that triad realized. To put it simply, without a comprehensive agenda of concrete parameters
and steps that grounded them in specifics and defined how they were to be achieved, “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” were
merely a hodgepodge of unrealistic utopian ends and not a set of tangible demands that any government could work with.
Whichever way I looked at it, the protestors’ failure to present the Egyptian government with such an agenda inevitably put
them in a position of weakness. For one thing, I just couldn’t understand how were they going to determine whether or not
their demands were met if the government were to accept them. “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” were as unquantifiable as
they were ambiguous. Outlining an agenda of steps for the government to follow wouldn’t have only cleared the ideological
and procedural ambiguity that came with those demands. More than anything else, that agenda would have also served
as a reference for gauging how the government fared in responding to them. As a matter of fact, it would have been the
only feasible criteria of assessment in that situation. There was simply no other workable scale against which the protestors
could have measured to what extent the government was upholding the unquantifiable ideals they’ve demanded.
But then again the chances that the government would agree to meet the protestors’ demands were very slim. I believed
that the protestors’ failure to present the government with that agenda was most likely going to be an invitation for the
Mubarak regime to either reject or make a mockery of their demands. In my mind, the two and only logical responses from
such a corrupt regime were either that it will completely dismiss the protestors’ demands on the basis that they are too
vague – which sadly would have been a legitimate excuse; or that it will offer the protestors promises of reform that are as
vague and poetically ambiguous as their demands. I didn’t believe that either response would have satisfied the protestors
however. They might have been naïve, but they weren’t that stupid to settle for the latter, and they most certainly were not
lacking in determination to just easily accept the former. This is exactly why I came to the conclusion that, one way or the
other, the protestors and the Mubarak regime were bound to clash violently.
202
I also felt that it wasn’t only the Mubarak regime that was going to exploit the protestors’ failure to present the government
with that agenda. Such a failure left the door wide open for many a political group banned by the Mubarak regime to step
in and impose their already well-established agendas and ideologies which didn’t necessarily sit well with the protestors.
As power-hungry and Machiavellian as most political organizations are, it was quite plausible that those banned groups
would take advantage of the ideological ambiguity of the protestors’ demands and claim making common cause with them
just to use their numbers and determination to put pressure on the Mubarak regime. Whether those groups then cut deals
with the Mubarak regime, or waited until it was driven out of power and then won popular favor under the pretext that
they were part of the protests, were both viable possibilities. Those groups were devious enough not to shy away from
the former if the opportunity presented itself, and – unlike the protestors – they had extensive and organized networks to
manipulate the public and ensure that the latter would come to pass. Either way, they would eventually weasel their way
into power and fill the ideological vacuum created by the protestors’ lack of an agenda with one of their own.
fig.4.a.3 Strength in numbers;

Hundreds of thousands of young
protestors assembled in Tahrir Square.
The protestors’ vast numbers and
determination were no doubt their
greatest strength, but I felt that their
failure to present an agenda to back
their demands meant left the door open
for more organized political groups to
exploit such strength in order further
their own agendas.
203
As much as I was bothered by the protestors’ naïveté though, a part of me did identify with it. George Carlin once said:
“Scratch any cynic and you will find a disappointed idealist”, and he couldn’t have been closer to the truth of it. Indeed, I
was once an idealist myself, and that persona still lingers. And so I didn’t really have anything against what the protestors
were ultimately trying to achieve; it was rather the quixotic manner in which they were going about it that troubled me.
I just dreaded the utter frustration that I knew they were bound to experience when their idealistic aspirations shattered
against the solid wall of real-life political power struggles. And as it happened, only two days into the protests most of what
I feared had already started to come true.
fig.4.a.4 A Muslim Brotherhood banner in Tahrir Square.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood initially declared that they
would not partake in the protests, they soon changed their
position seeing the huge turnout of young protestors and their
apparent resolve not to leave the square until their demands
were met. Not two days after it had started, power-hungry
political groups began jumping on the January Uprising’s
bandwagon.
On the 27th of January, the Muslim Brotherhood – one of the oldest, largest, and most organized banned political groups in
Egypt – announced its full support for the protestors and their demands, as well as the intent of its members to participate
in the protests until such demands were met. In the days that followed however, the Muslim Brotherhood were tacking
on their own sets of demands to the Mubarak regime, and sitting on the protestors’ side of the negotiations with the
government, as if they were the sole sponsors of what the media had then begun referring to as the January Uprising. I
also distinctly remember watching in anger as a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood told a BBC correspondent
in a very assertive manner how the Brotherhood could easily secure a 35 to 40 percent of the popular vote right there and
then, provided that no electoral fraud would be involved. It was just beyond me that he had the audacity to sit there and
204
fig.4.a.5 Time Magazine’s Person
of the Year, 2011. The romantic
notion of the anonymous protestor
who does not associate with any one
particular ideology clearly appealed
to the idealistic inclinations of the
young protestors in Tahrir Square. In
response to the attempts of many a
political group to claim the leadership
of the January Uprising, both young
and old activists who had originally
called for the protests proclaimed that
the uprising did not belong to a specific
political current or group, but that it
was rather an uprising of the “people”.
205
discuss the makeup of a post-uprising political scene while such an uprising still had no foreseeable end, and protestors
were loosing their lives in violent clashes with the Mubarak regime as he spoke. But then again, the protestors didn’t allow
the Brotherhood’s and other groups’ attempts at hijacking the uprising go unanswered. Many of the protestors were soon
declaring that the January Uprising was a leaderless uprising which did not belong to a specific ideological orientation
but rather represented the Egyptian people as a whole. As much as it was actually true, I once again found that response
absurdly romantic and detached from the reality of the situation – its utter naïveté only rivaled by the naivety of announcing
it publicly. To me, it essentially offered the Brotherhood and all of those other groups an undeniable reassurance of how
easy it would be to take advantage of the protestors.
fig.4.a.6 On January 28, in his first televised address since

the outbreak of the uprising, Mubarak offered the protestors
a plethora of ambiguous reform promises in response to their
equally vague demands. The quote on the screen here reads:
“We will take new steps towards more democracy, granting
more freedoms to individuals, and battling unemployment.”
Then on the night of 28th of January, President Mubarak – who was still in power at that point – appeared to address the
Egyptian people on national television. And as I expected, he offered a whole lot of nicely worded, yet empty, promises
of reform, and announced that he’s dissolving the government and forming a new one in hopes that the protestors would
be appeased, abandon their stand, and leave the square. The response that speech elicited from the protestors left me
with mixed feelings of fascination and disappointment. In its wake, and as I imagined they would be, the protestors were
indeed unsatisfied with Mubarak’s unsubstantiated promises, and opted to stand their ground refusing to leave the square.
206
fig.4.a.7 As it is quite evident from
this facetious rewording of Eric
Cartman’s catchphrase, the protestors
weren’t the least bit satisfied with
Mubarak’s hollow promises and
refused to abandon their stand.
But then something else also happened; something which I did not anticipate. In their anger over Mubarak’s speech, the
protestors developed a new set of demands which quickly took precedence over the abstract triad of ideals that they initially
called for. “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice” was no longer the most popular slogan chanted in the square as it was being
overshadowed by two new slogans: “The People want to bring down the Regime” and “Down, Down with Hosni Mubarak”.
Yet, again, the protestors didn’t seem to have a clue or care about what came next if and when the regime was disbanded
or Mubarak stepped down. The flicker of the idealist in me found that development quite intriguing. The power vacuum and
lack of an organized government that it seemed to hint at would have been, in a way, the closest thing to a manifestation of
Anarchism in its most fundamental form – and I have always been fond of the Anarchist school of political thought. But as
much as I admire it, I’ve also always understood that anarchism is an inherently flawed and unrealistic model. It is human
nature to seek out systems of control and think of them as the foundation of civilized society, and to assume that it could
be otherwise is just plain silly. And so the cynic in me had no illusions that it would actually ever boil down to situation
where an organized government did not exist in Egypt, let alone that the protestors had ever intended it to be that way.
207
Their demands for Mubarak and his regime to step down were clearly not calculated, but were rather another outcome of
their headstrong and quixotic mindset. That is why, for the most part, I found the protestors’ response to Mubarak’s speech
very frustrating. Because if anything, it just made it even easier for all the power-hungry political groups out there to step
in whenever the Mubarak regime was overthrown, fill the political vacuum left behind, and cheat the protestors of what
should have been theirs by rights.
fig.4.a.8 & fig.4.a.9 A pair of new

demands emerged in response to
Mubarak’s TV address on January
28. [left] A young protestor sits with
a sign that reads: “The People want
to bring down the Regime”. [right] A
man holds a sign he fashioned out of a
shoe that reads: “LEAVE” in Arabic,
referring to the protestors’ demand
for Mubarak to relinquish his position
as President. Holding up a shoe is a
sign of extreme disrespect in Middle
Eastern culture. The protestors didn’t
seem to have the slightest idea of what
would follow in the eventuality of
Mubarak stepping down.
208
However, over the span of the 28th and 29th of January, my analytical and detached approach towards the protests just
went out the window. It had become quite difficult to keep an objective distance from it all considering what happened
during those two days. By the afternoon of the 28th, the clashes between the protestors and the security forces had quickly
fig.4.a.10 [opposite page] Scores
of protestors running through a thick taken a very violent turn, and Tahrir square had effectively become a war zone. There were reports of numerous injuries
cloud of tear gas. Starting on January
28, the tense standoff between the and deaths among the protestors as security forces resorted to the use of live ammunition and their vehicles ran down
protestors and the Mubarak regime
took a turn to the worst as security crowds; public buildings were set ablaze; a night curfew was announced by the government; and the Egyptian army was
forces resorted to the use of excessive
violence against the protestors. deployed on the streets of Cairo. The Mubarak regime also shut down all Internet services, mobile phone networks, and
fig.4.a.11 [bottom right] A protestor even conventional telephone landlines in a communication blackout targeting the protestors’ reliance on social media, such
being brutally beaten by riot police.
Rubber bullets and water cannons as Facebook and Twitter, for coordination. And that wasn’t even the worst of it. Towards the end of the night there were
were also used in hopes of dispersing
the crowds of protestors, but to no reports of looting, acts of vandalism, and gunfights erupting across many of Cairo’s residential districts, including Nasr City
avail. The protestors stood their
ground and began to fight back.
and the suburbs of New Cairo and Shorouq City where my family and most of my close friends dwell. And to my distress, all
fig.4.a.12 [bottom left] A protestor
holds a spent bullet cartridge. As the those reports maintained that such incidents were taking place in a complete and unexplained absence of the police. Then
crowds refused to back down, security
forces began to use live ammunition to make matters worse, the 29th brought news that swarms of convicted felons had escaped from prisons, and nobody
against the unarmed protestors. Many
protestors were shot dead. seemed to know whether they broke out themselves or if it was actually prison officials that had let them out.
209
210
211
fig.4.a.13 [opposite page, top left] A riot police truck burning on the night of January 28
as Cairo descended into chaos. After the violent events of the day, a citywide curfew was
announced for the night of January 28. The protestors however defied it and remained in
Tahrir Square where they fought running battles with security forces for the better part of the
night. Security forces then began to fall back towards the end of the night giving the protestors
free reign over the square. And around the same time, the police conveniently disappeared
from the streets of Cairo as an overwhelming wave of mayhem and vandalism swept in to
engulf the entire city.
fig.4.a.14 [opposite page, bottom left] A column of tanks rolling into Tahrir Square on
January 29. After chaos had taken over Cairo the night before, and with the continued and
unexplained absence of the police, the Army was deployed to restore order to the capital. The
Army’s involvement was an alarming development to say the least since nobody seemed to
know whether the Army was acting on Mubarak’s orders, or if it had decided to take matters
into its own hands. As tanks and troops marched into Tahrir Square, the protestors were
reassured that the Army was only there to protect the interests of the nation, which wasn’t
really much of a clarification as to which side of the conflict did the Army with.
fig.4.a.15 [opposite page, right] An Air Force helicopter hovering low over Tahrir Square
as a protestor waves an Egyptian flag with the words “Down with Mubarak” scribbled on it.
Adding to the confusion regarding whose side the Army was on, jet fighters and helicopters
flew rounds over the square in what looked like an attempt to intimidate the protestors. That
was quite contradictory to the very friendly attitude that the ground forces in the square had
towards the protestors. Such contradiction raised the worrisome suspicion that there might be
a rift within the ranks of the Egyptian Armed Forces, especially that the Air Force is generally
associated with Mubarak given that he was its commander during the October War of ’73.
fig.4.a.16 [top] On January 29, evidence of the mayhem that had erupted the night before
began to emerge. In Tahrir Square, the headquarters of Mubarak’s ruling party – the National
Democratic Party – was still smoldering from when it was set ablaze by an unknown culprit
on the night of January 28. Many public buildings, banks, shops, and private properties
were ransacked in almost every part of Cairo that night. And as the looting and plundering
continued for days to follow, the government maintained that the protestors, or at least a
corrupt few among them, were responsible for those acts of vandalism; while the protestors on
the other hand accused the government of using hired thugs to carry out such crimes in order
to create a state of chaos in the capital.
fig.4.a.17 [bottom] The run-down fortifications of Abu Za’bal prison – a notorious

penitentiary on the outskirts of Cairo. The looting epidemic that hit the capital on January 28
seemed to worsen on the night of the 29th amid reports of mass prison breakouts. With scores
of dangerous convicts reportedly loose in the streets of Cairo and the Army mainly occupied
with securing the capital’s vital sites, the safety of Cairene families and homes was at an even
higher risk than the night before.
212
It seemed that in its attempts to deter the protestors, the Mubarak regime had decided to hit them where it hurt the most
– their home bases. It also could have been that the Mubarak regime was trying to create a state of mayhem and blame
it either directly or indirectly on the protestors in the of hopes of overturning the public support and sympathy that they
had gained. Or maybe it was both. I really couldn’t tell because as soon as the final development of the night of the 28th
fig.4.a.18 Marked here is the area
of downtown Cairo that had been the came about, I started to panic. Up until that point, all the action had been centered in Tahrir Square in Downtown Cairo; a
main stage for unrest in the capital
since the outbreak of the uprising. The predominantly administrative, business, and commercial district that is miles away from either Nasr City or the suburbs of
fastest route from there to Nasr City is
roughly 15 kilometers long. New Cairo Cairo. I therefore didn’t have a reason to worry beyond a mild concern for the few causal friends and acquaintances that I
is even further at almost 40 kilometers
form downtown Cairo, while Shorouq knew were at the square that day; besides, those had made the decision to be there knowing full well the consequences it
City is the furthest at 45 kilometers.
It therefore seemed highly unlikely might entail. But then out of nowhere and for no fault of their own, it was my family and close friends that were potentially
that those residential districts would
ever get caught up in the unrest that
had been raging so far away at the in grave danger, and with Internet and phone services down, there was no way of telling whether or not they were safe. It
administrative heart of Cairo. But
as unlikely as it seemed, the night of was just too hard to keep my composure about me with their well-being hanging in the balance. And it became even harder
January 28 brought such unrest to the
doorsteps of those residential districts. as the events of the 28th continued on into the 29th and I was still unable to reach them. So by the time communications
213
0.5 1.0 2.0 km
were restored and I finally got through on the 30th, I was quite frantic. And needless to say, this thesis and my arguments
about the latent potential of Nasr City’s extended family house typologies and their edge over those of suburban Cairo were
the last things on my mind. However, three out of the five phone calls I made that day and on the 31st contributed directly
to further validate those arguments.
fig.4.a.19 My thoughts exactly. A sign held up

in a solidarity rally in Toronto during Egypt’s
communication blackout. With the rampant
disorder that engulfed Cairo’s residential
districts, it was very hard not to be able to reach
one’s family and friends.
Naturally, the first phone call I made was to my mother in Nasr City. The first thing she told me when she picked up was:
“Amr, you should come see how safe we are here!”. She was clearly trying to reassure me that she and the rest of my family
in 11 El-Insha street were safe and sound, because, as a mother, she must have known how distraught I was by then. That
statement however was not an exaggeration – from what she told me next and what I later learned from other family
members and friends living on El-Insha street, it turned out that my family, and all the residents of El-Insha street for that
matter, were indeed quite safe. Apparently as soon as the dire developments of the night of the 28th were underway, every
grown man from every household on El-Insha street came together and quickly organized themselves into an emergency
neighborhood watch to secure the street. They first blocked all four entrances to the street with makeshift barricades
214
fashioned out of chopped-off tree branches, empty crates, old tires, and basically every other piece of junk they could get
their hands on. They then lit a series of small fires down the length of the street for warmth and for keeping darkness at bay,
armed themselves with sticks and household blades for self defense, and kept watch in shifts all through the night and up
until the next morning. They had themselves strategically arranged in such a way that there were several lookout groups on
duty at any given time; that each of those groups was stationed at a visible distance form the next one down the street; and
that none of them was made up of less than three individuals. And to avoid any sort of confusion in the heat of dealing with
whatever or whoever might have come their way, they decided that all those who stood sentry or went down to the street
for any reason must at all times wear a white armband for identification. Moreover, even the storekeepers of almost all the
shops in the small market on El-Insha street took part in that neighborhood watch. They helped with set up and preparation,
stood sentries themselves, and kept their shops open all night long providing everybody on the street with snacks and hot
beverages. And so, except for a couple of false alarms that only served to show how alert the vigilantes of El-Insha street
were, the night of the 28th passed without incident, and so did the night of the 29th.
fig.4.a.20 The men of El-Insha street

chopping down tree branches to
barricade the south end of the street.
As soon as the unfortunate events of
the night of the 28th began to unfold,
those men organized themselves into
a neighborhood watch that proceeded
to secure El-Insha street in a very
thorough and efficient manner.
215
fig.4.a.21, fig.4.a.22 & fig.4.a.23 Besides tree
branches, the vigilantes of El-Insha street used
everything from fallen lamp posts, crates, and old
furniture to safety guards that they borrowed from
near by construction sites to fashion makeshift
barricades and block every entry point to the street.
216
fig.4.a.24 The vigilantes of El-
Insha street standing sentry late on
the night of January 28. After they
had barricaded all of the street’s
entrances, they lit a series of small
fires to illuminate the darker corners
of the street and kept watch in shifts
all through the night. And in a show of
solidarity, the storekeepers of El-Insha
street’s small market [appearing here
on the right] kept their shops open
all night, provided the vigilantes with
snacks and hot beverages, and even
stood sentry themselves.
I was quite relieved to know it was that safe for my family in Nasr City. Sadly though, I was soon struck with feelings of
anxiety once again when I learned that that wasn’t the case for one of my very good friends who lived alone with her two
children in the suburb of Shorouq City. In my phone call to her on January 31st, she painted a very different picture of the
situation there during those two fateful nights. Not that anything bad happened, but the impression I got from her was that
she and her children in their suburban villa were in a much more compromised position in comparison to my family in 11
El-Insha street. In our conversation, my friend told me that with the trouble that was brewing on the night of the 28th, her
primary concern was the safety of her children. So she tucked them in, barricaded all possible entrances to the villa with
furniture and bricks, then armed herself with a piece of rebar, and kept guard throughout the night from the villa’s main
balcony. But then she added that even though she was ready to face whatever might have come her way for the sake of her
children, she was not quite sure if she would have been able to fend it off after all. She said that she felt quite alone and
217
vulnerable with how ominous her suburban street was that night. From her vantage point in the balcony, there was no soul
in sight on the street – let alone a friendly one; and the street was shrouded in darkness and a haunting silence that was
shattered form time to time by the sound of gunshots echoing in the distance. And it didn’t get any better the following
night, nor the night after that for that matter.
Although El-Insha street’s neighborhood watch was still operating on the night of the 30th when I called my mother, it
seemed that the worst of it had already passed in Nasr City. But in my phone call to my friend almost 24 hours later on
the night of the 31st, she made it quite clear that the daunting situation in Shorouq City had persisted through the night
of the 30th, and that it didn’t look like it was going to be any different that night either. As a matter of fact, she told me in
a much later phone call that it had been almost two weeks after the 28th of January before she finally felt that her street
was relatively safe. During that call she also did mention that before those two weeks were over, the few residents on her
street had finally managed to put together a neighborhood watch of their own. From what she told me though, that didn’t
really make much of a difference – her street was still foreboding and she did not feel any less vulnerable. She explained that
despite of her neighbors’ best efforts, they were stretched too thin as they tried to secure and hold all the entrances to their
vast suburban street. She saw no sign of a neighborhood watch operating except for a patrol of two men making their rounds
up and down the street. And even worse, those two men didn’t pass by her villa as frequently as she would have wanted
them to; and whenever they did, they seemed dwarfed by the scale of the street. She did notice however that they were
carrying machetes and firearms. They waved them around while shouting threats at the top of their lungs, and sometimes
even fired warning shots, all in order to deter whoever might have been lurking in the distance. But then again from the way
she described it, my friend found that hollow display of power more disconcerting than reassuring. It felt as if the two men
on patrol duty were overcompensating for their own vulnerability, as well as that of the neighborhood watch in general.
On the whole, it just sounded like my friend did not trust that her street’s neighborhood watch was fully capable of
dealing with the imminent threat. So I wasn’t really surprised when she told me that she continued to stand sentry in her
balcony regardless of the fact that it was operating. And although I was sad to hear it, I still was not surprised when she
recounted a particular incident in which the shortcomings of that neighborhood watch had allowed the danger to come too
close for her comfort. At around 2 a.m. one night, the microphone of a nearby mosque, which is typically used to announce
the call for prayer, began to bellow a warning that thugs have been spotted in the area. From her balcony, she saw the
men on patrol duty that night racing to the one end of the street where they believed the thugs were approaching. She
also heard the sounds of the few other men of the neighborhood watch rushing to the same spot, followed by the sounds
of the rest of her male neighbors, who weren’t on the street at the time, leaving their houses and joining them. From her
portrayal, it just seemed that they were all caught off guard – her street’s neighborhood watch was clearly oblivious to how
close the danger was until the mosque broadcasted the warning. However, her neighbors made it just in time to cut off the
218
thugs before they went too far down the street. And no sooner than they had encountered one another, both groups were
at each other’s throats. My friend said that, standing in her balcony, the sounds of the fight were so loud and clear that it
felt as if she was right in the middle of it. She heard the thundering discharge of firearms; the loud metal clatter of machetes
clanging against each other; and underneath it all she was literally able to make out the muffled thumps of blows exchanged
in fistfights. It wasn’t just some potential threat far out in the distance any more; the danger was as real as it could ever get
and it was a mere few meters away from her and her children. My friend found herself seriously considering her very limited
and extremely bleak options if the thugs came out on top as the fight raged on and neither side seemed to be having the
upper hand in it. Thankfully though, it never came to that. After what seemed to her like an eternity, my friend’s neighbors
were finally able to overwhelm the thugs bringing an end to what she referred to as one of the most horrific experiences
of her life.
Before I knew all of that however, and in light of what my friend told me in our first phone call alone, I began to look at the
discrepancy between the perilous situation on her suburban street and the considerably safer situation on El-Insha street
as the basis for a potential addition to this thesis. Right after I hung up with her on January 31st, I felt that such glaring
discrepancy could very well strengthen the case I was making for Nasr City’s latent potentials. My analytical faculties, which
had then come around for the first time since the 28th, were already formulating arguments about a whole new set of
advantages that the urban and architectural typologies of Nasr City had over those of suburban Cairo. My biggest concern
though was not to jump to conclusions or make hasty generalizations. After all, both my mother’s and my friend’s accounts
were very specific, and I needed to know if they were actually reflective of the overall situation in Nasr City on one hand,
and Shorouq City and the Cairene suburbs in general on the other. Over the following weeks, I managed to verify that that
was indeed the case from all the news reports and blog entries that I came across, as well as the correspondences I had with
other friends, neighbors, and family back in Cairo. However, the first and most substantial reassurance came as early as the
same day, the 31st of January, when I called another one of my very good friends back home. That friend lives in Moqattam
City in his wife’s extended family house which has the same typology as that of 11 EL-Insha street. He is a practicing architect
with a sharp critical sense. He keeps in touch with our wide circle of friends and acquaintances who predominantly dwell
in Nasr City and the suburbs of Cairo. And most importantly, he is quite familiar with the arguments of my thesis, as I have
discussed them with him many times before. And so, if there were anybody who could have given me an objective and
reliable opinion about the half-baked arguments and hypotheses I had at that point, it would have been him.
Naturally, my phone call to him began with me making sure that he, his wife, and the rest of his in-laws in Moqattam
City were fine, and that his parents in Nasr city were alright as well. After that was done, and on a lighter note, he jokingly
proposed that I roll up my thesis and inappropriately place it up some of the academics back home who had rejected the
validity of its arguments. He said that, if for nothing else, the case for Nasr City’s advantage over the Cairene suburbs could
219
fig.4.a.25 A group of vigilantes keeping
watch on their street on the night of
January 29. As it turned out to be, efficient
neighborhood watches such as that of
El-Insha street were not an uncommon
occurrence in the older high-end residential
districts of Cairo during the disorder that
erupted on the night of January 28. Those
districts were relatively the safest places in
the city at the time due to the efforts of such
vigilante groups.
be predicated solely on how safer it has been since trouble broke out on the night of the 28th. I was really surprised to hear
him say that since I hadn’t yet told him about what I’ve learned in my phone calls to my mother and my friend who lived in
the suburb of Shorouq City, nor about the emergent arguments that have since been rambling in mind. I took that as a cue
to tell him about those things, and once I did, he went on to elaborate on his lighthearted remark in a more serious tone.
He said that with what was going on at the time, the general consensus among Cairenes was that it’s a blessing, and even a
privilege, to be a resident of any of the older high-end residential districts such as Nasr City and Masr Al-Gadeeda. He told
me that tight and efficient neighborhood watches, like that of El-Insha street, were a very common occurrence on almost
every street in those districts making them the safest in Cairo. He then added that the very grim and ominous situation on
my other friend’s suburban street was actually the status quo not only in the rest of Shorouq City, but in all of the Cairene
suburbs as well. He said that many of the suburban dwellers he knows were then realizing the value of their former homes
in those older districts, and that those of them who had the option, opted to go back to such homes until the situation in
the suburbs came to an end. He then concluded by stressing once again that it’s become clear to everyone in Cairo that
suburbia can be a very unsafe place; and that he therefore believes that all those who were eager to live in the suburbs
before will now think twice before establishing or relocating their households there.
220
The account of my friend who lives in Moqattam City was everything I needed to hear to further pursue and validate my
emergent arguments. And so after talking to him I set out to investigate the reasons why Nasr City was much safer than
the Cairene suburbs during the rampant disorder that had befallen Cairo back then. My starting point was Nasr City’s
neighborhood watches since all evidence suggested that such vigilante groups and their outstanding performance were the
key factor that set Nasr City apart from the suburbs. I took El-Insha street’s neighborhood watch as an exemplary model and
began to carefully reflect on its every aspect. I soon found it particularly interesting that despite the bleak circumstances
that they had never experienced before, the residents of El-Insha street had almost automatically transformed their
immediate urban environment into a safe communal setting. I also was quite intrigued by the effectiveness and efficiency
of their impromptu neighborhood watch, especially since a “neighborhood watch” is a very foreign concept to Cairo.
As I extrapolated what I worked out to be the reasons behind such unexpected yet impressive capacities, I came to the
conclusion that the remarkable performance of the rest of Nasr City’s neighborhood watches, and in turn the general state
of safety throughout the district, was the outcome of three interrelated factors. Those were: the urban characteristics of
Nasr City’s streets; the architectural qualities of the buildings standing on those streets; and finally the attributes of the
social structures housed within those buildings.
Owing to Nasr City’s orthogonal planning, all of its inner streets – which incidentally constitute the bulk of its street network
– are linear, short in length, and have relatively narrow widths of either 12 or 16 meters. These features made securing and
holding those streets a relatively easy task. In terms of scale, a Nasr City inner street was a small and rather manageable
space, and its linear geometry provided whoever was on guard duty with a clear line of sight all the way down its length
and facilitated coordination with those manning their stations elsewhere in the street. The same was also true even for the
remainder of Nasr City’s street network – the longer, wider streets that mark the perimeters of its neighborhoods. Once again
thanks to the orthogonal nature of that street network, any given long street in Nasr City has several junctions where inner
streets feed into it. Posting guard details at those junctions helped break it down into shorter, more manageable segments.
Another very important factor that facilitated securing the streets of Nasr City is the manner in which buildings stand
on those streets. The maximum permissible footprint for a residential building in Nasr City occupies a considerably large
area of the lot it’s on, and lot sizes are not all that big to start with. Moreover, as it has been demonstrated earlier in this
thesis, a great deal of Nasr City’s buildings exceeds the stipulated maximum footprint anyway. This resulted in a closely-
knit architectural canvas – on any given street in Nasr City, buildings stand quite close to each other and the relationship
between the buildings and the street itself is rather intimate too. For those who had the task of securing a street in Nasr
City, such an architectural canvas meant that they had little to worry about. The gaps between the buildings down the street
where intruders might have come through were very small and therefore quite easy to defend, and securing the street
automatically catered to securing the buildings on it as well.
221
In my opinion however, the most important factor that helped keep Nasr City safe is that a fairly decent portion of the
apartment buildings standing on its streets are extended family households. This opinion of mine stems mainly from
observations regarding El-Insha street – a street which up until recently was made up entirely of such apartment building–
extended family households. Although I was initially a bit surprised that securing El-Insha street came almost naturally to
its residents, I soon found myself thinking that it wasn’t all that strange after all. Living on El-Insha street for most of my life,
I’ve always known it to be a rather safe environment. But I have to admit though that this doesn’t really show right away.
The extended families of El-Insha street are very reserved to say the least, and they mostly keep to themselves. As a matter
of fact, none of them actually knows any of the other extended families living down the street. Be that as it may however,
they are still quite familiar with one another. The residents of each of El-Insha street’s extended family households know
the faces of every single one of their neighbors on the street; and even though they may not be able to put names to those
faces, they can tell to which of the street’s other extended family households do those faces belong. As a result, it has
always been quite easy to pick out anyone or anything that doesn’t belong on El-Insha street; and whenever such a situation
presented itself, there would almost immediately be one or more of the street’s residents looking into it.
This subdued sense of community that the extended families of El-Insha street have maintained over the years is what
concerns me here. As I have discussed earlier in this thesis, the apartment building–extended family house typology of
Nasr City features a very delicate balance between the traditional extended family house of rural Egypt and medieval Cairo,
where the boundaries of privacy for the nuclear families living in it were rather permeable; and the conventional apartment
building typology, where those boundaries are quite rigid. And now in light of my observations regarding El-Insha street,
it seems that there is a similar kind of balance featured on those of Nasr City’s streets where the majority of the buildings
follow this hybrid typology. On one hand there’s the traditional residential street of medieval Cairo, where the street was in
essence one big extended family house – it had its own door and was made up of a number of extended family households
that all belonged to the same kin. And on the other hand there are all the different models for the modern residential street,
be it metropolitan or suburban, where the residents of the street are unrelated and tend to be rather withdrawn. And then,
nestled perfectly in between both extremes, there’s the model for those particular streets in Nasr City. A model where the
extended families living down the street are not close enough to be intimate with one another, and yet at the same time
they aren’t too distant that they wouldn’t recognize and care for each other.
I believe that this finely balanced sense of community had a very significant effect when trouble broke out on the night of
the 28th. On any given street in Nasr City where the apartment building–extended family house is the dominant typology,
it was the main reason why the residents of the street were very quick to come together and set up neighborhood watches.
And it was also because of it that they did so in a rather seamless manner. The fact that they were already familiar with
each other made it quite easy for them to coordinate and work together when the situation called for it. Apart from that
222
‘ATFA
ZUQAQ DARB
DARB
ZUQAQ
fig.4.a.27 [top] The street hierarchy in medieval Cairo; the marked doorways are street entrances. In Fatimid
Cairo, the city’s main spine and most public realm, the qasaba, gave way to a semi-public hara; a hara then led
to a semi-private ‘atfa, and in some cases a zuqaq; and finally the ‘atfa led to a zuqaq, the most private tier of
HARA
the hierarchy. The transition between the first two public street types and the latter two private street types was
controlled by way of a door. In the zuqaq street model, all the extended family households that stood on the street
were related by blood and the zuqaq itself resembled one big extended family house. Not only did it have its own
door, but it also had its own courtyard, or darb, around which extended family houses of the street were arranged.
The way a zuqaq was articulated was undoubtedly conducive to the solidarity of its extended family households.
However, it also had a serious downside since it allowed for those extended family households to get too involved
into each other’s affairs, which was certainly quite overbearing most, if not all, of the time. ‘ATFA
fig.4.a.26 [bottom] El-Insha street as it was for almost two decades; the quintessential example of the Nasr
City street model where the majority, if not all, of the buildings on the street follow the apartment building-
extended family house typology. This particular Nasr City street model features the best of two worlds, and none
of their shortcomings. It has the semblance of an ordained modern residential street, and a social structure that
is somewhat similar to that of medieval Cairo’s zuqaq considering that each of its apartment buildings is an REET
extended family household but none of those households are related. The extended families of that street model are
AL-MU’IZ ST
therefore not as distant and detached from one another as the nuclear families of most modern residential street [QA SA BA ]
models; and at the same time they are not as overbearingly close and intimate with each other as the interrelated
extended families of the zuqaq street model. Instead, the mix of modern urban & architectural typology and
traditional social structure helped the extended families of that particular Nasr City street model to nurture a very
healthy, balanced relationship without encroaching on each other’s privacy. I believe that this kind of relationship
was one of the main reasons why the residents of streets such as El-Insha street were arguably the safest people
in Cairo during the trouble that began on the night of January 28.
223
balanced sense of community however, there are other aspects to the social make-up of that street model which also
helped a lot in dealing with those troublesome times. For Instance, the fact that every building on the street is an extended
family household, and that every extended family household is its own social unit, was very beneficial to the management
of the street’s neighborhood watch. It meant that there were always enough individuals to secure the street, but at the
same time there were few social units to coordinate between. Settling on a plan of action for the neighborhood watch as
whole required but only one or two representatives from each of the extended family households down the street, and
those guaranteed that such a plan would be relayed without a hitch to the other members of their respective extended
families. This reduced the chances of confusion or miscommunication within the neighborhood watch and enhanced its
overall efficiency. And then there’s the very simple fact that, in such a street model, any one member of the neighborhood
watch was protecting his own flesh and blood. Apart from his own nuclear family, it wasn’t all mere neighbors that he was
watching over; it was his extended family – his grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Yes, Egyptians are an inherently
protective people and they have a natural tendency to help out strangers in their time of need. But the simple fact of the
matter is that people are naturally much more protective of their own immediate family. And this is why the neighborhood
watches on those of Nasr City’s streets that followed such model were arguably the tightest and most alert vigilante groups
in all of Cairo.
But then again, there aren’t that many streets in Nasr City where the apartment building–extended family house is the
dominant building typology. Earlier in this thesis, it’s been demonstrated that the greater majority of residential buildings
in Nasr City follow a condominium typology where the building towers past the maximum height limit stipulated in Nasr
City’s bylaws, and houses a large number of unrelated nuclear families. On a street where that condominium typology is
dominant, the nuclear families in any one building are hardly familiar with one another, let alone the scores of the other
nuclear families living down the street. So when the events of the 28th started to unfold, putting together a neighborhood
watch didn’t run as smoothly for the residents of that street model, nor was their neighborhood watch as efficient, in
comparison to the residents of the apartment building–extended family house street model. Although in terms of sheer
numbers the condominium street model has far more residents, the lack of a sense of community on the street hindered
the management of such numbers. It meant that there was a lot more confusion, miscommunication, and coordination
pitfalls within the neighborhood watch.
As I’ve explained in the beginning of this analysis, all streets in Nasr City share the same urban and architectural
characteristics that turned out to be quite beneficial during the hard times that befell Cairo in the wake of the events of
January 28th. It goes without saying then that the social make-up of a street is what made all the difference within the
context of Nasr City; it is what made some streets safer than others. I believe that this serves to highlight yet another
advantageous inherent quality to the core subject of this thesis – the apartment building–extended family house typology.
224
And at the same time, it also serves to further discredit the condominium typology that’s been with Nasr City since its boom
in the late 80s, and which has been lately festering through its urban fabric at the expense of apartment building–extended
family households. But then again, riding on their urban and architectural characteristics alone, the least safe of Nasr City’s
condominium dominated streets were still way safer than any street in the suburbs of Cairo.
As I investigated the dire situation in the Cairene suburbs, I soon found that it is also a combination of their urban,
architectural, and social characteristics that rendered them quite unsafe in comparison to Nasr City. Due to the curvilinear
planning schemes of the Cairene suburbs, the streets there almost always have a meandering course; and on average, they are
longer and wider than the streets of Nasr City. These features, which are an integral part of the suburban luxurious character,
had a serious downside to them – they made securing a street in the suburbs a much harder task for its residents. In terms of
scale, a street’s neighborhood watch there had a considerably larger area to manage on their hands, and the nonlinear street
geometry created quite an obstacle for communication and coordination between its members. The bends on the street
obstructed a clear line of sight down its length, which in turn meant that a guard detail wouldn’t be able to see the danger coming
its way until it was too late, let alone signal a warning to the other vigilantes manning their stations elsewhere on the street.
There’s also the issue of how the architecture stands on the streets of the Cairene suburbs. In terms of the maximum
permissible footprint and minimum setbacks for residential buildings, the Cairene suburbs’ building bylaws are not all that
different from Nasr City’s. And so, much like Nasr city, the adjacent buildings on the typical residential street in the Cairene
suburbs stand in close proximity to each other, and in close proximity to the street itself. However, in yet another aspect of
the suburban luxurious character, the typical street in the Cairene suburbs features a lot more open spaces than a Nasr city
street. And then there’s the fact that the suburbs of Cairo are still very far from being fully developed, which means that
more often than not the typical residential street there will also feature a number of vacant lots and under construction
buildings. Together, these two features resulted in an architectural canvas that’s full of gaping holes, which made matters
even worse for the members of a street’s neighborhood watch in the Cairene suburbs. On top of the street’s overwhelming
scale and curvilinear geometry, they also had to deal with all the building-free voids down the street where intruders might
have come through; voids that are quite large, and were therefore rather difficult to barricade or defend. Not to mention
that the unfinished, uninhabited structures on the street, where intruders could have lurked to stage an attack or used as
strongholds during one, were another source of major concern that was equally as hard to address.
I however believe that the social characteristics of the Cairene suburbs are what sealed their fate. Obviously, the urban
and architectural drawbacks of the typical residential street there would have been less of an issue if there were plenty
of vigilantes to post all around its vast extents, blind spots, and big voids. But then again, having that many vigilantes on
hand would have required a considerably large number of people living down the street in the first place – and that just
isn’t a feature of the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street. Instead, the typical street there has a very small number
225
of residents, which – in light of its overwhelming physical disadvantages – wasn’t exactly the most favorable of features.
It meant that the typical street in the Cairene suburbs didn’t have enough residents for assembling a neighborhood watch
with the adequate manpower needed to properly secure the street, which in turn left everybody living down the street in
a very vulnerable position. I’d like to make it clear here that such deficiency has little to do with the fact that the suburbs of
Cairo are fairly new residential settlements that haven’t been fully populated yet. These suburbs are actually designed to
have very low population densities. Allocating the greater majority of their residential land use to the villa typology; their
strict building bylaws that limit such typology to a maximum of three, and sometimes even two, storeys; and the abundance
of large open spaces on their streets – all of these things cater to having a minimal number of residents per street, which
is by far the most essential feature of any suburban model. And so it wouldn’t have really made much of a difference if the
Cairene suburbs were at their full population capacities during the trouble that erupted on the night of January 28th. The
residents of the typical street there would have still been gravely short on the numbers needed to keep their street safe.
But then again, having a small number of residents wasn’t the only disadvantageous social feature of the Cairene suburbs’
typical residential street. I believe that the lack of a sense of community among its residents had quite an adverse effect as
well. As I’ve established earlier in this thesis, any given villa in suburban Cairo is either a single nuclear family household
or an extended family household. This in turn means that the social make-up of the Cairene suburbs’ typical street model,
where all buildings follow the villa typology, is very similar to that of the Nasr City street model, where the apartment
building–extended family house is the dominant typology. And while that similarity may imply that the households of the
Cairene suburbs’ street model would also have the same balanced and healthy relationship featured on the Nasr City street
model, the truth of the matter is that they don’t – and that’s mainly because of three reasons.
For one thing, there’s the fact that the suburbs of Cairo are very young residential settlements. It takes a good many
years to build up a balanced sense of community like the one in question here. But as it is right now, none of the families
living down a typical street in the Cairene suburbs have resided there long enough to develop a relationship that’s even
remotely close to that special bond that their Nasr City counterparts have nurtured for over two decades. And then there
are the urban qualities of the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street, which – regardless of the time factor – will always
deter its households from cultivating a communal sense of any kind. In the Nasr City street model, the intimate scale of the
street and the proximity of its apartment buildings literally brought its extended families close together, making it relatively
easy for them to become familiar with each other. In the Cairene suburbs on the other hand, the vast scale of the street
distances the villas standing on it, while its meandering geometry breaks its continuity and fragments those villas into
disjointed architectural segments. This reduces the chances of the street’s residents running into each other, crossing paths,
or interacting in any other way; which in turn makes it virtually impossible for the members of any one of its households to
be acquainted with all of their neighbors down the street, let alone maintain a balanced relationship with them.
226
NASR CITY
NEW CAIRO
227
SHOROUQ CITY
And finally there’s the architecture of the villas that stand on the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street. For purposes of
privacy, the architecture of these villas hardly ever acknowledges the street, except for it being a front towards which the
building’s main façade is oriented. And while the same is also true for the architecture of Nasr City’s apartment building–
extended family houses, there’s quite a fundamental difference between the two typologies. In an apartment building–
extended family house, the living spaces, where the inhabitants of the building spend the majority of their time, are almost
always situated looking out on the street from behind a fairly closed off main façade. This provides the members of Nasr
City’s extended family household with their due privacy, and at the same time allows them to have a healthy connection
to the domain of their street. Not only did such connection make it even easier for them to become familiar with their
neighbors down the street, but it’s also been the main reason why they are always aware of, and quick to deal with, any
sort of trouble as soon as it materializes on the street or threatens any of their neighboring households. In the Cairene
suburbs however, a villa usually features a certain design element, such as a pool or a terrace overlooking a big yard, which
completely draws the focus of the building and its inhabitants away from the street. The members of the typical household
in the Cairene suburbs are therefore far less involved with what happens on their street in comparison to the members
of Nasr City’s extended family household. They would not be able to tell, let alone act, if and when a problem manifests
itself on the street or befalls any of their neighboring households, not to mention that their minimal exposure to the street
further reduces their chances of ever becoming familiar with the members of those neighboring households. Needless
to say, none of this is conducive to either developing or maintaining a relationship with their neighbors on the street, nor
is any of it likely to change over time. Much like the urban qualities of the Cairene suburbs’ typical residential street, the
architecture of the villas that stand on it will always isolate the families dwelling in them and obstruct their growth as a
community no matter how long they may end up residing there.
My analysis and conclusions regarding why Nasr City had been much safer than the Cairene suburbs during the rampant
disorder that erupted on the night of January 28th and threatened them for days to follow were gratifying to say the least.
Upon completing them, I felt that they made it clear beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Cairene suburbs are at a severe
disadvantage in comparison to Nasr City; and that they indeed provided some very strong points for arguing against middle
fig.4.a.28 [opposite page] Samples
class professionals abandoning their Nasr City apartment building–extended family houses and relocating to the Cairene of the urban fabric in Nasr City, New
Cairo, and Shorouq City. Looking at
suburbs. But most importantly, they also seemed to resonate with what had become of Nasr City and the Cairene suburbs these samples side by side makes it
very clear that there are some major
in the wake of those unsettling times. differences between Nasr City and the
Cairene suburbs in terms of their urban
Over the first year or so after the disorder that took hold of Cairo’s residential districts had died out, I couldn’t help and architectural characteristics. In
my opinion, these differences were
the main reason why the residents of
but notice that once again there was a glaring discrepancy between the sort of atmosphere that set over Nasr City on Nasr City were much more capable of
coping with the troublesome times that
the one hand, and the Cairene suburbs on the other. In Nasr City, it looked as though such disorder had tapped into the ensued from the night of January 28
in comparison to their counterparts in
latent social potential of the district’s street model where the apartment building–extended family house is the dominant suburban Cairo.
228
typology. This became quite evident as I turned my attention back to El-Insha street being the quintessential example
for that street model. There, the hardships of dealing with the imminent threat to their street had brought the extended
families of my street closer than ever and set in motion a communal momentum that proceeded to push the limits of their
long-standing balanced relationship. It all began in late February when the younger members of El-Insha street’s extended
family households came together to clear the aftermath of the street’s neighborhood watch. On the last Thursday of the
month, the youth of 11 El-Insha street’s two extended families put up a sign on its front gate announcing that they will be
performing a full-scale cleanup of the street starting Friday, and inviting whoever’s interested in helping out to join them.
The next morning, almost every kid, teenager, and young adult living down the street showed up in front of 11 El-Insha
street in response to the invitation, and over the course of the whole weekend, they all worked side by side with the
blessings and supervision of their parents. First, they dismantled the remnants of the barricades that were still partially
blocking the street’s entrances; they collected and disposed of the all clutter and debris that had been lying about the street
from when the vigilantes stood sentry; and they swept out the all of street and its sidewalks. They then went on a quest to
revamp El-Insha street as they took it upon themselves to wash the gates and entrances of every single one of its apartment
buildings, and repaint the sidewalks down the its entire length. And on the last day of the weekend when all the work was
done, they gathered in the entrance lobby of 11 El-Insha street where they shared a celebratory meal that the mothers of
its two extended families had prepared for them.
229
fig.4.a.29 [opposite page, left] Prepped and ready to begin
the cleanup of El-Insha street. On the right stands Noha, my
cousin; and on the left stands Tony, her neighbor across the
hall in 11 El-Insha street. Apparently, they were the ones who
thought it would be a good idea to clear the aftermath of the
street’s neighborhood watch, and extended the invitation to
the younger members of the street’s other extended family
households to come out and help. Almost every kid, teenager
and young adult living down El-Insha street responded to that
invitation.
fig.4.a.30 & fig.4.a.31 The youth of El-Insha street’s different

extended family households hard at work cleaning their street.
They disposed of all the litter that was left behind from when
the street’s vigilantes stood sentry [opposite page, right], and
swept the entire length of the street [left].
230
fig.4.a.32 Working together to straighten a street sign
that was knocked askew during the time El-Insha street’s
neighborhood watch was in operation. After they were done
with the cleanup, the youth of El-Insha went on to give their
street a complete facelift.
fig.4.a.33 to fig.4.a.38 [opposite page] In their effort to

revamp their street, the youth of El-Insha street washed the
gates and entrances of every one of its apartment buildings,
and painted the sidewalks down its entire length. They carried
out both tasks in a very organized manner.
231
232
fig.4.a.39 [left] The youth of El-Insha
street posing for a picture to celebrate
all what they had achieved after a
whole weedend of working tirelessly
side by side. A lot of good memories
and new friends were made over the
course of that weekend.
fig.4.a.40 [right] The youth of El-

Insha street gathered around a big
tray of traditional fava beans in
the entrance lobby of 11 El-Insha
street. After all the work was done,
and as part of their celebration, they
shared a meal that the mothers of El-
Insha street’s two extended families
had prepared for them. Much like
everything else about the communal
effort to clean and revamp El-Insha
street, this very friendly and inviting
gesture was the first of its kind.
I found that communal effort, as well as the genuinely warm and friendly sentiments exhibited in carrying it out, to be
quite a departure from the reserved relationship that the extended families of my street have maintained with one another
over the years. And it was only a little over a year later before they took yet another major step beyond the boundaries of
their subdued relationship. In July of 2012, several of the older members of El-Insha street’s extended family households
organized themselves into what could be best described as a council aimed at addressing issues that affect the well-being of
their street. The circumstance that prompted this initiative presented itself when the owner of the bakery that stands across
form 11 El-Insha street started to appropriate the little garden adjacent to his bakery with the intention of turning it into an
outdoor coffee shop. Concerned that this kind of coffee shop will disturb the calm of their street; invite a lot of strangers
into its domain; and compromise the privacy of their households, a group of representatives from a number of the street’s
extended families came together to discuss how best to deal with the emerging situation and prevent it from developing
any further. They then set up a meeting with the owner of the bakery where they presented him with their grievances, and
informed him that unless he forgoes his plans, they will have to lodge a formal complaint with the proper authorities on
the account of his unlawful annexing of public property. This in turn triggered a lengthy series of negotiations with the man
233
during which they also brought up the loudness and inappropriate habits of the bakery’s workers as nuisances that have
long inconvenienced their households, and demanded that he puts an end to them as well. These negotiations eventually
came to an end as the owner of the bakery insisted on moving forward with his plans, giving them his word that none of
their concerns regarding the coffee shop will ever come to pass, and that he will personally see to it that their issues with
his bakery’s workers will be sorted out immediately. And while they welcomed the latter half of his promise, which he did
fulfill right away, the representatives of El-Insha street’s extended families weren’t the least bit satisfied with his assurances
regarding the coffee shop. They therefore decided to push on with lodging a formal complaint, and divided among
themselves the tasks of drafting it; collecting signatures for it from as many of the street’s other households that were not
yet involved; and finding a suitable connection who will ensure that it will be quickly delivered to the highest authorities. By
that point, the situation had caught the attention of the residents of some of the apartment buildings standing on the two
other streets that mark the perimeter of the small market where the bakery is located, and they subsequently expressed
their desire to sign that formal complaint as well. Seeing that the representatives of El-Insha street’s extended families were
serious about their ultimatum, and that their complaint document was gaining the support of households other than those
of El-Insha street itself, the owner of the bakery finally backed down and refrained from taking any further steps towards
transforming the garden into a coffee shop. Shortly after that, a couple of families from 11 El-Insha street hired a landscaper
to properly replant the little garden as a gesture of reclaiming it as part of the street’s public domain.
fig.4.a.41 El-Insha street’s small market;

a dispute over the little garden marked
here saw El-Insha street’s different
extended family households join forces
for the first time to protect the interests of
their community.
234
I learned about those events from my mother who had been part of the group that spearheaded the entire effort to thwart
the plans of the bakery’s owner. In her telling of the story, one thing was very obvious from the way she referred to those
of her neighbors who had led that effort with her. They were clearly no longer just faces to her that might or might not
have a name attached to them, but instead it sounded more like they were real individuals whom she had come to know
and respect though working and sharing experiences together. This left me with the distinct impression that participating in
that effort helped the members of El-Insha street’s different extended families, or at least some of them, to actually get to
know each other; which was undoubtedly a big step forward considering that for more than two decades their relationship
amounted to nothing more than a mere casual acquaintance. However, I believe that the real breakthrough of that effort,
as well as the effort to clean up El-Insha street for that matter, was that they both saw the extended family households of
my street actively and collectively engage in protecting the interests of their community. Although the members of those
households have always been prompt to act whenever a dangerous situation manifested itself on El-Insha street, they’ve
had a very different approach towards problems that did not present a clear and direct threat to the street’s security. They
usually sat idly by until that sort of problem became a real bother and then all they did was moan and complain about it,
but they wouldn’t take any meaningful action towards dealing with it. And in the few rare incidents when one of the street’s
social units decided to do something about that sort of problem, they were pretty much on their own – an extended family
household could never rally the support of the street’s other extended family households, and in some cases not even
a nuclear family could muster support from the rest of its own extended family household. And so it was a truly radical
development for the extended families of El-Insha street to shake off their passiveness and join forces to address the kind
of issues they’ve let slide so many times in the past, which only seemed appropriate since it took an equally extreme set of
circumstances to bring about such a development. In my opinion, the catalyst for the unprecedented behavior of my street’s
extended families was the disorder that had befallen Cairo’s residential districts on the night of January 28th and prompted
their successful neighborhood watch endeavor. I believe this made them realize how much they’re capable of achieving
if they pulled together and worked as a group, which in turn encouraged them to make more use of their newly found
potential. As unpleasant as it was, that disorder had done some good after all ushering the extended family households
of El-Insha street, and the many other streets like it all over Nasr city, into a more mature phase of their evolution as a
community.
During the same period these positive developments were taking place in Nasr City, things were looking pretty grim in the
Cairene suburbs. There, the ominous and brooding atmosphere that came with the disorder that erupted in late January
2011 didn’t seem to subside over the months that followed. I first became aware of this during a phone call with my friend
who lived in Shorouq City some time after order had been restored to most of Cairo’s residential districts. In that phone call,
she told me that in Shorouq City things never went back to the way they were before the night of January 28th. She said that
235
although her family and herself were no longer in direct danger, she was still constantly worried and anxious nonetheless
because she felt that Shorouq City had become generally unsafe. My friend’s somber outlook was indeed justified. At
around the same time I had that phone call with her, I also began to notice form all the news reports I was coming across
that there was some serious criminal activity going on not only in Shorouq City, but in the suburbs of New Cairo as well.
The Cairene suburbs in general were just plagued with incidents of armed robbery and kidnapping school children for
ransom. And as late as February 2013, I was still coming across news of those incidents as the crime epidemic continued to
haunt the Cairene suburbs for almost two years after the trouble that briefly overwhelmed Cairo’s residential districts had
ended. This was disconcerting to say the least, but I also found it quite puzzling. Crimes such as those that befell the Cairene
suburbs have never been an issue in Cairo’s high-end residential districts at any point in time. It was therefore very strange
to witness those crimes fester with such intensity through out the suburbs of Cairo, and it was even stranger that that
would be the case at a time of relative calm in all of Cairo’s other high-end residential districts. To me, it looked a though
the disorder of late January 2011 had yielded a very different outcome in the Cairene suburbs than it did in Nasr City. As I’ve
explained earlier, during such disorder all the urban, architectural, and social disadvantages of the Cairene suburbs were
brought out for everyone to see, and it is my belief that this in turn encouraged many a criminal and wrongdoer to exploit
those disadvantages – that and the obvious fact that the residents of suburban Cairo are generally well off.
By that point, between the promising atmosphere that was shaping up in Nasr City and the bleak air that hung over the
Cairene suburbs, I had become quite hopeful. Judging by their behavior, the extended families of Nasr City’s middle class
professionals appeared to have discovered the potential and advantages of their apartment building households. And from
their remarks on the dreadful criminal activity in suburban Cairo, it also sounded like that they were aware and thankful for
how safe Nasr City was in comparison. And so, for a little while there, I got to thinking that maybe, just maybe, the trend
of middle class professionals relocating their extended family households to the Cairene suburbs might come to an end
after all. But alas, every other aspect of their behavior ever since the outbreak of the January uprising seemed to indicate
otherwise.
236
237
4.B An Unanswered Wake-up Call
The failings of older middle class professionals
in a post-Uprising Egypt and the imminent demise
of Nasr City’s apartment building-extended family households
It’s now almost four years after the outbreak of the January Uprising and the unrest in Egypt is still nowhere near a definitive
conclusion. Although the Uprising itself came to a close when Mubarak stepped down on the February 11, 2011, protests
against the military council that was appointed to temporarily run the country in his stead erupted soon thereafter bringing
about a whole new episode of violent strife which lasted until the council’s tenure in power ended in mid 2012. And not long
after the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi took over from the outgoing military council as Egypt’s newly elected
president, culminating the Brotherhood’s post-uprising ascension to power, protests against Morsi and the emerging Muslim
fig.4.b.1 [opposite page] Owing to
Brotherhood regime flared up in yet another chapter of violent conflict, which came to a bloody end in the summer of 2013 their sustained inaction, continued
criticism of the younger, and
when the Army – in response to such popular discontent – stepped in and removed him from office and then went on to reluctance to participate of effectuate
real change; such passive members
brutally cracked down on his supports. And now, after a mock democratic process in which he was glorified as Egypt’s savior of the older generation came to be
widely known as the ‘couch party’
in Egypt, in reference to their sitting
in his capacity as the head of the Army that overthrew Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, Abd elFattah elSisi had been their following events and passing
judgments while sitting comfortably
elected president, and ever since, Egypt has been under the rule of a regime that bears striking similarities to the Mubarak on couches in their homes.
238
regime that had been toppled four years earlier – a rule that has been marred by a consistent suppression and violation of
civil and human rights. That is to say, Egypt is pretty much back to were it was before the outbreak of the January Uprising
of 2011; not to mention that since then the county has also been, and still is, struggling through a rather turbulent process
of political reform; a deteriorating economy; rising sectarian tensions; and the rapid ideological polarization of its people.
Be that as it may however, the events of those four years offered yet another very important, and rather conclusive,
addition to my thesis. Granted, that addition has little to do with the immediate focus of this thesis on issues of architecture
and urbanism. But it remains a pivotal addition nonetheless given that it relates directly to the overarching social concept
upon which my arguments concerning those issues were predicated, and which – in essence – constitutes the answer to
the “why bother?” question of this thesis. The concept I’m referring to here is the one suggesting that the well-being of any
given society is closely tied to the integrity of its middle class and their active involvement in maintaining a sound social
order. It’s my belief that the events and aftermath of the January Uprising provide ample clues that prove the failure of the
professionals class – whom I perceive as the last remnants of a moral middle class in Egypt – to live up to their supposed
social responsibility. A failure that I have argued would be an inevitable outcome of the professionals’ preoccupation with
preserving their threatened socio-economic status, and their irrational pursuit of excessively consumeristic and ostentatious
lifestyles in order to assert it.
The first and maybe the most obvious of those clues presented itself in who initiated and staged what is now referred
to as the Revolution of 25 January – the Egyptian youth. It was young Egyptians who called for the initial day of protest on
the 25th which practically sparked the “revolution”; it was young Egyptians who endured and stood their ground through
the violent events in the months that followed; and it was young Egyptians who suffered, and are still suffering, the most
devastating losses through it all. And among those young Egyptians, it seems that young professionals in particular have had
a more, if not the most, central role in the Uprising. It is this issue that I find quite contradictory to simple logic.
It baffles me that the professionals of my generation were the instigators of that Uprising and not the professionals of our
parents’ generation. It baffles me because the professionals of our parents’ generation were brought up during the 50s and
60s, and – as students aspiring to be professionals – they were part of that era’s socio-economic system where professionals
were revered as a higher tier of the social hierarchy; where they were guaranteed economic stability and comfortable
lifestyles; and where personal excellence and sincere achievement were the standards for reaping such rewards. And it
baffles me because it was also the professionals of that generation who, as fresh graduates, witnessed at first hand the
drastic socio-economic shifts of the 70s, and since then have seen the demise of the principles they were brought up on;
have been struggling economically to maintain the decent lifestyles they grew believing they were entitled to; and have
watched as less worthy individuals ascended rapidly through social ranks while their own status hung by a thread. Logically,
one would have expected the professionals of that generation to play a more central and active role in an uprising against
239
the regime whose ideologies helped subject them to such social and economic injustices as opposed to their children who
were born in 80s and lacked their parents’ frame of reference. Yet, it seems to me that they hardly played any significant
role in the January Uprising, and that instead they generally had a rather negative attitude towards it.
I found some of the aspects of this negative attitude of theirs to be somewhat justifiable. For the better part of their adult
lives, older middle class professionals, along with the rest of the Egyptian population for that matter, have been living under
an Emergency Law that has been perpetually kept in effect since 1981. They’ve witnessed the atrocities that the Mubarak
regime committed in its name to quell any form of nonconformist political activity; and in turn came to associate engaging
in such activity with suffering police brutality, arrests without warrants, indefinite imprisonment with no right for trial,
torture, and even death. It goes without saying then that this conviction must have been of the greatest influence on their
reaction regarding such a politically charged occurrence as the January Uprising, especially in its early and most turbulent
days between its outbreak on January 25th and Mubarak stepping down on February 11th.
During that period, it seemed to me that the greater majority of older middle class professionals refrained from participating
in the protests, and that they strongly objected to their children’s participation and desperately tried to dissuade them from
following through with it. Considering the violent manner in which the authorities typically dealt with protesters, it was an
understandable position to take – they simply feared for their children’s and their own lives and safety if they would have
joined the protests. I also got the impression that they had very little faith that the protests would yield any substantial
results; which was a rather reasonable reservation as well. At the time, it indeed seemed highly unlikely that the Mubarak
regime, which has effectively kept political activism in check for 30 years, would give in to the protestors’ outrageous
demands for dissolving the government, putting top officials on trial, disbanding the regime’s political apparatus, and for
Mubarak himself to step down.
To be fair though, after the inconceivable happened and Mubarak stepped down, I’ve noticed that the older professionals’
generation had a change of heart. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) had been placed in charge of the
country for a transitional period, representing a revered and well-loved Egyptian Army that seemingly sided with the
protestors and refused to act against them when called upon by Mubarak during his last days in power. In turn, older middle
class professionals started to register an increased presence in Tahrir Square, and even allowed their younger children to
take part in the then SCAF-tolerated, peaceful sit-ins – and they were not the only ones. It also seemed to me that members
of the higher social classes, who originally wanted nothing to do with the Uprising, followed a similar trend. This spark of
activism however was rather short-lived, and was soon revealed for what it truly was – just another fad among the many
other fads of higher society.
Over the months after it assumed power, it became evident that the SCAF is no different from, if not worse than, the
Mubarak regime in terms of dealing with nonconformist political activity. With escalating fresh protests demanding faster,
240
more effective and transparent reforms, the council’s initial tolerance ran out and not before long it was authorizing the
same kind of atrocities that were committed during the early days of the Uprising. It also deployed the military police, and
even troops, against civilian protestors – both of which proving to be more brutal than the regular security forces, and it
brought civilian activists who openly criticized it to stand military tribunals. At the first signs of the council’s new attitude,
the majority of older professionals, as well as everyone else who had jumped on the dissidence bandwagon after Mubarak
stepped down, reverted to their original position regarding participating in protests. It was a disappointing relapse but an
understandable one nonetheless given that their children’s and their own lives and safety were, once again, at risk.
Yes, older middle class professionals may have good reason for this passive and discouraging behavior. But then again,
this doesn’t mean that they are entirely free of blame for behaving in such manner. The young people who went down to
Tahrir Square in January 2011, and who have since kept going back, have an instinct for self-preservation and knew full well
the dangers of political dissent the same as the older middle class professionals; and still they chose to make their stand
regardless. As a part of it myself, I know for a fact that the younger professionals’ generation in particular was brought up
by their parents to believe that discussing politics, let alone openly defying the political institution, is the stuff of taboo.
And yet there they were at the forefront of the Uprising, while their parents – the older professionals – took a backseat and
deemed their resort to protesting an uncalculated stunt of hotheaded youth.
This brings me to the single most significant aspect of those older middle class professionals’ negative attitude. It seems to
me that, so far, their biggest “contribution” to the Uprising and the events that unfolded in its wake has been their incessant
criticism of the younger generation’s reckless disregard for the dire consequences of their continuous protesting. At first,
the only consequence that seemed to bother the older professionals was the authorities’ response to the protestors’ bold
political dissent. During the earliest days of the uprising, the older professionals were critical of the young protestors for
thinking lightly of such response. They were simply under the impression that despite their efforts to instill the younger
generation with a sense of the atrocious manner in which the authorities handled political dissidents, the protesting youth
were still unable to fully grasp that they were literally putting their lives and personal safety on the line by standing up to
the Mubarak regime. It was rather difficult for them to acknowledge the fact that the protestors – who are just children
in their eyes – were knowingly taking this risk out of a strong commitment to a valid cause. As fathers and mothers, it was
much easier and almost natural for them to assume that, at their young age, those protestors were instead misguided by
youth’s false notions of invincibility when they chose to defy the system; and therefore felt the need to berate them in
order to bring them back to their senses. In other words the older professionals’ criticism during that time was just another
one of their attempts to dissuade their children from carrying on with the protests. And like the rest of those attempts, it
essentially stemmed from their fear for the lives and safety of those children. This is why I believe that, at first, their criticism
was still well within the bounds of pardonable behavior. However, what it developed to next was most certainly not.
241
fig.4.b.2 In Egypt, tradition dictates that one week
after a child is born, his family would celebrate
his birth with members of his extended family. As
part of that celebration, the child is placed in a big
sifter, after which relatives from both sides of his
extended families take turns instructing the child to
heed their advice and not that of his other family
members – a tradition that is very telling of the
ageist nature of Egyptian society. In this caricature,
the Egyptian revolutionary youth are depicted as
the child in the sifter, and around him, his “elders”,
each representing a form of authority in Egypt, are
gathered telling him to heed their advice. From left
to right those instruct him to: “listen to what the
Morshed [Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood] tells
you”, “listen to what the Pope [of the Egyptian
Coptic Church] tells you”, “listen to what the
SCAF tells you”, “listen to what the [educated]
Elite tells you”.
As time passed and the youth persisted with their protests, the older professionals’ criticisms took on a very different and
far more antagonistic tone as they voiced their discontent with the adverse economic effects of the civil unrest wreaked
by the protesting youth. This attitude first became obvious with the stalemate that developed during the 18-day run of the
January Uprising as protestors refused to leave Tahrir Square after Mubarak’s failure to offer a satisfactory response to their
demands; and became all the more intense as young protestors kept staging sit-ins and demonstrations after the SCAF’s
ascension to power and its lackluster performance with regards to achieving the goals of the “revolution”. It just seemed
to me that ever since that aforementioned stalemate, older professionals have never ceased complaining about how the
perpetual protests staged by the younger generation, and in turn the authorities’ crackdown, are impeding the flow of
everyday life and jeopardizing its safety; and are therefore posing serious threats to the country’s economy.
I found that particular recurring complaint to be, by far, the one aspect of the older middle class professionals’ negative
attitude that is in no part excusable. Granted, it wouldn’t have been much of an issue for them to voice such a criticism
242
if older professionals were opposed to the purpose of the protests to begin with; but they weren’t. On the contrary, they
clearly wanted an end to political, economic and social grievances all along – and therein lies the problem. For one thing, it
is a rather selfish behavior for them to be that critical considering that they’ve hardly been participating in the protests. It is
as if they wanted to reap the fruits of socio-political upheaval without having to endure even the least of its inherent trials.
After all, putting up with the economic repercussions of civil unrest seems rather mild in comparison to being subjected to
physical brutality or losing one’s life while protesting.
But what’s even more frustrating is that despite being so adamant about the economic drawbacks of the youth’s
continuous protesting, the older professionals are yet to come up with a viable alternative for it. After four years since the
outbreak of the Uprising, all they’ve had to offer was harsh and unconstructive criticism of the rash younger generation and
the error of their ways, which often sank to the level of petty faultfinding. Or at best, they’ve engaged in endless rhetorical
debates about the ”less damaging“ methods for bringing about the desired reforms, which have so far yielded nothing but
impractical options and unacceptable compromises. I believe that this takes their failure to meet their social obligation to a
whole new level; because if there were anybody who could – and should – have brought forth such an alternative, it would
have been the older middle class professionals. They are the legislators, political scientists, economists, and the countless
other experts who, by way of their fields of expertise and age, possess both the adequate knowledge and experience
needed to bring the country out of its turmoil and into a new era of genuine reform. But it’s not just about them being
tailored for the job. After they’ve stood idly by while the younger generation took the daring first step, one would have
expected them to step in and do their part if not for anything but to redeem themselves.
In time, the older middle class professionals’ repeated failure to rise to the occasion led me to the conclusion that their
incessant complaining about the continuous state of civil unrest in Egypt didn’t really stem from a genuine concern for the
country’s economy as they claimed, but it was rather because such unrest has been interfering with their “leisure dreams”.
It just seemed to me that they perceived the recurring protests which called for a wholehearted, and therefore lengthy,
reform effort as a hindrance to their pursuit of comfortable life styles, and particularly their aspiration to relocate their
homes to the suburbs. I also got the distinct impression that they would have rather had matters return to a status quo as
soon as possible so that they can get back to wallowing in such “leisure dreams”, which they felt that they were entitled to
after they had struggled to maintain their social and economic status all throughout their adult lives.
I believe that this is precisely why every single regime that’s been in power since the outbreak of the January Uprising,
including the Mubarak regime itself, have resorted to playing what came to be known as the “Production Cycle” card
whenever public dissatisfaction manifested itself into widespread protests. Almost every time protestors took to the streets,
the head of the regime in power would address the “good citizens” of Egypt urging them to practice restraint and to return
to their homes so as not to impede the “Production Cycle” and in turn hurt the country’s economy. Rather than being
243
strictly directed towards protestors, that kind of address was more of a veiled message to older middle class professionals
– one that played on their fears of a sustained state of civil unrest and economic uncertainty that would undermine their
pursuit of “leisure dreams”. And surely enough, every time a regime came out with that kind of address, older middle class
professionals, without fail, responded by advocating settling for whatever half-measures that that regime had to offer
instead of standing up to it and assuming their supposed social responsibility to affect structured and informed reforms.
fig.4.b.3 The sustained economic woes in Egypt since the outbreak

of the January Uprising has been the boogeyman of older middle
class professionals, among many other members of the older
generations in Egypt. In the four years since the Uprising, they
seemed more willing to accept the quickest, rather than the most
sustainable, fix to that problem.
244
This brings me to the one event which, I believe, was the most striking example of the older middle class professionals’
failure to take on their supposed social role in the wake of the January Uprising, and which I also believe sent Egypt down
the turbulent road that it’s been on since. That event is the constitutional referendum of March 19, 2011. A little over
a month after Mubarak had stepped down, a seemingly simple question was put to the Egyptian electorate: Should the
standing Egyptian Constitution be retained and amended, or should it be scraped and a new one be drafted? Despite its
seeming simplicity, there was quite a lot riding on that question as evident by all the extensive projections of what either
votes might entail on the long run which quickly became the centre of a heated public debate at the time. But the short
version was this: A Yes vote would allow for quicker parliamentary and presidential elections, and thus worked to the
advantage of already established and well organized Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the
Salafi Noor Party which, naturally, were at the forefront of the Yes campaign. A No vote on the other hand entailed delayed
parliamentary and presidential elections, which would give the younger revolutionary currents that staged the Uprising
enough time to organize themselves into proper parties that could take part in those elections. Accordingly, the supporters
of the No campaign were the Egyptian youth, many political and social reform advocates, and all those who saw that, by
rights, the young Egyptians who staged the revolution should have a central role in shaping the country’s future.
fig.4.b.4 [opposite page] possible scenarios for

either result of the March 19 referendum of 2011
245
YES
March 19 Referendum
Election of the
assembly may be The new Democratic
postponed for up to
six months as per
constitution may
require new
State
the amendments elections
End of
Military
Rule
Referendum on Parliamentary Presidential Election of a Referendum on a Parliamentary Presidential
Constitutional Amendments Elections Elections Constituent Assembly New Constitution Elections Elections
Many people will be Muslim Brotherhood Many people will be The assembly will be elected A lot of elections might
denided the right to & ex-NDP will have the denided the right to by a parliament that’s not have a negative effect on
run for presidency majority of the seats run for presidency representative of the people the country’s stability
Mar. 2011 Apr. 2011 May 2011 Jun. 2011 Jul. 2011 Aug. 2011 Sep. 2011 Oct. 2011 Nov. 2011 Dec. 2011 Jan. 2012 Feb. 2012 Mar. 2012 Apr. 2012 May 2012 Jun. 2012 Jul. 2012 Aug. 2012 Sep. 2012 Oct. 2012 Nov. 2012 Dec. 2012 Jan. 2013 Feb. 2013 Mar. 2013
Choosing the assembly Given the current political Military rule will last
via a direct election strife, drafting a constitution longer, and achieving
might be problematic might cause a lot of disputes stability will be delayed
Constitutional Declaration Referendum on a Parliamentary Presidential

and Election of a Constituent Assembly New Constitution Elections Elections
NO
The constitutional Young activists will
declaration will not have an adequate
necessarily require opportunity to Democratic
drafting a new establish new State
constitution political parties;
Presidential elections
can precede
parliamentary ones
after restricting the
President’s powers
End of POTENTIAL
NOTES
246 Military HAZARD
Rule
7% 5%
22. 77.3 38. 61.5
% %
Egypt Cairo
fig.4.b.5 Referendum results in Cairo and Egypt
fig.4.b.6 [opposite page] Voters against passing Voters Against passing

the constitutional amendments vs. professional the Constitutional Amendments
popilation in Cairo’s districts
On the eve of the referendum, an electronic sample poll on the Information & Decision Support Center web site projected
that 60% of Egyptians will vote against the amendments versus 39% for. However as one of my best friends remarked at the
time, the sample that was used to make such a projection was clearly skewed towards middle and upper classes with access
to the Internet. And he couldn’t have been more right. The actual results of the referendum which were announced a few
days later were the complete opposite of that projection. 77% of Egyptians voted Yes for the passing the amendments, while
only about 23% voted No. And in Cairo specifically, 61.5% of its inhabitants voted Yes for the passing the amendments, while
38.5% of them voted No. Needless to say, that was a major letdown, but a breakdown of the referendum results in Cairo told
a very interesting story. When I cross-referenced the percentage of those who voted No and the percentage of professional
residents in each of Cairo managerial district, I found a rather clear correlation between both percentages. Apart from a
consistent difference that could be attributed to the younger electorate that had no occupation because they were still
students, the trend of those who voted No was almost identical to that of the professional residents in each managerial district,
with a few understandable anomalies. And while this, at first, might seem as a good sign that middle class professionals had
assumed some of their supposed social responsibilities, a more encompassing look at the vote as a whole proves otherwise.
247
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
Abdeen
Ain Shams
Azbakeya
Bab A’Sha’reya
Badr
Basateen
Boulaq
A’Darb AlAhmar
Gammaleya
Hada’eq AlQobba
Helwan
Khalifa
Ma’adi
Mansheyet Nasser
Marg
Masr AlGadeeda
Masr AlQadeema
Matareya
Mosky
Nasr City
New Cairo First
New Cairo Second
New Cairo Third
Nozha
Qasr A’Neel
Rawd AlFarag
Sahel
Salam
A’Sayeda Zaynab
Sharabeya
Shobra
Shoruq
Tebbeen
Waily
Zaher
A’Zawya AlHamra
Zaytoon
15 May
Residents holding Voters Against passing In Close Proximity Large Coptic High Real
a Professional Occupation [2006] the Constitutional Amendments [2011] to Tahrir Square Population Estate Value
Percentages attributed to Ma’adi represent combined data from Ma’adi and Torah districts. Percentages attributed to Qasr A’Neel represent combined data from Qasr A’Neel and Zamalek
districts. Percentages attributed to Nasr City represent combined data from Nasr City First and Nasr City second districts, as well as Ezbet AlHaggana squatter settlement which has been
otherwise excluded from the former and treated as its own district. These adjustments compensate for Torah, Zamalek, and Ezbet AlHaggana being parts of the electoral districts of Ma’adi, Qasr
A’Neel, and Nasr City First respectively in the results of the 2011 Constitutional Referendum.
248
As I considered Cairene districts where real estate values are quite high, it was safe to assume that the remaining percentage
of those districts’ residents who were not professionals were members of the new middle class since they could afford living
there. That, by association, meant that the new middle class residents in those districts accounted for the Yes votes there.
I also noticed that, collectively, the Yes and No votes in those high real estate value districts were almost split around the
50% mark. And so, when I took a step back and considered the overwhelming majority of the Yes vote in both Cairo and
Egypt as a whole, it dawned on me that, given such an even split, it was obviously the members of the new middle class
who were, by far, the more proactive of the two factions of the Egyptian middle class; and that they were indeed as they
fervently promoted their agendas to the more impressionable members of society and in turn tipped the scales towards
a Yes vote. By the same token, I also came to the realization that older middle class professionals on the other hand did
nothing beyond casting their own No votes. Those numbers strongly suggested a gross incompetence on their part when
it came to carrying out what I believed to be their responsibility as a moral middle class to objectively inform the general
public about what either vote entailed. But then again, none of those realizations were much of a surprise to me. Rather,
they illustrated, in quantifiable terms, my vivid memories of the older middle class professionals’ lackluster and passive
attitude during the buildup leading to the referendum, at a time when the Islamist proponents of the Yes vote falsely
preached to the inherently religious Egyptian masses that a No vote would bring in a new constitution that would scrap the
articles that proclaim Egypt as a “Muslim” state; and that casting a No vote basically amounted to saying No to God himself.
It wasn’t long though before older middle class professionals, and most of the Egyptian society, had to face the
consequences of the former groups’ failure to live up to their social responsibility during the March 19 referendum. About
ten months after the referendum, a parliament, with an overwhelming Islamist majority headed by the Muslim Brotherhood,
was voted in; and about six months after that, the Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, was elected president of
Egypt. Needless to say, in both elections, the Muslim Brotherhood – as expected – utilized its ample resources and already
well-established networks, as well as employed the same type of proactive campaigning it had used during the buildup to
the March 19 referendum, to secure the majority of the votes. And all the while, older middle class professionals stood idly
by still, and did nothing but cast their own votes and complain about the almost certain repercussion of the Brotherhood’s
uncontested ascension to power. And surely enough, in the months following its rise to power, all of the older middle class
professionals’ fears came true as the Brotherhood regime’s performance quickly became a cause of major concern to
everyone save for its own supporters.
During both election campaigns, the Brotherhood, through its candidates, promised to effectuate all the political,
economic, and social reforms that the Uprising had called for; it promised to restore the declining Egyptian economy and
usher the country into an age of prosperity; it promised allowing a healthy and diverse political and social rhetoric; and in
the particular case of Morsi’s candidacy for the presidency, it promised to fix almost all of the problems that beset Egypt
249
fig.4.b.7 The makeup of the post-Uprising Egyptian
Parliament of 2012; the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Freedom and Justice party seccured the most seats.
Egyptian Parliament | 2012
Islamist Liberal/Leftist
The Democratic Alliance (235 seats; 46%). Led by the Muslim Brotherhood's Wafd Party (38 seats; 7.5%)
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) [solid green], this bloc was intended to be Egypt's
pre-eminent post-revolution political force, a broad coalition of Islamist and secular parties
who could dominate across the country. However, the FJP won by far the largest number of
seats within the bloc, taking 218 of the Alliance’s 235, plus another eight FJP-affiliated The Egyptian Bloc (34 seats; 6.5%)
independents, accounting for a 44.5% of the Parliament’s 508 seats on its own.
The Islamist Alliance (124 seats; 24.5%). The Islamist Alliance was founded by Reform and Development Party (8 seats; 1.5%)
the fundamentalist Salafi Nour Party, which withdrew from the Brotherhood's Democratic
Alliance, and which is the most popular of the hardline Salafi groups. The Salafi Authenticity
Party and the Building and Development Party – the political wing of the once-militant and The Revolution Continues Alliance (7 seats; 1%). The Revolution Continues
banned Islamic Group – also joined the Islamist Alliance. Within the bloc, the Nour party won Alliance essentially represents those parties that broke off from the liberal Egyptian Bloc. It
108 seats, Building and Development secured 13, and the Asala party took three. includes Egypt Freedom Party, the Muslim Brotherhood youth’s Egyptian Current Party, the
Socialist Popular Alliance Party and an assortment of lesser groups. The alliance can be
described as leftist, though it includes Islamists and economic liberals. The one constant
among its most notable members is that they declined to compromise in order to remain in
Wasat Party (10 seats; 2%) more-powerful groups – the Egypt Bloc and the Muslim Brotherhood.
National Democratic Party Offshoots Independents (26 seats; 5%) Appointees (10 seats; 2%)
Remnants of the Mubarak Regime (16 seats; 3%)
250
fig.4.b.8 The Muslim Brotherhood, and its
Freedom and Justice Party, became the subjects of
public discontent in Egypt after they have failed to
deliver on their campaign promises.
251
fig.4.b.9 Graffiti of Morsi on the outer wall of
the Presidential Palace in Heliopolis. His move
to consolidate his, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s,
position in power not long after he was elected
president was a major cause of concern for large
portions of Egyptian society, which soon thereafter
developed into a full out public uproar demanding
his removal from power.
in the wake of the Uprising and impeded the flow of everyday life in his first 100 days in office. By the summer of 2013
though, a little under a year after Morsi had taken office, the Brotherhood regime had hardly fulfilled any of its campaign
promises. The economy was in a much worse shape than before the Brotherhood had come into power; public amenities
were in shambles as power outages, water shortages, and traffic jams became a staple of everyday like across all of Cairo
much to the dismay of its residents; the regime took a number of power grab measures that were clearly aimed at securing
their position in power indefinitely; and in many instances, the Muslim Brotherhood supporters cracked down violently on
anyone who voiced their opposition to or protested against its regime’s policies. All in all, the Egyptian people in general,
and older middle class professionals in particular, found themselves under the yoke of yet another authoritarian regime,
which seemed poised to excise even more liberties than any other regime they had lived under given its hard-line Islamist
ideological platform. And so, when young protestors, once again, took to the streets in the summer of 2013 in an attempt
to depose Morsi and the Brotherhood, older middle class professionals hardly voiced any complaints, and even took part
in the protests towards the end when the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime seemed imminent. When that
happened however, I was under no illusion that older middle class professionals had come around and were finally living
up to their supposed social responsibility, simply because their track-record over the previous 4 years strongly suggested
otherwise. As a matter of fact, the way the events of that summer unfolded put an end to all my prior hopes that Nasr
City’s middle class professionals might be reconsidering abandoning their apartment building–extended family houses and
relocating their homes to the suburbs of Cairo.
252
fig.4.b.10 Rab’a Mosque and square relative to
11 El-Insha Street. After the brutal dispersal of
the Rab’a sit-in sin the summer of 2013, the Rab’a
logo [top] became synonymous with the incident,
and served a reminder of what happened what
happened then and there, as well as a symbol of
defiance to the current Egyptian authorities which
banned the any public display of that logo.
253
fig.4.b.11 The Rab’a sit in
In the standoff that developed between the anti and pro Morsi protestors during that summer, the latter group staged its
biggest sit-in at Rab’a Square – a fairly large traffic node at the northwest corner of Nasr City’s residential neighborhoods, on
which the Rab’a mosque, one of the Nasr City’s oldest and most iconic landmarks, stands. And with nothing but the suburbs
of New Cairo and Shorouq City to the east of Nasr City, Rab’a Square has always served as the primary entry point to Nasr
City for the rest of Cairo’s population. That is to say, Rab’a Square carries a lot of symbolic weight as a gateway and an urban
façade for Nasr City as a whole. And so when the pro Muslim Brotherhood protestors claimed Rab’a Square as their turf,
they essentially claimed the whole of Nasr City as such. It came as a shock for Nasr City’s middle class professionals, and for
254
me for that matter, to realize that so many of the neighborhood’s new middle class residents were avid supporters of the
Muslim Brotherhood. They were obviously taken aback by the realization that their new middle class neighbors in Nasr City
were fundamentally different from them at a very deep ideological level. And given the clear majority of Nasr City’s new
middle class inhabitants, it also seemed to me that middle class professionals came to realize that Nasr City was not the
habitat that they had once thought of as their own.
The middle class professionals’ perception of Nasr City was further tarnished in the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster. After the
Army had deposed Morsi, pro Brotherhood protestors refused to leave Rab’a square and continued to occupy it, making life
that much difficult for all of Nasr City’s inhabitants. But when they Army finally moved in to disperse the Rab’a sit-in almost
two months after Morsi’s ouster, it was a rather ugly affair. In its effort to remove the protestors from the square, the Army
exercised excessive, and at times deadly, force, and amid allegations from both the Army and the Brotherhood as to who
instigated the violence and killed protestors, the death toll of what was quickly dubbed as the “Rab’a Massacre” piled up. In
fig.4.b.12 [bottom, right] and the wake of that unfortunate event, I got the distinct impression that the image of Nasr City was forever marred in collective
fig.4.b.13 [bottom, left] As Egyptian
security forces moved in to clear
the Rab’a sit-in after months of not consciousness of its middle class professionals inhabitants. It seemed to me that the prevalent sentiment among them was
addressing the issue, the situation
quickly developed to the worst as the that of alienation, and more than ever before, it looked as though they had more reasons to leave Nasr City than they had
pro-Morsi supporters and security
forces clashed violently. reasons to stay.
255
fig.4.b.14 [top, left], fig.4.b.15 [top, right] and fig.4.b.16 [bottom] As security forces
stepped-up the force by which they went about dispersing the sit-in and clearing its
camps; the Rab’a square, and its typically quiet residential context, quickly developed
the semblance of a scorched war-zone.
256
During my most recent visit to Cairo in early 2014, I conducted an additional layer of urban survey on Nasr City’s First
Zone. Sadly enough, my findings were in clear correlation with my observations regarding the middle class professionals’
stronger than ever resolve to leave Nasr City and relocate to the suburbs. All of the trends that I have tracked in previous
surveys persisted. Granted, in comparison to the two-year stretch between 2008 and 2010, some of those trends might
have slowed down a bit during the following 4 years, but they most certainly did not completely abate. By-law abiding
apartment buildings were still being demolished and replaced by gaudy neo-classical condominium towers at very high
rates that suggest that the middle class professionals’ exodus is still in full swing. As a matter of fact, the data seemed to also
suggest that there was hardly a time following the January uprising when middle class professionals seriously considered
staying in Nasr City.
fig.4.b.17 What follows is a series of maps tracking urban changes in

the First Zone Four years after the urban survey I conducted in 2010,
and three years after the outbreak of the January Uprising. And while
the trends tracked in the aforementioned survey have slowed down a bit
during those three years, they most definitely have not lost their vigor.
The apartment building¬–extended family house typology is still sharp
decline and the condominium tower typology is still on the rise. The
following maps aim to demonstrate the continuation of those trends.
257
%
11
%
5.9
66.5% 1994
16
.6%
%
15
6.3%
62.2% 2007
16
.5
%
18%
7.1%
58.2% 2010
16
.7%
21%
54.2% 7.6%
17.2%
no height data available
within height limit
First Zone | 2014

258
fig.4.b.18
New Residential
96 Buildings
14 Years [1994 – late 2007]
New Residential
56 Buildings
2 Years [2008 – 2010]
New Residential
58 Buildings
4 Years
First Zone | 2010 – 2014

259
fig.4.b.19
14 Years [1994 – late 2007]
2 Years [2008 – 2010]
4 Years
First Zone | 2010 – 2014

260
fig.4.b.20
6.3%
93.7% 2007
53.6% 46.4% 2010
27.6% 72.4%

First Zone | 2010 – 2014

261
Replacement
fig.4.b.21
19.8
%
58.3% 1994 – late 2007

5%
12.
%
9.4
1.8%
10
.7
%
%
69.6% 2008 – 2010
17.9
13
.7%
13.7% 72.6%
no height data available

within height limit
First Zone | 2010 – 2014

262
263
fig.4.b.22
2007
1994
2010 First Zone | 2014

264
This brings me back to El-Insha Street and my extended family house there – the microcosm that gauges Nasr City as a whole.
In 2012, before the Rab’a sit-in and subsequent massacre, 2 El-Insha street was demolished, and shortly afterwards an eight-
storey condominium stood in its place, which quickly put out the glimmer of hope I had with regards to the residents of
El-Insha Street might be electing to keep residing in their extended family homes down my street. That particular incident
was a very early indication that the reversal of the extinction of Nasr City’s apartment building–extended family house
typology which I though might be possible hoped for was in fact never going to happen. And during my most recent visit to
Cairo in 2014, I learned some things that only served to confirm what I had already suspected. Most of the nuclear families
of 13 El-Insha Street household have moved out and were renting their apartments until they got a good offer on selling the
whole property. Similarly, many of the nuclear families of 1 and 8 El-Insha Street households have sold their apartments and
moved out to the suburbs. My uncle is now in the final phases of completing his Shorouq City residence. And my mother is
seriously considering selling her apartment in 11 El-Insha Street and moving to a single apartment in New Cairo, and is now
fig.4.b.23 In 2011, another of El-Insha
Street’s extended family households seeing my sister’s and my own apartments merely as future assets for us later in life rather than apartments that we would
was demolished; this time it was 2 El-
Insha Street. actually occupy with our own prospective nuclear families.
265
fig.4.b.24 [top] and fig.4.b.25
[bottom] Lot no.2 on El-Insha Street
lies vacant after the demolition of the
extended family house that used to
occupy it. The sign boasts the now legal
construction of an 8-storey apartment
building, with two apartments on each
level, in its place.
266
fig.4.b.26
0 5 10 20m
267
fig.4.b.27
268
269
In other words, the life of 11 El-Insha Street as an extended family household is at an end, and so is that of Nasr City
as a hub for middle class professionals and the apartment building–extended family house typology. The social pull of
Cairo’s suburbs and the middle class professionals’ socially driven pursuit of “leisure dreams” is clearly poised to prevail
here, and with it, the last remnants of a characteristic architectural typology are most likely going to fade into extinction.
Nevertheless, Nasr City itself will live on, albeit in a very different urban, architectural, and social form – there’s yet another
chapter in its story. But as this thesis comes to a close, my hope is that, in years to come, it would serve as a record of Nasr
City’s apartment building–extended family house typology with its unassuming character and the latent potential of its
architecture and social structure, for anyone who might wonder what small role it could have played in the grander scheme
of things had it endured.
fig.4.b.28 [opposite page] 11 El-Insha Street, and

by association Nasr City’s apartment building–
extended family house typology, are fading into
extinction.
270
Notes
271
1.1 The Egyptian Middle Class [1800s-1960s]
1. Ahmed Kh. Allam, Yhya O. Shedid, and Maged M. El Mahdi, Tagdid alAhya’ [Urban Renewal] (Cairo: The Anglo-
Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 263.
2. The objectives of establishing Nasr City are listed in a heavily edited informational video that was obtained from
the Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban Development; the video was edited by (photographer/cameraman) Samir
alMoqaddem from the Microfilm and Public Relations Department.
3. Although he does not refer to it as a middle class per se, P. J. Vatikiotis states that by the end of Muhammad Ali’s
reign, a nucleus of an educated class had begun to form. See P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad
Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 71. Identifying that nucleus as the seed
of the Egyptian middle class here draws on Galal Amin’s ideas pertaining to education as the earmark and the primary
source of income of the Egyptian middle class up until the mid 70s which is the overarching common theme in his books
‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002] and Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor
alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in
Half a Century, 1945-1995]. Moreover, it is clearly stated in Egypt: A Country Study that the economic transformation of
Egypt in the 19th century, which was set in motion by Muhammad Ali, resulted in a professional “middle class”. See Helen
Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Social Change in the
Nineteenth Century”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/23.htm.
4. The role of Muhammad Ali as the founder of Modern Egypt, his reform efforts, and the feudal system it produced
are staples of history curriculums throughout the various stages of the Egyptian education system. However, I never trusted
everything I learned at school, especially when it came to history. In that regard, the chapter entitled “Muhammad Ali, The
Modernizing Autocrat” in Vatikiotis’ extensive volume on the history of modern Egypt helped verify and substantiate the
account given here about Ali’s reign and reform efforts. See P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad
Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 49-69. The sections dealing with Muhammad
Ali and the social changes in Egypt during the 19th century in the country study edited by Helen Chapin Metz were also
rather helpful. See Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990),
in “Muhammad Ali, 1805-48”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/21.htm; and in “Social Change in the Nineteenth Century”,
http://countrystudies.us/egypt/23.htm.
272
5. Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El
Shorouk, 2005), 119-120; and Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-
1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo:
Dar El Hilal, 2001), 128-129. Also see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of
Congress, 1990), in “Social Change in the Nineteenth Century”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/23.htm.
6. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Urban
Society”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm.
7. P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 219-220.
Shorouk, 2005), 119.
9. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever
Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal,
2001), 127.
10. Ibid, 127-128. Also see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress,
1990), in “Social Change in the Nineteenth Century”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/23.htm; and in “The Occupiers”, http://
countrystudies.us/egypt/26.htm; and in “Economy and Society under Occupation”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/27.htm.
Also see P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 61; and although the population values conflict with those mentioned in Metz, “Social
Change in the Nineteenth Century”, also see Vatikiotis, 81-82.
Shorouk, 2005), 121.
12. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened
to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 21.
273
13. Ibid, 129-130.
14. Ibid, 70.
Shorouk, 2005), 122-123.
16. Ibid, 26.
17. Even more so than Muhammad Ali’s reforms, the reform efforts of the Nasserist Regime during the 50s and 60s are
a very common subject in any basic history of modern Egypt. The account given here about the socioeconomic policies of
that era was written after reading a number of different sources in order to verify and substantiate some of the commonly
known facts regarding those policies. Although the narratives of those sources were quite engaging, they were either too
generalized, or digressed into too much detail that was not pertinent to the flow of my own narrative. Not to mention
that, more often than not, any one fact in the account given here is mentioned in more than one of those sources, albeit in
different manners and contexts. All of this makes it far more fitting to list the sources that helped me formulate this rather
short account than to cite every single fact in it.
• Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El
Shorouk, 2005), 142.
• Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever
2001), 21-22.
• Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Nasser
and Arab Socialism”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/34.htm.
• Ibid, in “Nasser’s Legacy”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/39.htm.
• Ibid, in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm.
274
• Ibid, in “Education”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/71.htm.
• Ibid, in the introduction to “Structure, Growth, and Development of the Economy”, http://countrystudies.us/
egypt/74.htm.
• Ibid, in “The Role of the Government”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/75.htm.
• Ibid, in “Land Ownership and Reform”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/85.htm.
• P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 393-402.
• Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Class, State and the Reversal of Egypt’s Agrarian Reform,” Middle East Report 23, no. 184
(September/October 1993), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer184/class-state-reversal-egypts-agrarian-reform.
• Saleh S. Abdelazim, “Structural Adjustment and the Dismantling of Egypt’s Etatist System” (PhD thesis, Virginia
Tech, 2005), 21-30. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12232002-083424/unrestricted/CHP2.pdf.pdf.
18. Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar
El Shorouk, 2005), 125. Also see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of
Congress, 1990), in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm, and in “Education”, http://countrystudies.us/
egypt/71.htm, and in “The Bureaucracy”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/112.htm.
19. In addition to being common knowledge about the socioeconomic zeitgeist in Egypt during the 50s and 60s, the
ideas presented here regarding the educated middle class becoming an upper echelon of Egyptian society and the emerging
social importance of education and government employment are also draws on my understanding of the following sources:
Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk,
2005), 153-157; Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever
2001), 130-135; and Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990),
in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm.
275
Shorouk, 2005), 142; and 156-157.
Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 220-221.
1.2 Nasr City [1960s]

1. The general consensus in Cairo is that those five neighborhoods are indeed the premium residential districts of
the City. The eighth chapter of the book Urban Renewal, entitled “High Level Districts”, identifies those neighborhoods as
such, and provides a brief history of the inception and the general urban features of each of them. Although alAwqaf City,
or Mohandeseen, is counted among those neighborhoods in that chapter, it has been omitted here because, although it
is part of Greater Cairo, it is located to the west of the Nile and is technically within the managerial jurisdiction of Giza
Governorate. See Ahmed Kh. Allam, Yhya O. Shedid, and Maged M. El Mahdi, Tagdid alAhya’ [Urban Renewal] (Cairo: The
Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 247-268.
2. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 103.
3. This statement is based on the extensive body of work listed in a tribute site to Sayyed Karim. See “Sabeqat
alKhebra wa alA’mal fi alHayah alFaneyya wa alMehaneyya” [Previous Experience and Work in His Artistic and Professional
Careers], Imhotep alQarn al’Eshreen wa Ra’ed Takhteet alModon al’Alamy: Dr. Eng. Sayyed Karim [A Twentieth Century
Imhotep and World-class City Planning Pioneer: Dr. Eng. Sayyed Karim], http://www.sayedkarim.com/cv.php.
4. As far as the research of this thesis went, it is not explicitly stated anywhere who was responsible for the detailed
planning of Nasr City’s original residential Zones. However, of all the blueprints of the detailed planning of those zones,
which were obtained from The Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban Development, the blueprint of the Second Zone
is the only one that credits Sayyed Karim as the planner. The rest do not have any planning credits on them. Furthermore,
in an index of legal decrees pertaining to Nasr City, which was compiled by and obtained from Ahmed AbdelMaqsoud
Muhammad, a lawyer at the aforementioned company, it is listed that the Second Zone’s urban design was approved by the
276
Governor of Cairo in 1961, whereas the urban designs of the rest of Nasr City’s Zones – the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
– were approved at different times throughout 1966. Moreover, in a PowerPoint presentation about the early history of
Nasr City, which was obtained from the company’s Microfilm and Public Relations Department, the greater majority of the
promotional images that showed off Nasr City, and which dated back to the late 60s and early 70s, centered around public
and residential buildings in the Second Zone in particular, as opposed to a handful of images of other areas in the settlement
that appeared to be far less developed in comparison. All of this strongly suggested that, after completing the overall
planning of Nasr City, Karim devised a detailed urban design for the Second Zone to serve as a template for the rest of the
settlement’s residential zones. Salah Hegab, a renowned architect who writes a regular column entitled “wa Da’eman ‘Amar
ya Masr [May Ye Always Be Inhabited O Egypt]” in alAhram newspaper, credits Gamal Fahim and Kamal Shohaib with devising
the detailed planning for the rest of Nasr City’s residential zones in one of said columns that was published shortly after
Karim’s death. See Salah Hegab, “wa Da’eman ‘Amar ya Masr [May Ye Always Be Inhabited O Egypt],” alAhram, Jul. 25, 2005.
Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 264; percentages averaged from the ranges offered by the authors.
6. The basic planning features of Nasr City’s residential zones and the design logic behind them are discussed in a
heavily edited informational video that was obtained from the Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban Development; the
video was edited by (photographer/cameraman) Samir alMoqaddem from the Microfilm and Public Relations Department.
Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 264; those bylaws were corroborated by sample original zoning maps obtained from The Nasr
City Company for Housing and Urban Development.
8. That restructuring and its date are listed in the aforementioned index of legal decrees pertaining to Nasr City that
was compiled by and obtained from Ahmed AbdelMaqsoud Muhammad, a lawyer in The Nasr City Company for Housing
and Urban Development.
2001), 91; and 114-115. Also see P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 412.
277
1.3 The Egyptian Middle Class [1970s-1990s]
1. In the opening chapter of his book Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians?], Galal
Amin identifies and briefly discusses the relation between those three factors and the drastic social changes they affected
throughout the 70s and 80s. See Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-
Dar El Hilal, 2001), 10-11; and 24-31.
2. In January of 1977, “Bread Riots” erupted across Egypt after the Sadat regime cancelled subsidies on basic food
items, as well as bonuses and pay increases for public sector employees, in response to external pressures from the IMF
and The World Bank among other foreign creditors. The regime was forced to renege on those cancellations to restore
calm, and since then governments in Egypt approached cuts to social welfare programs with great caution. See Helen
Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Politics among Elites”
under “The Politics of Economic Strategy”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/111.htm; and in “Egypt’s New Direction”, http://
countrystudies.us/egypt/43.htm.
3. Favoring quantity over quality was the hallmark of the Sadat regime’s approach to higher education. Nine of the
fourteen public universities that operated in Egypt in 1990 were established in the 70s and 80s. See Metz, in “Education”,
http://countrystudies.us/egypt/71.htm. In comparison, only one new public university was established under the Nasserist
regime in the 50s and 60s. Coming from an extended family in which the majority of the older generations are professors
of medicine, engineering, and political science in Cairo’s oldest universities, a common complaint of theirs at the beginning
of every academic year was how the increasing quotas of students that the government allowed to be admitted in their
respective institutions would negatively affect their ability to do their jobs, and in turn, the quality of education those
institution had to offer. They often lamented the time when they were university students and their schools had far smaller
student bodies. As it will be discussed later in this chapter, the Sadat regime’s push for expanding the capacity of the post-
secondary education system was more of a response to an overwhelming, socially driven, public demand rather than a
genuine concern for providing quality education for all.
4. “In 1985-86, Egypt’s primary and secondary schools employed only 155,000 teachers to serve 9.6 million pupils--a
ratio of about 62 students per teacher. Some city schools were so crowded that they operated two shifts daily.” See Metz,
in “Education”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/71.htm.
278
5. At the time, “average annual pay in the private sector was said to be three times that in the government” and “a
person holding a ministerial-level position in government could earn up to 1,000 percent more by taking a post in the private
sector.” See Metz, in “Wages”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/82.htm; and in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/
egypt/61.htm.
6. The woes of freshly graduated university students with government employment since the mid 70s is a rather
familiar issue in Egypt. Growing up in the 80s and early 90s, a staple in most Egyptian soap operas and movies involved
the frustrations of a young university graduate waiting for a “letter of appointment” from the government, and the near
impossibility of actually receiving it. In the wake of introducing the Open-Door Policy in 1974, “Individual ministries
determined the number of new positions that needed to be filled each year; once the quota was met, the names of other
applicants were placed on waiting lists. During the 1980s, an average of 250,000 college graduates were waiting at any given
time to be called for government jobs; the typical applicant remained on the waiting list for more than three years. This
situation caused unrest among middle- and lower-middle-income students who had hoped that higher education would be
their ticket to upward mobility.” See Metz, in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm.
7. Like the discourse regarding the socioeconomic reforms of the 50s and 60s in Chapter 1.1, the account given here
concerning the Open-Door Policy and the drastic socioeconomic shift it affected during the 70s and 80s was written after
reading various sources to substantiate and verify known facts about the subject. And for the same reasons given in the
note following the aforementioned discourse in chapter 1.1, the material that helped craft the account given here are listed
below.
• Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El
Shorouk, 2005), 144-145.
• Ibid, 158-159.
• Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever
2001), 22-23.
• Ibid, 34-35.
279
• Ibid, 43.
• Ibid, 89.
• Ibid, 91-92.
• Ibid, 135-137.
• Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Political
Developments, 1971-1978”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/42.htm.
• Ibid, in “Egypt’s New Direction”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/43.htm.
• Ibid, in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm.
• Ibid, in “Education”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/71.htm.
• Ibid, in the introduction to “Structure, Growth, and Development of the Economy”, http://countrystudies.us/
egypt/74.htm.
• Ibid, in “The Role of the Government”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/75.htm.
• Ibid, in “Public Finance”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/79.htm.
• Ibid, in “Employment”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/81.htm.
• Ibid, in “Wages”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/82.htm.
• Ibid, in “Debt and Restructuring”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/104.htm
• Ibid, in “Politics among Elites” under “The Politics of Economic Strategy”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/111.htm.
280
• Ibid, in “The Bureaucracy”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/112.htm.
• P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 415.
• Ibid, 429-430.
• Ibid, 434.
• Ibid, 449.
• Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Class, State and the Reversal of Egypt’s Agrarian Reform,” Middle East Report 23, no. 184
(September/October 1993), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer184/class-state-reversal-egypts-agrarian-reform.
• Saleh S. Abdelazim, “Structural Adjustment and the Dismantling of Egypt’s Etatist System” (PhD thesis, Virginia
Tech, 2005), 30-41. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12232002-083424/unrestricted/CHP2.pdf.pdf.
• Sonia M. Ali and Richard H. Adams Jr., “The Egyptian Food Subsidy System: Operation and Effects on Income
Distribution,” World Development 24, no. 11 (1996): 1778.
2001), 25-26; 115; 167-169; and 171-172. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the
Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 159. Also see P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt:
From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 431-432. Also see Helen
Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Urban Society”, http://
countrystudies.us/egypt/61.htm; in “Employment”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/81.htm; and in “Remittances” http://
9. Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened
to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 28.
281
10. These figures were calculated using the “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)” indicator values for each of the
years in both the specified periods for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Those values were obtained from the World DataBank
website. The World Bank, “World DataBank,” worldbank.org, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
2001), 29; 115; and 136. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002],
2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 159-160. Metz gives an example that “in the early 1980s . . . a free-lance tile-setter
could earn about as much in one week as a government minister could earn in a month.” See Helen Chapin Metz, ed.,
Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Urban Society”, http://countrystudies.us/
egypt/61.htm. Also see Metz, in “Wages”, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/82.htm.
2001), 36; and 135-136. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002],
2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 127; 131; and 159.
2001), 74.
14. Ibid, 23. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed.
(Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 45-46; and 127.
2001), 76-77; and 136.
16. The statements made here about middle class professionals are implicit throughout the narratives of Amin’s two
books, and draw primarily on my deductions from his more explicit statements about those who quickly rose through the
social hierarchy in Egypt during the 70s and 80s. See Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry
282
fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-
1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 75-76. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of
the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 127-128.
2001), 19-20. Amin points out that there is a strong consensus regarding the parasitic nature of the rising social classes
during 70s and 80s in Egypt among prominent Egyptian social scientists. And while Amin himself, who is a renowned and
widely published Egyptian scholar who was contemporary to that specific period of socioeconomic change, does not
challenge that such classes are indeed of that nature, he is more concerned with investigating why they had developed it.
What I’m trying to convey here is that, in most social sciences, more often than not there are contrasting academic biases
on any given issue. The views presented here regarding the rising entrepreneurial class in Egypt during the 70s and 80s are
the most widely accepted in the Egyptian academic circles of social sciences. That is not to say though that these views are
absolute, but rather they are more of a general picture of the societal dynamics during that particular period. As matter
of fact, later in the same book, in the chapter entitled “Government Jobs”, Amin states that since the beginning of the 90s
the reputation of the entrepreneurial class in Egypt, or rather the private sector in general, has gotten considerably better
than it was throughout the 70s and most of the 80s. And that’s not to mention that throughout the book, Amin identifies
earnest, small and medium scale tradesmen and businessmen as a longstanding and integral portion of the Egyptian middle
class that dates back to before any of the socioeconomic changes of the 70s and 80s, or even the 50s and 60s, took place.
It is just that, in terms of relative size, they constituted a miniscule portion of the Egyptian middle class in comparison to
professionals and bureaucrats. That is the primary reason why they are not discussed in the main socioeconomic discourse
of this thesis.
18. Ibid, 72; and 77.
19. The corruption of the bureaucracy is a staple of everyday life in Egypt. The account given here draws upon the
widely known drives behind the prevalence of that corruption, and following sources helped substantiate it: Galal Amin,
Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians?
The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 42-43; and Helen Chapin
Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “The Bureaucracy”, http://
283
20. In the chapter entitled “Culture” in his book ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera [The Age of the Masses], Amin discusses,
at some length, how the types and sources of income of middle class individuals, as well as the time it took them and the
manner in which they came to attain their social status, can make all the difference between the values, the moral qualities,
and the characteristics of one middle class versus the other. He also points out that the zeitgeist of any given society at any
given time is generally of a far better quality when its middle class individuals depend primarily on productive and useful
economic activities for their income and had attained their status after long periods of time that involved hard work and
genuine achievement, as opposed to when its middle class individuals depend primarily on less productive and unethical
economic activities for their income and had attained their status over short periods of time that involved unscrupulous or
unethical practices aimed at accumulating large monetary gains. He essentially argues that the well-being of society as a
whole is closely tied to the moral quality of its middle class, and highlights the important social role and responsibilities of
that stratum. Those concepts, which he deems to be rather obvious constructs, are of the utmost importance in this thesis
as they are the underlying themes throughout its discourse. See Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The
Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 116-118.
21. In the section entitled “Social Mobility and Patterns of Consumption” in the first chapter of his book Maza Hadath
lelMasreyeen? [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians], Amin briefly discusses the phenomenon that I refer to here as social
emulation. However, I had come to identify and formulate my own understanding of that phenomenon before encountering
his mention of it. In that sense, his brief discussion of that phenomenon served to verify what I had already learned about it.
The discourse presented here regarding social emulation is my own and draws on other academic sources. See Galal Amin,
Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to the Egyptians?
The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001), 31-32.
22. Ibid, 23. Also see Galal Amin, ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed.
(Cairo: Dar El Shorouk, 2005), 46.
Shorouk, 2005), 160. Also see Galal Amin, Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-
Dar El Hilal, 2001), 115. Also see P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 431-432. Also see Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study
(Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Remittances” http://countrystudies.us/egypt/100.htm.
284
24. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Egypt: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990), in “Mubarak”,
http://countrystudies.us/egypt/76.htm.
25. I came to learn about the real estate values in Nasr City during that period in my conversations with members of
my family and my neighbors in 11 El-Insha Street. Nahed Fahim, in discussion with the author, February 2010; and Maher
Farag, in discussion with the author, February 2010. The increase rates presented here were calculated using the land prices
relayed to me in those conversations. These inflation figures presented here were calculated using the “Inflation, consumer
prices (annual %)” indicator values for each of the years in the specified periods for the Arab Republic of Egypt. Those values
were obtained from the World DataBank website. The World Bank, “World DataBank,” worldbank.org, http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
26. In my conversation with Maher Farag, my mother’s cousin who is a dentist and a faculty member at alAzhar
University, I came to learn about the various methods of profit-seeking bylaw violation in Nasr City during the late 80s
and early 90s. Dr. Farag became very well versed in the workings of residential construction in the settlement at that time
after his father delegated him with the responsibility for constructing an apartment building–extended family house for
himself and his siblings in Nasr City. According to Dr. Farag, an individual who constructed a residential building that far
exceeded Nasr City’s maximum height bylaws would approach the Nasr City District Administration Authority and report
that height violation. Accordingly, the Authority’s engineer would “estimate” the cost of one square meter of built area of
the building in question, and in turn a fine of double that estimate for every square meter built in violation of the bylaw
would be issued to the building’s owner. However, it was a very common practice for the owner of the building in question
to bribe the engineer in order to lower his “estimate” and considerably bring down the overall sum of the fine. But if the
engineer was unwilling to cooperate, or if the violation was too gross to overlook, and the Authority issued a demolition
order for the storeys in violation of the bylaw or the building as a whole, the owner could still circumvent that order and
keep his building standing since the administrative bodies that issued such orders were separate entities from those who
carried them out. A common practice in that case involved the owner of the building that was to be demolished bribing
the officials in the administrative body vested with carrying out the demolition order to stall acting on it, since, by Egyptian
law, those kinds of orders became void three years after they’ve been issued if they were not carried out within that
time frame. But then again, if that did not work either, the owner of the building in violation still had one last resort to
avoiding the building’s demolition. In that case, the common practice involved the owner of the building quickly selling the
apartments on the higher, bylaw-violating, floors and filling them with occupants before doing so with the lower floors of
the building, since the loopholes in the Egyptian law made it illicit to evict, let alone demolish, bylaw violating structures
285
once they had been occupied. Those practices also came up in my conversations with Nahed Fahim, my neighbor in 11 El-
Insha Street, and with Bassem alBorolossy, an acquaintance of my father, who owns a real estate and construction company.
Maher Farag, in discussion with the author, February 2010; Nahed Fahim, in discussion with the author, February 2010; and
Bassem alBorolossy (engineer, owner, and general manager of Masr alAseela Company for Real Estate Investment, and Fajr
Company for Construction) in discussion with the author, February 2010.
Egyptian Bookshop, 1997), 264-265. The date for amending Nasr City’s building bylaws was obtained from the blueprints
of the First and Seventh Zones’ detailed planning, which were provided by The Nasr City Company for Housing and Urban
Development. On those blueprints the new maximum height values for residential buildings are annotated and dated to
1985. According to the index of legal decrees pertaining to Nasr City, which was compiled by and obtained from Ahmed
AbdelMaqsoud Muhammad, a lawyer in the company, the boundaries of the settlement were extended and more areas
were added to its jurisdictions in 1971, 1982, and again in 1984. The index also lists the approval of the detailed planning of
five new residential zones between 1974 and 1993.
3.1 An Urban Exodus

1. “New Cairo,” New Urban Communities Authority, http://www.newcities.gov.eg/english/New_Communities/Cairo/
default.aspx.
2. Bassem alBorolossy (engineer, owner, and general manager of Masr alAseela Company for Real Estate Investment,
and Fajr Company for Construction) in discussion with the author, February 2010.
3. Those values were obtained from a photocopy of the official bylaw booklet for the villa zones in New Cairo.
4. Bassem alBorolossy (engineer, owner, and general manager of Masr alAseela Company for Real Estate Investment,
and Fajr Company for Construction) in discussion with the author, February 2010.
5. To give an example: Given that the average real estate value in Nasr City’s first zone was about 10,000 Egyptian
pounds in 2010, a middle class family living in an apartment building–extended family house that stands on a 500 square
meter lot in the first zone would get about 5 million pounds for their property. Assuming that said extended family household
286
is made up of the nuclear families of tow siblings, the share of each would be 2.5 million Egyptian pounds. On the other
hand, the real estate value in New Cairo’s highly sought after Fifth Settlement was about 2,250 pounds in 2010. It would
therefore cost either of the siblings of the aforementioned extended family household about 1,575,000 pounds to acquire
a comparable 700 square meter land lot there to construct a villa their own nuclear family and the possible nuclear families
of their children. And given that the cost of construction and finishing of one built square meter in 2010 was about 1,200
pounds, constructing a bylaw abiding 3-storey villa that stands on 50% of the land of the 700 square meter land lot would
amount to 1,260,000 pounds. That is a total cost of 2,835,000 Egyptian pounds for land and construction costs, and that’s
not counting design cost and building permit fees. At best, those hypothetical siblings would have to pay about 300,000
pounds out of pocket if they sold their Nasr City apartment building–extended family house and each used their share of its
price to finance building their separate extended family homes in New Cairo. Not to mention that, in reality, they’d have to
come up with the entire cost for constructing their New Cairo homes before taking any steps towards selling their Nasr City
dwelling, since they’d have no where to stay during the construction of the former. Surely, there are smaller lots to be had in
New Cairo, and cheaper suburban real estate to relocate to. For instance, because it is relatively newer and less developed,
as well as further away from the city than New Cairo, the real estate values in Shorouq City averaged at about 1,100 pounds
per square meter in 2010. However, there are lower real estate values in Nasr City too, and smaller lots as well; and many
situations where there are more than two siblings in any one apartment building–extended family household. In any light,
relocating to suburbs is ultimately a rather cumbersome financial undertaking. (The real estate values and building costs
used here were obtained during my afore mentioned conversation with Bassem alBorolossy)
287
Bibliography
289
Books
Allam, Ahmed Kh., Shedid, Yhya O., and El Mahdi, Maged M. Tagdid alAhya’ [Urban Renewal]. Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian
Bookshop, 1997.
Amin, Galal. Maza Hadath lelMasreyeen? Tatawor alMogtama’ alMasry fi Nesf Qarn, 1945-1995 [Whatever Happened to
the Egyptians? The Evolution of Egyptian Society in Half a Century, 1945-1995], 3rd ed. Cairo: Dar El Hilal, 2001.
Amin, Galal. ‘Asr alGamaheer alGhafeera, 1952-2002 [The Age of the Masses, 1952-2002], 2nd ed. Cairo: Dar El Shorouk,
2005.
Baudrillard, Jean. The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures, 7th ed. Translated by Chris Turner. London: Sage Publications
Ltd, 2008.
Elias, Norbert. “The Kitsch Style and the Age of Kitsch.” In The Norbert Elias Reader: A Biographical Selection, edited by
Johan Goudsblom and Stephen Mennell, 26-35. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998.
Goldschmidt Jr., Arthur. Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
Hopkins, Nicholas S. and Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, eds. Arab Society: Class, Gender, Power, and Development, 3rd ed. Cairo: The
American University in Cairo Press, 1997.
Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. Egypt: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for The Library of Congress, 1990. http://countrystudies.
us/egypt/
Tawfik, Ahmed Khaled. Utopia: Rewaya [Utopia: A Novel]. Cairo: Dar Merit, 2008.
Vatikiotis, P. J. The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991.
290
Periodicals
Ali, Sonia M. and Adams Jr., Richard H. “The Egyptian Food Subsidy System: Operation and Effects on Income Distribution,”
World Development 24, no. 11 (1996): 1777-1791.
Hegab, Salah. “wa Da’eman ‘Amar ya Masr [May Ye Always Be Inhabited O Egypt].” alAhram, Jul. 25, 2005.
Hinnebusch, Raymond A. “Class, State and the Reversal of Egypt’s Agrarian Reform,” Middle East Report 23, no. 184
(September/October 1993). http://www.merip.org/mer/mer184/class-state-reversal-egypts-agrarian-reform.
Maslow, A. H. “A Theory of Human Motivation.” Psychological Review 50 (1943): 370-396.
Theses
Abdelazim, Saleh S. “Structural Adjustment and the Dismantling of Egypt’s Etatist System.” PhD thesis, Virginia Tech, 2005.
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12232002-083424/unrestricted/CHP2.pdf.pdf.
Online Sources
“New Cairo.” New Urban Communities Authority. http://www.newcities.gov.eg/english/New_Communities/Cairo/default.
aspx.
“Sabeqat alKhebra wa alA’mal fi alHayah alFaneyya wa alMehaneyya [Previous Experience and Work in His Artistic and
Professional Careers].” Imhotep alQarn al’Eshreen wa Ra’ed Takhteet alModon al’Alamy: Dr. Eng. Sayyed Karim [A Twentieth
Century Imhotep and World-class City Planning Pioneer: Dr. Eng. Sayyed Karim]. http://www.sayedkarim.com/cv.php.
The World Bank. “World DataBank.” worldbank.org. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx.
291

Elbahrawy Amr PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Elbahrawy Amr PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Elbahrawy Amr PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A House of No Importance

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2015

This thesis tracks the history of 11 El-Insha Street, an apartment

To my mother, Ola Abouzeid, who I know that completing this thesis

1.1 The Egyptian Middle Class [1800s-1960s] 20

1.2 Nasr City [1960s] 28

1.3 The Egyptian Middle Class [1970s-1990s] 47

2.1 Nasr City [1990s] 118

3.1 An Urban Exodus

4.B An Unanswered Wake-up Call 238

8 1.a.1 Entrance to 11 El-Insha Street

10 1.a.2 Mr. Gerges Fahim

12 1.a.4 11 El-Insha Street – Site plan c.1984

14 1.a.5 11 El-Insha Street – Ground and typical floor

15 1.a.6 Ola Abouzeid and Aly elBahrawy

16 1.a.8 The texture and color of 11 El-Insha Street’s

17 1.a.9 11 El-Insha Street – Main facade plans

19 1.1.1 Decree of the President of the United

75 2.a.2 Property allocation in 11 El-Insha Street in

78 2.a.3 El-Insha Street – Site plane; early 90s – mid

80 2.a.4 1 El-Insha Street – Elevation

131 2.1.14** Nasr City First Sub Districts; 1996;

209 4.a.11 http://i.lidovky.cz/11/013/lnorg/ 216 4.a.21 Photo by Antonious Nady

210 4.a.10 http://i.lidovky.cz/11/013/lnorg/ 220 4.a.25 http://justimage.org/blog/2011/01/30/

Arab Republic of Egypt. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and

263 4.b.22 First Zone: 2014: Residential Building

“In the beginnings of the 21st Century, the last statistical

(Tawfik 2008, 137)

fig.1.a.2 [left] Mr. Gerges Fahim.

fig.1.a.3 [right] Dr. Abd-alAziz Abouzeid.

Mr. Fahim’s Dr. Abouzeid’s

Ground Floor Setback

Building’s Central Axis

fig.1.a.5 Ground [opposite page] and typical floor plans of 11

fig.1.a.7 [left] Ahmed Abouzeid and

fig.1.a.6 [right] Ola Abouzied and

≈10% Middle Class c.1940

fig.1.1.3 The stratification of the

Nasr City | Original Master Plan 33

Private Residential Properties – to be developed by the public

Miscellaneous Mid-sized Projects

Nasr City Boundaries

Masr Al-Gadeeda District

Sand/Gravel Plains – Venue for future extensions of Nasr City

Youssef Abbas Street

Nasr City | Sixth Zone | Detailed Urban Design ‘66

Abbas El-Akkad Street Property of the Institution of

fig.1.2.8 Street sections showing the relation between the maximum

Nasr City | Planning c.1970

Public Service Infrastructure

fig.1.2.12 Rab’a Al-Adawiya Complex in 1968 [northwest

fig.1.2.14 The condominiums on Youssef Abbas street in 1969;

fig.1.3.2 The stratification of the Egyptian

sexual intimacy, family,

security of: body, employment,

breathing, food, water, sex, sleep, excretion

self – others’ respect

security of: body, employment,

breathing, food, water, sex, sleep, excretion